

MAPS OF THE PROFOUND



Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality



JEFFREY HOPKINS



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Preface

Depending on lamas who gave inspiration,
Showed the art of scholarship, repeated details,
Refined contrasts, and illuminated the essence,
I will array the twelve and four approaches.
Listen and you shall hear the roar of reality.

Near the end of 1962 I opened the door of a typical American pink ranch house in the flatlands of New Jersey to be stunned by a Tibetan-Mongolian temple—brightly colored paintings mounted on brocade, a huge case of books, a large Buddha with golden countenance, hangings from the ceiling. Never again would I think I know what is going on inside American houses.

This was the Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America, "lamaist" being a way to indicate that the monastery was both Tibetan and Mongolian. It was founded in 1958 by Geshe Ngawang Wangyal, originally from Astrakhan in Kalmyk Mongolia where the Volga River empties into the Caspian Sea (in Europe), who traveled to Hla-s̄a at age twenty-one to join the Gomang College of Dre-b̄ung Monastic University, which uses the textbooks of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a. After a few visits, I moved to the monastery in April of 1963 and stayed for five years. Even during the first several months, occasionally Geshe Wangyal would translate portions of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* to Bob Thurman, Chris George, and myself, sitting on the floor before him. Geshe Wangyal, sitting cross-legged on his bed, held the text in front of him like a fascinating source of jewelled insights.

A few years later, I began studying with another scholar at the monastery—Geshe Lhundup Sopa of the Jay College of S̄e-ra Monastic University—a short text written by Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's reincarnation, Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets.*[a] Geshe Sopa, who graduated first among the first rank emerging as his year's national hero, embodies what being a well-versed Tibetan scholar requires—the ability to think, react, and create within many different systems.

In the summer of 1968, I returned to studying Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* with Kensur Ngawang Lekden, abbot emeritus of the Tantric College of Lower Hla-s̄a and ge-s̄hay in the Go-mang College

[a] See Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Cutting through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1990).

of Dre-b̄ung Monastic University. In New Jersey and later in Wisconsin, while I was in graduate school, we covered all but the Autonomy School of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's massive *Great Exposition of Tenets* and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's equally massive *Annotations* (the chapter on the Consequence School twice), along with all but twenty-five folios of another of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's massive works, the *Great Exposition of the Middle.* Through patient repetition, he inculcated in me basic perspectives that made it possible to find the way through the tangle of tenets.

One of his students, Geshe Gedün Lodrö also of the Go-mang College, visited us in Wisconsin, and I made arrangements to study with him for three months at the University of Hamburg on my way to India on a dissertation Fulbright in 1971. Asking question after question to this scholar whom the Dalai Lama selected—after testing—as the best among the ge-s̄hays who had escaped to India, I was drawn into the acuity, often novel but always inviting, with which he probed issues.

Arriving in India in the early months of 1972, I quickly made my way to Dharmsala, where I took many complex issues about tenets to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. His ability to see the woods from the trees—to bring to bear on an issue the approaches of many different systems, rather than letting the systems themselves become the issue—has been and is very appealing. The focus becomes the truth.

During that period in India, the N̄ying-ma Lama Khetsun Sangpo taught me L̄ong-chen-b̄a's presentation of the tenets of the nine vehicles in his *Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle* and later, in Virginia, his *Treasury of Tenets.* He had a photocopy of the S̄a-ḡya scholar D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets,"* which I avidly read, since Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a goes to great lengths in his *Great Exposition of Tenets* to refute it.

Back in the States in 1973, I took a position at the University of Virginia where I invited several lamas over three decades:

Lati Rinpoche, abbot emeritus of and ge-s̄hay in the S̄har-d̄zay College of Gan-den

Denma Lochö Rinpoche, abbot emeritus of the N̄am-gyel College and ge-s̄hay in the L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing College of Dre-b̄ung

Kensur Jampel Shenpen, Throne-Holder of Gan-den (head of the Ge-luk-b̄a order), abbot emeritus of the Tantric College of Lower Hla-s̄a, and ge-s̄hay in the Jang-d̄zay College of Gan-den

Kensur Yeshi Thupten, abbot emeritus of and ge-s̄hay in the L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing College of Dre-b̄ung

Geshe Thupten Gyatso of the Go-mang College of Dre-b̄ung

Geshe Palden Drakpa of the L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing College of Dre-b̄ung
Geshe Yeshi Thabkhe of the L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing College of Dre-b̄ung
Geshe Könchok Tsering of the S̄har-d̄zay College of Gan-den
Khenpo Tsultrim Dargyay Rinpoche of Lung-ḡya Monastery in Ga-day, Go-lok in Am-do Province, Tibet.

They contributed greatly, directly and indirectly, to my project of translating and analyzing the work that is considered to be the mother of all presentations of schools of tenets in the Ge-luk-b̄a order, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence*. And lately, two Jo-nang-b̄a scholars—Lodrö Gyeltsen of S̄ay Monastery in Am-do Province, Tibet, presently residing in Taiwan, and Khenpo Tsultrim Dargyay Rinpoche of Lung-ḡya[a] Monastery in Ga-day, Go-lok[b] in Am-do Province, Tibet—have opened crucial avenues for approaching the monumental treatise on the Great Middle Way by Döl-b̄o-b̄a S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen, against whom D̄zong-ka-b̄a was chiefly arguing in *The Essence of Eloquence*.

In Tibet, I was aided by the Inner Mongolian scholar, Gen Losang Tenzin of the Go-mang College of Dre-b̄ung Monastic University, whose delight in challenging Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's own positions on the three wheels of doctrine showed how a partisan tradition is maintained with non-partisan analysis. In India, the teachings of Ge-s̄hay L̄o-sang-gya-tso of the L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing College of Dre-b̄ung Monastic University on the two truths in classes at the School of Dialectics in Dharmsala opened the way for appreciating conundrums in the debating courtyard.

In these ways, I have been shown D̄zong-ka-b̄a's presentations of tenets and subsequent interpretations of them over six centuries of intense Ge-luk-b̄a scholarship, as well as perspectives on two very different highly influential thirteenth-century Tibetan polymaths, L̄ong-chen-b̄a and S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen, along with the fifteenth-century criticism by D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen. Without this background, I would never have even considered constructing this journey through Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets*.

The work of my Ph.D. students in all four orders of Tibetan Buddhism has also been very helpful. Specifically, in this book I have made use of:

John B. Buescher's thesis, *The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths in the Vaibhāṣika and Theravāda Schools,* for the Great Exposition School
Anne C. Klein's thesis, *Mind and Liberation: The Sautrāntika tenet system in Tibet—perception, naming, positive and negative phenomena, imperma-*

[a] *lung skya.*
[b] *dga' bde 'go log.*

nence and the two truths in the context of Buddhist religious insight as presented in Ge-luk literary and oral traditions,[a] for the Sūtra School Following Reasoning

Daniel E. Perdue's thesis, *Practice and theory of philosophical debate in Tibetan Buddhist education,*[b] for terminology and definitions in the Great Exposition School and Sūtra School

Georges Dreyfus' thesis, *Ontology, philosophy of language and epistemology in Buddhist tradition: a study of Dharmakīrti's philosophy in the light of its reception in the later Indo-Tibetan tradition,*[c] for logic and epistemology in the Sūtra School Following Reasoning and the Mind-Only School

Joe B. Wilson's thesis, *The Meaning of mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy of mind-only (cittamātra) : a study of a presentation by the Tibetan scholar Gung-tang Jam-ȳay-ȳang (Gung-thang-'Jam-pa'i-dbyangs) of Asaṅga's theory of mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna) and related topics in Buddhist theories of personal continuity, epistemology, and hermeneutics,* for the Mind-Only School

John C. Powers' thesis, *The Concept of the ultimate (don dam pa, paramārtha) in the Saṃdhinirmocana-Sūtra,*[d] for the Mind-Only School

Donald S. Lopez's thesis, *The Svātantrika-Mādhyamika School of Mahāyāna Buddhism,*[e] for the Autonomy School

Elizabeth S. Napper's thesis,[f] *Dependent-arising and emptiness: a Tibetan Buddhist interpretation of Mādhyamika philosophy emphasizing the compatibility of emptiness and conventional phenomena,*[g] for the Consequence School

Guy M. Newland's thesis, *The Two truths: a study of Mādhyamika philosophy as presented in the Monastic textbooks of the Ge-luk-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism,*[h] for the Consequence School

Daniel G. Cozort's thesis, *Unique tenets of the Middle Way Consequence*

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[a] See Anne C. Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation: A Buddhist Epistemological Analysis in Support of Transformative Religious Experience: Tibetan Interpretations of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986); and *Knowing, Naming, and Negation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1988).

[b] See Daniel E. Perdue, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1992).

[c] See Georges B. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY, 1997).

[d] See John C. Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha: Saṁdhinirmocana Sūtra* (Berkeley: Dharma, 1995).

[e] See Donald S. Lopez Jr., *A Study of Svātantrika* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986).

[f] Her thesis director was Professor Paul Groner.

[g] See Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1989).

[h] See Guy Newland, *The Two Truths* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1992).

School: the systematization of the philosophy of the Indian Buddhist Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika School by the Tibetan Ge-luk-ba scholastic tradition,[a] for the Consequence School

William A. Magee's thesis, *Tradition and innovation in the Consequence School: nature (rang bzhin, svabhāva / prakṛti) in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism,*[b] for the Consequence School

Jules B. Levinson's thesis, *The Metaphors of liberation: a study of grounds and paths according to the Middle Way Schools,* for the Autonomy and Consequence Schools

Katherine Rogers' thesis, *A Tibetan manual of logic: an introduction to reasoning in the Ge-luk-ba monastic educational system,* for reasoning in all four schools

Leah J. Zahler's thesis, *The Concentrations and formless absorptions in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Ge-luk Tibetan interpretations,* for all four schools

Derek Frank Maher's thesis, *Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Monastic Buddhism: A Biographical Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Jamyang Shayba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) in his Historical Context.*

In addition, my own thesis *Meditation on Emptiness,*[c] stands as the foundation for the current book and is its companion volume.

Also, forays into Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* with then graduate students were very beneficial:

Anne C. Klein's rough translation of sections from the chapter on the Sūtra School

Donald S. Lopez's rough translation of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's own statements in the chapter on divisions of the Autonomy School (without the source quotes)

Steven Brian Daley's translation of the entire section on the fruits of practice in the chapter on the Consequence School, along with Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations*

Derek Frank Maher's translation of the material on valid cognition in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle.*

Interaction during one-to-one readings with my graduate students has increased my exposure to these materials exponentially.[d]

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[a] See Daniel Cozort, *Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998).

[b] See William Magee, *The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1999).

[c] (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom, 1996).

[d] In 1981 my Tibetan class translated most of L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok's (*blo bzang dkon mchog,*

I also want to express my gratitude to Fulbright-Hays for three fellowships and the American Institute of Indian Studies for two fellowships that opened the way for crucial study abroad. Many thanks to Kevin Vose for reading the entire manuscript and making many helpful suggestions.

The many factors involved in the production of this book illustrate Buddha's focal teaching of dependent-arising. We own nothing; it is only borrowed.

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born 1803) *Word Commentary on (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Root Text of Tenets": Clear Crystal Mirror,* which has now been re-translated, introduced, and annotated by Daniel Cozort and Craig Preston as *Buddhist Philosophy: Losang Gonchok's Short Commentary to Jamyang Shayba's Root Text on Tenets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 2003).

Technical Notes

It is important to recognize that:

- footnotes are marked "a, b, c…"; backnotes are marked "1, 2, 3…." References to texts are mostly given in the backnotes, whereas other information, more pertinent to the reading of the material at hand, is given in the footnotes.
- references to my forthcoming *Absorption in No External World,* which is arranged by way of issues in numbered sequence, are by issue number;
- full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes and backnotes at first citation;
- for translations and editions of texts, see the Bibliography;
- citations of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* often include references to the edited Tibetan text and French translation of it in consultation with the Chinese by Étienne Lamotte in *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra: L'Explication des mystères* (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935) and to the English translation from the *stog* Palace edition of the Tibetan by John C. Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha: Saṁdhinirmocana Sūtra* (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995). There is also a translation from the Chinese by Thomas Cleary in *Buddhist Yoga: A Comprehensive Course* (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), in which the references are easily found, as long as chapter 7 of Lamotte and Powers is equated with chapter 5 of Cleary as per the Chinese edition that he used (see my *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism,* Appendix 2, p. 457ff.);
- I have translated the term *drang don* (*neyārtha*) sometimes as "interpretable meaning" and other times as "requiring interpretation," or a variant thereof. There is no significance to the multiple translations other than variety and clarity;
- the names of Indian Buddhist schools of thought are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists;
- for the names of Indian scholars and systems used in the body of the text, *ch, sh,* and *ṣh* are used instead of the more usual *c, ś,* and *ṣ* for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, *cch* is used for *cch,* not *chchh.* In the notes the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used;

- transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 22 (1959):261-267; and
- the names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in "essay phonetics" for the sake of easy pronunciation; for a discussion of the system used, see the technical note at the beginning of my *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom, 1996), 19-22. The system is used consistently, with the result that a few well-known names are rendered in a different way: for example, "Lhasa" is rendered as "Hla-sa," since the letter "h" is pronounced before the letter "l."

BACKGROUND

1. Presentations of Tenets

The Transformative Aim

The Tibetan cultural region[1] stretches beyond the borders of Tibet through a vast area ranging from Kalmyk Mongolian lands near the Volga River in Europe where the Volga empties into the Caspian Sea, through Outer and Inner Mongolia, the Buriat Republic of Siberia, and through Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh, and parts of Nepal. In this vast area, schools of non-Buddhist and Buddhist Indian philosophy are systematized in texts called "presentations of tenets."[a] Focal topics and issues are presented in order to stimulate inquiry and to encourage development of an inner faculty capable of investigating appearances so as to penetrate their reality. In this context philosophy is, for the most part, related to liberative concerns—the attempt to extricate oneself and others from a round of painful existence and to attain freedom and full development.

The basic perspective is that afflictive emotions—such as desire, hatred, enmity, jealousy, and belligerence—bind beings in a round of uncontrolled birth, aging, sickness, and death and are founded on misperception of the nature of persons and other phenomena. When a practitioner penetrates reality and this insight is teamed with a powerful consciousness of concentrated meditation, the underpinnings of the process of cyclic existence can be destroyed, resulting in liberation. Also, when wisdom is further empowered through the development of love, compassion, and altruism—and the corresponding actions of generosity, ethics, and tolerant patience—the wisdom consciousness is capable of achieving an all-knowing state in which one can effectively help a vast number of beings.

Because of this basic perspective—namely, that false ideation traps beings in a round of suffering—reasoned investigation into the nature of persons and other phenomena is central to the process of spiritual development (though it is not the only concern). Schools of tenets primarily are studied not to refute other systems but to develop an internal force that can counteract one's own *innate* adherence to misapprehensions. These innate forms of ignorance are part and parcel of ordinary life. They are not just learned from other systems, nor do they just arise from faulty analysis.

The stated aim of studying the different schools is to gain insight into the fact that many of the perspectives basic to ordinary life are devoid of

[a] *grub mtha'i rnam bzhag, *siddhāntavyavasthāpana.*

valid foundation. This realization leads practitioners to replace invalid assent to deceptive appearance with well-founded perspectives. The process is achieved through (1) first engaging in *hearing* great texts on such topics and getting straight the verbal presentation, (2) then *thinking* on their meaning to the point where the topics are ascertained with valid cognition, and (3) finally *meditating* on the same to the point where these realizations become enhanced by the power of concentration such that they can counteract innate tendencies to assent to false appearances.

Since it is no easy matter to penetrate the thick veil of false facades and misconceptions, it became popular in the more scholastic circles of India to investigate not just what the current tradition considered to be the best and final system but also the so-called lower systems. Systematic study provided a gradual approach to subtle topics so as to avoid confusion with less subtle ones. In Tibet, because of the need to get a handle on the plethora of Buddhist systems inherited from India, presentations of tenets comparing the views of the different schools of thought assumed considerable importance. That the primary concern is indeed with developing the capacity to appreciate the profound view of a high system of philosophy is evidenced by the amount of time actually spent by students probing the workings of the so-called lower schools. Since the stances of those schools are appreciated, they are studied in considerable detail.

A presentation of tenets functions primarily to provide a comprehensive worldview. Its descriptions, ranging from the phenomena of the world through to and including the types of enlightenment, give students a framework for study and practice as well as a perspective for relating with other beings. The hierarchical presentation, fortified with reasoned explanation, itself inculcates the basic posture that the power of reason can penetrate the false veils of appearance and lead to meditative perception of a liberative reality. Presentations of tenets are founded on confidence in the mind's ability to overcome tremendous obstacles to the point where love, compassion, and altruism can be expressed in effective, continuous activity, and, therefore, they do more than just structure Indian Buddhist systems; they structure practitioners' perception of their place in a dynamic worldview.

The perspective is that individuals are bound by misconception in a round of suffering and mired in afflictive emotions counterproductive to their own welfare, but also poised on a threshold of transformation. The uncontrolled course of cyclic existence lacks a solid underpinning; it is ready to be transformed into a patterned advance toward liberation. The starkness of the harrowing appraisal of the current situation of multi-layered pain stands in marked contrast to the optimistic view of the libera-

tive development that is possible. Such optimism stems from conviction that the afflictive emotions and obstructions, the causes of misery and finite intelligence, are not endemic to the mind but are peripheral to its nature and thus subject to antidotal influences that can remove them.

This vision serves as a powerful force orienting and ordering lives. It stimulates the metaphysical imagination, beckoning, pushing against, and resonating with inner potentials such that persons are drawn into the transformative process. I have found that it is helpful to apprehend it with a playful attitude—allowing exploration of this grand perspective without the pressure of commitment, letting horizons open on their own.

The Genre of Presentations of Tenets

The main Indian precursors of these systemizations are texts such as the *Blaze of Reasoning*[2] by Bhāvaviveka (500-570? C.E.)[3] and the *Compendium of Principles*[4] by the eighth-century scholar Shāntarakṣhita, with a commentary by his student Kamalashīla. Both Shāntarakṣhita and Kamalashīla visited Tibet in the late eighth century and strongly influenced the direction that Buddhism took there.

In Tibet, the presentations assumed a more developed structure.[a] Some of these texts are long; for instance, a lengthy text entitled *Treasury of Tenets: Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles*[5] was written by the fourteenth-century scholar L̄ong-chen-rap-jam[b] of the N̄ying-ma order of Tibetan Buddhism. It appears that D̄zong-ka-b̄a's[c] *The Essence of Eloquence,*[d] which is the mother of presentations of tenets in the Ge-luk-b̄a order, was written in reaction to presentations like those of L̄ong-chen-b̄a.[e]

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[a] For more discussion on this genre of Tibetan literature, see Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982), 1-12; and David Seyfort Ruegg's foreword to Geshé Ngawang Nyima, *Introduction to the Doctrines of the Four Schools of Buddhist Philosophy* (Leiden, 1970).

[b] *klong chen rab 'byams / klong chen dri med 'od zer,* 1308-1363.

[c] *tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa,* 1357-1419.

[d] *drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po;* Peking 6142, vol. 153. My annotated translation of the General Explanation and the Section on the Mind-Only School is to be found in *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). For a translation of the complete text, see Robert A. F. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). A Chinese translation was completed in Hla-s̄a on the day commemorating Buddha's enlightenment in 1916 by Venerable Fa Zun, "Bian Liao Yi Bu Liao Yi Shuo Cang Lun," in *Xi Zang Fo Jiao Jiao Yi Lun Ji* (Taipei: Da Sheng Wen Hua Chu Ban She, 1979), vol. 2, 159-276.

[e] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's main opponent is the fourteenth-century scholar-yogi S̄hay-rap-gyel-

Again, in reaction to Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's writing, the fifteenth-century scholar Ḏak-tsang Ṡhay-rap-rin-chen[a] of the Ṡa-ḡya order wrote a long text titled the *Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence,*[6] detailing what he considered to be Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's contradictions. Ḏak-tsang's text in turn gave rise to the most extensive text of this type in Tibet. In part to refute Ḏak-tsang's account of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's contradictions, Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa (1648-1721) composed the *Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings,* also known as the *Great Exposition of Tenets.*[7] The word "tenets" in the title refers to the root text; his commentary on it is like the light of the lang of Samantabhadra, which is not lit by a sun that rises and sets but shines continuously through the power of meditative stabilization. This book of tenets fulfils the hopes of all beings seeking the ability to gain the wanted and avoid the unwanted, since it explains what the wanted and the unwanted are and how to achieve and avoid them. Through delineating the profound meanings of emptiness, it shows the path to liberation from cyclic existence and the eventual attainment of omniscience.

The *Great Exposition of Tenets* is replete with citations of Indian sources but is written, despite its length, in a laconic style (unusual for him) that sometimes can leave one wondering about the relevance of citations. Even more so, Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's root text (which is translated in this book), written ten years earlier in nine-syllable poetry, often is more befuddling. However, once it is unpacked, it serves as an easy technique to memorize stances of tenet systems.

Perhaps this inaccessibility was partly why the eighteenth-century Tibetanized Mongolian scholar J̄ang-ḡya Röl-ḇay-dor-jay[b]—whom Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa, then an old man,[c] helped to find as the reincarnation of the last J̄ang-ḡya—composed a more issue-oriented text of the same genre entitled *Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching.*[8] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's own reincarnation,

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tsen; see Part 4 of Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

[a] *stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen,* born 1405.

[b] *lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje,* 1717-1786. A Tibetanized Mongolian born in what is presently the Am-do Province of Tibet, currently the Qinghai Province of China, he is also known as the Second J̄ang-ḡya Hu-tok-tu (*hu thog thu*), using the Mongolian for *sprul sku.*

[c] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa himself had been tutored by the previous J̄ang-ḡya, Nga-w̄ang-l̄o-sang-chö-den.

Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o,[a] became J̄ang-ḡya's main pupil and in 1733 wrote an abbreviated version of these texts, entitled *Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland.*[b] Many authors chose to write concise texts so that the general outlines and basic postures of schools could be taught and memorized without the encumbrance of a great deal of elaboration, though sometimes the brevity itself makes the issues being discussed inaccessible.

A medium-length presentation of tenets that also treats the other schools of Tibetan Buddhism but in a biased fashion was written by J̄ang-ḡya's biographer and student, who was also a student of Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o, Tu-ḡen L̄o-sang-chö-ḡyi-nyi-ma.[c] His text is called *Mirror of Eloquence Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Schools of Tenets.*[9] The final major development was a text unraveling the difficult points of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's huge but terse *Great Exposition of Tenets,* written by the Kalkha Mongolian scholar Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den.[d] As long as Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's commentary itself, his *Annotations for (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Tenets": Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought*[e] elaborates key points, making the *Great Exposition of Tenets* clear and accessible.

The number, length, and quality of these texts testify to this genre's having captured the attention of several important authors as a means to stimulate the metaphysical imagination and thereby to penetrate the veil of false appearances.

ABOUT JAM-YANG-SHAY-BA'S *GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS*

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text of Tenets: Lion's Roar,*[f] published in 1689, is

[a] *dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po*, 1728-1791.

[b] *grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba.* In this sub-genre of brief Presentations of Tenets are earlier texts such as the *Presentation of Tenets* by Jay-d̄zün Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen (1469-1546), the *Ship for Entering the Ocean of Tenets* by the Second Dalai Lama (1476-1542), the *Presentation of Tenets, Sublime Tree Inspiring Those of Clear Mind, Hammer Destroying the Stone Mountains of Opponents* by Paṇ-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a (1478-1554), and the *Condensed Essence of All Tenets* by J̄o-nay-b̄a Drak-b̄a-shay-drup (*co ne ba grags pa bshad sgrub,* 1675-1748). For a list of other such brief texts, see the bibliography (XLVI, and so forth) and introduction (5-12) in Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'.*

[c] *thu'u bkvan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma,* 1737-1802.

[d] *ngag dbang dpal ldan,* b. 1797; also known as B̄el-den-chö-jay (*dpal ldan chos rje*).

[e] *grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor.*

[f] There are two editions of the *Root Text* in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Collected Works, the second also containing interlinear annotations; it is attributed to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a but on a

written in unusually terse, sometimes opaque nine-syllable lines, largely devoid of customary grammatical endings and particles.[a] (An oral tradition reports that the stylistic oddness of his root text is due to Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's composing it in a inspired state hearing the sounds of a lute-like instrument played by the goddess Svarasvatī.) His prose autocommentary, finished ten years later in 1699, cites the entire root text section by section, and includes most but not all of the words of the root text scattered within the commentary. Monumental in length, the *Great Exposition of Tenets* expands greatly on the root text through citing sources, unraveling issues, and suggesting other issues. Yet, despite its length, it is often cryptic in its references and meaning (atypical for Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a whose style is usually clear); it is also laden with copy-editing problems.

Seeing the tremendous value of *Great Exposition of Tenets,* the Kalkha Mongolian scholar Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den sought to make it more accessible through lengthening, explaining, and identifying source materials and through expanding on issues. He also raises qualms about the relevance of certain source quotes and frequently corrects misprints, faulty citations, and other copy-editing problems in the Central Tibet edition,[b] though he forswears trying to list of what requires copy-editing.[c] His attention to detail manifests the great value he put on the text, bringing tremendous clarity to what otherwise is an abstruse work. His annotations are a necessary key for

few occasions contains material contrary to his commentary in the *Great Exposition of Tenets,* and, therefore, may have been authored by a student.

[a] D̄ak-tsang's root text, on the other hand, contains sufficient grammatical endings and particles to be readily understood. His autocommentary, however, is sometimes difficult to follow because he uses the root text within explanatory sentences but cites it only by a syllable or two and "and so forth" (*sogs*); the difficulty is that the words of the root text are integral parts of the commentary, which, therefore, can be understood only by the reader's supplying the remaining words of that phrase, line, or lines of the root text. In translation, I have supplied the missing words so as to make it accessible.

[b] Some of his corrections indicate that he did not have the D̄ra-s̄hi-kyil edition at his disposal.

[c] He says (*stod, ha,* 179.2):

> Since, in general, I have not tried to write down the very many mistakes in wording (*yig nor*) here in Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* I have mostly neglected them.

and (*dngos, tha,* 215.5):

> Although in general there are very many tiny mistakes in wording in all of the omniscient Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's textbook literature on philosophy and in particular in the *Great Exposition of Tenets,* such as the genitive case where the instrumental case should be and the instrumental case where the genitive case should be, I have not tried here to write [all of] them down, and hence have mostly neglected them.

Great Exposition of Tenets through providing rigorous contextualization and non-partisan critique.

When Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den, evincing independence and intellectual honesty, disagrees with Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, he usually presents a carefully framed argument, sometimes in great detail (see his opinion on the meaning of "mine," 869ff.). Still, he adopts a humble attitude; for instance, after thoroughly challenging the relevance of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation of a passage, he says:[10]

> These are stated in the manner of raising qualms for those of new awareness. The fact that there is no chance to debate with the explanations by the omniscient patriarch Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a-dor-jay should be known everywhere throughout [my annotations].

With this type of format, or mask, Tibetan and Mongolian authors critically examine the works of esteemed predecessors. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, for instance, uses similar formats when he examines, and improves upon, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's works.

I have primarily woven together passages from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* to form an accessible, detailed commentary on Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's brilliant breadth and depth—eschewing simplistic reductions—and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's clarity provide a magnificent vision of manifold world-views in the Tibetan cultural region.

Format of the Text

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* is in thirteen chapters, starting with a description of tenets in general, then passing to non-Buddhist schools, and finally to Buddhist schools. He treats twelve renowned non-Buddhist schools somewhat briefly over six chapters and then focuses on the four Buddhist schools and their main sub-schools, with an additional short chapter on Mantra, also called Tantra. In the order of their presentation (the list of Buddhist schools represents an ascent in order of estimation), these are:

Non-Buddhist Schools

1 Lokāyata[a] (Hedonists)
2 Sāṃkhya[b] (Enumerators) and Kāpila[c] (Followers of Kapila)

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[a] *rgyang 'phan pa.*
[b] *grangs can pa.*
[c] *ser skya pa.*

3-6 Brahmaṇa[a] (Followers of Brahmā), Vaiyākaraṇa[b] (Grammarians), Vedānta[c] (Proponents of the Finality of the Vedas), and Guhyaka[d] (Secretists)
7-8 Vaiṣhṇava[e] (Followers of Viṣhṇu) and Mīmāṃsā[f] (Analyzers or Ritualists)
9-11 Shaiva (Followers of Shiva), Vaisheṣhika[g] (Particularists), and Naiyāyika[h] (Logicians)
12 Nirgrantha[i] (The Unclothed), also known as Jaina[j] (Followers of Jina)

Buddhist Schools

Lesser Vehicle (*hīnayāna*)[k]

1. Great Exposition School[l]
   Eighteen sub-schools

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[a] *tshang pa ba.*
[b] *brda sprod pa.*
[c] *rig byed mtha' pa.*
[d] *gsang ba pa.*
[e] *khyab 'jug pa.*
[f] *dpyod pa ba.*
[g] *bye brag pa.*
[h] *rig pa can pa.*
[i] *gcer bu pa.*
[j] *rgyal ba pa.*
[k] The term "Lesser Vehicle" (*theg dman, hīnayāna*) has its origin in the writings of Great Vehicle (*theg chen, mahāyāna*) authors and was, of course, not used by those to whom it was ascribed. Substitutes such as "non-Great Vehicle," "Nikāya Buddhism," and "Theravādayāna" have been suggested in order to avoid the pejorative sense of "Lesser." However, "Lesser Vehicle" is a convenient term in this particular context for a type of tenet system or practice that is seen, in the tradition analyzed in this book, to be surpassed—but not negated—by a higher system. The "Lesser Vehicle" is not despised, most of it being incorporated into the "Great Vehicle." The monks' and nuns' vows are Lesser Vehicle, as is much of the course of study in Ge-luk-ba monastic universities—years of study are put into the topics of Epistemology (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*), Manifest Knowledge (*chos mngon pa, abhidharma*), and Discipline (*'dul ba, vinaya*), all of which are mostly Lesser Vehicle in perspective. ("Lesser Vehicle" and "Low Vehicle" are used interchangeably in this book.)
[l] *bye brag smra ba, vaibhāṣika.* I feel that it is important gradually to get beyond the use of Sanskrit terms whenever possible in order to lift Buddhist studies out of the arcane. There is no need to translate persons' names, except perhaps in texts such as certain sutras where some names have great meaning, but the translation of technical terminology can be very helpful. With respect to this, I stand directly opposed to the style of the great French Buddhologist, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, though I do not criticize him for not trying to do what I am. Scholars have different tastes and perceive different needs, and the field is wide enough to accommodate many different approaches. I disagree entirely with those who call for only one style of translation.

2. Sūtra School[a]
    Sūtra School Following Scripture[b]
    Sūtra School Following Reasoning[c]

Great Vehicle (*mahāyāna*)

3. Mind-Only School[d]
    Mind-Only School Following Scripture
    Mind-Only School Following Reasoning
4. Middle Way School[e]
    Middle Way Autonomy School[f]
    Middle Way Consequence School[g]

The Great Exposition School is a collection of at least eighteen schools that never recognized themselves as belonging to a single, over-arching school except as being Buddhist, and their tenets are so various (some prefiguring Great Vehicle schools) that it is difficult to recognize tenets common to all eighteen. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a gives representative tenets found among these eighteen schools as explained in the root text of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge*.[11] Strictly, even the name "Great Exposition School" might be limited to followers of the *Mahāvibhāṣhā* (*Great Exposition*), a text of Manifest Knowledge[h] by Vasumitra (translated into Tibetan from Chinese only in 1949 by Fa Zun). The amalgamation of many schools into one is a technique used to avoid unnecessary complexity that might hinder the main purpose of this genre of exegesis—the presentation of an ascent to the systems considered to be higher. Nevertheless, in the *Great Exposition of Tenets* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a presents a great variety of different views to show the range of perspectives and ambiguities absent from short presentations.

Also, the division of the Sūtra School into those Following Scripture and those Following Reasoning is highly controversial as it is found only in Ge-luk-b̄a scholarship.[12] The former are said to follow Vasubandhu's own commentary on his *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* in which he indicates disagreement with many assertions of the Great Exposition School as presented in his own root text. The latter—the Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning—are followers of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who (despite the

a *mdo sde pa, sautrāntika.*
b *lung gi rjes 'brangs, *āgamānusārin.*
c *rigs pa'i rjes 'brangs, *nyāyānusārin.*
d *sems tsam pa, cittamātra.*
e *dbu ma pa, mādhyamika.*
f *rang rgyud pa, svātantrika.*
g *thal 'gyur pa, prāsaṅgika.*
h *chos mngon pa, abhidharma.*

fact that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti themselves do not assert external objects) assert external objects—objects that are different entities from the consciousnesses perceiving them. Again, neither of these groups saw themselves as sub-divisions of a larger school called the Sūtra School. However, this does not militate against a grouping convenient to exposition. The burden then becomes to show that they demonstrate a commonality worthy of being called a single school or sub-school.

Similarly, the two sub-divisions of the Mind-Only School are those Following Scripture, who depend on the writings primarily of Asaṅga and his half-brother Vasubandhu (after the latter converted to Asaṅga's system), and those Following Reasoning, who depend on what is accepted to be the main system of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's writings. Dignāga is reputed to be a student of Vasubandhu, and Dharmakīrti, though not a direct student of Dignāga, sought to explicate Dignāga's works; yet whether Dignāga or Dharmakīrti cite Asaṅga or Vasubandhu as sources remains to be seen.

In addition, the names of the two sub-divisions of the Middle Way School—the Autonomy School and the Consequence School—were, as is clearly admitted by Dzong-ka-ba and his followers, never used in India. Rather, these names were coined in Tibet in accordance with the (infrequent) mention of autonomous syllogisms in the works of Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti's extensive criticism of them.[a]

Thus, the very format of the four schools and their sub-divisions often

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[a] For a discussion of the Tibetan origins of the names of the sub-divisions of the Middle Way School, see:

- Katsumi Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982).
- Katsumi Mimaki, "The *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, and the Mādhyamika Classification in Tibetan *grub mtha'* Literature," in *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy,* ed. Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, 1983), 161-167.
- Peter della Santina, *Madhyamaka Schools in India* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986).
- Jeffrey Hopkins, "A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School: Dzong-ka-ba's Two Interpretations of the *Locus Classicus* in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* Showing Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Commonly Appearing Subjects and Inherent Existence," *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989):10-43, although the printing contains egregious typographical errors.
- Kodo Yotsuya, *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet,* Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 8 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999).
- Tom J.F. Tillemans, "Tsong kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti Debate" in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2 (Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992), 315-326.

does not represent a historical account of self-asserted identities but is the result of centuries of classification of systems in India and Tibet based on certain shared assertions and teacher-student connections, all within the dictum that there are only four Buddhist schools of tenets. The purpose of the schematization is to give the emerging scholar-practitioner a handle on the vast scope of positions found in Indian Buddhism.

In Tibet and the Mongolias, students are first taught this fourfold classification, often without mention of the diversity of opinion that it conceals. Then, over decades of study, they gradually recognize through the study of such texts as Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* that the structure of such presentations is a technique for gaining access to a vast store of opinion through focusing on topics crucial to certain Indian authors. The task of distinguishing between what is clearly said in the Indian texts and what is interpolation over centuries of commentary becomes a fascinating enterprise for the more hardy. Even more interesting are ongoing attempts to justify the hierarchy of views. The devotion to debate as a primary mode of education provides an ever-present avenue for students to challenge homegrown interpretations and affords a richness of critical commentary within traditions.

The format of four schools can be seen as a horizon that opens a way to appreciate the plethora of opinions, not as one that closes and rigidifies investigation. It serves as a framework for interrogating texts in order both to tease out their implications and to create interpretive conundrums absorbing the mind in attempts to maintain the hierarchy of systems.

TOPICS

Although Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a addresses various topics according to the school he is discussing (see the Detailed Outline, viii), a principal structure revolves around five topics: their teachers, names of the school, texts, divisions, and tenets. The issues considered under the heading of "assertions of tenets" reveal the liberative orientation of the inquiry. These are divided into three categories—presentations of the basis,[a] the paths,[b] and the fruits[c] of the path. The presentation of the basis refers to assertions on classes of phenomena, which provide the *basis* for practicing the spiritual *paths,* which, in turn, produce attainments, the *fruits of the path.* It is clear from this ordering that a principal reason for philosophical learning about phe-

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[a] *gzhi, sthāpana.*

[b] *lam, mārga.*

[c] *'bras bu, phala.*

nomena is to enable spiritual practice that can transform the mind from being mired in a condition of suffering to being enlightened in a state of freedom.

The general structure of basis, paths, and fruits takes its lead from the emphasis in texts of the Middle Way School on three coordinated sets of twos:

1. Two truths—obscurational and ultimate—which are the basis
2. Two practices—method (that is, motivation and its incumbent deeds) and wisdom—which are the paths
3. Two Buddha Bodies—Form Bodies and truth body—which are the final fruits of the path.

According to Great Vehicle schools of tenets, taking as one's basis obscurational truths, one practices the paths of method—love, compassion, and the altruistic intention to become enlightened as well the compassionate deeds that these induce—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of the Form Bodies of a Buddha. Also, taking as one's basis ultimate truths, one practices the paths of wisdom—especially the realization of the final status of persons and phenomena, their emptiness—in dependence upon which one achieves the fruit of a truth body of a Buddha. This threefold format, which finds its main expression in the Middle Way School, supplies the structure for the genre of presentations of tenets for both the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle.

Within the section on the basis, the emphasis—found in Tibetan presentations of tenets—on the two truths in all four schools derives from the fact that the two truths are a prime subject in the tenets of what is considered to be the highest school, the Middle Way School. As the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century scholar, Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may[a] (hereafter called Gung-tang), who was the chief student of Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo, says,[13] the prime way that the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School delineate the meaning of the scriptures is by way of the four noble truths, whereas the Mind-Only School accomplishes this through the doctrine of the three natures, and the Middle Way School, through the doctrine of the two truths. Thus, the emphasis on the four schools' delineations of the two truths derives from the system that this tradition has determined to be the highest, the Middle Way School. This is not to say that the two truths are not important topics in all four schools,

[a] *gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me,* 1762-1823. For a brief biography, see E. Gene Smith, *University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1969), 1:81-82.

for they are; rather, the two truths are not *the* central topic in the other schools in the way that they are in the Middle Way School.

In these ways, in the genre of presentations of tenets the very structure (basis, paths, and fruits) and the choice of some topics (such as the two truths) clearly do not arise from prime concerns within each school but are brought over from focal issues in other schools, particularly those considered to be higher. That topics of prime concern in the "higher" schools dominate to some extent the presentation of the tenets of all four schools is natural, given that the main aim is to draw readers into realizing the impact of the views of those systems. Nevertheless, since Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's aim also is to indicate the breadth of topics in each school, his presentation serves as an antidote to simplification; his attention to a plethora of topics and variant detail becomes a fascinating avenue to reflect on the import and implications of many profound topics.

The Author

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a Nga-w̄ang-d̄zön-drü[a] was born in the Am-do Province of Tibet in 1648 east of the Blue Lake. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk. He went to Hla-s̄a at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-b̄ung Monastic University; six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered the Tantric College of Lower Hla-s̄a. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-b̄ung. (Perhaps it was at this time that Mañjushrī, also called Mañjughoṣha, appeared to him and smiled, due to which, according to Kensur Lekden, he came to be called "One On Whom Mañjushrī Smiled," Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a.)

At age fifty-three he became abbot of Go-mang and at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded a highly influential monastery at D̄ra-s̄hi-kyil,[b] this being 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2.

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-luk-b̄a by this time, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's influ-

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[a] *'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus,* 1648-1722.

[b] *bkra shis 'khyil.*

ence on the Ge-luk-ba̅ order has been considerable. His life manifests a pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures—child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer.[a]

CONTROVERSY

It is clear from D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* that the philosophical influence of D̄zong-ka-ba̅, the founder of the Ge-luk-ba̅ order, was already widespread by the middle of the fifteenth century at least in Central Tibet. D̄ak-tsang's markedly different interpretation of D̄zong-ka-ba̅'s main source, the seventh-century Indian scholar-adept Chandrakīrti, caused him to take D̄zong-ka-ba̅ as his main opponent throughout his presentation of tenets but especially in a separate section in which he spells out eighteen contradictions in D̄zong-ka-ba̅'s works with regard to Chandrakīrti's Consequence School.

Two centuries later, the Fifth Dalai Lama suggested that a scholar refute D̄ak-tsang (see 1022), and the First Paṇ-chen Lama[b] composed a forty-five folio text, *Response to Objections by the Sanskritist S̄hay-rap-rin-chen: Roar of the Lion of Scripture and Reasoning*[c] in which he quotes D̄ak-tsang's eighteen indictments one by one and gives his responses, sometimes along with invective, perhaps in response to D̄ak-tsang's several outbursts. Jam-ȳang-shay-ba̅, undoubtedly aware of the First Paṇ-chen Lama's text, weaves a broader response into the *Great Exposition of Tenets,* providing a sustained refutation of D̄ak-tsang's presentation of tenets, citing various parts of D̄ak-tsang's root text and commentary, but then devoting a section that is more than an eighth of his own book[d] to detailing twenty-seven contradictions in

[a] For his life story see Derek Maher's University of Virginia thesis, *Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Monastic Buddhism: A Biographical Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Jamyang Shayba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) in his Historical Context.*

[b] *blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan,* 1567(?)-1662.

[c] *sgra pa shes rab rin chen pa'i rtsod lan lung rigs seng ge'i nga ro;* Collected Works of blo bzaṅ chos kyi rgyal mtshan, Paṇchen Lama I (New Delhi: Lama Gurudeva, 1973), vol. 4: 559-648. To my knowledge, the First Paṇchen Lama does not explicitly indicate that he was answering the Fifth Dalai Lama's request.

There is also an early twentieth-century response by Pa-bong-ka-ba̅ Jam-ba̅-d̄en-dzin-trin-lay-gya-tso (*pha bong kha pa byams pa bstan 'dzin 'phrin las rgya mtsho,* 1878-1941), *Answer to the Translator D̄ak-tsang's Objections: Vajra Nodes* (*stag tshang lo tstsha ba'i brgal lan rdo rje'i gzegs ma*) (Collected Works, New Delhi: 1973, Toh. 6154); thanks to Derek Maher for identifying this.

[d] 84 out of 623 pages in the Taipei edition of the *Great Exposition of Tenets.*

D̄ak-tsang's own work.

The core of D̄ak-tsang's criticism of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's system is his predecessor's assertion that all phenomena are established, or certified, by valid cognition:

> They who, though following the glorious Chandrakīrti,
> Assert—upon analyzing with many reasonings—
> That impure mistaken appearances are established by valid cognition
> Have the following great burden of contradictions.

In his *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī* the Fifth Dalai Lama makes reference to these lines:[14]

> Mañjushrī told the Foremost Lama [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] that it was necessary to value the varieties of appearances. His thought was based on a qualm that, in the future, trainees who did not understand such an essential would fall into a view of nihilism. Thus, many modes of establishing the existence of appearances are [presented] in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's great and small expositions of the *Stages of the Path* and in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*. However, the lion of proponents, the translator D̄ak-tsang [criticizes D̄zong-ka-b̄a] saying, "Upon analyzing with many forms of reasoning, he asserts that impure mistaken appearances are validly established." [This criticism] is seen to arise from the same source of error.

Valid certification for D̄ak-tsang and for D̄zong-ka-b̄a are different; D̄ak-tsang sees it as implying self-institution,[a] due to which, in the Consequence School, only the ultimate is established by valid cognition. He views D̄zong-ka-b̄a's assertion that all phenomena—conventional and ultimate—are certified by valid cognition as having fallen to an extreme of reification, exaggerating what does not exist as if it existed.

From D̄zong-ka-b̄a's perspective, however, self-institution is a synonym for inherent existence, and thus nothing—either ultimate or conventional—is self-instituting according to the Consequence School. Hence, establishment by valid cognition cannot possibly imply self-institution. As Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a indicates, D̄ak-tsang has fallen to an extreme of reification in asserting that the ultimate is self-instituting and thus (in Ge-luk-b̄a terms) truly existent and has fallen to an extreme of nihilism in denying the valid establishment of conventional phenomena.

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[a] *tshugs thub tu grub pa.*

In this way Ḏak-tsang frequently returns to criticizing Ḏzong-ka-ḇa for bringing the valid certification of conventional phenomena into the Consequence School, and Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa frequently returns to criticizing Ḏak-tsang for over-concretizing valid establishment. Although Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa indicates that he is aware that by that time Ḏak-tsang's system had lost all of its adherents, during his step-by-step refutation he nevertheless frequently stoops to ad hominem incendiary invectives that, for me, were at first shocking, then amusing, then boring, and finally counter-productive. Sometimes, they provide comic relief in the midst of the intellectual challenge of the intricate controversies, such as when he accuses Ḏak-tsang of drinking the water of a mirage, or when he says that Dharmakīrti has become afraid of a mirage and is building a boat to cross over it. At other times, however, slurs—such as accusing him of being a fool, of confused bragging, of being overcast with darkness, and so forth—double back on Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa, making one wonder why he needed to be so nasty, distracting his readers from interesting information and issues, thereby weakening his own position. On these occasions the remarks unwittingly and witlessly provide a model of how not to present a case. Though the virulent outbursts provide a window on the rough and tumble of inter-sectarian and even intra-sectarian rivalries in Tibet, I hope that far from contributing to sectarian bitterness, they will serve to warn against counter-productive harshness.

For me, the controversies (but not the name-calling) are extremely valuable in that they highlight differing readings of the same Indian figure, Chandrakīrti; the contrasts make clearer their respective interpretations and perhaps also multiple meanings in Chandrakīrti's words. To this end I have added before Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's rebuttal more than sixty pages from Ḏak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* and his autocommentary on:

- the eighteen contradictions
- the three phases of spiritual training
- the five unique features of the Consequence School
- the three roots of cyclic existence
- the nature of an action's having disintegrated
- the definitions of the two truths
- and the necessity to enter the Mantra Vehicle after achieving the Buddhahood of the Perfection Vehicle.

May the gems of insight scattered throughout the controversy stimulate exploration and insight.

2. Do All Buddhist Schools except the Consequence School Actually Assert that Persons are Findable Under Analysis?

Central[15] to Ge-luk-b̄a presentations of the four schools of tenets is that only the Consequence School asserts an emptiness of inherent existence and thus that all other schools assert that when one analytically seeks an imputed object, one can come up with something that is it. This is based on statements by Chandrakīrti that when positing conventionally existent phenomena[16] it is not suitable to analyze the object imputed. It becomes incumbent then to discover what each school asserts the self and so forth to be, in the course of which what may have been a minor topic in those schools becomes major in Ge-luk-b̄a presentations of tenets.

In Ge-luk-b̄a texts this is found under the topic of "object-possessors,"[a] which is sub-divided into the three topics of expressional terms (which indicate objects),[b] consciousnesses (which apprehend objects),[c] and persons (who own objects).[d] In the last section we learn that:[17]

1. In the Great Exposition School, all five aggregates are the person for some Saṃmitīyas, whereas the mind alone is the person for the Avantakas.
2. In the Sūtra School, the continuum of the mental and physical aggregates is the person for the Sūtra School Following Scripture, whereas the mental consciousness is the person for the Sūtra School Following Reasoning.
3. In the Mind-Only School, the mind-basis-of-all is the person for the Mind-Only School Following Scripture, whereas the mental consciousness is the person for the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning.
4. In the Middle Way School, a subtle neutral form of the mental consciousness is the person for the Autonomy School, whereas the mere-I imputed in dependence upon its basis of imputation, the aggregates, is the person for the Consequence School.

In all schools except the Consequence School, the person is imputed to

[a] *yul can.*
[b] *rjod byed kyi sgra.*
[c] *shes pa.*
[d] *gang zag.*

something—the mental consciousness and so forth—meaning that the mental consciousness, for instance, **is** the person, whereas in the Consequence School the person is imputed **in dependence upon** the mental consciousness and so forth and thus is **not** those phenomena.

This point is a brilliant discovery of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's analysis, a pivot of Ge-luk-ḇa commentary, an over-riding organizing principle of their philosophical presentations, a dazzling insight into the Indian Buddhist schools, the core of their practice of emptiness, the grindstone for reducing other explanations to powder, the insight making the presentation of moral behavior in the four systems feasible, a foundation for making sense out of the controversies between the Indian schools, the cause impelling the drawing of nearly incredible distinctions about the person, the magnifying glass for discovering hidden assertions of what the person is, and the foundation for recognition that even in Buddhism with selflessness as the core doctrine there are selves, there are persons, there are agents, there is a basis for moral retribution, there is someone to achieve nirvāṇa, there are other sentient beings not just on a baseless level of pre-wisdom ignorance but validly established. It is a magnificent stroke.

It is necessary to search thoroughly among the teachings of each school in order to find its views on the existent self because most of their attention is paid to the non-existent self, be it self-sufficiency, true establishment, inherent existence, or the like. In his *Blaze of Reasoning* Bhāvaviveka says that to prove to him that the mental consciousness is the self would be a case of proving what he already accepted.[18] This short statement is taken to indicate that indeed for him the mental consciousness is the person. Bhāvaviveka also says that since the mental consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self, which Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa again takes to indicate that for Bhāvaviveka the mental consciousness **is** the self, not just its basis of imputation.

Also, Bhāvaviveka says that the senses and the body are the basis of the imputation "self." Thus,[19] for him there are two types of selves, a temporary one such as a human merely imputed to the aggregates and a continual one that is a subtle type of mental consciousness, which has traveled ceaselessly in all types of lives and therefore exists even during deep sleep, fainting, and meditative absorption in cessation. Still, Bhāvaviveka is not teaching that yogis should engage in a particular type of practice in order to identify this ever-present consciousness as the self; the mental consciousness that he considers to be the person is subtle, and neither he nor anyone else puts forth practices aimed centrally at realizing or making manifest this subtle form of consciousness.

According to Kensur Lekden, Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa told his own students

that if a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka asked a Consequentialist why the mental consciousness could not be the self, the Consequentialist would have difficulty replying. For the mental consciousness travels from life to life right through to the attainment of Buddhahood, and even the Consequentialists say that "mind-only" sometimes literally means that the mind is the main creator. However, the Consequentialists say that the reasoning that the selves would be as many as the many moments of the mental consciousness opposes asserting that the mental consciousness **is** the person. The person and the mental consciousness are related as object imputed and basis of imputation; therefore, the I is not the mental consciousness.

In a similar vein, D̄zong-ka-b̄a and Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a say that the Mind-Only School following Asaṅga asserts that the substantially existent mind-basis-of-all (a subtle consciousness somewhat like Bhāvaviveka's subtle type of mental consciousness) is the person and thus is the substantially existent person.[a] Like Bhāvaviveka, Asaṅga says that the person itself imputedly exists, but, in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's explanation, that which is the person substantially exists. (The main difference between Asaṅga's mind-basis-of-all and Bhāvaviveka's subtle mental consciousness is that the former is the repository of the seeds producing the appearance of external objects, whereas the latter does not have this function because for Bhāvaviveka there are external objects.) Still, it is difficult to find any passage in Mind-Only literature proclaiming that the mind-basis-of-all is a substantially existent self. Also, the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is often quoted to show that the mind-basis-of-all should not be conceived as a self,[20] "I do not teach this [mind-basis-of-all] to children because they would take it as a self." Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's commentary is that Buddha is referring to a conception of the mind-basis-of-all as a *self-sufficient* substantially existent person.[b] Although the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent and thus capable of being *apprehended self-sufficiently*[c] it is not a self-sufficient person like a controller.

D̄ak-tsang (552), however, argues that there is no Buddhist school that says that a mind *is* the person. He accuses D̄zong-ka-b̄a of committing the absurdity of saying on the one hand that the Proponents of Mind-Only do not accept that the self is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and yet saying on the other hand that they accept that the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent and is the self. The Ge-luk-b̄a answer is that for the Proponents of Mind-Only the person itself is not substantially

a *rdzas yod kyi gang zag, dravyasatpudgala.*

b *rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi gang zag.*

c *rang rkya 'dzin thub pa'i rdzas yod.*

existent, but the consciousness that is the illustration of the person is substantially existent. Technically, the illustration-isolate of the person (*gang zag gi gzhi ldog*) substantially exists, but the self-isolate of the person (*gang zag gi rang ldog*) does not.[21] As J̄ang-ḡya says:[22]

> The Proponents of True Existence[a] and below assert that there must be something self-sufficiently substantially existent as the basis of imputation of imputedly existent things.

The Ge-luk-b̄a claim is that only the Consequentialists do not require this.

The gist is that the Proponents of Mind-Only do not accept the existence of the self as it is usually conceived, but do accept the substantial existence of a consciousness that performs all the functions of rebirth and thus is a self. In terms of practice, the Proponents of Mind-Only present both a Lesser Vehicle path, which concentrates on the non-existence of a substantially existent self, and a Great Vehicle path, which centers around the non-difference of entity between subject and object; there are no special reasonings aimed at discovering the mind-basis-of-all as the actual self.

Have these distinctions between self-isolate, illustration-isolate, and so forth made it impossible to reflect on the insubstantiality of the person according to the lower systems? How could one meditate on the self-isolate of the person and not the illustration-isolate (the thing that is the person)? Is it possible to zero in on the person devoid of everything that is it, recognize that we have been conceiving it to exist substantially, and realize that it does not? Is the "self-isolate of the person" so abstract that it reduces a most profound and emotionally trying meditation to mere superficial intellectual verbiage? Or, is there something inside us, quite familiar, that corresponds to this (odd) term, the identification of which is aided by such hair-splitting distinctions?

The pressing question is: Why not say that the lower schools present a path to realization of the absence of inherent existence of the person but are not able to extend this realization to other phenomena? And that they are blocked from making the extension that everything lacks inherent existence by views that it would be an extreme of nihilism to go so far? Why not say that this is the reason why they hold that the person does not inherently

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[a] *dngos por smra ba.* In the terms *dngos por smra ba* and *dngos po med par smra ba* (in Sanskrit perhaps *bhāvavādin,* or *vastusatpadārthavādin,* and *abhāvavādin,* or *vastvasatpadārthavādin*) the term *dngos po* (*bhāva*) can have two different meanings in Ge-luk-b̄a explanations. In the first it means "inherent existence," whereas in the latter it means "things," that is, those which are able to perform a function, or even more widely, "phenomena." For extended discussion of this topic, see Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1989), 50-51 and n. 73.

exist but its basis of imputation must?

I believe that the answer to this revolves around what realization of emptiness entails. As Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:[23]

> That which is the viewer[a] of one thing
> Is described as the viewer of all.
> That which is the emptiness of one
> Is the emptiness of all.

The viewer (or person realizing the emptiness) of one thing is capable of realizing the emptiness of all things. As the Dalai Lama said in lectures on Dzong-ka-ba's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* in 1972, if you want to test your supposed realization of the emptiness of the person, switch to another object such as your head and see if the same realization of emptiness applies to it; if it does not, you have realized something more coarse.

Thus, when yogis realize that whatever is not findable under analysis is not inherently existent, even though they do not *at that time* realize the absence of inherent existence of all phenomena, superimpositions contrary to such realization are removed. Therefore, a person capable of realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of the person is capable of realizing the absence of inherent existence of any phenomenon as long as the functioning of that first consciousness has not diminished. Also, because the person is imputed in dependence upon the aggregates, there would be no way to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of the object imputed (the person) without removing the superimposition that the bases of its imputation (the mental and physical aggregates) inherently exist. Hence, there is no way to say that the lower schools realize the emptiness of inherent existence with respect to the person but not with respect to other phenomena. In that case, what they realize must be coarser.

Since the meaning of inherent existence implies that the object can be found under analysis, those schools must be holding that objects, even the self, can be found under analysis. Even though they make a distinction between imputedly existent and substantially existent objects, the former must, in the end, have the latter as their basis of imputation. Hence, even the self or person has a substantially existent phenomenon as its basis of imputation, and since the person is findable under analysis, that substantially existent phenomenon must *be* the person. What they refute is that the person, in isolation, substantially exists.

The issue is crucial to identifying the mistake underlying the suffering

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a "Viewer" (*lta po*) means "consciousness viewing."

of cyclic existence, and thus central to presentations of tenets, which are ordered around identifications of what is being misconceived and ascending views of the nature of reality.[a] Let us take a look at these maps, first Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's bare *Root Text* and then opened up with detailed commentary.

[a] I have singled out this issue for discussion here because of its centrality. I hope to discuss other issues in a separate book.

ROOT TEXT OF TENETS

Presentation of Tenets: Lion's Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience

By Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a Nga-w̄ang-d̄zön-drü

(The respective page numbers of the commentary on the root text are at the right margin.)

Preamble to the Treatise 58

Namas svarasvatyai (Homage to Svarasvatī.) 58

Obeisance to the lion of Shākyas—as well as those in his transmission—who, through limitless deeds of the three secrecies and through limitless multiplications of stable and moving dance, opened many doors of profound and vast doctrine in accordance with the dispositions of trainees and who, with discourse on dependent-arising, showed the path to omniscience. 59

O you two, the sole father of all Conquerors—simultaneous with raising the sharp sword of incomparable wisdom in the empty sky you destroy the enemy, ignorance; simultaneous with eyes of compassion your lips smiling at beings expound eloquence; and simultaneous with bringing a treasury of doctrine you bestow on those in mindful yoga the ability to answer questions without forgetting. Brightly bestow on me simultaneously supreme intelligence and speech. 59

O Daughter of Brahmā, mountain of white crystal come from an ocean of milk, simultaneous with attractive lips, you smilingly bring about satisfaction through looking askance with blue sapphire eyes, and liberate the dark confinement of mind into a hundred thousand very bright lotuses of discrimination through letting loose the arrows of your blue-lotus, long, drawing eyes on your full moon face. 60

Who with discrimination would not respect L̄o-sang—the former Conqueror—and his children and the later Conquerors and their children, and so forth, whose appearance is like that of the Monarch of Sages, since when here Sūtra and Mantra as well as

the profound and the vast were practiced only alternately like day and night, he emitted the awakened light of the practice of all teachings by the Sage? 60

O you with intelligence, happily retain this previously non-existent precious eloquence, lamp illuminating the path to omniscience, which I, having relied on skillful captains of the ship of reasoning through hundreds of fatiguing tasks, gained upon crossing to the end of the ocean of tenets. 63

1. General Presentation of Tenets 68

Through teaching, teacher, and view there are two, Outer and Inner. 68

By way of views that testify to the word, meditation that is the antidote of cyclic existence, behavior that has abandoned the two extremes, and fruits of separation that are analytical cessations, there is the teaching. 70

The opposites of the two—pure teaching and a teacher who has exhausted all defects—are the others. Hence, assertions that it is not by refuge and that the teachers are the same are mistaken. 72

Through proving or refuting the object conceived by a view of a self there are two, Outer and Inner. About the first, by way of the manifest and the obscure there are proponents of annihilation and of permanence. Through asserting and refuting true existence there are Proponents of True Existence and Proponents of No True Existence. Through holding to the outer and the inner there are Proponents of Objects and Proponents of Mind-Only. 72

The Teacher and so forth are mostly drawn to their own schools; the respectful are many. 83

Each is free of the extremes; imaginary imputations are refuted by the higher. The lower views are also pedestals to the higher. 84

The others fall to extremes; that free of the extremes is the system of the honorable Nāga. 88

This has been the first chapter, the section on the general presentation of schools of tenets. 89

Introduction to Non-Buddhist Schools of Tenets 91

At the time of incalculable lifespan Kapila composed the texts of the Sāṃkhyas. Through various imaginative imputations regarding

differences about a self the systems of Forders split into many. Some explain that from the start there were different teachers and so forth. Some assert that the teacher of all is Arhat. The two sacrifices arose here serially. The Sāṃkhyas are earlier. 91

Others' Schools, Outsiders, Forders to the End, and so forth are the names. 92

Though twenty-five are mentioned, those that are clear here are the different houses. It is a mistake that they are five because, unlike our own schools, that they are numerous cannot be refuted. One proponent of annihilation and twelve proponents of permanence are renowned. 93

2. Nihilism 95

Bṛhaspati, Lokachakṣhu, and Juk-d̄op are the teachers. 95

They are Hedonists, Proponents of Annihilation, Proponents of Non-Existence, Barhaspatyas, Ayatas, and so forth. That they are Proponents of Nature as the Cause is mistaken. 95

Because it is explained that some do and some do not assert cause and effect as well as gods and so forth, it is mistaken that former and future lives are utterly non-existent and that there are only the three transmigrations and so forth. 97

The Logicians and the Meditators are due to being pained by lust and through claiming to help. 98

Because of not being perceived and because of no concomitance, there is no cause and effect. Because the self, which is only body and mind, perishes, there are no former and future lives. Because the minds depend on different bodies, they are not one continuum. The mind is produced from the elements. Nirvāṇa is a non-actuality. Direct perception is valid. Inference is not valid because of being mistaken. 98

REFUTATION OF NIHILISM: Because of being a mind, a preceder of it is established. Because of moving about and because of memory also. 100

Because of clarification through conditioning, omniscience is established. Because of concomitance, cause and effect are established. 101

The non-existence of those is not an object of direct perception; they refute inference; therefore! Also. 102

selflessness of phenomena, ten grounds, three bodies, and so forth. The earlier do not assert the Great Vehicle as the word. It is renowned that later ones accept it. 194

8. Great Exposition School 208

Because of mainly propounding the *Great Exposition of Particulars* and because of propounding particulars of substantialities, they are called Proponents of the Great Exposition or Proponents of Particulars. 208

The modes of splitting off are two and so forth. 209

From the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṃghikas, Sthaviras, and Saṃmitīyas there are seven, five, three, and three. 209

Or, the Mahāsaṃghikas have eight schools, and the Sthaviras ten. 210

That all those are the Great Exposition School and that there are two schools are contradictory. Mere inclusion is too narrow since the Great Vehicle is explained; moreover. The five Saṃmitīya schools propound an inexpressible self, but they are similar to all concerning the non-existence of a self endowed with the three; they are not other. 218

Two truths, aggregates, constituents, sense-spheres, five transmigrations, foods, the contaminated, the uncontaminated, compounded phenomena, and three uncompounded phenomena. Space is illumination or darkness. Subtle particles do not have parts and do not touch. 222

Direct perception and inference are the valid cognitions. Five paths. Enlightenment, and so forth. Six perfections. 225

Twenty aspirants to virtue. Eight Approachers to and Abiders in the fruit. When the twelve deeds in two parts are completed, Buddha is finished. Severance of the continuum of matter and mind in all three without remainder is the fruit. 228

Phenomena such that awareness is cancelled or is not cancelled due to breaking up or separation are respectively conventional truths and ultimate truths. 233

Because there are three, the Seven Treatises are the word. Scriptures are compositional factors. 235

Direct perceptions: sense, mental, and yogic. Self-cognizing consciousnesses do not exist. 236

Simultaneous cause and effect exist. Non-revelatory form is form. 236

The first requires interpretation because of scripture and the non-existence of external objects. In consideration of the appearance of objects, it is for the sake of entry. 323

The middle, the Great Vehicle sūtras on the profound, are not literal because of being in consideration of the non-natures of the three characters. 329

It is not suitable to be literal; this would deprecate. 332

Because of not being produced and so forth in that way, they are unproduced and so forth. 334

Forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production is by way of eight—itself, other, and so forth. 337

For the master Dharmakīrti also, in consideration of the non-existence of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as other substantial entities it was explained there. 343

For the master Dharmakīrti also, in consideration of the object and agent of cause and effect, definition and definiendum, and so forth it was explained there. 344

According to the former, because the basic constituent is definite as capacities and is truly established, the lineages of the three vehicles are definite, and although those whose lineage is severed get involved by way of hearing and so forth, they do not at all generate discouragement and so forth and the intention to leave. 348

According to the latter, because they are impermanent, there are methods, those knowing them exist, there are teachers, and seeking occurs, one vehicle is also established. 359

That imputational natures are truly established is a superimposition. That the other two are not truly established is a deprecation. 360

The opposite is the middle path. 362

If all effective things are truly established, why it is said that even agents exist conventionally? There are two modes of existing as the two truths. The first is the existence and the non-existence about which Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Mind-Only debate. About the second, being or not being suitable to give rise to thorough afflictions and being or not being bases of conventions are just called existing conventionally and existing ultimately. Because there are also two with respect to the substantial and the imputed, that effective things are falsely established is mistaken. 363

Factors of superimposition are imputational. There are two, completely nihil and enumerative. Non-existents and unproduced conventionalities are posited respectively as them. 374

Bases of mistake and mistake are other-powered natures. The pure and the impure are respectively non-conceptual exalted wisdoms and afflictive emotions. 375

The emptinesses of the superimposed two selves are thoroughly established natures, the two selflessnesses, and even each has twenty and so forth. Terminologically, there are three—object, attainment, and practice ultimates. 377

The formation, abiding, destruction, and so forth of the environment and beings in it are partially similar. 379

However, the thirty-six of the desire realm and the eighteen of the form realm, the shape of the mountains, and so forth are not similar. There are differences with respect to the purification of definite actions, the ways of dividing the aggregates, virtues, and so forth, also. 381

Objects of knowledge are divided into the two truths as one entity and different isolates. An object of observation suitable to generate thorough afflictions is a conventional truth; synonyms are convention truth and so forth; when divided, there are three. A final object of observation of a path of purification is an ultimate truth; synonyms are noumenon, suchness, and so forth; the divisions have been explained. 382

Due to manifest and obscure, there are two prime cognitions, direct and inferential. Four direct perceptions; lower sense direct perceptions are mistaken. 387

Because an awareness does not exist prior, that it is the nature of that is contradictory. Because of having many names, one object being many essences is contradictory. Because a name is not limited in usage to one object, that essences are mixed is contradictory. 391

Because when investigated by way of the four thorough examinations in that way, this does not exist in those. 396

Because of the certainty of simultaneous observation, they are not other. 397

When a minute particle is encircled, if the eastern side does not face the western direction, it has parts. If it faces, they would not become a mass. Despite being minute, what contradiction is

there in not being those of the Proponents of the Great Exposition? 402

Because of being refuted by many, it is mistaken that Proponents of the Middle and of Mind-Only assert those. 404

Because of not existing in the perspective of meditative equipoise, because of many mentalities about one thing, because pleasant and unpleasant, because of yogic appearances and so forth, and because of being similar to dreams and so forth, objects do not exist; they are true as only mind. Since objects do not exist as referents of conceptual consciousnesses, their appearance to non-conceptual consciousnesses that way is mistaken; hence it is refuted that they are different substantial entities from those. 405

Because of being their support, removing this overcomes a hundred ideations and so forth. 414

Gross appearances to operative consciousness are the basis of debate. About the controversy, True and False Aspectarians debate whether true or not true, existing or not existing, or not polluted or polluted by obscuration—not about truth or falsity as Proponents of the Middle Way and Proponents of Mind-Only debate, or existence, effective thing, and so forth. 416

With respect to True Aspectarians, there are three—Split-Eggists, Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects, and Non-Pluralists. Respectively, Brahmin asserts that the apprehended-object and the apprehending-subject of consciousness are different; Shākyabuddhi asserts aspects equal in number to apprehended-objects; the honorable Dharmakīrti asserts that there is a single aspect of consciousness of the various. 420

With respect to False Aspectarians, there are two. It is *reputed* that they are Tainted and Untainted since a Conqueror does or does not have taints of dualistic appearance. 424

For False Aspectarians there are effects of prime cognitions that take external objects as objects.§ That is not correct. If external objects are established, what is Mind-Only? If it is said to be in the perspective of conceptual consciousness, it is the same for True Aspectarians; that is mistaken. Saying all phenomena are mind also is an incorrect crudeness. There would be many fallacies—defects and good qualities, cyclic existence and nirvāṇa would be one, and so forth. 426

What is the meaning of mind-only? Just as in a dream an appearance as a human is not said to be a mind and hence is not a mind and is not other, those which appear and are renowned are not minds and are not substantial entities other than minds. 429

The basis-of-all is a non-defiled and neutral mind—subtle, obscure, and possessing all seeds. The afflicted mentality has the specific feature of observing it and thinking "I." Eight collections of consciousness are asserted by the brothers and followers. For those not setting it forth there are not eight because two conceptual consciousnesses are not simultaneous, and so forth; six collections is the system of the Seven Treatises and followers. 432

Skill in methods of meditation, mental contemplation, and in meditative observation is needed. Hence there are the seven actual mental contemplations, the other forty, and the objects of observation—that is, signs—four and thirty-two. When condensed, there are two, or the nine minds also as well as abandoning the five and so forth. 442

Twelve, four, so forth are the features of the grounds and perfections. 452

Twelve sets of one hundred; transformations of eye and so forth; four, five, and so forth exalted bodies; ten and two exalted activities and so forth are described in Maitreya's two *Differentiations,* Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,* and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* and so forth. 452

This has been the tenth chapter, the section on the Proponents of Cognition who, having refuted a coarse self of phenomena—external objects and so forth—prove a selflessness of phenomena. 453

Introduction to the Middle Way School 454

They propound a middle free from extremes and propound naturelessness. 454

They are called Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Non-Nature. 455

The divisions are two, Consequence School and Autonomy School; the others are only names. 457

Both are Proponents of the Middle, similarly refuting the extreme of non-existence, which is not to exist even conventionally, and the extreme of permanence, which is true establishment, and thereupon asserting as the middle dependently arisen

anything and meditating on emptiness are contradictory. 609

Asserting production from other merely due to their being other and not asserting production from self merely due to asserting a self are contradictory. 617

That one trains in all topics for many eons but at the time of the fruit does not know even one of the diversity is to mistake the stages of the path. That the remainderless is the utter non-existence of form and knowledge and that there are four exalted bodies are contradictory. 620

Asserting the two—direct perception and inference—and not asserting valid cognition are contradictory. That there are proofs and that there is no valid establishment are contradictory. 624

That the unshared and the powers have been attained and that one is a perfect Buddha in cyclic existence are contradictory. 634

Proving and refuting the conceived object of the view of the transitory are contradictory. That the two views of the coarse and subtle selflessnesses have one object is contradictory. 645

Asserting that a basis-of-all exists and asserting external objects are contradictory. 654

That the ultimate is established by reasoning and that there is no object of meditative equipoise are contradictory. That it is not yogic direct perception and that selflessness is manifest are contradictory. 661

That there are three roots of cyclic existence and that the doors of peace are the same are contradictory. 669

That treatises refuting those are the system of those is contradictory. 676

That despite being devoid of logicality they are suitable and reasonable is contradictory. That all bases do not exist and that there are substrata and bases of imputation are contradictory. 682

Being a perfect Buddha and entering again from the path of accumulation are contradictory. That one who has extinguished all obstructions to omniscience has predispositions of emission is contradictory. 687

Labels such as voidness of predication and bad meditations are the causes of your mistakes. 693

11. Autonomy School 695

Because autonomous sign and own-powered sign are the same,

Autonomists are those who state a sign proving a thesis through the three modes and the subjects being own-powered as appearing in common. 695

There are two, Sūtra and Yogic Middle Way Autonomy Schools. 703

Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School 704

External objects are established by the former and refuted by the latter. They assert that the three characters are established by way of their own character. However, in consideration of the absence of true existence it was said that these and those do not exist. 704

Bases of emptiness, factors of superimposed true establishment, and emptinesses of that are respectively other-powered natures, imputational natures, and thoroughly established natures because of not being under their own power, because of being imputed, and because of being the mode of subsistence. 713

The collectors are not the same; they do not realize. Because the Great Vehicle has meaning, the selflessness of phenomena is not in the Lesser sūtras. Just as fear of a snake with respect to a coiled rope is cleared away by an awareness apprehending it as a vine, obscuration is overcome by realizing selflessness; it is not the mode of subsistence. 716

It is said that external objects do not exist ultimately. Saying that the sole mind is the abodes, bodies, and so forth is with respect to the aspects. The term "mind-only" refutes an agent; therefore, the non-existence of apprehended objects is not the meaning of sūtra. Sense consciousnesses are aspected. Apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are cause and effect sequentially. Aggregations of the separate—an army and so forth—are imputedly existent. Composites of particles of concordant type also are substantially existent. Even each is suitable as an observed-object-condition. The appearance of a double moon in dependence upon a single moon would not be produced if external objects did not exist, and it would be a deprecation. Because there is no appearance of an object, self-cognition of an object-possessor is not. 731

Whatever truly exists must exist in the perspective of reasoning because of being truly established. But what exists for that is not necessarily truly established, like the noumenon. Although there are objects found by a rational consciousness, what is able to bear analysis by it must stand to be truly established because true

establishment is being analyzed. Establishment as bearing analysis by a rational consciousness is true establishment, the object of negation here. 736

Because a similar example possessing the sign and predicate of the probandum is easier, mostly signs of a negative phenomenon that are observations of a contradictory object are stated. They state, for example: Because of being a physical sense power, an eye sense power does not ultimately see forms, as is the case with an ear sense power; and so forth. 748

Among objects of knowledge there are the two truths. "Ultimate" is an uncontaminated awareness; "object" is what is found by that; because of being non-deceptive, it is a "truth." Due to obstructing, it is obscurational, and because of being truths in its perspective, they are other. Because phenomena that are able and unable to function as they appear are conventional truths, obscurational truths are divided into the real and unreal; the first are effective things, and the second are reflections and so forth. 753

The two, direct perception and inference; and three and four direct perceptions respectively. 761

Those of definite lineage simultaneously extinguish the two obstructions and are completely enlightened. The three bodies, three mysteries, three hundred unshared. 761

The three poisons are the afflictive obstructions. The obstructions to omniscience are the cycles of true existence. The paths of Hearers and Solitary Realizers agree; the differences are by way of time and fruit. 763

Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School 763

The second Autonomists are twofold, those who accord with True Aspectarians and those who accord with False Aspectarians. 763

For the first—Shāntarakṣhita, the father, and his spiritual son—aspects are effective things. 765

For the second, including Haribhadra, aspects are non-effective. Jetāri accords with Tainted False Aspectarians. Kambala accords with Untainted False Aspectarians. 769

The system of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is that the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom* and so forth are of definitive meaning and that those in which "ultimate" is not affixed are similar in being the second wheel but are of interpretable meaning. The mode of the three characters is

similar. External objects do not exist. The two meanings—principal and secondary—in the *Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned, Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra,* and so forth are respectively the systems of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School. 772

It is agreed that not being posited through appearing to a non-defective awareness is the object of negation. They mostly state signs that are non-observations of related objects because of being set forth in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* and the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra.* Forms and so forth do not truly exist because of lacking being a truly established one or many, as is the case, for example, with a reflection. Whatever is true is limited to the two, whereby the entailments are established. Regarding the presence of the reason in the subject, it is not one because of having parts; it is not many because one does not exist. The vajra nodes, refutation of production of the existent and the non-existent, refutation of production of the four alternatives, and the sign of dependent-arising are chief. 781

They agree about the presentations of the selflessness of persons and of the two truths. The subtle obstructions to omniscience are consciousnesses conceiving true existence, and the coarse obstructions to omniscience are apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, and so forth. The sixteen aspects of the truths, the emptiness of duality, and the absence of true existence are the different types of realization of the paths of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Great Vehicle. Both agree about the features of there being meditative equipoise and subsequent realization on seeing and meditation. 791

This has been the eleventh chapter, the section on the Autonomy School which, having cleared away the extreme of truly established things, establishes the middle. 793

12. Consequence School 794

Because they do not assert autonomous inferences but mainly state consequences contradicting assertions by the other party, they are Consequentialists. 795

They are renowned as Consequentialists, Only-Appearance Proponents of the Middle, and Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle. 799

Their divisions are three—model, partisan, and non-partisan. 801

The texts are the profound sūtras, the Collections of Reasoning, *The Four Hundred, Engaging in the Deeds,* the two—*Compendium of Sūtra* and *Compendium of Learnings—Lamp for the Path,* and so forth. 804

Sūtras teaching the two truths are respectively those to be interpreted, because they must be interpreted otherwise, and the definitive, because the mode of subsistence is definite there. There are two modes of interpretation: because even the literal meaning is not suitable and because the literal meaning, though established, is not the final mode of subsistence. The first and last wheels require interpretation. The middle are definitive sūtras. Five sūtra sections in the *Descent into Laṅkā, Unraveling the Thought,* and *The Heavily Adorned*—in consideration that there is no other creator and in consideration of emptiness—teach mind-only, no external objects, a permanent matrix, the existence of a basis-of-all, the true existence of other-powered natures and of thoroughly established natures, and three final vehicles. These five teachings are proved to require interpretation. 805

All of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa appearing and renowned—the diversity and the mode of being—are posited by innate non-analysis according to the conventions of the world. Therefore, existing objectively not imputed to there by conceptuality, substantially existing, established by way of its own character, established from its own side, truly established, inherently established, and so forth are equivalent as what is negated. 823

Positing all actions and agents in this non-existence from their own side and imputation there by name and conceptuality is the middle, free from extremes. Anything coarser or finer than this is an extreme of permanence or annihilation. 825

There are the two selves of persons and phenomena. The non-existence of these there is asserted as the two selflessnesses. A self of phenomena is refuted by the four—the vajra nodes and so forth. A self of persons is refuted by the fivefold and sevenfold. Both also by dependent-arising. 828

Because they are not produced from self, other, both, or causelessly, inherently established production does not exist. 830

If produced from themselves, it would be senseless and endless. That which exists is not from itself. Causes and effects would always be seen. It would contradict the world’s perception. All

agents and objects would be one. 830

If produced from other, then darkness would arise from a flame, and all would arise from all, both causes and non-causes. Because other, they could not be one continuum, like wheat and barley. They would have to be simultaneous, but it is not so. How could another be produced from another? 833

Refuting temporally different others, a mass exactly the same, and so forth are mistaken. Because it is explained that the four extremes are not asserted and that production from other is non-existent even in the world, its assertion here is a dance of the insane. 837

Because of not being from self and other separately, production from both is also perforce refuted. 839

If produced causelessly, striving would be senseless. It would contradict perception. All would also be produced from all. 839

If produced from other, consider existent, non-existent, both, or neither. What use for the existent? The non-existent lacks object and agent. These refute being both. What could they do for what lacks both? 840

Things are not truly produced by causes. One does not produce one, nor many one, nor one many, nor also many many. 843

Because it is established that one produces one and because the others are suitable, not affixing here a qualification of what is negated is mistaken. 844

Because phenomena that are not dependent-arisings do not exist here, and dependent-arising is only established upon meeting, in reliance, and in dependence, all phenomena are not self-instituting and are not established from their own side. Profound and vast, eradicating the two extremes, this is the monarch of reasonings. 847

Therefore, that the ultimate is self-instituting is to eat space. No one takes “validly established” and “self-instituting” as equivalent. 864

A self under its own power does not exist because the aggregates are not it; the person is not other, is not the base of the aggregates, also does not depend on the aggregates, and does not possess the aggregates; the shape is not it; and the collection is not it, like a chariot. Apply this to all phenomena. 864

They assert that on some occasions there is valid establishment with the three modes commonly appearing and that there are mere reasons. However, since the self-powered is not valid, they do not assert autonomy. Autonomy in this system is mistaken. 891

The basis of division is objects of knowledge. The divisions are the two truths, no more. If less, non-inclusion. They are limited in number to those. 894

Because it would be unsuitable as the mode of subsistence and all would directly perceive it, and so forth, the two truths are an indivisible entity, distinguished by their isolates. 896

Definitions: That with respect to which an awareness—a rational consciousness—comes to distinguish the ultimate and that which is found by it. That with respect to which a conventional awareness comes to distinguish a conventionality and that which is found by it. 902

An ultimate truth is because of being an object, ultimate, and also truth. An obscurational truth is because of being a truth for the perspective of the obscurational due to concealing. 903

Two, four, sixteen, and so on divisions of ultimate truth. The two—awarenesses of common beings and of Superiors as well as their objects—are enumerative and other. Real and unreal conventionalities are not in the Middle Way's own system. In the perspective of a worldly consciousness a human and a reflection and so forth are true and untrue, mere real and unreal. 905

The conventional are preceders and assisters of a rational consciousness—the means and that arisen from the means. 911

The purpose is for the sake of overcoming all views and for the sake of discarding and adopting. Therefore, in the third phase a freedom from proliferations that is not emptiness is mistaken. 912

Sūtra and Mantra assert that initially the non-meritorious is overcome through actions and their effects, and so forth; in the middle the two selves are overcome through impermanence and so forth; finally all views as well as defilements are overcome through the stages of actualizing suchness. 913

There are five stages of meditation. Look at the statements of the wise. 915

Like emptiness, the borderline of positing conventionalities is difficult. Whichever of the two truths one falls from, one is ruined and falls to an extreme; therefore, it is unsuitable to be

lopsided with respect to those two. Cherish their union. 925

The three characters are similar. It is asserted that for the childish the nature is superimposed on the other-powered, but for Conquerors the nature is thoroughly established. 926

Because of not asserting establishment by way of the object's own character even conventionally, there are many unique features—eight and so forth. 927

They assert that because of not being refuted by an awareness distinguishing conventionalities, external objects exist, and they assert that because of not being established by an awareness distinguishing conventionalities, a basis-of-all does not exist. 928

Conceiving true existence, one is not liberated. That is afflictive. The selflessnesses are equal. 929

It is established that because there are none unpolluted, all consciousnesses of childish persons are mistaken, and it is established that because new realization is unsuitable, subsequent cognitions are valid cognitions. 929

They assert that because feeling is mental direct perception, there is conceptual mental direct perception, and they assert that because one who has actualized the sixteen aspects of the truths nevertheless is not necessarily a Superior, there are common beings who actualize the sixteen. 931

They assert that because special insight regarding emptiness and the path of preparation are simultaneous, direct perception of the sixteen has not reached even the path of preparation, and they assert that because having-disintegrated is an effective thing, the three times are effective things. 932

Because of being produced, having-disintegrated is an effective thing. Although much passes after an action ceases, effects issue forth even though acquisition, a continuum, and non-wastage do not exist. The mere propounding that having-disintegrated is an effective thing is without analysis, like pots being effective things. If harsh speech of a long time ago appeared to an innate awareness without having disintegrated, why are all previous deeds not remembered? 933

Because of not being without analysis, autonomy and self-cognizing consciousness do not exist. 938

When related, the manifest (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) is for objects, not subjects. True cessations are the element of attributes.

Superiors perceive the absence of true existence. 940

Because it is explained that extinction of the aggregates is unsuitable and that feelings and discriminations are destroyed, without remainder and with remainder are the extinction and non-extinction of mistaken appearance. 942

Predispositions are obstructions to omniscience. Non-afflictive ignorance is also asserted. Until afflictive emotions are removed, abandonment of obstructions to omniscience is not begun. 945

Through appearance the extreme of existence is cleared away, and through emptiness the extreme of non-existence is cleared away. For many such uniquenesses and so forth, look in the Middle Way. 946

Valid cognition is described as fourfold—direct perception, inference, comprehension, and scriptural—but by way of their objects of comprehension there are two, direct perception and inference. 948

A consciousness that, without a reason, is non-deceptive with respect to the manifest that is the object of its mode of apprehension is asserted to be a direct valid cognition. The divisions are sense direct perception, mental direct perception, and yogic direct perception. 949

That which, in dependence on a reason, is non-deceptive with respect to an obscure object is an inference. Inferences comprehending the obscure, through analogy, and the very obscure are asserted as inference, comprehension, and scriptural. 951

That which induces ascertainment with respect to the object of its mode of apprehension and is free from damage by other valid cognitions about this is non-deceptive with respect to this. Therefore, it is not contradictory to be a valid cognition even though mistaken. The meaning of non-deceptive is explained in many ways according to context and is also used for conventionalities. Hence, like the term "substance," it is not single. 954

The means for achieving high status and definite goodness are the two, faith and wisdom. Faith, a prerequisite for wisdom, makes a suitable vessel. Wisdom is the cause of liberation because of achieving the non-conceptual aim. 956

All doctrinal modes are included in the stages of the path of beings of low, middling, and supreme capacity because of stemming

from two aims. Among the middling are the two, Hearers and Solitary Realizers, and their paths. The Great Vehicle is within the great. There are not four vehicles. 969

Here the realizations of Hearers and Solitary Realizers are similar. Eight grounds. By length of time and fruits they are differentiated. 970

With a stable root—altruistic mind generation—the perfections are the broad branches. Accumulation and preparation are differentiated by qualities, signs, meditations, and entities. 972

There are no divisions with regard to meditative equipoise on the ten grounds. The trainings and the twelve subsequent qualities of activities and so forth advance. Each is also explained by eight—etymologies, divisions, qualities, the supported, fruitions, two omens, objects of abandonment, and antidotes. 974

Concerning the fruit, meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment do not alternate; they are one entity. The movement of mind—conceptuality—has been thoroughly pacified. Hence, one abides stably, without rising, yet also performs the activities of subsequent attainment. 981

In the perspective of perception of the element of attributes all proliferations have vanished. Nevertheless, without analysis the diversity of phenomena is known, like olives. 989

Because one body or two, three, four, or five bodies are asserted, that Subduers do not have the vast and that it is in the perspective of others are mistaken. 991

Purity of the adventitious and natural purity are the nature body. 993

The wisdom truth body is the twenty-one groups, and so forth. 995

Endowed with five and not withdrawing its appearance is complete enjoyment. 997

Artisan, incarnation, and enlightenment are the three emanation bodies. All of space is filled with speech having the sixty harmonies. 1000

Those having the lot see the sport of the three mysteries pervading all. A moment is transformed into an eon, and vice versa, and the stable and moving are placed in a hair-pore, but like space, do not become larger or smaller. 1002

Even though all Conquerors engaged in expressing the marvelous qualities—ten powers, eighteen unshared with others, and so

forth—they would not finish, like the end of space. 1003

Spontaneous activities—whatever will tame—are displayed forever. 1007

This has been the twelfth chapter, the section on the Consequence School which, having cleared away all extremes, establishes the great middle. 1008

13. Secret Mantra 1009

Both Sūtra and Mantra are able to extinguish all afflictive obstructions. Just as the supreme object is taught but the supreme subject is hidden, so the principal defilements are taught but the supreme antidote is hidden. Hence, the subtle small obstructions to omniscience, except for Mantra, cannot be abandoned by Sūtra. Therefore, that the objects of abandonment and antidotes are similarly hidden is mistaken. 1009

They have many profound methods; hence, the paths also differ greatly in terms of speed. 1011

In order to purify the three—coarse, subtle, and very subtle—in body, speech, and mind, there are advances higher and higher in the vehicles and in sūtra and tantra. The other two are in the lower; however, the third—despite being suitable as a basis of thought—is not in sūtra and in the lower tantras. 1014

They are clear in Highest Yoga in general and in the monarch of tantras. The path of secrecy of the Conquerors of the three times—the trail of millions of lords of adepts endowed with fortune going to the peak—is established as supreme. 1015

This has been the thirteenth chapter, the section that, upon having distinguished Sūtra and Mantra, establishes Secret Mantra as supreme. 1016

Perspective of the Treatise 1017

Free from the darkness of mistake, coming from the majestic light of the Smooth Protector’s wisdom; arranged pleasantly and beautifully, like spoken by the goddess Svarasvatī; virtuous in the beginning, middle, and also end, like the speech of the Sovereign of Subduers; weighty, like a compilation of the systems of the supreme ornaments of the world.

Some, blind from not having studied, assert that they have progressed to the distant end; some, mice having low intelligence, take up an elephant’s burden; and most are

conceited from lifting a tiny hill of a little training. Who is the *kūrma* supporting the container of the jewels of teachings by the Sovereign of Subduers?

Even many in the Land of Superiors and Snowy Tibet, greatly wiser than the wise—in whose mental perspective the profound and the vast, like the feet of rug weavers, were such that sometimes they were uncomfortable—sought everywhere with the walking-staff of scripture and reasoning without finding the path of union of appearance and emptiness.

For the sake of traveling the ocean of tenets—sport of thousands of serpent sovereigns of many of our own and others' scholars, filled with overflowing jewels of help and happiness, and riled with the waves of refutation and proof—skilled captains built all sorts of ships.

Even some low ones—who, due to striking the first chord mistaking the ship of reasoning, destroyed the mode—have had their arrogance of inflation about having crossed the ocean of tenets reduced, and I have gone to the other side of the ocean of tenets in order to see the two systems.

May the collections of continuums of poisonous bewilderment and mistake be cleansed by the water—the ancestral tradition of L̄o-sang, flow of the three paths, coming from the matted hair of the great god of analysis—washing the defilements of the feet of the god of wealth, degraded and polluted with argumentation.

As long as Mount Meru—heavy with loads of precious substances, with a vibrating girdle of great oceans, and raising the lamps of sun and moon—remains, may also this, heavy with loads of new exposition and waving the banner of fame, serve to illuminate the three grounds with the light of the lamp of eloquence.

Through the force of the element of attributes—the basic disposition—and the Three Jewels, may transmigrating beings progress successively over the grounds like magical creations, and having completely fulfilled—like a full moon—all qualities, quickly attain omniscience shining more brightly than a hundred suns.

Colophon 1020

Through this *Presentation of Tenets: Lion's Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience* put together and later slightly edited by Jam-yang-shay-b̄ay-dor-jay,

exponent of endless scriptures and tenets,

with few words and clear meaning, summary of the extensive, on the fifteenth day of the Miracle Month in the year earth-female-monkey called "White" in the palace of the Sea of Enjoyment of the Great Vehicle Secret Mantra Great Bliss located on Mount Increase of Virtue, the Snowy Land's second Vulture Peak, gathering place of heroes and sky-travelers

in dependence upon texts on tenets by Indians and Tibetans and in particular on the great textual systems of Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom,"* Shāntarakṣhita's *Compendium of Principles* and Kamalashīla's commentary, *Kālachakra,* and so forth

in order to fulfill an earlier request by the learned S̄er-kang Chö-jay Guṇamati with fresh flowers of poetry and a later request by the great spiritual guide of all, Pak-b̄a-rin-chen, whose master was the supreme scholar J̄ang-ra and who in an official letter in poetry along with tea, turquoise, and a ceremonial scarf wrote, "A very extensive response to D̄ak-tsang's refutation is needed," and especially in order to develop facility in my own mind

upon having gained from the Great Scholar, Precious Lord of All Conquerors the religious boon of the three vows and so forth and having taken to the crown of my head the dust of the feet of many holy ones—the four (the father, Jam-yang Lama, precious Throne-Holder of Gan-den and his spiritual sons), Paṇ-chen Ḡa-gyur-ba, Dor-jay-chang M̄in-dröl Chö-ḡyi-gyel-bo, S̄ay-dor-jay-chang, great Bodhisattva Nga-w̄ang-lo-drö, and so forth—

and upon having gained ascertainment with respect to the Foremost Lama's Sūtra and Mantra,

may the Conqueror's teaching advance and spread in all directions and at all times!

Great Exposition of Tenets: Commentary on the *Root Text of Tenets*

REMARKS ABOUT THE COMMENTARY

With regard to the format of the commentary:

- The *Root Text of Tenets: Lion's Roar*[24] by Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a Nga-w̄ang-d̄zön-drü is in bold type, divided into 351 units in accordance with Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's autocommentary, *Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings,* also known as the *Great Exposition of Tenets.*[25]
- The *Root Text* is preceded by the running outline[a] found in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets.*
- Due to its terseness, the *Root Text* is followed at the margin by the word-commentary by Kalkha Mongolian scholar Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den[b] as found at the end of each chapter in his *Annotations for (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Tenets": Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought.*[c]
- The *Root Text* is supplemented with clearly marked indented commentary from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* and from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations for (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Tenets."* Explanatory materials are also added at several relevant places from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of the Obscurational and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets,* Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of Tenets* and *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths,* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Seventy Topics,* D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* and *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path,* Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline,* Gedün Lodrö's *Calm Abiding and Special Insight,* and Ge-dün-l̄o-drö's oral commentary on the chapter on the Sūtra School. Lengthy excerpts are also added from D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen's *Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets*[d] and his autocommentary *Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence.*[26]

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[a] A separate table of contents, titled *Contents of the "Root Text of Tenets: Lion's Roar" by Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a Nga-w̄ang-d̄zön-drü* (*grub mtha' rtsa ba gdong lnga'i sgra dbyangs zhes bya ba'i tshig 'grel*), was compiled by Ge-s̄hay Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma (*ngag dbang nyi ma*) in 1976.

[b] *ngag dbang dpal ldan,* b. 1797; also known as B̄el-den-chö-jay (*dpal ldan chos rje*).

[c] *grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor.* The word-commentary also appears in a separate text as the last item in his Collected Works.

[d] *grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos.*

Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

By Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a Nga-w̄ang-d̄zön-drü

Preamble to the Treatise

The description of the presentations of our own and others' tenets has three parts: beginning, text, and end.

I. BEGINNING {2}

This section has two parts: expressions of worship and advice to listen along with a promise of composition.

Namas svarasvatyai **(Homage to Svarasvatī.)**[a]

A. EXPRESSIONS OF WORSHIP {4}

[This section has four parts: obeisance to Buddha and those holding the teaching; obeisance to Mañjushrī, father of all conquerors; obeisance to Svarasvatī, mother of all conquerors; and obeisance to D̄zong-ka-b̄a and so forth.[b]]

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[a] *Svarasvatī* has not been edited to *Sarasvatī* because the *sva* spelling occurs consistently in many Tibetan texts and accords more with the Tibetan translation of the name as *dbyangs,* "melody" or "intonation." Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a pays homage to his special deity, the goddess Svarasvatī for bestowing verbal feats to aid in composing the text. Kensur Ngawang Lekden mentioned that Svarasvatī is a special deity for authors, assisting with perfect speech; he said that for this purpose she is imagined as residing on one's tongue, and Mañjushrī is imagined as residing in one's throat; Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a himself speaks of the two Mañjushrīs as residing in his heart. See the stanza concluding the section on the history of the Great Vehicle for a further mention of the two Mañjushrīs and Svarasvatī, 505.

[b] These four headings have been added for the sake of clarity.

[1. Obeisance to Buddha and Those Holding the Teaching]

Obeisance to the lion of Shākyas—as well as those in his transmission—who, through limitless deeds of the three secrecies and through limitless multiplications of stable and moving dance, opened many doors of profound and vast doctrine in accordance with the dispositions of trainees and who, with discourse on dependent-arising, showed the path to omniscience.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Homage to the lion of Shākyas—as well as the lineage of gurus, the seven of the line of transmission, and so forth—who, through limitless deeds of the three secrecies[a] of exalted body, speech, and mind in accordance with the dispositions, thoughts, and tendencies of high, middle, and low trainees and through limitless multiplications of dancing aspects appearing as varieties of stable environments[b] and moving animate beings, opened many doors of profound and vast doctrine and who in particular, with discourse on profound dependent-arising, intensively showed the clear path proceeding to omniscience.

[2. Obeisance to Mañjushrī, Father of all Conquerors]

O you two, the sole father of all Conquerors—simultaneous with raising the sharp sword of incomparable wisdom in the empty sky you destroy the enemy, ignorance; simultaneous with eyes of compassion your lips smiling at beings expound eloquence; and simultaneous with bringing a treasury of doctrine you bestow on those in mindful yoga the ability to answer questions without forgetting. Brightly bestow on me simultaneously supreme intelligence and speech.

Word Commentary on Root Text: O you two, white and yellow Mañjughoṣhas:

- simultaneously, all at once, with raising the sword of incomparable wisdom in the sky of emptiness you clear away the enemy of trainees, ignorance
- simultaneously with looking at beings with eyes of compassion your smiling, laughing lips bestow on them a festival of eloquent doctrine

[a] They are secret because no sentient being's thought can encompass them.
[b] Physical things.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- simultaneously with bringing a treasury of doctrine—books—you bestow on those in mindful yoga, that is, on those trainees who are depending on you as their special god, the retention and confidence that are the ability to hold without forgetting the terms and meanings of those books and the ability to explain them unobstructedly to others

brightly—clearly—bestow on my mental continuum supreme feats of intelligence and speech simultaneously.

[3. Obeisance to Svarasvatī, Mother of all Conquerors]

O Daughter of Brahmā, mountain of white crystal come from an ocean of milk, simultaneous with attractive lips, you smilingly bring about satisfaction through looking askance with blue sapphire eyes,[a] and liberate the dark confinement of mind into a hundred thousand very bright lotuses of discrimination through letting loose the arrows of your blue-lotus,[b] long, drawing eyes on your full moon face.

Word Commentary on Root Text: O Daughter of Brahmā, mountain of white crystal come from, or risen out of, an ocean of milk, simultaneous with lips attractive due to your compassion, smilingly bring about satisfaction through looking askance with your blue, or indranīla, eyes, and liberate the dark confinement of mind into a hundred thousand very bright lotuses of the intelligence of discrimination through letting loose the arrows of your blue-lotus, long, drawing eyes—on your face, the full circle of the moon—looking askance.[c]

[4. Obeisance to Dzong-ka-ba and so forth]

Who with discrimination would not respect Ḻo-sang—the former Conqueror—and his children and the later Conquerors and their children, and so forth, whose appearance is like that of the Monarch of Sages, since when here Sūtra and Mantra as well as the profound and the vast were practiced only alternately like day and night, he emitted the awakened light of the practice of all teachings by the Sage?

Word Commentary on Root Text: Who with discrimination would not re-

[a] *dbang sngon, indranīla.*

[b] *utpala sngon po.*

[c] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's identification of the types of poetic figures has been omitted.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

spect L̄o-sang, the former Conqueror, the great D̄zong-ka-b̄a, and his children and the later Conquerors and their children, and so forth, whose appearance is like of the Monarch of Sages! For at a time when here in the Snowy Land [of Tibet] there was no style of practice of the union of Sūtra and Mantra and there was no style of practice of the union of the profound and the vast and those were practiced alternately like day and night, he brought forth a good system—like awakened, or godly, light which does not alternately rise and set—of the practice of all the teachings of the Sage, in one sitting, from the approach of the simultaneous practice of:

- the union of Sūtra and Mantra
- the union of method and wisdom
- the union of exposition and practical implementation
- hearing, thinking, and meditating

and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[27] It used to be that like day and night there was no chance that Sūtra and Mantra would come together at one time in one person, and they could not even be present at one time in one locality. Similarly, there was no technique for practicing at one time the view of stopping conceptuality—which was claimed to be the profound view—and the vast path of altruistic mind-training and so forth. Instead of this, when a person practiced the discipline in the early part of the life, Mantra was discarded, and when Mantra was practiced later in the life, the signs of having left the home-life on up were discarded, and these were practiced just alternatively like the high and lower ends of a scale. Then, an emitter of great illumination that is like awakened light—in a lesser way like the light of the gods of the Highest Pure Land and below and in a greater way like the light of great Complete Enjoyment Bodies and Emanations Bodies—in three senses:
>
> 1. shining everywhere without rising or setting
> 2. naturally overwhelming other light with its brilliance
> 3. maturing and releasing endless numbers of the fortunate in each time period
>
> emitted the great illumination of the teaching
>
> 1. shining at all times the illumination of the practice of the apprehension, maintenance, and increase of the explanation and achievement all without exception of Sūtra and Mantra
> 2. naturally overwhelming with its brilliance the mass of bad of explanations
> 3. maturing all the endless numbers of the fortunate in each time

period with each eloquent explanation.

He accomplished well prayer-wishes he had made in the holy presence of many Conquerors such as the earlier Conqueror Indraketu. The foremost holy Mañjushrīvajra, pervasive lord of maṇḍalas and sole father of all Conquerors, conferred initiation on him as lord of the teaching, bestowing the vase-water of the entirety of the profound and vast Sūtra and Mantra, transmitting the teaching of the entirety of Sūtra and Mantra. …Who with a mind would not respect these Indians and Tibetans whose appearance is like that of the monarch of sages:

- the great being Dzong-ka-ba, king of doctrine of the three realms, who is the former Conqueror [mentioned in the root text], being confirmed by the Conqueror Ajita [Maitreya] as coming like a second Buddha and by the *Glorious Kālachakra* as coming like King Suchandra
- his senior spiritual son, the omniscient Gyel-tsap
- the supreme ornament of the world, the omniscient Ke-drup
- Jam-yang-chö-jay,[a] whose exalted activities are equal to space
- the omniscient holy leader [the First Dalai Lama] Gen-dün-drup[b]…and the subsequent [Dalai Lamas], who are the later Conquerors [mentioned in the root text], along with their spiritual children

and those included with the phrase "and so forth" in the root text, these being mainly:

- the general line of reincarnations of the omniscient Ke-drup, himself an emanation of Kalki Mañjushrīkīrti, and in particular the omniscient [First] Paṇchen [Lama] Lo-sang-chö-gyi-gyel-tsen,[c] the father—who is also renowned as an emanation of Amitāyus—and his spiritual sons
- my own tutors, more than thirty scholar-adepts

and so forth. For they are guides to the path to liberation and omniscience.

[a] *'jam dbyangs chos rje,* 1379-1449; founder of Dre-bung Monastic University.

[b] *dge 'dun grub,* 1391-1474.

[c] *blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan,* 1567(?)-1662.

B. ADVICE TO LISTEN ALONG WITH [AN IMPLICIT] PROMISE OF COMPOSITION

O you with intelligence, happily retain this previously non-existent precious eloquence, lamp illuminating the path to omniscience, which I, having relied on skillful captains of the ship of reasoning through hundreds of fatiguing tasks, gained upon crossing to the end of the ocean of tenets.

Word Commentary on Root Text: O you with intelligence, happily and enthusiastically retain in mind this precious eloquence, this unprecedented lamp clarifying the path to omniscience, which no master of tenets could clearly expound and which, having entered on the sturdy great ship of the unmistaken path of reasoning and relying on good skillful captains of the ship of non-erroneous reasoning—wise virtuous friends who had crossed well to the other side of the ocean of our own and others' schools of tenets—I, upon crossing to the end of the ocean of tenets, gained through many hundreds of tiring tasks in order to hear, think, and meditate.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[28] In general, it is very difficult and rare to go to the other side of the ocean of our own and others' tenets because:
>
> - It is renowned that even in the country of Superiors [India], the source of scholars, there were no more than several, the father Nāgārjuna, his spiritual sons, Atisha, and so forth who crossed to the other side of the ocean of our own and others' tenets.
> - It is renowned and established that even in most of the commentaries by the Proponents of Valid Cognition there are many mistakes.
> - Here in Tibet also, as will be explained, most professors of tenets did not even see the mere sources of tenets and could not explain the details, and it is apparent that J̄om-ral,[a] D̄ak-tsang, and so forth made many errors.
>
> Nevertheless, this eloquent explanation—gone to the end of the ocean of tenets, precious jewel of both word and meaning—of the difference between Outer and Inner, the difference between the

[a] *bcom ral / bcom ldan ral gri / bcom ldan rigs pa'i ral gri / dar ma rgyal mtshan,* 1227-1305. He is a Ḡa-dam-b̄a (*bka' gdams pa*) and teacher of Ḡyo-d̄ön M̄ön-lam-tsul-trim (*skyo ston smon lam tshul khrims,* 1219-1299); he wrote a tenets text titled *grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog.*

Sūtra School and the Mind-Only School, the difference between the two types of Autonomy Schools, the eight pairs of uncommon features of the Consequence School, and so forth, which were not brought out by other, earlier professors of tenets [was composed] upon having perceived the door-opening to the stages of the path by means of the sun-like eloquent explanations of the six ornaments[a] and, in particular, the foremost father [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] and spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup] and the Fifth Dalai Lama's *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī Giving Instructions on the Path,* and having perceived the door-opening to the complete range of Sūtra and Mantra through their explanations of the *Glorious Guhyasamāja.* Since it is a source of much great meaning, those with discrimination should be enthusiastic in retaining it with pleasure and delight, for it illuminates the entire path progressing to knowledge of all phenomena.

The implicit promise of composition is: Though there are endless words and meanings, the text is short due to many purposes such as making it easy to grasp both the text and its meanings, and so hold this like a jewelled lamp of supremely great light rays of discrimination, and I will make the explanation.

To know such features it is necessary to have abandoned bias. Though [one's own system] is of high quality, it is not suitable to have great attachment to it and to hate others' systems. If such happens, not only will you not understand the meaning properly but also there are many faults such as being oppressed by great obscuration…Nevertheless, it is not suitable, as some fools claim, that there be no difference between good and bad explanations, because good explanations should be praised and apprehended, whereas bad explanations should be criticized and discarded but without desire and hatred…Mere non-bias is not sufficient; rather, you must analyze with intelligence that discriminates good and bad explanations, since otherwise you would be susceptible to being led by a fool to a promontory over a river…For it is necessary to eliminate doubts through the power of valid cognition.

Consequently, do not create boastful attitudes of bewilderment by thinking, "There are many arguments among the six ornaments and so forth, and if I was to discriminate between our own and others' positions, this would be a case of desire and hatred, whereas since for me there is no difference even between the systems of the

[a] Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Great Exposition School and the Consequence School, I have no desire and hatred." For there is no greater ill-deed than that, and it clearly shows that you are a fool and that you dislike the doctrine…

With respect to synonyms of tenet (*grub mtha'*, literally "limit of the established") there are *samaya, siddhyanta, siddha, siddhānta, tantra,* and *kṛtānta.*

<u>*Samaya*</u>

Amarasinha's *Treasury* says:[a]

> *Samaya* [is used for] practicing oaths (*gna' kun spyod*),
> Time (*dus*), tenet (*grub mtha'*), correct knowledge (*yang dag rig*)
> Non-virtuous previous action (*mi dge sngon las*), suffering (*sdug bsngal*), and so forth.

<u>*Siddhyanta*</u>

Through compounding *siddhi* and *anta,* there is *siddhyanta,* and *siddhi* is used for actual [yogic] achievement (*dngos grub*), established (*grub pa*), and so forth.

<u>*Siddhānta*</u>

Through compounding *siddha* and *anta,* there is *siddhānta,* and with respect to *siddha* Amarasinha's *Treasury* says:[b]

> Established (*grub pa*), terminated/ceased (*zin pa*), finished (*rdzogs pa*).

Niṣpanna, the Sanskrit original for finished (*rdzogs pa*), is also suitable [to be translated into Tibetan as] definite production (*nges par bskyed pa*), and *pariniṣpanna* is also translated as thoroughly established (*yongs grub*).

With respect to *anta* Vasubandhu's *Principles of Explanation* says:

> *Anta* [is used for] finished (*zad*), point of entry (*'jug cha*)
> Near/vicinity (*nye*), faction/position/direction (*phyogs*), derision (*smad pa*).

Also, *anta* is used for center (*dbus*), in-between (*bar*), inside (*nang*), and so forth.

<u>*Tantra*</u>

Amarasinha's *Treasury* says:[c]

> *Tantra* [is used for] principal (*gtso bo*), tenet (*grub mtha'*),

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[a] 3.3.659-660: *samayāḥ śapathā' 'cārakālasiddhāntasaṃvidaḥ / vyasanānyaśubhaṃ daivaṃ vipadityanayāstrayaḥ.*

[b] 3.1.203: *siddhe nirvṛttaniṣpannau.*

[c] 3.3.731: *tantraṃ pradhāne siddhānte sūtravāye paricchade.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> weaving threads (*thags 'thag pa*), and thoroughly concealed (*yongs su 'gebs*).

and also the *One Word, Many Meanings* says:

> *Tantra* [is used for] treatise (*bstan bcos*), lineage (*rigs*), continuum (*rgyud*),
> The actions of activated medicine (*grub pa'i sman gyi bya ba*),
> Bliss (*bde ba*), powerful (*stobs ldan*),
> Training the winds (*rlung sbyong*), and tenet (*grub mtha'*).

<u>*Kṛtānta*</u>

Amarasinha's *Treasury* says:[a]

> *Kṛtānta* [is used for] Yama (*gshin rje*),
> Tenet (*grub mtha'*), might (*dbang thang*), and non-virtuous action (*mi dge'i las*).

To condense those points: The meaning of tenet is that which is established as correct for one's own mind upon having refuted other conceptually imagined factors.

- The *sam* of *samaya* is used for "correct" (*yang dag pa*), and *aya* is also used for "realization" (*rtogs pa*). Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* also speaks of "the pledges (*dam tshig, samaya*) of the individual schools," and this is the meaning of *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* where it says, "One's own mind overcomes appearing conceptions."
- *Siddhyanta* or *siddhānta* is so called because it is within what is established for one's own mind. Moreover, it is formed from the root for "treatise" (*bstan bcos, śāstra*), the *Sūtra of Roots*[b] saying, "*Ṣidhu* [is used for] treatise (*bstan bcos*), fortune (*bkra shis*)," and hence by way of the verbal root, [*siddhyanta* and *siddhānta*] also refer to a treatise. Thus a text that demonstrates factors established for one's own mind is called a *Tenets* (*grub mtha', siddhyanta* or *siddhānta*) as in the statement, "So-and-so composed a *Tenets*."
- *Tantra* is also used for this.
- In *kṛtānta, kṛta* is used for "done" (*byas pa*), and *anta* is used for "end" (*mtha'*), "inside" (*nang*), "position/faction/direction" (*phyogs*), and so forth; hence, it is the limit, or containment, of meanings presented within having ascertained them as correct by one's own awareness.

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[a] 3.3.475: *kṛtānto yama siddhānta daivā 'kuśalakarmasu.*

[b] *byings mdo, dhātusūtra.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[29] With respect to *anta* (*mtha'*):

- When *anta* is taken as "finished" (*zad pa*), a tenet (*siddhānta*) is so called because a meaning established in the perspective of one's awareness is finished—that is, non-existent—as anything else…
- When *anta* is taken as "position/faction/direction," it is described as [meaning] discriminated as a position/faction, "Mine is this and not anything other."
- In the case of, for instance, "The severance of the continuum of matter and knowledge at the time of a remainderless nirvāṇa is a tenet of the Hearer Schools," *anta* is taken as a "factor" (*cha*), since it is a portion (*cha shas*) that is established for their awareness.

II. THE TEXT {3}

This section has three parts: differentiation of outer and inner together with dispelling mistakes, brief indication of outer and inner in terms of the body, and extensive explanation of outer and inner limb by limb.

A. DIFFERENTIATION OF OUTER AND INNER TOGETHER WITH DISPELLING MISTAKES {2}

This section has two parts: identifying the difference between outer and inner and dispelling mistakes with regard to that.

1. Identifying the Difference between Outer and Inner

Through teaching, teacher, and view there are two, Outer and Inner.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There is a way of establishing Outer [non-Buddhist] and Inner [Buddhist] through whether the teaching abandons harming and hurting sentient beings, whether the teacher has exhausted all defects and has completed good qualities, and whether the view is of self or of selflessness.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [30] [Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a] is saying that Outer and Inner have differentiating features—the three being teacher, teaching, and view and the four being view, meditation, behavior, and fruit. He is not setting out that whoever is an Insider necessarily has those features, since the omniscient foremost [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] clearly explains—in accordance with the renowned assertions of the Elder [Atisha] and Ratnākarashānti—that Outsider and Insider are differentiated by refuge. Therefore, becoming an Insider, entering the scriptural and realizational teaching, generating refuge in one's continuum, and so forth are simultaneous because D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Exposition of the Stages of the Path*[a] explains

[a] When the title "*Exposition of the Stages of the Path*" is used without specifying whether this is D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* or his *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path,* it usually refers to both texts.

that Insider and Outsider are differentiated by refuge and that the door of entry to the teaching is refuge.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[31] The difference between Outer and Inner must be made through the three—teaching, teacher, and view. This is because the system of just the Buddhists, or Insiders, is one whose:

- teacher has extinguished all defects and attained good qualities without remainder and hence teaches under their own power the profound dependent-arising
- teaching is the excellent doctrine that has the features of abandoning the harming and hurting of sentient beings
- view is an assertion from the depths that a permanent, unitary, self-powered self does not exist

and the opposite of those three is the system of others' schools, which are outside of these Insiders…

Outer and Inner are posited by way of teacher since teachers are accepted upon having come to know their attributes:

- because…the glorious Chandrakīrti explains that the teaching of the profound doctrine of dependent-arising *under one's own power* does not exist even in Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas, never mind the common beings of Outsider Schools
- and because [Outsiders and Insiders] assert as the teacher their respective ones—as in [calling themselves after the name of their teacher] Bauddhas, Barhaspatyas, Kāpilas, Ulukaputrīyas, Akṣhipādas, Aishvaras, Vaiṣhṇavas, Chāndrakas, Brāhmaṇas, and Arahatas—and are seen to only assert themselves as followers of those teachers
- and because even though there are cases of designating forms of names by way of a text, an assertion, and so forth, that does not damage this point.

Therefore, although the difference between Outer and Inner is made just by way of the teacher, the difference between the individual schools of tenets—Outer and Inner schools of tenets—is just made by way of view, as is the case with the four schools of Insider [Buddhist] tenets…

Also, the [Buddhist] teaching has the features of:

- a relationship of completion among hearing, thinking, and meditating such that:
    1. Initially, through hearing any of the twelve branches of

scripture predispositions for liberation [are established].

2. In the middle, through thinking on them meanings are realized whereby the pointedness of most afflictive emotions is suppressed.
3. Finally, through meditating on them one is gradually released from afflictive emotions and so forth.

- a teaching that does not harm
- asserting selflessness as a path of release.

Outer and Inner can be differentiated by way of those because all four Inner schools of tenets assert those features, whereas Others' schools do not assert them…

Also, Outer and Inner must be differentiated by way of whether there is or is not assertion of:

- the view of the selflessness of persons
- the views that are like four seals—that all compounded things are impermanent and so forth (see the next page).

2. Dispelling Mistakes with regard to Identifying the Difference between Outer and Inner {2}

This section has two parts: explaining that there is a difference also by way of view, meditation, and behavior, and indicating that certain professors of tenets are mistaken about the meaning established by those points.

a. Explaining that there is a Difference between Outer and Inner also by way of View, Meditation, and Behavior

By way of views that testify to the word, meditation that is the antidote of cyclic existence, behavior that has abandoned the two extremes, and fruits of separation that are analytical cessations, there is the teaching.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Moreover, the pure teaching of the Insiders, the Buddhists, is established through four—view that is the four seals testifying the word [of Buddha]; meditation that eradicates all cyclic existence, such as the peak of existence and so forth; behavior that abandons the two extremes of indulgence and tiring fatigue; and fruits of separation through the wisdom realizing selflessness, these being fruits that are individual analytical cessations after which [what has been overcome] does not return.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[32] The difference between Outer and Inner must be made this way:

1. [Concerning *views*] all doctrines of the One-Gone-Thus are included in four aphorisms:
   - All compounded things are impermanent.
   - All contaminated things are miserable.
   - All phenomena are selfless.
   - Nirvāṇa is peace…
2. [Concerning *meditation*] the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra* says:[33]

   > Though worldly beings cultivate meditative stabilization,
   > They do not destroy the discrimination of self.
   > They are greatly disturbed by the return of afflictive emotions,
   > As was the case of the cultivation of meditative stabilization by Udraka.
   >
   > If phenomena are individually analyzed as selfless
   > And what has been analyzed is meditated upon,
   > That is the cause for attaining the fruit, nirvāṇa.
   > Through any other cause one does not go to peace…

   Since [non-Buddhists] have a meditation that [achieves] only the peak of cyclic existence and also have turned their backs on the view of selflessness, they do not have meditative cultivation of antidotes totally overcoming even just the lowest forms of cyclic existence, the bad transmigrations, due to which they do not have antidotes pulling out the roots of any form of cyclic existence…
3. The *behavior* is to know the proper measure, avoiding the two extremes:
   - the extreme of indulging desire and attachment for high quality and many foods, garments, and so forth—low quality and few not being sufficient
   - the extreme of harsh, fatiguing living, harming body and mind through very severe life-styles as is the case with the behavior of the Nirgranthas [that is, Jainas]…
4. The *fruits of separation* [brought about] by the wisdom of individual investigation of phenomena as selfless are true cessations such that what are abandoned do not return.

b. Indicating that Certain Professors of Tenets are Mistaken about the Meaning Established by Those

The opposites of the two—pure teaching and a teacher who has exhausted all defects—are the others. Hence, assertions that it is not by refuge and that the teachers are the same are mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Through the opposites of the aforementioned four—view, meditation, behavior, and fruit—it is established that the others' teaching is impure, and through the opposite of a teacher who has extinguished all defects it is established that others' teachers have defects. Hence, you should know that it is mistaken[a] to say that the differentiation of Outer and Inner is not made through refuge and that it is mistaken to assert that the teacher of Outer and Inner is one.

B. Brief Indication of Outer and Inner in Terms of the Body {4}

This section has four parts: assertions of the individual proponents of Outer and Inner tenets, who is respected, how the lower tenet systems serve as pedestals to the higher, and the feature of how they fall or do not fall to subtle extremes.

1. Assertions of the Individual Proponents of Outer and Inner Tenets

Through proving or refuting the object conceived by a view of a self there are two, Outer and Inner. About the first, by way of the manifest and the obscure there are proponents of annihilation and of permanence. Through asserting and refuting true existence there are Proponents of True Existence and Proponents of No True Existence. Through holding to the outer and the inner there are Proponents of Objects and Proponents of Mind-Only.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The proponents of Outer tenets are established from the perspective of their affirming that the object conceived by a view[b] of a permanent, unitary, independent self is correct.

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 43.20) identifies the persons making these mistakes as D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen and so forth.

[b] "View" is a mental factor and thus an apprehender of an object; therefore, the word

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Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[34] Through quasi-scriptures and quasi-reasonings the Forders assert that a self of persons exists. The quasi-scriptures are explanations, transmitted from one to the other, that a self of persons exists. The quasi-reasonings…are:

- If the self did not exist, then when the shapes of the face and so forth of a being are seen, it would be right for an awareness only of shape to be generated, and it would not be right for an awareness of a sentient being to be generated, but it is perceived that an awareness of a being is generated. Hence, a self, or sentient being, aside from just the mental and physical aggregates, exists.
- Likewise, when feelings of pleasure and pain are perceived, it [absurdly] follows that it would be right for an awareness of only feeling to be generated, but, beyond that, an awareness of a lofty sentient being would not be generated with respect to predominantly partaking of pleasure, and an awareness of a lowly sentient being would be not generated with respect to predominantly partaking of pain.
- It [absurdly] follows that when imputing conventions of names such as "Devadatta" and so forth, an awareness only of discrimination would be generated, but an awareness of a sentient being aside from that would not be generated.
- It [absurdly] follows that when engaging in the compositional activity of afflictive emotions such as desire and so forth, an awareness of only compositional activity would be generated, but an awareness of a childish person aside from those would not be generated, and when engaging in the compositional activity of faith and so forth, an awareness of only compositional activity would be generated, but an awareness of a wise person aside from those would not be generated.
- It [absurdly] follows that when consciousness engages objects by way of the eyes and so forth, an awareness thinking "Consciousness sees," would be generated, but an awareness of a sentient being through thinking "I see," would not be generated. Since, opposite to this, an awareness of a sentient being is generated, a sentient being aside from consciousness exists.
- Moreover, if a self aside from the mere aggregates did not exist, then without first having an awareness of self thinking, "[I] saw a form; [I] will see it [again]," it would be right just to have an

could be translated as "viewer" rather than "view" as is customary.

awareness of the aggregates, but when engaging [in such activities] an awareness of self definitely operates upon prior motivation, and hence a self aside from the mere aggregates exists.

- In brief, the subject, an awareness thinking "sentient being," engages its object properly because of being an awareness that operates when seeing things without prior consideration, like an apprehension of blue.

Insider Buddhists have endless scriptures refuting a self of persons, and from among the very many reasonings, for the time being they should be known by way of the ten groups as explained in Asaṅga's *Grounds of Yogic Practice* because if those seeking release definitely must entirely refute the conceived object of a [false] view of the transitory [as real I and mine] and definitely must assert a mere person, you should become skilled in the ways of refutation and proof also by reasoning, for otherwise all endeavors will be senseless.

Question: If the mere person is not to be refuted, what specifics are there?

Answer: The statements in many sūtras to refute a true person,"[a] the statements in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Bases* to refute an ultimate[b] person, and the statements in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,* Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments,* and commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* to refute a substantially existent[c] person all have the same meaning. Hence, concerning the meaning of imputed existence and substantial existence:

- A phenomenon that, when it appears as an object of awareness, definitely must depend upon the appearance of the aspect of another substratum whose character is discordant with it is imputedly existent.
- A phenomenon that, when it appears as an object of awareness, does not have to depend upon the appearance of the aspect of another substratum whose character is discordant with it but appears under it own power is substantially existent.

[The Ten Reasonings]

1. Refuting the assertion that because an awareness of a sentient being is seen to be produced without prior consideration when

[a] *gang zag bden pa pa.*

[b] *don dam pa.*

[c] *rdzas yod.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

effective things and so forth are seen, sentient beings are substantially existent: Is it that, upon seeing general effective things and so forth, an awareness of a sentient being is generated with respect to just them? Or, is it that upon seeing something else, an awareness of a sentient being is generated with respect to it?

If it is that, upon seeing general effective things and so forth, an awareness of a sentient being is generated with respect to just them, then it follows that this awareness is a wrong consciousness because this awareness adheres to just them as a sentient being, and [according to you] a sentient being is established as other than them. If it is that upon seeing something else, an awareness of a sentient being is generated with respect to it, [the assertion] that this awareness is generated upon seeing those very things and so forth has fallen apart.

Moreover, do those substrata that, when seen, generate an awareness of a sentient being, have the nature of a sentient being, or the nature of something else? If it is that those substrata that, when seen, generate an awareness of a sentient being, have the nature of a sentient being, then it also follows that this awareness is a wrong consciousness because this awareness perceives [a sentient being] as being self-sufficient in the sense of having a character discordant with those. If it is that those substrata that, when seen, generate an awareness of a sentient being, have the nature of something else, then it would be necessary to assert that even a pot is a cause generating an awareness of woolen cloth.

Also, do you assert that an awareness of a sentient being is, or is not, generated with respect to what is not a sentient being? If you do not assert that an awareness of a sentient being is generated with respect to what is not a sentient being, such is negated by obvious perception, since it is experienced that an awareness of a human is generated with respect to a cairn.[a] If you do assert that an awareness of a sentient being is generated with respect to what is not a sentient being, then you have made inconclusive your own earlier reasons proving that an awareness of a sentient being properly engages its object.

Likewise, this is to be refuted upon analyzing (1) whether it is asserted, or not, that an awareness of a non-sentient-being

[a] A vertical pile of stones.

is generated with respect to a sentient being, and (2) whether it is asserted, or not, that an awareness of another sentient being is generated with respect to a sentient being. These are understood through the above reasons.

Moreover, when the aggregates are seen, is the substratum generating an awareness of a sentient being manifest or obscure? If the substratum generating an awareness of a sentient being is manifest, then it follows that the aggregates themselves are the sentient being because another substratum aside from those is not manifestly seen. If the substratum generating an awareness of a sentient being is obscure, then when a small child engages [those objects] without investigation and without analysis, an awareness of a sentient being would not be generated.

2. Refuting the assertion that because it is observed that upon having a prior awareness such as "I will murder," and "I will give up taking life," such activities are done, the self substantially exists: Do those activities arise from a cause that is an awareness or a cause that is the self? If those activities arise from a cause that is an awareness, then that it is an activity of a substantially existent self falls apart. If those activities arise from a cause that is the self, then it contradicts that it is an activity preceded by an awareness.

Is the cause of the activity permanent or impermanent? If the cause of the activity is permanent, that it is an "activity" falls apart. If the cause of the activity is impermanent, it is not feasible for it to be an activity of a permanent self.

Does the sentient being who is the actor have an essence of exertion or an essence of non-exertion? If the sentient being who is the actor has an essence of exertion, then that it is a permanent self falls apart. If the sentient being who is the actor has an essence of non-exertion, then it is contradictory for the non-exerting to exert.

Does this activity of a sentient being have a cause or not? If not, it would always act; if it does, some cause other than itself would have to precede it, whereby that the self acts under its own power falls apart.

Is the activity done under [the self's] own power, or is it done under another's power? If the activity is done under its own power, then it would utterly not undergo sufferings such as birth, aging, sickness, and death because whatever is done is

under its own power. If that activity is done under another's power, then the activity is not fit to be an activity by the self because you have asserted that the self is under its own power.

Through those [two] the reasonings proving the self are refuted.

3. Imputation to the aggregates: (1) Is the "person" imputed to the aggregates, or (2) does it abide in the aggregates like the heap [of grain] of a maṇḍala offering,[a] or (3) is it other than the aggregates like aligned spoons, or (4) are the aggregates utterly non-existent? If the "person" is imputed to the aggregates, then that the person is established self-sufficiently as a separate factuality from the aggregates falls apart.

   If it abides in the aggregates like the heap [of grain] of a maṇḍala offering, is the person permanent or impermanent? If it abides in the aggregates like the heap [of grain] of a maṇḍala offering and is permanent, then pleasure and pain cannot help or harm it, due to which it would not accumulate virtuous and non-virtuous karma, and if it does not accumulate karma, it would not take a body, due to which there would be no need to assert a person. If it abides in the aggregates like the heap [of grain] of a maṇḍala offering and is impermanent, production and disintegration that are separate factualities from the aggregates would have to be observed, but such is not observed, whereby an impermanent person is not feasible.

   If it is other than the aggregates like aligned spoons, then the person would be uncompounded, due to which it would be senseless to assert it.

   If the aggregates are utterly non-existent, then it would be released without striving because it would not be related with any means of being bound.

4. Positing its characteristics: If a person exists aside from the mere aggregates, does it have the nature of the seer of forms and so forth, or not? If it has the nature of the seer of forms and so forth, then is it imputed to the eyes that are the seers of forms and so forth, or is it a separate factuality from those? If it is imputed to the eyes that are the seers of forms and so forth, then your assertion [that it exists aside from the mere aggregates] falls apart.

[a] *tshom bu;* this is a heap or heaps of grain on a flat, usually round, surface. It is called a maṇḍala due to being round, which is the basic meaning of the word.

If the person is not imputed to the eyes that are the seers of forms and so forth, then the person would be the action[a] of seeing or the means[b] of seeing, since a relationship of separate factualities is being asserted. If the person is the action of seeing, it would be the basis of operation of the means, and hence is it the basis of operation of the means of seeing by way of newly generating its similar type, like a seed; or by way of transformation like a potter or a magician's [manifesting a] human; or by way of [serving as] a support, like the earth; or by way of opening an opportunity, like space?

If the person is the basis of operation of the means of seeing by way of newly generating its similar type, like a seed, then the seer would be impermanent, due to which the assertion that the seer is permanent would fall apart.

If the person is the basis of operation of the means of seeing by way of transformation like a potter [making a pot] or a magician's [manifesting a] human, then the seer would be impermanent and conventional, due to which your assertion [of a permanent ultimate self] would fall apart. If the seer is under its own power like certain manifestations by a magician [that upon being emanated are under their own power], then the seer would not have any suffering.

If the person is the basis of operation of the means of seeing by way of [serving as] the support, like the earth, then just as the earth serves as the support of the mobile and the immobile and is observed to disintegrate, it would have to be observed that the seer also does these, but such is not observed.

If the person is the basis of operation of the means of seeing by way of opening an opportunity, like space, then just as extension, contraction, and so forth can be performed in space and space does not block an opportunity [or area], these would also have to be observed in the seer, but such are not observed. Furthermore, just as space is posited to the mere elimination of its object of negation,[c] the seer would be posited to the mere elimination of its object of negation, in which case [the asser-

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[a] *las*. In general, the Tibetan term *las* (*karma*) means "action," but in the context of action, agent, and object (*bya byed las gsum = bya ba byed pa po las gsum*), it means "object." Neither of these seems to me to fit the meaning here.

[b] *byed pa*.

[c] The object of negation of space is obstructive contact.

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tion] that it appears to an awareness under its own power falls apart.

If the person is the means [of seeing], then does its engaging in action definitely depend on an agent, like a sickle, or does it from time to time engage in action under its own power, like fire. That like a sickle its engaging in action definitely depends on an agent is not feasible because whereas with regard to [a sickle] the means of engaging in the action[a] and the action that is engaged[b] are observed individually, such is not observed with regard to the seer.

If, like fire, it engages from time to time in action under its own power, then there would be no need to assert a person from being concerned that an agent would be lacking.

5. Positing full purification: Does the self have the character of full purification, or is it a separate factuality from full purification? If the self has the character of full purification, then it would not be reasonable to assert a person that is a separate factuality from the aggregates because benefit by way of food, clothing, and so forth and harmful affliction by way of disturbance of the elements and so forth is seen only in the aggregates and is not seen in something else.

   If the self has the character of full purification, then [the assertion] that the self is thoroughly afflicted and [becomes] fully purified falls apart.

6. Positing operation and desisting from operation[c]: Does a person that has the character of operation and desisting from operation perform operation and desisting from operation, or does a person that does not have the character of operation and desisting from operation perform operation and desisting from operation? If a person that has the character of operation and desisting from operation performs operation and desisting from operation, a person that is aside from the aggregates would not exist because the activity of operation is observed in only just the phenomena of the aggregates. There is:
   - operation by way of having causes, like one's own body from semen, blood [of the mother], and so forth

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[a] *las la 'jug byed.*

[b] *las la 'jug bya;* or perhaps "the object engaged in the action."

[c] *'jug ldog.* The word *'jug* has multiple meanings—operate, function, enter, engage, work, and so forth.

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- operation through having a nature of production, like a shoot
- operation through having a nature of disintegration, like the gradual descent of a river
- operation from one to the other, like a flame's [continuation of] similar type in another object/place
- changing operation, which is to engage in another activity upon having done a different activity, like changing upon having mounted a mount.[a]

If a person that does not have the character of operation and desisting from operation performs operation and desisting from operation, then the self would not operate because of not having the character of operation.

Desisting from operation is the falling off of operation, and since desisting from operation definitely depends upon operation that precedes it, analysis of desisting from operation is subsumed [in analysis of operation].

7. Positing the partaker,[b] agent,[c] and one who is released[d]: Do you assert that something that is affected, or not affected, by pleasure and pain generated by objects is the partaker? If something not affected by pleasure and pain generated by objects is asserted as the partaker, such is not fit to be the partaker because the partaker is that which is helped or harmed upon experiencing the partaken.

   If something affected by the pleasure and pain generated by objects is asserted as the partaker, a substantially existent self is meaningless because being affected is seen only in just compositional phenomena. It should be known that this fallacy of being affected applies also in the next two.

   Is something that is affected or not affected by the mind asserted as the agent? If something that is not affected by the mind is asserted as the agent, then [the assertion] that it is an agent falls apart because something that is affected by the mind is feasible as the person that is the agent.

   Is something that is affected or not affected by the afflictive emotions and the secondary afflictive emotions asserted as

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[a] I presume this to mean switching from one mount to another.

[b] *za ba po.*

[c] *byed pa po.*

[d] *grol pa po.*

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the one who is released? If something that is not affected by the afflictive emotions and the second afflictive emotions is asserted as the one who is released, then due to not having earlier been bound, how could later release be reasonable?

8. Imputing the agent:[a] Is the agent posited only to the self, or are others also suitable? If the agent is posited only to the self, it would not be suitable to say that the light of a burning fire makes illumination, and so forth.

    If others are also suitable as agents, then it would be sufficient to impute seeing, hearing, and so forth as agents, but there is no point in asserting a substantially existent self.

9. Imputing expressions: Is the convention "person" used only with respect to the self, or is it also used with respect to others? If the convention "person" is used only with respect to the self, then it would not be feasible to use the conventions [that is, the names] "Buddhadatta," "Guṇamitra," and so forth upon observing a being's body.

    If the convention "person" is also used with respect to others, then since it would also be used with respect to the seer and so forth, just that would be sufficient, but it would be pointless to assert a self.

10. Imputing the view of self: Is the view of self virtuous or non-virtuous? It is not feasible for the view of self to be virtuous:
    - because it is generated to a high degree in the bewildered, and
    - because it is produced without the endeavor of striving, and
    - because it generates fear of liberation, and
    - because it is seen that it nourishes faults such as desire and so forth.

    If the view of self is non-virtuous, then since it is mistaken with respect to an erroneous object of conception, it cannot be proved by way of it that the self exists.

    It is not suitable for the view of selflessness to be non-virtuous because the Omniscient One spoke of it as supreme and because:
    - it must be achieved through great striving, and
    - it does not generate fear of liberation, and
    - auspicious fruits are achieved immediately, and

[a] Reading *byed par 'dogs pa* for *byed par ldog pa,* 44.2.

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- it acts as an antidote to faults.

Furthermore, is it that since the self abides in objective suchness, a view of self is generated through its force, or is it that, while the self does not exist, the self is superimposed as existing through the force of one's being accustomed to improper mental application? If it is that since the self abides in objective suchness, a view of self is generated through its force, it [absurdly] follows that ascertainment of selflessness is not generated in Buddhists because [according to you] the view of self, generated through the power of the thing itself, blocks it.

If it is that, while the self does not exist, the self is superimposed as existing through the force of being accustomed to improper mental application, then it could not be proved by way of [the view of self] that the self exists.

In brief, the subject, a person not imputed [in dependence] upon any collection or continuum, does not have inherent existence because of not being established as either inherently one with or inherently different from the aggregates. The cause behind generating the qualm that the self exists is to have taken the innate view of the transitory as valid in terms of how [the self] appears to it.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Proponents of inner tenets are established from the perspective of their refuting such.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[35] Through many reductions to absurdity Insiders reject the existence of the self as apprehended by a view of a permanent, single, independent self. For instance, "If the self exists as apprehended by that coarse view of a self, the six transmigrations must not exist through the birth of the six types [gods, demigods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings, since the self would be permanent and thus could not be the agent of anything]."

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to Outsiders, those who assert only objects of direct perception are proponents of annihilation, and those who also assert obscure objects are proponents of permanence.

With respect to Inner proponents of tenets, those who assert truly existent entities are Proponents of True Existence [the Great Exposition School, the Sūtra School, and the Mind-Only School], and those who refute such are Proponents of No True Existence that is, the Middle Way School]. With respect to the first, the Proponents of True Existence, those who assert that external objects truly exist [the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are Proponents of Objects, and those who assert that

there are no external objects and that internal mind truly exists are the Mind-Only School.

2. Who is Respected

The Teacher and so forth are mostly drawn to their own schools; the respectful are many.

Word Commentary on Root Text: All proponents of Inner tenets draw to their own schools—or, in other words, assert as proponents of their own schools—the Teacher, the Buddha, as well as those who are included in the word "and so forth" in the root text: most of the valid beings who have the eye of doctrine—Maitreya, Mañjushrī, the two supreme beings [Shāriputra and Maudgalyāyana], the seven of the line of transmission, and so forth. There also are many later Proponents of Objects who have faith and respect for Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[36] Even though earlier members of the Hearer Schools despised Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, his brother [Vasubandhu], and so forth, later various Hearers did not have contempt for them and asserted the thought of their sayings. Proponents of Sūtra, Proponents of Mind-Only, and above [used the books of others' schools]. For instance, though the teacher Dharmapāla was a Proponent of Mind-Only, he commented on Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* and Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* [which are Middle Way texts] according to Mind-Only. Also, the master Ratnākarashānti's *Ornament of Mind-Only* says:
>
> > I will describe the two truths
> > Endowed with valid scripture
> > Explained by Maitreya and Asaṅga
> > And also asserted by Nāgārjuna.
>
> Also, he says in the same text:
>
> > Ratnākarashānti propounds that the tenets
> > Of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are similar.
>
> His *Connected Explanation of the Guhyasamāja Tantra, Handful of Flowers* also speaks similarly. The master Bhāvaviveka refutes the Mind-Only School, but…he cites the master Asaṅga as a source also for assertions on a [Buddha's] exalted bodies. Also, Shāntarakṣhita and his spiritual son [Kamalashīla], the duo—Āryavimuktasena and Haribhadra—Buddhajñāna, Jetāri, and so forth made Mind-Only and Middle Way just the yoked necks of

lions.[a] Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle* says:

> Mounting the chariot of the two systems [of Mind-Only and Middle Way]
> And grasping the reins of reasoning.

Both Āryavimuktasena and Haribhadra assert [the Mind-Only and Middle Way perspectives] like Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization.* In particular, Haribhadra's *Great Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization"* cites a passage from Dignāga:

> The perfection of knowledge, non-dual wisdom,
> Is the One-Gone-Thus.

and in the *Autocommentary to the "Texts of the One-Gone-to-Bliss"* Jetāri comments on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* as the Middle Way concordant with Nāgārjuna:

> Thus, it is suitable for the intelligent to assert and familiarize with this suchness of the Middle Way—understood from the scriptural sayings of the Supramundane Victor, illuminated by the holy Superior Nāgārjuna who was thoroughly certified by valid cognition, and asserted by the holy master Dharmakīrti.[b]

3. How the Lower Tenet Systems Serve as Pedestals to the Higher

Each is free of the extremes; imaginary imputations are refuted by the higher. The lower views are also pedestals to the higher.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Those proponents of tenets assert that their own system is a system of the center, free from the two extremes of permanence and nihilism.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[37] Even all these Outer schools and the four Inner schools assert that their own school is free of the two extremes without being mixed with the two extremes of non-existence and permanence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Uncommon, imaginary imputations by the lower schools are step by step refuted by the higher.

[a] For D̄ak-tsang's criticism of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's usage of this term in the Consequence School, see 536.

[b] This passage is also cited later, 771, but slightly differently; I am following the second reading here.

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Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [38] The non-established imaginative imputations by the lower schools of tenets are step by step refuted by the upper schools of tenets, and the schools just prove their own assertions, because there is no school of tenets that stubbornly insists, "I have no system, but what you say is not feasible." This is because:

- In general, the assertions by lesser worldly beings that a woman [or man][a] is clean by having washed herself [or himself] and that food—such as meat and blood—as well as clothing, and dwelling places and so forth are faultless are harmed when even worldly yogis, who although they are of Others' schools, examine those assertions by way of the yoga of estimation of things as unclean and by way of the yoga [that considers the phenomena of the lower realms to be] coarse [and the phenomena of the upper realms to be] peaceful.
- The Other schools' assertion of the self as permanent, unitary, and self-powered according to their systems of uncleanliness and of coarseness and peacefulness is harmed when the Great Exposition School breaks down things to partless particles and when it does investigation by way of the four seals.
- The assertion by the Proponents of the Great Exposition that everything is substantially established is harmed by the Sūtra School's refutation of substantial existence in uncompounded phenomena and their reasoning proving imputed existence even among compounded phenomena.
- The Proponents of Sūtra do not know how to establish all those [uncompounded and compounded phenomena]—the unclean and so forth—if phenomena are not established by way of their own measure of subsistence as the referents of their own names. The Proponents of Mind-Only refute that such is indeed established with absurd consequences such as, "It [absurdly] follows that many entities must be mixed,"[b] "It

[a] The text was addressed to men; so, it needs to be brought up to date.

[b] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

According to the other party, when the one name "Upagupta" is used for two beings, there is no difference in [the fact that] an awareness thinking, "This is Upagupta," is generated [with regard to both of them], and [if those two persons of different continuums are established by way of their own character as referents of the one name "Upagupta"] the names of those [two] and the conceptual consciousnesses [that are aware of such would have to] operate with respect to those two [persons] through the force of the things themselves. Therefore, those two

[absurdly] follows that one entity must be many,"[a] and so forth.

- Through many reasonings such as the lack of being one or many, and so forth, the Proponents of the Middle demonstrate the harm to the Mind-Only assertion that effective things are truly established and establish that all phenomena are only posited as established by names and terminology.

Furthermore, among lesser worldly beings in this context are Proponents of True Existence and all those whose minds have not been affected by tenets. Yogis [in this context] are the chief beings, Superiors—that is, yogis who have a union of calm abiding and special insight directly realizing emptiness. Even lesser common beings who realize emptiness [but not directly] are suitable to be worldly beings.

Therefore, not only do the higher harm the ways of positing conventions by the world, but also [the higher harming the lower] is relative among [the higher], because regarding the way yogis who realize emptiness mutually harm each other, the higher yogis harm the lower—that is to say, suppress the lower through their brilliance—and also within one mental continuum[b] higher [insights] harm the seeds that are to be abandoned yet cannot be harmed by the lower. Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (582, 603) says:[39]

> Among those, two aspects of the world are seen,
> Yogis and the ordinary.

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objects[—the two persons of different continuums—absurdly] would be one object [that is, would be one person with one continuum].

See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 208-209.

[a] Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> According to the other party [who holds that an object's being a referent of the convention of its name is established by way of the mode of subsistence of the object], the usage of many names such as Shakra, Indra, Grāmaghātaka, and so forth for one object must be by way of the force of the thing itself [since, according to the other party, this god is established by way of his own character as the referent of those names], and [in that case] just as [different meanings dependent upon each of those names] appear [individually] to conceptual consciousnesses, so [the one object, the sole Shakra, would have to] subsist in fact [as individual objects], whereby the [one] object would [absurdly] become many.

See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 208.

[b] Within one person over time.

Among those, the ordinary world
Is harmed by the yogic world.
Yogis also are harmed
By the higher and higher through special awareness.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Also, knowledge of the views of the lower tenet systems is a pedestal, or method, for understanding the higher views.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[40] It is not that all assertions of the lower schools of tenets are refuted; most of the lower assertions are pedestals to the higher. Persons who know tenets are easier to instruct than ordinary worldly beings because they know the entities, attributes, various enumerations,[a] and so forth of phenomena. Hence:
>
> - Whereas the Others' schools do not know how to posit former and later births if the self is asserted to be impermanent, the knowledge by the Great Exposition School of how to do such is a pedestal for the knowledge by the Sūtra School of how to posit uncompounded phenomena even though they are not effective things and not substantially existent and to posit [certain] compounded phenomena as imputedly existent.[b]
> - The Sūtra School's knowledge of how to do such and their knowledge that the relationship of word and meaning is not an effective thing and exists imputedly is a pedestal for the Mind-Only School's understanding that though all phenomena are not established through their own power as referents of names, action and agent are feasible and that all phenomena are not established as imputational natures [that is, not established as imputed to be separate entities from the consciousnesses apprehending them and not established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses].
> - The Mind-Only School's knowledge of such and their knowledge of how to posit the three characters serves as a pedestal for the Middle Way School's knowledge of how to posit all phenomena as established by the power of names and terminology, how to posit actions and agents within that, and how to posit the three characters of the Middle Way system.

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[a] *rnam grangs.*

[b] The Great Exposition School asserts that all phenomena, including permanent phenomena such as uncompounded space, are effective things; they also assert that permanent phenomena are necessarily substantially established.

This is because Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:[41]

Just as a grammarian [first] has students
Read a model of the alphabet,
So Buddha taught trainees
The doctrines that they could bear.
To some he taught doctrines
To turn them away from ill-deeds;
To some, for the sake of achieving merit;
To some, doctrines based on duality;
To some, doctrines based on non-duality;
To some what is profound and frightening to the fearful—
Having an essence of emptiness and compassion—
The means of achieving [unsurpassed] enlightenment.

4. Feature of How They Fall or Do Not Fall to Subtle Extremes

The others fall to extremes; that free of the extremes is the system of the honorable Nāga.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The other proponents of inner and outer tenets only fall to extremes of either coarse or subtle permanence or annihilation, whereas that free from all extremes is the system of the honorable master Nāgārjuna.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[42] Others among our own and others' schools fall to extremes, either coarse or subtle. That which is free from all extremes is the system of the honorable master Nāgārjuna because those who assert that dependent-arisings are empty of inherent existence like a moon in water are limited to only the Superior [Nāgārjuna's] system. For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

Others' [non-Buddhist] schools who do not assert persons and phenomena as relative phenomena, which are dependently arisen, but assert those two to be true[ly established] fall into the chasms of views of permanence and annihilation. Also, our own schools who, although they assert those two as relative phenomena, assert them to be established as [their own] suchness and to be established by way of their own character have come under the influence of views of permanence and annihilation. Hence, those who want to be free from views of permanence and annihilation assert that persons and phenomena are

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dependent-arisings, empty of inherent existence, like a moon in water. Just this mode is asserted to be the excellent door for abandoning permanence and annihilation. Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

Those who adhere to the self
Or the world as not dependent,
Alas, are captivated by views
Of permanence, impermanence, and so forth.

How could those who assert dependent things
As established as [their own] suchness
Also not be involved
In faults of permanence and so forth!

Those who assert dependent things
As not real and not unreal,
Like a moon in water,
Are not captivated by [bad] views.

This has been the first chapter, the section on the general presentation of schools of tenets.

NON-BUDDHIST SYSTEMS

Introduction to Non-Buddhist Schools of Tenets

C. Extensive Explanation of Outer and Inner Limb by Limb {2}

This section has two parts: refuting the extremes of permanence and annihilation of others' schools and delineating by stages the coarse and subtle selflessnesses of our own schools.

1. Refuting the Extremes of Permanence and Annihilation of Others' Schools {4}

This section has four parts: history of others' individual schools, synonyms, divisions, and individual extensive explanations.

a. History of Others' Individual Schools

At the time of incalculable lifespan Kapila composed the texts of the Sāṃkhyas. Through various imaginative imputations regarding differences about a self the systems of Forders split into many. Some explain that from the start there were different teachers and so forth. Some assert that the teacher of all is Arhat. The two sacrifices arose here serially. The Sāṃkhyas are earlier.

Word Commentary on Root Text: According to Prajñāvarman's *Commentary on (Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin's) "Exalted Praise,"* during the first eon when a lifetime in Jambudvīpa was immeasurable, a Brahmin called Kapila appeared. In retreat he attained a solitary liberation through certain asceticisms. In order to teach the path well to others, he composed the books of the Sāṃkhyas, which mainly teach the twenty-five categories. It is said that depending on various imaginative imputations with regard to small differences, or attributes, of the self described in his compositions, many systems of Forders split off.

Some, thinking that this is the thought of Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning,* say that all Forders individually arose from the start—that is, the beginning—with their own fundamental teachers, different texts, and so forth without depending on the texts of the Sāṃkhyas. As is explained in

Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning*, according to some texts of the Nirgranthas, the fundamental teacher of all Forders is the sage Arhat. Arhat gathered his retinue together and individually gave to the Forders, such as the Sāṃkhyas and so forth, all their tenets, which he had formulated. Afterwards, when Brahmā came, Arhat said, "Great Brahmā, you have come leisurely; you have come very late. Because I have given away all the treatises, use these Vedas."[a]

Initially the pure offerings described in the Vedas spread widely, but at the time of the possession of three [of the ten virtuous deeds by the average being] sages debated about whether the offering of killed animals was either suitable or unsuitable with regard to the statement [in the Vedas] "Various ones are auspicious." Those who wished to eat meat performed impure offerings and even changed the Vedas. Thus, as explained in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning,* two types of offerings arose gradually.

According to the explanations in the root text of and autocommentary to Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"*[b] it is to be asserted that the Sāṃkhya system arose earlier than the other Forder systems.

b. Synonyms of Others' Schools

Others' Schools, Outsiders, Forders to the End, and so forth are the names.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The synonyms are:

- Others' Schools, because they are schools other than our own
- Outsiders, because they are outside our own systems
- Makers of a Ford to the End, because, as Prajñāvarman's *Commentary on (Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin's) "Exalted Praise"* explains, they compose

[a] This is how the non-Vedic Nirgranthas, or Jainas, put down the Vedas and Vedic systems.

[b] Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (VI.121) says:

> The [Sāṃkhya] Forders impute a self that is the experiencer [of pleasure, pain, and so forth], a permanent thing,
>
> Non-creator [of transformations], without [the three] qualities [of the nature—mental potency, motion, and darkness—], inactive.
>
> Depending on little little differences in it,
> The systems of the Forders became different.

About "non-creator" see 519, fnt. a. The bracketed material is drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ya,* 29.3.

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treatises teaching paths to high status and liberation and those treatises are called Fords to the End

and so forth.

c. Divisions of Others' Schools

Though twenty-five are mentioned, those that are clear here are the different houses. It is a mistake that they are five because, unlike our own schools, that they are numerous cannot be refuted. One proponent of annihilation and twelve proponents of permanence are renowned.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The divisions of the Outsiders are described in Avalokitavrata's[a] *Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka's) "Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) 'Wisdom,'"* in Ke-drup-ge-lek-b̄el-sang's[b] *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness,*[c] and so forth as being the twenty-five Forders who split off from the Sāṃkhyas. However, here [in Tibet] the varieties of systems of Forders for which systems of assertions are described clearly in the great texts are the [astrological] "houses," or twelve. Hence, [I] will describe those.

Those who assert that all Forders are included in five—Lokāyatas, Sāṃkhyas, Vaiṣhṇavas, Aishvaras, and Nirgranthas[d]—are mistaken. For, Others' Schools are not similar to our own, which, though they have many discordant systems of assertions, are included into four schools of tenets. Also, that the Other Sectarians are numerous cannot be refuted because it is renowned and established that there are twelve—one Proponent of Annihilation, the Lokāyatas, and eleven Proponents of Permanence:

Sāṃkhyas and Kāpilas
four—Brāhmaṇas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas
two—Vaiṣhnavas and Mīmāṃsakas

---

[a] *spyan ras gzigs brtul zhugs;* Kensur Ngawang Lekden reported that Avalokitavrata's name means "One who has the Manner of Avalokiteshvara"; when he lost in debate to Bhāvaviveka and they tried to cut his hair as was the custom since he lost the debate and had to become a Buddhist, blood poured from his mouth due to having previously achieved the state of a god for the sake of not losing his non-Buddhist stance. Therefore, he had to let his hair be, like the hair style of Avalokiteshvara.

[b] *mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang,* 1385-1438.

[c] *zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed.*

[d] D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* presents this opinion (Dzongsar Institute, 2.13 and 3.7).

three—Aishvaras, Vaisheṣhikas, and Naiyāyikas
Nirgranthas.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[43] Others' Schools are not limited in number…[I] do not assert that they are limited to twelve; rather, here [in Tibet] twelve are seen to be explained in [Buddha's] word and in the treatises in terms of their greater differences, due to which [I] will describe these.

2. Nihilism

d. Individual Extensive Explanations of Others' Schools {2}

This section has two parts: refuting proponents of annihilation and refuting proponents of permanence.

(1) REFUTING PROPONENTS OF ANNIHILATION {2}

This section has two parts: stating the assertions of proponents of annihilation and refuting their assertions.

(A) STATING THE ASSERTIONS OF PROPONENTS OF ANNIHILATION {3}

This section has three parts: teachers, synonyms as well as dispelling a mistake, and tenets.

1' Teachers of Proponents of Annihilation

Bṛhaspati, Lokachakṣhu, and Juk-d̄op are the teachers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The teachers are:

- Bṛhaspati,[a] or Devaguru, who is one of the seven planets[b]
- the sage Lokachakṣhu who composed a hundred thousand Ayata texts[c]
- his student Juk-d̄op.[d]

2' Synonyms as well as Dispelling A Mistake

They are Hedonists, Proponents of Annihilation, Proponents of Non-Existence, Barhaspatyas, Ayatas, and so forth. That they are Proponents of Nature as the Cause is mistaken.

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[a] *phur bu;* Jupiter. Thanks to Jeffrey S. Lidke for the identification.

[b] *res gza'.*

[c] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (*Great Exposition of Tenets,* 59.2) says, "Avalokiteshvara explains that the sage Lokachakṣhu composed the text [called] *The One Hundred Thousand.*"

[d] *'jug stobs;* Having the Power to Engage. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (*Great Exposition of Tenets,* 59.3) identifies him as a contemporary of Dharmakīrti and student of Bṛhaspati.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The synonyms:

- Because they propound being satisfied with what is merely pleasant here, that is, in this life, they are called Hedonists.[a]
- Because they propound that the continuum of the self is annihilated at death, they are Proponents of Annihilation.
- Because they propound that either former and later births, or the cause and effect of actions,[b] and so forth, or all of these do not exist, they are Proponents of Non-Existence.
- Because they hold Bṛhaspati to be their teacher, they are Barhaspatyas.
- Because they have gone apart from the correct view, they are Ayatas [literally, Those Who Are Flung Afar].
- The term "and so forth" in the root text includes Daivagurus, Followers of Juk-d̄op-j̄en, Proponents of Intrinsicality,[c] Proponents of Nature,[d] and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[44] Because they advocate that causes of the sharpness of thorns, the roundness of peas, and so forth do not exist and advocate that those arise from their own entity or nature, they are called Proponents of Intrinsicality and Proponents of Nature.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because "Proponents of Nature as Cause"[e] is a name of the Sāṃkhyas, know that applying it to Ayatas is mistaken.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[45] D̄ak-tsang's calling them Proponents of Nature as Cause[46] is not correct because that is a name of the Sāṃkhyas, and although these [Nihilists say that things] arise from nature [that is, naturally], they do not propound nature as a cause.[f]

3' Tenets of Proponents of Annihilation {2}

This section has two parts: having refuted mistakes, setting forth the divisions and describing the system of the main Proponents of Annihilation.

---

[a] *tshu rol mdzes pa, cārvāka;* literally, those for whom it is pleasant here.

[b] *las, karma.*

[c] *ngo bo nyid smra ba.*

[d] *rang bzhin smra ba.*

[e] *rang bzhin rgyur smra ba.*

[f] *rang bzhin las byung yang de rgyur mi smra ba'i phyir.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

a' Having Refuted Mistakes, Setting forth the Divisions

Because it is explained that some do and some do not assert cause and effect as well as gods and so forth, it is mistaken that former and future lives are utterly non-existent and that there are only the three transmigrations and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [Some of them] assert that cause and effect, gods and so forth, and former and later births do not exist. However:

- According to the description of the seven Proponents of Annihilation from among the sixty-two bad views, [some] assert gods and so forth.
- Also, in the *Basal Scripture*[a] on the occasion of the ninety-six fantastic ones, [some] are described as asserting former and later births, like the birth of gods as gods [in the next life] and so forth.
- In the root text of and autocommentary to Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* [some] are described as asserting the production of the mind from the four elements.
- Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* and Avalokitavrata's *Explanatory Commentary* and so forth speak of the way that [some] assert that articles like vases and so forth are produced from causes.

Therefore, you should know that [Ḍak-tsang Ṣhay-rap-chen[47]] is mistaken to say that whoever is an Ayata asserts that former and later births and cause and effect are utterly non-existent and that there are only three transmigrations—humans, animals, and invisible [spirits].

> Jam-ȳang-shay-ƃa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[48] Most of them assert that even the birth and so forth of this life, the designs on lotuses and on ducks and so forth, are produced from the four elements of this life, but do not assert effects of former lives and the production of future lives…Hence, there are three systems [of Nihilists]:
>
> - those who assert former and future lives
> - those who do not assert former and future lives but assert that since the mind and so forth arise from the four elements, the four elements are the causes of the mind and so forth
> - those who do not assert former and future lives and do not assert that the four elements are the causes of the mind and so forth although the mind and so forth are produced from the four elements.

[a] *lung gzhi.* These are canonical stories exemplifying the conduct to be emulated by Buddha's followers.

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b' Describing the System of the Main Proponents of Annihilation {2}

This section has two parts: motivations for their tenets and actual explanation of their tenets.

1" MOTIVATIONS FOR THE TENETS OF THE PROPONENTS OF ANNIHILATION

The Logicians and the Meditators are due to being pained by lust and through claiming to help.

Word Commentary on Root Text: According to the explanation in the commentary on the *Basal Scripture:*

- There are those relying on logic,[a] who, for instance, upon seeing that some misers become wealthy and that some donors of charity become poor, hold that giving and so forth [that is, their good effects] do not exist.
- Also, there are those relying on meditative absorption,[b] who through clairvoyance see that some who killed in a former life are born in a longer life and that some who did not kill are born in a shorter life. Then they say that virtue is non-existent and that non-virtue is non-existent.
- There are those who are pained by lust, like the sage Lokachakṣhu, who, desiring to lie with his daughter, explained to her that other lives do not exist [and thus she did not need to be concerned about karmic retribution].
- There are those like Bṛhaspati who set forth tenets out of claiming to help.

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[49] D̄ak-tsang's explanation[50] that the motivation for all of the Nihilists' tenets is pangs of lust is also reduced to being mistaken on a coarse level.

2" ACTUAL EXPLANATION OF THE TENETS OF THE PROPONENTS OF ANNIHILATION

Because of not being perceived and because of no concomitance, there is no cause and effect. Because the self, which is only body and mind,

[a] *rtog ge pa, tārkika.*
[b] *snyoms 'jug pa, samāpattika.*

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perishes, there are no former and future lives. Because the minds depend on different bodies, they are not one continuum. The mind is produced from the elements. Nirvāṇa is a non-actuality. Direct perception is valid. Inference is not valid because of being mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Due to any of these motivations, they assert [at least some of the following]:

- Because a maker [of the eyes of a peacock's feathers or of the sharpness of thorns] is not perceived, there is no cause and effect.
- Because coming from a former life to here and going to a future life from here are not seen, there are no former and later births.
- Because an effect, such as the wealth of a miser, is not the concomitant of a cause, there is no cause and effect.
- Because the self is the body and mind which are only objects of the senses, [a self that is not visible to the senses is impossible], and hence at the time of death the self, due to being an entity of the mind, ceases and is extinguished, and due to being a physical entity, perishes and is wasted. Hence there are no former and later births.
- Because the mind of a god and the mind of a human depend on different bodies, they are not one continuum [as would be required for rebirth from god to human].
- Like the production of inebriation from beer and of fire from a fire glass,[a] the mind is produced from the mindless four elements.

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[51] Then, what is the cause of the mind of this life just after birth [that is, conception]? They answer: From the four great mindless elements the existence of mind is produced because [the mind of this life just after conception] is a thing having production [that is, whatever is produced is produced from the four elements], like the production of effects from causes having non-homogeneous characteristics, such as the power of inebriation from beer, fire from a fire glass [or, magnifying glass], bugs from the hairs of a cow or of a bull or from the wool of a sheep, small lizards from horns, ashes from wood, and yogurt and so forth from milk.
- Finally, at the time of death the four inner elements become non-manifest in the four external elements, and the sense powers—eye and so forth—become non-manifest in space, whereby the annihilation of mind and body is nirvāṇa. Therefore, nirvāṇa is a non-actuality.

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[a] That is, a magnifying glass. There is also a water glass that, when exposed to the full moon, yields water.

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> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[52] Because of those reasons why the mind is produced from the elements, in the world there are no Foe Destroyers who have eradicated the afflictive emotions. Due to this, they do not accept a Buddha, omniscience, or a Spiritual Community. Because there is no abandonment of afflictive emotions and no path abandoning them, many assert that there is no excellent doctrine…
>
> The Logicians say that there are no Foe Destroyers, since they think that existents are permanent, stable, perpetual, unchanging, and so forth [and thus do not become good or bad through the power of causes]. The Meditators, when they attain whatsoever of the four meditative equipoises of the concentrations or the four formless meditative equipoises, have the idea that they are Foe Destroyers. Again at the time of death they fall from their meditative stabilization, see their birth in a lower place, and think and say, "There is no Foe Destroyer, and there is no path to becoming a Foe Destroyer."

- Because they see that sense direct perception is non-deceptive, direct perception is valid cognition.
- Inference is not valid cognition because it is mistaken, like inferring being dark-complexioned[a] from being Devadatta's child [like other children of his who are known to be dark-complexioned].[53]

(B) Refuting the Assertions of Proponents of Annihilation {3}

This section has three parts: proving that former and future births exist, proving that omniscience and cause and effect exist, and explaining that the root of Ayata reasonings is mistaken.

1' Proving that Former and Future Births Exist

Refutation of Nihilism: **Because of being a mind, a preceder of it is established. Because of moving about and because of memory also.**

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because of being a mind, the mind right after birth [that is, conception] has a preceding mind.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[54] The subject, the first consciousness of this life in the womb, is preceded by its cause, a past or ceased consciousness, because it is a consciousness, like

[a] *sngo bsangs.*

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the consciousness of the time right after coming out of the womb.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Former births are established because [beings] move about for the sake of sustenance.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[55] The subjects, a child who has not learned language or a calf and so forth, have in a previous life conditioned to eating, desiring, and so forth because without being taught, they move about for the sake of eating and enter into desire and so forth, like a human of developed organs.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Also, former births are established because memory of [former] lives [occurs], and because [children from the same parents] have different behavior, and so forth.

2' Proving that Omniscience and Cause and Effect Exist

Because of clarification through conditioning, omniscience is established. Because of concomitance, cause and effect are established.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Omniscience is established by applying the reason proving that it is possible—by conditioning to wisdom and mercy—to complete clear perception to its fullest.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[56] Shāntarakṣhita says:

> Through possessing the practices of wisdom, love, and so forth [the discordant diminishes and concordant antidotes to obstructions increase]. The completion of those is the emergence of [a wisdom of] clear light [free from adventitious obstructions] and of omniscience…Hence, there is a consciousness that clearly perceives all phenomena simultaneously.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Cause and effect are established through applying the reason proving that the concomitance and non-concomitance of the production or non-production of an effect according to the existence or non-existence of causes and conditions is non-mistaken.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[57] Kamalashīla says:

> Because thorns and so forth are produced from their own seeds and because the sharpness and so forth [of thorns] is produced from that same seed, [the sharpness of thorns] is not an example [for the causeless production of suffering]. The determination that they arise sometimes in some places [is a proof that] they are produced in dependence [on their own objects of dependence], and those objects of dependence are asserted as

their causes. A cause is what aids [its own effect]; what does not aid is not an object of dependence [of production].

3' Explaining that the Root of Ayata Reasonings is Mistaken

The non-existence of those is not an object of direct perception; they refute inference; therefore! Also.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The non-existence of former and later births, of omniscience, and of cause and effect and so forth is not an object of Ayatas' direct perception. Also,[a] Ayatas themselves refute that inference is valid. Therefore, the assertion that those are non-existent is established as mistaken.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[58] That there are no former and later births, no omniscience, and no effects of giving and so forth you said was because these have not been seen directly. Is it to be taken that (1) all or that (2) you have not seen them directly? Also, (3) were those directly seen to be non-existent, or (4) were they realized to be non-existent through inference? The analysis of those four is as follows.

1-2 Shāntarakṣhita says:

> That all have not seen them is doubtful [how can one know what all have and have not seen? If those are non-existent because] you have not seen them, [then that the non-existent is concomitant with what you have not seen] is mistaken because there are tombs in caves of the Mandara Hills that you have not seen.

Thus the first [two, that is, that those are established as non-existent because all or only you did not see them,] are incorrect.

3-4 When both possibilities of the latter [that is, that direct perception sees those as non-existent or that inference realizes them as non-existent] are examined, they also are incorrect because as Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

> If you say that direct perception sees them as non-existent, the non-existence of other lives could not be an object of realization by direct perception because [the non-existence

[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den places the word "also" in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's root text here, but as is seen below in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's own commentary, he has something else in mind.

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> of other lives] is a non-existent entity, like a non-thing…

and as the master Shūra[a] says:…

> If you are indifferent with regard to proving it with reasons, then what is the use of a thesis alone?

Thus, the non-existence of former and later births and so forth is not established through direct perception, and because you disallowed non-deceptive inference, the non-existence of former and later births and so forth not only cannot be established by inference, but also, if these are attempted to be established by inference, this would demolish your own [position that inference is not valid].

The word "also" in the root text indicates that not only can those not be proven, but also the view of annihilation has been refuted well by such statements as Chandrakīrti's (840):[59]

> If it is viewed that [things] are produced only causelessly,
> Then everything would always arise even from everything.

This has been the second chapter, the section intensively refuting the extreme of annihilation.

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[a] The Tibetan scholars with whom I have worked have identified Shūra (*dpa' bo*) as Ashvaghoṣha. For references to controversy about this, see D. S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1981), 119-21.

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3. Sāṃkhya and Kāpila

(2) Refuting Proponents of Permanence {5}

This section has five parts: refuting the extreme of permanence superimposed by Kāpilas and Sāṃkhyas; refuting the extreme of permanence superimposed by Brāhmaṇas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas; refuting the extreme of permanence superimposed by Vaiṣhṇavas and Mīmāṃsakas; refuting the extreme of permanence superimposed by Shaivas, Vaisheṣhikas, and Naiyāyikas; and refuting the extreme of permanence superimposed by Kṣhapanas, or Parivrajakas.

(A) Refuting the Extreme of Permanence Superimposed by Kapilas and Samkhyas {2}

This section has two parts: expressing their assertions and refuting them.

1' Expressing the Assertions of the Kāpilas and the Sāṃkhyas {4}

This section has four parts: teachers, synonyms, divisions, and assertions.

a' Teachers of the Kāpilas and the Sāṃkhyas

Kapila, Arhat, Īshvara, and Patañjali are their teachers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The previously mentioned sage Kapila, the sage Arhat, the great god Īshvara, and the teacher Patañjali are the teachers of the Sāṃkhyas.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[60] About their teachers:
>
> - There is the sage Kapila about whom *Prajñāvarman's Commentary on (Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin's) "Exalted Praise"* says, "During the first eon a sage called Kapila arose; Sāṃkhya treatises were composed by him."
> - As explained earlier (92), according to the texts of the Parivrajakas [that is, the Jainas], the sage Arhat also is the Sāṃkhyas' teacher; however, they are not known as Arahatas…I have stated this in order to indicate that it is difficult [to differentiate between] what these [systems] say and what the facts are;

therefore, understand [the context].

- Īshvara also is held to be a teacher by later Sāṃkhyas, as will be explained below.
- Patañjali is the teacher who, under the care of Īshvara, composed the *Īshvarakṛṣhṇa Tantra* in thirty and sixty [stanzas?] and so forth.

b' Synonyms

Sāṃkhyas, Proponents of the Nature as the Cause, Kāpilas, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: According to the explanation by the master Bodhibhadra, they are called Sāṃkhyas [literally, Enumerators] because they advocate a definite enumeration of the causes that produce things. Or, according to Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning,* they are called Sāṃkhyas because they assert that beings are released through understanding the enumeration of the twenty-five principles [or categories] or through completely knowing enumeration.

TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES[61]

CONSCIOUSNESS

1. person (*skyes bu, puruṣa*), or self (*bdag, ātman*), consciousness (*shes pa*), knower (*rig pa*), the sentient (*sems pa can*), knower of the field (*zhing shes pa, kṣetrajña*)

MATTER

2. fundamental nature (*rtsa ba'i rang bzhin, mūlaprakṛti*), or nature (*rang bzhin, prakṛti*), principal (*gtso bo, pradhāna*), generality (*spyi, sāmānya*), general principal (*spyi'i gtso bo, sāmānyapradhāna*)
3. awareness (*blo, buddhi*), or great one (*chen po, mahat*)
4. I-principle (*nga rgyal, ahaṃkāra*)
   (a) I-principle dominated by motility (*rdul, rajas*)
   (b) I-principle dominated by darkness (*mun pa, tamas*)
   (c) I-principle dominated by lightness (*snying stobs, sattva*)

Five subtle objects, or potencies of objects, which evolve from the I-principle dominated by motility:

5. sounds (*sgra, śabda*)
6. tangible objects (*reg bya, spraṣṭavya*)
7. odors (*dri, gandha*)

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8. visible forms (*gzugs, rūpa*)
9. tastes (*ro, rasa*)

Eleven faculties which evolve from the I-principle dominated by lightness:

Five physical faculties, or action faculties

10. speech (*ngag, vāc*)
11. arms (*lag pa, pāṇi*)
12. legs (*rkang pa, pāda*)
13. anus (*rkub, pāyu*)
14. genitalia (*'doms, upastha*)

Five mental faculties

15. ear (*rna ba, śrota*)
16. body or skin (*pags pa, sparśana*)
17. tongue (*lce, rasana*)
18. eye (*mig, cakṣu*)
19. nose (*sna, ghrāṇa*)

One intellectual faculty

20. Intellectual faculty (*yid, manas*), the nature of which is both mental and physical

Five elements:

25. space (*nam mkha', ākāśa*), which evolves from the sound potency
24. wind (*rlung, vāyu*), which evolves from the tangible object potency
23. fire (*me, tejas*), which evolves from the visible form potency
22. water (*chu, āp*), which evolves from the taste potency
21. earth (*sa, pṛthivī*), which evolves from the odor potency

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Because they advocate that all produced things are produced from their own nature, they are called Proponents of the Nature as the Cause. Because they follow the sage Kapila, they are called Kāpilas. The word "and so forth" in the root text indicates that they are called Principalists[a] because they assert that the non-manifest principal is the cause; and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[62] Because they advocate that the difficulty of seeing that the principal is the cause [of traveling in cyclic existence], they are called Principalists.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Those are synonyms.

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[a] *gtso bo pa, prādhānaka.*

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c' Divisions

The divisions are the system of the non-theistic Kāpilas of manifestations, and the theistic Sāṃkhyas, Patañjali's system of transformations.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The divisions are the theistic Sāṃkhyas and the non-theistic Sāṃkhyas. The non-theistic Sāṃkhyas are followers only of Kapila and do not take Īshvara to be a god; hence, they assert that all produced things exist at the time of their causes and are manifested by conditions. The theistic Sāṃkhyas take Īshvara to be their teacher and assert that, although all causes and effects are the same nature, transformations come to be different in dependence upon Īshvara's empowerment. Theistic Sāṃkhya is the system of the teacher Patañjali and his followers.

d' Kāpilas' and Sāmkhyas' Assertions {3}

This section has three parts: assertions about the basis, path, and fruit.

1" KĀPILAS' AND SĀMKHYAS' ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE BASIS {2}

This section has two parts: Kāpilas' assertions about the basis and theistic Sāṃkhyas' assertions about the basis.

a" Kāpilas' Assertions about the Basis {2}

This section has two parts: assertions about valid cognition and assertions about objects of comprehension.

1: Kāpilas' Assertions about Valid Cognition {3}

This section has three parts: terminologically speaking, assertions about direct valid cognition, inferential valid cognition, and scriptural valid cognition.

A: KĀPILAS' ASSERTIONS ABOUT DIRECT VALID COGNITION

Direct valid cognition is engagement by the senses, of which there are two.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Direct perception is asserted as the five senses—ear and so forth—which, having been empowered by the mental faculty, are engaging in apprehending their objects, sound and so forth. The

meaning of "empowerment by the mental faculty" is asserted either as the simultaneous engagement by the mental faculty and the senses in outer objects or as the mental faculty's knowledge of engagement by the senses.[a]

With regard to engagement by the senses, there are two modes of assertion—with condition and without condition. The first, with condition, is the following: When iron is burned, even though fire and iron are not one substantial entity, they appear to be the same substantial entity; just so, when the person experiences an outer object, the object and the person are not mixed, but they seem to be mixed due to the appearance—in the mirror of awareness—of the image of the object from the outside and the image of the person from the inside. The second, without condition, is the following: The person, like the light of a lamp, illumines objects but does not seem to be mixed with objects.[b]

B: Kāpilas' Assertions about Inferential Valid Cognition

Inference for oneself is from seven relationships. Inference for others is twofold, aspect and clarification.

Word Commentary on Root Text: An inference for oneself is taken as inferring something from depending on perceiving a substratum of one of the seven relationships. The seven relationships are:[c]

1. the relationship of wealth and owner of the wealth [that is, possession and possessor], like subjects and a monarch, or like the principal and the person
2. the relationship of nature and transformation, like milk and yogurt, or

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[a] The senses engage objects, which are either simultaneously or subsequently identified. The five senses are valid cognitions, but they are not the perceiver of their objects; the person is. Though the person is the perceiver of the objects, the form of the object does not appear to the person; the form of the object appears to the sense. The person perceives the object through the sense, and thus here "valid cognition" has the sense of the *means* of valid cognition.

[b] The above explanation accords with Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's own commentary in his *Great Exposition of Tenets,* but Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den disagrees, and thus adds:

> [However,] according to Jinendrabuddhi's *Explanatory Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition,"* "with condition" and "without condition" are taken to mean whether engagement by the senses and the person appear to be mixed or not. Also, in that text it is clear that the meaning symbolized by the light of the lamp is applied to engagement by the senses.

[c] For these, see Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy,* Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 4 (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1987), 95.

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like the principal and the great one
3. the relationship of the entities of effect and cause,[a] like a chariot and its components, or like the five subtle objects[b] and the three qualities
4. the relationship of cause and cause-possessor,[c] like a potter and a pot, or like the person and the principal
5. the relationship of branch and branch-possessor, like branches and a tree, or like the five elements and the five subtle objects
6. the relationship of cooperation, like a male red wild duck and a female red wild duck, or like *rajas* and *sattva* [as well as *tamas* when they are in balance]
7. the relationship of harmed and harmer, like a snake and a mongoose, or like the three qualities [mental potency, motion, and darkness], which become stronger or weaker in strength [in the sense that when one is stronger, it suppresses the others].

The first of the two examples for each are described as examples renowned in the world, and the second are described as examples renowned in treatises.

There are two inferences for others:

- having the aspect of mainly proving one's own position, like a five-membered proof statement [thesis being proven, reason, example, relating the example to the predicate of the thesis, and conclusion][d]
- eradication,[e] which mainly refutes another's position, like a contradictory consequence.

C: KĀPILAS' ASSERTIONS ABOUT SCRIPTURAL VALID COGNITION

The *Īshvara Tantra,* the *Thirty,* and so forth are the scriptures.

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[a] This is the relation of material cause and effect.

[b] *de tsam lnga, tanmatra.*

[c] *rgyu mtshan dang rgyu mtshan can.* This is the relation of efficient cause and effect. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* gives these two as *rgyun dang rgyun can* (continuum and possessor of the continuum), but Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*stod, da,* 99.1) indicates that this reading is mistaken. D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (45.19) reads "cause and cause-possessor" (*rgyu dang rgyu can*).

[d] See Larson and Bhattacharya, *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition,* 96.

[e] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's word commentary reads *bsal;* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's root text, however, reads *gsal* (clarification). These two spellings correspond to the variations in spelling of the term for "predicate of the thesis" (*bsgrub bya'i chos*) or perhaps also the "thesis" (*bsgrub bya*) of a consequence—*bsal ba* (eradication, or that which is being eradicated since it is wrong) and *gsal ba* (clarification, or that which is being clarified as wrong).

Word Commentary on Root Text: Īshvarakṛṣhṇa's *Tantra,*[63] *The Thirty Scriptural Traditions,*[a] *The Fifty Characteristics,*[b] and so forth are asserted to be valid scriptures.

2: Kāpilas' Assertions about Objects of Comprehension {5}

This section has five parts: Kāpilas' assertions about consciousness and matter; assertions about the four possibilities of nature and transformation; assertions about the two truths; assertions about production; and assertions about disintegration.

A: KĀPILAS' ASSERTIONS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS AND MATTER {2}

This section has two parts: Kāpilas' assertions about consciousness and assertions about matter.

1* Kāpilas' Assertions about Consciousness {3}

This section has three parts: Kāpilas' assertions on the definition of consciousness, divisions of consciousness, and synonyms of consciousness.

a Kāpilas' Assertions on the Definition of Consciousness*

A self that is qualityless, inactive, a non-agent, a permanent thing, consciousness, and the experiencer exists.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They say that a personal self that has many attributes exists. It does not have the qualities of motility, darkness, and mental potency.[c] It is inactive because it pervades all transmigrating beings. It is not an agent of virtue and non-virtue. It is a permanent thing because it does not change. It is consciousness because it is not an aggregate [of particles] and so forth. It is the experiencer because it partakes of pleasure and pain.

> Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[64] The self has many attributes. Because it finds objects, it is an entity of consciousness. Because it has no undertakings, it has the attribute of non-production. Because it has no production or degeneration, it is

[a] *gzhung lugs sum cu pa;* reference not known. D̄ak-tsang (Dzongsar Institute, 44.5) refers to thirty synonyms of self.

[b] *mtshan nyid lnga bcu pa;* for the fifty characteristics see 120.

[c] These are the three qualities (*yon tan gsum, triguṇa*) associated with matter: *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas.* See the chart above.

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permanent. Because it experiences pleasure and pain, it is the experiencer. Because it pervades all transmigrating beings in the three places [that is, beneath the ground, on the ground, and above the ground], it is pervasive. Because it does not have the characteristics of the three qualities—mental potency, motility, and darkness—it is qualityless. Because it has no undertakings, it has the attribute of not producing [effects]. Because it experiences objects, it is an object-possessor. Because it lacks parts, it is unitary. Because it has no beginning or end, it has the characteristic of endlessness.

b Kāpilas' Assertions on the Divisions of Consciousness*

It dwells and does not dwell beside the generality.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are two selves: a self that dwells beside the generality until release from bondage, and a self that, when it has been released from the generality, does not dwell beside the generality.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[65] [I] think that the great translator [D̄ak-tsang] S̄hay-rap-rin-chen's explanation[66] that [the self] only dwells beside the generality is mistaken.

c Kāpilas' Assertions on the Synonyms of Consciousness*

Consciousness, knower, person, self, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Its synonyms are consciousness, knower, person, self, and those which the phrase "and so forth" in the root text indicates—knower of the field, the sentient, and so forth.

2* Kāpilas' Assertions about Matter

Twenty-four are matter.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The twenty-four—the principal and so forth—are aggregations and composites [of particles] and therefore are matter.

B: KĀPILAS' ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE FOUR POSSIBILITIES OF NATURE AND TRANSFORMATION AND THEREUPON A REFUTATION OF A MISTAKE

The fundamental nature is asserted as the agent, permanent, unitary, pervading all objects, unmanifest, and the qualities in equilibrium; the mode of subsistence and so forth. From it, is the great one, like a mir-

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ror; when the two intermingle, there is knowing. The qualities are mental potency, motility, and darkness, or pleasure, pain, and so forth. From the awareness the three I-principles are produced. From the first, the five subtle objects are produced; from the five subtle objects are the five elements. From the second are the five action faculties and the five mental faculties, as well as the intellectual faculty. The third drives those two.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The fundamental nature is asserted as an object of knowledge that is:

- the agent of virtue, non-virtue, and so forth
- permanent, because it does not disintegrate
- unitary, because it is partless
- an object, because it is the object of enjoyment of the person
- pervading all transformations
- always non-manifest
- the three qualities—motility, darkness, and mental potency—in equilibrium.

 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[67] [As for the reasons behind Sāṃkhyas' holding that the non-manifest principal exists:][a]

 - The principal exists because the differentiations [of the world] have a measure. [Manifestations are seen to have measures, or names, which are affixed to each type of manifestation—elements, senses, and so forth—whereby there must be a cause producing manifestations having such measures; that cause is the principal.]
 - The principal exists because it is seen that the differentiations [of manifestations such as earth, water, senses, and so forth are seen to have the types of the three qualities—pleasure, pain, and gloom or, in other words, mental potency, activity, and darkness—and thus those differentiations] accord with [the three qualities, which in equilibrium are the principal].
 - The principal exists because it is established from the viewpoint of potencies [since if the natures of the various potencies of, for instance, a seed, earth, and water were different, a shoot could not be earth's effect. However, because the nature of the various potencies is the same, even though the many causes are different, one effect, like one shoot from many causes, can be produced.]

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[a] See also Larson and Bhattacharya, *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition,* 100.

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- The principal exists because differentiation of cause and effect exists. [In the world one sees the differentiation of cause and effect; we notice that a mound of clay—that is the cause of a pot able to hold water—and so forth cannot hold water. Just so, having seen the great one and so forth, we know that there is a cause producing those; that cause is the principal.]
- The principal exists because [at the time of the destruction of the world system] the three worlds are undifferentiated. [If there were not one place of dissolution—namely, the principal—earth, the senses, the great one, and so forth would not disintegrate.]

It was said:

> Because the differentiations have measure, because of being established from the viewpoint of potencies, because of the division of cause and effect, and because the varieties of nature [that is, the three transient worlds] are undifferentiated, there is a non-manifest cause.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[68] [There are eight causes of the non-apprehension of something that exists yet is not manifest:]

1. If it is too far away like a bird that has gone to another town it cannot be seen, but it is not thereby non-existent.
2. If it is too close, like medicine on one's eye, it cannot be seen, but it is not thereby non-existent.
3. If the senses have degenerated as with a deaf person who cannot hear a sound, the objects of that sense, though not apprehended, do not thereby not exist.
4. If the mental faculty does not pay attention to an object, the object does not thereby become non-existent.
5. If an object is too subtle, like particles, to be perceived, it is not thereby non-existent.
6. If an object such as a pot is obstructed by a wall, it is not seen but is not thereby non-existent.
7. If an object, like a star, is overpowered by the light of the sun, it is not seen but is thereby not non-existent.
8. If an object, like a bird, is thronging with many other similar birds, it is not seen but is not thereby non-existent.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Ascertainment of Prime Cognition"* speaks of the mode of subsistence of phenomena, the ultimate, and nature as synonyms of the principal. However, the person also is explained to be ultimate and the seven, the great one

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and so forth, are said to be natures; hence, though they are synonyms,[a] they are not equivalent.[b]

From the fundamental nature the great one, or awareness, is produced. The awareness is like a two-sided glass mirror; in it the images of objects from the outside and of the person from the inside meet or intermingle. That is asserted as the way that the person knows, or realizes, objects.

The synonyms of the three qualities are the three: mental potency, motility, and darkness; or the three: desire, hatred, and obscuration; or the three: pleasure, pain, and gloom, and so forth.

From the awareness the three I-principles are produced. From the first, the transforming I-principle, [the subtle natures of] the five—odors, tastes, visible forms, tangible objects, and sounds are produced. Those five respectively produce the five elements—earth, water, fire, wind, and space. From the second, the mental potency I-principle, are produced the eleven senses:

- the five action faculties—the faculties of speech, arms, legs, anus and genitalia
- the five mental faculties—the faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin, or body
- the intellectual faculty, which has [both] action and mental natures.

The third, the dark I-principle, is the driver of the former two. This is how they are described in both Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": Illumination of the Thought* and in Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Ascertainment of Prime Cognition."* [However,] it is to be analyzed whether the description, according to Avalokitavrata, that the five subtle objects are produced from the I-principle dominated by darkness, and that the I-principle dominated by the motion arising from particles (*rdul, rajas*) is the driver of [the other two I-principles] contradicts or does not contradict Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought.*[c]

The principal is only a nature. The seven—the great one, I-principle, and five subtle objects—are both natures and transformations. The sixteen—the eleven faculties and the five elements—are only transformations.

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[a] *rnam grangs;* here it has the sense of "loose synonyms," variant names, not limited in meaning to each other.

[b] *don gcig,* "do not have the same connotation." Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den is explaining away the discrepancy between what Gyel-tsap says and what has to the case.

[c] I take this as Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's polite way of disagreeing with both Ḏzong-ka-ḇa and Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa. Avalokitavrata's description also strikes me as more likely, since *rajas* is the most active quality.

The person is neither a nature nor a transformation.[a]

Because there are four possibilities, that the twenty-five are included in the principal and the self is very mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because those four possibilities [between nature and transformation] are described, you should know that the explanation by someone [that is, Ḍak-tsang Ṣhay-rap-chen[b]] that the twenty-five objects of knowledge are included in the two—the principal and the self, that is, the conscious person—is very mistaken.

C: Kāpilas' Assertions about the Two Truths

The generality and the self are true existents. The others are false.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because they are unmanifest objects of knowledge, the general principal and the conscious self are things[c] that are truly established. Because the other twenty-three are manifest, they are asserted to be false, or obscurational things.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-ƀa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[69] From among the twenty-five objects of knowledge, the fundamental generality and the self are things that are truly established, and the others are falsely established. Shāntarakṣhita's autocommentary on the *Ornament for the Middle* says:
>
> > The great sage Kapila says:
> >
> > > The supreme nature of the qualities
> > > Does not go on the path of perception.[d]
> > > What is on the path of perception
> > > Is very false, like magical illusions.
>
> This scriptural passage explains that non-manifest objects of knowledge are ultimate truths and manifest objects of knowledge are fraudulent objects of knowledge. Implicitly then all objects of

[a] The third stanza of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by Īshvarakṛṣhṇa says:

The fundamental nature is not a transformation.
The seven—the great one and so forth—are natures and transformations.
Sixteen are transformations.
The person is not a nature and not a transformation.

[b] Ḍak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (46.4) says, "The enumerated twenty-five objects of knowledge are included in the two—the principal and the self, that is, the conscious person—because of being included in the two, nature and non-nature."

[c] *dngos po, bhāva.*

[d] That is, the fundamental nature is not an object of direct perception.

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knowledge are also included into the two, the manifest and the non-manifest.

Difference between those two exist; for, the manifest are those that have causes, are impermanent, do not pervade all, are active, are seen to be manifold, are dependent [on causes], go [that is, they dissolve at the time of disintegration into the principal], have parts, and are under the power of another [that is, are dependent on causes]. Those that have those nine attributes are the manifest. The opposites of those nine are the meaning of non-manifest. Īshvarakṛṣhṇa says:

> Having causes, impermanent, not pervasive,
> Active, manifold, dependent, going, having parts,
> And under the power of another are the manifest.
> The opposites of those are the non-manifest.

D: KĀPILAS' ASSERTIONS ABOUT PRODUCTION

The mode of production is that that which earlier exists becomes manifest.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The mode of production is that that which exists at the time of the cause is manifested through conditions.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[70] Both Sāṃkhya systems assert that the mode of production is that the effect formerly exists [in its causes]. Some Sāṃkhyas assert that production is the *manifestation* of that which is the same entity as the causes and is non-manifest formerly. Some assert that production is *transformation,* like yogurt, which at the time of milk dwells in the entity of the milk and through conditions is transformed into yogurt.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[71] [Kamalashīla] explains that by means of five reasons [Sāṃkhyas] prove that the effect exists at the time of the cause before its production. Those five reasons are:

1. The non-existent cannot be acted upon. That is: If the effect does not exist in the nature of the cause through a potential entity, the effect cannot be acted upon by means of any cause, because it is entityless, like a sky-lotus. "Existing through potential entity" means existing non-manifestly.
2. Beings take up causes individually. That is: If *śālistamba* rice was equally non-existent [in all seeds], why do those who seek *śālistamba* rice take up *śālistamba* seeds but do not take up

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others, [such as] millet[a] seeds? If just as millet seeds are devoid of *śālistamba* rice, so *śālistamba* seeds were also empty of *śālistamba* rice, by reason of the presence of what features are individually distinct seeds taken up, given that they do not differ? That those who want yogurt take up milk, and not water, is due to the fact that yogurt exists in milk and does not exist in water.

3. Nothing would be produced. That is: Because all existents would not differ in lacking the nature [of the effect], all that are subject to production would be produced from all things [but since this is not assertable, nothing would be produced at all].
4. Potencies create the potentialized. That is: Buddhists say that because the potencies of the causes are individually distinct:
   (1) though the effect does not pre-exist, it is produced
   (2) causes with potencies are used
   (3) and all is not produced from everything,
   whereby the above-mentioned fallacies are not incurred. To this, the Sāṃkhyas say, "That is not suitable as a response because potentialized causes create only potentialized effects. There is entailment because if the non-pre-existent is created, only the non-potentialized would be made. This is because the non-existent is not created into anything different—as is the case with the horns of a rabbit—since the non-existent is entityless and does not change, and since if it did change, that it has a nature of non-existence would be dropped. Thus, how could those causes create previously non-existent effects? They do not.
5. Causes exist. That is: The above four reasons have proven that the creation of a formerly non-existent effect is not suitable; therefore, if [causes] do not create an effect, by doing what are seeds and so forth called causes? Hence, seeds and so forth would not be causes because [according to you] effects do not exist [in causes], like a sky-lotus. Since [that effects do not pre-exist in causes] can be refuted, [the actual fact is that] pre-existent effects are produced.

[a] *ko tra pa.*

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E: Kāpilas' Assertions about Disintegration

Disintegration is dissolution or quiescence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The mode of disintegration is that an effect dissolves into its own nature, or is pacified in the entity of its nature.

b" Theistic Sāṃkhyas' Assertions about the Basis

The varieties are not just from the principal because it is mindless. Without a supervisor, there would be no undertakings. The person is not the supervisor because of not knowing. Through the three qualities, which abide in the entity of the nature, there is production, duration, and disintegration. The causes exist, but because the three are serial, there are effects.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The theistic Sāṃkhyas say the following. The varieties of environments and animate beings are not produced from just the principal because the principal is mindless. [That the principal is mindless] entails [that the varieties of environments and animate beings are not produced from just the principal] because what is mindless is not suitable to be the supervisor; there is entailment because without a supervisor the initiation of effects is not seen. The person is not suitable to be the supervisor because at that time there is no knowledge, since at that time the awareness has not been produced, and since without determination by the awareness there is no realization of objects. Consequently, with the great god Īshvara and the principal mutually dependent, the varieties of effects are produced.

When motion[a] from among the three qualities, which dwell in the entity of the fundamental nature, increases in strength, this acts as the cause of Īshvara's issuing forth all beings. When mental potency[b] increases in strength, this acts as the cause of duration. When darkness increases in strength, that acts as the cause of disintegration. [Therefore] although the two, Īshvara and the principal, which are the causes producing all environments and animate beings, always exist, the serial production, duration, and disintegration of effects is admissible because the three—motion, darkness, and mental potency—increase and diminish serially.

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[a] *rdul, rajas.*

[b] *snying stobs, sattva.*

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2" Kāpilas' and Sāmkhyas' Assertions about the Path

By means of the path—the eight concentrations and formlessnesses—there is clairvoyance. It views the principal. And so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When the person wishes to enjoy objects, the principal creates varieties of transformations and acts strongly. However, due to a lessening of desire, the person views objects as faulty, whereby it separates from desire. At this time, the concentrations and formless absorptions are meditatively cultivated in stages. In reliance on concentration, the divine eye is obtained and views the principal.

The phrase "And so forth" in the root text contains in general the paths of meditating on the twenty-five principles and in particular the paths of meditating on the self as empty of the principal and on the principal as empty of the self, and so forth.[a]

3" Kāpilas' and Sāmkhyas' Assertions about the Fruit {2}

This section has two parts: assertions on liberation and assertions on the paths to liberation.

a" Kāpilas' and Sāṃkhyas' Assertions on Liberation

There are two liberations—alone and when the nature is free of the self.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When that divine eye looks at the principal, the principal, like another's wife [discovered by the actual wife], is ashamed. Consequently, it does not accompany the self and separates from it. At that time, opposite to the stages of production, all the transformations dissolve into the principal. When they have become non-manifest and the self is left alone, that is asserted to be the attainment of liberation. There are two liberations:

- liberation that is the self left alone
- liberation that is the nature's release from the self.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[72] When the nature, which is like a blind being with legs, and the person, which is like a cripple with eyes, are confused and apprehended as one, a being cycles in cyclic existence. When with clairvoyance depending on

[a] These are other-emptiness (*gzhan stong*) meditations.

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concentration a being realizes that the self and the nature are mutually different, the nature does not create manifestations. Then, the nature does not go with the self. The self alone is asserted by some Sāṃkhyas as liberation.

Again, other Sāṃkhyas assert that through perceiving the reality that the nature does not belong to the person and the person does not belong to the nature, the nature—having worked for the sake of the person—is liberated from the person. Thus the release of the nature from the person is asserted to be liberation.[a] In this way there are two systems.

b" Kāpilas' and Sāṃkhyas' Assertions on the Paths to Liberation

There are fifty characteristics. Bondage and liberation are each three, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are fifty characteristics.[b]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[73] The fifty characteristics are:

- nine pleasures and eight accomplishments, which assist the path
- twenty-eight forces and five perversions, which detract from the path.

NINE PLEASURES

"Pleasure" is the same as very pleasing or satisfying.

1. Whoever sees that effects are obtained from the nature and are not created by the person generates strong liking for liberation and so forth; this is called water.
2. Generating strong liking for liberation and so forth upon knowing that effects are obtained from their substantial causes and are not created by the person is called a continuum of water.
3. Generating strong liking for liberation and so forth upon knowing that effects are obtained by time and are not created by the person is called a continuum of water.
4. Generating strong liking for liberation and so forth upon knowing that effects are obtained by one's lot and are not created by the person is called falling rain.

[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, stod, nya,* 131.4) adds that because the latter means the liberation of the fundamental nature from the self, *gnas* (remain) is a mis-reading for *nas* (from) in the root text.

[b] See also Larson and Bhattacharya, *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition,* 56-59.

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5. Generating strong liking for liberation and so forth upon perceiving faults of working at objects is called crossed well.
6. Generating strong liking for liberation and so forth upon seeing the faults of guarding is called not-other.
7. Seeing liberation upon generating meditative stabilization through strong liking for liberation and so forth in that way is called good eye.
8. Seeing what has passed beyond the senses is called having light.
9. Liking liberation from having seen violence or fault is called superior body.

EIGHT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

They are called "accomplishments" (*grub pa, siddhi*) because of being accomplished in dependence upon exalted wisdom and because of accomplishing benefit for oneself and others.

1. Knowledge generated upon having analyzed is called liberator.
2. Knowledge of hearing and so forth is called good liberator.
3. Knowledge generated from a guru's prior teaching of objects expressed and means of expression is called completion of liberation.
4. Knowledge of the methods of reversing hot and cold is called joy.
5. Accomplishment of knowledge—by oneself or from a teacher—of the methods of reversing internal sicknesses of wind, bile, phlegm, and so forth is called intense joy.
6. The accomplishment through knowledge—by oneself or from a teacher—of curing the sufferings of frights, disputations, fights, and so forth arisen from and produced by the elements, humans, animals, deer and antelope, snakes, and so forth is called pleased.
7. Knowledge of pure behavior—by oneself or from a teacher—through taking cognizance of bliss that is caused by being endowed with the lot is called delightful.
8. Knowledge—by oneself or from a teacher—of how to help [teachers and so forth] rise, how to pay obeisance to them, how to cut their hair and moustache, and so forth is called always happy.

TWENTY-EIGHT FORCES

Eleven forces harming the eleven faculties:

1. Deafness that harms the ear faculty
2. Leprosy that harms the skin faculty
3. Blindness that harms the eye faculty

4. Insensitivity[a] that harms the tongue faculty
5. Unpleasant odor that harms the nose faculty
6. Rheumatism that harms the foot/leg faculty
7. Persistent dryness that harms the anal faculty
8. Impotence[b] that harms the regenerative faculty
9. Deterioration of the arms that harms the hand/arm faculty
10. Dumbness [that is, inability to speak] that harms the speech faculty
11. Mental deterioration that harms the mental faculty.

Nine forces that are the opposites of the nine pleasures:

12.-20. Non-water is non-generation of liking liberation and so forth due to one's not knowing it even though it has always naturally existed…Non-superior body is non-generation of liking liberation and so forth despite having seen violence.

Eight forces that harm the eight accomplishments:

21.-28. Non-liberator is knowledge not generated upon having performed analysis…Non-always-happy is not to take cognizance of right aims with regard to deception, miserliness, and so forth.

Five Perversions

1. darkness: thinking what is not other to be other
2. obscuration: thoroughly proving what is not good to be good
3. great obscuration: manifestly fancying that what is not pleasure is pleasure
4. extreme darkness: manifestly fancying that what is impossible is possible
5. extreme blackness: believing what is unbearable to be bearable.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are three bondages.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[74] The bondage of nature [that is, the bondage of having the nature of a human, a god, a demigod, an animal, and so forth], the bondage of being affected [by the objects of the senses], and the bondage of wealth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are three liberations.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[75] These are liberations from the three bondages.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The word "and so forth" in the root text

[a] *bems po nyid;* literally, materiality.

[b] *ma ning.* This term has a wide variety of meanings revolving around what was considered to be non-normative sex; here I presume it to mean impotence and perhaps also sterility.

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contains features like the assertion that if one knows the twenty-five categories, wherever and however one dwells, one is liberated, and so forth.

2' Refuting the Assertions of the Kāpilas and the Sāṃkhyas {3}

This section has three parts: contradictions in Kāpilas' and Sāṃkhyas' assertions on the mode of production, unsuitability of Kāpilas' and Sāṃkhyas' assertions on objects of comprehension and so forth, and unsuitability of theistic Sāṃkhyas' and Kāpilas' assertions on bondage and release.

a' Contradictions in Kāpilas' and Sāṃkhyas' Assertions on the Mode of Production

***REFUTATION:* If what exists is nevertheless produced, it would be senseless and endless. It is contradictory for the producers to be permanent and non-diminishing and yet for the effects to disappear.**

Word Commentary on Root Text: If what exists at the time of its causes is nevertheless produced again, it [absurdly] follows that [its] production would be senseless and endless.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[76] It follows that the subject, the so-called production of an effect even though it exists at the time of the cause, is senseless production because [the effect already] exists. If it is answered that the [prior] existence [of the effect] does not entail senseless production, then it [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, the so-called production of an effect even though it exists at the time of the cause, that its production would be endless because [according to you] what has already been produced is produced again. The honorable Chandrakīrti says:[77]
>
> If it is thought that the already produced is produced again,
> The growing of a shoot, and so forth, would not be found here [in the world].
> The seed would be produced endlessly.
>
> This is the great sword of reasoning of the glorious Buddhapālita.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It is contradictory for the twenty-three effects to disappear while the producers are permanent and do not diminish.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[78] It follows that the subject, the nature, does not produce effects because of being permanent. It follows with respect to the subject, the nature, that the

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disappearance of the twenty-three effects created by it is not suitable because it—the full complement of causes producing those—always dwell without diminishment.

Further, it follows that the subject, this Sāṃkhya system of the existence of all effects in the entity of the permanent, unitary, all-pervasive generality and the disappearance and so forth of the effects of it, and so forth, is a system of contradictions and amazement because it is harmed by such consequences as:

- It [absurdly] follows that in a small banyan seed there is a great banyan tree.
- It [absurdly] follows that excrement pervasively exists in food…
- It [absurdly] follows that since the person is permanent and changeless, the four castes are merged, and gods, humans, animals and so forth are merged [that is, they do not have their own entities because the person is but one unchangeable entity].
- It [absurdly] follows that there is no liberation.

and so forth.

b' Unsuitability of Kāpilas' and Sāṃkhyas' Assertions on Objects of Comprehension and so forth

Because it is matter, it does not experience. Because they are pervasive, being partless is contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because awareness is matter, it does not experience pleasure and pain. Because the principal and the self pervade all, it is contradictory for them to be partless.

c' Unsuitability of Theistic Sāṃkhyas' and Kāpilas' Assertions on Bondage and Release

Because it is permanent, it is not mind. How can the permanent have bondage and release?

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because the person is permanent, it is not consciousness. When the person is permanent, how can it be bound and free? Such is impossible.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[79] Further, it follows that release of the nature from the person does not occur because

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> the nature is single and partless and there are many persons, due to which, though it is released from one, it would be difficult to be released from all. For instance, although a servant who is shared by many masters is released from one master, the servant is not released from the others.[a]

This has been the third chapter, the section clearing away the extreme of permanence superimposed by the Kāpilas and Sāṃkhyas.

[a] Ge-s̄hay Gedün Lodrö added, "Is Īshvara a person? If so, then Īshvara is not an agent, a creator, since persons are non-agents. If not, then Īshvara would be a twenty-sixth object of knowledge, thereby contradicting the basic tenet that there are only twenty-five objects of knowledge."

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4. Brāḥmaṇa, Vaiyākaraṇa, Vedānta, and Guhyaka

(B) Refuting the Extreme of Permanence Superimposed by Brahmanas, Vaiyakaranas, Vedantins, and Guhyakas {2}

This section has two parts: stating the assertions of the four—Brāhmaṇas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas—and refuting them.

1' Stating the Assertions of the Four—Brāhmaṇas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas {4}

This section has four parts: stating the assertions of the Brāhmaṇas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas.

a' Stating the Assertions of the Brāhmaṇas {3}

This section has three parts: teachers, synonyms, and tenets.

1" Teachers of the Brahmanas

Brāhmaṇa

Brahmā and so forth are the teachers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Brahmā and those included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text—Lord of All Beings[a] and so forth—are their teachers.

2" Synonyms

Brāhmaṇas, Vaidakas, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Brāhmaṇas,[b] Brahmins,[c] Vaidakas,[d] and so forth are synonymous.

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[a] *skyes dgu'i bdag po, prajāpati.*

[b] *tshangs pa pa.*

[c] *bram ze.*

[d] *rig byed pa.*

3" Tenets of the Brahmanas

Brahmā, born from a lotus or an egg, has seven names in the ages. From his four faces and four parts of his body the four Vedas and four castes of humans were produced. He is the creator of the world. The Vedas are self-arisen, and the horse sacrifice is supreme.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are explanations that Brahmā was born from the opening up of a lotus or an egg[a] emanated by the great god Īshvara, and so forth. With respect to his names, in another eon he was called Possessing Fortune. In the seven periods of this eon, chronologically he is called Self-Arisen, Brahmā, Prajāpati, One Whose Place of Birth Was a Lotus, Four-Faced, Patriarch, and Golden Womb.

He is asserted to be the creator of the world since he emanated the environment and the beings therein:

- Once Prajāpati arose, the eight mothers of the world were born.
- The four Vedas arose from his four faces.
- The four castes of humans were produced from four parts of his body—the priestly caste[b] from his mouth; the royal caste[c] from his shoulders; the merchant caste[d] from his thighs; and the commoner caste[e] from his heels.

The Vedas are self-produced since they were not made by anyone. The *aśvamedha,* that is, horse-sacrifice, which is described in the Vedas, is asserted to be the supreme means of achieving the rank of Brahmā. These are the general assertions of the Brāhmaṇas. Their internal divisions are the Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas.

b' Stating the Assertions of the Vaiyākaraṇas {3}

This section has three parts: teacher, names, and assertions.

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[a] In another version, Gung-tang (*Difficult Points,* 5.10) reports that Brahmā was born from a golden lotus in the shape of an egg in the midst of a sphere of fire; the egg arose from water, the two halves of which, when they split, became the sky and the earth. This is why Brahmā is called Golden Womb (*gser gyi mngal, hiraṇyagarbha*).

[b] *bram ze, brahmin.*

[c] *rgyal rigs, kṣatriya.*

[d] *rje'u rigs, vaiśya.*

[e] *dmangs rigs, śudra.*

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1" TEACHER OF THE VAIYAKARANAS

Vaiyākaraṇa

Sadāshiva is their teacher.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Brahmā and Sadāshiva are their teachers.

2" NAMES

Vaiyākaraṇas and Shabdakāras, their names.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Vaiyākaraṇas [Grammarians], Shabdakāras, Proponents of Sound Brahmā, and so forth are synonyms.

3" ASSERTIONS OF THE VAIYAKARANAS {4}

This section has four parts: assertions on the basis, path, fruit, and valid cognition.

a" Vaiyākaraṇas' Assertions on the Basis

They propound a Sound Brahmā that acts as the basis of the varieties. The syllable, *oṃ* or long *auṃ,* is the nature of all things, partless, and permanent, truly permeating them. Due to cloudiness, it appears as the varieties.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They propound a Sound Brahmā that acts as the basis for the production of the varieties of environments and animate beings. This is the syllable *oṃ,* which is a composite of the three—*a, u, m.* In some texts a long *auṃ* also occurs. It is the nature of all things, [spatially and temporally] partless, and permanent.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [80] The Sound Brahmā—which is the base of the production of all existents, or is transformed into existents—has initially no production and finally no disintegration and therefore is asserted to be permanent. This permanent Sound Brahmā is asserted as existing able to bear analysis by reasoning.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [That sound] truly permeates objects through the force of reality itself. Although all external and internal things are the nature of the sole Sound Brahmā, due to pollution by the cloudiness of ignorance, it appears as the varieties of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, such as blue, yellow, white, and red.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [81] Though all outer and inner phenomena ultimately abide as the entity of that sound

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[*oṃ*], like a person with an eye disease who sees hairs falling in what is empty space, those whose eye of awareness is polluted by the darkness of ignorance fancy and apprehend blue and so forth as varieties of subjects and objects.

b" Vaiyākaraṇas' Assertions on the Path

External and internal burnt offerings are the path.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The two:

- external burnt offerings—the burning of cattle in fire, and so forth
- internal burnt offerings—emission of the essential constituent [that is, seminal fluid] in the hearth-vagina of a woman

are taken to be the path.

c" Vaiyākaraṇas' Assertions on the Fruit of the Path

The bliss of emission is liberation.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that bliss and emptiness, which is the disappearance of coarse conceptuality at the time of emitting the essential constituent, is liberation.

d" Vaiyākaraṇas' Assertions on Valid Cognition

Valid cognition is only the Vedas. For some there are two.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [Vaiyākaraṇas mostly assert that] valid cognition is only the Vedas. [Some also assert] the two, direct perception and inferential cognition.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[82] Most Vaiyākaraṇas assert that direct perception often has mistaken perception and that inference also is affected by good and bad reasoning, and therefore only the Vedas are asserted as a self-produced valid cognition. Some teachers, specifically Bhartṛhari, say that though the Vedas are non-deceptive, one must depend on inference, and, therefore, both direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition are also asserted.

c' Stating the Assertions of the Vedāntins {4}

This section has four parts: teachers, synonyms, divisions, and tenets.

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1" Teachers of the Vedāntins

Vedānta

Brahmā and so forth are the teachers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Their teachers are Brahmā and so forth.

2" Synonyms

Vedāntavādins and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Their synonyms are:

- Vedāntavādins, so called because the propound that they have reached the finality (*mtha', anta*) of the four Vedas
- Parabrahminvādins, so called because they propound that they are the supreme among brahmins
- Puruṣhahetuvādins, so called because they propound that only the person described in the Vedas is the cause of the varieties of environments and animate beings

and so forth.

3" Divisions of the Vedāntins

> Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline:* There are no separate words in the root text indicating the divisions of the Vedāntins; the words "pervasive" and "color of the sun" [in the tenets section] indicate the divisions.
>
> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [83] Bodhibhadra speaks of two assertions on the size of the self, large and small,[a] as divisions of Parabrahminvādins:
>
>> They assert a self endowed with five such faculties. Moreover asserters of a self are included in those who think that it is only the size of three[b] tips of hair and those who think that it is bodiless, or all pervasive, unable to be indicated as only the first part of the thumb that is like a clear crystal globe, or unable to be indicated as only [the size of] a mustard grain, or only [the size of] Mount Sumeru.

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[a] As Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* points out, there seem to be three assertions—large, small, and bodiless.

[b] Or, in the *dbus* edition "a hundred thousand."

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

4" TENETS OF THE VEDĀNTINS

Only the person—pervasive, subtle, consciousness, permanent, color of the sun, and beyond darkness—creates environments and animate beings, bondage, and so forth. When the golden color is seen, dissolution as part of it is release.

Word Commentary on Root Text: This called:

1. "person"[a] because of having the capacity of being indemonstrable like Mount Sumeru, pervading all environments and animate beings, being as subtle as a hundred thousandth of the tip of a hair, being an entity of consciousness, being permanent in the sense of not disintegrating, and not undergoing disintegration or dissolution
2. "having the color of the sun" because of having various colors
3. "beyond darkness," that is, beyond the three realms

creates the varieties of:

- the production, abiding, and disintegration of environments and animate beings
- bondage and release of transmigrating beings
- pleasure and pain
- high and low.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[84] Realization of the self described in the Vedas is extremely rare for the followers of Buddha who propound that compounded phenomena are empty, that is, disintegrate moment by moment and who are outside the view of the Vedānta. Due to despising the permanent self that is the basis of bondage and liberation, where is liberation for Buddhists? It does not exist…

Because the person has passed beyond darkness—that is, the three realms—it is "other than darkness,"…the composites of cause and effect that are unpleasant and create unpleasantness…Regarding [creative] etymologies of person (*skyes bu, puruṣa*), "existing prior to destruction" [means] coming without disintegration from before. "Other than sleep" [means] not to be destroyed when the world is destroyed. Because in the past, present, and future all that arises abides by way of the supervisory blessings of the person, it is the "sustainer." Because the person pervades the three

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[a] *skyes bu, puruṣa.* For a translation of much of the source material for this section, see V.V. Gokhale, "The Vedānta-Philosophy Described by Bhavya in his *Madhyamakahṛdaya,*" *Indo-Iranian Journal* 2, no. 3 (1958):165-189.

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realms, it is the "filler." Because of being endowed with such capacities it is the "person."

Word Commentary on Root Text: When, upon meditating on that self, a yogi sees it as the color of gold,[a] the yogi dissolves into just that self. That itself is release.

d' Stating the Assertions of the Guhyakas {4}

This section has four parts: teachers, synonyms, scriptures, and tenets.

1" TEACHERS OF THE GUHYAKAS

Guhyaka

Brahmā, and so forth, are the teachers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Brahmā and so forth are their teachers.

2" SYNONYMS

Vedaguhyakas.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Vedaguhyaka, Non-Dualists, Proponents of the Brahmā of Consciousness, and so forth are synonyms.

3" SCRIPTURES OF THE GUHYAKAS

The *Drop of Ambrosia* is the scripture.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Vedas such as the *Drop of Ambrosia* are valid scriptures.

4" TENETS OF THE GUHYAKAS

They assert a partless self that is consciousness, awareness, permanent, without a second entity, and truly established.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that the Brahmā of consciousness is:

- a partless self that is consciousness, awareness, and permanent
- without a second entity,[b] since an object of knowledge that is a

[a] This is the person, the golden-colored one.

[b] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (347.2) says it should be analyzed whether *ngo bo* ***nyid*** *med pa* in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's root text is a scribal error. This is his way of suggesting that he prefers

different entity from it does not exist
- a truly existent thing.

2' Refuting the Assertions of the Brāhmaṇas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas

REFUTATION: **There are not four castes. All brothers and sisters are doing it. If violence is religious practice, what are the causes of hells? And so forth.**

Word Commentary on Root Text: Since all humans are born from Brahmā, the four castes would not exist. Since all male and female humans are born from one father, they are brothers and sisters, and, therefore, when they copulate, all brothers and sisters would be doing it together. In that case, they are engaging in the religion of barbarians, due to which all of the religious systems of the brahmins would be degenerate. If violence, such as killing cattle, is religion, what are the causes of being born in a hell? There would not be any. The term "And so forth" in the root text contains the ways of refuting the sound-Brahmā of consciousness, the sun-colored person, the Brahmā of consciousness, and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[85] These are mostly refuted by refuting a permanent, unitary, and self-powered [self]. It follows that the subject, that sort of self, is not large because of being subtle. It follows that it is not one because of being many…It follows that the subject, the Vedas, are not produced from the mouth of Brahmā because of being self-arisen. It follows that the Vedas are recited by all—the commoner's caste and so forth—because of being sounds pervading all.

This has been the fourth chapter, the section clearing away with valid cognition the extreme of permanence superimposed by the four—Brāhmaṇas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Vedāntins, and Guhyakas.

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*ngo bo **gnyis** med pa,* and I have taken the root text this way.

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5. Vaiṣhṇava and Mīmāṃsaka

(C) REFUTING THE EXTREME OF PERMANENCE SUPERIMPOSED BY VAISHNAVAS AND MIMAMSAKAS {2}

This section has two parts: stating the assertions of the Vaiṣhṇavas and Mīmāṃsakas and refuting them.

1' Stating the Assertions of the Vaiṣhṇavas and Mīmāṃsakas {2}

This section has two parts: assertions of the Vaiṣhṇavas and of the Mīmāṃsakas.

a' Describing the Vaiṣhṇavas' Assertions {4}

This section has four parts: teachers, synonyms, scriptures on which they rely, and tenets.

1" TEACHERS

Vaiṣhṇava

Their teachers are Vasudeva, Chandra, and Taker of Virgins.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Vasudeva, that is, Viṣhṇu, Guruchandra, Taker of Girls,[a] and so forth are the teachers of the Vaiṣhṇavas.

2" SYNONYMS

Vaiṣhṇavas, Chāndrakas, and Proponents of the Doctrine of Songs.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Vaiṣhṇavas, Chāndrakas, Proponents of the Doctrine of Songs, and so forth are synonyms of Vaiṣhṇavas.

3" SCRIPTURES ON WHICH THE VAISHNAVAS RELY

***Branches Helping Investigation, The Five Nights,* and so forth are the scriptures.**

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[a] *gzhon nu ma len.*

Word Commentary on Root Text: Branches Helping Investigation[a] *The Five Nights,*[b] and so forth are valid scriptures.

4" VAISHNAVAS' TENETS {2}

This section has two parts: attributes of the god and attributes of that god's doctrine.

a" Attributes of the God Vishnu {4}

This section has four parts: attributes of the abode of the god Viṣhṇu and of his retinue, attributes of Viṣhṇu's assertions out of pride, assertions on the attributes of the entities [of Viṣhṇu], and assertions on Viṣhṇu's non-peaceful attributes.

1: Attributes of the Abode of the God Viṣhṇu and of His Retinue

Viṣhṇu dwells in the Many-Gated surrounded by many women.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It is asserted that Viṣhṇu lives in the city called Many-Gated[c] in an ocean surrounded by many—sixty thousand—women.

2: Attributes of Viṣhṇu's Assertions Out of Pride

"I am the supreme—sun and so forth. I am the agent by way of the bodies of Brahmins."

Word Commentary on Root Text: Viṣhṇu propounds, "The supreme things of environments and animate beings—the sun and (those which are included in the phrase 'and so forth' in the root text:) the moon, the glittering wind, the Kāvya[d] Veda, the foremost of gods Shakra, and so forth—am I." And "I am also the agent and enjoyer of burnt offering by means of the bodies of Brahmins."[e]

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[a] *rtog pa la phan pa'i yal ga.*

[b] *mtshan mo lnga, pañcarātraka.*

[c] *sgo ldan, dvāraka.*

[d] That is, poetry.

[e] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, stod, nya,* 186.6) adds a textual correction of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's root text, reading *mchog* ***nga*** instead of *mchog* ***de***.

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3: Assertions on the Attributes of the Entities of Viṣhṇu

If, from between the two entities, the peaceful is meditated, liberation is attained.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that one will attain liberation if, from between the two entities of Viṣhṇu, one meditates on the peaceful divine substantial entity[a]—which is free from existence, non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence, and not both existence and non-existence.

4: Assertions on Viṣhṇu's Non-Peaceful Attributes

Concerning the non-peaceful, the ten incarnations—fish, tortoise, boar, man-lion, dwarf, two Rāmas, Kṛṣhṇa, Buddha, and Kalki—brought out, raised, suppressed, killed, deceived, killed the Ten-Necked, severed the lineage, aided, purified sins, and will tame sentient beings.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to his non-peaceful entities which are on the earth, they assert that Viṣhṇu emanates as ten incarnations:

- A fish brought out the four Vedas which had vanished into the ocean.
- A tortoise raised the world which had sunk into the ocean.
- A wild boar suppressed[b] the Brahmā world and below.
- A man-lion killed the demi-god Hiraṇyakashīpu.[c]
- A dwarf deceived the demi-god Baliko by begging for the land of two footsteps.
- Rāma killed the ten-necked monster Laṅka.
- Rāma severed the royal lineage of Arjuna by killing him.
- Kṛṣhṇa served the welfare of sentient beings through drawing the four rivers in all directions.
- Buddha purified the sins [of his killing limitless millions of demons as Rāma].
- Kālki will tame many sentient beings in the future. These are asserted to be the ten incarnations [of Viṣhṇu].

[a] *rdzas, dravya.*

[b] *mnan.* Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, nya,* 151.6) indicates that perhaps this should read that the wild boar "raised up the Brahmā world and below."

[c] *'gro skyong gser can.*

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b" Attributes of the God Vishnu's Doctrine {3}

This section has three parts: assertions on the basis, path, and fruit.

1: Vaiṣhṇavas' Assertions on the Basis

They assert creators, self, actions, time, natures, qualities, emptiness which is degeneration, and cause and effect.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert:

- the existence of partless permanent particles, which are the creators building the world systems
- the existence of a permanent self
- the existence of virtuous and non-virtuous actions done by that self
- the existence of time that is a permanent thing
- the existence of the natures, or substances, of earth and so forth
- the existence of qualities of substances—mental potency, motility, and darkness
- the existence of an emptiness that is the degeneration, or disintegration, of all existents by way of their dissolving into their source
- the existence of causes that give forth the effects of pleasure and pain, made by virtuous and non-virtuous agents.

2: Vaiṣhṇavas' Assertions on the Path

They assert cultivation of wind, the syllable, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: One cultivates wind-yoga—which has the six branches of transference, concentration, inhalation and exhalation of wind, retention, subsequent mindfulness, and meditative stabilization[86]—and the threefold *oṃ* syllable.

3: Vaiṣhṇavas' Assertions on the Fruit of the Path

They assert liberation, an end to cyclic existence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that if those are cultivated, Viṣhṇu grants the feat of release. Since they assert a liberation that is the degeneration, or emptying, of cyclic existence, they assert a temporary liberation having an end.

b' Describing Mīmāṃsakas' Assertions {3}

This section has three parts: teachers, names, and tenets.

1" MIMAMSAKAS' TEACHERS

Mīmāṃsā

Jaimini is the teacher.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Jaimini[a] is the teacher of the Mīmāṃsakas.

2" NAMES

Mīmāṃsakas and Jaiminis.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Mīmāṃsakas[b] and Jaiminis[c] are synonymous.

3" MIMAMSAKAS' TENETS {2}

This section has two parts: assertions on the attributes of the self and on the attributes of doctrines.

a" Mīmāṃsakas' Assertions on the Attributes of the Self

The self is awareness, consciousness, permanent, a substantial entity, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Unlike the Sāṃkhyas, they assert that the self is not different from the awareness but is an entity of awareness. Unlike the Aishvaras, they assert that the self is not matter but is an entity of consciousness. Unlike the Buddhists, they assert that the self is not impermanent but is a permanent entity. Unlike the Ayatas, they assert that the body and mind are not inseparable but that the self exists as a substantial entity separate from the body.[d]

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[87] Since it is evident from this that the Ayatas do not assert a substantially existent self separate from the body, and there are also many sources for this, there is a slight

a *rgyal dpog pa;* a student of Vyāsa.

b *spyod pa pa.*

c *rgyal dpog pa.*

d *lus las yan gar ba'i rdzas yod kyi bdag.*

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call[a] for analyzing how the Ayatas assert a self that is substantially existent in the sense of being able to stand by itself.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Unlike the Naiyāyikas, they assert that the self does not in all respects appear continuously; rather, the entities experiencing pleasure and so forth disappear, whereas the entity of sentience does not disappear at any time and appears at all times.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[88] Unlike the Naiyāyikas who assert that the self has no appearance and disappearance, they assert that the self has aspects that are the agents of experience at various times of pleasure and pain, and they assert that though the states of the self are impermanent, its parts, conceptually isolatable factors, and so forth are inseparable in the entity of the person. For example, though the conceptually isolatable factors of a coiled snake and an extended snake are different, the entity—being a snake—does not disappear.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[89] The Naiyāyikas assert that the permanent self is related with the experience of pleasure and pain and therefore is the "eater," or agent of experience, but the entity of the self itself does not experience pleasure and pain. Otherwise, the self [like the experience of pleasure and pain] would appear and disappear, and it would absurdly follow that the self would be impermanent. Similarly, though the self does not know objects by itself, through its relation with knowledge it is posited as the knower, seer, and so forth…

The Mīmāṃsakas do not assert it this way; they assert that the self that is an entity of pleasure and so forth disappears and the self that is an entity of existence and so forth does not disappear but continually exists. The sentient entity of self has a character of awareness, unlike the notion by the Sāṃkhyas that it is other than awareness…

How could disappearance and continual existence exist simultaneously in a single self? There is no contradiction in those two existing in one substratum; for example, the entity of a snake continually exists while giving up its state of being coiled and assuming the state of being straightened out; [when one of those states supercedes the other, the former state disappears, but] the entity of the snake does not disappear. Accordingly, even if the sentient nature of the self is permanent at all times, it is neither the case that the

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[a] This is polite understatement.

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entirety of the entities of the self disappears, or that, in accordance with the Naiyāyikas and so forth, the entirety of the entities of the self continually exist. Then, how is it? The states of pleasure, pain, and so forth of the self disappear, but the entity of sentience continually exists at all times…

If, like the Buddhists, it was asserted that the self strictly disappeared, deeds done would be wasted [that is, karmas would be lost] and one would meet with [the consequences of] actions not done by oneself. If, like the Naiyāyikas and so forth, it was asserted that the self strictly continually exists, there would no possibility for the self to experience pleasure and pain. Hence, one should assert a person that has a nature of both disappearance and appearance, like a snake that the nature of both being coiled and being straight.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[90] The word "and so forth" in the root text indicates also the reasons for the existence of the self: The self exists because there is identification, and because there is memory, and so forth.

b" Mīmāṃsakas' Assertions on the Attributes of Doctrines {2}

This section has two parts: having explained that the Vedas are valid, the general meaning[a] and particular meanings.

1: Having Explained that the Vedas are Valid, the General Meaning

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[91] Also, the scriptures of Sāṃkhyas, Vaisheṣhikas, Nirgranthas, Proponents of Non-Existence, Buddhists and so forth are false because they were made by persons. The self-arisen, unmade Vedas, the source of all four groups—practices [that is, the causes of high status and liberation], objects [that is, wealth which prevents poverty], liberation [that is, Brahmā and so forth who are liberated from bad transmigrations], and desire [that is, the enjoyments of the desired attributes of the five senses]—are valid scriptures. [Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* says]:

> Because of degeneration through faults of desire and so forth
> The words of persons are only false.

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[a] There is no separate root text for this first section.

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> Because the Vedas were not made by persons,
> They are held to be valid.
>
> and:
>
> Because it is asserted that an agent is not remembered,
> The Vedas were not made by persons.
> Because their transmission through lineage is not severed,
> They are indicated to be "oral transmission."[a]…
>
> What is explained in the Vedas should not be refuted because analysis with inference is like a blind person going on a dangerous path. It is said:
>
> The four accomplishments of the ancient doctrines [that is, the doctrines of the history of Viṣhṇu],
> The doctrines of the knowledgeable [that is, the laws of Manu, the book of Vyāsa],
> The Vedas together with their branches [that is, the doctrines of Brahmā],
> And the science of medicine are not destroyed by reasons.
>
> Like a blind person going on a dangerous path
> By guessing with the feet,
> Those who hold inference to be central
> Do not fall with difficulty.[b]

2: Particulars of the Mīmāṃsakas' Doctrines {3}

This section has three parts: attributes of the fruit, paths for achieving the fruit, and valid cognitions which are the means of comprehension.

A: ATTRIBUTES OF THE FRUIT IN THE MIMAMSAKAS' DOCTRINES

Because defilements are of the nature of the person, there is no omniscient being. High status is asserted as liberation, but.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that because defilements abide in the nature of the person, which is consciousness, there is no omniscient one who has exhausted all defects. They assert that the likes of Brahmā, which is a high status, is liberation because he is released from bad transmigrations, but they do not assert a liberation that is irreversible.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [92] According to Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime*

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[a] *lung, āgama.* I frequently translate this word as "scripture" or "scriptural sayings."

[b] That is, they fall easily.

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Cognition," because defilements abide in the nature of the person which is consciousness, there is no omniscient one who has exhausted all faults, and therefore, true speech is non-existent. Because instances of high status, such as Brahmā, are liberated from bad transmigrations, that is liberation or release, but there is no fruit other than only that [high status]. It is said:

Even the speech of Buddha is not valid
Because of being produced, like others.
The perfect Buddha is not omniscient
Because of being a person, like others.

B: PATHS FOR ACHIEVING THE FRUIT IN THE MIMAMSAKAS' DOCTRINES

They assert forty-eight powers of deeds as causes. They assert four horns, three legs, two heads, seven arms, the triple binding, leader of the herd, and the roar as particulars of the Vedas. They assert offerings of the three or seven of seven, with ghee.

Word Commentary on Root Text: According to Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning,* the forty-eight powers of deeds are the causes of becoming a Brahmana.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[93] Furthermore, the internal offering is [described as follows in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning*]:

Gautama says a woman is fire.
Her place [that is, female organ] is the chimney of the fireplace.
The hairs grown there are smoke.
The fire there is charcoal.
Her juice is the spark.
In such fire the seed of a godly person is burned.
From that burnt-offering a person [that is, a Brahmin boy] is produced.
Then he is nourished [by the forty-eight powers of deeds].
Without such offering there is no attainment of high status.
The childless do not have high status [because the Vedas explain that the birth of a child from the approach of the internal offering is the method for attaining high status].

Such are only shameful and nauseous [assertions] and are not indicated in words. Rather, such rites are explained in a hidden way through various symbols.

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Word Commentary on Root Text: There are many particulars [of the secret language] of the Vedas like:

- the four horns, which are the four Vedas
- the three legs, which are the three periods—dawn and so forth—or the three fires of burnt offering and so forth
- the two heads, which are the agent of the offering and his wife, or the syllable *oṃ* and euphonic combination
- the seven arms, which are the seven meters
- the triply bound, which are heart, neck, and head
- the leader of the herd, which is the syllable *oṃ*
- the roar, which means making an internal sound.

Moreover, they assert the three—benedictions, praises, and rites. Or, they assert offerings through seven groups of seven—the seven foods which are the seven substances of burnt offering, the seven tongues which are the seven meters, the seven sages, the seven houses, worshipping seven times on the seven days, and satiation with ghee in the seven birth-places [that is, vessels].

C: Valid Cognitions which are the Means of Comprehension in the Mimamsakas' Doctrines

There are six valid cognitions, called direct perception, inference, comprehension through analogy, arisen from sound, understanding through an object, and of the non-existent. One says there are reasoning, existence, non-apprehension, renown, thinking, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert six valid cognitions:

1. direct perception

    Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[94] A direct perception is asserted as a sense consciousness, devoid of conceptuality and initially produced from the meeting of the object and the sense power.

2. inference
3. comprehension through analogy

    Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[95] For instance, realizing a gayal[a] [that is, what a gayal is] from being shown that it is like an ox.[b]

[a] *ba min* or *ba men, gavaya;* a domesticated bovine mammal (*Bos frontalis*) of India and Burma, having thick, pointed horns, a dark coat, and a tufted tail; *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,* 1992.

[b] *ba* or *ba lang, go;* also, a cow.

4. arisen from sound

    Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[96] An awareness realizing an [obscure] verbalized meaning through a consciousness arisen from verbalization; there are two types, valid cognitions arisen from the Vedas, which are not made by an agent, and valid cognitions arisen from the words of a believable person.

5. implicit understanding[a]

    Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[97] A realization—through the power of gaining ascertainment by any of the six valid cognitions—that another, unseen object, which has been discriminated, will not become otherwise or be affected by doubt at any place or time is asserted to be a valid cognition of implicit understanding. When implicit understanding is divided, there are six:

    1) Implicit understanding preceded by direct perception: For instance, an implicit understanding—from having directly realized that fire burns—that fire has the potency of burning.
    2) Implicit understanding preceded by inference: For instance, an implicit understanding—by reason of the sun's having gone to another area—that the sun has the power of going.
    3) Implicit understanding preceded by a valid cognition arisen from sound: For instance, an implicit understanding—through hearing that the corpulent Devadatta, who does not make use of special essence extracts,[b] does not eat during the day, and so forth—that he eats at night.
    4) Implicit understanding preceded by a valid cognition of knowledge through analogy: For instance, the implicit understanding—through realizing that an ox is like a gayal—that a gayal has the capacity of exemplifying an ox.
    5) Implicit understanding preceded by a valid cognition of implicit understanding: For instance,
        - [The first implicit understanding, which will serve to understand another obscure phenomenon, is, for instance:] Having earlier associated the vocabulary "pot" to a silver bulbous thing able to hold fluid, then when one later sees a gold bulbous thing able to hold fluid, one generates an awareness thinking "pot," whereupon one implicitly understands that the term of the previous association of vocabulary has the power to produce this awareness.

[a] *don gyis go ba.*

[b] These are vitamin-like extracts from flowers, minerals, and so forth.

- [The second implicit understanding produced by this first implicit understanding is:] From this implicit understanding, there is further produced an implicit understanding that the associated term is permanent, because if the term of the time of initial association were impermanent, it would not appear at the time of the [future] usage of the convention.

6) Implicit understanding preceded by a valid cognition of a non-existent: For instance, the implicit understanding that because Kṛṣhṇa, who has not died, is not inside the house, he is outside.

6. valid cognition of non-existent things.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [98] The Mīmāṃsakas assert that among things[a] there are existent entities and non-existent entities. The other five valid cognitions—direct perception and so forth—are not generated as means of comprehending non-existent entities of things, since the five valid cognitions—direct perception and so forth—realize existent entities of things. Hence, an awareness that is a valid cognition with regard to a non-existent entity of a thing is a valid cognition of a non-existent thing.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[99] If valid cognitions of non-existent things are divided, there are four valid cognitions realizing :

- things that were non-existents formerly, such as the non-existence of yogurt in milk
- things that are non-existents upon having disintegrated, such as the non-existence of milk in yogurt
- things that are non-existents of the type [called] one in another, such as the non-existence of a horse in a cow, and so forth
- things that are extreme non-existents, such as the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit.

Word Commentary on Root Text: One—that is, the muni Chāraka[b]—[also] asserts:

- reasoning[c]

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[a] *dngos po, bhāva.*

[b] *sman dpyad pa.*

[c] *rigs pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[100] For instance, knowing cause and effect from the approach of concomitance and non-concomitance.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[101] Since it is conceptual, it is not a direct perception; and since there is no example for the reason that is its basis, it also is not an inference.

- non-apprehension[a]

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[102] The realization of anything as non-existent from realizing that the object of awareness does not exist is asserted as non-apprehension. Because it does not depend on an example, it also is just another valid cognition…For instance: the realization of non-freedom from desire because of not apprehending freedom from desire.
- renown[b]

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[103] Realizing something from an ancient story, for instance.
- occurrence

  Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[104] Realizing that if a whole exists, parts possessing the whole exist[c]; for instance, knowing that a hundred exists if a thousand is known to exist.
- thinking

  Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[105] The occurrence of an event after thinking, without any reason, that such would happen; for instance, young sisters thinking, "Today my brother will come," and his coming.

and so forth.

2' Refuting the Assertions of the Vaiṣhṇavas and Mīmāṃsakas {2}

This section has two parts: refuting Vaiṣhṇavas' assertions on the attributes of the god Viṣhṇu and refuting Mīmāṃsakas' assertions on omniscience, liberation, and so forth.

---

a *ma dmigs pa.*

b *zhes grags pa.*

c *tshogs pa yod par rtogs pa na/ tshogs pa can yod par rtogs pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

a' Refuting Vaiṣhṇavas' Assertions on the Attributes of the God Viṣhṇu

***REFUTATION:* Because Viṣhṇu pervades all, his running away is contradictory, and the ten incarnations are false.**

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because Viṣhṇu pervades all environments and animate beings, his running away is contradictory.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[106] It follows that Viṣhṇu does not pervade all because he runs away, like an ordinary human. Also, it follows that Viṣhṇu's running away is not feasible because he pervades all, like space. Furthermore, it follows that Viṣhṇu abides in Viṣhṇu; Viṣhṇu eats Viṣhṇu; and Viṣhṇu arrives even into the hand of Viṣhṇu, because Viṣhṇu is partless and unitary and pervades all.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Also, the ten incarnations are established as false.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[107] If it is true that the ruler of the gods gave to Ramaṇa the superiority of the gods, why did he take up weapons?…That the universal monarch Mahābāla together with the four divisions of his army could fit into the city of Ayodhya is nothing else but a lie; it is false, like saying that a herd of elephants could fit into an ant-hill…Also, the assertion that the childless do not have high status contradicts the Vedas; for it contradicts the explanation that the sage Jinaputra Ne-j̄o[a] and so forth practiced asceticism from their youth and entered to the Brahmā Land and the explanation that they went inside the sun and so forth…The assertion that Viṣhṇu is omniscient and his ignorance of the stealing of his wife and his asking [cattle where she was] are contradictory. Similarly, his covering the great earth with three foot steps and his need for a bridge to cross an ocean are contradictory. The abiding of the three worlds in his stomach and the stealing of his wife and so forth are contradictory…Therefore, it is contradictory and untrue that if one is devoted to Viṣhṇu, one will not degenerate and that he bestows liberation, bestows the best, and so forth because his wife…despite being devoted to him was carried off by an enemy, and not only that but also his own lineage degenerated, as you yourself assert and is explained in the Vedas.

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[a] *rgyal ba'i bu ne co.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

b' Refuting Mīmāṃsakas' Assertions on Omniscience, Liberation, and so forth

Because abandonment and realization can be completed, abandonment of all defects and omniscience are established.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Through the reasons of the existence of the completion of abandonment and of realization, respectively the extinguishment of faults and omniscience are established as existing.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[108] It follows that the assertion by the Mīmāṃsakas—upon having stated a reason like [because of] speaking or [because of being] a person—that liberation (extinguishing [all] defects) and omniscience do not exist is not correct:
>
> - because it is not that defilements of the mind, such as desire, are permanent or that a method for abandoning them does not exist, or
> - because although such a method does exist, a teacher of it does not exist…
>
> Therefore, since desire and so forth have causes, they are not permanent. Since there is conditioning to the wisdom realizing selflessness, this wisdom is suitable to extinguish all faults, and hence there is an antidote [to defects]. Because knowledge of all phenomena exists even in a single mind, there exists one who teaches upon knowing the method…
>
> *Objection:* Because defilements permeate[a] the nature of the mind, there is no extinction of them.
>
> *Answer:* That also is incorrect since defilements, like oxidation on gold and rust on iron, do not permeate the nature of the mind, and hence the nature of the mind is luminous, and defilements are adventitious…
>
> Otherwise, it [absurdly] follows that minds always necessarily only have the afflictive emotions of indwelling desire and so forth because there is no possibility of setting aside the mind's own nature, and desire and so forth [according to you] permeate, or dwell in,[b] the nature of the mind. If that is asserted, [it is wrong] because then persons would simultaneously have both manifest desire and

[a] *zhugs pa.*

[b] *zhugs pa'am gnas pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

hatred whereas the non-existence of such is manifestly established…

Therefore, because abandonments are completed and realizations are completed through progressive development, omniscient ones arise:

- because jumping and so forth depend on the body but this does not, and the obstacles to knowing all phenomena are not form and so forth but internal defilements, and if those become non-existent, all phenomena are known, and
- because completion of conditioning in the mind, which is a stable base and of non-interrupted continuum, gives rise to omniscience.[109]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[110] It follows that your assertion that there are six different, or mutually exclusive, valid cognitions is incorrect because whatever is a valid cognition among those six is included in the two, direct perception and inference …It follows that arisen from sound must not be suitable to be a valid cognition because:

- since its objects are obscure phenomena, it is not a direct perception
- and it does not have the characteristics of an inference—depending on a reason that has three aspects and so forth…

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[111] About comprehension through analogy the Mīmāṃsakas say:

> When, having already seen an ox, someone sees a gayal in a remote area, the limbs of the gayal are seen to be mostly similar to an ox's limbs except for its roundish neck. The eye consciousness that sees the gayal at this time is a direct perception that understands only the form of the gayal. At this time the similarity of the gayal with an ox is established manifestly, but the similarity of the ox with the gayal is realized by a valid cognition of comprehension through analogy. Because the gayal, the reason [for the similarity], is present, its similarity with an ox is an object of sense operation. Because the ox is not present, the ox's similarity with the gayal is known by a valid cognition of comprehension through analogy.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[112] It follows that comprehension through analogy is not strictly different from the

two valid cognitions because:

- To someone who has first seen an ox, someone else says, "A gayal is like that," and later when a gayal is seen, its neck[a] is seen to be without a dew-lap and to be roundish, and its limbs are seen to be mostly similar [to an ox's limbs] and that is a direct perception.
- Also, the memory of the reason—the similarity with the ox that was seen—is neither a direct perception nor an inference, [it is a memory consciousness].
- Even if it is a conceptual consciousness realizing similarity through depending on a reason, that is included in inference…

It follows that implicit understanding must not be another valid cognition because, when analyzed, if it does not have the complete features [of a valid cognition], it is not suitable to be a valid cognition, and if it does have those features, it is not distinguishable separate from inference.[b]

This has been the fifth chapter, the section clearing away with valid cognition the extreme of permanence superimposed by Vaiṣhṇavas and Mīmāṃsakas.

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[a] Reading *mgrin par* for *mi dran par* (Taipei, 116.3) in accordance with Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*stod, cha,* 184.1).

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a refers his readers to Shāntarakṣhita's *Compendium of Principles* for refutations of the other so-called valid cognitions.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

6. Shaiva, Vaisheṣhika, and Naiyāyika

(D) Refuting the Extreme of Permanence Superimposed by Shaivas, Vaisheshikas, and Naiyāyikas {2}

This section has two parts: expressing their assertions and refuting them.

1' Expressing the Assertions of the Shaivas, Vaisheṣhikas, and Naiyāyikas {2}

This section has two parts: explaining the Shaivas' system and explaining the systems of the others, that is, the Vaisheṣhikas, and Naiyāyikas.

a' Explaining the Shaivas' System {5}

This section has five parts: Shaivas' teachers, names, divisions, scriptures and so forth, and assertions on valid cognition.

1" Shaivas' Teachers

Shaiva

Shiva, the sage Akṣhipāda, and so forth are the teachers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The Aishvaras' teachers are:

- Shiva—so called because of having attained peace—or Īshvara
- the sage Akṣhipāda, who protected the Great God's consort.

and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[113] The Great God left the sage Handsome[a] to guard Uma [his wife who was so called because she uttered the exasperated sigh "u" due to her displeasure with the Great God's austerities.] Uma became desirous of the sage and flirted, but the sage lowered his eyes to her feet. Because the sage kept his discipline, Īshvara was pleased and empowered him to compose books. Due to being known for this, he came to be called "Eyes-Feet".[b] The phrase "and so forth" in the root text contains

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[a] *mdzes pa.*

[b] *rkang mig, akṣipāda*

even most of the teachers of the Vaisheṣhikas and the Naiyāyikas.

2" Names

Aishvaras, Followers of the Origin of Existence, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Synonyms are:

- Aishvaras
- Followers of the Origin of Existence, so called because they follow the Great God who is the Originator of Existence due to primordially issuing forth existence
- Shaivas

and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[114] Because he possesses dominion according to his wish with respect to the production and so forth of environments and animate beings, he is called Īshvara. Because they take him to be their god or teacher, they are called Aishvaras, Shaivas, and so forth. It is like [calling the followers of Buddha] Bauddhas.

3" Divisions of Shaivas

When divided, there are three.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When they are divided, there are three—theistic Sāṃkhyas, Vyañjakas (?),[a] and Those who Do Not Pierce their Ears.[b]

4" Scriptures of the Shaivas

The *Tantra of Resounding Sound* and the *Tantra of Bhurkuṃkūṭa* are valid scriptures; as explained.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The *Īshvara Tantra of Resounding Sound,*[c] the *Tantra of Bhurkuṃkūṭa,*[d] and so forth are valid scriptures. [Other valid sources of cognition are as explained on the occasion of the individual schools].

---

[a] *gsal byed pa.*

[b] *rna ba ma phug pa.*

[c] *dbang phyug sgra bsgrags kyi rgyud.*

[d] *sme brtsegs zhes bya ba'i rgyud.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

5" SHAIVAS' ASSERTIONS ON VALID COGNITION {3}

This section has three parts: assertions on the god, explaining their tenets, and elimination of qualms.

a" Shaivas' Assertions on the God Īshvara

Īshvara, endowed with eight qualities, dwells on Mount Kailāsa.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It is explained that Īshvara is endowed with eight qualities—he is subtle, light, owner, controller, going everywhere, object of worship, having all wishes, and abiding in joyous pleasure—and abides on the great snow mountain Kailāsa.[a]

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[115] By only slightly moving a minor part of his body, such as a hand, a foot, or face, he has power over the creation and destruction of many worlds of animate beings; this is his quality of subtleness. He has power over the generation, abiding, and dissolution of the world of the environment, that is, external earth, water, fire, and wind; this is his quality of lightness. He has power over the generation, abiding, and dissolution over both the world of sentient beings and the world of the environment; this is his quality of ownership. He controls all that arises; this is his quality of being the controller. His mind goes to areas, food, drink, whatever it wishes, and the body does not remain behind but also goes there; this is his quality of going everywhere. Since he is supreme among the three worlds, it is fitting that all creatures worship him and pay service to him; this is his quality of being the object of worship. He controls *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas* according to his wish; this is his quality of having all wishes. He himself has attained peace and bestows high status and liberation as he wishes; this is his quality of abiding in joyous pleasure.

b" Explaining Shaivas' Tenets {3}

This section has three parts: basis, fruit, and path.

1: Shaivas' Assertions on the Basis {2}

This section has two parts: Shaivas' assertion that Īshvara is the creator of environments and animate beings and the explanation in the *Kālachakra Tantra.*

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[a] *ti se.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

A: Shaivas' Assertion that Īshvara is the Creator of Environments and animate beings

Because things abide differently and so forth and because there would be confusion, he is established as the agent of production and destruction.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It is established that there is a creator of the production and destruction of the world of the environment and of beings therein other than virtuous and non-virtuous deeds:

- because of staying still and entering into action as is the case with an arrow,[a] and
- because of possessing particular shapes as is the case with pots and so forth, and
- because of performing functions as is the case with an axe, and
- because confusions such as the sinful having a long life, the virtuous having a short life and so forth, the miserly being rich, and the charitable being poor.

And [the creator] moreover is established to be Īshvara.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[116] [They say that] the world of the environment is blessed into being by Īshvara because shapes and colors abide individually and differently, like, for example, a potter's forming in individual states the different shapes of earthen vessels, pots, and so forth. Thus they think that if there were no maker of such shapes and so forth for mindless matter, these could not occur.
>
> Also, it is clear that the various levels of comfort and suffering of persons, that is, of the beings in the environment, are created by Īshvara because confusion—such as the sinful having long lives, the miserly being wealthy, the liberal being poor, and so forth—is seen [whereas such would not be the case if the possession of long life, wealth, and its opposites were solely the effects of actions]. It is similar for example to certain kings' creating pleasure and pain individually for friends and enemies. As is said:
>
> That misers [are seen to be] wealthy,
> That the virtuous [are seen to be beggars] living on others' livelihood,
> And that the non-virtuous [are seen to] have high positions
> Make it clear that Īshvara is the creator.

[a] *ste'u.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Because [some] who have a wealth of virtues are seen to have short lives,
Because [some] who behave badly are seen to have long lives,
And [some who are] liberal are seen to be poor,
It is clear that Īshvara is the creator.

B: Explanation of Shaivas' Assertions about Environments and animate beings in the Kālachakra Tantra

Creator, self, and so forth; six paths; five principles—constituents, mantra, desire, self, and Shiva. Abiding in the three he joins, disjoins. The twelve knots.

Word Commentary on Root Text: As explained on the occasion of the Vaiṣhṇavas, they assert a creator of environments and animate beings, a permanent self, action, time, nature, qualities, an emptiness of destruction, and so forth. They also assert:

- the six—the eyes and so forth—that are the paths by which consciousness engages in objects
- the five principles:
  1. the principle of constituents—space, wind, fire, water, and earth
  2. the principle of mantra, which has an essence of vowels and consonants
  3. the principle of desire, which is the sixty-four arts of enjoying pleasure
  4. the principle of self, which is the permanent self
  5. the principle of Lord Shiva, who pervades all.
- Because Lord Shiva abides in the body, speech, and mind of all transmigrating beings, he acts as the cause of joining, or coming together, of the six paths and so forth at birth, and he acts as the cause of disjoining, or separation, from them at the time of death.
- the twelve astrological houses, that is, twelve great cycles which abide in the body, indicated by the term "knots" [in the root text and in the *Condensed Kālachakra Tantra*].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[117] They assert that bliss during emission and seminal drops are the entity of Īshvara.

2: Shaivas' Assertions on the Fruit of the Path

They propound that the pristine wisdom of the fourth state is the state of liberation.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Word Commentary on Root Text: They propound that from among four consciousnesses—that is, the pristine wisdoms on the occasions of wakefulness, thick sleep, dream, and copulation—the wisdom of the establishment of the bliss of copulation, the fourth state, is the rank of liberation.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[118] There are pristine wisdoms of the four periods—the time of wakefulness, the time of thick sleep, the time of dreaming, and the time of copulatory bliss. Of those, the fourth is asserted to be liberation.

3: Shaivas' Assertions on the Path

Yoga of the winds, Rudra's initiation, and bliss of emission are the path.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that:

- wind yoga as explained on the occasion of the Vaiṣhṇavas
- bestowal of initiation from the tip of Rudra's, that is, Īshvara's, phallus
- bliss of the emission of the essential constituent upon union with a female shāktī

and so forth are the path that is the means for attaining liberation.

c" Elimination of Qualms

Because their conventions are contradictory, they are not the Vaisheṣhikas and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although in general there are many Aishvaras, such as Vaisheṣhikas, Naiyāyikas, Sāṃkhyas, Brāhmakas, Vaiṣhṇavas, and so forth, the Aishvaras [of Shambhala] described in the *Kālachakra Tantra* assert the seven (creator, self, and so forth) but contradict the conventions—and moreover disagree with the meaning—of the assertions concerning the six categories, the twenty-four qualities, and so forth by the widely known Vaisheṣhikas and Naiyāyikas. Hence the Aishvaras described in the *Kālachakra Tantra* are not the widely known Aishvaras, Vaisheṣhikas, Naiyāyikas, and so forth.

b' Explaining the Systems of Vaisheṣhikas and Naiyāyikas {4}

This section has four parts: teachers, synonyms, divisions, and tenets.

1" TEACHERS OF VAISHESHIKAS AND NAIYĀYIKAS

Vaisheṣhika and Naiyāyika

The teachers are Uluka, Kaṇāda, and Akṣhipāda.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The teachers of the Vaisheṣhikas[a] are the sage Uluka and the sage Kaṇāda, and the teachers of the Naiyāyikas[b] are Akṣhipāda and so forth.

2" SYNONYMS

Kāṇādas, Akṣhipādas, Ulukaputrīyas, Āgamamātrins; also more.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The synonyms are Kāṇādas, Akṣhipādas, Aulukyas, Ulukaputrīyas, and also Āgamamātrins, and so forth, as fitting.

3" DIVISIONS OF VAISHESHIKAS AND NAIYAYIKAS

The divisions are Vaisheṣhikas and Naiyāyikas.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The divisions are the two—the Vaisheṣhikas who follow the sūtras composed by Kaṇāda and the Naiyāyikas who follow the treatise composed by Akṣhipāda called *View of Logic.*[c] There also is a description of three, including the Āgamamātrins.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[119] When divided, there are:
> - Vaisheṣhikas [that is, Detailists or Particularistis] or Kāṇādas, so called because they explain the six meanings of terms [that is, the six categories] in detail or propound many differentiations of generalities and particulars or follow the *Sūtra Illuminating Particulars* composed by Kaṇāda
> - Naiyāyikas [that is, Logicians], so called because they follow the *View of Logic* composed by Akṣhipāda
> - and Āgamamātrins, so called because they mainly propound just scripture.

4" TENETS OF VAISHESHIKAS AND NAIYAYIKAS {4}

This section has four parts: valid cognition, basis, path, and fruit together with a dispelling of mistake about cyclic existence and nirvāṇa.

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[a] *bye brag pa;* Particularists.

[b] *rig pa can pa;* Logicians.

[c] *rig pa'i lta ba.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

a" Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Valid Cognition {3}

This section has three parts: assertions on direct perception, inference, and scriptural valid cognition.

1: Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Direct Perception

The six categories are comprehended by the four valid cognitions. Direct perception is the meeting of sense power and object; there are six. For Vaisheṣhikas relation is material. For Naiyāyikas a conceptual consciousness from a meeting that apprehends a specificity is a direct perception.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that the six categories[a] are comprehended by four valid cognitions—direct perception, inference, comprehension through analogy, and arisen from sound—as appropriate. Among these, direct perception is the meeting of self, sense power, mentality,[b] and object. When divided, there are six.[c] The Vaisheṣhikas' system is the assertion that the entity of the meeting [or relation] is matter and is a factuality other than the sense power, object, and so forth. The Naiyāyikas' system is the assertion that a conceptual consciousness[d], that is, an unmistaken, determinative knower,[e] apprehending a specificity—something not susceptible to being expressed in conventions—produced from the meeting of sense power and object is a direct perception.

2: Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Inference

Inferences: three, three. Remainder is correct; and so forth. That having five is for others. Comprehension is proof through similarity.

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[a] *tshig gi don drug, ṣadpadārtha;* literally, the six meanings-of-words. The six categories are substance (*rdzas, dravya*), quality (*yon tan, guṇa*), action (*las, karma*), generality (*spyi, sāmānya*), particularity (*bye brag, viśeṣa*), and inherence (*'du ba, samavāya*). See below, 160.

[b] *yid.*

[c] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, stod,* 197.1) speaks of two direct relations (*dngos 'brel*) and four indirect relations (*rgyud 'brel*) as well as (*Annotations, stod,* 197.6) four relations of connection (*sbyor 'brel, saṃyoga-sambandha*) and two relations of inherence (*'du 'brel, samavāya-sambandha*). Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (*Great Exposition of Tenets,* Taipei, 127.19) refers only to the latter two types.

[d] *'dzin rtog.*

[e] *ma khrul ba'i zhen rig.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Word Commentary on Root Text: In the Naiyāyikas' system there are three inferences for oneself:

1. inferring an effect from a cause in an inference—that is preceded by direct perception apprehending the reason, the predicate of the probandum, and the specifically characterized relationship between the reason and the predicate of the probandum—is [called] that which has a preceder[a] [that is, that which has, or is like, its cause]

   Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[120] Since the inference realizes the probandum due to merely seeing the reason with direct perception immediately before it…the inference is called "like what precedes it" and "that which has a preceder."…

   They assert that the relationship between the reason and predicate of the probandum is not imputed by an awareness but is an effective thing apprehendable as a substance separate from the two substrata [that is, the reason and the predicate of the probandum].
2. inferring a cause from an effect is [called] that which has a remainder [that is, that which has an effect]

   Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[121] When it is seen with direct perception that a fruit has a sour taste, the inference that the remaining fruit—since they grew from the same tree and are similar in form—is called "having a remainder," the remainder being the effects/fruits.
3. inferring another, very obscure phenomenon from seeing a phenomenon is [called] that which has general perception.

   Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[122] This is a case, for instance, of seeing one phenomenon and from it knowing another, very obscure phenomenon, as when from seeing that the moon disappears in a mountain, inferring that the sun also does such.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In the Vaisheṣhikas' system, thinking, "This is an ox itself. This is a horse itself," is a direct perception, and an awareness subsequently realizing a phenomenon other than what is seen by direct perception is an inference. It is explained that there are four inferences for oneself:

1. inferring an effect from a cause
2. inferring that which possesses relation from apprehending a relation

   Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[123] There are two relations—the relationship of possession as in the case of fire and smoke and the

[a] *snga ma can.*

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relationship of inherence as in the case of an ox and a horn.

3. inferring that which possesses inherence from inherence in one object

    Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[124] There are two inherences—the inherence of an effect and another effect as in the case of form and tangible object, and the inherence of a cause and another cause as in the case of leg and arm.

4. by means of one wing of a set of contradictories inferring the other contradictory.

However, I wonder whether in the root text here the mention of "three, three" is an inclusion of the [Vaisheṣhikas'] middle two into one.

They assert a reasoning having a preceder—inferring an effect from a cause—as a correct reason [whereas Buddhists do not]. In the root text "and so forth" includes the sixteen categories of logic. The likes of a five-branched proof statement is asserted to be an inference for others. A valid cognition that is a comprehension [through analogy] is, for instance, the proof of [that a certain cattle is] a gayal [which does not have a dewlap] through similarity with an ox [which has a dewlap].

3: Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Scriptural Valid Cognition

With respect to those arisen from sound, the tantras by Shiva and the *Lokachakṣhu Sūtra* are scriptures.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Valid means of cognition arisen from sound are of two types—consciousnesses and scriptures. Of these, scriptures are:

- the tantras composed by Shiva, that is, Īshvara, such as *Shiva's Beautiful Composition*
- the *Sūtra Clarifying Distinctions* composed by Uluka, also known by another name as the *Lokachakṣhu Sutra*
- the *View of Knowledge* composed by Akṣhipāda.

b" Vaisheshikas' and Naiyayikas' Assertions on the Basis {2}

This section has two parts: brief indication and extensive explanation.

1: Brief Indication of Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on the Basis

The six categories—substance, quality, activity, generality, particular-

ity, and inherence—are truly established effective things, or bases.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The six categories—substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity, and inherence—are effective things, or truly established bases.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[125] Knowing well the opponents' perspective [that is, how the Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' present these topics in their own system] appears to be very important for identifying the object of negation [in the view] of emptiness.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[126] The Vaisheṣhikas and so forth assert that:

- A conceptual consciousness thinking "pot" is produced from a components-possessor[a] [that is, whole] that is a different substantial entity from the components of a pot, such as form and odor.
- A conceptual consciousness apprehending the raising up and putting down of a pot is produced from factually other activities that are different substantial entities from the object raised, raiser, and so forth.
- A conceptual consciousness thinking "ox" with regard to a white ox is produced from a factually other ox-generality that is a different substantial entity from the manifestations of ox.
- A conceptual consciousness apprehending a hundred, a thousand, and so forth with respect to [the beads of] a rosary is produced from the quality of number that is a different substantial entity from a rosary, and so forth.

[These assertions are wrong] because those conceptual consciousnesses are not produced within taking, for instance, the substantial entity of a components-possessor that is factually other [than all the components, and so forth] as the apprehended object, but operate or do not operate in accordance with the presence and absence merely of internal branches [that is, internal causal factors], such as [the presence of] terms, motivational exertion, and so forth.

2: Extensive Explanation of Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on the Basis {6}

This section has six parts: assertions on substance, quality, activity,

[a] *yan lag can.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

generality, particularity, and inherence.

A: Vaisheshikas' and Naiyayikas' Assertions on Substance {3}

This section has three parts: assertions on substances in general, on permanence and impermanence, and on self.

1* Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Substances in General

The four elements, mentality, space, direction, self, and time are the nine substances. Five substances are non-pervasive; four are pervasive. The four have four and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The first of those is substance.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[127] They assert that the definition of substance is: an object of knowledge that
>
> - is self-sufficient, not depending on other phenomena
> - serves to support other phenomena such as qualities
> - and serves as a cause of different qualities inhering together in it.
>
> Also, Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* describes substance as that which has the three features of possessing activity, possessing qualities, and serving as a cause of inherence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are nine substances: the four elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—mentality, space, direction, self, and time.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[128] The way in which a substance, which is a components-possessor, is composed of minute particles is asserted as follows: When different substantial particles of similar type conglomerate, "possession" is produced from among the twenty-four qualities. Possession is an object different from the particles that serve as the basis of composition, because if it were not, the mind apprehending particles as conglomerated would be causeless. After this, a components-possessing substance that is an object other than them is produced, because if when the parts of a pot, for instance, conglomerate, a components-possessing substance that is an object factually other than them is not produced, then just as one does not posit the convention "pot" to those parts, so one would not affix the convention "pot" even to their conglomeration.
>
> There are three substances of the components that compose

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components-possessing substances: minute particles, an initial components-possessor produced from the conglomeration of two minute particles, and secondary components-possessors produced from the conglomeration of three or more. There are also three substances that are the components-possessors produced from those:

- that which is composed of only minute particles—an initial components-possessor, for instance
- that which is composed of the initial components-possessor, a components-possessing substance produced from the conglomeration of four minute particles, for instance
- that which is composed of imputed components-possessors, a pot, for instance.

Moreover, that is the case because from among these three [types of] components, the first are only components, and the latter two are both components and components-possessors.

Word Commentary on Root Text: From among those, five—earth, water, fire, wind, and mentality—are delimited and hence are non-pervasive substances. Four—space, direction, self, and time—are not delimited and hence are pervasive substances.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[129] In that way, Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition'"* explains that five substances—that is, the four elements and mentality—are non-pervasive substances, and the remaining four are pervasive substances. However, Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition'"* asserts that the five [substances aside from the four elements]—such as space and so on—are omnipresent substances. These statements should be examined.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Among the four elements, respectively:

- earth possesses four qualities—form, odor, taste, and tangibility
- water possesses three qualities—form, taste, and tangibility
- fire possesses two qualities—form and tangibility
- wind possesses one quality—only tangibility.

2* Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Permanence and Impermanence

The others are permanent; quality has two classes; activity is impermanent.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Word Commentary on Root Text: The other categories [substance, generality, particularity, and inherence] are permanent. Quality has both permanent and impermanent factors. Activity is only impermanent. Though [Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a explains it that way, Kamalashīla's *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Compendium of Principles"* and Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition'"* explain that substance has both permanent and impermanent factors.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[130] Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition'"* says that [Vaisheṣhikas] assert that in regard to substances, there are two types (permanent substances and impermanent substances) and that among them, five (space and so on) are only permanent, whereas the minute particles of the four [elements] (earth and so on) are impermanent and coarse things composed of them are impermanent. Therefore, [Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's assertion] should be examined.

3* Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Self {2}

This section has two parts: actual indication and ancillary topic.

a Actual Indication of Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on Self*

They assert a self that is the experiencer, agent, uncompounded, permanent, not conscious, pervasive, and without activity. Respectively, pervasive and minute.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert a substantially existent self that is the experiencer of pleasurable and painful effects, agent of virtuous and non-virtuous causes, uncompounded, permanent in the sense of not disintegrating, non-conscious matter, all-pervasive, and without activity.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[131] The Vaisheṣhikas assert the substance of the self to be a substance that:
>
> - is an object other than the three: body, sense faculties, and consciousness
> - serves as a basis of nine types of qualities—consciousness and so forth
> - serves as the cause of the inhering together of those qualities in itself

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- is an entity that is not consciousness or knowledge
- is an effective thing that does not disintegrate and that pervades everywhere.

"Self,"[a] "being,"[b] and "person"[c] are equivalent. If such a permanent self did not exist, the agent of an action and the experiencer of its effect would be separate, whereby there would be the faults that actions done would be wasted and one would encounter [the effects of deeds] not done by oneself. Therefore, the self is proved to exist.

One might say, "If the self is permanent, the doing of actions, experiencing of effects, and taking birth and dying would not be feasible." [The Vaisheṣhikas reply that] the self does not perform actions, and so forth, with its own entity; performance of the meritorious and non-meritorious by qualities inhering in the self, such as consciousness, effort, desire, and so forth, is called performance by the self, just as inherence of pleasure and pain in the self is the meaning of the self's experiencing effects. For example, this is like imputing that the self sees a form when [actually] the eye consciousness inhering in the self sees a form. Also, otherwise, [one could] never [say] that Devadatta sees a form.

The production of the quality called "conjunction" from the self's newly coming together with a body, sense powers, consciousness, and so forth—which did not previously exist—is posited as the self's taking rebirth. When [body, sense faculties, and consciousness] are separated from the self, it is posited that the self dies and transmigrates. I wonder whether they assert that when the self dies, the quality called "disjunction" is produced.

There are also many reasonings proving [the existence of] the self, ways of asserting the self as the basis of bondage and liberation, and the like.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Some assert that respectively the Vaisheṣhikas' system is that the self pervades all, and the Naiyāyikas' system is that the self is only the size of a minute particle. However, our own opinion about the difference between them is that the Vaisheṣhikas assert that the self pervades all, whereas the Naiyāyikas assert that although in general the self pervades all, the self that has the relationship of meeting with and withdrawing from mere mentality has the size of a minute particle.

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[a] *bdag, ātman.*

[b] *skyes bu, puruṣa.*

[c] *gang zag, pudgala.*

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b Ancillary Topic*

Mentality is awareness, a permanent effective thing, conceptual, and an object-possessor.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a] explains that the mentality-substance is a permanent effective thing, conceptual, an object-possessor,[a] and awareness.[b] However, I wonder whether there is something to be analyzed here:

- because mentality is described as being a substance, whereas awareness is described as being a quality, and
- because mentality is described as being matter, whereas awareness is described as being consciousness.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[132] By reason that even though the five objects and the five sense faculties meet at the same time, the five consciousnesses are not produced at the same time, it is established that there is a cause of consciousness different from sense faculties and objects; just it is asserted to be mentality-substance.
>
> [Concerning space:][133] "Whatever has production and disintegration necessarily depends upon some substance; for example, [the flame of] a butter lamp. Sound also has production and disintegration." By such reasoning, sound is proved to depend upon a substance. Because sound is heard apart from the four elements, earth and so on, it does not depend on those four. Also, because it is observed externally by a sense consciousness, as shared between oneself and others, it is not a quality of the self. Since it is an object of apprehension by the ear, it is not a quality of the three—direction, time, and consciousness. Hence, it is asserted to be established as a quality only of space.
>
> Time is a substance that depends on any of these: long duration, short duration, fast, slow, and so on.
>
> Direction is a substance that depends upon any of these: the ten [directions]—east and so forth.[c]

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[a] *yul can.* In the division of existents into objects and object-possessors (subjects), this is the latter.

[b] *blo, buddhi.*

[c] The four cardinal directions, the four intermediate directions, zenith, and nadir.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

B: Vaisheshikas' and Naiyayikas' Assertions on Quality

Qualities possess four and are twenty-four or also twenty-five.

Word Commentary on Root Text: A substance has the three features of possessing activities, possessing qualities, and serving as cause of inherence; however, a quality has four features:

- depending on a substance
- not possessing other qualities
- not acting either as a cause of inherence or as a cause of non-inherence
- not depending on a sign.

  Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets:* A quality does not depend on another quality as a proof for its existence but is a proof for the existence of a substance.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Kamalashīla explains that, when qualities are divided, there are twenty-four, and there also is an explanation of twenty-five, which are:

- *five:* (1) form, (2) taste, (3) odor, (4) touch, (5) sound
- *four:* (6) heaviness, (7) moisture, (8) heat, (9) oiliness
- *seven:* (10) number, (11) dimension, (12) separateness, (13) conjunction, (14) disjunction, (15) otherness, (16) non-otherness
- *nine:* (17) awareness, (18) pleasure, (19) pain, (20) desire, (21) hatred, (22) momentum, (23) striving, (24) merit, (25) demerit.

  Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[134] The five [sense objects, that is,] form and so on, are asserted to be objects of apprehension of the eye and so on, and their [existence] proves the existence of the substances that are their bases of dependence. For sound is asserted as a quality of space, since it depends on space and is a sign that is a means of inferring that the space-substance exists.

  Number[a] is asserted to be an effective thing that is the cause of using [or affixing] conventions such as, one, ten, hundred, thousand, and so on. This is because one pot is asserted to be (1) the cause of using the term expressing "one pot," this being an object other than the pot, (2) the explicit object of expression of the term expressing "one pot," and (3) an effective thing that is the object appearing to the conceptual consciousness apprehending, "one pot." The other qualities also should be understood through this illustration.

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[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den uses a different order of the qualities here.

Dimension is asserted to be the effective thing that is the cause of affixing the conventions "large" and "small," "long" and "short."

Separateness is the effective thing that is the cause of affixing the convention, "mutually separate" to such things as a pot and a woolen cloth.

Conjunction is the cause of affixing the convention "conglomerated" to substances that have met [that is, come together] or abide without interstices.

Disjunction is the cause of affixing the convention "mutual disjunction" to substances that earlier were conglomerated and became divided.

Otherness and non-otherness are respectively the effective things that are the appearing-objects of the conceptual consciousness apprehending pot as other in relation to pillar and as not other in relation to pot.

Awareness is the five operative consciousnesses—eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses.

Pleasure is contentment; pain is torment; desire is attachment; hatred is animosity, and effort is exertion. Those five, pleasure and so on, are non-conscious matter…It is their tenet that two consciousnesses are not produced in a single mental continuum at one time, and thus since it is evident that pleasure is produced internally simultaneously with seeing a pleasing form, it would follow, if pleasure were a consciousness, that two consciousnesses would be produced at one time in a single [mental] continuum [and thus they assert that pleasure is a material thing]. Pain, desire, hatred, and so on are also treated in the same way.

There are three kinds of conditioning—momentum,[a] predispositions,[b] and reversion of state.[c] Momentum is an effective thing produced in reliance upon a specific exertion through striving on five substances—earth, water, fire, wind, and mentality—and is a different substance from exertion and striving. Predispositions are factually other effective things produced with a consciousness as their cause and capable of producing a consciousness as their effect. Reversion of state is (1) a quality of a physical substance and (2) an effective thing causing the abiding of something the way it was earlier upon leaving off trying to make it abide elsewise; for example,

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[a] *shugs.*

[b] *bag chags.*

[c] *gnas pa 'jig pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

though a tala leaf that has been folded for a long time is stretched out with striving, when the striving is stopped, reversion of state is the agent causing the leaf to become folded again.

Since there are five divisions of consciousness, and three of compounded phenomena, the qualities of the self are also explained to be fifteen [in number].

Merit causes the bestowal of pleasures that are [presently] unseen effects. Demerit causes the bestowal of sufferings that are [presently] unseen effects. Heaviness, oiliness, moisture, and heat are easy to understand.

There[135] is an explanation of the twenty-four qualities in terms of the nine substances. It is asserted that:

- Tangibility is a quality of the four [elements]—earth, water, fire, and wind.
- Form is a quality of three—earth, water, and fire.
- Taste is a quality of two—earth and water.
- Odor is a quality of earth.
- Sound is a quality of space.
- Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, otherness, and non-otherness are qualities of time and direction.
- Awareness, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, merit, demerit, momentum, and striving are qualities of self.
- Heaviness is a quality of a gross substance.
- Oiliness is a quality of gross substances produced from the conglomeration of earth and water, such as butter.
- Wetness is a quality of water.
- Heat is a quality of fire.

Moreover,[136] those qualities are asserted to be effective things that are different substantial entities from the possessors of the qualities. This is because, for example, they assert that the cause producing a conceptual consciousness apprehending the interweaving and conglomeration of threads in a woolen cloth to be without gaps is a quality called "conjunction" produced from the conglomeration of the threads as something that is factually other than the threads. For, since they assert that terms and conceptual consciousnesses engage their objects through the power of the things themselves, they must be produced from the things that are their apprehended objects, and they assert it thus due to not knowing how to posit anything as imputedly existent, that is, imputed to other factors. That the reason is so follows because they assert that, "A

conglomeration of threads is an object other than the threads because a consciousness apprehending threads and a conceptual consciousness apprehending threads as a conglomeration have different objects of apprehension."

C: VAISHESHIKAS' AND NAIYAYIKAS' ASSERTIONS ON ACTIVITY

Activity is fivefold. Part and whole, and so forth, are different substantial entities.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The third category, "activity," is the five: lifting up, putting down, contraction, extension, and going. Similarly, they assert that part and whole, quality and qualificand, definition and definiendum, and so forth are mutually different substantial entities.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[137] Activity has five divisions:

- Lifting up is asserted to be the activity of drawing upward that which is to be lifted.
- Putting down is the activity of placing down that which is to be placed down.
- Contraction is the activity of bending arms and so forth that are straight.
- Extension is the activity of straightening legs and so forth that are bent.
- Going is the activity of moving that which is to be moved to another area, the goal of the motion.

Moreover, these are effective things that are different substantial entities from the object lifted and lifter, the object put down and the putter, and so on.

Lifting up is the cause of the disjunction that is a separation from the lower direction and of the conjunction that is a meeting with the upper direction. Such should be extended to the others also. The statement in Ke-drup's *Great Commentary* that lifting up is produced from conjunction with the upper direction and disjunction from the lower direction should be examined.

D: VAISHESHIKAS' AND NAIYAYIKAS' ASSERTIONS ON GENERALITY

Factually other than the three is generality. Eight features.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Generality is an object of knowledge that is concomitant with substance, quality, and activity and is factually other than those three.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[138] A generality is the cause for the common operation[a] of awarenesses of terms[b] with regard to the phenomena with which it is concomitant. When generalities are divided, there are two, pervasive generality and limited generalities. The first is called "existence"; it operates with respect to all three—substances, qualities, and activities—and does not operate with respect to other than those three. It is:

- the appearing-object of a consciousness apprehending those three within thinking "exists"
- the meaning of terms expressing such
- and the cause of those awarenesses of terms.

It is only a generality and not a particularity.

Limited generalities are substanceness, qualityness, activityness, oxness, treeness, and so forth. Since substanceness is a generality only of substance, and qualityness is a generality only of quality, and so forth, these are called "limited generalities."

Oxness is not ox; it is a substantial entity other than ox that is the cause and the appearing-object of a consciousness apprehending a generality within thinking "ox." It is the cause of the operation of such a general term and the meaning of the term ["ox"]. From the viewpoint of pervading the manifestations[c] of ox, it is concomitant with them. It is also a particularity because of being a phenomenon that is distinguished from non-ox, [oxen being] its manifestations. Through this illustration, you should understand other limited generalities.

Concerning this, a consciousness thinking "ox" that is generated when white oxen and so forth are seen is a sense consciousness, since the activity of a sense faculty is present. If, when the eye sees an ox, there was a sense consciousness separate from the consciousness that apprehends within thinking "ox," then two consciousnesses would have to be generated simultaneously, but such is not feasible. Therefore, the ox generality called "oxness" is also the appearing-object of the sense consciousness apprehending the ox generality.

The reason for the existence of such a generality is that if there was not a common cause for the generation of a consciousness thinking "ox" with regard to the manifestations of ox, then just as a

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a In this context "operation" (*'jug*) has the sense of referentiality.

b *sgra blo.* This could also mean "terms and awarenesses."

c *gsal ba.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

consciousness apprehending white and black oxen as one type is generated, a consciousness apprehending even a white ox and sandalwood as one type would have to be generated, because all those would similarly not have a common cause for generating a consciousness apprehending [certain phenomena] as one type. Consequently, by way of the sign that a common awareness of terms operates, it is established that a generality that is its cause exists. The generality, moreover, is established—as a substantial entity separate from its manifestations—by the sign that it is an object of apprehension that is a separate substantial entity. Thus, it is established that a generality that is an effective thing and a substantial entity separate from its manifestations exists. This is what they say.

Moreover, if a generality were impermanent, then after the destruction of a generality, the manifestations would be without a generality. Consequently, they assert generalities to be permanent.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The three—generality, particularity, and inherence—possess eight features: non-production, pervasiveness, permanence, partlessness, absence of activity, dependence on substance, dependence on qualities, and dependence on activity. Though it is explained that way, whatever is any of those three do not necessarily have all eight features because, for instance, a trifling generality that depends on a quality and a particularity that depends on a quality do not depend upon a substance.

E: Vaisheshikas' and Naiyayikas' Assertions on Particularity

The presence of difference is particularity.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The apprehended object of a consciousness apprehending that there exists a presence of difference—distinction—of its substratum from others is a particularity.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[139] A particularity is an effective thing that serves as a cause for understanding its substratum as distinct from others, and it is factually other than its substratum. For example, the cause of understanding that space is a substance other than earth, water, and so on is asserted to be the particularity of space.

F: Vaisheshikas' and Naiyayikas' Assertions on Inherence {2}

This section has two parts: assertions on inherence and an ancillary topic.

1* Assertions on Inherence

Inherence: two relations.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The apprehended object of a consciousness apprehending that a substratum has [such and such] supported [attributes] is inherence. Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Ascertainment of Prime Cognition"* explains that inherence is twofold—a relationship of possession[a] in which substratum and that which is supported occupy different places and a relationship of inherence[b] in which a substratum and that which is supported do not occupy different places. However, it needs to be examined whether this agrees or disagrees with Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition.'"*[140]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[141] An inherence is:

- the object appearing to a consciousness apprehending within thinking, "This substratum has such and such a supported [attribute," as in "A pot has form."]
- the factor of the meeting and connection of substratum and that which is supported
- and an effective thing that is a different substantial entity from both the substratum and that which is supported.

2* Ancillary Topic

Environments and animate beings are by minute particles and Īshvara.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that when the world of the environment and of beings first formed, Īshvara emanated the world from the permanent, partless minute particles of the four elements themselves, which abide individually in space. There is a gradual formation through the attaching of two minute particles of wind, and so forth, from the force of the religious and non-religious karma[c] of sentient beings.

c" Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on the Path

Bathing and so forth are religion. Cyclic existence is inherence of the qualities.

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[a] *ldan 'brel.*

[b] *'du 'brel.*

[c] *chos dang chos min gyi las.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Word Commentary on Root Text: Bathing and those which are included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text—initiation, fasting, pure behavior while living in the guru's home, and so forth are asserted to be religious practice. Cycling in cyclic existence is as long as the relationship of inherence of the nine qualities—awareness, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, merit, demerit, momentum, and striving—in the self exists.

d'' Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' Assertions on the Fruit together with Dispelling a Mistake about Cyclic Existence and Nirvāṇa

Liberation—the self separated from inherence with the qualities—is inexpressible. Realizing suchness is a cause of liberation; that it is liberation is mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Liberation is described as inexpressible. They assert that through the force of cultivating the path the relationship of the inherence of the nine qualities—awareness, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, merit, demerit, momentum, and striving—in the self is severed and separated, and when the self abides alone,[a] liberation has been attained. It should be known that since realizing suchness is a *cause* of liberation, [Ḏak-tsang's][142] assertion that it is liberation is mistaken.

2' Refuting the Assertions of the Shaivas, Vaisheṣhikas, and Naiyāyikas

***REFUTATION:* Īshvara would be the cause of pleasure and pain and would perform sins. That which depends on wish does not have capacity. Pervading all and being partless are contradictory. Because he is permanent, things would always be produced or never produced at all.**

Word Commentary on Root Text: Since you assert that Īshvara is the cause bestowing happiness on persons with faith in him and the cause bestowing pain on those who do not have faith in him, he would not be the creator of all environments and animate beings, because it is seen that pleasure and comfort arise for Buddhists who do not respect Īshvara, and it is seen that pain arises for those respecting Īshvara, whereas the creator of those [actually] is not Īshvara.

If Īshvara was the creator of all non-virtuous karma, then since he acts out very powerful sins, he would immediately afterwards boil in a hell.

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[a] *yan gar ba;* 374.3.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

If Īshvara's producing environments and animate beings depends on an awareness wishing to produce environments and animate beings, then since Īshvara would be under the outside influence of that wish, he would not have the capacity to produce environments and animate beings under his own power. If it did not depend on that wish, this would contradict the assertion that it arises from Īshvara's wish.

If Īshvara pervades all stable things and animate beings, this contradicts the assertion that he is partless.

Since Īshvara is permanent, all environments and animate beings either would always be produced or would never be produced at all.

This has been the sixth chapter, the section clearing away the extreme of permanence asserted by Shaivas and the two—Vaisheṣhikas and Naiyāyikas—making three.

7. Jaina

(E) Refuting the Extreme of Permanence Superimposed by Kshapanas, or Parivrajakas {2}

This section has two parts: expressing Kṣhapanas' assertions and refuting them.

1' Expressing Kṣhapanas' Assertions {2}

This section has two parts: actual expression of Kṣhapanas' assertions and the reason for not describing others of lesser import.

a' Actual Expression of Kṣhapanas' Assertions {4}

This section has four parts: Kṣhapanas' teachers, synonyms, divisions, and tenets.

1" Kshapanas' Teachers

Jinatā, Ṛṣhabha, and Dong-ri are the teachers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The master Prajñāvarman[a] says that there are twenty-five teachers of the Naked Ones[b]—the sages Jinatā,[c] Ṛṣhabha,[d] Dong-ri,[e] N̄ö-ḡyi-day,[f] Vardhamāna,[g] and so forth.

2" Synonyms

Kṣhapanas, Arahatas, Nirgranthas, and Parivrajakas.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They are called:

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[a] *shes rab go cha.*

[b] *gcer bu pa, nirgrantha.* The Tibetan literally means "naked"; the Sanskrit literally means "unclothed."

[c] *rgyal ba dam pa.*

[d] *khyu mchog.*

[e] *ldong ris;* I could not find the Sanskrit. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (*Great Exposition of Tenets,* Taipei, 146.10) glosses this with Vardhamāna (*'phel ba*), but Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den lists the latter separately as *'phel byed.*

[f] *snod kyi sde.*

[g] *'phel byed.* Also known as Mahāvīra (599-527 B.C.).

- Kṣhapanas,[a] because they assert that one is liberated through exhaustively plucking their hair each day
- Arahatas,[b] because they hold the sage Arhat to be their teacher
- Nirgranthas, because they are without clothes
- Those Having Sky-Clothing[c]
- Parivrajakas,[d] because they beg for alms without accumulating and setting aside food, drink, and so forth
- Ājīvikās,[e] either because liveliness is life and life is propounded to be the self, or because they do not consider as their own anything beyond merely the liveliness of the body
- Shameless Ones,[f] because they are not ashamed of nakedness
- Ashen Ones[g]

and so forth.

3" KSHAPANAS' DIVISIONS

> Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline:* There is no separate root text for this. There are two assertions about Kṣhapanas' divisions—nine and six groups of living beings, as will be explained below.

4" KSHAPANAS' TENETS {3}

This section has three parts: assertions on self, valid cognitions which are the means of comprehension, and objects of comprehension.

a" Kṣhapanas' Assertions on Self

Life is the size of the body, permanent, self, person, and transmigrator.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that:

- Life[h] is equal to the size of the body.
- Its substantial entity is permanent, but its states are impermanent.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[143] Just as the Jaiminis,[a] that is,

[a] *zad byed pa;* "Exhausters."
[b] *mchod 'od pa.*
[c] *nam mkha'i gos can.*
[d] *kun tu rgyu;* "Wanderers."
[e] *'tsho ba pa;* "Those of Liveliness."
[f] *'dzem med pa.*
[g] *thal ba pa;* "Ashen Ones" so called because they smear ash on their bodies.
[h] *srog, jīva.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Mīmāṃsakas,[b] assert that even if the previously existent entity of the self experiencing pleasure disappears, the sentient entity [of the self] never disappears and continues at all times, so the Jainas, that is, the Nirgranthas, also propound that even if the states, or enumerations, of the self disappear, the substantial entity or nature [of the self] never disappears and has the character of a person and consciousness having an essence of continuing at all times.

- Self, living being, nourisher, person, being, transmigrator, and so forth are synonyms.

b" Kṣhapanas' Assertions on Valid Cognitions which are the Means of Comprehension {3}

This section has three parts: Kṣhapanas' assertions on direct perception, inference, and scriptural valid cognition.

1: Kṣhapanas' Assertions on Direct Perception

Non-conceptual and conceptual direct perceptions comprehend generalities and instances.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although it is explained here [in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets*][144] that there are two direct valid cognitions—non-conceptual that comprehend generalities and conceptual that comprehend instances—I think that it is necessary to search for a source. Even if [a source] treats it this way, I wonder whether it would be fitting if it is explained that the conceptual comprehends generalities and the non-conceptual comprehends instances. This should be analyzed.

2: Kṣhapanas' Assertions on Inference

That which is the three modes is not feasible. Inference has one mode.

Word Commentary on Root Text: That which is the three modes is not feasible as the definition of a correct reason because:

- it is not necessary to have the forward- and counter-entailments
- and the presence of the reason in the subject also is included in the one mode that has the name "otherwise infeasible."

Inferential valid cognition depends on one mode.

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a *rgyal dpog pa.*

b *spyod pa pa.*

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3: Kṣhapanas' Assertions on Scriptural Valid Cognition

The *Bhāratatārakashāstra* and so forth are the scriptures.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that the *Bhāratatārakashāstra*[a] and so forth are scriptural valid [means of] cognition.

c" Kṣhapana-Nirgranthas' Assertions on Objects of Comprehension {3}

This section has three parts: assertions on the basis, path, and fruit together with proofs.

1: Kṣhapana-Nirgranthas' Assertions on the Categories of the Basis {3}

This section has three parts: Nirgranthas' presentation of nine categories, presentation of the difference between substances and enumerations, and presentation of time, substances, and life-possessors.

A: KSHAPANA-NIRGRANTHAS' PRESENTATION OF NINE CATEGORIES {2}

This section has two parts: the system of Arhat in Shambhala and the system of Kṣhapana-Nirgranthas in the Country of Superiors [India].

1* Presentation of Nine Categories in the System of Arhat in Shambhala

Living being, the lifeless, contamination, abandonment, restraint, bond, liberation, going, and coming are the nine.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Concerning the nine categories described in the Kālachakra cycle, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* explains that the system of the Nirgranthas of Shambhala is that all objects of knowledge are included within the nine:

- living beings—persons
- the lifeless—non-persons
- contamination—karma
- restraints—the five that are explained below
- abandonment of non-virtue

[a] *rgyas byed skar ma'i bstan bcos.* The Sanskrit is a guess.

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- bonds—bad views imputed by three hundred sixty-three bad proponents
- liberation—which will be explained below
- going from here to the next world [that is, the next life]
- coming from the past world [that is, the past life] to this.

2* Presentation of Nine Categories in the Kṣhapana-Nirgrantha System in the Country of Superiors [India]

Or: living being, contamination, restraint, wearing down, bond, karma, sin, merit, and liberation are the nine.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Concerning the nine categories described in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* and Shāntarakṣhita's *Compendium of Principles* as well as Kamalashīla's commentary on the latter, it is explained here that the system of the Nirgranthas of the Country of Superiors [India] is the assertion that all objects of knowledge are included within the nine:

- Living being is the self.
- Contaminations are virtuous and non-virtuous karmas because they are the means of contamination. Moreover, since one travels in cyclic existence by either virtue or non-virtue, both are contaminations.
- Restraint is the cessation itself of contamination; one does not accumulate any new karma.
- Wearing down is the wearing down of all formerly done karmas through restraint itself, not eating food, not drinking, concentration, yoga, tormenting the body, plucking out the hair, and so forth as well as asceticism, since it is the cause of extinguishment.
- Bonds are the wrong views imputed by 363 bad proponents.
- Karmas are of four types—those experienced later, name, bone [that is, lineage], and life.
- Sins are what are discordant with religion.
- Merits are what are concordant with religion.
- Liberation—due to having consumed all previous actions and due to not accumulating new karma, one goes to what is like an upside down white umbrella at the top of all worlds, called Consummation, white like yogurt and the esculent white water lily. It is an effective thing[a] since it has life, and it is also a non-thing[b] since it is free from cyclic existence.

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[a] *dngos po, bhāva.*

[b] *dngos po med pa, abhāva.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

B: Kshapana-Nirgranthas' Assertions on the Difference between Substances and Enumerations

Also concerning all, the substantial entities are permanent, and the enumerations are impermanent.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Also, with respect to all those categories, the substantial entities are permanent, and the enumerations [or states] are impermanent.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[145] For example, the two—the substantial entity of Devadatta's self and the states of his self—are not different from the viewpoint of place, time, and nature [that is, entity], because those two dwell at one time in one place and are one nature. Those two are different from the viewpoint of number, name, character, and effect:
>
> - because the substantial entity of his self is one, whereas the states are manifold in number from the viewpoint of pleasure, pain, and so forth, and
> - because it is easily understood that the names differ, and the character of the substantial entity is continuous, whereas the character of the states is discontinuous, and
> - the sentient substantial entity of the self experiences objects, whereas the states experience pleasure, pain, and so forth.

C: Kshapana-Nirgranthas' Presentation of Time, Substances, and Life-Possessors

Three times, six substances, and six or nine life-possessors.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Kalki Puṇḍarīka's *Great Commentary on the "Kālachakra Tantra"* explains that past, future, and present times are three substantially existent entities and that living beings, persons, time, space, merit, and sins are the six substances.

The six life-possessors mentioned in the Kālachakra cycle are earth, water, fire, wind, lords of the forest (that is, trees), and grains such as barley. The nine classes of life-possessors mentioned in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* and so forth are the five: earth, water, fire, wind, and trees; and the four: worms, ants, bees, and humans. They say that from among those:

- Earth, water, fire, wind, and trees have one sense power since they are endowed with the sense power of touch.
- Worms, conches, oysters, leeches, and so forth have two sense powers since they are endowed with sense powers of touch and taste.

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- Ants, fireflies, and so forth have three sense powers since they are endowed with sense powers of touch, taste, and nose [that is, smell].
- Bees, honey bees, long-lipped bees, and so forth have four sense powers since they are endowed with sense powers of touch, taste, nose, and eye.
- Humans, the four-legged, birds, and so forth have five sense powers since they are endowed with sense powers of touch, taste, nose, eye, and ear.

2: Kṣhapana-Nirgranthas' Assertions on the Path of Liberation

Five restraints, five modes of conduct, five exalted wisdoms, and thirteen behaviors are asserted to be the path.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The five restraints are:

- restraint of behavior, which is to be naked and so forth
- restraint of speech, which is to vow not to speak and so forth
- restraint of seeking livelihood just through begging alms from others
- restraint of not letting alms be wasted
- restraint of keeping close the screen for filtering bugs, fan, and so forth…[146]

The five modes of conduct are:

1. not harming others
2. speaking the truth through having abandoned lying
3. taking what [only] is given through having abandoned stealing and so forth
4. behaving purely through having abandoned impure behavior
5. thoroughly giving away everything through not holding onto even clothing.

The five exalted wisdoms are:

1. exalted wisdom of intelligence attained at birth [due to the influence of previous lives]
2. exalted wisdom arisen from hearing
3. [exalted wisdom of] the boundary, which some explain as the boundary of the time of death, and others explain as the exalted wisdom of retreats in four sessions; or in accordance with the frequent translation as "end" it is explained as the exalted wisdom on the occasion of liberation.
4. exalted wisdom of thorough examination of objects of knowledge by mental investigation and analysis

5. exalted wisdom of divination, astrological calculation, and so forth.

The divisions of behavior are thirteen:

- five divisions of modes of conduct described above
- five divisions of restraints explained above
- secrecy of body, which is to make use of five fires [that is, fires in front, back, on both sides, and the sun above to scorch away karmic accretions], to enter the Ganges, and so forth
- repetition of secret mantra and so forth with speech
- meditative cultivation of the path of liberation with the mind.

They assert that these are the paths that are the means of attaining liberation.

3: Kṣhapana-Nirgranthas' Assertions on the Fruit together with Proofs {4}

This section has four parts: assertions on liberation, features of transmigrations related with liberation and so forth, features of bonds and karmas obstructing liberation, and expression of proofs.

A: KSHAPANA-NIRGRANTHAS' ASSERTIONS ON LIBERATION

Liberation is form.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Liberation is a form called Consummation of the World, which was described above.

B: KSHAPANA-NIRGRANTHAS' ASSERTIONS ABOUT FEATURES OF TRANSMIGRATIONS RELATED WITH LIBERATION AND SO FORTH

Five transmigrations, five bodies, possessing one sense power, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Hell-beings, animals, humans, gods, and liberated transmigrations are the five transmigrations. The "five bodies" are:

- bodies of those who make use of morsels of food
- bodies of light of gods
- bodies of the six—the lords of the forest and so forth—which have a nature of life
- widely renowned bodies of spontaneous birth
- bodies of those who have attained liberation which is the final state.

These transmigrating beings also are included in the groups of living beings described earlier as possessing one sense power and so forth.

C: Kshapana-Nirgranthas' Assertions on Features of Bonds and Karmas Obstructing Liberation

Three hundred sixty-three bonds. Karmas of life and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Bonds are the three hundred sixty-three bad views. The four karmas are those of life-span and those included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text: bone [that is, lineage], name, and later experience.[147]

D: Kshapana-Nirgranthas' Expression of Proofs

Because of not composing and remaining non-committal, it is proven that omniscience does not exist. Because of sleeping, it is proven that trees and so forth possess mind.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Omniscience does not exist:

- because, according to Nirgranthas, [Buddha] did not compose treatises on astrology, and
- because, according to Mīmāṃsakas, [Buddha] did not compose Vedic treatises on burnt offering, political control, and so forth, and
- because, according to both Nirgranthas and Mīmāṃsakas, [Buddha] did not respond about fourteen points and said that a beginning to cyclic existence is not evident.

  Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[148] The fourteen views to which [Buddha] did not respond are:

  Four Views Dependent upon the Earlier Pole

  1. The self and the world are permanent.
  2. The self and the world are impermanent.
  3. The self and the world are both permanent and impermanent.
  4. The self and the world are neither permanent nor impermanent.

  Four Views Dependent upon the Later Pole

  5. The self and the world have an end.
  6. The self and the world do not have an end.
  7. The self and the world both have an end and do not have an end.
  8. The self and the world neither have an end nor do not have an end.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Four Views Dependent upon Nirvāṇa

9. The One-Gone-Thus appears[a] after dying.
10. The One-Gone-Thus does not appear after dying.
11. The One-Gone-Thus both appears after dying and does not appear after dying.
12. The One-Gone-Thus neither appears after dying nor does not appear after dying.
13. Viewing the body as the living being.
14. Viewing the body and the living being as other.

The [first] four, which are concerned with being permanent and so forth, are called "dependent upon the earlier pole":

- Relative to the present self and the present world, the past self and the past world are called "earlier."
- "Pole" (*mtha'*) is the earlier factor (*cha snga ma*) passing (*rgyud pa*) from one birth [that is, life] to the next birth.
- "Dependent upon the earlier pole" means observing them.

The way the self and the world are viewed to be permanent upon observing them is that they are viewed as existing from the beginning without changing. The way the self and the world are viewed to be impermanent is that they are viewed as arising later adventitiously. Since Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Golden Rosary* takes them this way, it is not correct to describe them as conceptions of a self of persons because the first twelve views are necessarily not views of a transitory collection [as real I and mine].

The [next] four concerned with having an end and so forth are called "dependent upon the later pole"; Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"* says that:

- Relative to the present self and the present world, the future self and the future world are called "later."
- "Pole" (*mtha'*) is the later factor (*cha phyi ma*) passing (*rgyud pa*) from one birth [that is, life] to the next birth.
- "Dependent upon the later pole" means observing them.

The way the self and the world are viewed as having an end is that their continuum is viewed as being severed at a later time. The way the self and the world are viewed as not having an end is that they are viewed as existing in a non-manifest manner without changing into another nature at a later time; it is not just the view that the continuum is not severed at the time of the next birth because

[a] *'byung;* that is, the One-Gone-Thus continues to exist after dying.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

otherwise it would not be a bad view…

The four that are concerned with whether the One-Gone-Thus appears after dying and so forth appear to be specifics of the four concerned with having an end and so forth, but I wonder whether the questioner makes such separate inquiries out of a wish to reveal inner contradictions, namely:

- If it is said that the One-Gone-Thus appears after dying, then the One-Gone-Thus would be under the other-influence of contaminated karma and afflictive emotions like an ordinary being.
- If it is said that the One-Gone-Thus does not appear after dying, then the accumulation of the collections [of merit and wisdom] for many eons and the planting of prayer-wishes for many eons would be senseless.

[Buddha's Non-Response]

With[149] regard to why [Buddha] did not respond about fourteen views:

- If he said that the self and the world are permanent, [those particular listeners] would have understood, like the Sāṃkhyas, that they came from the past life with an immutable nature.
- If he said that the self and the world are impermanent, they would have understood, like the Ayatas [that is, the Nihilists], that the self and the world arise adventitiously without former lives.
- If he said that the self and the world are both permanent and impermanent, they would have understood, like the Nirgranthas, that their substantial entities are permanent and their states impermanent.
- If he said that the self and the world are neither permanent nor impermanent, they would have understood, like the Vatsīputrīyas, that there exists a self that is inexpressible as either permanent and impermanent.

By reason of the fact that the questioner was not a suitable vessel for understanding, "Since the two—a self-sufficient[a] self and the world (that is, objects of use by a self-sufficient self)—do not exist, they are not either permanent or impermanent," he did not indicate an answer.

Through that [explanation] you should know, by extension, about the other questions, such as whether the world has an end or

[a] *rang rkya ba.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

not. Therefore, those [non-responses] are proofs that he is omniscient, not proofs that he is not.[a]

Moreover, [Buddha's] statement that a beginning to cyclic existence is not evident is not that although it has a beginning, he did not perceive it; rather, he did not perceive it because a beginning to cyclic existence does not exist, like not perceiving the odor and taste of space.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because trees sleep in the winter and become hyper-active in the summer, trees and those included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text—earth, water, fire, and wind—are proved to possess mind.

b' Reason for Not Describing Others of Lesser Import

Though there are many quasi, there is little importance. They will not be elaborated here.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although there are many quasi-schools of tenets—twenty-five schools of Forders and so forth that arose in the Country of Superiors [India] and the Bön School[b] that arose in Tibet—there is little importance, that is to say, purpose, in knowing them. Hence, they will not be elaborated, that is, explained, here in the root text.

2' Refuting Kṣhapanas' Assertions

REFUTATION: **Substance and enumerations, whether mutually one entity or not, fall apart. Because liberation is a form, the exhaustion of karma is senseless. If it has size, it is impermanent. A single mode is also contradictory.**

Word Commentary on Root Text: When substance and enumerations are analyzed as to whether they are mutually one entity or do not exist as one entity, the features of substance and enumerations fall apart.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[150] The Kṣhapanas assert that most of the categories—living being, or self, and so forth—have an essence of both a substantial entity and states.

[a] The point is that Buddha, being omniscient, had answers for each of the fourteen questions, but, given the mental orientation of the questioner, the answers would have been misunderstood, and thus he remained silent. That silence, therefore, is a sign of omniscience.

[b] Within most current Tibetan Buddhist circles, attitudes toward Bön and also toward Tibetan schools that are not enumerated among the so-called "four major schools" have changed considerably.

Moreover, they assert that the substantial entity is permanent, whereas the states are impermanent, and hence although a living being and so forth do not disintegrate, they possess disintegration.

About this [Buddhists ask]: When the substantial entity that is the essence of the self, or sentient one, associates with a state, does it associate with the state without discarding its previously existent entity, or does it associate with the state within discarding its previous entity?

- According to the first, it would follow that the sentient one [that is, the self] is not together with disintegration, because there would be no difference between the former and later states, as is the case, for example, with space.
- According to the latter, it would follow that there would not be any separate possessor of the states.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[151]

Objection:[a] It is not that there is strictly no difference between the two—the earlier substance and later substance—that associate with earlier and later states. They become different through the earlier and later states because the two—substance and states—are one nature [that is, entity].

Answer: It would follow that the two—substance and states—do not have different characteristics of disintegrating or not disintegrating and different characteristics of being continuous or discontinuous because of being a partless unit of indivisible nature.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[152] Therefore, it is manifestly established that a self—the way you assert it—does not exist because only states having a nature of just production and disintegration are observed…Since when the two—substance and states—are analyzed as to whether they are mutually one entity, the one to the other, they do not exist, this system's features of substance and states fall apart, and hence at this point most of this system's superimpositions are perforce refuted.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because liberation is a form that is a conglomeration of minute particles, although karma is exhausted, there is no sense of release.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[153] It follows that although karma is exhausted, there is no sense of release:

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[a] A Jaina objects to the above line of argument.

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- because liberation [according to you] is a form that is a composite of minute particles, and
- because one would not have passed beyond the nature of transmigration.

Word Commentary on Root Text: If the self had size like the body, it would be impermanent, due to which the assertion that it is permanent would degenerate.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[154] It [absurdly] follows that if life has size like the body, it is impermanent because sometimes it would become bigger, and sometimes it would become smaller. It [absurdly] follows that life is severable because when a [piece of a living] tree, an arm, and so forth are cut [into two parts], it dwells in the individual parts. If you say that it is not established that when a [piece of a living] tree, arm, and so forth are cut, life stays in the individual parts because it does not dwell in one of the parts, then it [absurdly] follows that having cut a [piece of a living] tree [into two parts] and planted them, both parts would not grow because life [according to you] exists in no more than one of its parts.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Since a syllogism that has a single mode does not have the capacity to generate an inference realizing a thesis, the assertion of a correct reason having one mode is contradictory, that is, is not feasible.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[155] It follows that it is not suitable to use a reason with one mode, which does not have all three modes,[a] because it does not have the capacity to generate realization of a meaning in another since that [type of] reason would be mistaken with regard to what is being proven and since it is very easy to prove that it is a quasi-reasoning, and so forth…

Also, their proofs that trees have sense faculties are just inconclusive because observation that even those that lack sense faculties

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[a] Roughly speaking, with respect to the syllogism:

The subject, the sound of a conch, is impermanent because of arising from exertion.

the three modes are:

- presence of the reason in the subject—the sound of a conch is arisen from exertion
- forward pervasion (that is, forward entailment)—whatever is arisen from exertion is necessarily impermanent
- counter-pervasion (that is, counter entailment)—whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not arisen from exertion.

move toward objects despite being mindless gives rise to error. Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

> Although iron does not have eyes, when it comes near a magnet, it sticks to it…

Moreover, the subject, a tree, does not possess mind because of not being included in the four types of birth[a] and because though it is cut from its very center, it can stand it, as is the case, for example, with a piece of stone. Therefore, it is matter…

Objection: Is it not that medicines and so forth described by Forder sages are helpful?

Answer: That mere fact does not necessarily mean that they know the mode of being and cyclic existence and nirvāṇa.

This has been the seventh chapter, the section clearing away with valid cognition the extreme of permanence superimposed by Parivrajakas.

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[a] Womb-birth, egg-birth, birth from heat and moisture, and spontaneous birth.

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BUDDHIST SYSTEMS

2. Delineating by Stages the Coarse and Subtle Selflessnesses of our own Schools {2}

This section has two parts: positing our own schools of tenets as four through scripture and reasoning and the individual assertions of the four schools of tenets.

a. Positing our own Schools of Tenets as Four through Scripture and Reasoning {3}

This section has three parts: positing the correct, refuting mistakes, and how the Great and Lesser Vehicles debate.

(1) Correct Way of Positing our own Schools of Tenets as Limited to Four through Scripture and Reasoning

Our own schools are limited to four—Great Exposition, Sūtra, Mind-Only, and Middle Way. It is said that here the schools of tenets are not five.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Our own Buddhist schools are limited to four schools of tenets, Great Exposition School, Sūtra School, Mind-Only School, and Middle Way School because many sūtras and tantras and many scholars and adepts say that Shākyamuni Buddha's teaching does not have five schools of tenets or four vehicles [beyond the three—Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicle].

(2) Refuting Mistakes about Positing the Number of our own Schools of Tenets

These four are two—Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle schools. Inclusion into three vehicles, assertion of three, and division into five are mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are two modes, divided and

inclusionary. The divided mode is these four just explained, and the inclusionary mode is that two—Great Exposition School and Sūtra School—are Lesser Vehicle schools, and two—Mind-Only School and Middle Way School—are Great Vehicle schools.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[156] Those four schools of tenets are included in the two, Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle proponents of tenets, because when posited by way of tenets:
> - the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School are included in Hearer schools
> - the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School are included in Great Vehicle schools.
>
> This is so because:
> - The Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School are posited as Hearer Schools since, upon having accepted just the Hearer scriptural collections, they propound from the depths tenets explained there.
> - The Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School are posited as Great Vehicle since they are persons who propound from the depths any of the uncommon Great Vehicle modes of explanation in the vast sūtra sets of the Great Vehicle.

Mistaken are:

1. some Tibetans who include them into three vehicles: the Great Exposition School and Sūtra School as persons of the Hearer Vehicle, the Mind-Only School as persons of the Solitary Realizer Vehicle, and the Middle Way School as persons of the Great Vehicle
2. [D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen] the author of *Knowing All Tenets* who, by including the Sūtra School in the Great Exposition School, asserts three schools of tenets
3. some [Tibetans][157] who, separating the Vatsīputrīyas from the Great Exposition School, divide them into five schools of tenets.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[158] Those are mistaken because they:
> - contradict scriptures explaining that there are four schools of tenets
> - especially contradict statements that among Buddhists a fifth [school of tenets] is unsuitable
> - and contradict reasoning.
>
> There is uncountable damage [to the first opinion]:
> - It [absurdly] follows that the four types of proponents of tenets

do not exist among those who have not entered the path.[a]

- It [absurdly] follows that whoever is an upholder of Inner [Buddhist] tenets necessarily has entered the path.
- It [absurdly] follows that whoever possesses a vow of individual liberation—lay, novice monastic, and so forth—must have entered the path.
- It [absurdly] follows that whoever has not entered the path has not entered into refuge or into the [Buddhist] teaching.

and so forth. Therefore, in accordance with Ke-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate:*

- Hearer *persons*[b] must have entered the Hearer path, and even if they not only accept the Great Vehicle scriptural collections but have realized meanings found therein, their strength of attitude [that is, motivation] is small, and hence are involved in their own welfare, as was the case, for instance, with Shāriputra and so forth.
- Lesser Vehicle *tenet-holders*[c] are those who accept mere enlightenment as well as the path in accordance with the Lesser Vehicle scriptural collections but who do not accept the word of the Great Vehicle or even if they do accept it, do not assert that the meanings expressed therein are uncommon.

Consequently, how could Hearer *persons* and Lesser Vehicle *tenet-holders* be one!

(3) How the Great and Lesser Vehicles Debate {2}

This section has two parts: controversies between the Lesser and Great Vehicles and the responses.

(A) Controversies beween the Lesser and Great Vehicles

Both Hearer schools do not assert a basis-of-all, afflicted mentality, selflessness of phenomena, ten grounds, three bodies, and so forth. The earlier do not assert the Great Vehicle as the word. It is renowned that later ones accept it.

[a] Entry to the path requires attainment of the path of accumulation of any vehicle.

[b] *gang zag nyan thos pa.*

[c] *grub mtha' theg dman pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Word Commentary on Root Text: Both Hearer schools do not assert the following described in the scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle:

- a basis-of-all
- an afflicted mentality
- a selflessness of phenomena that is an absence of true existence or an absence of difference of entity between apprehended-object and apprehending-subject
- the ten Bodhisattva grounds
- the three bodies (truth, complete enjoyment, and emanation bodies) and their many good qualities
- obstructions to omniscience
- and those included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text—limitless approaches of retentions[a] and meditative stabilizations, and so forth described in the scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle.

In accordance with what is renowned, earlier members of Hearer schools do not assert that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are [Buddha's] word, but later members of Hearer schools do assert that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are [Buddha's] word.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[159] [Earlier members of Hearer schools say:]
>
> - It follows that the subject, the Great Vehicle scriptural collections, were not spoken by Buddha because of not being included in the three scriptural collections and because of teaching other paths such as attaining purification and release through bathing, fasting, and repeating mantra, as is the case, for example, with the Vedāntins…
> - It follows that the subject, the Great Vehicle scriptural collections, were not spoken by Buddha because of deprecating—as not truly existent—all, that is to say, actions and their effects, the four truths, the Three Jewels, and so forth, as is the case, for example, with the Ayatas…
> - It follows that the subject, the Great Vehicle scriptural collections, were not spoken by Buddha because of not being included in the texts of the eighteen [Hearer] schools, as is the case, for example, with the opinions of the Vedāntins…
> - It follows that the subject, the Great Vehicle scriptural collections, are not included within those eighteen
>   1. because of not being gathered on the occasion of the first

[a] *gzungs, dhāraṇā.*

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gathering together of [Buddha's] word, and
2. because even if they came to be distinguished later, they were not included by those making the second gathering together of [Buddha's] word, and so forth, and
3. because of contradicting the statement that all products are impermanent by teaching that a One-Gone-Thus is permanent, and
4. because of contradicting the statement that all phenomena are selfless by teaching a pervasive matrix of One-Gone-Thus and a consciousness that takes [rebirth, that is, a mind-basis-of-all], and
5. because of contradicting the statement that nirvāṇa is peace by teaching that a Buddha does not pass beyond sorrow [that is, pass into nirvāṇa, or die], and
6. because they prophesy [Buddha-enlightenment for] Hearers, and
7. because they intensely deride Foe Destroyers, and
8. because they teach that it is suitable to pay obeisance to householders, and
9. because they praise Bodhisattvas as surpassing Ones-Gone-Thus, and
10. because the prayers of Bodhisattvas such as for the sky-treasury are only words, and
11. because the entire teaching becomes twisted by their propounding that Shākyamuni is an emanation [of a being who attained enlightenment much earlier], and
12. because it is not correct that [a Buddha] is always in meditative equipoise, and
13. because many [Great Vehicle] sūtras set forth fruitless praises [of its practices], and
14. because they teach that actions have no effects by propounding that even very great ill-deeds are destroyed from the root, and
15. because other[160] Very Vast Sūtras were taught, and
16. because they are not indicated among the divisions [of the Buddhist schools to come in the future as depicted] in [King] Kṛkṛ's[a] dream.

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[a] Sarat Chandra Das's dictionary reports that he was "a Buddhist king of Banaras who is said to have patronized Buddha Kāshyapa. In the Chinese version of the *Vimala-kīrti-nirdeśa sūtra,* he is called Kṛppin, the kind and merciful."

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Therefore, this Great Vehicle was not set forth by the Buddha. It is definite that devils composed many various things to deceive beings of bad intelligence and fools.

(B) RESPONSES

Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline:* That responses are not explicitly given here in the root text is in consideration that they will be explicitly set forth on the appropriate occasions. That they are explicitly given in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's autocommentary is for the sake of affixing a commentary to the root text.[a]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [161] Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says that the Great Vehicle was spoken by Buddha:

- because if that were not the case and some later ones interfered with the holy doctrine [by putting forward a fake Great Vehicle], Buddha would have prophesied this beforehand, but he did not, and
- because the Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle arose simultaneously and were not newly made by some later beings, and
- because since the profound and vast doctrine is not in the sphere of activity of logicians, it is not possible for some later logicians to have newly set it forth, and
- because if some later ones set it forth upon having become fully enlightened, that perforce establishes that this is Buddha word, and
- because if the Great Vehicle exists, it is perforce established that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are Buddha's word, since there is no Great Vehicle other than this, but if the Great Vehicle does not exist, the Lesser Vehicle also would not exist, whereby it is not suitable to make a differentiation between Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle scriptural collections as to being or not being Buddha's word, and
- because when this Great Vehicle is meditatively cultivated, transformation into a non-conceptual exalted wisdom serves as an antidote to all afflictive emotions, and
- because, since [a particular sūtra] is not literal, it is not suitable

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (*Great Exposition of Tenets,* Taipei, 167.21-170.15) gives a lengthy response, which Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos,* 6.5-17.6) details at even greater length, given just below.

to say that it is not Buddha's word upon having taken [Buddha's word] to be literal.

Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* also proves that the Great Vehicle is the word [of Buddha]:[162]

Since the collections [of merit and wisdom] of Bodhisattvas
Were taught by the One-Gone-Thus in the Great Vehicle,
Those who are bewildered [about the full extent of the paths and fruits of the Great Vehicle][163]
Deride them out of antagonism.

Either through not knowing the good qualities [of altruism][164] and the defects [of mere self-concern],
Or identifying good qualities as defects,
Or through despising good qualities,
They deride the Great Vehicle.

Those who deride the Great Vehicle—
Knowing that to harm others is defective
And that to help others is a good quality—
Are said to despise good qualities.

and so forth, and:

Who with intelligence would deride
The explanation in the Great Vehicle
Of deeds motivated by compassion
And of stainless wisdom!

Feeling inadequate about its great extent and profound depth
Untrained beings—foes of themselves and others—
Nowadays deride the Great Vehicle
Because of bewilderment.

The Great Vehicle has a nature
Of giving, morality, patience, effort,
Concentration, wisdom, and compassion.
Hence how could there be any bad explanations in it?

Others' aims are [achieved][165] through giving and morality.
One's own are [achieved] through patience and effort.
Concentration and wisdom are causes of liberation.
These epitomize the sense of the Great Vehicle.

The aims of benefiting oneself and others and the meaning of liberation

As briefly taught by the Buddha [in the Hearers' Vehicle][a]
Are contained in the six perfections.

Therefore these [scriptures of the Great Vehicle][166] are the word
of Buddha.
Those blind with ignorance cannot stand
This Great Vehicle where Buddhas taught
The great path of enlightenment
Consisting of merit and wisdom.

Conquerors are said to have inconceivable good qualities
Because the [causal][167] good qualities are inconceivable like the
sky.
Therefore let this great nature of a Buddha
Explained in the Great Vehicle be allowed.

Even [Buddha's] ethics were beyond
The scope of Shāriputra.
So why is the inconceivable great nature
Of a Buddha not accepted?

The absence of production taught in the Great Vehicle
And the extinction of the others[b] are in fact the same emptiness
[Since they indicate] the non-existence of [inherently existent]
production and the extinction [of inherent existence].
Therefore let [the Great Vehicle] be allowed [as Buddha's
word].

If emptiness and the great nature of a Buddha
Are viewed in this way with reason,
How could what is taught in the Great Vehicle and the other
Be unequal for the wise?[c]

What the One-Gone-Thus taught with a special intention
Is not easy to understand.
Therefore since he taught one as well as three vehicles,

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[a] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary* (lha sa: zhol par khang, 15th rab 'byung in the fire rooster year, i.e., 1897, *ka*), 61b.2. I use "Hearers' Vehicle" rather than "Lesser Vehicle" in that this is the way Nāgārjuna explicitly refers to this vehicle (390, 440), whereas Gyel-tsap uses "Lesser Vehicle." Nāgārjuna uses the term "Great Vehicle" eighteen times; thus the implication that the Hearers' Vehicle is lesser is clear.

[b] That is to say, as taught in the scriptures that the Proponents of Hearer Vehicle tenets assert (Gyel-tsap's *Commentary,* 62b.5).

[c] The inequality would be to consider one as the word of Buddha and one as not (Gyel-tsap's *Commentary,* 63a.1).

You should protect yourself through neutrality.[a]

There is no fault with neutrality, but there is fault
From despising it. How could there be virtue?
Therefore those who seek good for themselves
Should not despise the Great Vehicle.

Bodhisattvas' aspirational wishes, deeds, and dedications [of merit]
Were not described in the Hearers' Vehicle.
Therefore how could one become
A Bodhisattva through it?

[In the Hearers' Vehicle] Buddha[b] did not explain
The foundations[c] for a Bodhisattva's enlightenment.
What greater authority for this subject
Is there other than the Victor?

How could the fruit of Buddhahood be superior
[If achieved] through the path common to Hearers
Which has the foundations [of the Hearer enlightenment],
The meanings of the four noble truths, and the harmonies with enlightenment?

The subjects concerned with the Bodhisattva deeds
Were not mentioned in the [Hearers' Vehicle] sūtras
But were explained in the Great Vehicle.
Hence the wise should accept it [as Buddha's word].

and so forth…

1. The reasoning that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are not included in the three scriptural collections is not established because they are indeed included in the three scriptural collections:

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[a] If due to the complexity of Buddha's teaching one cannot understand it, neutrality is better since despising it is sinful (Gyel-tsap's *Commentary,* 388.3).

[b] The Sanskrit *buddhair* is plural but can be interpreted as an honorific.

[c] Gyel-tsap (63b.3) comments:

> Buddha did not set forth the complete path of the Great Vehicle in the scriptural divisions of the Lower Vehicle because he did not, for the time being, teach [such] to Hearers. Because moreover [such] is blessed for the sake of the unsurpassed enlightenment of Bodhisattvas.

It may be that Gyel-tsap was aware of the reading as "foundations" (*rten rnams*) and thus spoke of "the complete path of the Great Vehicle" as well as of the reading as "blessings" (*byin rlabs*) which he uses in the final "because" clause.

- because the four truths, thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, four fearlessness, four individual sciences, unshared attributes of Buddhas, and so forth are taught in the discipline, sets of discourses, and manifest knowledge, and
- because through meditatively cultivating those the afflictive emotions are likewise abandoned and the difference is merely that through meditatively cultivating those as unapprehendable [as inherently existent] the obstructions to omniscience are abandoned.

2. The reasoning that the gatherers [of the Buddha's doctrines] did not gather the Great Vehicle scriptural collections is not established because the Great Vehicle scriptural collections were gathered together by Samantabhadra, Mañjushrī, [Vajrapāṇi] the Caretaker of the Secret, Maitreya, and so forth. The gatherers of the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are not Hearers because the uncommon meanings of the Great Vehicle are not in the province of Hearers…Hence Ānanda collected together some of the Lesser Vehicle sūtras but was not fit to be the gatherer of all sūtras…
3. It is taught that a One-Gone-Thus is permanent since the continuum of a One-Gone-Thus is not severed, but it is not taught that a One-Gone-Thus is permanent in the sense of being immutable. The term "permanent" is used for continuous things, for example, in the case of saying, "A waterfall continually flows," and "A fire always burns."
4. The statement that a One-Gone-Thus is pervasive is due to extending to all objects of knowledge, not because of abiding in all, like Viṣhṇu. The explanation that all sentient beings have the matrix of One-Gone-Thus is because emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, and so forth exist in all sentient beings and not because an internal permanent person pervades all. Although the consciousness that takes [rebirth, that is, a mind-basis-of-all] serves as the causes of entering into and disengaging from cyclic existence and operates at all times like the continuum of a great river, it is momentary and hence operates by way of a continuum and is not like a permanent self.
5. Regarding the statement that a Buddha does not pass beyond sorrow [that is, pass into nirvāṇa, or die], a Buddha has planted prayer-wishes to set all sentient beings in the final state [of Buddhahood], due to which a Buddha does not pass away,

like the way such is asserted by Hearer schools, and just as a fire burns or dies due to the presence or absence of fuel, a Buddha displays the deeds of taking birth and passing into nirvāṇa due to the presence or absence of trainees, but it is not that a Buddha does not actualize the non-abiding nirvāṇa that does not abide in either cyclic existence or [solitary] peace.

6. Concerning Buddhas' prophesying [Buddha-enlightenment for] Hearers, this is done in consideration that Hearers have the Buddha-lineage because even if Foe Destroyers have abandoned afflictive emotions and actions [motivated by afflictive emotions], they accumulate—over a continuum of many births that they naturally attain—the two causal collections [of merit and wisdom] for the great enlightenment and thereupon become fully purified. Or, in another way, Buddhas prophesy their own emanation as Hearers. Or, Buddhas prophesy Bodhisattvas who wear the clothing of Hearers and are called by names such as Shāriputra…
7. Foe Destroyers are not derided in the Great Vehicle scriptural collections. The teaching that Hearers and Bodhisattvas differ like a white mustard seed and Mount Sumeru, a firefly and the sun, a fox and a lion, and a castor-oil plant and sandalwood express their nature and do not deride them, because just as when it is propounded that a hole eaten by a bug in a white mustard seed and the sky are equal, it is laughable, so the proposition that the good qualities of Hearers and Bodhisattvas are equal is also like that…
8. Regarding the claim that only householders should pay obeisance to householder Bodhisattvas, one should pay obeisance to those whose good qualities are greater, not to [external] signs, and hence it is only the case that those who have left the household should pay obeisance to householders endowed with special qualities. This is because those who have the signs but are without good qualities are said to be sources of derision, like clouds without rain, wells without water, and seeds that do not give rise to shoots and because even in the texts of the eighteen [Lesser Vehicle] schools it is said that those who have left the household should pay obeisance to householders…
9. The purposes for praising Bodhisattvas as surpassing [Buddhas] are fourfold:
    - to highly value the causes of a Buddha

- by implicitly worshipping the causes (Bodhisattvas) the effects (Buddhas) are implicitly worshipped
- like a medicinal tree, it is necessary to sustain it with great care when it is small
- to cause trainees in Buddha's circle who have the three lineages to connect to the Great Vehicle.

10. The prayers of Bodhisattvas such as for the sky-treasury are not just words because effects are perceived. If [beings] do not see them now, it is that for those bereft of roots of virtue [the marvelous effects] deteriorate, or are perverted, because just as the Ganges River appears to hungry ghosts to be dry, or to be pus, or to be blazing fire, so although a rain of jewels falls from the prayer-wishes of Bodhisattvas, these are absent from the sky for those who have not accumulated roots of virtue, or they transform into falling thunderbolts and so forth.

    Objection: If it is only by sentient beings' karma that they become rich or destitute, are Bodhisattvas not incapable of helping?

    Answer: That is not the case because just as, for example, a shoot arises from a collection of earth, water, fire, air, and space but does not if they are not complete, so the descent of rain of jewels from the prayer-wishes of Bodhisattvas is obtained due to:

    - accustoming a great deal to charity, abandoning miserliness, and becoming desireless
    - completing an attitude of equality and giving to those who want
    - and developing generosity without hope for reward, without wanting effects [for oneself], and in common for all sentient beings

    but if those are not complete, the descent of rain of jewels is not obtained.

11. Shākyamuni is just an emanation:
    - because of being an emanation of the complete enjoyment body Vairochana dwelling in the Highest Pure Land, and
    - because if the youthful prince Siddhārtha was not an emanation but was an actual common being, it would be impossible for him to display the twelve deeds [of a supreme emanation body] in a billion worlds, and
    - because if Bodhisattvas in their final lifetime gave birth to a child out of liking desire, then their morality would

become perverse, and if they did not have the perfection of morality, they would not have the six perfections, whereby Buddhahood also would not exist…

12. Although Ones-Gone-Thus are always in meditative equipoise, they spontaneously accomplish deeds through the force of earlier prayer-wishes…
13. Concerning statements in the Great Vehicle scriptural collections that many benefits will arise in the present lifetime, the fact that these do not occur for some persons is that:
    - temporarily effects do not arise due to degeneration of their faith and special altruistic attitude and due to the suppression of roots of virtue because of possessing very powerful non-virtues, like the fact that although when the sun is shining there are a great many stars, they are not seen
    - but the benefits, as described, without question arise for those who write out, memorize, and so forth the Great Vehicle scriptural collections because of possessing fear even with regard to very small ill-deeds, as is the case, for example, with the definiteness to attain the immortal state free from birth, aging, sickness, and death from having cultivated [the path] in dependence on the three scriptural collections…

    Therefore, even through uttering in speech, thinking about, and meditating on *dhāraṇī* and so forth, ill-deeds as well as their causes are pacified because of their concordance with the path, like the high sayings of the sets of discourses and so forth.
14. The uprooting of even very great ill-deeds exists…because it is said in sūtra if one possesses the four powers [of disclosure of ill-deeds, contrition, intention not to do ill-deeds in the future, and performing virtuous deeds to ameliorate the effects of the ill-deeds], ill-deeds that have been done and accumulated [as karmic imprints] will be overwhelmed…
15. Although other Very Vast [sūtras] were taught, there is no fallacy because the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are said to be Very Vast due to being very vast in text and in meaning and because even the Supramundane Victor did not make the distinction, "This is very vast; that is not," and hence our position is not damaged by either scripture or reasoning.
16. That the omens in [King] Kṛkṛ's dream indicate that Shākyamuni's teaching would split into eighteen schools but do not

indicate that the *vehicles* would split into two, Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle, is that…:

- In terms of the attitude and special resolve of sentient beings intent on the profound and the vast [the Great Vehicle] is indicated as being shared with the eighteen schools, or since all Buddhas have divisions of vehicle, there is no need to indicate that there would be a split into different vehicles in Shākyamuni's teaching.
- Since divisions of different teachings exist only with regard to Shākyamuni, the dream omens indicate that there would be a split into eighteen schools.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [168] Therefore, although the two Hearer schools of earlier times did not accept the Great Vehicle as the [Buddha's] word, there arose Hearer schools that accepted the Great Vehicle as the [Buddha's] word from the time of the father Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], the fathers Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] as well as their spiritual sons, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and onwards…It is evident that within the Great Exposition School there were some who, due to similarities between the sūtras of the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Great Vehicle, accepted the Great Vehicle…At that time the Great Exposition School in general and even the Vatsīputrīyas took the statements in Great Vehicle sūtras of the non-existence of things[a] as intending refutation of permanent things in Forder systems such as Sāṃkhya.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[169] In our own schools some Proponents of Sūtra such as venerable Saṃgharakṣhita take the negative term in the statements in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are nothings[b] as a negative term of derision from among the seven [usages] of negative terms—beginning with refuting the existent and so on. Just as a bad child is called "not a child," so since compounded phenomena are bad things, they are called "nothings." For, since compounded phenomena are between the past and the future and are unsteady, that is, impermanent, in the present, they are fit to be described as having a sense of badness…

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[a] *dngos po med pa, abhāva;* translated according to context.

[b] Ibid.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Or, they take this negative term as a diminutive because from among times when things exist and when they do not exist there is more time when they do not exist and less time when they exist, and so they are called "nothings." For, since they earlier were not produced and later pass—that is, cease—immediately [upon being produced], the time when things exist is less, and hence they are fit to be described as having a diminutive sense, just as having little wealth is called "no wealth."

b. Individual Assertions of the Four Buddhist Schools of Tenets {2}

This section has two parts: systems delineating coarse and subtle selflessnesses of persons and systems delineating coarse and subtle selflessnesses of phenomena.

(1) Systems Delineating Coarse and Subtle Selflessnesses of Persons {2}

This section has two parts: describing a school of tenets delineating the non-existence of a permanent, unitary, and self-powered self and describing a school of tenets delineating the non-existence of a substantially existent self.

LESSER VEHICLE SYSTEMS

8. Great Exposition School

(A) Describing a School of Tenets Delineating the Non-Existence of a Permanent, Unitary, and Self-Powered Self {3}

This section has three parts: etymology, divisions, and system of tenets.

1' Etymology of Vaibhāṣhika

Because of mainly propounding the *Great Exposition of Particulars* and because of propounding particulars of substantialities, they are called Proponents of the Great Exposition or Proponents of Particulars.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because they propound tenets mainly following Vasumitra's *Great Exposition of Particulars,*[a] they are called Vaibhāṣhikas [Proponents of the Great Exposition], or because they propound that the three times [that is, past, present, and future objects] are particulars of substantialities[b] or propound many substantially established phenomena like the Forder Vaisheṣhikas, they are called Vaibhāṣhikas [Proponents of Particulars].

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[170] The three times are asserted to be particulars [or instances] of the substantially established things with respect to which they are posited. For example, when divided, a shoot has the three times which are itself.[c]
>
> According to explanations in some Indian texts, [Proponents of the Great Exposition hold that] any phenomenon must have a separately apprehendable entity of its own, and since they do not know how to posit objects that are merely imputed to factors of

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[a] *mahāvibhāṣā, bye brag bshad mtsho* [or *mdzod*] *chen mo* (*Ocean* or *Treasury of Great Exposition*. It was translated into Tibetan from the Chinese (T 1545) by the Chinese monk-scholar Fa Zun (aka *blo bzang chos 'phags*) only in 1949 but is, as yet, unpublished.

[b] *rdzas, dravya.*

[c] Yesterday's pot exists today as a past pot. The past of a thing occurs after its present existence, that is, after its present existence has passed. Tomorrow's pot exists today as a future pot. The future of a thing occurs before its present existence, that is, when its present existence is yet to be. Today's pot exists as a present pot today. In this way, the three times of a pot are instances of a pot, and since in the Great Exposition School all phenomena are substantially established, the three times of a pot are substantially established.

other phenomena, their way of positing the existence of phenomena accords greatly with the Vaisheṣhikas' components-possessing substance, due to which they are called Vaibhāṣhikas. This also appears to be a suitable [etymology].

2' Divisions of the Great Exposition School[a] {2}

This section has two parts: correct divisions and refuting mistakes.

a' Correct Divisions of the Great Exposition School {4}

The modes of splitting off are two and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are two ways in which eighteen schools split off:

- from four basic schools
- from two basic schools.

as well as those included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text:

- from one basic school
- from three basic schools.

This section has four parts: mode of splitting off from four basic schools, from one basic school, from two basic schools, and from three basic schools.

1" Mode of Splitting off from Four Basic Schools {2}

This section has two parts: the general system of splitting off from four basic schools according to Vinītadeva and so forth and Padma's system.

a" General System of Splitting off from Four Basic Schools according to Vinītadeva and so forth

From the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṃghikas, Sthaviras, and Saṃmitīyas there are seven, five, three, and three.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to the ways in which eighteen schools split off from four basic schools, there are two systems—that described by Vinītadeva and described by [Padma who is] the author of the

[a] For more elaboration on this topic, see André Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Saigon: 1955).

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

śrāmaṇera-varṣāgra-pṛcchā and *bhikṣu-varṣāgra-pṛcchā.*[171] Vinītadeva's *Compendium Showing the Different Sects*[a] says that from the four basic schools—Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṃghikas, Sthaviras, and Saṃmitīyas—respectively seven, five, three, and three split off (see chart 1, next page).[172]

b" Splitting off from Four Basic Schools according to Padma's System

> Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline:* The root text does not indicate this, but it is clear in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's autocommentary that in the master Padma's explanation, there are four Sarvāstivādins, six Mahāsaṃghikas, five Saṃmitīyas, and three Sthaviras (see chart 2). Do not mistake this master for Padmasambhava from Oḍiyāna.

2" Mode of Splitting off from One Basic School

> Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline:* The master Shākyaprabha explains that from an early single school [the Sarvāstivāda], after the passing away of the Religious King [Ashoka] they split off due to different dialects. I wonder whether Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a did not explicitly indicate those two [that is, this and the previous mode] in the root text since they are easy to understand.

3" Mode of Splitting off from Two Basic Schools

Or, the Mahāsaṃghikas have eight schools, and the Sthaviras ten.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are also two ways in which they split off from two basic schools. The first is that the Mahāsaṃghikas split into eight schools (see chart 3) and the Sthaviras split into ten, as in clear in *sdoms logs* [?].

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[173] With regard to etymologies of the eighteen schools:
>
> *Eight Mahāsaṃghika Schools*
>
> - Mahāsaṃghikas (Majority Community; *dge 'dun phal chen pa*) are so called because when they split apart, they included most of the spiritual community.

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[a] *gzhung tha dad pa rim par klag pa'i 'khor lo las sde pa tha dad pa bstan pa bsdus pa, samayabhedoparacanacakre nikāyabhedopadeśanasaṃgraha;* P5641, vol. 127.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 1: Vinītadeva's Rendition of the Eighteen Sub-Schools of the Great Exposition School from Four Basic Schools

Chart 2: Padma's Rendition of the Eighteen Sub-Schools of the Great Exposition School from Four Basic Schools

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 3: Bhāvaviveka's First Rendition of the Eighteen Sub-Schools of the Great Exposition School from Two Basic Schools (as found in his *Blaze of Reasoning*)

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 4: Bhāvaviveka's Second Rendition of the Eighteen Sub-Schools of the Great Exposition School from Two Basic Schools (as found in his *Blaze of Reasoning*)

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 5: Vasumitra's Rendition of the Eighteen Sub-Schools of the Great Exposition School from Two Basic Schools

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 6: Bhāvaviveka's Rendition of the Eighteen Sub-Schools of the Great Exposition School from Three Basic Schools (as found in his *Blaze of Reasoning*)

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- Ekavyaharikas (One Convention; *tha snyad gcig pa*) are so called because they use the convention "Buddhas know all phenomena with one exalted mind, realizing all with wisdom in one instant."
- Lokottaravādins (Proponents of World-Transcendence; *'jig rten 'das par smra ba*) are so called because they propound that since a Buddha has passed beyond the world, a Buddha does not have attributes of the world.
- Bahushrutīyas (Much Hearing; *mang thos pa*) are so called because they propound that they have heard much through relying on masters.
- Prajñaptivādins (Proponents of Imputation; *btags par smra ba*) are so called because they propound that imputing compounded things in many ways is the cause of suffering.[a]
- Chaitikas (Monument Ones; *mchod rten pa*) are so called because of dwelling at a stūpa.
- Pūrvashailas (Eastern Mountain Ones; *shar gyi ri bo pa*) are so called because of dwelling on an eastern mountain.
- Aparashailas (Western Mountain Ones; *nub kyi ri bo pa*) are so called because of dwelling on a western mountain.

Ten Sthavira Schools

- Sthaviras (Abiding Firmly; *gnas brtan pa*) are so called because they teach that they are the lineage of Superior firm abiders; they are also called Haimavatas (*gangs ri ba*) because of dwelling on a snow mountain.
- Sarvāstivādins (Proponents of the Existence of All; *thams cad yod par smra ba*) are so called because of propounding that the three times exist; they are also called Vibhajyavādins (*rnam par phye ste smra ba*) because of emphatically propounding experience and non-experience of effects [relative to] the presence or absence of past karma; they are also called Hetuvādins (Proponents of Causes; *rgyur smra*) because of propounding the causes of the elements and derivatives of the elements; and some call them Muruntakas (Muruntakas; *mu runta ka*) because of dwelling on Mount Muruntaka.
- Vatsīputrīyas (Vatsīputra Followers; *gnas ma'i bu pa*) are so called because a woman of the Vatsi lineage is a Vatsī, and her son is [called] Vatsīputra, and they teach that they are of his lineage.

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[a] *'dus byas phan tshun brtags pa sdug bsngal rgyur smra bas brtags smra.*

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- Dharmottaras (Dharmottara Followers; *chos mchog pa*) are so called because they teach the system of the master Dharmottara.
- Bhadrayānīyas (Bhadrayāna Followers; *bzang lam pa*) are so called because they teach the system of the master Bhadrayāna.
- Saṃmitīyas (Mahāsammata Followers; *mang bkur ba / kun gyis bkur ba*) are so called because they teach the system of the master Mahāsammata; they are also called Avantakas (Avantakas; *srung ba pa*) because of gathering in Avantaka City; they are also called Kurukullas (*sa sgrogs ri*) because of dwelling on Mount Kurukulla.
- Mahīshasakas (Great Teaching; *mang ston pa*) are so called because…of teaching that rebirth will not occur for a great collection of beings.
- Dharmaguptakas (Dharmagupta Followers; *chos sbas pa*) are so called because of belonging to master Dharmagupta.
- Kāshyapīyas (Kāshyapa Followers; *'od srung pa*) are so called because of belonging to Kāshyapa; they are also called Suvarṣhakas (Auspicious Rain Flowing; *char bzang 'bebs*) because they let fall the auspicious rain of the excellent doctrine.
- Uttarīyas (Uttara Followers; *bla ma pa*) are so called because of belonging to Uttara; they are also called Saṃkrāntivādins (Proponents of Transference; *'pho bar smra ba*) because of propounding that the aggregates transfer to the next life.

I have explained these according to the speech of Bhāvaviveka.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[174] It is not suitable to treat all that are called synonyms[a] as equivalents[b] because, for example, although Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda are described as synonyms, it can be known from their etymologies that they are not equivalent:

1. because Bhāvaviveka explains that:
   - Sarvāstivādins are so called because of asserting that all three times substantially exist.
   - Vibhajyavādins are so called because of propounding [tenets] within differentiating that past [objects] that have not issued forth effects and present [objects] are substantially existent, whereas past [objects] that have issued forth effects and future [objects] are imputedly existent.

[a] *rnam grangs.*

[b] *don gcig.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

2. Vinītadeva and so forth explain that the latter is a particular instance of the former.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [The second way in which they split off from two basic schools is set forth in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* (see chart 4), and yet another is found in Vasumitra's *Wheel Stating the Distinctions of the Systems*[a] (see chart 5)].

4" Mode of Splitting off from Three Basic Schools

> Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline:* With respect to how the eighteen schools split off from three schools, there are six Sthaviras, eight Mahāsaṃghikas, and four Vibhajyavādins (see chart 6). Though this is renowned as the assertion of the Mahāsaṃghikas, I wonder whether Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a did not explicitly indicate it in the root text since the time and so forth of the split from three schools are similar to the mode of division from two. It is said that there are also Proponents of Sūtra among them.

b' Refuting Mistakes regarding the Divisions of the Great Exposition School

That all those are the Great Exposition School and that there are two schools are contradictory. Mere inclusion is too narrow since the Great Vehicle is explained; moreover. The five Saṃmitīya schools propound an inexpressible self, but they are similar to all concerning the non-existence of a self endowed with the three; they are not other.

Word Commentary on Root Text: D̄ak-tsang's assertions that:

- all those eighteen schools are the Great Exposition School
- Mahīshasakas, Dārshtāntikas, and so forth are Proponents of Sūtra, and thus the two Hearer schools [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are included in the eighteen schools

are contradictory. With respect to how Proponents of Sūtra might be included among Proponents of the Great Exposition:

- If this is taken as [meaning] merely that full-fledged and novice monastics who are Proponents of Sūtra are included among full-fledged and novice monastics of any of the four basic schools [Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṃghikas, Sthaviras, and Saṃmitīyas], this would incur the fault of

[a] *gzhung lugs kyi bye brag bkod pa'i 'khor lo, samayabhedoparacanacakra;* P5639, vol. 127.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

including too little because full-fledged and novice monastics who are Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Mind-Only also are included among full-fledged and novice monastics of any of those four basic schools.

- Not only that, but also, since Bhāvaviveka and Avalokitavrata explain that even the scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle are included in the texts of the eighteen schools, it would incur the fault of including too little.

 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[175] The term "moreover" in the root text [indicates] that the way the scriptural divisions of the Great Vehicle are included in the texts of the eighteen schools, moreover, is in the sense that the scriptural divisions of the Great Vehicle have extensive explanations and the texts of the eighteen schools have brief indications. It is not suitable to assert that the unique scriptural collections of the Great Vehicle are in the scriptural collections asserted by those eighteen schools.

 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[176] That the scriptural divisions of the Great Vehicle are included in the texts of the eighteen schools means that the four truths, thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, four fearlessnesses, and so forth, which are described at great length in the scriptural divisions of the Great Vehicle, are taught in a brief way, moreover, in the texts of the eighteen schools. It is not that the scriptural divisions of the Great Vehicle are included in the scriptures of the eighteen schools in the sense of being them.

Word Commentary on Root Text: From among the ten Sthavira schools described in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* on the occasion of the first mode of division from two root schools into eighteen, five schools—Saṃmitīya and so forth—propound that a self that is inexpressible as either substantially existent or imputedly existent, or as the same entity as or a different entity from the aggregates, and so forth, exists. However, they are the same as all Inner schools of tenets in:

- asserting the non-existence of a self endowed with the three—the permanence of not disintegrating, the unity of not having parts, and being self-powered such that it does not depend on anything else—
- and valuing dearly the Subduer's scriptural and realizational teaching.

Hence they are utterly not Other Schools. Since they are Our Schools and propound that uncompounded phenomena—space and so forth—are substantial entities and effective things, they are also not any tenet system except the Great Exposition School.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[177] Some say that the five Saṃmitīya schools—Vatsīputrīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Kurukullas, Dharmaguptakas, and Uttarīyas—assert a self of persons and do not assert a selflessness of persons. Also, a certain Translator [D̄ak-tsang] S̄hay-rap-rin-chen says that the Vatsīputrīyas assert that even though persons are inexpressible as either one with or different from the aggregates, permanent or impermanent, and so forth, persons are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient.[a] His citation of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle":*

> Some assert substantially existent persons,
> Inexpressible as the same or other, permanent or impermanent.

is the loose talk[b] of one who does not know the distinction of:

- amounting to asserting[c] substantial existence as described in a higher school of tenets
- but not explicitly asserting substantial existence or not asserting substantial existence as described in one's own system.

Both [assertions] are wrong because even the Vatsīputrīyas assert that all phenomena are selfless and do not assert that persons are either substantially existent or imputedly existent. It is established that even the Vatsīputrīyas assert that all phenomena are selfless, because they propound that:

- If it is expressed that a person is a different entity from the aggregates, it would be like the self of the Forders, and this would contradict the Supramundane Victor's refutation of such and statement that all phenomena are selfless.
- Also, if it is expressed that a person is one with the aggregates, this is damaged by the fact that the self would be plural, [would be impermanent, and would cease at death like the body, and deeds done would be wasted].[178]
- Therefore, an inexpressible self is beautiful…

This clears away the bad system claiming that the Vatsīputrīyas do not assert a selflessness of persons.

Question: Then why do they assert that persons are inexpressible?

Answer: The reasoning is as above. With respect to scripture, a sūtra says:

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[a] *rang skya thub pa'i rdzas yod.*

[b] *'chal gtam.* "Loose" in the sense of "disordered."

[c] *khas blangs par song ba.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> Monastics, I will teach you about the burden. I will also teach you about the taker of the burden, the leaver of the burden, and the carrier of the burden. Regarding this, the burden is the five appropriated aggregates. The taker of the burden is attachment. The leaver of the burden is liberation. The carrier of the burden is the person…

Depending on this…they assert a self that is the doer of actions, the experiencer of effects, the cycler who leaves former aggregates and thereupon takes later ones, and the liberator. Moreover, the Supramundane Victor says, "The carrier of the burden is the person, inexpressible as being permanent or impermanent," due to which they assert that the self is inexpressible.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[179] If the person was the aggregates, then the burden would [absurdly] be the carrier of the burden.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[180] The meaning of the passage from Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* is that, according to the Consequentialists, they have come to assert[a] substantially existent [persons]. Hence, although the five Saṃmitīya schools assert and propound that the person, or self, that is the basis of actions and their effects is inexpressible, they are similar to all Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra in:

- asserting the non-existence of a self endowed with the three attributes asserted by the Forders—permanence, a separate entity from the aggregates, and unitary in the sense of being partless—individually or as a group
- valuing dearly the system of the Subduer.

Therefore, they could never be among Others' Schools. Moreover, since they, like the Proponents of the Great Exposition, assert that space and so forth are effective things, they are not other than Proponents of the Great Exposition.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[181] Although nowadays it is renowned like the wind that "the five Saṃmitīya schools assert an inexpressible self," this calls for a great deal of analysis because:

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[a] *khas blangs par song ba.* From a higher standpoint, they have come to assert substantially existent persons, but they do not explicitly assert this.

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- It does not accord with any of the three modes of explanation by Vinītadeva and Bhāvaviveka.
- Although [Padma,] the author of the *śrāmaṇera-varṣāgra-pṛcchā* and *bhikṣu-varṣāgra-pṛcchā,* mentions "the five Saṃmitīya schools," his enumeration of them differs from the five Saṃmitīya schools widely renowned nowadays. For [Padma] calls Tāmrashāṭīyas (*gos dmar ba*), Avantakas, Kurukullas, Bahushrutīyas, and Vatsīputrīyas the five Saṃmitīya schools, but he does not explain that they assert an inexpressible self, and although in the first assertion of the split from two basic schools Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* mentions that the five—Vatsīputrīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Saṃmitīyas, Dharmaguptakas, and Uttarīyas—assert an inexpressible self, he does not associate the convention "five Saṃmitīya schools" with them.

3' Assertions of Tenets by the Great Exposition School {2}

This section has two parts: general indication of their assertions and detailed explanation.

a' General Indication of the Assertions of Tenets by the Great Exposition School {3}

This section has three parts: presentations of the basis, path, and fruit.

1" Presentation of the Basis by the Great Exposition School

Two truths, aggregates, constituents, sense-spheres, five transmigrations, foods, the contaminated, the uncontaminated, compounded phenomena, and three uncompounded phenomena. Space is illumination or darkness. Subtle particles do not have parts and do not touch.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With regard to their presentation of the basis, they assert:

- two truths—conventional and ultimate
- five aggregates—forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses

  Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[182] Aggregates (*phung po, skandha*)

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are so called because many things are piled or gathered into one because a sūtra says that gathering together all forms—past, present and future, external and internal, bad and auspicious, and near and far—they go into the [single] count of the form aggregate.

- twelve sense-spheres—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense spheres and form, sound, odor, taste, tangible object, and phenomena sense spheres

    Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [183] Sense-spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*) are so called because:

    - the six objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and [other] phenomena) by way of acting as observed-object-conditions[a]
    - and the six sense powers (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers) by way of acting as proprietary [or empowering] conditions[b]

    serve as doors causing their respective, previously non-existent consciousnesses to be produced and increase, that is, to maintain their continuum. In this system it is explained that individual minute particles of objects are objects of the senses and that individual minute particles of sense powers are bases of sense consciousnesses.

- eighteen constituents—supports (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers), objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena), and those supported (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mental consciousness)

    Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[184] Constituents (*khams, dhātu*) are so called because of being types of specific phenomena.

- five transmigrations—hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods

    Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[185] Demi-gods are included among gods and animals.

    Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[186] Humans and animals have all four types of birth [that is, birth from a womb, birth from an egg, birth from heat and moisture, and spontaneous birth]. Gods, hell-beings, and intermediate state beings have only spontaneous birth. Hungry ghosts have birth from a womb and spontaneous birth.

- foods—morsels, contact, intention, and consciousness

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[a] *dmigs rkyen, ālambanapratyaya.*

[b] *bdag po'i rkyen, adhipatipratyaya.*

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Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[187] It is explained that morsels [that is, usual sorts of foods] are only in the desire realm; the other three foods exist in all three realms—desire, form, and formless.

- the contaminated—that which is suitable to increase contaminations by way of either being an object of observation or mental accompanier

 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[188] Compounded phenomena not included among true paths and contaminated phenomena are equivalent.

- the uncontaminated—that which is not suitable to increase contaminations by way of either being an object of observation or mental accompanier

 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[189] Uncontaminated compounded phenomena and true paths are equivalent. They assert that there are instances of true paths in all five aggregates.

- compounded phenomena—the five aggregates (forms and so forth)
- three uncompounded phenomena—uncompounded space, analytical cessations, non-analytical cessations

 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[190] Space is a permanent substantial entity that not only does not obstruct physical things but also is not obstructed by physical things; it is not a mere absence of obstructive contact [as it is in the higher schools of tenets]. An analytical cessation is a permanent substantial entity that is the cessation of its respective object of abandonment through the force of having individually analyzed a lower level as gross and a higher level as peaceful, or a permanent substantial entity that is the cessation of its respective object of abandonment through the force of having individually analyzed the four truths. A non-analytical cessation is a permanent substantial entity that prevents forever the future production of something not through having individually analyzed with wisdom but through the force of the incompleteness of conditions.[a]

- The space constituent that is in the first of six groups among the sixty-two constituents is a form-sense-sphere having an essence of either illumination or darkness.

 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[191] Space and space-constituent are equivalent, and both are uncompounded [and hence permanent]. However, the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the

[a] For instance, the lack of hunger at the time of intensely concentrating on conversation. Once the moment has passed, the absence of desire for food at that time will never change, and for this reason, its cessation is permanent.

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space constituent that is in the first of six groups among the sixty-two constituents is a form-sense-sphere having an essence of either illumination or darkness [and hence is impermanent].

- Subtle substance-particles do not have parts and do not touch each other [when aggregated].

2" Presentation of the Path by the Great Exposition School

Direct perception and inference are the valid cognitions. Five paths. Enlightenment, and so forth. Six perfections.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to object-possessors [that is, subjects], direct perception and inference are the valid cognitions.

With respect to paths there are:

- Five paths—accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, and no more learning

  Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[192] Knowledge—in the continuum of a Foe Destroyer—of extinguishment [of obstructions] and knowledge of non-production [of obstructions in the future] are enlightenment. Because of being causes concordant with attaining that enlightenment, thirty-seven practices are called harmonies with enlightenment…The thirty-seven [and the paths with which they are associated] are:[193]

  I. Four mindful establishments (attained from the path of accumulation)

  1. Mindful establishment on the body
  2. Mindful establishment on feeling
  3. Mindful establishment on mind
  4. Mindful establishment on phenomena

  II. Four thorough abandonings (attained from the heat level of the path of preparation)

  5. Generating virtuous qualities not yet generated
  6. Increasing virtuous qualities already generated
  7. Not generating non-virtuous qualities not yet generated
  8. Thoroughly abandoning non-virtuous qualities already generated

  III. Four legs of manifestation (attained from the peak level of the path of preparation)

  9. Aspiration
  10. Effort

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11. Thought
12. Analytical meditative stabilization

IV. Five faculties (attained from the forbearance level of the path of preparation)

13. Faith
14. Effort
15. Mindfulness
16. Meditative stabilization
17. Wisdom

V. Five powers (attained from supreme mundane qualities level of the path of preparation)

18. Faith
19. Effort
20. Mindfulness
21. Meditative stabilization
22. Wisdom

VI. Seven branches of enlightenment (attained from the path of meditation)

23. Correct mindfulness
24. Correct discrimination of phenomena
25. Correct effort
26. Correct joy
27. Correct pliancy
28. Correct meditative stabilization
29. Correct equanimity

VII. Eightfold path (attained from the path of seeing)

30. Correct view
31. Correct realization
32. Correct speech
33. Correct aims of actions
34. Correct livelihood
35. Correct exertion
36. Correct mindfulness
37. Correct meditative stabilization…

In Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* and in the higher systems of tenets:

- The first three groups are associated with the three paths of accumulation—small, medium, and great.
- The five faculties are associated with the heat and peak levels of the path of preparation.
- The five powers are associated with the forbearance and

supreme mundane qualities levels of the path of preparation.
- The seven branches of enlightenment are associated with the path of seeing.
- The eightfold path is associated with the path of meditation.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[194] [Other] features of the path are:
- Hearing, thinking, and meditating and wisdoms of hearing, thinking, and meditating which, respectively, take to mind names, both names and meanings, and both names and meanings.
- Calm abiding and special insight
- At the quickest, Hearers attain the [final] fruit of the path in three lives.
- Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers accumulate the collections [of merit and wisdom] for a hundred eons.
- Bodhisattvas accumulate the two collections for three periods of countless eons.
- With respect to all enlightenments of rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers and the Teacher [Buddha], through relying on the final [fourth] concentration they progress in one meditative sitting over the four levels of the path of preparation—heat, peak, forbearance, and supreme mundane qualities—and then the paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning. Hence, prior to that one meditative sitting, they are common beings on the path of accumulation.

- Six perfections—giving, morality, patience, effort, concentration, and wisdom.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[195] It is asserted that [over the course of] the Teacher [Shākyamuni Buddha's lifetimes as] Bodhisattvas who are in the same continuum as him, he completed:
- the perfection of giving through giving to all sentient beings all external and internal things, such as his head, arms, legs, and so forth, motivated by compassion and without hope for reward
- the perfections of morality and patience through not even the slightest disturbance of his mind—being free from desire—even though others cut off his limbs
- the perfection of effort through poetic praising of the Buddha

Tiṣhya[a] for seven days with one leg raised up: "Leader of Beings, there is no other great practitioner of virtue like you in the lands of gods," and so forth
- the perfections of concentration and wisdom when, having gathered the collections [of merit and wisdom] for nine eons, he thereupon entered into the diamond-like meditative stabilization.

3" Presentation of the Fruit by the Great Exposition School

Twenty aspirants to virtue. Eight Approachers to and Abiders in the fruit. When the twelve deeds in two parts are completed, Buddha is finished. Severance of the continuum of matter and mind in all three without remainder is the fruit.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With regard to their presentation of the fruit, they assert:

- twenty aspirants to virtue:[b]
  1. Eighth Superior
  2. Approacher to Stream Enterer of dull faculties
  3. Approacher to Stream Enterer of sharp faculties
  4. Abider in the fruit of Stream Enterer of dull faculties
  5. Abider in the fruit of Stream Enterer of sharp faculties
  6. Stream Enterer who will be reborn from a god lineage into a god lineage
  7. Stream Enterer who will be reborn from a human lineage into a human lineage
  8. [Special Abider in the fruit of Once Returner] with one life intervening [who will take rebirth once more in the desire realm before passing from sorrow]
  9. Never Returner who passes from sorrow in the intermediate state
  10. Never Returner who passes from sorrow from just rebirth [once in the form realm]
  11. Never Returner who passes from sorrow with [great] exertion
  12. Never Returner who passes from sorrow without [great] activity

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a *skar rgyal.*

b *dge 'dun, saṅgha.* There are various presentations of these.

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13.-15. Three Never Returners who rise [to the highest land in the form realm]
16. Never Returner who goes to finality of the peak of cyclic existence
17. Never Returner who goes to the formless realm
18. Never Returner who attains peace in the life [during which the path of seeing is attained, this being on the basis of a life-support of the peak of cyclic existence]
19. Never Returner with the manifest corpus [of the eight meditative liberations which have been attained and have not degenerated]
20. Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer.

Paṇ-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a's[a] *General Meaning of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization":*[196] The twenty are in five groups:

FIVE STREAM ENTERERS

1. Approacher to Stream Enterer with sharp faculties—a follower of fact
2. Approacher to Stream Enterer with dull faculties—a follower of faith
3. Mere Abider in the fruit of Stream Enterer
4. Stream Enterer who will be reborn from a god lineage into a god lineage two or three times
5. Stream Enterer who will be reborn from a human lineage into a human lineage two or three times.

THREE ONCE RETURNERS

6. Approacher to Once Returner
7. Mere Abider in the fruit of Once Returner
8. Special Abider in the fruit of Once Returner with one interruption who will take rebirth once as a god of the desire realm before passing from sorrow.

TEN NEVER RETURNERS

9. Approacher to Never Returner
10. Never Returner who passes from sorrow in the intermediate state on the way to the form realm
11. Never Returner who passes from sorrow upon rebirth once in the form realm
12. Never Returner who passes from sorrow with great exertion upon rebirth once in the form realm

[a] *paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa,* 1478-1554.

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13. Never Returner who passes from sorrow without great exertion upon rebirth once in the form realm
14. Never Returner who rises, taking only two births in the form realm—the Brahmā type and the Highest Land where the Never Returner passes from sorrow
15. Never Returner who rises half-way, taking rebirth only three times: in the form realm—Brahmā type, any of the pure lower places, and Highest Land where he passes from sorrow
16. Never Returner who transmigrates in all stations, taking rebirth in sixteen of the form levels [but not Great Brahmā] and then passes from sorrow in the Highest Land
17. Never Returner who attains peace in this life when the path of seeing is attained, having conquered desires included within the levels of form
18. Never Returner with the manifest corpus of the eight meditative liberations, which are attained and not degenerated.

ONE APPROACHER TO FOE DESTROYER

19. Approacher to Foe Destroyer.


ONE RHINOCEROS-LIKE SOLITARY REALIZER

20. Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer

- eight Approachers to and abiders in the fruit:
  1. Approacher to Never Returner
  2. Abider in the fruit of Never Returner
  3. Approacher to Once Returner
  4. Abider in the fruit of Once Returner
  5. Approacher to Never Returner
  6. Abider in the fruit of Never Returner
  7. Approacher to Foe Destroyer
  8. Abider in the fruit of Foe Destroyer

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 7: Path of Meditation
(read from bottom to top)



{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[197] The twelve deeds of a Buddha are:

1. descent from the Joyous Pure Land[a]
2. entering the womb
3. birth
4. youthful sports and mastery of the arts
5. living in the household together with consorts, thereby residing in the capital for twenty-nine years
6. renunciation
7. asceticism for six years
8. meditation under the tree of enlightenment
9. conquest of the array of demons at dusk on the fifteenth day of the last month of spring, *vaiśāka,* of his thirty-fifth year
10. becoming a Buddha
11. turning the wheel of doctrine
12. nirvāṇa (death)

Word Commentary on Root Text: The twelve deeds of a Buddha are divided into two classes [three different ways]:

- those of a householder [that is, the first five] and those of one who has left the household [that is, the last seven]
- those of a common being [that is, the first nine] and those of a Superior [that is, the last three]

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[198] He was on the path of accumulation through the conquest of the array of demons at dusk; then in the period of meditative equipoise at midnight, in the first part he was on the path of preparation and thus still a common being, but in the latter part of that meditative equipoise he was on the path of seeing and thus a Superior. He was still a learner Superior during the vajra-like meditative stabilization during the period of precursor to dawn, and finally he become a non-learner Superior upon being enlightened at dawn.
- those of a Bodhisattva [that is, the first nine] and those of a Buddha [that is, the last three].

They assert that when those are completed, the activities of the actual exalted body of a Buddha are finished.

They assert that in all three actualizations of nirvāṇas without remainder by Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Buddhas the continuums of matter

[a] *dga' ldan, tuṣita.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

and mind are severed, whereupon only the sphere of peace remains.

b' Detailed Explanation of the Assertions of Tenets of the Great Exposition School {7}

This section has seven parts: assertions on the two truths, scriptural collections, divisions of direct perception, cause and effect and non-revelatory form, aspects of consciousness and five basic categories, features of a Buddha, and unique features of individual schools.

1" ASSERTIONS ON THE TWO TRUTHS IN THE GREAT EXPOSITION SCHOOL

Phenomena such that awareness is cancelled or is not cancelled due to breaking up or separation are respectively conventional truths and ultimate truths.

Word Commentary on Root Text: A phenomenon such that an awareness apprehending it is cancelled due to actually breaking it up or mentally separating it into its individual parts is a conventional truth.

> Gōn-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of Tenets:* A clay pot and a rosary are illustrations of conventional truths because, if a clay pot is broken with a hammer, the awareness apprehending that object as a clay pot is cancelled; and, if the beads of a rosary are separated, the awareness apprehending that object as a rosary is cancelled.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[199] The conventionally existent, such as pots, are called "conventional truths" (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*) because names are designated conventionally, and hence when through the force of conventions one says, "This and that exist," it is only true and is not false.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:* The reason why such things as a pot or water are called "relative truths" (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*) is that when shapes such as bulbousness become interdependent, the statement "A pot exists there" is true and not false, and when substances such as the form, odor, and taste of water become interdependent, the statement "Water exists there" is true and not false. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* refers to three usages of the word *saṃvṛti* (*kun rdzob*):

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that which obstructs [seeing] suchness, the interdependent, and the conventions of the world. From among these, it here is taken as the interdependent.[a] As for *satya* (*bden pa*)…here it must be taken as the existent,[b] or the true as opposed to the false…Vasubandhu's *Explanation of the "Treasury of Manifest Knowledge"* says:

> Only those things are conventionally designated with those names. Therefore, when through the force of convention one says, "A pot exists there" and "Water exists there" one has quite simply spoken the truth and not something false, and for that reason they are *saṃvṛtisatya*.[c]

Word Commentary on Root Text: A phenomenon such that an awareness apprehending it is not cancelled due to actually breaking it up or mentally separating it into its individual parts is an ultimate truth.

Gön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of Tenets:* Illustrations of ultimate truths are directionally partless particles, temporally partless moments of consciousness, and uncompounded space.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[200] In this context, ultimate means that which does not depend upon parts, and truth means that which is comprehended through reasoning and so forth [and hence existent],[d] for although [an ultimate truth] such as an isolated substance particle cannot abide without depending upon other substances, this does not contradict the fact that, without depending upon those other substances, an awareness of it does operate. This is because an awareness can apprehend an isolated substance particle, but that particle can neither abide nor be produced in isolation, since in order for a gross form to be produced or to abide, it must be produced and must abide together [in a collection of] at least six substance particles [in the form realm and at least eight in the desire realm].

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[a] The multivalent meaning of *saṃvṛti* makes it difficult to translate *saṃvṛtisatya* with a single term; however, aside from the Great Exposition School, the first meaning is emphasized, and, therefore, I have mostly translated it as "obscurational truth"; see 904ff.

[b] Here s*atya* (*bden pa*) is taken as meaning *sat* (*yod pa*).

[c] Adapted from the translation by John Buescher. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a takes *saṃvṛti* as meaning "convention," whereas Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den takes it as interdependent, although Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's citation from Vasubandhu seems to me to confirm Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's choice. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's choice of "interdependent," however, ties together with his own treatment of "ultimate" and "ultimate truth," where he says, "In this context, ultimate means that which does not depend upon parts"; see just below.

[d] *Satya* (*bden pa*) is taken as meaning *sat* (*yod pa*).

2" ASSERTIONS ON SCRIPTURAL COLLECTIONS IN THE GREAT EXPOSITION SCHOOL

Because there are three, the Seven Treatises are the word. Scriptures are compositional factors.

Word Commentary on Root Text: If the Seven Treatises of Manifest Knowledge were not the word [of Buddha], there would be no scriptural collection of manifest knowledge, but since [Buddha] said, "Monastics, the third scriptural collection…," the Seven Treatises are the word [of Buddha]. Because scriptures and treatises are sound-generalities[a] that are composites of the three—letter, stems, and words—they are non-associated compositional factors.[b]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[201] Certain Proponents of the Great Exposition assert, in accordance with the description in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning,* that all of [Buddha's] word is just of definitive meaning[c] [that is, literal] and do not assert that there are interpretable meanings.[d] In addition, there are also [some] who assert that there are both definitive meanings and meanings requiring interpretation. Not only that, but also all later Proponents of the Great Exposition and even the Vatsīputrīyas assert that even Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras require interpretation, saying that:
>
> - The statements that the absence of true existence and non-production refer to the type of truth and production imputed by Forders such as the Sāṃkhyas and so forth.
> - Likewise, the statements of the non-existence of nature, the non-existence of attainment, abandonment, and so forth and the non-existence of things also are in consideration that the nature and so forth and permanent effective things as imputed by Forders do not exist.

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[a] *sgra spyi, śabdasāmānya;* less literally, generic images of terms.

[b] *ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasaṃskāra.* In the other Buddhist systems, generic images are not asserted to be non-associated compositional factors, which are impermanent, but instead are asserted to be permanent in the sense of not disintegrating but not in the sense of always existing.

[c] *nges don, nītārtha.*

[d] *drang don, neyārtha.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

3" ASSERTIONS ON THE DIVISIONS OF DIRECT PERCEPTION IN THE GREAT EXPOSITION SCHOOL

Direct perceptions: sense, mental, and yogic. Self-cognizing consciousnesses do not exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to direct perceptions, even though three—sense, mental, and yogic direct perceptions—are asserted, there are no self-cognizing consciousnesses.[a]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[202] With respect to sense direct perceptions there are five—eye, ear, nose, tongue, and physical direct perceptions. From among these…an eye sense power sees forms, and hence it is not that only the consciousness dependent on it sees form because if only consciousness sees form, it [absurdly] follows that even forms that are obstructed by walls are seen because consciousness is unimpeded.[b]

4" ASSERTIONS ON CAUSE AND EFFECT AND NON-REVELATORY FORM IN THE GREAT EXPOSITION SCHOOL

Simultaneous cause and effect exist. Non-revelatory form is form.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are many [types of] fully qualified simultaneous cause and effect—those which have association [such as minds and their accompanying mental factors], simultaneously arisen causes and effect [such as a pot and the eight substance-particles[c] that exist in its collection], and so forth. Non-revelatory form is fully qualified form.[d]

5" ASSERTIONS ON ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND FIVE BASIC CATEGORIES IN THE GREAT EXPOSITION SCHOOL

Sense-consciousnesses do not have the aspect. The five categories are things and substantially established.

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[a] *rang rig, svasaṃvedana.* A self-cognizing consciousness is, roughly speaking, a mind's awareness of itself simultaneous with its awareness of an object.

[b] Because a consciousness does not have form, it is not impeded by form; however, because the support of the eye consciousness is a physical sense power, the seer also incorporates form and so is impeded by form.

[c] The eight are earth, water, fire, wind, form, odor, taste, and tangible object.

[d] Non-revelatory forms are, for example, the subtle form of the absence of a vow as in the case of the subtle form of non-virtuous deeds that a butcher would always possess even when not actually engaged in killing.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Sense consciousnesses actually know objects without the aspect of a representation.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[203] They assert that sense consciousnesses actually apprehend objects nakedly without [the object casting a representation or] aspect [of itself to the consciousness]. Sense consciousnesses are specified in order to eliminate the likes of conceptual consciousnesses [which operate through the medium of an image]. "Without the aspect" and "actually" are specified in consideration that they do not assert, as the Proponents of Sūtra do, that a representation intervenes. Even minute particles are actually known.
>
> *Objection:* Are minute particles not beyond the senses?
>
> *Answer:* Although single minute particles are beyond the senses, composites or aggregations of similar type are not beyond the senses because although from a distance single hairs are not observed, they are known when many aggregate.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[204] The Proponents of the Great Exposition do not know how to posit a merely imputed object called "gross" when many minute particles accumulate. And since they do not assert, as the Vaisheṣhikas do, that a substantial entity called "gross" is produced as a separate factuality, they have to assert that a sense direct perception apprehending a pot perceives the multiple minute particles existing in the collection of the pot. Otherwise, because when many minute particles accumulate, a components-possessor does not exist, there would be no object of this sense direct perception.
>
> The Proponents of Sūtra assert that a composite of blue minute particles casts its representation to a sense direct perception apprehending blue and thereupon ceases. Hence, they assert that this sense direct perception:
>
> - indirectly knows a blue that, having ceased, does not exist
> - and actually knows a representation of blue.
>
> Unlike that, [the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that] the sense direct perception actually nakedly knows blue without an intervening representation.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are five basic categories:

1. appearing forms[a]

[a] *gzugs, rūpa.*

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Forms are of eleven types: the five sense objects, the five sense powers, and non-revelatory forms. The five sense objects are: (1) colors and shapes, (2) sounds, (3) odors, (4) tastes, and (5) tangible objects. The five sense powers are: (6) eye sense power, (7) ear sense power, (8) nose sense power, (9) tongue sense power, and (10) body sense power

2. main minds[a]

   A main mind is a consciousness apprehending the general object, such as an eye consciousness apprehending a patch of blue.

3. accompanying mental factors[b]

   Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[205] There are forty-six mental factors:

   FIVE DEFINITE GROUPS

   - ten mental factors that accompany all main minds: feeling, intention, discrimination, aspiration, contact, intelligence, mindfulness, mental engagement, interest, and stabilization.
   - ten virtuous mental factors that accompany all virtuous states: faith, conscientiousness, pliancy, equanimity, shame,[c] embarrassment,[d] non-attachment, non-hatred, non-harmfulness, and effort
   - six great afflictive emotions that accompany all afflicted states: obscuration, non-conscientiousness, laziness, non-faith, lethargy, and excitement
   - two non-virtuous mental factors that accompany all non-virtuous states: non-shame and non-embarrassment
   - ten lesser afflictive emotions: belligerence, resentment, dissimulation, jealousy, verbal spite, concealment, miserliness, deceit, haughtiness, and harmfulness

   EIGHT MISCELLANEOUS MENTAL FACTORS

   - desire, anger, pride, doubt, investigation, analysis, sleep, and contrition.

   When five mental factors—forgetfulness, non-introspection, distraction, afflicted view, and non-obscuration—are added to the forty-six mental factors described in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* there are the fifty-one mental factors described in Asaṅga's Treatises on the Grounds, Vasubandhu's *Work on the*

a *sems, citta.*
b *sems byung, caitta.*
c Lack of concern about misconduct from one's point of view.
d Lack of concern about misconduct in consideration of others' disapproval.

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Five Aggregates, Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge,* and so forth.[a]

4. states of compositional factors not associated [with either minds or mental factors][b]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [206] There are fourteen non-associated compositional factors:

1. acquisition.[c] This is asserted to be what causes a person to possess virtuous and non-virtuous actions and so forth, like a rope tying up goods. Acquisition of acquisition and so forth are similar.[207]
2. non-acquisition.[d]
3. similar lot[e]
4. one having no discrimination.[f]
5. absorption without discrimination.[g] This and the next are mindless compositional factors. There are also Proponents of the Great Exposition who assert that these are subtle minds.
6. absorption of cessation[h]
7. life faculty.[i] This is the support of warmth and consciousness.
8. production[j]
9. aging[k]
10. abiding[l]
11. disintegration[m]
12. group of stems.[n] Stems indicate entities.
13. group of words.[o] Words [that is, stems with case endings and

[a] For the fifty-one mental factors see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom, 1996), 238-268.

[b] *ldan pa ma yin pa'i 'du byed, viprayuktasaṃskāra.*

[c] *thob pa, prāpti.*

[d] *ma thob pa.*

[e] *skal mnyam.*

[f] *'du shes med pa ba.*

[g] *'du shes med pa'i snyoms 'jug, asaṃjñisamāpatti.*

[h] *'gog pa'i snyoms 'jug, nirodhasamāpatti.*

[i] *srog dbang, jīvitendriya.*

[j] *skye ba, jāti.*

[k] *rga ba, jarā.*

[l] *gnas pa, sthiti.*

[m] *'jig pa.*

[n] *ming gi tshogs, nāmakāya.*

[o] *tshig gi tshogs, padakāya.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

so forth] indicate specifics, such as "Compounded phenomena are impermanent."

14. group of letters.[a] Letters are vocalization that are the bases of setting up stems and words, such as *ka* in *ka dam pa*.[b] In general, *go,* for instance, is a letter, and it is also used as a name for cow, whereby they assert that stems and letters are not mutually exclusive.[c]

In this system these are not just imputed to factors of other phenomena but have their own separately apprehendable entities. For example:

- "Acquisition" is asserted to be a substance whose entity is apprehendable separately from the acquired phenomenon and that causes that acquired phenomenon to be possessed.
- "Similar lot" is asserted to be a substance that is the basis [that is, referent] of the operation of an awareness [thinking] "sentient being" and the basis of the imputation of the convention "sentient being" for mutually different sentient beings without any distinction. Through this [explanation you can understand how] to extend this to the similar lot of phenomena such as the aggregates.

The four characteristics are asserted to be substantially established [phenomena] that are produced simultaneously with a compounded phenomenon and whose entities are apprehendable separately from a compounded phenomenon. Production causes the production of the compounded phenomenon that it characterizes; abiding causes it to abide; aging causes it to become older; impermanence causes it to disintegrate…

Objection: Since the four—production, abiding, aging, and disintegration—are compounded phenomena, other [sets of] production and so forth would have to exist [for them], whereby the characteristics would be endless.

Answer: Although there are indeed also four similitudes of characteristics (production of production, abiding of abiding, aging of aging, and disintegration of disintegration), the root production produces eight phenomena (the compounded phenomenon that it characterizes, three characteristics not including itself, and the four

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a *yi ge'i tshogs, vyañjanakāya.*

b A type of tree with fragrant orange blossoms.

c For a brief discussion of the twenty-three non-associated compositional factors in the higher tenet systems see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 268-271.

similitudes of characteristics), and the production of production produces only the root production. The same is to be extended to others—abiding and so forth. Hence, there is no fallacy of their being endless…

The Proponents of Sūtra assert that:

- The beginning of the continuum of a compounded phenomenon is production; the severance of its continuum is disintegration; the continued operation of that very continuum is abiding; the differences of the earlier and later [parts of the] continuum are aging, that is, the changes of abiding.
- Moreover, these must be described as just imputed to compounded phenomena upon associating them with the *activities* of production, disintegration, and so forth.
- They are not established as substantially other than compounded phenomena upon associating them with the *agents* of production, disintegration, and so forth, as the Proponents of the Great Exposition do…
- [In another way] in each instant, the arising of what did not exist earlier is production; its not abiding for a second time [that is, moment] is disintegration; the remaining of a type similar to what was earlier is abiding; the latter moment's different character from the former moment is aging[a]…

Thus in the system of the Sūtra School there are two ways of positing the four—production and so forth—one from the viewpoint of a continuum and another from the viewpoint of an instant.

Since the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that the four characteristics are the *agents* of production, abiding, and so forth…these four characterize [things] as compounded because of the existence of producers, and so forth, of those that are other factualities. Since the Proponents of Sūtra assert that the four characteristics are the *activities* of production, disintegration, and so forth…these four characterize [things] as compounded because of their own production and so forth…Though one has apprehended the entities of forms and so forth, as long as one has not understood the production of what did not exist earlier, the disintegration which is their non-existence later, and so forth, one does not understand those phenomena to be compounded. Hence, the four characteristics—production and so forth—characterize [or cause one to know] forms and so forth as compounded, but they do not

[a] In this way, the four characteristics occur simultaneously, not serially.

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> characterize [or cause one to know] the entities of forms and so forth, and also forms and so forth and their production and so forth are not substantially other…
>
> The Proponents of the Great Exposition say that although the four agents are established simultaneously, the times at which they perform their activities are different because initially, production causes production; after that, abiding causes abiding; after this, impermanence causes disintegration.

5. uncompounded phenomena[a]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[208] Although most Proponents of the Great Exposition assert three uncompounded phenomena [that is, uncompounded space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations], the Magadha Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that, including thusness there are four. Even thusness is asserted to be substantially established since…they do not know how to posit uncompounded phenomena as non-affirming negatives.

Word Commentary on Root Text: All five basic categories are asserted to be effective things.

> Among the four Buddhist tenet systems, only this system asserts that a permanent phenomenon such as uncompounded space is able to perform a function and thus is an effective thing. For instance, the lack of obstructive contact that space affords performs the function of allowing movement to take place. Since both permanent and impermanent phenomena are asserted to be effective things in this system, functionality is not limited to producing causal sequences as it is in the higher Buddhist schools; instead, as with uncompounded space, functionality can refer to allowing or opening the way for something to occur.

Word Commentary on Root Text: All five basic categories are asserted to be substantially established.[b]

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[209] Except for the Consequentialists, all Inner proponents of tenets are similar [in asserting that]:
>
> - [A phenomenon] is posited as existing if there is something findable upon searching for the object that is imputed through names, "This is such-and-such."
> - However, if there is nothing findable upon searching for the object imputed, it cannot be posited as existing.

[a] *'dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta.*

[b] *rdzas grub, dravyasiddha.*

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Nevertheless, the others—the Sūtra School and so forth—are able to posit existents that are imputed to factors of other [objects] without the separate establishment of a self-powered substantial entity. However, since the Great Exposition School is very much involved in searching for objects imputed, it is not able to posit such existents and asserts that all [phenomena] are substantially established. The Great Exposition School's non-assertion of:

- components-possessors aside from mere aggregations of components
- part-possessors [that is, wholes, aside from mere aggregations of parts]
- non-affirming negatives that are mere eliminations of an object of negation

and so forth also derives from this.

6" Assertions on Features of a Buddha in the Great Exposition School

The form aggregate is not; a Buddha is the attributes of non-learning.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The form aggregate of a Buddha is not a Buddha. The Buddha that is the object to which one goes for refuge is asserted to be only the attributes of non-learning.

Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of Tenets:* The Buddha Jewel is asserted to be the wisdom of extinction [of the obstructions] and the wisdom [that the obstructions] will never be produced again that exist in the mental continuum of a Buddha.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[210] In general, all three Foe Destroyers [that is, Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Buddha Foe Destroyers] have a nirvāṇa with remainder.[a] It is easy to understand that Hearers and Solitary Realizers have a remainder of effects of [contaminated] actions and afflictive emotions [since their bodies are continuations of their bodies before their respective enlightenment]. It is asserted that even a Buddha possesses appropriated aggregates that are a continuation of the earlier, common being's body. The omniscient Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition'"* says:

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[a] *lhag bcas myang 'das, sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

In the systems of the Hearers [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] a "complete enjoyment body" is utterly not asserted, and from among the twelve deeds (232) [of a Buddha] the taming of the demons and all those prior to it are of a fully qualified common being. Hence, the body of a supreme emanation body is asserted to be a continuation of similar type of a common being's body. Consequently, they propound that a Buddha's form body is only matter. They assert that:

- Until a Buddha displays the deed of nirvāṇa [that is, dies], there is a nirvāṇa with remainder.
- Upon nirvāṇa [that is, upon death] a nirvāṇa without remainder[a] is actualized, like the death of a flame of a butter lamp.[b]

7" Assertions on the Unique Features of the Individual Schools

For many unique, look at the texts of Bhāvaviveka and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: For many unique assertions of the individual schools look at the texts of the master Bhāvaviveka—the *Heart of the Middle* and its autocommentary, the *Blaze of Reasoning*—and those included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text, Avalokitavrata's *Commentarial Explanation of (Bhāvaviveka's) "Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) 'Wisdom,'"* Vasumitra's *Wheel Stating the Distinctions of the Systems,*[c] and Vinītadeva's *Compendium Showing the Different Sects,*[d] and you will know them.

This has been the eighth chapter, the section on the Great Exposition School which, having refuted the extreme of permanence, propounds the three times as particulars of substantial entities.

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[a] *lhag med myang 'das, nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.*

[b] The simile is a flame that goes out because of the exhaustion of its fuel; the comparison is not made to blowing out a flame.

[c] *gzhung lugs kyi bye brag bkod pa'i 'khor lo, samayabhedoparacanacakra;* P5639, vol. 127.

[d] *gzhung tha dad pa rim par klag pa'i 'khor lo las sde pa tha dad pa bstan pa bsdus pa, samayabhedoparacanacakre nikāyabhedopadeśanasaṃgraha;* P5641, vol. 127.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

9. Sūtra School

(B) Describing a School of Tenets Delineating the Non-Existence of a Substantially Existent Self[a] *{3}*

This section has three parts: meaning of the term, divisions, and description of tenets.

1' Meaning of the Term Sautrāntika

Because of propounding the sets of sutras as valid, Proponents of Sūtra.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because of being a Hearer school propounding tenets upon taking mainly the sets of sūtras[b] to be valid, the convention "Proponents of Sūtra" is designated.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[211] Because they are skilled in teaching through examples they are also called "Exemplifiers."[c]

2' Divisions of the Sūtra School

The divisions are Followers of Scriptures and Followers of Reasonings. By way of aspect, three.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The divisions are the two, Followers of Scriptures described in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* his commentary, and so forth and Followers of Reasonings described in Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition[d] and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[212] There are also [Sūtra School] Followers of Reasoning who follow Dignāga's

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[a] This is what Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a originally calls this section, but at this point he switches to "the Sūtra School delineating the subtle selflessness of persons."

[b] *mdo sde, sūtrānta.* This is not the sets of discourses among the three scriptural collections—discipline (*'dul ba, vinaya*), sets of discourses (*mdo sde, sūtrānta*), and manifest knowledge (*chos mngon pa, abhidharma*) but sūtras from any of these three collections, which Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a specifies as those cited in "Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* his commentary, and so forth."

[c] *dpe ston pa, dārṣṭāntika.*

[d] *tshad ma sde bdun.*

Compilation of Prime Cognition and Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition. For the Seven Treatises are renowned as texts common to Proponents of Sūtra and Proponents of Mind-Only.

Word Commentary on Root Text: By way of assertions on aspect there are three, Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects, Non-Pluralists, and Sequentialists (see also 277).

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[213] In our own system [Proponents of Sūtra] are asserted to be threefold:

- Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects, who are so called because they assert that many consciousnesses of similar type [for example, many eye consciousnesses] simultaneously arise in accordance with the number of aspects [such as the number of colors] in, for instance, a painting; this is like the fact that consciousnesses of dissimilar type arise simultaneously with respect to visible form, sound, and so forth.
- Non-Pluralists are so called because the consciousness is only single, whereas the aspects of the object are plural.
- Sequentialists are so called because, for instance, eye consciousnesses arise sequentially with regard to the colors of an object. Due to their arising quickly, the stupid, that is to say, common beings, think that they are simultaneous.

3' Description of the Tenets of the Sūtra School {2}

This section has two parts: general indication of their tenets and detailed explanation.

a' General Indication of the Tenets of the Sūtra School {3}

This section has three parts: presentations of the basis, path, and fruit.

1" THE SUTRA SCHOOL'S PRESENTATION OF THE BASIS {2}

This section has two parts: their presentations of the two truths and of the aggregates, constituents, and sense spheres.

a" Presentation of the Two Truths by the Sūtra School [Following Reasoning] [a]

[a] The Sūtra School Following Scripture assert the two truths in the same way as the

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The two truths are and are not truly able to perform functions.

Word Commentary on Root Text: An ultimate truth is a phenomenon able to perform a function ultimately.

> Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Presentation of Tenets:* A pot is called an ultimate truth because it is a truth for an ultimate awareness. This ultimate awareness is a consciousness that is not mistaken with regard to its appearing-object.[a]

Word Commentary on Root Text: An obscurational truth is a phenomenon unable to perform a function ultimately.

> Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Presentation of Tenets:* Uncompounded space is called an obscurational truth because of being a truth for an obscuring awareness. "Obscuring" here refers to a conceptual consciousness, which is called obscuring because it obstructs direct perception of specifically characterized phenomena.

> Nga-wang-bel-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths:*[214] The definition of an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon that is established from its own side, without merely being imputed by conceptuality. Ultimate truth, ultimate existent, truly established, specifically characterized, effective thing, and appearing-object of direct perception are equivalent.
>
> The definition of an obscurational truth is: a phenomenon that is established as merely being imputed by conceptuality. Obscurational truth, conventional existent, falsely established, generally characterized, permanent, and appearing-object of conceptuality are equivalent. For Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*...says that a specifically characterized phenomenon exists ultimately:
>
> 1. because of being capable of performing the function of producing its own effects, and
> 2. because of appearing distinctly, that is, uniquely, to an awareness that takes it as its appearing-object, and
> 3. because it is a phenomenon, the entity of which is incapable of appearing fully as an object of an awareness merely from an

Proponents of the Great Exposition.

[a] *snang yul*, **pratibhāsaviṣaya.* An appearing-object is not just the object that appears to a consciousness because it is asserted that although a pot, for instance, appears to a conceptual consciousness apprehending a pot, a pot is not the appearing-object of that consciousness. Roughly speaking, the appearing-object of a conceptual consciousness is a meaning-generality (or conceptual generic image) of the object.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

empowering condition[a] that is a verbalizing term, and

4. because it is a phenomenon with regard to which an awareness realizing it would not be produced if the object did not exist from its own side, in its own manner of residing,[b] even though other factors exist, such as sense powers and mental application[c] which are other than it…

The generally characterized exists conventionally because:

1. it is incapable of performing the function of producing its own effects,
2. it appears non-uniquely to an awareness taking it as its appearing-object,
3. its entity is capable of fully appearing as an object of an awareness merely through the empowering condition that is an expressional term
4. and an awareness that realizes it can be produced merely through the existence of other factors such as sense powers and mental application…

Compounded phenomena[215] must have their own unique characteristics. This is because a phenomenon is called "specifically characterized" because it has to be realized by an awareness that takes it as its appearing-object through the appearance of its own unique characteristics. For this reason, it is not an object of terms because its entity is not capable of appearing fully to a consciousness arising from terms, and an awareness realizing it is not produced through the mere existence of terminology, mental application, and so on, which are other than it.

A generally characterized phenomenon is the opposite. For it does not have unique characteristics that could appear to an awareness that takes it as its appearing-object but has to be realized through taking to mind a general aspect, and thus it is called generally characterized. Also, since for this reason its entity fully appears to a consciousness arisen from terms, it is an object of terms. Also, since it appears to an awareness merely through the existence of other factors such as terminology and mental application and does not appear through being established from the side of its own manner of residing, it is described as a [mental] superimposition and as merely imputed by conceptuality.

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a *bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya.*

b *sdod lugs.*

c *yid byed, manaskāra.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

The reason for calling a pot, an "ultimate truth" is that it is true for the appearance factor[a] of an ultimate awareness. For "ultimate awareness" on this occasion refers to a direct perception unmistaken with respect to own-character because a direct perception apprehending blue is unmistaken with respect to [that is, in its perception of] the own-character of blue, since the Autonomy School and those below assert this in common. For even False Aspectarian Proponents of Mind-Only and Proponents of the Middle Way Autonomy School who accord with them must assert that an eye consciousness apprehending blue is unmistaken with respect to the own-character of blue because the Autonomy Schools and those below assert that there is no way that [a consciousness] can be a valid cognition with respect to the five objects—visible form, sound, and so on—without being a valid cognition with respect to the own-character of those five and that when [a consciousness] has become a valid cognition with respect to any of the five objects, it must also be a valid cognition with respect to the own-character of those five. This is explained in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Great Exposition of Special Insight [in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*] and in Ke-drup-jay's *Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate,* and so forth. Also, except for the Consequentialists, no one asserts that it is not contradictory to be mistaken with respect to an object and yet realize it, due to which the difference arises that the Autonomy School and those below assert the common appearance of subjects,[b] whereas the Consequentialists do not.

The reason for calling a meaning-generality,[c] an "obscurational

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a *snang ngor.*

b *chos can mthun snang ba.* For discussion of this topic, see:

- Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 455-530.
- Jeffrey Hopkins, "A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School: D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Two Interpretations of the *Locus Classicus* in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* Showing Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Commonly Appearing Subjects and Inherent Existence," *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989):10-43, although the printing contains egregious typographical errors.
- Kodo Yotsuya, *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet,* Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 8 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999).
- Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, ed., *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction* (Boston: Wisdom, 2003).

c *don spyi, arthasāmānya.*

truth" is that it is true for the appearance factor of an obscuring awareness. This is because here an obscuring awareness refers to a conceptual consciousness that perceives the natures[a] [of different objects] to be mixed together, since a conceptual consciousness to which their natures appear to be mixed together obstructs perception that operates within taking the unique entity of a specifically characterized phenomenon as its apprehended object and therefore is called "obscuring." Hence, Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says:[216]

> An awareness, depending on effective things
> That are different and to which they appear to be one thing,
> Obscures the difference
> Due to its own nature.
>
> Although their natures are different,
> Since the difference is obscured,
> Several entities of effective things are perceived
> By that obscuring [awareness] to be similar and not to be different.

The conceptual consciousness to which the natures [of specifically characterized phenomena] appear as mixed together obstructs perception [that operates] within taking the unique natures of the specifically characterized as appearing-objects. This is because, for example, a conceptual consciousness apprehending tree obstructs perception in which the unique natures of instances of tree are taken as appearing-objects. For the appearance as the opposite of non-tree to the conceptual consciousness apprehending tree is a meaning-generality and is also a generality that applies to the instances of tree, and when the meaning-generality appears to that conceptual consciousness as applying to instances of tree, [the conceptual consciousness] obscures perception of the natures of instances such as *shiṃshapa*[b] and juniper due to the fact that the tree-generality that is the nature of a *shiṃshapa* tree appears as if it is the tree-generality that is the nature of a juniper tree, and the tree-generality that is the nature of a juniper tree appears as if it is the tree-generality that is the nature of a sandalwood tree. Accordingly, Ke-drup's *Ornament for the Seven Treatises*[c] says:

> Most Buddhist proponents of tenets agree in asserting that an

[a] *rang bzhin, svabhāva.*

[b] A type of fruit tree.

[c] *tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel.*

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etymological meaning of *saṃvṛti* (*kun rdzob*) is "obstructing seeing suchness." Therefore, why is a conceptual consciousness—apprehending a generality—that serves as a substratum for the etymology of *saṃvṛti* called *saṃvṛti*? It obstructs actually taking the own-character that is the suchness of an effective thing as an apprehended object and thus is called *saṃvṛti* (fully obscuring). Hence, a consciousness apprehending a generality is a substratum for the etymology of *saṃvṛti,* and because generally characterized phenomena are true in the perspective of the awareness that is a substratum for the etymology of *saṃvṛti,* they are called obscurational truths.

The appearance as opposite from non-tree to a conceptual consciousness apprehending the tree-generality is a generality that applies commonly to the specifically characterized phenomena that are instances of tree. Yet, it is not ultimately established, for if it were ultimately established, the conceptual consciousness apprehending the generality would be unmistaken, as a consequence of which the instances of tree would be established as they appear to the appearance factor of that conceptual consciousness, that is, with their natures mixed together, but the instances of tree abide without being mixed together.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[217]

About this a certain D̄ak-tsang says:[218] It follows that the descriptions of the system of the Proponents of Sūtra by earlier Tibetan scholars and the contemporary foremost [D̄zong-ka-b̄a]—father and sons—and so forth are not correct because it is not feasible that the system of the Proponents of Sūtra differs in such a way from the Great Exposition School. For although Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* separately describes the assertions of the Proponents of Mind-Only on the occasion of the two truths, it does make individual explanations of the systems of the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School.

Answer: Then, it [absurdly] follows that the Proponents of Sūtra [Following Reasoning] do not assert self-cognition because on the occasion of explaining consciousness Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* aside from only speaking of other-cognition, does not speak of self-cognition. The three spheres of self-contradiction![a] You have no reply!

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[a] You have accepted, or are logically forced to accept:

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[219] [That the Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning assert] that all compounded phenomena are truly established is known by how the Proponents of Non-Nature[a] and Proponents of Sūtra debate.[220]

Objection by Proponents of Non-Nature: No effective things have the capacity of ultimately producing effects.

Answer: That is not correct because it is seen with direct perception that seeds and so forth have the capacity to aid shoots and so forth.

Objection by Proponents of Non-Nature: That is asserted conventionally.

Answer: How could it be that direct perception explicitly observes conventionalities, for false objects do not appear to non-mistaken awarenesses…

Statement of opinion:[b] Since even generally characterized phenomena have the capacity to produce a consciousness apprehending them, all specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena have the capacity to function.

Answer: Because valid cognition does not see that generally characterized phenomena have the capacity to aid awarenesses apprehending them by way of ineluctable concomitance with their existing or not, they do not produce consciousnesses apprehending them. If a consciousness apprehending a generality was generated from a generality, it would have ineluctable concomitance with a generality, as is the case, for example, with an eye consciousness's

- the reason (you have accepted that on the occasion of explaining consciousness Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* aside from only speaking of other-cognition, does not speak of self-cognition)
- that the "predicate" of the consequence is entailed by the reason (you have accepted that if Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* does not describe a difference of tenet between Proponents of the Great Exposition and Proponents of Sūtra, such a difference does not exist)
- the opposite of the consequence (you have accepted that Proponents of Sūtra assert self-cognition).

[a] *ngo bo nyid med par smra ba, niḥsvabhāvavādin.* These are the so-called Proponents of the Middle (*dbu ma pa, mādhyamika*), but, as Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a said earlier (84), all schools consider themselves to be Proponents of the Middle since they propound what they consider to be a middle free from the two extremes of exaggeration and deprecation.

[b] This is not a rejoinder by the Proponents of Non-Nature.

ineluctable concomitance with an eye sense power, a form, and so forth…[a]

Through this reasoning it is explained that:

- the awarenesses mentioned below operate merely upon internal factors such as using terminology, the exertion of motivation, and so forth, and it is not seen that they exist or do not exist concomitant with [the presence or absence] of components-possessing substances—which are separate factualities—and so forth and, therefore,
- an awareness thinking "pot" is not produced from a components-possessor [that is, whole] that is a different substantial entity from the parts [of a pot such as form and odor]
- a conceptual consciousness apprehending raising up and putting down is not produced from factually other activities that are different substantial entities from a pot and so forth
- a conceptual consciousness thinking "ox" [with regard to a white ox] is not produced from a factually other ox-generality that is a different substantial entity from the manifestations of ox
- a conceptual consciousness apprehending a hundred, a thousand, and so forth [with respect to the beads of a rosary] is not produced from the quality of number that is a different substantial entity from a rosary, and so forth…

Knowing well the opponents' perspective [that is, how the Vaisheṣhikas' and Naiyāyikas' present these topics in their own system] appears to be very important for identifying the object of negation [in the view] of emptiness. Therefore, this has been explained at length on the occasion of the tenets of the Vaisheṣhikas (161-173).

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[221]

Objection by D̄ak-tsang[222] *and so forth:* It [absurdly] follows that Proponents of Sūtra are lower than Proponents of the Great Exposition because [according to you] Proponents of the Great Exposition assert that a pot is conventionally established, whereas Proponents of Sūtra assert that a pot is ultimately established.

Answer: Then, it [absurdly] follows that all three—the Great Exposition School, the Sūtra School, and the Mind-Only School—are lower than Sāṃkhya because among awarenesses, forms,

[a] To have an eye consciousness apprehending a form, it is utterly necessary to have an eye sense power, a form, and a prior moment of consciousness as conditions generating it.

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sounds, and so forth Sāṃkhya utterly does not assert that even one is ultimately established, whereas those three do. The three spheres of self-contradiction! You have no answer!

Objection: There is no such fallacy because:

- the Sāṃkhyas' conventional establishment fulfills those [three's] meaning of being ultimately established
- and the Sāṃkhyas do not know how to posit the connection between former and future lives, a basis of the cause and effect of actions, and so forth within the impermanent, whereas these [three] know how to.

Answer: [That is right.] Then it follows that there is no fallacy of mis-ordering lower and higher with respect to the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School because:

- the Great Exposition School's conventional establishment fulfills the Sūtra School's meaning of own-character [or ultimately established]
- and there are many [points of contrast] such as that the Great Exposition School does not even know how to posit a mere object of knowledge that is not substantially established, whereas the Sūtra School [including the Sūtra School Following Scripture] does.

Even the glorious Dharmakīrti could not put forth a rejoinder to this! I have explained it well.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[223] With respect to the meaning of being conventionally and ultimately established according to the Sāṃkhya system: Objects of knowledge that are manifested through conditions [namely, the twenty-three transformations that arise out of the fundamental nature, or general principal,] are suitable to finally dissolve, or be pacified, into the general principal, just as the strands of a rainbow disappear into the expanse of space, and hence are called "conventionally established." Objects of knowledge that abide as permanently non-manifest entities are called "ultimately established" because of not changing into other aspects.

With respect to the meaning of being conventionally and ultimately established according to the system of the Great Exposition School: A phenomenon that is such that an awareness apprehending it is canceled when [the object] is broken or mentally subdivided—just as an awareness apprehending from a distance a pile of stones to be a person is canceled when one nears it—is not suitable

for confidently thinking "It is such-and-such," and hence is called "conventionally established." A phenomenon that is such that an awareness apprehending it is not canceled when [the object] is broken or mentally subdivided is opposite from that above and hence is called "ultimately established."

With respect to the meaning of being conventionally and ultimately established according to the system of the Sūtra School: That which is established as merely posited through terms and conceptuality—such as mental application and so forth—which are other than it, is called "conventionally established." That which is able to bear reasoned analysis, not depending on being imputed by terms or conceptuality but established from the side of its own mode of residing, is called "ultimately established."

Therefore, even though a lower system speaks of something as being conventionally established, in the estimation of a higher system it comes to have the meaning of [what the higher system describes as] being ultimately established. Since lower systems are opponents who are the objects of [higher systems'] refutation of ultimate establishment, the fallacy of there being a mis-ordering of lower and higher views does not exist.

b" The Sūtra School's Presentation of the Aggregates, Constituents, and Sense Spheres

Aggregates, constituents, sense spheres, compounded phenomena, and uncompounded phenomena. Those are the basis.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Their assertions on the five aggregates, the eighteen constituents, and the twelve sense spheres mostly agree with the Great Exposition School.[a]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[224] They differ in not asserting substantial entities like the Great Exposition School and in not asserting a mind-basis-of-all, afflicted mentality, emptiness of an otherness [of entity between apprehended-object and apprehending-subject], and so forth, which are asserted by the Mind-Only School.

Although Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* gives a

[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den continues with a point that is not in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's root text:

However, it may be that since [the Sūtra School] asserts that an aggregate is imputedly existent, they assert that form and form aggregate are not mutually inclusive and that eye and eye-constituent have four possibilities.

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mere enumeration of the mind-basis-of-all and afflicted mentality, it is not a proprietary text of the Mind-Only School:

- because it is a compendium in common to the [Great and Lesser] Vehicles, since it:
  1. mainly comments on the thought of many sūtras as being shared between the Great and Lesser Vehicles
  2. speaks of Bodhisattva common beings in their *final* life
  3. and does not speak about any of the Great Vehicle system's complete enjoyment body and so forth
- and because a treatise by Asaṅga mainly commenting on the thought of shared sūtras exists, since there is a reason for the many disagreements in how the twelve [branches of] scripture are posited as the [three] scriptural divisions by Asaṅga's Treatises on the Grounds and his *Summary of Manifest Knowledge.*

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[225] The arising of many differences in [Asaṅga's] explanations of how to include the twelve branches of scriptures into the three scriptural collections is due to the sūtras on which he relied.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The compounded are the five aggregates, and there also are conventions of three uncompounded phenomena [namely, uncompounded space, analytical cessations, and analytical cessations] or four uncompounded phenomena [including thusness].

Ge-s̄hay Ge-dün-l̄o-drö: Each of the three renowned uncompounded phenomena has a special function. *Uncompounded space* permits the presence of coarse forms, a *non-analytical cessation* is the state of having abandoned its own object of abandonment, and an *analytical cessation* prevents these from recurring in the future. There are many generally characterized phenomena other than these that are uncompounded phenomena, but these three are singled out due to their special functions.

Word Commentary on Root Text: However, uncompounded phenomena are not limited to those since there are many uncompounded phenomena such as term-generalities, meaning-generalities, generality, common locus, one, different, past objects, future objects, and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[226] *Generalities and instances are not substantially established:* The appearance as reversed from non-tree, as it is imputed by an awareness apprehending the tree-generality, does not ultimately exist because if it did ultimately exist, an awareness apprehending it would be non-mistaken with respect to its appearing-object, and in that case since instances of tree appear with

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their natures mixed to an awareness of the tree-generality, instances of tree would have to have mixed natures, but instances of tree are not mutually concomitant, the one to the other, but abide with unmixed natures.

How a common locus is a conceptual superimposition: When one says, "This flower is a blue utpala," the two—utpala and blue, which are the flower's attributes—do not exist as separate substantial entities, but the flower can just be posited as a common locus of utpala and blue by way of the two, opposite from non-utpala and opposite from non-blue, appearing to be different to a conceptual consciousness. However, different entities such as object of hearing and permanent cannot be posited in a common locus, nor can a single isolate such as product and product, for instance, which do not appear to a conceptual consciousness to be separate, be posited in a common locus.

The object of a terminological association is conventionally established, not specifically characterized: Terms indicate the meaning for which they are imputed as symbols [that is, means of communication], and those symbols are used at [subsequent] times of communication for the sake of understanding meaning. Hence, when the symbol [or vocabulary] ox is initially associated with a white ox, the symbol is applied to the other-elimination that is an elimination of non-mass-that-is-an-aggregation-of-a-hump-and-so-forth. If not, and the symbol ox was initially associated with the single substantial entity of a white ox, then just that single substantial entity of the white ox at the time of the initial association would have to be present even at the time of later communication. However, at the time of communication the specifically characterized white ox of the time of earlier symbolization has ceased and is non-existent. Therefore, it is not that a symbol is initially associated with only an instance, without an other-elimination being the object of the symbol.

Conventionally established phenomena such as attribute and substratum, the proven and means of proof, and so forth are for the sake of realizing the own-character of ultimates: Although generalities, common loci, and so forth are not established in the mode of subsistence of things, conventionally a presentation of them is made in accordance with how they are renowned to conceptuality. With respect to the purpose for doing so:

- presentations individually differentiating attribute and substratum, such as impermanent and sound, and so forth

- presentations of common loci of certain sorts of the different
- presentations of generalities of certain sorts of the non-different

are made in dependence on how they are renowned to conceptuality, without analyzing the mode of subsistence, or suchness, of things, and, likewise, scholars—depending only on appearances to conceptuality—make presentations of all means of proof and the proven for the sake of engaging temporary and final ultimate meanings.

Word Commentary on Root Text: That is their presentation of the basis.

2" The Sutra School's Presentation of the Path

The harmonies with enlightenment, the liberations, the serial, mercy, and so forth are the path.

Word Commentary on Root Text: About the path there are:

Thirty-Seven Harmonies with Enlightenment

I. Four mindful establishments
 1. Mindful establishment on the body
 2. Mindful establishment on feeling
 3. Mindful establishment on mind
 4. Mindful establishment on phenomena

II. Four thorough abandonings
 5. Thoroughly abandoning thorough afflictions already generated
 6. Not generating thorough afflictions not yet generated
 7. Increasing pure qualities already generated
 8. Generating pure qualities not yet generated

III. Four legs of magical manifestation
 9. Aspiration
 10. Effort
 11. Contemplation
 12. Analysis

IV. Five faculties
 13. Faith
 14. Effort
 15. Mindfulness
 16. Meditative stabilization
 17. Wisdom

V. Five powers[a]
   18. Faith
   19. Effort
   20. Mindfulness
   21. Meditative stabilization
   22. Wisdom
VI. Seven branches of enlightenment
   23. Correct mindfulness
   24. Correct discrimination of phenomena/doctrine
   25. Correct effort
   26. Correct joy
   27. Correct pliancy
   28. Correct meditative stabilization
   29. Correct equanimity
VII. Eightfold path
   30. Correct view
   31. Correct realization
   32. Correct speech
   33. Correct aims of actions
   34. Correct livelihood
   35. Correct exertion
   36. Correct mindfulness
   37. Correct meditative stabilization.

EIGHT MEDITATIVE LIBERATIONS[b]

1. liberation of the embodied looking at a form: [yogis consider themselves to be beings with a body and cultivate any of the four concentrations, which are included in the form realm].[227]
2. liberation of the formless looking at a form: [yogis consider themselves to be beings without a body and cultivate any of the four concentrations, which are included in the form realm].
3. liberation of beautiful form: [yogis consider themselves to have an attractive body and cultivate any of the four concentrations, which are included in the form realm. These first three are prerequisites for

[a] These are stronger than the preceding five.

[b] These eight are called "liberations" not because they liberate beings from cyclic existence but because they free beings from the manifest activity of specific afflictive emotions. They are to be distinguished from complete cessations of afflictive emotions which involve the conquest of both the manifest appearance and the predisposing potencies for the afflictive emotions.

making physical manifestations and thus are called three paths of manifestation.]
4. liberation of limitless space: [yogis concentrate solely on space and imagine that it is infinite].
5. liberation of limitless consciousness: [yogis concentrate solely on consciousness and imagine that it is infinite].
6. liberation of nothingness: [yogis imagine that there is nothing to be apprehended and no apprehender].
7. liberation of peak of cyclic existence: [yogis imagine that there are no coarse objects to be apprehended but that there are subtle objects of apprehension].
8. liberation of cessation: [yogis enter a state of meditative equipoise that is an absence of manifest activity of the six consciousnesses].

NINE SERIAL ABSORPTIONS

1. meditative equipoise of the first concentration
2. meditative equipoise of the second concentration
3. meditative equipoise of the third concentration
4. meditative equipoise of the fourth concentration
5. meditative equipoise of limitless space
6. meditative equipoise of limitless consciousness
7. meditative equipoise of nothingness
8. meditative equipoise of peak of cyclic existence
9. meditative equipoise of cessation.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[228] The meditative equipoise of cessation is asserted to involve a subtle mind in which coarse feelings and discriminations are pacified.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although the type of realization [of selflessness] does not differ, the Great Vehicle is considered to be supreme due to mercy, compassion, and so forth, as well as the [Bodhisattva] grounds, perfections, and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[229] The vehicles are differentiated also by superior and inferior effects attained over longer and shorter times [of practice].

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[230] The achievement of omniscience necessarily is initially preceded by great compassion wishing to release all transmigrators from suffering. Moreover, great compassion does not arise causelessly or from discordant causes but is achieved from having familiarized over many births with compassion that has the aspect of not being able to stand the suffering of

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all transmigrators [without doing something about it]. That very compassion also increases limitlessly from having familiarized with it over innumerable births. Furthermore, when omniscience is attained, one achieves completion of great compassion that never deviates from protecting limitless transmigrators from all troubles.

From having familiarized with that very meaning of selflessness delineated through hearing and thinking in association with many methods of compassion—giving and so forth in many enumerations—a person actualizes the final exalted wisdom very clearly knowing defects and good qualities. Hence, because the mind also has final clarity with respect to all objects of knowledge, not only has one abandoned afflictive emotions, which are the causes of suffering, but also has abandoned as well the obstructions to omniscience, the predispositions that are the causes of afflictive emotions. It is to be known that the difference between a Buddha—a Great Subduer engaging in others' welfare—and rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers and so forth is this abandonment or non-abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[231] Since they do not assert objects of the path other than the four truths and their sixteen attributes, impermanence and so forth,[a] Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says:

One is released through the view of emptiness.
The remaining meditations are for the sake of it.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[232] Through meditatively cultivating the view realizing the emptiness of self and of the mine, one is released from cyclic existence. The remaining meditations—such as the meditations on emptiness, suffering, and so forth—are paths that are means of maturation definitely necessary to be cultivated for the sake of generating the path that is the means of release.

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[a] The sixteen aspects of the four noble truths are:

Suffering: impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness
Origins: cause, origin, strong production, condition
Cessation: cessation, pacification, auspiciousness, definite emergence
Path: path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance.

For Gung-tang's presentation of how to meditate on these, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 285-296.

Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* explains that the Hearer schools assert that:

- one is released from cyclic existence upon having extinguished the afflictive emotions through having directly seen the four truths and their sixteen attributes, impermanence and so forth, and through having familiarized with what has been seen
- and thus [they ask] what is the use—that is, there is no use—for seeing and familiarizing with an emptiness of inherent existence not included among those:[233]

One is released through seeing the truths.
What is the use of the view of emptiness?

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[234] Except for not negating the bare possibility that there might be Bodhisattvas having the Great Vehicle lineage among the two early Hearer schools, there mainly are only those having the Lesser Vehicle lineage:

- because the intended trainees of the scriptures of those two schools are necessarily only those having the Lesser Vehicle lineage, and
- because this is the thought of sūtras and the great chariots [that is, the great scholar-yogis]…

Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:[235]

Bodhisattvas' aspirational wishes, deeds, and dedications [of merit]
Were not described in the Hearers' Vehicle.
Therefore how could one become
A Bodhisattva through it?

Hence, since the two early Hearer schools are not extensive about mainly seeking others' welfare…they do not have the complete mode of sustaining the objects of observation and subjective aspects of the altruistic intention to become enlightened… due to which it is not generated with all of its characteristics. For although there are cases of their wishing to attain Buddhahood, the entanglements of self-cherishing are not severed, whereby such does not serve as a cause of perfect enlightenment, like, for example, the fact that although a Solitary Realizer's generation of motivation involves a wish to attain Buddhahood, it does not serve as a cause of perfect enlightenment.

Therefore, it is permissible for later Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning and so forth, who assert Great Vehicle methods—the prayer-wishes of Samantabhadra, for instance—to use the

convention “Great Vehicle school” *from that viewpoint.* This is the implicitly indicated thought of Nāgārjuna’s saying:

Bodhisattvas’ aspirational wishes, deeds, and dedications [of merit]
Were not described in the Hearers’ Vehicle.

However, since they assert the view [of selflessness] in accordance with only the scriptures of the Lesser Vehicle schools…[such persons] are posited as Hearer sectarians by way of view…Also, although the two—Proponents of Mind-Only and Proponents of the Middle—are Great Vehicle tenet schools, how could it be that they have to be Great Vehicle persons [in terms of altruistic motivation]!

Word Commentary on Root Text: That is their presentation of the path; it mostly accords with Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge.*

3" The Sutra School’s Presentation of the Fruit

The two with Approachers and Abiders, Solitary Realizers, and perfect Buddhas.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In agreement with Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* they assert:

- the two—Hearers and Solitary Realizers—who have the eight Approachers and Abiders
- two types of Solitary Realizers—congregating and rhinoceros-like
- and also perfect Buddhas.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a’s *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[236] Most assert that at the time of all three[a] nirvāṇas without remainder the continuums of matter and mind are severed like the death of a butter-flame. They assert that those nirvāṇas without remainder are not substantially established.

That is the presentation of the fruit.

b' Detailed Explanation of the Tenets of the Sūtra School {10}

This section has ten parts: assertion that things are momentary, assertions on scripture, assertions about the features of forms such as minute particles, assertions about the features of imputed existents, assertions about the aspect of consciousness, assertion about cause and effect, assertion that Foe

[a] Of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Buddhas.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a’s *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a’s outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den’s *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Destroyers do not fall from abandonments and realizations, assertion about the branches of concentrations, assertion about direct perception, and assertion about Great Vehicle Superiors.

1" THE SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTION THAT THINGS ARE MOMENTARY

Things are momentary.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Things made upon the collection and aggregation of causes and conditions are momentary.

> Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of Tenets:* [The Great Exposition School holds that] all compounded phenomena are necessarily impermanent but do not necessarily disintegrate moment by moment, for the Great Exposition School asserts that *following* production there is the activity of duration, and *after it* the activity of disintegration occurs.

> Ge-dün-l̄o-drö:[237] The Sūtra School maintains that whenever a product is produced, it does not last a second moment but disintegrates, and in the next moment there is again production, whereby the factors of production, abiding, aging, and disintegration are generated simultaneously. The Great Exposition School does not agree; they say that production, abiding, and disintegration are established serially, due to which the entity of production is different from the entity of disintegration, and so forth. However, according to the Sūtra School any product must at any given moment be a basis of the four characteristics—production, abiding, aging, and disintegration …
>
> Impermanent phenomena are always changing, from one moment to the next. They not only change, they become worse from moment to moment. The sign of this is that they do not get better. We do not notice people changing from one day to the next, but they are not getting younger. This is a sign that they are getting older, for they are not permanent. Once something or someone is not permanent and is not getting better, we can understand that it is degenerating. The actual process of momentary disintegration is too subtle to appear to our minds. This disintegration is the nature of contaminated phenomena, true sufferings.
>
> People sometimes feel that things improve with age; for example, some types of cloth that are harsh at first become soft through

being washed many times. However, it is a mistake simply to think that the cloth is improving; it is in fact being used up. A sign of this is that if the cloth was not being used up, then one could wear it for a hundred years, or three hundred, without any fault coming to it.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[238]

Proponent of the Great Exposition: Although whatever is a compounded thing is necessarily impermanent, it is non-momentary.[a]

Proponent of Sūtra: It follows that things made upon the collection and aggregation of causes and conditions are momentary because they last only for the moment of production. Compounded phenomena such as forms and so forth are seen to be included among what disintegrate, and the entity due to which forms and so forth finally disintegrate exists from the very production of those compounded phenomena; hence, they disintegrate immediately after being produced. Therefore, it is clear that forms and so forth are momentary.

Proponent of the Great Exposition: The entity of production is one entity, and the entity of final disintegration another.

Proponent of Sūtra: That cannot be said because there are the faults that:

- If these two entities are not different from the thing [for example, a form], it [absurdly] follows that [the two entities themselves] are not different.
- If the thing [for example, a form] is not different from these two entities, it follows that [the two entities are not (?)] different.

The first consequence contradicts your own assertion [that the two entities are different]. If the second is accepted, [then your assertion that things] are not momentary falls apart.

Proponent of the Great Exposition: Mountains and so forth, which abide for a while, are produced by their own causes as having the nature of abiding temporarily.

Proponent of Sūtra: Just that very nature that they have at the time of production is just what they have at the end; hence,

---

[a] Because the Great Exposition School asserts that production, abiding, aging, and disintegration work in series on an object, the object is not momentary in the sense of just existing for a moment; rather, the object is momentary in the sense of serially undergoing production, abiding, aging, and disintegration; see 240ff.

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mountains and so forth never would not remain. Therefore, if something is produced as having a nature of abiding in the second moment, just as at the time of the first moment it has the nature of abiding for two moments, so at the time of the second moment it also would necessarily have the nature of abiding for two moments. Hence, it would never disintegrate.

Proponent of the Great Exposition: Due to the fact that mountains and so forth are produced by their causes as having a steady nature, they indeed would not change into other entities even in the end, but another cause that makes them cease causes them to disintegrate.

Proponent of Sūtra: It is not reasonable [to say that something produced as having a steady nature is later made to disintegrate by another cause]:

- because something that has the nature of non-disintegration would not disintegrate when a cause of disintegration approaches, and
- because to say, "Although it does not have an inner nature of disintegration, it will disintegrate due to such and such" is a contradiction of your own words, like saying, "Although Devadatta has the quality of not dying, he will die."

Proponent of the Great Exposition: Although initially it does not have an inner nature of disintegration, when a cause of cessation approaches it is generated into an entity possessing an inner nature of disintegration.

Proponent of Sūtra: When a cause of cessation approaches, the prior nature of non-disintegration either continues or does not continue. If it continues, the contradiction would accrue of saying that it is both non-disintegrative and disintegrative. If it does not continue, then because the production and cessation of the two—the nature and that which has the nature—are not different, the former thing [which has the nature] also would not exist; thus what would be generated into having an inner nature of disintegration? For, there would be no basis to be generated into having an inner nature of disintegration, just as it is not suitable for a flower in the sky to be generated into having an inner nature of disintegration.

Therefore, since it is not suitable for something that does not have an inner nature of disintegration to disintegrate, and products such as forms are also seen to disintegrate, they are produced by their own causes into just having an inner nature of disintegration. For this reason they necessarily disintegrate immediately after their

production, whereby they are established as momentary…

Proponent of the Great Exposition: The temporary abiding of mountains and so forth is produced by causes.

Proponent of Sūtra: It [absurdly] follows that they would never fail to abide because in just the way they are produced by causes, so they would also be just that way in the end.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[239] *A Proponent of the Great Exposition among our schools as well as Proponents of Other Schools:* If things are momentary how would someone know "This is what I saw before"?

Proponent of Sūtra: It follows that although there is such recognition, there is no fallacy that momentariness is unsuitable:

- because a continuum similar [to what was previously seen] continues, and a dissimilar one does not, and there is no interruption by a non-thing, and
- because ignorance destroys the opportunity of understanding these two to be different. It is like the fact that, with respect to hair or nails that have been cut, an awareness arises thinking "This is that," but the earlier and later [hair or nails] are not the same.

Ge-dün-l̄o-drö: When you come back after a period of time and see your own cut hair or nails, due to the force of habit from when these were actually part of your continuum you think, "That is my hair," "Those are my nails." However, once they are cut, the connection between yourself and the hair or nails is severed. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is referring to innate ignorance that misconceives the former and later portions of a continuum to be the same.

2" Sutra School's Assertions on Scripture

The Seven Treatises are not taken to be the Word. Manifest knowledge is the descriptions of the specific and the general residing in the sets of discourses and discipline. Scripture is words, form.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The scriptural division of manifest knowledge within [Buddha's] word is the sūtra passages residing in the scriptural collections of the sets of discourses and the discipline that describe here and there the specific and general characters of phenomena. Scriptures such as [Buddha's word,] treatises, and so forth have a nature of words, and hence are included in form.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[240] Certain Proponents of Sūtra say that the Seven Treatises are not the word [of Buddha] because they were composed by seven Foe Destroyers such as Shāriputra and so forth…For most Proponents of Sūtra, not only are the Seven Treatises not the word [of Buddha], they are not even the word of Foe Destroyers because [those treatises] propound that space is a permanent substance, and so forth, and Superiors would not assert such, since they are fully empowered as persons who have valid cognition with respect to [understanding] phenomena. [These treatises] were composed by ordinary beings having the same names [as For Destroyers]…

Question: If the Seven Treatises are not [the scriptural division of] manifest knowledge, then because [the scriptural division of] manifest knowledge is not to be observed [anywhere else], it would not be feasible for the Supramundane Victor to speak of "the three scriptural divisions."

Answer: Although it is true that [the scriptural division of] manifest knowledge is not separate, there is no fallacy of unsuitable non-existence of three scriptural divisions, since the scriptural division of manifest knowledge is the descriptions of the specific and general characters of phenomena here and there in the sets of discourses and the discipline.

Because the 80,000[a] bundles of doctrine set forth by the Supramundane Victor are collections that have the nature of words, they have form,[b] but they are not form in the division of forms into [visible] form, sound, smell, taste, and tangible objects [that is, they are not objects of visual consciousness].

They assert that these bundles of doctrine—and, in accordance with Asaṅga's *Grounds of Hearers,* the twelve branches of scripture—are included into the three scriptural collections and in the two [categories of] sūtras of definitive meaning and sūtras of interpretable meaning. Even most Proponents of Sūtra Following Scripture and Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning assert that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are the Word [of Buddha] requiring interpretation; it will be explained below (344ff.) how the Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning explain the thought of the *[Perfection of] Wisdom Sūtras.*

According to some Proponents of Sūtra such as Saṅghagupta

a This is shorthand for 84,000.

b *gzugs can.*

there is a thought behind the words of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth saying "All phenomena do not exist, do not exist," because it would be unsuitable for the meaning of the statement that "Phenomena do not exist" to be that phenomena utterly do not exist, and, therefore, scripture and reasoning establish that the meaning is to be taken as referring to the lowliness and smallness of [impermanent] objects…With respect to the statements in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras [that all phenomena] are nothings[a] and so forth, since effective things are momentary, they are said to be nothings and so forth, these being terms of lowliness…Also, since non-effective things are plentiful and effective things are fewer, [all phenomena] are called "non-things." And they are called natureless, unproduced, unceased, and so forth because of not being produced beforehand and passing away afterwards, as, for example, when someone with little wealth is said to have no wealth.

Ge-dün-l̄o-drö: [241] According to the Proponents of Sūtra, the thought behind the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is not that products do not exist at all but that they are impermanent, disintegrating from moment to moment. For example, someone who has little wealth may say, "I have nothing at all"; this is an exaggeration of her or his situation, but there is something true to be understood from it. A thing has not yet been produced at the time of its cause; at the time of its effect it has already ceased, and even in the present it does not exist steadily; thus, it is said to be without its own nature.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[242] Although this is clearly explained this way [in Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle* and its commentaries], Tibetans who have said with the cry of a bewildered ox that the Hearer schools assert that the Great Vehicle is the Word [of Buddha] but that there are no [sūtras] requiring interpretation should hear this fearless lion's roar[b] and take heed!

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[a] *dngos med.*

[b] The title of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's root text is *Presentation of Tenets: Lion's Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

3" Sutra School's Assertions about the Features of Forms such as Minute Particles

Minute particles have parts, and are partless. The non-revelatory is not form. The physical are not valid cognitions.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are two assertions with regard to minute particles—as having parts and as partless.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[243] In general in most cases when the assertions of the Hearer schools are opposed [by other schools], there are many descriptions of [their asserting] partless minute particles, and there is no clear source saying "They assert minute particles having parts." However, it can be known that Proponents of Sūtra have two assertions—[some asserting] that minute particles are partless and [others asserting] that they have parts. Among those asserting that minute particles are partless:
>
> - There are those who assert that there is space between the particles, and they are not stuck together, but circle each other…
> - There are those who assert that, it being unsuitable if there is space between minute particles, there is no space between them but they do not touch…
>
> There are also Proponents of Sūtra Following Reasoning who assert that minute particles have parts because during the debate between the Proponents of Sūtra and Proponents of Mind-Only in the root text and commentary of Dignāga's *Examination of Objects of Observation* the Proponents of Sūtra assert that when minute particles having parts collect together, each particle casts its representation [to the consciousness].[a]

Word Commentary on Root Text: Non-revelatory forms[b] [such as a vow of individual liberation] do not substantially exist.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[244] A physical revelation [or communication] such as pressing the palms together reveals to another person the attitude motivating it due to being demonstrable[c] to an

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[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos, ha,* 88.5) challenges this reading of Dignāga.

[b] *rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i gzugs, avijñaptirūpa.*

[c] Nga-w̄ang-d̄ra-s̄hi's (*ngag dbang bkra shis*) *Go-mang Collected Topics* (n.d., 12.18) says:

> The three—form-sense-sphere, form-constituent, and demonstrable form—are mutually inclusive. There are illustrations of demonstrable form because the two, color and shape, are that. With respect to the subjects, the two—color and shape—there is a reason for calling them "demonstrable form" because since they are demonstrable as objects of the eye, they are called thus.

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eye consciousness. Although a verbal revelation [or communication] is not demonstrable [to an eye consciousness], it reveals to another person the attitude motivating it by way of having obstructive form[a] audible to an ear consciousness. Since a non-revelatory form [or non-communicative form] is neither of those, it does not reveal to another person the attitude motivating it.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[245] The Proponents of Sūtra and so forth assert that although non-revelatory form exists, it is not form but is imputational form that is a phenomenon-sense-sphere [that is, an object of the mental consciousness].

Word Commentary on Root Text: A physical eye sense power is not a valid cognition.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[246] Physical sense powers are not fit to be valid cognitions because of being matter and because of not being able to comprehend their objects and because of being empty of luminosity and knowing…

Objection: If consciousness [alone] is what sees, then it would see even what is obstructed by a wall and so forth.

Answer: That is not so because an eye consciousness is not produced with respect to what is obstructed and, not being produced, it does not apprehend an object.

Question: Are eye consciousnesses not produced with respect to anything obstructed or intervened?

Answer: There is no certainty; despite intervention by a glass vessel, mica,[b] a crystal, or water, [objects] are seen. Therefore, even the statement by you Proponents of the Great Exposition that [an eye consciousness] does not see what is intervened is uncertain. For an eye consciousness is produced with respect to whatever form has no obstacle to its appearing even while it is obstructed, and an eye consciousness is not produced with respect to what has an obstacle to its appearing.

4" SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTION ABOUT THE FEATURES OF IMPUTED EXISTENTS

Non-products are non-things. Compositional factors are not material, but imputed.

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a *thogs bcas kyi gzugs.*

b *lhang 'tsher.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Word Commentary on Root Text: Uncompounded phenomena do not exist as effective things, and non-associated compositional factors are imputed existents that are not material, that is to say, do not substantially exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[247] Uncompounded phenomena must be neither substantially existent nor substantially established because:

- a mere negative of obstructive contact is posited as "space"; non-production due to incompleteness of conditions is posited as a "non-analytical cessation," and a mere state of having separated from any [level of] afflictive emotions through the wisdom of individual investigation is posited as an "analytical cessation"
- their entities are not demonstrable separately as "It is this," the way forms and feelings are
- and their functions also are not demonstrable separately as "It does such-and-such," the way eyes and so forth are…

D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence:*[248] A negative [phenomenon][a] is an object of realization such that when it is expressed by a term, the words literally eliminate an object of negation, or an object of realization that explicitly appears as having the aspect of negating an object of negation when its aspect appears to an awareness. The first is, for instance, selflessness. The second is, for instance, noumenon,[b] which, although [this term] does not literally eliminate an object of negation, when its meaning appears, it appears as having the aspect of an elimination of the proliferations [of self].

Objects that are realized through an explicit elimination of an object of negation in this way are twofold [affirming negatives and non-affirming negatives]. An affirming negative,[c] upon explicitly eliminating an object of negation, suggests another phenomenon…A non-affirming negative,[d] upon explicitly eliminating an

[a] *dgag pa, pratiṣedha.*

[b] *chos nyid, dharmatā.*

[c] *ma yin dgag, paryudāsapratiṣedha.* The two types of negations seem to have their origin among the Mīmāṃsakas, who used the terms to refer to types of injunctions—when something was just forbidden and when something positive was implied in place of what was forbidden. See J.F. Staal, "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* XXV, Part 1 (1962): especially 56-66.

[d] *med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha.*

object of negation, does not suggest another phenomenon…

Since all phenomena negate what is not themselves [in the sense that they are not what is not themselves], it is not sufficient that an object of negation be eliminated with respect to the thing; rather, either the term expressing it must eliminate [an object of negation], or [the phenomenon] must appear—to an awareness realizing it—as having the aspect of explicitly eliminating an object of negation…With respect to how another phenomenon is suggested there are four [types]: implicit suggestion, explicit suggestion, suggestion both [implicitly and explicitly], and suggestion by way of context. Avalokitavrata's *Commentarial Explanation of (Bhāvaviveka's) "Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) 'Wisdom'"* quotes:[249]

> Negations that indicate [another positive phenomenon] through their import,
> Negations that establish through one phrase,
> Negations that possess those, and negations that do not indicate through their own words
> Are affirming [negatives]; others are other [that is, non-affirming negatives].

In this:

- That which indicates through its import is, for instance, "The corpulent Devadatta does not eat during day-time."
- That which establishes a thing through one phrase is a case of one phrase's containing both the elimination of an object of negation and an explicit suggestion of another phenomenon—for instance, "Non-production from self exists."
- That which possesses those is a phrase that has both explicit and implicit suggestion of other phenomena—for instance, "The non-emaciated fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day exists."[a]
- That which does not indicate through its own words is, for instance, "This one is not a Brahmin," at a time when it has been ascertained that a person is either of the royal lineage or a Brahmin and has not ascertained the specific.

Whenever any of those four modes of suggestion occur, [the phenomenon] is an affirming negative, whereas those negatives that are other than those—that do not suggest [in] any of those four [ways]—are non-affirming negatives, which are other than affirming negatives.

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[a] Or "the existence of the non-emaciated fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day."

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Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[250] Negative [phenomenon] and exclusion-of-the-other[a] are equivalent. That which is realized upon having explicitly eliminated an object of negation is an exclusion-of-the-other. When divided, there are three: objective exclusion-of-the-other, mental exclusion-of-the-other, and non-affirming exclusion-of-the-other.

The definition of an objective exclusion-of-the-other is: that which is an affirming exclusion-of-the-other and is an object established from its own side, not superimposed by conceptuality. Opposite-from-not-being-a-pot, for instance, is an illustration…

The definition of a mental exclusion-of-the-other is: that which is an affirming exclusion-of-the-other and is imputed by conceptuality. An illustration is, for instance, an appearance as opposite from not being a pot to a conceptual consciousness apprehending a pot…

The definition of a non-affirming exclusion-of-the-other is: that which is realized by having explicitly eliminated an object of negation and does not suggest another phenomenon in place of the negated object of negation.

5" SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE ASPECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Sense consciousnesses are aspected. The three systems are equal number of apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects, equal number apprehended serially, and the varieties as one aspect: the systems of the schools of Scripture and Reasoning.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Sense consciousnesses possess a representation of the object.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[251] The position of the Proponents of the Great Exposition is that:

An unaspected sense awareness
Directly knows aggregations of particles.

In order to refute this, Proponents of Sūtra and above…say:

It is not suitable to know objects that illumine themselves without aspect [that is, without the medium of a representation] because those objects are not entities illuminating themselves and because if objects were luminous, then just as blue

[a] *gzhan sel, anyāpoha.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> [being blue does not depend on a consciousness apprehending it],[252] those objects would be illuminated even without depending on consciousness. Therefore, that which luminously perceives a present object is consciousness.

Proponents of Sūtra assert that the minute particles that are the basis of an appearance as blue, long, and so forth exist as external particles. The distinguishing feature of the Proponents of Mind-Only and the Proponents of the Middle[a] who assert an emptiness of duality [of subject and object] is that there are no external particles that are the basis of appearance.

All of our own proponents of [consciousness as] having aspects [that is, the Sūtra School and above] assert that it is like the fact that when a person looks at a clear piece of glass the far side of which has been painted, both the glass and the paint are similar in being seen, but the glass is realized from its own entity and the color is realized in the manner of an image. [About the Proponents of Sūtra] the master Bodhibhadra says:

> When a person looks at a glass the color of which has been affected by shell-paint, the eye apprehends both glass and paint; the glass is apprehended directly and the paint is apprehended in the manner of an image, whereby the person apprehends two apprehended objects. These Proponents of Sūtra propound that accordingly:
>
> - that which is perceived directly is an aspect of only consciousness
> - the basis of the consciousness's appearing as color and shape is a separate collection of minute particles
> - the consciousness is [generated into having the aspect of] those entities without contacting them [directly]
>
> whereby there are two apprehended objects…

Chandrakīrti's commentary on his *Supplement* explains that comprehension of an aspect similar to [the object][b] is imputed with the convention of comprehending it.

About this, it follows that many earlier Tibetans saying that the Proponents of Sūtra assert that the [external] object is obscure[c] is not feasible because the Proponents of Sūtra also assert that an eye consciousness directly sees form, since they assert that an eye

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[a] That is, the Yogic Autonomy subschool of the Middle Way School.

[b] This is comprehension of a representation.

[c] This means that the presence of the external object itself would be known by inference.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

consciousness clearly perceives [its object] by way of having [been generated in its] aspect.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[253] In the Hearer schools asserting that consciousness is aspected:

- although blue and a sense direct perception apprehending blue are different substantial entities, the two aspects of blue—(1) blue and (2) the image that has the nature of consciousness and that is set up by the blue—are similar, that is to say, are cause and effect,
- it is suitable to designate in the world that the object is experienced—that is, to designate that the clear perception of the effect, the representation, is clear perception of the cause, blue.

Ge-s̄hay Ge-dün-l̄o-drö:[254] When an eye consciousness looks at a table in front of oneself, that table is seen by perceiving an aspect similar to the table. This is not called "indirect," but it is perception by way of an image. We say that the table is perceived directly, as is said in the world's conventions. If one did not see the object by way of an aspect, then either one would not see it at all, or the consciousness would have to actually contact the object—and then there would be no explanation for why we do not see through walls and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[255] Many Tibetans [mistakenly] assert that the upper and lower schools of tenets debate about:

1. whether plural eye consciousnesses[a] apprehending the colors of a mottle arise [simultaneously] or not
2. whether plural main consciousnesses[b] of dissimilar type [such as a main eye consciousness and a main ear consciousness] arise [simultaneously] or not.

This is laughable because all four schools or tenets, without difference, assert that:

1. plural eye consciousnesses—a main eye consciousness and accompanying mental factors [which are all eye consciousnesses]—arise simultaneously even with respect to one object
2. plural consciousnesses of dissimilar type—eye consciousness,

[a] *shes pa.*

[b] *rnam shes / rnam par shes pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

ear consciousness, and so forth—arise simultaneously when their respective objects arise.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are three systems:

1. Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects[a] assert that when looking at a mottle of colors, many eye consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the aspects apprehended—blue, yellow, white, red, and so forth—are produced simultaneously.

   Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[256] They assert that with regard to the sounds of many musical instruments ear consciousnesses of an equal number arise [simultaneously], but even though a white patch has ends and a middle, many eye consciousnesses are not generated.

2. Serial Pluralists[b] assert that when looking at a mottle of colors, many eye consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the aspects apprehended—blue, yellow, white, red, and so forth—are produced serially.

   Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[257] When apprehending not only a mottle of colors but even the ends, middle, and so forth in one color such as white, consciousnesses having those aspect arise serially. If they did arise simultaneously, this would contradict the Supramundane Victor's statement that the mental consciousness of sentient beings has a single continuum. Hence it is feasible according to our system because nothing else is suitable.

   Objection: Then, are these all not presently perceived simultaneously?

   Answer: Due to the quick operation of consciousness, it is mistaken to be simultaneous, like, for example, one arrow piercing a hundred *utpala* petals or the wheel of a firebrand [being rapidly twirled].

   Since Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* also treats this system as an opponent, it is only [found in] the Sūtra School Following Scripture.

3. Non-Pluralists[c] assert that when looking at a mottle of colors, it is not contradictory for the various colors of the mottle to appear to one consciousness, and hence a single consciousness having the aspects [of the

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[a] *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam.*

[b] *sna tshogs rim 'byung.*

[c] *sna tshogs gnyis med.*

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colors] of the mottle is produced.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[258] Though the aspects [of the object] are plural, there do not come to be many consciousnesses because it is not contradictory for there to be many aspects in even one consciousness, since many objects appear clearly even to one consciousness. This is the best reasoning shared with [Non-Pluralists of] the Sūtra School and Mind-Only School.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a] explains that there are both Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning among Proponents of an Equal Number of Objects and Subjects and that Serial Pluralism is the system of only the Sūtra School Following Scripture. However, since he does not clearly set forth proofs for this, it should be examined.

6" SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTION ABOUT CAUSE AND EFFECT

Cause and effect are not simultaneous.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The non-simultaneous are needed for fully qualified cause and effect.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[259] All causes are established as existing prior to their respective effects:
>
> - because if cause and effect were simultaneous, the cause would not exist prior to the effect, due to which a capacity to assist the effect would not exist prior to the effect, and
> - because later [that is, at the time of the effect] the effect is already established, whereby assistance does not operate at that time.
>
> Consequently, if [an object] exists at the same time as the awareness apprehending it, it is not the apprehended object of that awareness.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[260] They assert that although the two—an apprehended-object which is the object of, for instance, an eye consciousness and an apprehending-subject, that is, a consciousness—are temporally different, former and later, they are object and subject, since the object's aspect appears [to the consciousness].

7" SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTION THAT FOE DESTROYERS DO NOT FALL FROM ABANDONMENTS AND REALIZATIONS

No falling from abandonments and realization.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Word Commentary on Root Text: Foe Destroyers necessarily do not fall from their abandonments [of obstructions] and realizations [of selflessness].

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[261] They assert that although there are cases of falling from the middle two fruits [that is, from abiding in the fruit of Once Returner and from abiding in the fruit of Never Returner], there is no falling from the first and final fruits [that is, from abiding in the fruit of Stream-Enterer and from abiding in the fruit of Foe Destroyer].

8" SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTION ABOUT THE BRANCHES OF CONCENTRATIONS

A body consciousness is suitable as a branch.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The bliss that is a branch of the first three concentrations is a feeling that is a body consciousness; hence, a body consciousness generated by the power of meditation is suitable as a branch of a concentration.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[262] With respect to the difference between the joy and bliss that are branches of the first two concentrations:
>
> - The Great Exposition School asserts that joy is bliss accompanying a mental consciousness and that since bliss is not suitable to be a sense consciousness, bliss is pliancy.
> - The Sūtra School asserts that joy is bliss accompanying the mental consciousness and that bliss is a body consciousness, because even though an ordinary sense consciousness is faced outward, there is a sense consciousness generated through the power of concentration and also assisting meditative stabilization.

9" SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT DIRECT PERCEPTION

Direct perceptions are the four—sense, mental, yogic, and self-cognizing. An appearing-object of direct perception is impermanent; selflessness is implicit.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to direct perceptions there are four: sense direct perceptions, mental direct perceptions, yogic direct perceptions, and self-cognizing direct perceptions. Because the appearing-object of a sentient being's direct perception must be impermanent, a yogic direct perception realizing selflessness explicitly realizes compositional

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phenomena that are devoid of self and implicitly realizes selflessness.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[263] Since appearing-objects are limited to two—specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena—it is proven that prime cognitions are limited to two [direct perception and inference]. Also, since engaged objects are limited to two—manifest and obscure—it is proven that prime cognitions are limited to two [direct perception and inference].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[264] By way of how they know objects, direct perceptions are twofold—other-cognitions and self-cognitions.[a] With respect to other-cognitions, due to the uncommon proprietary condition there are sense direct perceptions, mental direct perceptions, and yogic direct perceptions because:

- due to depending on a sense power as the proprietary condition, sense direct perceptions are posited
- due to depending on a mere mind as the proprietary condition, mental direct perceptions are posited
- due to depending on a union of calm abiding and special insight as the proprietary condition, yogic direct perceptions are posited...

They assert that an unmistaken consciousness devoid of conceptual apprehension of a sound-generality and a meaning-generality [that is, an image of a word and an image of an object] in such a manner that they are suitable to be associated is a direct perception. Also, they assert that a newly non-deceptive unmistaken consciousness devoid of conceptuality is [the definition of] a direct prime cognition.

They say that if the Sanskrit original of prime cognition, *pramāṇa* (*tshad ma*), were explained as thorough comprehension (*rab tu 'jal ba*), then subsequent cognition (*bcad shes*) also would [absurdly] be prime cognition, in which case, in accordance with the statement in Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* it would [absurdly] follow that all consciousnesses would be prime cognitions and hence would be infinite:[265]

Having already inferentially realized but not forgotten that fire

[a] For an extensive description of types of awarenesses see Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986).

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is present from the sign of the presence of smoke, knowing this again and again is not a third category of prime cognition because, if that were the case, all consciousnesses would be prime cognitions, whereby the number of prime cognitions would be infinite. This is like, for example, the fact that memory, desire, hatred, and so forth are not a third category of prime cognition.

Therefore, they think that *pra* means "initial" or "newly," and *māṇa* means "comprehension," the import of which is that it is non-deceptive. Due to "newly," later [moments of the] continuation of direct perception that are produced such that the functioning, or ascertainment, of the earlier prime cognition has not deteriorated are subsequent cognitions and are not prime cognitions.

Nevertheless, a direct perception again of that object once its functioning, or ascertainment, has deteriorated is a prime cognition. Hence, the assertion by a certain fool that a yogic direct perception on the path of meditation is not a prime cognition is laughable…

They explain that a consciousness apprehending a sound-generality and a meaning-generality [that is, an image of a word and an image of an object] as associated is a conceptual consciousness. Moreover, although, for instance, a pot's sound-generality and meaning-generality do not appear to be associated to children, oxen, and so forth who do not know the vocabulary for pot, they have [conceptual apprehension] in such a manner that these are suitable to be associated.

Even though those proficient in the vocabulary for pot have a great many consciousnesses apprehending a sound-generality and a meaning-generality as associated, the conceptual consciousnesses in their continuum are not necessarily like that because their conceptual consciousnesses arisen from meditation do not apprehend a sound-generality.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [266] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Ascertainment of Prime Cognition"* says:

Question: What is the meaning of associating object verbalized and means of verbalization? And what is the meaning of their being suitable to be associated? What is the purpose for saying "suitable"?

Answer: [There can be] a collection at one time of both a sound-generality and a meaning-generality as an apprehended

object of a single conceptual consciousness of a person proficient in vocabulary.[267] [This can be of two types:]

- When "pot" is verbalized, although subsequently the specifically characterized sound has stopped, the very appearance having the aspect of an [internal] echo is a sound-generality. And, to just that conceptual consciousness taking the sound-generality as its apprehended object the meaning-generality of that which is bulbous, flat-based, and able to hold water appears.
- In another way, initially the meaning-generality appears, whereupon the sound-generality appears to that conceptual consciousness.

[In both cases] that the two—the sound-generality and the meaning-generality of one substratum [that is, one object]—have become the apprehended objects of one conceptual consciousness is the meaning of associating object verbalized and means of verbalization.

Conceptual consciousnesses of children and of others not proficient in vocabulary to which either a sound-generality or a meaning-generality appear, and so forth, are suitable for such association. In order to include them "suitable" is mentioned.

There is no certainty that to all conceptual consciousnesses of those proficient in vocabulary there will be a collection of a sound-generality and a meaning-generality as the apprehended object. For to some well accustomed to the meaning of impermanence, selflessness, and so forth a meaning-generality appears fully without reliance on a sound-generality…

When[268] conceptual consciousnesses are divided by way of the manner of association, there are two:

- conceptual consciousness associating the sound. Its definition is: a consciousness apprehending within associating the name at the time of learning the vocabulary and the meaning of the convention; for instance, an awareness thinking, "That which has branches and leaves is a tree."
- conceptual consciousness associating meaning. Its definition is: a consciousness apprehending within associating a substratum and attributes; for example, an awareness apprehending within thinking, "This being is one having a stick."

When conceptual consciousnesses are divided by way of their appearing-object, there are three:

- conceptual consciousness to which only a sound-generality

appears; for example, an awareness in the continuum of someone not proficient in vocabulary to which a sound-generality of pot appears.
- conceptual consciousness to which only a meaning-generality appears; for example, an awareness in the continuum of someone not proficient in vocabulary to which a meaning-generality of pot appears.
- conceptual consciousness to which both a sound-generality and a meaning-generality appear; for example, a conceptual consciousness—in the continuum of someone proficient in vocabulary—that apprehends a pot.

These are mentioned in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers.*

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[269]

Sense Direct Perception

There are five:
- sense direct perceptions apprehending forms
- sense direct perceptions apprehending sounds
- sense direct perceptions apprehending odors
- sense direct perceptions apprehending tastes
- sense direct perceptions apprehending tangible objects.

Mental Direct Perception

A mental direct perception is an other-cognizing direct perception that depends on a mere mind as a proprietary condition. When divided, there are five:
- mental direct perceptions apprehending forms
- mental direct perceptions apprehending sounds
- mental direct perceptions apprehending odors
- mental direct perceptions apprehending tastes
- mental direct perceptions apprehending tangible objects.

With respect to their timing, they assert that these are produced only for a single instant that is the smallest unit of time at the end of the continuum of the mental direct perception that is its observed-object-condition. For these are described as very obscure for common beings…These are of two types—prime cognitions and non-prime cognitions; the first are those in the continuum of Superiors, and the second are those in the continuum of common beings.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[270] [With respect to the mode of production of mental direct perception] there are four explanations by Indian and Tibetan scholars who are followers of Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatise on Prime Cognition:

1. those who assert that the two—a sense direct perception and a mental direct perception—each are produced in alternation
2. those who assert that mental direct perception occurs from the second moment onward of a sense direct perception
3. those who assert production in three types—simultaneous with the second moment of a sense direct perception a mental direct perception is produced, due to which from that point onward there are three: sense direct perception, mental direct perception, and self-cognizing direct perception
4. those who assert that at the end of a continuum of sense direct perception a mental direct perception is produced having the length of a single moment that is the smallest unit of time.

From among these, the Foremost Gyel-tsap asserts that the fourth mode of explanation is correct, and nowadays most follow this. The Foremost Ke-drup asserts that the third mode is correct…

The Proponents of Mind-Only Following Scripture assert that a sense direct perception and a mental direct perception are produced simultaneously. The Consequentialists assert that a [conceptual] ascertaining consciousness induced by sense direct perception is a mental direct perception (see 931ff.).

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[271]

Self-Cognition

That which apprehends a consciousness, which is its object of experience, by only experiencing its mere luminosity and that having the aspect of the apprehender[a] within the vanishing of dualistic appearance of object and subject, part and whole, and so forth is the meaning of self-cognition…When divided, there are three—prime cognitions, subsequent cognitions, and those to which there is appearance but not ascertainment…The proof of self-cognition is:

> With respect to the subject, a sense consciousness perceiving blue, an experiencer of it exists because of being a consciousness, the memory of which exists. If that is accepted, then self-cognition exists.

Also:

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[a] It takes on the aspect of the apprehending consciousness.

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> With respect to the subject, a sense consciousness perceiving blue, an experiencer of it exists because experience must be either self-experience or other-experience, and the possibility of its being other-experience is prevented by its then having to be infinite…

Self-cognition does not involve the two aspects of mind and mental factors because the experiencer of the main mind also experiences the accompanying mental factors that are one substantial entity with the main mind. Although even conceptual consciousnesses and sense consciousnesses each have a self-cognition of their mere luminosity, those self-cognitions are neither conceptual consciousnesses nor sense consciousnesses, since if self-cognition were a different entity or substantial entity from those, the convention of *self*-cognition would be destroyed…

Yogic Direct Perception

An other-cognizing direct perception that—depending on the yoga that is a union of calm abiding and special insight as the proprietary condition—sees the mere meaning with regard to its object, the mode of subsistence of the [four] truths, without any mixture with sound-generalities or meaning-generalities is a yogic direct perception. This is because it is a non-mistaken awareness, devoid of conceptuality, that—depending on a union of calm abiding and special insight—[realizes a correct meaning].[272] There are paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning that are yogic direct perceptions. Paths of seeing that are yogic direct perceptions are only prime cognitions;[a] the other two have prime cognitions and subsequent cognitions.

In this context [of the Sūtra School Following Reasoning] how could it be possible for [yogic direct perceptions] to either have appearance or not have appearance? [Meditative equipoise necessarily has appearance, since] they assert that, in the perspective of apprehension when a yogic direct perception directly realizes that forms, consciousnesses, and so forth are without a self of persons, the basis of negation—those specifically characterized [forms, consciousnesses, and so forth] themselves—appear, whereas selflessness, which is included among non-affirming negatives, is realized

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[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos, ca,* 104.5) questions what Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a could possibly mean by excluding subsequent cognition; Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den presents the cogent position that there are subsequent cognitions that are yogic direct perceptions on the path of seeing, since direct perceptions do not have to be one instant.

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implicitly. This is because Proponents of Sūtra and even some Proponents of Mind-Only[a] assert that appearing-objects of direct perceptions must be specifically characterized things themselves. For example, with regard to an area devoid of a pot, a sense direct perception directly ascertains the basis that is devoid of a pot, but this direct perception does not have to ascertain the absence of pot, a non-affirming negative…

Quasi-Direct-Perceptions

A direct perception has to be devoid of conceptuality and unmistaken because conceptual and non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses are quasi-direct-perceptions, since seven quasi-direct-perceptions are described—six conceptual and a mistaken consciousness polluted by visual dimness. Dignāga's *Sūtra of Prime Cognition* [that is, *Compilation of Prime Cognition*] says:

> Mistaken, conventional consciousness,
> Inference, arisen from inference,
> Memory, and wishing are quasi-direct-perceptions
> Along with dimness of sight.

Six conceptual quasi-direct-perceptions

1. mistaken consciousness such as considering a mirage to be water
2. conceptual consciousness apprehending conventional existence that is a superimposition
3. inference, that is, a conceptual consciousness that is a mind apprehending a [logical] sign
4. conceptual consciousness having a sign, that is, arising after an inference
5. conceptual consciousness remembering a past object
6. conceptual consciousness wishing for the future

One non-conceptual quasi-direct-perception

7. mistaken sense consciousness such as that of one with dimness of sight. Consciousnesses apprehending a white conch as yellow [due to a bile disease], apprehending trees as moving [due to riding in a vehicle], and the like are…[non-conceptual] quasi-direct-perceptions in the system of the Sūtra School.

With respect to an etymology, the Sanskrit original of direct

[a] According to Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos, cha,* 104.7), the reference is to certain Proponents of Mind-Only who assert that non-dualistic consciousness is the thoroughly established nature; running against the grain of assertions about the Mind-Only School, its inclusion here is an indication of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's wish not to over-simplify.

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perception is *pratyakṣa,* and if it is separated into its components, *prati* is taken as having a distributive meaning [like "diversely"] and as the basis; *akṣa* [literally, eye] is taken as sense power. Hence, due to depending on sense powers it is called direct perception (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*); or, due to depending on diverse sense powers it is called direct perception (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*)…

Inference. An inference is a consciousness—comprehending a thesis—that arises in dependence on [a sign, or reason, having] the three modes[a] as its support…Reasons are limited in number to three—effect signs, nature signs, and non-observation signs—because, except for those three, it is impossible to have the full complement of the three modes and a relationship of non-occurrence if not present. Reasons other than those are threefold—contradictory, indefinite, and non-established.[b]

10" SUTRA SCHOOL'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT GREAT VEHICLE SUPERIORS

Bodhisattva Superiors are in meditative equipoise. The two, truth and form, are Buddha.

Word Commentary on Root Text: That Bodhisattva Superiors are necessarily in meditative equipoise accords with the system of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* but the assertion that both the truth and form bodies of a Buddha are Buddha is different

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[273] In the systems of both the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School one progresses over the heat level of the path of preparation and above in one meditative sitting, due to which Bodhisattva Superiors are necessarily in meditative equipoise. Not only that, but also a Great Vehicle Superior must have the life-support of a male in Jambudvīpa,[c] since they assert that full purification does not occur in

[a] The three modes are presence of the reason in the subject (*phyogs chos, pakṣadharma*), forward-entailment (*rjes khyab, anvayavyāpti*), and counter-entailment (*ldog khyab, vyatirekavyāpti*).

[b] For an extensive discussion of reasons, see Katherine Rogers, "A Tibetan manual of logic: an introduction to reasoning in the Ge-luk-ba monastic educational system," doctoral dissertation, University of Virginia, 1992.

[c] Nowadays, the term "Jambudvīpa" is used to refer to our world; earlier, it referred to one of four continents in a four-continent, flat world.

two of the three realms [that is, in the form and formless realms] or on other continents…

The ten powers, four fearlessnesses,[a] three mindful establishments, and great compassion are eighteen attributes that only Buddhas have. Also, all Buddhas are equal in excellence, truth body, and acting for the welfare of transmigrators, but they differ in lifespan, lineage, and body size.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[274] [In brief, there are three excellences of Buddhas:]

1. Their causal excellence is endowed with four features—repeated familiarization with the entirety of the two collections of merit and wisdom, familiarization over a long time, familiarization without interruption, and familiarization with strong intensity.
2. Their resultant excellence is endowed with four features—excellence in exalted wisdom, excellence in abandonment, excellence in power, and excellence in form body.
   - Their excellence in exalted wisdom is endowed with four features—knowing without being taught, knowing entirely, knowing all aspects, and knowing without striving.
   - Their excellence in abandonment is endowed with four features—abandonment of all afflictive emotions, abandonment forever, abandonment of predispositions, and abandonment of obstructions to meditative equipoise as well.
   - Their excellence in power is endowed with four features—emanating the non-existent, transforming the existent, blessing to remain for a long time, and dominion with regard to setting up and giving up the lifespan; or in another way, going through the obstructive, going in space, going quickly over a very long distance, and making many into few.
   - Their excellence in form body is endowed with four features—thirty-two marks, eighty beauties, strength of Nārāyaṇa, and body relics hard as a diamond.
3. Their excellence in helping is endowed with four features—acting to liberate transmigrators forever from the three bad transmigrations and the sufferings of cyclic existence; or in

[a] See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 208-211.

another way, acting to set transmigrators in the three vehicles and in happy transmigrations…

Although a Buddha's qualities are infinite, when—upon condensing them into the above-mentioned three excellences—one takes them to mind, has faith in them, and is intent upon them, one experiences in this life and so forth definiteness in the issuance of effects, pleasant effects, myriad effects, very speedy effects, and attains effects with a good conclusion, that is, nirvāṇa. Therefore, Buddhas are unsurpassed fields of merit.

This has been the ninth chapter, the section on those who, having refuted a permanent self and substantialities, propound the sūtras as valid.

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GREAT VEHICLE SYSTEMS

Introduction to Great Vehicle Schools of Tenets

(2) Mind-Only and Middle Way Systems Delineating Coarse and Subtle Selflessnesses of Phenomena {2}

This section has two parts: general indication and individual explanations.

(A) General Indication of the Mind-Only and Middle Way Systems Delineating Coarse and Subtle Selflessnesses of Phenomena {2}

This section has two parts: how the thought of the Subduer is commented upon and brief indication of the uniqueness of the two Great Vehicle schools of tenets.

1' How the Thought of the Subduer is Commented Upon {2}

This section has two parts: (1) explaining the difference between the mere thought of the Subduer and the final thought of the Subduer and (2) two modes of opening chariot-ways.

a' Explaining the Difference between the Mere Thought of the Subduer and the Final Thought of the Subduer

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[275]

Question: Well, do the systems of these that are widely renowned as the four schools of tenets accord with the Teacher [Buddha's] thought,[a] or not? If they do, then since nothing damages the thought of the Subduer, then there are the fallacies that:

- It [absurdly] follows that any and all teachings that mutually damage each other would be senseless.
- It [absurdly] follows that these refute the Subduer's own system.

[a] *dgongs pa.*

- According to these systems things would be both truly existent and not truly existent.
- It [absurdly] follows that there is valid cognition unmistaken with respect to the contradictory.
- In that case, true existence and the absence of true existence would be proven merely by words.

and so forth. However, if the systems of the four schools of tenets do not accord with the Teacher's thought, then which of the schools is not the Teacher's thought? There would be many problems:

- There is the awful damage that it [absurdly] follows that since those would be outside the systems of the Subduer, they would be others' [that is, non-Buddhist] schools of tenets or would be a third category of schools of tenets [neither Buddhist nor non-Buddhist].
- Not only that, but also the Teacher would not be their teacher, and the sūtras cited as their sources would not be the Subduer's word.

and so forth. How do you handle these?

They assert that because the Proponents of Objects are posited in accordance with the meaning of the first wheel, and the two, the Middle Way and Mind-Only Schools, in accordance with the systems of the middle and final wheels, even the four tenet systems are the thought of the Subduer, inferior and superior.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Scholars assert that because:

- the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are posited in accordance with the meaning of the first wheel as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*], and
- the two, the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School, are posited in accordance with the systems of the middle and final wheels as indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*],

even all four tenet systems are the thought of the Subduer's scriptures. They also assert that there are differences of inferiority and superiority in the thought of the Subduer's scriptures.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[276] Although the four schools of tenets are the Subduer's thought, positions that are their superimpositions are not the Subduer's thought:

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- because the meaning of a certain sūtra does not have to be the meaning of the Teacher's thought, and
- because although damage by valid cognition occurs with respect to the literal meaning of a certain sūtra, damage by valid cognition necessarily does not accrue to whatever is the Teacher's thought, since it is like the fact that, for example, the existence of a self of persons is the meaning of a certain sūtra, but it is not reasonable to assert that it is the Teacher's thought…

Moreover, in the system of the Consequence School:

- Although it is the meaning of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* that if one sees [imputational natures] as not established by way of their own character, one comes to deprecate all three characters [that is, imputational natures, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures], it is not the Teacher's assertion.
- It is the meaning of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and the Teacher's assertion that, relative to a trainee who is a Proponent of Mind-Only, if one sees [imputational natures] as not established by way of their own character, one comes to deprecate all three characters. This is because this must be asserted as like the fact that, for example, although the absence of permission to kill dependent on circumstances is the meaning of Lesser Vehicle scriptural collections, it is not the Teacher's thought, whereas it is both the meaning of sūtras and is the Teacher's thought that, relative to trainees of the Lesser Vehicle, there is never permission to kill.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[277] [Since there are higher and higher perspectives as one advances on the path] there is no fallacy that teachings that mutually damage each other are senseless. Since those damages were set forth by the Teacher and not by any other, they do not refute the Subduer's system. As will be explained, there are correct proofs that things do not truly exist, and a correct example for something truly existing is not to be found; hence there also is no fallacy that things would be both truly existent and not truly existent. Since those are not the final thought of the Subduer, those fallacies are non-existent.

Moreover, even the assertion of an inexpressible self by the Vatsīputrīyas—a sub-group of the Great Exposition School—while

not the thought of the inner meaning of the Teacher's Word,[a] is the thought of the literal reading.[b]

As asserted by others, that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School, the basis (the aggregates, constituents, and so forth), the path (the harmonies with enlightenment and so forth), the four truths—that are the causes and effects of entry into and reversing cyclic existence—and so forth are in accordance with the first Word, the wheel of doctrine of the four truths. The Middle Way School is posited like the wheel of doctrine of the middle Word. And the system of the Proponents of Mind-Only is posited in accordance with the final wheel of doctrine of good differentiation, spoken in consideration of many who have the Great Vehicle lineage but cannot fit [the teaching of the middle wheel of doctrine] into their minds. Therefore, all those are the mere thought [of the Teacher], but the final thought is only the system of the Middle Way. Also, among those that are the mere thought [of the Teacher], there are [tenets] like lower and higher rungs on a ladder, and, consequently, there are great differences of inferiority and superiority in the four schools of tenets. For there are a great many [sources indicating that this is the case], such as the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* where it says:[278]

> Just as a doctor distributes
> Medicines to the ill,
> So Buddha teaches even mind-only
> To sentient beings in that way.

and Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:[279]

> Just as a grammarian [first] has students
> Read a model of the alphabet,
> So Buddha taught trainees
> The doctrines that they could bear.
>
> To some he taught doctrines
> To turn them away from ill-deeds;
> To some, for the sake of achieving merit;
> To some, doctrines based on duality;
>
> To some, doctrines based on non-duality;
> To some what is profound and frightening to the fearful—
> Having an essence of emptiness and compassion—

---

[a] *ston pa'i bka'i bsam don gyi dgongs pa.*

[b] *sgras zin gyi dgongs pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> The means of achieving [unsurpassed] enlightenment.

and Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:[280]

> To those seeking suchness it is to be said initially
> That all [the aggregates, constituents, sense-spheres, and so forth] exist.
> Later, to those who have realized [all compounded phenomena to be produced and disintegrating] and are unattached [to cyclic existence
> It is to be taught that] all are devoid [of inherent existence].

The features are included into Great Vehicle Sūtra and Mantra. Each also is expounded by scholars in the systems of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The many features present in the Great Vehicle that differ from the Lesser Vehicle are included by scholars into two systems of Great Vehicle Sūtra and Great Vehicle Mantra because Sūtra and Mantra each also are expounded by scholars in the manner of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[281] There were many scholar-adepts who expounded [on Sūtra and Mantra] as Mind-Only, such as Vasubandhu, Dignāga, the master Dharmapāla, Sthiramati, Suvarṇadvīpa [Dharmakīrti],[a] Ratnākarashānti, and so forth. There also were many scholar-adepts who expounded [on Sūtra and Mantra] as Middle Way, such as:
>
> - the five father-and-sons, Nāgārjuna [Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, and Shāntideva]
> - the master Asaṅga
> - Shāntarakṣhita, master and student [Kamalashīla]
> - Bhāvaviveka, father and spiritual son [Avalokitavrata]
> - Atisha, father and sons [Drom-d̄ön-b̄a[b] and so on]
>
> and so forth.

b' Two Modes of Opening Chariot-Ways

The two great chariots prophesied by the Conqueror newly opened the ways of the Middle and of Mind-Only through the kindness of

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[a] *gser gling pa chos kyi grags pa;* tenth century; a teacher of Atisha. In Sanskrit, *gser gling* (Golden Land) is either Suvarṇadvīpa or Suvarṇabhūmi, likely an area in southeast Asia—Indonesia or perhaps Burma or Thailand. Thanks to Gene Smith for the identification.

[b] *'brom ston pa rgyal ba'i 'byung gnas,* 1004/5-1064.

Mañjughoṣha and Maitreyanātha in accordance with the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra* and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.* The widespread opinion of four is not feasible. It is asserted that three are suitable.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga,] the two great chariots prophesied by the Conqueror, newly opened the chariot-ways for [respectively]:

- the Middle Way School through the kindness of the foremost holy Mañjughoṣha in accordance with the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra*
- and the Mind-Only School through the kindness of the regent Maitreyanātha in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[282] The great chariots prophesied by the Conqueror are only the two—Asaṅga and the glorious protector Nāgārjuna. Concerning Nāgārjuna,[a] the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says:[283]

When four hundred years have passed
After I, the One-Gone-Thus, have passed away,
A monk called Nāga will arise.
Faithful in and helpful to the teaching,
He will attain the Very Joyful ground.
Living for six hundred years,
That great being will also achieve
The knowledge[-mantra] of *Mahāmayūrī.*[b]
He will know the meaning of various treatises
And the meaning of no inherent existence.[c]
When he leaves that body,
He will be born in the [Pure Land of] Bliss.
Finally he will just definitely attain
Thoroughly the state of Buddhahood.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[284] This passage in the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* prophesies the Superior Nāgārjuna's:

- time of arising
- name

[a] For an extensive explanation of the prophesies as well as Nāgārjuna's history from Tibetan sources, see Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 9-21.

[b] *rma bya chen po;* Great Peacock.

[c] *dngos po med pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- help to the teaching through proclaiming the first proclamation of doctrine and so forth
- how he gained realization of the first ground through the force of reading the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras
- his lifespan
- how he effected the welfare of transmigrators through the power of achieving knowledge-mantra
- his composing many treatises—Collections of Advice, Collections of Praises, medical and political treatises, and so forth, and in particular his clarifying the meaning of the profound emptiness by way of the Collections of Reasonings
- his going to the [Pure Land of] Bliss upon passing away from sorrow
- how in the future he will be thoroughly purified [as a Buddha] in the desire realm through [the display of] an emanation body.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[285] The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

Mahāmati, know that after
The One Gone to Bliss has passed away
There will appear after the passage of time
One who will uphold the ways [of emptiness, the essence of the teaching].
In the south, in the area of Vidarbha[a]

[a] Louis de la Vallée Poussin (*Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX [Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 76.13), the Dharamsala edition (63.14), and Dzong-ka-b̄a (64.12) read *be ta*. The Sanskrit for X.165-166, as given in P. L. Vaidya, *Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtram*, ed. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No.3. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1963, 118, is:

*dakṣiṃāpatha**vedalyām** bhikṣuḥ śrīmān mahāyaśāḥ*
nāgāḥvayaḥ sa nāmnā tu sadasatpakṣadārakaḥ
prakāśya loke madyānam mahāyānamuttaram
āsādya bhūmiṃ muditāṃ yāsyate 'sau sukhāvatīm

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, ga,* 114) gives *be da* (misprinted as *pe da*) and identifies the place as Vidarbha (*be dar bha*). He etymologizes the name as a place where a certain type of grass (identified in Sarat Chandra Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* [Calcutta, 1902], as *Andropogon muricatus*) grows (*'jag ma skye ba'i yul*). Poussin (*Muséon* 11, 274) also identifies the place as Vidarbha. M. Walleser, in his *The Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources*, further identifies (rpt. 6, n. 2) Vidarbha as now called Berar. E. Obermiller, in his *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston* (Heidelberg: Harrassowitz, 1931), 110, identifies the place as Vedalya, based on the Sanskrit edited by Bunyiu Nanjio (286). The late Tibetan

> Will be a monk known widely as Shrīmān
> Who will [also] be called Nāga.
> Destroying the [extreme] positions of [inherent] existence and
> [conventional] non-existence,
> He will thoroughly teach in the world
> The unsurpassed Great Vehicle—my vehicle.
> Having done this, he will achieve the Very Joyful[a] ground
> And then go to the Blissful[b] [Pure Land upon passing away]...

Concerning Asaṅga, the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra,* cited in Wonch'uk's *Great Commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* says:

> When nine hundred years have passed
> After I have gone beyond sorrow,
> There will be a monk called Asaṅga,
> Skilled in the meaning of treatises.
> He will differentiate many aspects

scholar Ye-s̄hay-tup-d̄en (*ye shes thub bstan*) identified the term as meaning a place of *kuśa* grass, which he said is an area near present-day Madras.

Both Poussin (*Muséon* 11, 274) and Obermiller (110) take *dpal ldan* (*śrīmān*) as adjectival to "monk" (*bhikṣuḥ*), the former as "illustrious" (*illustre*) and the latter as "glorious," but Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos, ga,* 114.3) takes it as Nāgārjuna's name given at ordination (*dge slong du gyur ba'i ming dpal ldan zhes grags pa*), saying that he was otherwise known in the world as "Nāga" (*de'i ming gzhan 'jig rten na klu zhes 'bod pa ste*). This accords with Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's statement (466) that the name given at ordination was *dpal ldan blo 'chang*. Bu-d̄ön refers to Nāgārjuna early in his life as *śrīmān* (*dpal ldan*), and Obermiller (123, n. 891) recognizes this but mistakenly does not carry it over to this passage in the *Descent into Laṅkā.*

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*dngos, ga,* 114.4) incorrectly takes "destroying the positions of existence and non-existence" (*yod dang med pa'i phyogs 'jig pa*) as modifying "my vehicle":

> Having thoroughly—clearly—explained in this world the final path of the Great Vehicle of which there is none higher among my vehicles and which destroys—abandons—the two positions, or extremes, of existence and non-existence which, when apprehended, bring ruination, he, having achieved the first ground, the Very Joyful, will go to the Blissful Land.

Poussin (*Muséon* 11, 274) rightly takes "destroying the positions of existence and non-existence" as referring to Nāgārjuna; this is justified by the Sanskrit *sad-asat-pakṣa-dārakaḥ* (given also in Obermiller, 110 n. 759) which is a nominative whereas the unsurpassed Great Vehicle (*mahāyānamuttaram*) is accusative. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's (299) different reading of the Tibetan (*yod dang med pa'i phyogs 'jig cing*) more accurately reflects the Sanskrit in that the particle *cing* prevents taking "destroying the positions of existence and non-existence" as modifying "my vehicle," whereas *yod dang med pa'i phyogs 'jig pa* does not do this.

[a] *rab tu dga' ba, muditā.* This is the first Bodhisattva ground.

[b] *bde ba can, sukhāvatī.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Of definitive meanings and interpretable meanings.
He will have the nature of explaining texts,
His selfhood being to teach worldly knowledge.

About his achievement of knowledge,
Through the power of the mantra
Of the one called Female Messenger of *Sala*[a]
His awareness will grow good.

For the sake of the teaching remaining long
He will compile the meanings of the principles in sūtras.
He will live for one hundred and fifty years.
His body having disintegrated, he will go to a land of gods.

Having experienced bliss for a long time
Traveling in cyclic existence,
The great being finally
Will attain enlightenment.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[286] The first four lines of that passage indicate the Superior Asaṅga's time of arising, name, and skill in the Great Vehicle scriptural collections. Then, [four lines] indicate his differentiating definitive and interpretable sūtras and composition of extensive treatises illuminating the stages of the path of vast [compassion]—Five Treatises on the Grounds,[b] and so forth. Then, four lines indicate the expansion of his intelligence through the power of the knowledge-mantra of his special deity. Then, four lines indicate his composition of two compendiums containing the meaning of the Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle scriptural collections—Two Summaries [that is, *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* and *Summary of the Great Vehicle*]—for the sake of the teaching remaining a long time and so forth, his lifespan, and the land of birth in the next lifetime. The final four lines indicate that although he will stay in cyclic existence out of the power of the altruistic intention to become enlightened, without being polluted by the faults of cyclic existence he will experience limitless bliss for a

a *sa la'i pho nya mo.* A-ḡya Yong-dzin (*a kya yongs 'dzin*) identifies the goddess as a red Sarasvatī; see Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only (Cittamātra): A Study of a Presentation by the Tibetan Scholar Gung-tang Jam-b̄ay-ȳang (gung-thang-'jam-pa'i-dbyangs) of Asaṅga's Theory of Mind-Basis-of-All (ālayavijñāna) and Related Topics in Buddhist Theories of Personal Continuity, Epistemology, and Hermeneutics* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1984), 861, n. 2.

b See Bibliography.

long time, and finally will attained unsurpassed enlightenment.

The first two lines—"When nine hundred years have passed/ After I have gone beyond sorrow"—do not appear in the text itself [of the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra*], and do not appear in citations of the passage [from the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra*] in the texts of the foremost father [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] and his spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup]. Although this passage is cited in Wonch'uk's *Great Commentary* and he explains that the master Asaṅga arrived nine hundred years after [Buddha passed away], there is no certainty that everything explained in that *Great Commentary* has to be asserted in accordance with its literal reading because, for example:

- he explains there that the Superior Nāgārjuna arrived two hundred years after the Teacher passed away [whereas it was actually four hundred years], and
- he describes the *Grounds of Yogic Practice* as composed by the foremost holy Maitreya [whereas it was actually by Asaṅga].

A certain [scholar] holds that if it is asserted that the master Asaṅga arrived nine hundred years after the Teacher passed away:

- This would not fit together with the citation of a passage from Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization,* "Nature and complete enjoyment" and so forth in Kalki Puṇḍarīka's *Great Commentary on the Kālachakra Tantra: Stainless Light* which was composed between seven hundred and eight hundred years after the Teacher passed away [since Asaṅga brought Maitreya's teachings to this world].
- It would also be difficult to fit this together with the fact that the *Grounds of Yogic Practice* [contains] a dispelling of the fallacy that it differs from Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* with regard to the presentation of the external environment [since Vasubandhu was Asaṅga's younger brother and Asaṅga brought Maitreya's teachings to this world].

This [objection] appears to be true, but there is much to be investigated since in Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's root text and commentary [Asaṅga's arrival in this world] is explained in accordance with Wonch'uk's *Great Commentary on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa, in his [auto] *Commentary on the Difficult Points of the "Mind-Basis-of-All,"* cites the explanation in the *Great Commentary* and does not refute it.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[287] Dharmamitra's[a] *Explanatory Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization": Clear Words* says:[288]

> Although the master Asaṅga had attained the third ground, the radiant,[b] he taught in the manner of mind-only for the sake of taming Vasubandhu…

The great chariot Asaṅga, despite having practiced at achieving a meeting with Maitreya for three years, did not gain even a sign, due to which he was discouraged, but when leaving [his cave], he saw an old man rubbing a piece of iron with wool, who said he was making a needle and praised his effort; so, Asaṅga turned back. Again, having practiced for three years, he was leaving when he saw that drops of water had worn down rock, whereupon he generated an attribute of effort. Again, having practiced for three years, he was discouraged and left, but saw that the feathers of a birth had worn down rock [coming into and leaving his cave], whereupon he returned for another three years. Though he practiced for twelve years, a sign had not arisen, and so, discouraged, he went outside, where he saw a female dog whose lower abdomen had been chewed up by worms. Generating compassion, he cut flesh from his thigh, whereupon he saw the dog as the protector Maitreya, and [being taken] to the Joyous Pure Land, he heard the *Great Vehicle Manifest Knowledge Mother Sūtra,* the Five Doctrines of Maitreya, and so forth. [Returning to this world] he opened the Mind-Only way in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.* For:[c]

- In his *Compendium of Ascertainments* Asaṅga quotes the chapters on the ultimate[d] in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:*[289]

  Furthermore, the ultimate possessing five characteristics[e]

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[a] *chos kyi bshes gnyen.*

[b] The point is that the view of the emptiness of inherent existence is required to attain a Superior path, and thus Asaṅga must have actually been a Consequentialist by view.

[c] The following points are drawn almost word for word from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence;* see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 135-136.

[d] These are the first four chapters of the sūtra. When Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a says that Asaṅga "quotes the chapters," he means just what he says, for, except for the introductory chapter, Asaṅga cites the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* in its entirety in his *Compendium of Ascertainments* (P5539, vol. 111, 83.2.6-107.5.1).

[e] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 356.5) identifies the five:

1. Inexpressible, because it cannot be expressed exactly as it is by terms and conceptual consciousnesses: taught in chapter 1
2. Non-dual, because there are no dualistic phenomena such as the compounded and the

should be known in accordance with how it occurs in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*[a]

- Also, he quotes the chapter on the three characters:[290]
  The characters of phenomena should be viewed in accordance with what occurs in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*
- Also, he quotes the chapters[b] on non-nature that teach about the question and answer concerning dispelling contradictions in the sūtras and the interpretable and the definitive:[291]
  The character of naturelessness in phenomena should be viewed in accordance with what occurs in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*
- Similarly, about the eight collections of consciousness, three final lineages, and definiteness with respect to lineages, he also quotes the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

Also, in his *Summary of the Great Vehicle* he expounds within also

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uncompounded in the face of meditative equipoise directly perceiving the ultimate: taught in chapter 1

3. Thoroughly transcending the sphere of logic, because of not being an object of direct perception by common beings: taught in chapter 2
4. Thoroughly transcending difference and non-difference, because of not being a different entity from the thing that is empty and not being the same conceptual isolate (that is, not being exactly the same) as the thing that is empty: taught in chapter 3
5. Of one taste in everything, because of being the same taste as the mere elimination of the object of negation in selflessness: taught in chapter 4.

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, following D̄zong-ka-b̄a, is paraphrasing Asaṅga, who, after indicating that the ultimate has five characteristics (inexpressible, non-dual, thoroughly transcending the sphere of logic, thoroughly transcending difference and non-difference, and of one taste in everything), says that "The characteristics of inexpressibility and non-duality should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,*" whereupon he cites chapter 1 of the sūtra in toto. Prior to citing chapter 2 (84.2.2), Asaṅga says, "The characteristic of thoroughly transcending the sphere of logic should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*" Prior to citing chapter 3 (84.5.2), he says, "The characteristic of thoroughly transcending difference and non-difference should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*" Prior to citing chapter 4 (86.1.5), he says, "The characteristic of being of one taste in everything should be viewed in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*"

[b] D̄zong-ka-b̄a speaks of plural chapters (*ngo bo nyid med pa'i le'u **rnams***), but the passage he cites precedes only Asaṅga's citation of chapter 7, the "Questions of Paramārthasamudgata." A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 175.5), based on Gung-tang's *Annotations,* makes the questionable suggestion that the plural marker also includes chapter 8, since it explains that the teaching of external objects requires interpretation. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 366.4) takes the plural marker here as referring to the *entire* chapter.

citing passages from Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras.*

As Nāgārjuna himself says about the foremost holy [Mañjushrī] in his *Praise of the Ultimate,* "Guru, protector Mañjughoṣha," and so forth, the honorable Nāgārjuna—in dependence upon taking Mañjughoṣha as his guru and actually hearing doctrine—became a second omniscient one. Having brought the *Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* and so forth from Nāga Land, he composed Six Collections of Reasonings in order to prove with reasoning the stages of the explicit teaching of the *Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*—emptiness—and composed the *Compendium of Sūtra* and so forth in order to prove it with scripture. However, although, unlike Asaṅga, he did not cite the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra,* he differentiated the interpretable and the definitive that way, newly opening the way for the Middle Way, free from the extreme of permanence and annihilation, in accordance with this *[Teachings of Akṣhayamati] Sūtra,* the *King of Meditative Stabilization Sūtra,* and so forth.

Hence, among those having a human life-support, the openers of chariot-ways [differentiating] the interpretable and the definitive among scriptures are limited to only these two masters [Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna]…

Word Commentary on Root Text: The opinion, widespread among earlier generations of Tibetans, that there are four openers of chariot-ways—Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga—is not feasible.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[292] There is a widespread opinion that there are "four openers of chariot-ways" who did not depend on other commentators:

1. glorious Nāgārjuna, who opened the way for the explicit teaching [of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] on emptiness
2. Vasubandhu, who commented on the three Mother sūtras by way of three approaches and eleven forms; or, Shūra, since some earlier and later Tibetans, such as D̄ak-tsang and so forth, say that [this text, *Conquest Over Objections*] was composed by him
3. Dignāga, in his *Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*[a]
4. the foremost holy Maitreya, who opened the way for the

[a] *brgyad stong don bsdus, prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

hidden meaning [of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] in his *Ornament for Clear Realization.*

They do not assert that Asaṅga is an opener of a chariot-way. [Their presentation] is not feasible:

- because, since the master Dignāga commented on the three characters in accordance with Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu], his is not fit to be a separate way of exposition separate from theirs. This is because his exposition in the *Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* is according to Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* and Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge:*[a]

  The teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom
  Thoroughly relies on the three—
  Just the imputational, the other-powered,
  And the thoroughly established.
  Expressions of non-existence and so forth
  Refute all imputations.
  Examples of magical illusions and so forth

[a] Stanzas 27-29ab; Golden Reprint, vol. 103, 824.6:

shes rab pha rol phyin par ni//
bstan pa gsum la yang dag brten//
btags pa dang ni gzhan dbang dang //
yongs su grub pa kho na'o//

med ces bya la sogs tshig gis//
btags pa thams cad 'gog pa ste//
sgyu ma la sogs dpe rnams kyis//
gzhan gyi dbang ni yang dag bstan//

rnam par byang ba bzhi yis ni//
yongs su grub pa rab tu bsgrags//

The Sanskrit from Giuseppe Tucci, "Minor Texts on the Prajñā-Pāramitā," in *Opera Minora: Parte II* (Rome: Giovanni Bardi Editore, 1971), 433:

prajñāparitāyāṃ hi trīn samāśritya deśanā/
kalpitaṃ paratantraṃ ca pariniṣpannaṃ eva ca//

nāstītyāpadaiḥ sarvaṃ kalpitaṃ vinivāryate/
māyopamādidṛṣṭāntaiḥ paratantrasya deśanā//

caturdhā vyavadānena pariniṣpannakīrttanaṃ//

See also Tucci's translation following the text, and Bhikkhu Pāsādika, "On the Meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom: A Summary Composed by Ācārya Dignāga," in *Wisdom Gone Beyond: An Anthology of Buddhist Texts* (Bangkok: Social Science Association Press of Thailand, 1966), 94-102.

Thoroughly teach the other-powered.
The four purifications
Proclaim the thoroughly established.

- Also, it follows that it is not feasible that the author of the *Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mother Scriptures*—the three Mothers being the *Hundred Thousand, Twenty-Five Thousand,* and *Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras*—is an opener of a chariot-way who does not depend on another commentator because:
  1. on the occasions of the sixteen emptinesses and the non-existence of production, cessation, affliction, and purification he seeks to expound in accordance with Nāgārjuna within citing the *Fundamental Treatise Called "Wisdom"*
  2. he refers to the *Commentary on the "Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra"*[a] by Bhadanta [Vimuktasena][b] with regard to the eight conceptions[c] of great beings who are Hearers, and
  3. he[d] states the assertion of Shāntarakṣhita, "The thought of Shāntarakṣhita"…

  Also…the author is neither Shūra nor Vasubandhu but, as

[a] *nyi khrid nam 'grel / 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam par 'grel pa, āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkārakārikāvārttika;* P5186, vol. 88, 107.2.2; this is supposedly (see the next footnote) the commentary by **Bhadanta** Vimuktasena, who was the student of Vasubandhu's student. The same eight are also given in another commentary by the same title (P5185, vol. 88, 12.2.7), supposedly by **Ārya**vimuktasena; see Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, *Tāranātha's History,* 210, n. 8.

[b] *btsun pa grol sde.* (In their translation of *Tāranātha's History* [210, n. 8], Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya cite the Sanskrit of *btsun pa* as *bhaṭṭaraka*). In Tāranātha's *History* (210) he is said to be from Magadha. He is not to be confused with the earlier **Ārya**vimuktasena who was Vasubandhu's disciple (see Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, *Tāranātha's History,* 188-189, 210-212).

[c] Ser-s̄hül (*Notes,* 53b.2) lists the eight as fewer desires, knowing satisfaction, initiating effort, solitariness, equipoise, establishment in mindfulness, meditative cultivation of wisdom, and liking the dislike of proliferation. He says that in the *Commentary on the "Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra,"* they are mentioned at the point of the third of the twenty-two mind-generations. He explains that not liking proliferation (*spros pa la mi dga' ba*) is described as not liking the proliferations involved in commerce, farming, and so forth.

[d] P5206, vol. 93, 300.4.3. This is cited in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Golden Rosary* (see E. Obermiller, *Prajñāpāramitā in Tibetan Buddhism* [Delhi: Classics India Publications, 1988], 4, n. 7, to demonstrate the complete impossibility for the *Conquest Over Objections* to be by Vasubandhu.

earlier ancient essays say, is Daṃṣhṭasena.[a]

Word Commentary on Root Text: In our own system scholars assert that three openers of chariot-ways are suitable—Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and the foremost holy Maitreya.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[293] Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are the two having a human life-support…and Maitreya opened the way for the hidden meaning [of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras].

2' Brief Indication of the Uniqueness of the Two Great Vehicle Schools of Tenets

Mostly the vast paths are concordant, not the profound.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Assertions by the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School with regard to vast paths [of compassionate method] mostly are in accord. Their assertions on the profound are not in accord.

(B) Individual Explanations of the Mind-Only and Middle Way Systems Delineating Coarse and Subtle Selflessnesses of Phenomena {3}

This section has three parts: indicating the Mind-Only system, the Middle Way system, and, as an offshoot, an elimination of qualms about the fruit vehicle.

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[a] *mche ba'i sde.* Alternate names are *Daṃṣṭrāsena, Diṣṭasena, Daṃṣṭasena, Daṃṣṭrāsena, Daṃṣṭasyana,* and so forth. For discussion of this topic, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 225-233, 335-341.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

10. Mind-Only School

1' Indicating the Mind-Only System {3}

This section has three parts: definition together with etymologies, divisions, and tenets.

a' Definition of the Mind-Only School

Since they propound that the three realms are cognition itself and mind-only, they are called Proponents of Cognition and Proponents of Mind-Only.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Since they propound that all three realms are cognition itself and mind-only, they are called Proponents of Cognition and Proponents of Mind-Only.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[294] Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[295]
>
> > Moreover, what are they?
> >
> > 1. Cognitions of the body [the five senses]
> > 2. cognitions of the embodied [the afflicted mentality]
> > 3. cognitions of the enjoyer [the mind constituent, that is, the mental consciousness]
> > 4. cognitions of what is used by those [the six objects—forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena]
> > 5. cognitions making use of those [the six consciousnesses]
> > 6. cognitions of time
> > 7. cognitions of enumeration [numbering]
> > 8. cognitions of location [the world of the environment]
> > 9. cognitions of conventions [the four conventions—the seen, the heard, the known, and the understood]
> >
> > 10. & 11. cognitions of the specifics of self and others [perceptions of self and other]
> >
> > 12. cognitions of good transmigrations [humans and gods]
> > 13. cognitions of bad transmigrations [animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings]
> > 14. cognitions of death
> > 15. cognitions of birth.
> >
> > Concerning this:

- Those that are the cognitions of body, the embodied, and the enjoyer as well as that which is cognition of what is used by those, that which is cognition making use of those, and those which are the cognitions of time, enumeration, location, and conventions arise from predisposing seeds [infused by] verbalization.
- Those that are the cognitions of the specifics of self and others arise from predisposing seeds [infused by] the view of self.
- Those that are the cognitions of the good transmigrations, bad transmigrations, death, and birth arise from predisposing seeds [infused by] the branches of cyclic existence.

Accordingly, since they assert that all compounded phenomena are [included] in the substantial entities of nine[a] cognitions and that all objects of knowledge are [included] in the entities of nine cognitions, they are called Proponents of Cognition.[b]

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[a] These are the first nine in the list of fifteen, since they include all fifteen.

[b] *rnam rig pa, vijñaptika / vijñaptivādin.* The central term *vijñaptimātra* has been translated differently by almost every scholar who has touched the topic. A list of translations used by nine American, Asian, and European scholars will suffice to illustrate the variety:

"perception-only": Stefan Anacker in *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984)

"ideation-only": Wing-tsit Chan in "The Thirty Verses on the Mind-Only Doctrine," in *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy,* ed. S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), 333-337

"mere representation of consciousness": Thomas A. Kochumuttom in *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982)

"ne sont rien qu'idée" (*vijñaptimātra*): Étienne Lamotte in *La Somme du grand véhicule d'Asaṅga,* reprint, 2 vols., Publications de l'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 8 (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1973)

"mere denominations" (*prajñaptimātra*) as used in Asaṅga's *Grounds of Yogic Practice:* Lambert Schmithausen in "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," in *German Scholars on India,* 235-250, Contributions to India Studies 2 (Bombay: Nachiketa, 1976), 238

"nothing but cognition" (*vijñaptimātra*) as used in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:* ibid., 240

"pure information": Robert A. F. Thurman in *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 239.19

"pure consciousness": ibid., 233.9

"consciousness-only": Yoshifumi Ueda in "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 17 (January-October 1967):162, and so forth

"conceptualized thing" as in "(the object of *vikalpa* are all consciousness-only [*vijñaptimātratā*]), that is, for one whose mind is *vijñāna,* the object known is a conceptualized

The *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]* says,[296] "These three realms are mind-only." Accordingly, since they propound that the three realms are truly established as mind-only, they are called Proponents of Mind-Only.[a] Also, Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[297]

Bodhisattvas who have attained dominion
And yogis as well observe
Phenomena such as [all-pervasive] earth and so forth
Through the force of their imagination.

Accordingly, since they propound that although there are no external objects, appearances as such to internal mind arise by the power of yoga or since they practice through proper mental application in accordance with explanations of a sixth grounder's yoga in sūtra, they are called Yogic Practitioners[b]...

Hence, the definition of a Proponent of Mind-Only is: one of our own schools who propounds that things are truly established and also are mind-only. By saying "one of our own schools" Others' Schools like that such as [the Guhyakas who propound] the Brahmā [of consciousness (see 132ff.)] and so forth are eliminated.

b' Divisions of the Mind-Only School

The divisions are Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning; True Aspectarians and False Aspectarians.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The divisions are:

- Followers of Scripture, such as Asaṅga's Treatises on the Grounds and

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thing, and not the object as it really exists": ibid., 163

"representation-only": Alex Wayman in "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 2, no. 1 (1979):67, 68, and so forth

"only representation," or "just conceptualization": Janice D. Willis in *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 34 and 36

"nothing but conceptualization": ibid., 28-31

In the traditions of scholarship following Ḏzong-ka-ḇa, it is clear that the term refers to mind-only involving a lack of external objects; see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* chapters 18-20. For a provocative and thorough article on this term, see Bruce Cameron Hall, "The Meaning of Vijñapti in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 9, no. 1 (1986):7-23.

a *sems tsam pa, cittamātrin.*

b *rnal 'byor spyod pa pa, yogācāra.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

so forth, and Followers of Reasoning, set forth in [Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* and][298] Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises

- True Aspectarians,[a] who assert that the apprehended aspect in sense consciousnesses truly exists, and False Aspectarians,[b] who assert that the apprehended aspect of sense consciousnesses is false (see 415ff.)

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[299] All Indian and Tibetan scholars, the foremost father [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] and his spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup], assert that even in each text by Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning there come to be double presentations—both True Aspectarian and False Aspectarian. Therefore, you should never associate True Aspectarian and False Aspectarian exclusively with one or the other. True Aspectarians are of three types:

  - Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects,[c] among whom there are those who assert eight collections of consciousness [that is, five sense consciousnesses, mental consciousness, afflicted mind,[d] and mind-basis-of-all[e]] and those who assert six collections of consciousness [that is, five sense consciousnesses and mental consciousness]
  - Split-Eggists[f]
  - Non-Pluralists,[g] among whom there are those who assert six collections of consciousness and those who assert one consciousness.

  False Aspectarians are of two types:

  - Tainted False Aspectarians [who assert that the entity of the mind is polluted by the latencies of ignorance (425)]
  - Untainted False Aspectarians [who assert that the entity of the mind is not in the least polluted by the latencies of ignorance].

  By way of assertions [on the number] of consciousnesses False Aspectarians are of four types since:

  - there are the three who propound eight collections of consciousness, six collections, and one consciousness

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a *rnam bden pa, satyākāravādin.*

b *rnam brdzun pa, alīkākāravādin.*

c *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa.*

d *nyon mongs can gyi yid, kliṣṭamanas.*

e *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālayavijñāna.*

f *sgo nga phyed tshal pa.*

g *sna tshogs gnyis med pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- there is the widely known asserter [that is, Paramārtha] of nine collections of consciousness.

c' Tenets of the Mind-Only School {2}

This section has two parts: texts on which their tenets rely and actual tenets described in those texts.

1" TEXTS ON WHICH THEIR TENETS RELY {3}

This section has three parts: source texts for the interpretable and definitive, from what approaches the interpretable and definitive are differentiated, and how texts are divided into the interpretable and definitive through that way.

a" Source Texts for the Interpretable and Definitive in the Mind-Only School

Good differentiation is definitive. The other two require interpretation.

Word Commentary on Root Text: From among the three wheels of doctrine indicated here in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* the wheel of doctrine of good differentiation is definitive in the sense of being literal, and the other two wheels of doctrine require interpretation in the sense that they are not literal.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[300] In the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* [the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata says to Buddha]:[301]
>
> > Initially, in the area of Varaṇāsi in the Deer Park called "Sage's Propounding,"[a] the Supramundane Victor thoroughly turned a wheel of doctrine for those engaged in the Hearer Vehicle,[b]

[a] *drang song smra ba, ṛṣivadana* (Étienne Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra: L'Explication des mystères* [Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935], 85 [30], n. 3). A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 141.5) cites an explanation in the *Great Exposition* (*bye brag bshad mdzod chen mo, mahāvibhāṣa*) that it is called Sage's Propounding because it is a place where Buddha, the supreme of sages, propounded doctrine.

[b] *nyan thos kyi theg pa la yang dag par zhugs pa, śrāvakayānasaṃprasthita* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 85 [30], n. 5). Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 228.4) explains that "vehicle" here means the scriptural collections of the Hearers, these being the Hearer vehicle as verbalizing words (*rjod byed tshig gi theg pa*).

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fantastic[a] and marvelous[b] which none—god or human—had previously turned in a similar fashion in the world, through teaching the aspects of the four noble truths. Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine thoroughly turned by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable,[c] affords an occasion [for refutation],[d] requires interpretation,[e] and serves as a basis for controversy.[f]

Based[g] on just the naturelessness of all phenomena and based on just the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow, the Supramundane Victor turned a second wheel of doctrine, for those engaged in the Great Vehicle,[h] very fantastic and marvelous, through the aspect of speaking on emptiness.[i] Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine turned by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable, affords an occasion [for refutation], requires interpretation, and serves as a basis for controversy.

However,[j] based on just the naturelessness of phenomena and based on just the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow, the Supramundane Victor turned a third wheel of doctrine for those engaged in all vehicles,[k] possessed of good differentiation,[l] fantastic and marvelous.[a] This wheel of

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[a] *ngo mtshar, āścarya* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 86 [30], n. 8).

[b] *rmad du byung ba, adbhūta* (ibid., 86 [30], n. 9).

[c] *bla na mchis pa, sa-uttara* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 86 [30], n. 14).

[d] *skabs mchis pa, sa-avakāśa* (ibid., 86 [30], n. 15).

[e] *drang ba'i don, neyārtha* (ibid., 86 [30], n. 16).

[f] *rtsod pa'i bzhi'i gnas, vivādādhikaraṇa* (ibid., 86 [30], n. 17).

[g] *brtsams, ārabhya* (ibid., 86 [30], n. 18). Gung-tang (*Difficult Points,* 236.10) explains that *brtsams* here means "taking such and such as substrata" (*khyad gzhir bzung ba*), although in other places it means that "the thought comes down to such and such" (*dgongs pa der 'bab pa tsam*). For the Go-mang tradition of Gung-ru Chö-jung, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, Gung-tang, and A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso, the second wheel—taking these as its substrata—teaches on the literal level that all phenomena are not established from their own side.

[h] *theg pa chen po la yang dag par zhugs pa, mahāyānasaṃprasthita* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 86 [30], n. 19).

[i] *stong pa nyid smos pa'i rnam pas, śūnyatāvādākāreṇa* (ibid., 86 [30], n. 20).

[j] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 294.2) points out the disjunctive function of the Tibetan *lags kyi* that follows the description of the middle wheel but not the first, since both require interpretation; it serves to separate out the third wheel.

[k] *theg pa thams cad la yang dag par zhugs pa, sarvayānasaṃprasthita* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 86 [30], n. 21).

[l] *legs par rnam par phye ba dang ldan pa, suvibhakta* (ibid., 86 [30], n. 22).

doctrine turned by the Supramundane Victor is unsurpassable, does not afford an occasion [for refutation], is of definitive meaning,[b] and does not serve as a basis for controversy…

The[302] *Wheel of Doctrine of the Four Truths* is an actual first wheel of

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[a] The *stog* Palace edition of the sūtra (70.4) reads "extremely fantastic and extremely marvelous" (***ha cang yang** ngo mtshar la/ **ha cang yang** rmad du byung ba*). Gung-tang (*Difficult Points,* 247.1-247.5) rejects similar readings (***shin tu** ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba*) in:

- the *rtag brtan* edition (this most likely being an early-seventeenth-century block-print edition prepared at *rtag brtan phun tshogs gling* Monastery built by the great Jo-nang-b̄a master Tāranātha, who was second only in importance to S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen to the Jonang-b̄a School; the monastery was taken over by the Ge-luk-b̄a order in 1650); and
- in Wonch'uk's commentary. (Although Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso, 307.5, reports that Wonch'uk's text does not have this reading, the Peking [5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 170.1.8] does.)

Gung-tang says that he rejects such readings because they contradict many other editions as well as the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* as it is cited in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments.* I would add that calling the final wheel of doctrine "*extremely* fantastic and *extremely* marvelous" goes against the basic Ge-luk-b̄a position that even for the Proponents of Mind-Only the middle wheel is the supreme teaching for the Bodhisattvas who are sharper than those for whom the third wheel was specifically taught. This is because these sharp Bodhisattvas can understand the doctrine of the three natures and the three non-natures just from hearing the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth (see Gung-tang's *Difficult Points,* 245.10-247.1). For this reason, the version of sūtra accepted in Ge-luk-b̄a circles speaks **only** of the middle wheel as being "*very* fantastic and marvelous."

In the seventh chapter of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* Buddha speaks about the various types of sentient beings to whom he teaches doctrine, among whom the supreme are these sharp Bodhisattvas (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 75 [17], and 199; and Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha,* 115):

> Paramārthasamudgata with respect to this, thinking of just these three types of non-nature, the One-Gone-Thus, by way of the aspect of setting forth sūtras of interpretable meaning, taught the doctrine [of the middle wheel] in this way, "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow." Regarding that, [when] sentient beings who have generated roots of virtue, have purified the obstructions, have ripened their continuums, have great faith, and have accumulated great collections of merit and wisdom hear this doctrine, they understand—**just as it is**—this which I explained with a thought behind it, and they develop faith in that doctrine. They also realize, by means of their exalted wisdom, **the meaning just as it is**. Also, through cultivating their realization they very quickly attain the very final state.

It is said that these sharp Bodhisattvas can realize the meaning of the middle wheel of doctrine—that is, the three natures and three non-natures—without relying on an exposition such as that found in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

[b] *nges pa'i don, nītārtha* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 86 [30], n. 23).

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

doctrine, and those partially concordant with it are the *Four Groups of Scriptures on Discipline,*[a] *Four Establishments through Mindfulness Sūtra,* the *brgya ba rtogs brjod brgya ba* in the *Extensive Sport Sūtra,* and so forth. Illustrations of [actual] middle wheel sūtras are those in the class of Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and those partially concordant with it are the *Diamond Cutter Sūtra, King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra, Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra, Pile of Jewels Sūtra,*[303] and so forth. Illustrations of actual final wheel sūtras are the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and its Chapter of Questions by Paramārthasamudgata, and those included in its class are the *Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned* and so forth. When considered by the Middle Way School, the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra, Sūtra on the Ten Grounds, Matrix of One-Gone-Thus Sūtra,* and so forth are not in the class of the final wheel of doctrine, but since Proponents of Mind-Only, upon citing those, prove that the class of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras requires interpretation, they must be posited as sūtras included in the class of good differentiation [that is, the final wheel of doctrine]. In that way, they assert that:

- the final Word, [the wheel of doctrine of] good differentiation, is of definitive meaning in the sense of being literal
- the wheel of doctrine of the four truths and the middle wheel of doctrine of no character require interpretation.

b" From what Approaches the Interpretable and Definitive are Differentiated in the Mind-Only School

The interpretable and definitive are divided by way of four reliances, four reasonings, four thoughts, and four indirect intentions.

Word Commentary on Root Text: By what are the interpretable and the definitive differentiated? Words and meanings are differentiated by the four reliances and the four reasonings; the interpretable and the definitive are differentiated with respect to scriptures[b] by the four thoughts and the four

[a] *lung sde bzhi.*

[b] Gung-tang makes a critical difference between *gsung rab* ***kyi*** *drang nges 'byed pa* and *gsung rab* ***la*** *drang nges 'byed pa;* I translate the former as "differentiating the interpretable and definitive **within** the scriptures" and the latter as "differentiating the interpretable and definitive **with respect to** the scriptures"; admittedly, the English is no clearer than the Tibetan. According to Gung-tang (*Difficult Points,* 38.4), the former, "differentiating the interpretable and definitive **within** the scriptures," means to identify what are interpretable and what are definitive scriptures from among the scriptures (*gsung rab* ***kyi nang nas*** *drang don*

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indirect intentions.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[304] The great chariots of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School differentiated the interpretable and the definitive with respect to both words and meanings by way of the four reliances and four reasonings and differentiated the interpretable and the definitive with respect to the Subduer's Word by way of the four thoughts and four indirect intentions. Hence, if these are understood, it has the great purpose of penetratingly realizing the scriptures, and so forth; therefore, [I] will briefly clarify the essence.

FOUR RELIANCES

Regarding this, the four reliances are indicated in sūtra:

> Rely on doctrine, but do not rely on persons.
> Rely on meaning, but do not rely on words.
> Rely on definitive meaning, but do not rely on interpretable meaning.
> Rely on exalted wisdom, but do not rely on consciousness.

Concerning this, there are six topics—positing the four reliances by way of persons, by way of times, by way of four validities, identifying the four to be relied upon, identifying the four not to be relied upon, and benefits of the four reliances.

1. The four reliances are posited respectively by way of distinctions of four persons who are pretentious, nihilistic, holding their own view to be supreme, and intent only on hearing because:

- The pretentious should rely on doctrine, but not on persons [who dissimulate so that the bad looks as if good].
- The nihilistic [who are intent on reciting secret formulas][305] should rely on meaning, but not on human words.
- Those holding their own view to be supreme [in the sense of holding how things appear to their senses to be their final

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gyi gsung rab dang nges don gyi gsung rab gang yin so sor ngos bzung ba la byed) whereas the latter "differentiating the interpretable and the definitive **with respect to** the scriptures," means to differentiate the interpretable and the definitive with respect to the *meaning* of the scriptures, this requiring extensive delineation of the presentation of the two truths, which itself requires realization of emptiness. Therefore, the latter cannot be required for realization of emptiness, whereas the former can. The latter is called (37.7) "differentiating the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meaning that is expressed within the scriptures" (*brjod bya don gyi drang nges 'byed pa*) whereas the former is called (38.5) "differentiating the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the words that are the means of expression" (*rjod byed tshig gi drang nges 'byed pa*). See *Reflections on Reality,* 99.

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mode of subsistence] should rely on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning.
- Those intent only on hearing should rely on exalted wisdom, but not on consciousness…

2. The four reliances are posited respectively in order not to lose out at four times:
- When understanding [that is, hearing] all doctrines, one should rely on doctrine, but not on persons [since if one takes as true all that is explained and does not analyze the meaning of words, one will not distinguish between the correct and the quasi].
- When holding all doctrines [without forgetting], one should rely on meaning, but not [be intent only] on persons' words.
- When closely investigating meaning, one should rely on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning [since if one merely takes conventionalities to mind, one will not gain ascertainment arisen from thinking with regard to the ultimate].
- When achieving doctrinal practices [of liberation], one should rely on exalted wisdom, but not on consciousness [since if one is satisfied with mere conceptual consciousnesses arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditation, one will not gain uncontaminated exalted wisdom in which clear perception of the meaning of reality is complete…

3. The four reliances indicate four validities, or four non-deceptives:
- The reasoning in "Rely on reasoning [that is, doctrine], but not on persons," is indicated to have validity.
- The meaning in "Rely on meaning, but not on human words," is indicated to have validity.
- The teacher in "Rely on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning," is indicated to have validity.
- The exalted wisdom in "Rely on exalted wisdom, but not on consciousness," is indicated to have validity because validity means non-deceptiveness…

4. On what should one rely? Four are described as to be relied upon because they have non-deceptive validity:
- Rely on doctrine [that is, scriptures].
- Rely on the meaning [of Buddha's thought, not the literal meaning].
- Rely on definitive meaning [that is, ascertained to be correct, not with wrong understanding].

- Rely on exalted [uncontaminated] wisdom…
  In the context of the Mind-Only School the literal are definitive meanings, whereas in the context of the Middle Way School the definitive has to mainly teach ultimate truth. Exalted wisdom is to be taken as the exalted wisdom of non-conceptual meditative equipoise of the three Superiors [that is, Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicle Superiors].

5. On what should one not rely? These must be stopped because they are not fit be valid…:
   - Do not rely on persons exemplified by those who abandon the doctrine.
   - Do not rely on words [that is, literal meanings].
   - Do not rely on interpretable meanings [that is, twisted by wrong thought].
   - Do not rely on consciousness [except for the exalted wisdom of individual self-knowledge]…
6. The four reliances have benefits:
   - By relying on doctrine, but not relying on persons one will not fall from the doctrine and thereby will not sever one's lineage.
   - By relying on meaning, but not relying on words one will not fall from analyzing the profound thought.
   - By relying on definitive meaning, but not relying on interpretable meaning one will not fall from hearing the meaning exactly as it is and thereby will not mistake the meaning of scripture.
   - By relying on exalted wisdom, but not relying on consciousness one will not fall from wisdom that has clear appearance and thereby will not fall from supramundane exalted wisdom…

FOUR REASONINGS

Through the four reasonings all words and meanings are delineated.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[306] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

1. The reasoning of dependence[a] is [from the viewpoint] that the arising of effects depends on causes and conditions. It is also an

[a] *ltos pa'i rigs pa, apekṣāyukti.*

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examination of the conventional, the ultimate, and their bases individually.

2. The reasoning of performance of function[a] is [from the viewpoint] that phenomena perform their respective functions, such as fire performing the function of burning. One examines, "This is the phenomenon; this is the functioning; it performs this function."
3. The reasoning of tenable proof[b] is to prove a meaning without contradicting valid cognition. It is an examination within considering whether [the meaning] has valid cognition—direct, inferential, or believable scripture.
4. The reasoning of nature[c] is to examine [from the viewpoint] of (1) natures renowned in the world, such as heat being the nature of fire and moisture being the nature of water, (2) inconceivable natures [such as placing a world-system in a single hair-pore], and (3) subsisting natures. It is done by way of believing in them and not contemplating other "reasons" for their not being like that.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[307] With respect to the thoughts and indirect intentions there are five topics—what is explained by them, the entities of those two, features of those two, whether they are interpretable or definitive, and analyzing whether they are mutually exclusive or not.

I. WHAT IS EXPLAINED BY THEM

The thoughts and intentions are means of explaining all scriptures.

II. ENTITIES OF THE THOUGHTS AND INDIRECT INTENTIONS

From between the two, thought and indirect intention, the first has four types:

Four Thoughts[d]

1. Thinking of sameness:[e] for instance, the statement "At that time, I was the Buddha Vipashyi," is in consideration of the sameness in truth body.
2. Thinking of another meaning:[f] for instance, "All phenomena

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a *bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa, kāryakāraṇayukti.*

b *'thad pas sgrub pa'i rigs pa, upapattisādhanayukti.*

c *chos nyid kyi rigs pa, dharmatāyukti.*

d *dgongs pa bzhi, catvāro 'bhiprāyā.*

e *mnyam pa nyid la dgongs pa, samatābhiprāya.*

f *don gzhan la dgongs pa, arthāntarābhiprāya.*

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are natureless," since the meaning is not literal [according to the Mind-Only School].

3. Thinking of another time:[a] for instance, "With regard to being born in the Blissful Pure Land, through merely planting wish-prayers you will be born there," since this is in consideration of [being born there upon the accumulation of causes and conditions at] another time.
4. Thinking of a person's attitude:[b] for instance, praising a particular root of virtue [such as giving] for one person, but deriding satisfaction with that for another…

Four Indirect Intentions[c]

1. Indirectly intending entry:[d] for instance, teaching "Forms and so forth exist" in order for Hearers to get rid of fear so that they could enter the teaching.
2. Indirectly intending the characters:[e] for instance, explaining that all phenomena are natureless and so forth, in consideration [of the three individual types of naturelessness] of the three characters (see 329).
3. Indirectly intending an antidote:[f] for instance, teaching in order to overcome eight faults:[308]
   - As an antidote to scorning the Buddha, using the first thought (see the thought of sameness above).
   - As an antidote to scorning scriptural doctrines, saying, for instance, "If you worship and serve Buddhas equal in numbers to the grains of sand of the Ganges, eventually realization of the Great Vehicle will be generated."…
   - As an antidote to the defilement of laziness, using a thought of another time (see the third thought above) and, for instance, the statement, "By merely uttering the name of the One-Gone-Thus Chandraprabhāvimāla[g] you will be definite with respect to unsurpassed enlightenment.
   - As an antidote to being satisfied with only a little, for instance, deriding giving and so forth for some, but praising

[a] *dus gzhan la dgongs pa, kālāntarābhiprāya.*
[b] *gang zag gi bsam pa la dgongs pa, pudgalāntarābhiprāya.*
[c] *ldem dgongs bzhi, catvāro 'bhisaṃdhaya.*
[d] *gzhug pa la ldem por dgongs pa, avatāranābhisaṃdhi.*
[e] *mtshan nyid la ldem por dgongs pa, lakṣaṇābhisaṃdhi.*
[f] *gnyen po la ldem por dgongs pa, pratipakṣābhisaṃdhi.*
[g] *zla 'od dri med;* the Sanskrit is a guess.

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them for others.

- As an antidote to desirous behavior, for instance, praising the wealth of Buddha Lands.
- As an antidote to prideful behavior, for instance, praising the wonders of certain Buddhas.
- As an antidote to regret, for instance, stating "Those who harm Buddhas and Bodhisattvas will be reborn in high status."
- As an antidote to defilements of indefiniteness and reversibility, for instance, prophesying [the Buddha enlightenment of] Hearers and speaking of one final vehicle.

4. Indirectly intending transformation:[a] This is to transform bad widespread literature into means of teaching profound meaning; for instance:

Know essencelessness as the essence,
Abide nicely in the obverse,
Be intensely afflicted with afflictions,
And holy enlightenment will be attained.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[309] Realization thinking, "One-pointed stability of mind *without distraction* is supreme, excellent, and chief," is called "knowing *essencelessness* as the essence"; this indicates the four levels of the Great Vehicle path of preparation, heat, peak, forbearance, and supreme mundane qualities. Not falling from direct realization of impurity, misery, impermanence, and selflessness—which are the obverse of apprehension of purity, bliss, permanence, and self—is called "abiding nicely in the obverse"; this indicates the Great Vehicle path of seeing. Making oneself physically tired through much asceticism for the sake of abandoning what is to be abandoned by the path of meditation is called "being intensely afflicted with afflictions"; this indicates the path of meditation from the second ground through the tenth. The final line says that if one does thus, holy enlightenment will be attained.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[310]

III. FEATURES OF THOUGHTS AND INDIRECT INTENTIONS

Interpretable sūtras whose thought must be explained as other than the literal reading, "In consideration of such and such," are those having a thought. The non-literal that are such that it must be

[a] *sbyor ba la ldem por dgongs pa/ bsgyur ba la ldem por dgongs pa, pariṇāmābhisaṃdhi*.

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explained, "It does not teach straight out, but the thought indicated with indirect speech is such and such," are those having indirect intention. Asvabhāva's[a] *Connected Explanation of (Asaṅga's) "Summary of the Great Vehicle"* says:

> Thought is only what is set in the mind; it is not asserted relative to another. Indirect intention is relative to another's apprehension.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[311] "Thought" (*dgongs pa, abhiprāyā*) is posited from the viewpoint of indicating the basis in [Buddha's] thought, "Thinking of this, [such and such] was said," and "indirect intention" (*ldem dgongs, abhisaṃdhaya*) is posited from the viewpoint of indicating purpose, "[Such and such] was said for this purpose." Since thought and indirect intention are posited by way of different modes of positing *with respect to one non-literal sūtra,* [a sūtra having an] indirect intention and [a sūtra having an] indirect thought must be asserted as mutually inclusive.[b] The basis in [Buddha's] thought is just what the Teacher has set in [the Buddha's] mind and is not relative to another—the trainee—whereas purpose definitely must rely on another, the trainee, since it is for sake of nurturing another.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[312]

IV. WHETHER THEY ARE INTERPRETABLE OR DEFINITIVE

All of these two require interpretation because of the features just explained…

V. ANALYZING WHETHER THEY ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE OR NOT

These two—[a sūtra having an] indirect intention and [a sūtra having an] indirect thought—are not mutually exclusive because, since they are distinguished in the manner of separate [conceptually] isolatable factors, their meanings are contained in even one sūtra [passage].[c]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[313] Whatever is a non-literal sūtra [passage] is necessarily both [a passage] indirectly intending

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[a] *ngo bo nyid med pa.*

[b] *don gcig.*

[c] As Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den says in his comment just above, they are mutually inclusive—whatever is [a sūtra having an] indirect intention is [a sūtra having an] indirect thought, and vice versa.

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transformation and [a passage having] a thought of another meaning.

c" How Texts are Divided into the Interpretable and Definitive through that way in the Mind-Only School {3}

This section has three parts: how the Followers of Scripture differentiate the interpretable and the definitive, how the Followers of Reasoning differentiate the interpretable and the definitive, and how the interpretable and the definitive are differentiated common to the Sūtra School and the Mind-Only School.

1: How Mind-Only Followers of Scripture Differentiate the Interpretable and the Definitive {2}

This section has two parts: how Followers of Scripture explain that the first wheel requires interpretation and how Followers of Scripture explain that the middle wheel requires interpretation.

A: How Mind-Only Followers of Scripture Explain that the First Wheel Requires Interpretation

The first requires interpretation because of scripture and the non-existence of external objects. In consideration of the appearance of objects, it is for the sake of entry.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The first wheel of doctrine indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] is of non-literal interpretable meaning:

- because of being damaged by:
    1. scriptures teaching that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character and teaching that apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are not established as separate substantial entities, and
    2. reasoning proving that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character and proving that external objects do not exist
- and because it is in consideration that imputational natures conventionally exist and that consciousnesses having appearance of external objects arise in dependence upon predispositions making the appearance of external objects

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- and because it is for the sake of trainees who for the time being are unfit to be taught the selflessness of phenomena, so that they will enter into realization of the selflessness of persons.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[314] The first wheel of doctrine is explained to require interpretation by way of four—basis [in Buddha's] thought,[a] purpose, damage to the explicit teaching, and thought.

I. BASIS [IN BUDDHA'S] THOUGHT

In consideration of ripened predispositions and appearances of [external] objects, [Buddha] spoke of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject [as separate substantial entities]. Vasubandhu's *The Twenty* says:[b]

> The Subduer spoke about these—
> The seeds from which cognitions respectively arise
> And the appearances [of forms]—
> In a dualistic way as [internal and external] sense-spheres[c] of those [cognitions].

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[315] In consideration of the existence of (1) seeds making the appearance of forms and (2) appearances as forms, [Buddha] said that the eye and the form sense-sphere that are external objects exist. By speaking of form and an

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[a] In this fourfold format of basis in (Buddha's) thought (*dgongs gzhi*), purpose (*dgos pa*), damage to the explicit teaching (*dngos la gnod byed*), and thought (*dgongs pa*) *dgongs* should not be translated as "intention," since this would too easily be confused with *dgos pa* ("purpose" or "intention").

[b] Stanza 9; the Sanskrit in Lévi (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,* 5.25) is:

yataḥ svabījādvijñaptiryadābhāsā pravartate/
dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munirabravīt//

See also Chatterjee, *Vijñapti-Mātratā-Siddhi,* 9.1. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 234. Vasubandhu's own commentary on this stanza is:

> Regarding (1) the seeds—the respective seeds that have undergone a type of transformation [that is, have thoroughly ripened]—from which the cognitions that perceive forms arise and (2) those appearances, the Supramundane Victor respectively spoke of an eye-sense-sphere and a form-sense-sphere of that cognition.

The bracketed material is from Vinītadeva's *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) [Auto] Commentary on the "Twenty Stanza Treatise"* (*rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad, prakaraṇaviṃśakāṭīkā*), P5566, vol. 113, 318.4.4; Vinītadeva glosses *pariṇāmaviśeṣaprāptād* with what in the extant Tibetan is *yongs su smin pa.* See also Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 165; and Thomas A. Kochumuttom, *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 265.

[c] *skye mched, āyatana.*

eye consciousness apprehending form as cause and effect, this comes to be saying that apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are different substantial entities because fully qualified cause and effect are necessarily different substantial entities. This is like, for example, the fact that by [Buddha's] speaking of the aggregates as a burden and the person as the carrier of the burden, this comes to be speaking of the aggregates and the person as different entities.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[316]
II. PURPOSE
Vasubandhu's *The Twenty* says:[a]

> That form-sense-spheres and so forth exist [as external objects][317]
> Was said through the force of a thought behind it
> With regard to beings tamed by that,
> Like [the teaching of] spontaneously arisen sentient beings [as substantially established or permanent].

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[318] [Buddha] said that forms and so forth are established as external objects in order that Hearers who are [temporarily] unfit to be taught the selflessness of phenomena could abandon their fear so that they could enter the teaching. This is like, for example, [his] saying—in consideration of sentient beings of the intermediate state—that spontaneously produced sentient beings substantially exist, this being for the sake of teaching those having nihilistic views that a person who is the basis of the connection of actions and effects exists. Teaching that an eye consciousness seeing form arises in dependence upon an eye and a form is intended [for the sake of entering into][319] realization that a person's seeing a form is merely imputed to the eye consciousness's seeing a form and thus that a personal self who is a seer of form and exists apprehendable as a separate substantial entity from an eye consciousness does not exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[320]

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[a] Stanza 8. The Sanskrit in Lévi (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,* 5.25) is:

rūpādyāyatanāstitvaṃ tadvineyajanaṃ prati/
abhiprāyavaśāduktamupapādukasatvavat//

See also Chatterjee, *Vijñapti-Mātratā-Siddhi,* 8.5. See also Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu,* 165; and Kochumuttom, *Buddhist Doctrine of Experience,* 264-265.

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III. DAMAGE TO THE EXPLICIT TEACHING

The existence of sense-spheres that are external objects is both the topic expressed and the literal reading [of the first wheel of doctrine]. Scriptural damage to this is, for instance, contradiction by:

- the statement in the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds,*[321] "O Conqueror Children, it is thus: These three realms are mind-only."
- sūtra passages teaching that imputational natures are not established by way of their own character.

With respect to [damage by] reasoning,[a] Vasubandhu's *The Twenty* says:[b]

Due to simultaneous conjunction with six [particles]
A particle has six parts.
Also, if the six were in the same place,
Even a mass would be of the size of a particle.

and Dharmakīrti's *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition* says:

Because of the certainty of simultaneous observation,
Blue and an awareness of it are not other.

and so forth, and Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says:

When things are analyzed,
They do not exist as things in suchness
Because they do not have
A nature of one or many.

and Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[322]

Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,
Because manifold, and because unrestricted,
There are the contradictions of being in the essence of that, of many entities,
And of the mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven.[c]

D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence:*[323] *Establishing [through the first reasoning]*[324] *that other-powered natures are empty of the imputational nature due to its being contradictory [for the imputational nature] to be in the essence of that phenomenon:* Let us express—in a way easy to understand—how this is. If a bulbous thing's[d] being a

[a] For a presentation of eleven reasonings, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 465-487.

[b] Stanza 12.

[c] For more discussion of this reasoning see 391.

[d] *lto ldir ba.* "Bulbous thing" is an abbreviation for the definition of pot: that which is bulbous, flat-based, and able to hold water [that is, fluid] (*lto ldir zhab zhum chu skyor gyi*

referent or foundation of the convention "pot" were established by way of the bulbous thing's own mode of subsistence or its own character, it would not be posited through the force of terminology [that is, language], in which case even an awareness that has the terminology ["pot"] as its object would not depend upon [making the connection of] the terminology [to the object through being taught language]. Hence, an awareness thinking "pot" with respect to a bulbous thing would [absurdly] be generated [just from seeing the bulbous thing][325] prior to imputing the name "pot" [that is to say, prior to learning that it is called "pot"].

Establishing [through the second reasoning[326] *that other-powered natures are empty of the imputational nature] by way of the contradiction that just one object would be many entities of objects:* According to the other party [who holds that an object's being a referent of the convention of its name is established by way of the mode of subsistence of the object], the usage of many names such as Shakra,[a] Indra,[b] Grāmaghātaka,[c] and so forth for one object must be by way of the force of the thing itself [since, according to the other party, this god is established by way of his own character as the referent of those names],[327] and [in that case][328] just as [different meanings dependent upon each of those names][329] appear [individually][330] to conceptual consciousnesses, so [the one object, the sole Shakra, would have to][331] subsist in fact [as individual objects],[332] whereby the [one] object would [absurdly] become many.

Establishing [through the third reasoning[333] *that other-powered natures are empty of the imputational nature] by way of the contradiction that the entities of unmixed objects would be mixed:* According to the other party, when the one name "Upagupta"[d] is used for two beings, there is no difference in [the fact that] an awareness thinking, "This is Upagupta," is generated [with regard to both of

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don byed nus pa).

[a] *brgya byin.*

[b] *dbang po.*

[c] *grong 'joms.* Perhaps also *Nagaraghātaka;* see *Mahāvyutpatti* (*Bon-zō-kan-wa yon'yaku taiko Mahabuyuttopatti*, ed. by Sakaki Ryōzaburō, 2 vols. [Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1981]; reprint, *Quadralingual Mahāvyutpatti,* reproduced by Lokesh Chandra [New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1981]), 3847 and 3848; or Puraṃdara; thanks to Christian Lindtner for the latter.

[d] *nyer sbas.* The life story of Upagupta is told in *The Aśokāvadāna* translated and published in John S. Strong, *The Legend and Cult of Upagupta: Sanskrit Buddhism in North India and Southeast Asia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

them], and [if those two persons of different continuums are established by way of their own character as referents of the one name "Upagupta"][334] the names of those [two][335] and the conceptual consciousnesses [that are aware of such would have to][336] operate with respect to those two [persons][337] through the force of the things themselves. Therefore, those two objects[—the two persons of different continuums—absurdly][338] would be one object [that is, would be one person with one continuum].[339]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[340]

IV. THOUGHT

The basis in [Buddha's] thought of this [first wheel] and the thought of this [first wheel] are not equivalent because these are in accord with the foremost precious [D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] statements in *The Essence of Eloquence*]:[a]

> The [basis in Buddha's] thought when he spoke of the eye sense-sphere and visible-form sense-sphere as existing is that he said this in consideration of (a) the respective seed called a "predisposition of fruition," from the ripening of which an eye consciousness arises, and (b) the appearance [of form]; but the meaning of [Buddha's] thought is not suitable to be the meaning that is expressed by those Low Vehicle sūtras.

and [concerning the thought of this first wheel]:

> The existence of sense-spheres that are external objects is explained as the meaning of Low Vehicle sūtras.

For, since the Sovereign of Subduers did not accept to teach the intended trainees of these [first wheel] sūtras the basis in [his] thought—that although external objects do not exist, the appearance of objects arises through the force of internal, ripened predispositions—this is not to be expressed to those trainees and is not the thought [of the first wheel of doctrine], and this is an occasion when those of the Lesser Vehicle are not suitable as vessels to realize this.

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[a] Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 254. For the sake of clarity the first quote has been lengthened to include the material up to "but." The lack of equivalence between the basis in Buddha's thought of the first wheel of doctrine and the thought of the first wheel of doctrine is emphasized since, as will be seen below, there is such an equivalence with regard to the middle wheel of doctrine.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

B: How Mind-Only Followers of Scripture Explain that the Middle Wheel Requires Interpretation {3}

This section has three parts: the thought behind the statements that [all phenomena] are natureless, the thought behind the statements that [all phenomena are] unproduced and so forth, and the thought behind the explanation of forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production.

1* Thought behind the Statements that [All Phenomena] are Natureless {2}

This section has two parts: the basis in [Buddha's] thought and damages to the explicit teaching.

a Basis in [Buddha's] Thought behind the Statements that [All Phenomena] are Natureless*

The middle, the Great Vehicle sūtras on the profound, are not literal because of being in consideration of the non-natures of the three characters.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The middle wheel of doctrine indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*], the Great Vehicle sūtras extensively teaching the profound path, is not literal because the statement that all phenomena are natureless is in consideration of the naturelessness of the three characters.[a]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[341] The middle wheel of doctrine indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] is the supreme of sūtra sets extensively teaching the Great Vehicle profound path through limitless forms, but it is of non-literal interpretable meaning because the sūtra words in those sūtras [saying] that all phenomena ranging from forms through to exalted knowers-of-all-aspects are, without difference, natureless. They have a basis in [Buddha's] thought because they are in consideration of the [three] naturelessnesses of the [three] characters. The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[342]
>
> > Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of three non-natures of phenomena—character-non-nature,[b] production-non-nature,[a] and

[a] See the reasoning in the next section.

[b] *mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid, lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 67 [3], n. 3).

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

ultimate-non-nature[b]—I taught [in the middle wheel of the teaching],[343] "All phenomena are natureless."[344]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[345] Imputational natures are described as character-non-natures because of not being established by way of their own character. Moreover, the meaning of not being established by way of their own character is to be taken as being established without reliance on names and terminology;[c] it is not to be taken, as the [Consequentialist] Proponents of Non-Nature do, as not established from their own side.

Other-powered natures are described as production-non-natures, that is, not being produced under their own power. Moreover, the meaning of not being produced under their own power is to be taken as not produced without depending on causes and conditions.

Thoroughly established natures are described as ultimate-non-natures because of being the ultimate, and the ultimate is just distinguished by [that is to say, is posited[d] by way of] the non-existence of the nature of self that is the object of negation [in the selflessness of phenomena].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[346] and Vasubandhu's *The Thirty*[e] also says:[347]

Thinking of three types of non-nature
Of the three types of natures [respectively],[348]
He taught [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras][349]
That all phenomena are natureless.

and Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments* also says:[350]

Question: Thinking of what did the Supramundane Victor say [in the middle wheel][351] that all phenomena are natureless?

Answer: Here and there[f] he said such through the force of

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a *skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid, utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā* (ibid., 67 [3], n. 4).

b *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid, paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* (ibid., 67 [3], n. 5).

c *brda;* to avoid redundancy with "names" this is taken to mean conceptuality (*rtog pa*). See Hopkins, *Absorption in No External World,* #104.

d D̄zong-ka-b̄a (Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 91) glosses the frequently used technical term *rab tu phye ba* with *bzhag pa,* which merely has the sense of "posit"; his reading, therefore, runs contrary to Lamotte's translation (194.6) as "***est manifesté*** par l'irréalité de toutes les choses."

e See Hopkins, *Absorption in No External World,* #61.

f Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 160.4) cogently suggests that "here and there"

taming[a] [trainees],[352] thinking of three types of non-nature.

Moreover, [the teaching that all phenomena are natureless] is in consideration of [the naturelessness of] the three characteristics of compounded things [that is, that things are not produced under their own power, do not abide under their own power, and do not disintegrate under their own power],[353] and in consideration of the non-existence [of natures] as conceived by childish beings [who conceive forms and so forth to be pure, blissful, permanent, and self and to be separate entities from the consciousnesses apprehending them].[354] Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:[355]

> Because [things] are not [produced in the future from] themselves
> And because [having ceased, past objects are] not [produced again] as having their own nature
> And because [present objects] do not abide [for a second moment] in their own entity
> And because [the natures of objects] conceived [by childish beings] do not exist,
> Naturelessness was asserted [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras].

and Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge*[356] says:

> What is the thought behind the statements in the Very Extensive [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] that all phenomena are natureless? [That is said] because:
> - [things] do not arise [in the future] by themselves
> - [past objects, having ceased,] are not [produced again] as having their own nature
> - [present objects] do not abide [for a second moment] in their own entity, and

(*de dang der*) may mean either "in this and that sūtra" (*mdo de dang der*) or "to this and that trainee" (*gdul bya de dang der*).

[a] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (ibid., 164.2) reports that Ḏra-ḏi Ge-s̄hay Rin-chen-dön-drup (*pra sti dge bshes rin chen don grub, Ornament for the Thought,* 18.16) interprets "through the force of taming" (*'dul ba'i dbang gis*) as "through the force of taming trainees having the lineage of the Middle Way School by means of the literal reading" (*gdul bya dbu ma pa'i rigs can sgras zin des 'dul ba'i dbang gis*). However, Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso points out that Ḏzong-ka-ḏba himself in the section on the Consequence School glosses "through the force of taming" (*'dul ba'i dbang gis*) with "through the force of trainees' thought" (*gdul bya'i bsam pa'i dbang gis;* Sarnath gtsang edition, 207). It seems to me that both expositions are suitable.

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- [objects] do not have characters as they are apprehended by childish beings.

b Damages to the Explicit Teaching that [All Phenomena] are Natureless*

It is not suitable to be literal; this would deprecate.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The middle wheel of doctrine indicated here [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*], the Great Vehicle sūtras extensively teaching the profound path, is not literal also[a] because the statement that all phenomena are natureless is not suitable to be literal and because if the statement that all phenomena are natureless is held to be literal, this would deprecate all three characters.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[357] There are two types of damages, scripture and reasoning. Scriptural damage exists because [the statement that all phenomena are natureless] contradicts many sūtra passages [of the wheel of doctrine] of good differentiation; for instance, the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[358]
>
> > Even though they have interest in that doctrine [of the profound thoroughly established nature], they do not understand, just as it is, the profound reality that I have set forth with a thought behind it.[b] With respect to the meaning of these doctrines, they adhere to the terms as only literal: "All these phenomena are only natureless. All these phenomena are only unproduced, only unceasing, only quiescent from the start, only naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow." Due to that, they acquire the view that all phenomena do not exist and the view that [establishment of objects by way of their own][359] character does not exist. Moreover, having acquired the view of nihilism and the view of the non-existence of [establishment of objects by way of their own] character, they deprecate all phenomena in terms of all of the characters—deprecating the imputational character of phenomena and also deprecating the other-

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[a] Continuing from the word commentary in the immediately previous section.

[b] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 202.2) points out that as the reason why they do not understand it, Wonch'uk says that "they do not have a nature of honesty and just dwell in their own view"; Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso takes these to mean that they are not unbiased and are attached to their own view.

He (202.1) glosses "set forth with a thought behind it" (*dgongs te bshad pa*) with "set forth non-literally" (*sgra ji bzhin pa min par bshad pa*).

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> powered character and thoroughly established character of phenomena.
>
> Why? Paramārthasamudgata, it is thus: If the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character exist [by way of their own character],[360] the imputational character is known [that is, is possible]. However, those who perceive the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character as without character[a] [that is to say, as not being established by way of their own character] also deprecate the imputational character. Therefore, those [persons] are said to deprecate even all three aspects of characters.

The damage by reasoning is the reasonings refuting the extreme of deprecation; these will be explained below (362). According to the literal reading, [this statement that all phenomena are natureless], deprecates all three characters.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[361] If other-powered natures were not established by way of their own character, then both other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures would not exist, and if those two do conventionally exist, imputational natures also would not exist because the bases of imputing imputational natures and even the imputers' conventions would not exist.

[In that citation from the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] "the view that all phenomena do not exist" is a brief indication; it should be taken as the view that all phenomena are empty of true existence. "The view that the characters do not exist"[b] is an extensive explanation because it should be taken as three views deprecating the imputed, conceptuality, and suchness.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[362] Not only that, but also there would be internal contradictions in the [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtras; Vasubandhu's *Principles of Explanation* says:[363]

> The Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtras] indicate many times, for instance, that all phenomena are natureless and so forth.

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[a] This is a source showing that according to the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* thoroughly established natures are established by way of their own character.

[b] The translation above as "the view that [establishment of objects by way of their own] character does not exist" follows D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations* (27.3) and differs from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's cogent exposition that the reference is to three views deprecating, respectively, the three characters.

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> However, they say that those who wish to enter into the flawlessness of Bodhisattvas [should train in the Perfection of Wisdom] and…[364] they also teach the individual disclosure of all ill deeds, and so forth.

Having explained that, [Vasubandhu shows that if naturelessness and so forth were literal, there would be internal contradictions]:[365]

> If the words of naturelessness and so forth [in the Mother Sūtras] were of only literal meaning, they would contradict all of these. As there would be nothing to be adopted [in practice], it would not be suitable to adopt [a practice] within thinking, "From this cause such and such will arise." Or, one would wonder what thing to be adopted exists to be adopted. Therefore, those words [speaking of naturelessness] [366] definitely should not be taken as of literal meaning. Then, as what? As having another thought [behind them].[a]

2* Thought behind the Statements that [All Phenomena are] Unproduced and so forth

Because of not being produced and so forth in that way, they are unproduced and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because the three characters are unproduced and so forth [that is, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow] in just the way that they are natureless, [Buddha] spoke of [all phenomena] as unproduced and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[367] The basis in [Buddha's] thought when he said that [all phenomena] are unproduced and so forth is explained in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,* and Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* as being in consideration that just as natures of the three characters do not exist, so they are not produced and so forth. The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[368]

> Paramārthasamudgata, with respect to this, thinking of just those three types of non-nature, the One-Gone-Thus, by way of the aspect of setting forth sūtras of interpretable meaning, taught doctrine in this way, "All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow."

and condensing the meaning of that, Maitreya's *Ornament for the*

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[a] *dgongs pa can.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Great Vehicle Sūtras says:[369]

> Since each serves as the basis of the latter,
> Due to naturelessness are established
> Non-production, non-ceasing, quiescence from the start,
> And naturally passed beyond sorrow.

and Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* says:[370]

> [The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say that all phenomena are natureless] by reason of the fact that imputational factors are natureless in the sense of not having character [that is, establishment by way of their own character], other-powered natures are natureless in the sense of not having [self-]production, and thoroughly established natures are the ultimate-non-nature.
>
> What is the thought giving rise [to the statements that all phenomena are] "unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow"?
>
> In just the ways that they are natureless, so they are not produced. In just the ways that they are not produced, so they do not cease. In just the ways that they are not produced and do not cease, so they are quiescent from the start. In those ways, they are naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.[a]

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[a] This is how Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's followers flesh out Asaṅga's presentation:

- Imputational natures are said to be "unproduced" because they are not produced by way of their own character. They are said to be "unceased" because they do not cease by way of their own character. They are said to be quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow because they are not afflicted phenomena, since they are uncompounded
- Other-powered natures are said to be "unproduced, unceasing" because they are not produced by their own power without depending on conditions and do not cease by their own power. They are said to be "quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow" because without depending on conditions they do not exist as thoroughly afflicted phenomena
- Thoroughly established natures are said to be "unproduced, unceasing" because they are not produced and do not cease as the nature that is a self of phenomena or because they are the suchness that is not produced and does not cease as either a self of persons or a self of phenomena. They are said to be "quiescent from the start" and "naturally passed beyond sorrow" because they are without afflictions that are the nature of a self of phenomena, that is, without afflictions that are established by way of their own character as referents of conceptual consciousnesses. On this occasion, "sorrow" consists of the afflictive emotions. Or, in another way, thoroughly established natures are said to be "quiescent from the start" and "naturally passed beyond sorrow" because of being naturally passed beyond the afflictions, in the sense of not being either established as a substantially existent person or established by way of their own character as the referents of

Moreover, the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* speaks of the thought behind the statement that phenomena are not produced and so forth upon associating it with [only] two [of the three] characters:

- Imputational natures are not established by way of their own character, due to which they are not produced and do not cease, and hence they are quiescent from the start and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow, that is, not suitable to be afflicted.
- Thoroughly established natures are not produced and do not cease since the noumenon does not differ in terms of former and later times, and hence they are quiescent from the start and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow, that is, not suitable to be afflicted.

The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[371]

> Concerning that, thinking of just character-non-natures [that is, thinking of just imputational factors which are not established by way of their own character], I taught that all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.
>
> Why? Paramārthasamudgata, it is thus: That which does not exist by way of its own character is not produced.[a] That which is not produced does not cease. That which is not produced and does not cease is from the start quiescent. That which is quiescent from the start is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow [that is, naturally devoid of the afflictive emotions without depending on an antidote].[372] That which is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow does not have the least thing to pass beyond sorrow.

and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* also says:[373]

> Moreover, thinking of just the ultimate-non-nature, which is distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena, I taught, "All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, from the start quiescent, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow."
>
> Why? It is thus: Just the ultimate-non-nature which is distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena only subsists in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time.[b]

conceptual consciousnesses and words.

[a] This sentence clearly sets forth the position that all products are established by way of their own character (Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 208.3).

[b] *rtag pa rtag pa'i dus* (*nityaṃ nitya-kālaṃ*) and *ther zug ther zug gi dus* (*dhruvaṃ dhruva-*

> It is the uncompounded final reality[a] of phenomena, devoid of all afflictive emotions. Because that uncompounded [nature] which subsists for permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time in the aspect of just that reality is uncompounded, it is unproduced and unceasing. Because it is devoid of all afflictive emotions, it is quiescent from the start and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

"Permanent, permanent time" is former, former time and "everlasting, everlasting time" is later, later time.

3* Thought behind the Explanation of Forbearance with respect to the Doctrine of Non-Production

Forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production is by way of eight—itself, other, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The statements [in sūtra] about attaining forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production[b] are by way of eight bases in [Buddha's] thought:

1. No production of a beginning to cyclic existence
2. No production again—of what was produced before—as itself
3. No new production of other [sentient beings] who did not exist earlier [and no production of other phenomena that did not exist earlier since something of similar type to what ceased earlier is produced][c]
4. No production of imputational natures by way of their own character
5. No production of other-powered natures under their own power [without relying on their respective conditions]
6. No production of change in thoroughly established natures
7. No production of afflictive emotions in [Foe Destroyers] who have

kālaṃ), (Noriaki Hakamaya, "A Consideration on the Byams Shus kyi Le'u," *Indobukkyogaku Kenkyu,* 14, no. 1 [Dec. 1975]: 28). My thanks to John C. Powers for the citation. Lamotte (*Saṃdhinirmocana,* 70 [9], n. 2) has *nityakālaṃ* and *śāśvatakālaṃ.*

[a] *chos nyid, dharmatā.*

[b] A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 223.2) takes "attaining forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production" as referring to attaining forbearance, that is, facility, with respect to the meaning of the selflessness of phenomena. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 505.6) adds that through ascertaining the meaning of the non-production of phenomena upon taking the eight non-productions as reasons, one attains forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production, that is, selflessness.

[c] Production is a case of the cause's ceasing and something of a similar type being produced.

attained knowledge of the extinction [of afflictive emotions]

8. No production of enhancements in a truth body.[a]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[374] Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:[375]

> Forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production is set forth
> In terms of a beginning [of cyclic existence],[b] of [phenomena already produced being produced again in that entity] itself, of the other [that is, a sentient being who did not exist earlier in cyclic existence],
> Of the own-character [of imputational natures], of self [that is to say, self-production of other-powered natures], of [thoroughly established natures] becoming other,
> Of the afflictive emotions [in those who have attained knowledge of extinction], and of enhancement [of a Buddha's Truth Body].

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[376] Since there are also cases of calling the clearing away of non-interest and non-faith "attaining forbearance," the term does not necessarily have to refer to clearing away an earlier presence of fear, but the generation of fear with respect to the eight non-productions is also feasible because there are cases of:

- generating fear with respect to the first and third non-productions due to the non-existence of a beginning not fitting into one's mind
- generating fear with respect to the second non-production due to innate conceptions of earlier and later [phenomena] to be

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[a] Gung-tang (*Annotations, 'u,* 114.3) explains that Maitreya's reasons for choosing merely these eight are threefold:

1. To dispel contradictions adduced by the Proponents of Truly Existent External Objects who attempt to prove that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are not the word of Buddha, by claiming that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras deprecate the presentations of entry into cyclic existence and reversal into nirvāṇa
2. To refute the Proponents of Non-Nature who claim that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are literally acceptable
3. To answer the argument by the Proponents of Non-Nature that the Proponents of Mind-Only deprecate the non-production that is the object with respect to which forbearance is attained.

[b] A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 222.1) glosses "cyclic existence" with compounded phenomena (*'dus byas*).

one and due to innate conceptions of permanence

- generating fear with respect to the fourth and sixth non-productions due to adhering to a self of phenomena
- generating fear with respect to the fifth non-production due to obscuration about actions and their effects
- generating fear with respect to the seventh non-production due to discriminating that the self is annihilated
- generating fear with respect to the eighth non-production due to a Buddha's qualities of inconceivable mysteries [of body, speech, and mind] not fitting into one's mind.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The term "and so forth" [in the root text] is explained as including the bases in [Buddha's] thought for the statement that there is one final vehicle, for the statement that [phenomena] are not existent, are not non-existent, and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[377] [According to Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*] there are seven bases in [Buddha's] thought for the teaching of one final vehicle:

1. the sameness of the element of attributes of the three persons [that is, Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas]
2. the sameness of the three persons as selfless
3. the sameness of release [from cyclic existence] that is a fruit of the three vehicles
4. that even two separate lineages [that is, some of those having indefinite lineage and those definite in the Great Vehicle lineage] engage in one [Great Vehicle] path
5. attainment of two attitudes—the similarity of:
    - the attitude of sameness, gained by the One-Gone-Thus, gained from the first Bodhisattva ground, this being non-dualism with respect to one's own and sentient beings' [final] natures, and
    - the attitude gained for just a moment by some definite in the Hearer lineage who temporarily practice the Bodhisattva deeds but give them up, enter the Hearer Vehicle, and then when they have attained a Hearer nirvāṇa, through the Buddha's power think—in accordance with the One-Gone-Thus's previous thought, "I became buddhafied through practicing the Bodhisattva deeds"—"I will become fully purified through practicing the Bodhisattva deeds."
6. that many times emanations of the Buddha display the manner of passing beyond sorrow by way of the Hearer Vehicle

7. that there is no other vehicle surpassing the Great Vehicle.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[378] The statement in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras:*

> Because of the sameness of the [element of] attributes, selflessness,
> And release, because of different lineages,
> Because of attainment of two attitudes, because of emanations,
> Because of finality, just one vehicle.

is in accordance with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:*

> Mañjushrī, with respect to the body of release Ones-Gone-Thus, Hearers, and Solitary Realizers are similar and equal.

and the seventh chapter [of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*]:[379]

> This is the sole path of purification of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas, and the purification is also one; there is no second. In consideration of this, I teach one vehicle.

The teaching of one final vehicle has a purpose because it is for the sake of leading Hearers having indefinite lineage and nurturing Bodhisattvas having indefinite lineage.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[380] Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle*[a] explains that:

1. imputational natures are indicated by way of enumerations of non-existence
2. other-powered natures are indicated by way of eight examples

[a] Chapter 2:

> Magical illusions and so forth are taught in relation to the dependent.
> Non-existence is taught in relation to the imputational.
> The four purities are taught
> In relation to the thoroughly established.

> *'byung rten sgyu ma la sogs bstan//*
> *btags la brten nas med pa bstan//*
> *rnam par byang ba bzhi brten nas//*
> *yongs su grub pa bstan pa yin//*

Étienne Lamotte, *La somme du grand véhicule d'Asaṅga,* reprint, 2 vols. Publications de l'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain, 8 (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1973), vol. 1, 38 (II.26); vol. 2, 122; and John P. Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaṅga: Translated from the Chinese of Paramārtha* (Berkeley, Calif.: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992), 52. Lamotte (vol. 2, 122) refers to the "Abhidarmasūtra, dans Madhyāntavibhaṅga, 112" and gives the Sanskrit: *māyādideśanā bhūte kalpitān nāstideśanā/ caturvidhaviśuddhes tu pariniṣpannadeśanā//.*

such as a magician's illusion
3. thoroughly established natures are indicated by way of four purities.

With respect to the meaning of those:

1. Indications of imputational natures in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras by the five—natureless, unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow—are done in terms of both indicating on the literal level non-existent imputational natures and refuting on the level of the meaning intended[a] the imputational natures that are the respective objects of negation.
2. With respect to the indication of other-powered natures by way of eight examples,[381] they are indicated to be like:
    - [a magician's] illusions in order to overcome the doubt wondering how one could observe objects
    - mirages in order to overcome doubt wondering how minds and mental factors arise without external objects
    - dreams in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, one gets involved in activities of desire and non-desire
    - reflections in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, one could accomplish the wanted effects of virtuous actions and the unwanted effects of non-virtuous actions
    - hallucinations in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, the varieties of consciousness arise
    - echoes in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, the varieties of expressions arise
    - a moon [reflected in] water in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, the objects of activities of correct meditative stabilization arise
    - emanations in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, Bodhisattvas are born in accordance with their thought [to accomplish the aims of sentient beings].
3. The four purities are the natural purity which is thusness [that is, emptiness], the stainless purity which is nirvāṇa, the true

[a] *dgongs don.*

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path purity which are the paths attaining nirvāṇa, and the observational purity generating those paths which is the Great Vehicle scriptural collections.[382] The first two are actual thoroughly established natures; the latter two are designated as thoroughly established natures due to being [respectively] consciousnesses realizing [the actual thoroughly established nature] and causes of realizing [the actual thoroughly established nature].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[383] Since various statements that way in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are described as antidotes to Bodhisattvas' ten distracting conceptualizations (see 394ff.), the claim that their purpose is to overcome views of permanence is not correct. Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:

In all Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtras] non-conceptual exalted wisdom is taught as an antidote to ten distracting conceptualizations.

2: How Mind-Only Followers of Reasoning Differentiate the Interpretable and the Definitive {2}

This section has two parts: how Followers of Reasoning explain that the first wheel requires interpretation and how Followers of Reasoning explain that the middle wheel requires interpretation.

A: How Mind-Only Followers of Reasoning Explain that the First Wheel Requires Interpretation

[There is no root text for this section.]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[384] The basis in [Buddha's] thought [for the first wheel of doctrine] is as before (324). With respect to the purpose, Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says:

He, leaving aside the teaching of suchness,
Adopting an elephant's mode of perception,
Only out of an attitude of mercy for the world
Caused them to engage in distinguishing external objects.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[385] Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Cognition"' says:

> For the perspective of the thought of certain trainees the Supramundane Victor, temporarily leaving aside the teaching of suchness, only out of an attitude of mercy for the world caused them to engage in distinguishing external objects—adopting an elephant's style of looking, as if he did not know the non-existence of external objects although he knew.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[386] The scriptures and reasonings damaging the explicit teaching are those described above (326). The thought is also similar (328).

B: HOW MIND-ONLY FOLLOWERS OF REASONING EXPLAIN THAT THE MIDDLE WHEEL REQUIRES INTERPRETATION

For the master Dharmakīrti also, in consideration of the non-existence of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as other substantial entities it was explained there.

Word Commentary on Root Text: For the master Dharmakīrti also, in consideration of[a] the non-existence of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as other substantial entities it was explained there [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] that all phenomena do not truly exist.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[387] The basis in [Buddha's] thought for the statements in the middle wheel of doctrine that all phenomena are natureless and are without the nature of production, cessation, and so forth is the non-existence of production and so forth in accordance with how apprehended-object and apprehending-subject appear dualistically to an awareness polluted by dualistic appearance differentiating the production and so forth of things. Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says:[388]
>
> > [That the production, abiding, and disintegration that characterize] things abide as different [is differentiated in]

[a] In his commentary Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a himself applies the one phrase "For the master Dharmakīrti also, in consideration of" to both this section and the next, and thus I have repeated it in both root texts and in both word-commentaries. Also, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a repeats the term "specifically characterized" (*rang mtshan*) when citing the root text in this section and in the next section despite its occurring only once, but as Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den says, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a does not use the term when commenting on either of the two, and also it does not seem to make particular sense in either of them; therefore, I have not included it.

Dependence upon [a consciousness having dualistic appearance to which] those [appear as] different.
That [appearance of a difference of entity of subject and object] is just polluted [by predispositions of ignorance].
Hence their difference is also polluted [or false since they are not established in accordance with their appearance as external objects].

Aside from aspects of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject,
There are no defining characters that have an otherness [of entity].
Due to the fact that defining characters are empty,
[The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] explain that [phenomena] are without an inherent nature.

With respect to the purpose, Dignāga's statement that it is as an antidote to the ten distracted conceptualizations is in accordance with Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* (342). The damages to the explicit [reading] are in accordance with [the system] common to the Sūtra School and the Mind-Only School, and accord with Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments*.

Therefore, in the system of this [master Dharmakīrti] also[a] the final wheel of doctrine is of literal definitive meaning.

3: Way the Interpretable and the Definitive are Differentiated Common to the Sūtra School [Following Reasoning] and the Mind-Only School

For the master Dharmakīrti also, in consideration of the object and agent of cause and effect, definition and definiendum, and so forth it was explained there.

Word Commentary on Root Text: For the master Dharmakīrti also, in consideration of the absence of true existence of the factors of object and agent in cause and effect, definition and definiendum, and so forth it was explained there [in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] that all phenomena do not truly exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[389] The Sūtra School's

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[a] The word "also" (*'ang*) is likely Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's splicing of the word "also" (*kyang*) in his root text into his commentary, and thus the meaning of this sentence has to be read into the root text.

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assertion is, as was explained on the occasion of the Sūtra School (268ff.), that the first wheel of doctrine is of definitive meaning and the latter two require interpretation. In the mode of explanation common to the Sūtra School and the Mind-Only School, the basis in [Buddha's] thought for the statements in the middle wheel of doctrine that all phenomena are characterless is the absence of true existence of the factors of object and agent since:

- the factor of [a definition] such as "that which is bulbous, flat-based, and able to hold water"[a] being the means of characterization is the means [or agent]
- the factor of [a definiendum] such as "pot" being the object characterized is the object, and
- if such factors of object and agent were truly established, definiendum and definition— pot and that which is bulbous, flat-based, and able to hold water—would [absurdly] not be just different by way of [conceptual] isolates within one basis.

Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says:[390]

> The feature of agent [and object involved] in all definitions
> In terms of specifics such as aggregates and so forth
> Are not suchness [that is, not established by way of their own character].
> Due to this also, those [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say that][391] these are devoid of character [that is, establishment by way of their own character].

The term "also" [indicates] that not only the [ones described] earlier but also this is suitable to be the basis in [Buddha's] thought and that not only Proponents of Mind-Only but also Proponents of Sūtra assert this.[b]

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a gives the definition of a form "that which is suitable as form," but I have substituted the definition of a pot since it is more evocative. The quotes around the definition merely are added for the sake of setting it off; they do not indicate that a definition is words; rather, it is said that a definition is the meaning, and the definiendum is the name (without the implication that all definiendums are words). Definitions are considered to be the actual things, not verbal descriptions; the *words* describing, or defining, an object would indeed be a different entity from the thing being defined, and thus it is obvious that the discussion is not about the relationship between word and object.

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a takes "also" as meaning that Hearer sectarians also (*kyang*) are included in positing the thought behind the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras this way. J̄ang-ḡya Röl-b̄ay-dor-jay (*Presentation of Tenets,* 129.2-130.3) objects to this on the grounds that Devendrabuddhi's and Prajñākaragupta's commentaries as well as those by D̄zong-ka-b̄a's

The damages to the explicit [reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] are the reasonings explained earlier, such as in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*:[a]

[A Proponent of Non-Nature says:] All are [ultimately] without the capacity [to perform functions].

[*Answer* by a Proponent of True Existence:] The capacity [to produce] shoots and so forth is seen in seeds and so forth.

[The Proponent of Non-Nature responds:] That is asserted conventionally.

[*Answer* by the Proponent of True Existence:] How? Let it be so![b]

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students Ke-drup and Gyel-tsap explain the term "also" in Dharmakīrti's text as referring only to the commonality between the Proponents of Mind-Only and Hearer schools concerning the assertion on the non-duality of definition and definiendum, not to a commonality in treating the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras this way. This is despite the fact that J̄ang-ḡya agrees that indeed there are later Lesser Vehicle scholars who, after the appearance of Nāgārjuna, accepted the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as the Word of Buddha and thus the frequent statements that there are no Hearer schools who accept the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as the word of Buddha refer to "most" Hearer sects. For summaries of the controversy, see Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den, *Annotations, dngos, ra,* 142.6-143.1; S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 42a.3-42b.2; and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 541.2-545.2). S̄er-s̄hül sides with J̄ang-ḡya, as apparently Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den does.

[a] III.4; for the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 428, footnote g. Translated in accordance with the commentary of Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths,* 39.2-39.6. For Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's explanation of two very different explanations of the stanza see *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 316ff.

[b] As mentioned in the previous footnote, I am following Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's reading, which for this line is:

> Since conventionalities are superimposed factors, how could they be appearing-objects of non-mistaken direct perception! Though [you] use the word "conventionality," [you Proponents of Non-Nature] have come to assert ultimate establishment. To indicate this response, [Dharmakīrti] says, "How? Let it be so." (*kun rdzob sgro btags yin pas ji ltar mngon sum ma 'khrul ba'i snang yul du 'gyur te/ ming kun rdzob zhes 'dogs kyang don dam par grub pa'i don khas blangs par song ba'i phyir/ zhes pa'i lan ston par/ ci ste de ltar 'gyur/ zhes so//*)

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den renders this line (which in Sanskrit is *astu yathā tathā*) as ***ci ste*** *de ltar 'gyur,* rather than *ji ltar de ltar 'gyur,* yet he uses *ji ltar* and not *ci ste* in his exposition in the first sentence. It strikes me that, rather than seeing correlatives which *yathā tathā* certainly suggest, he takes *ci ste* (or *ji ltar*) as one meaning unit, corresponding to his first sentence, and takes *de ltar 'gyur* as another meaning unit, corresponding to his second sentence. Though odd at first blush, this reading of Dharmakīrti's multivalent text is probably not so far-fetched. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den at this point is following the explanation of Devendrabuddhi,

2" ACTUAL TENETS DESCRIBED IN THOSE TEXTS {2}

This section has two parts: stating the roots of this tenet system's texts and individual explanations of their meaning.

a" Stating the Roots of this Mind-Only Tenet System's Texts

[There is no root text for this section.]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[392] These [Proponents of Mind-Only] assert that a sūtra completely teaching all ten topics is a Great Vehicle Word, but not by teaching just certain ones or through mere enumerations because they assert that even in Hearer scriptural collections there are many merely nominal teachings of certain [topics] such as the ten grounds, basis-of-all, six perfections, and so forth. Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:

> These ten topics are not seen to be taught in the Hearer Vehicle, but they are seen in the Great Vehicle.

Therefore, since in Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* the complete enjoyment body is not taught and with regard to the ten grounds it also has no more than the mere names, it is not a commentary on the thought of the Great Vehicle...The ten topics are asserted to be:

1. the abode of objects of knowledge—the basis-of-all
2. the characters of objects of knowledge—other-powered, imputational, and thoroughly established characters
3. entry into cognition-only
4. causes and effect involved in the six perfections
5. the divisions of meditatively cultivating the six perfections—the ten grounds
6. training in morality—a Bodhisattva vow
7. training in meditative stabilization—the hero-proceeding meditative stabilization and so forth
8. training in wisdom—non-conceptual exalted wisdom
9. the abandonment that is their effect—non-abiding nirvāṇa
10. the excellent fulfillment of exalted wisdom that is their effect—the three bodies consisting of nature, complete enjoyment, and emanation bodies.

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and so forth, who take Dharmakīrti to be a Proponent of Mind-Only; this is not to say that he is representing Devendrabuddhi's line-by-line explanation of this stanza; see P5717, vol. 130, 276.1.7-276.3.3, which offers two readings.

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b" Individual Explanations of their Meaning in the Mind-Only School {3}

This section has three parts: presentations of the basis, paths, and fruit.

1: Presentation of the Basis in the Mind-Only School

This section has two parts: describing the system of the general Mind-Only School and describing the systems of its individual components.[a]

A: DESCRIBING THE SYSTEM OF THE GENERAL MIND-ONLY SCHOOL WITH RESPECT TO THE BASIS {8}

This section has eight parts: presentation of lineage, the support for entry into the path; how the two extremes are abandoned; presentation of the three characters; as an off-shoot of those, the unique features of the environment and beings in it, the aggregates, and constituents; presentation of the two truths; prime cognitions confirming the two truths; detailed explanation of the suchness of cognition-only, and how ideation is overcome through refuting that.

1* Presentation of Lineage in the Mind-Only School {2}

This section has two parts: the system of the Mind-Only School Following Scripture and the system of the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning.

a Presentation of Lineage in the Mind-Only School Following Scripture*

According to the former, because the basic constituent is definite as capacities and is truly established, the lineages of the three vehicles are definite, and although those whose lineage is severed get involved by way of hearing and so forth, they do not at all generate discouragement and so forth and the intention to leave.

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[a] The second heading does not appear later; it likely that it ended up as the second subdivision of the eighth topic, "How Ideation is Overcome through Refuting that," which at the actual exposition changes to "How Ideation is Overcome through Refuting that, along with an Off-Shoot," which has the two sections, "How Ideation is Overcome through Refuting that" and "An Off-Shoot." Nga-w̄ang-nyi-ma's *Outline,* therefore, drops the division of the eighth topic into two and revives its second topic as the second topic here, "describing the systems of its individual components." However, given that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a discusses the two main components in various places during the eight topics and that when the topic finally surfaces, it is only concerned with True and False Aspectarians, I think that it is preferable to leave Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline as is, despite the hole.

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Word Commentary on Root Text: The former, the Proponents of Mind-Only Following Scripture, assert that because the basic constituent,[a] that is, lineage, is definite as separate capacities and is truly established:

- the lineages of the three vehicles are definite as separate, and
- although persons whose lineage is severed get involved by way of hearing and so forth, they do not at all generate discouragement and so forth and the intention to leave cyclic existence.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[393] The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

> Mahāmati, furthermore, there are five lineages that bring about manifest realization. What are the five? Lineage that brings about manifest realization of the Hearer Vehicle; lineage that brings about manifest realization of the Solitary Realizer Vehicle; lineage that brings about manifest realization of the One-Gone-Thus Vehicle; lineage indefinite as to any of those; and non-existent lineage.

Accordingly, there are three having the definite lineage of the three vehicles, those having indefinite lineage, and those having the lineage of not passing beyond sorrow, or those having the lineage of non-existent lineage. Those are condensed into two—those possessing lineage and those whose lineage is severed…Hence, there are four possessing lineage.

HEARER LINEAGE

This is in four topics—describing the nature of the Hearer lineage, its presentation, its signs, and persons abiding in the Hearer lineage.

Nature of the Hearer Lineage

With respect to synonyms of lineage, Asaṅga's *Grounds of Hearers* says, "Seed,[b] basic constituent, and nature[c] are synonyms." With respect to its nature it is a capacity for generating the Hearer enlightenment that is with the basis-of-all; moreover, they assert that it is a specific from among the six internal sense-spheres, suitable to increase Hearer topics of practice that has existed continuously from beginningless time…From between being substantially existent and imputedly existent it is imputedly existent because of being a capacity and truly established because of being an effective thing. For,

[a] *khams, dhātu.*

[b] *sa bon.*

[c] *rang bzhin.*

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Asaṅga's *Grounds of Hearers* says that it is not separate from the six internal sense-spheres and is designated by name and convention to a state of a specific from among the six internal sense-spheres.

Presentation of the Hearer Lineage

This should be known by way of three topics—features of subtlety and coarseness of the lineage, sameness of continuum, and faults obstructing the lineage. Concerning features of subtlety and coarseness of the lineage, at a time when aside from the lineage being a cause, its effects have not been produced, it is difficult to recognize it, and hence it is subtle, but when effects are generated, it is [easy to recognize it and hence] coarse. Concerning sameness of continuum, the lineage does not exist separately from the continuum of the six sense-spheres, and hence is of one continuum with them. Concerning faults obstructing the lineage, it should be known that that [a particular person] has not passed beyond sorrow despite its existing beginninglessly is due to having the presence of four obstructing faults—being born in a condition without leisure, the non-conscientiousness of being attached to desires and not viewing them as faulty, engaging in wrong view such as a view of annihilation, and fruitional obstructions such as being mute, stupid, and so forth, karmic obstructions such as having committed deeds of immediate retribution and so forth, and obstructions of great afflictive emotions.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[394] There are two conditions for attaining nirvāṇa, main and secondary. The main conditions are others' sounds [that is, verbal teaching] and properly taking [the doctrine] to mind. There are many secondary conditions:

- five inner fortunes [being a human, being born in a center of Buddhist teaching, having sound sense faculties, not having done the five actions of immediate retribution in a hell after death (killing one's father, killing one's mother, killing a Foe Destroyer, with bad intention causing blood to flow from the body of a Buddha, and causing dissension in the Spiritual Community), and having faith in Buddha's scriptures
- five outer fortunes [visitation from a Buddha to that world, his/her teaching the excellent doctrine, the teaching remaining to the present, followers still existing, and the people of the area having mercy and love for others and thus teaching
- aspiring to virtuous practices
- leaving the householder life

- moral restraint
- restraining the senses
- knowing the measure of food [leaving one-third of the stomach empty]
- making an effort not to sleep in the first and third [of the three parts of the night]
- behaving within introspection
- staying in an isolated place
- purifying the five obstructions
- dwelling thoroughly in meditative stabilization.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[395]
Signs of the Hearer Lineage
These are opposites of the six signs of non-existent lineage.

- slight attachment for the body and so forth
- great revulsion for cyclic existence
- not having great passion for ill-deeds due to shame, embarrassment, compassion, conscientiousness, and so forth, and having contrition and so forth for ill-deeds that have been committed
- when hearing about and contemplating the forward and reverse processes [how one gets into suffering and how one gets out of suffering according to the doctrine] of the four noble truths, the hairs of the body stand on end and tears well up in the eyes
- assumption of ethics out of wanting protection from fright and out of wishing for good [in the future] and taking precepts for the sake of liberation and not giving them up even for political duties or even if it comes down to life and limb
- dedicating all roots of virtue for the sake of release from cyclic existence.

Persons Abiding in the Hearer Lineage
When divided by way of having entered or not, having emerged or not, ripened or not ripened, and sharpness of faculty there are twenty-three.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[396] The twenty-three types of persons having the Hearer lineage are:

1. those not having entered have not relied on a holy being, listened to the excellent doctrine, and so forth
2. among those who have entered, the emerged have attained a

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Superior path and so forth

3. among those who have entered, the non-emerged have not attained a Superior path and so forth
4. those having dull faculties
5. those having middling faculties
6. those having sharp faculties
7. those predominately acting out desire
8. those predominately acting out hatred
9. those predominately acting out bewilderment
10. those born in a condition without leisure
11. those born in a condition with leisure
12. those having the non-conscientiousness of being attached to desires and not viewing them as faulty
13. those having the conscientiousness of not being attached to desires and viewing them as faulty
14. those engaging in wrong view such as a view of annihilation
15. those engaging in non-perverse views
16. those having fruitional obstructions such as being mute, stupid, and so forth, karmic obstructions such as having committed deeds of immediate retribution and so forth, and obstructions of great afflictive emotions
17. those not having fruitional obstructions such as being mute, stupid, and so forth, karmic obstructions such as having committed deeds of immediate retribution and so forth, and obstructions of great afflictive emotions
18. those far from attaining nirvāṇa
19. those near to attaining nirvāṇa
20. those thoroughly ripened, who can attain a Superior path in this lifetime
21. those not thoroughly ripened, who cannot attain a Superior path in this lifetime
22. the pure, who have actualized nirvāṇa
23. the impure, who have not actualized nirvāṇa

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[397]

SOLITARY REALIZER LINEAGE

This is in ten topics—lineage, paths, modes of achievement, situation, coming and going, features of scriptural collections, features of faculties, features of entering and abiding, accumulation of collections, and etymology.

Nature of the Solitary Realizer Lineage
Those having the Solitary Realizer lineage have three characteristics:

- few afflictive emotions and hence disliking commotion and liking to live alone
- low level of compassion and hence little activity of the heart, such as bringing about others' aims through teaching doctrine, and so forth
- great pride and naturally being of middling faculties and hence (1) keeping quiet about having teachers, (2) not having a teacher, and (3) wanting an incomparable form of enlightenment.

They also are twofold in terms of definiteness and indefiniteness of lineage; the Rhinoceros-like[a] are definite in the Solitary Realizer lineage, the Congregating[b] are indefinite.
Paths of Solitary Realizers
With regard to how they train in the path there are three…In the first path, dwelling in the Solitary Realizer lineage, these please Buddhas over even a hundred eons; they ripen the mental continuum for their own enlightenment, and in order to actualize their enlightenment later become skilled in the six topics of scholarship—aggregates, sense-spheres, constituents, dependent-arising, the suitable and unsuitable, and [four] truths…

With respect to the second path, some, having pleased a Buddha who has appeared, rely on a holy being, listen to the excellent doctrine, and properly take it to mind, whereby they generate three levels of the path of preparation—heat, peak, and forbearance. In that lifetime they are incapable of attaining manifest realization of the doctrine [that is, the path of seeing] or the fruit, but in order later to attain those two they become skilled in the six topics…

With respect to the third path, in dependence upon having created the four causes as explained above [that is, pleasing a Buddha, relying on a holy being, listening to the excellent doctrine, and properly taking it to mind], they realize the doctrine manifestly [that is, attain the path of seeing] and a fruit of virtuous endeavor [that is, Never Returner], but are incapable of attaining Foe Destroyer. Hence, in order to attain that later through a supramundane path, they become skilled in the six topics…

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[a] *bse ru lta bu.*

[b] *tshogs spyod pa.*

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Modes of Achievement

With respect to the mode of achievement of the first, after accumulating the collections [of merit and wisdom] for a hundred eons, without a teacher and when a Buddha is not appearing [in the world], they meditatively cultivate the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, whereupon they actualize [the state of a] Foe Destroyer who has abandoned all afflictive emotions. In this system it is asserted that the Rhinoceros-like also, having fully accumulated the collections for a hundred eons, then become skilled in the six topics, and having taken rebirth, generate the remaining four paths—preparation, seeing meditation, and no-more-learning—but they do not assert that those four paths are necessarily generated in one meditative sitting, [contrary to what] is explained in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge*…

With respect to the modes of achievement of the second and the third, through the causes and conditions described above on the occasion of the latter two paths, when a Buddha is not appearing [in the world], they meditatively cultivate the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. Then, in the second mode of achievement they manifestly realize the doctrine and make attainment through to and including Foe Destroyer. In the third mode of achievement, upon actualizing the remaining fruits up to but not including Foe Destroyer they become Congregating Solitary Realizers, not Rhinoceros-like…

Situation

With regard to mental situation the Rhinoceros-like and Congregating are in accord because they are situated by way of interest in the profound, being intent on individual investigation of the profound dependent-arising, and taking to mind the three doors of liberation—emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness…With regard to physical situation there are differences. Those behaving like a rhinoceros like to be alone and live alone;…the remaining two [from among the three modes of achievement], opposite to that, congregate and live together…

Coming and Going

Though they might dwell in villages or towns, they enter towns and so forth for begging with great control over their bodies, greatly restrained senses, and very steady mindfulness. Even when they pity those beneath them, they teach with physical [signs] and not with speech. Also, they use many physical displays of magic to cause the antagonistic to achieve faith…

Features of Scriptural Collections

Their scriptural collections are not separate from those of Hearers since they take cognizance of the Hearer scriptural collections themselves and do not abandon any other than the afflictive obstructions…Hence, differentiation of obstructions to be abandoned and of view with respect to Hearers and Solitary Realizers occurs in only the system of the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School; none of the others—Great Exposition School, Sūtra School, Mind-Only School, Consequentialist Middle Way School, and [the rest of the] Autonomy Middle Way School assert this, as has been and will be explained.

Features of Faculties

Although, relative to themselves internally, there are three—the sharp, middling, and dull—they are naturally of middling faculties, since, as Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* and so forth say, those definite in the Hearer lineage naturally have dull faculties; those definite in the Solitary Realizer lineage naturally have middling faculties; and those definite in the Bodhisattva lineage naturally have sharp faculties.

Features of Entering and Abiding

The eight Enterers and Abiders are suitable for Solitary Realizers…

Accumulation of Collections

There are differences with respect to accumulating the collections [of merit and wisdom] because the imprint of the accumulation of the collections in the presence of a Buddha for a hundred great eons by those definite in the Solitary Realizer lineage is that they come to have a crown protrusion and so forth that are partially similar to a [Buddha's] marks and beauties whereas since the indefinite do not necessarily accumulate the collections for a hundred eons, there is not certainty of their having a crown protrusion and so forth…Even among those indefinite as Solitary Realizers there are two types—those who do and do not accumulate the collections for a hundred great eons because there are many Congregating Solitary Realizers who from the beginning enter the Solitary Realizer path without previously entering another path. For among the three modes of achievement the first is definite in the lineage of a Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer, and indefinite Congregating Solitary Realizers in the latter two accumulate the collections for a hundred eons.

Etymology

In the Sanskrit original of Solitary Realizer (*rang sangs rgyas*)

pratyekabuddha, eka is used for "one" [or "alone"]; *buddha* is used for "realize" (*rtogs pa*) or "understand" (*khong du chud pa*). Hence, they are Solitary Realizers because of becoming buddhafied alone—that is to say, they "realize suchness"—without scripture.[a] [In another etymology] they are Realizers (*buddha*) of Conditionality (*prati,* that is, *pratyaya*) through understanding the reverse process and so forth [of the twelve links] of dependent-arising within observing a skeleton in a cemetery, for instance…[b] Congregators are so called because of practicing together with a group of companions…

GREAT VEHICLE LINEAGE

This is in nine topics—lineage, superiority, characters, etymology, signs, divisions, obstructive faults, benefits, and examples.

Lineage

There are different, truly established lineages for the three vehicles:

- because even among persons before entering the path there are many differences with regard to disposition—great, middling, and small, three, and
- because there are three different interests in individual paths—great, middling, and small, and
- because there are [three] different achievings—great, middling, and small, and
- because there are [three] different enlightenments as effect.[398]…

Superiority

This lineage is superior to those of Hearers and Solitary Realizers because of being superior from four viewpoints:

- virtuous antidote to both obstructions [that is, afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience]
- containing all powers and so forth
- greatly meaningful since it gives rise to both aims [that is, of oneself and others]
- inexhaustibility of non-abiding nirvāṇa…

Characters

There are two lineages—naturally abiding lineage which has not been nurture by hearing and so forth and developmental lineage which has been nurtured…

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[a] This is an etymology and thus does not necessarily apply to all Solitary Realizers, as has been explained.

[b] Thus the term "buddha" that is part of their name does not mean that they are Buddhas; rather, it means "realizer."

Etymology

In general, there are three Sanskrit originals for lineage (*rigs*):

- *dhātu,* from the viewpoint of seed (*sa bon*)
- *kula,* from the viewpoint of line of descent (*gdung*) or family name (*rus ming*)
- *gotra,* from the viewpoint of qualities.

From among these, here it is in terms of the third. The creative etymology is that *go* [is transformed into] *guṇa* (qualities), and *tra* [is transformed into] *tāraṇa*[a] (liberating); hence, lineage is so called because from it qualities are released and arise…

Signs

A sūtra says:

> Just as from smoke fire is known
> And from water fowl water is known,
> So the lineage of intelligent Bodhisattvas
> Is known from signs.

Accordingly, with respect to signs confirming [the presence of] this lineage—these being effect-signs[b]—it is known by way of four:[399]

- compassion for sentient beings prior to endeavors
- belief in Great Vehicle doctrine
- forbearance with regard to difficult practices [or asceticism]
- practicing virtues such as giving and so forth…

Divisions

With respect to lineages, there are four:

- two, definite and indefinite
- two, uncaptivatable by conditions and captivatable by conditions.

The definite and the uncaptivatable are equivalent, and the indefinite and the captivatable are equivalent…

Obstructive Faults

By way of four faults although beings reside in the lineage, they do not engage in good qualities:

- many afflictive emotions
- bad friends
- being bereft of necessities
- being under others' control…

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[a] Text reads *tarana.*

[b] From the division of signs, or reasons, into effect-signs, nature-signs, and non-observation-signs.

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Benefits
The benefits of residing in the Great Vehicle lineage are fourfold:
- it is difficult to go to a bad transmigration
- though one goes to a bad transmigration, one is quickly liberated
- little suffering in a bad transmigration
- ripening sentient beings grievously dwelling in a bad transmigration…

Examples
Just as a great lineage [or line] of gold is plentiful, brilliant, stainless, and workable, so this lineage also has plentiful qualities, is exalted wisdom, without afflictive emotions, and source of the four clairvoyances…Just as a superior jewel has four excellences—lineage, color, shape, and size—so this has four factors: great enlightenment, great exalted wisdom, enhanced meditative stabilization, and ripening sentient beings…

INDEFINITE LINEAGE
The master Asaṅga says with regard to those of indefinite lineage that which from among the three vehicles they will enter relies only on other conditions and that although they have entered a particular vehicle, they can switch to another vehicle through the influence of a teacher and friends.

NON-EXISTENT LINEAGE
There are five types of non-existent lineage—four temporarily non-existent lineages and one utterly non-existent lineage.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[400] The four of temporarily severed lineage are:
- those whose behavior is one-pointedly faulty
- those whose roots of virtue are completely severed
- those without virtuous roots for partial concordance with liberation [that is, the path of accumulation]
- those whose virtuous roots are inferior [or] incomplete.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[401] Those of utterly non-existent lineage do not at all pass beyond sorrow…

Objection: Since defilements are adventitious and do not permeate the nature of the mind, how could they never be released.

Answer: Although they try to enter into Buddha's teaching through hearing, thinking, and meditating, they are so involved in seeking just the prosperity of cyclic existence that not even all of

the Buddhas can get rid of their drive toward cyclic existence, and internally the slightest discouragement about cyclic existence, or compassion, or an attitude of renunciation, or the like is utterly not generated in them even once.

b Presentation of Lineage in the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning*

According to the latter, because they are impermanent, there are methods, those knowing them exist, there are teachers, and seeking occurs, one vehicle is also established.

Word Commentary on Root Text: According to the latter, the Proponents of Mind-Only Following Reasoning, because:

- obstructions are impermanent
- there are methods overcoming obstructions
- those knowing those methods exist
- there are teachers of those methods,
- generation of seeking those methods occurs,

one vehicle is also established.

Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"":*[402] Do you say that defects cannot be extinguished:

- because defects—desire and so forth which are the reasons for impossibility of extinguishing them—are permanent
- or because they are impermanent but there is no method to abandon them
- or because although there are methods to abandon them, no one knows these methods
- or because although when the methods to abandon them are studied, they can be known but there is no one who seeks to know them
- or because there are seekers but there is no teacher of the methods to abandon them?

When your position is examined:

- Defects are not permanent because they have causes.
- Methods to abandon them are not non-existent because, through familiarizing with the antidotes to the causes, they are entirely extinguished.
- It is not that although such methods exist no one knows them because through knowledge of the nature of their causes

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knowledge of the antidotes to them is established.

- It is not that seekers do not exist because it has already been established that seekers exist by:[403]

  In order to overcome suffering [in others]
  The merciful engage in methods.
  If the causal methods of what arise from them are obscure
  [to oneself]
  It would be difficult to explain them to others.

  and so forth.
- It is not that a teacher of the methods does not exist because this will be established by "The path of perception set forth by the Protector" and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[404] When [the opponent's positions denying the extinguishing of defects] are examined, none of them is suitable, whereby extinguishment of defects and omniscience are established. Through this reasoning one final vehicle is also implicitly established because there are no defilements—obstructing knowledge of all phenomena—that are not suitable to be removed and because the nature of the mind is clear light and the defilements are adventitious.

2* How the Two Extremes are Abandoned in the Mind-Only School {2}

This section has two parts: actual way two extremes are abandoned and refuting mistakes about that.

a Actual Way the Two Extremes are Abandoned in the Mind-Only School {2}*

This section has two parts: identifying the two extremes and the middle path free from the two extremes.

1# The Three Natures in the Mind-Only School's Identification of the Two Extremes

That imputational natures are truly established is a superimposition. That the other two are not truly established is a deprecation.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [A consciousness] conceiving that imputational natures are truly established is a superimposition, and [a

consciousness] conceiving that the other two characters [that is, other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures] are not truly established is a deprecation.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[405] Verbalization and apprehension that phenomena—other-powered natures, thoroughly established natures, and so forth—are truly established, ultimately established, established by way of their own character, and established under their own power as referents of terms and conceptual consciousnesses imputing them are superimpositions. Superimposed factors imputed that way and the conceived objects of [consciousnesses] apprehending in the manner of that imputation are extremes of superimposition, and conceiving such is the meaning of falling to an extreme of superimposition.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[406] The naming and linguistic symbolization of all phenomena—ranging from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses—as "This is such and such," and the imputation of them by conceptual consciousnesses as "This is such and such," are not in the mode of abiding of those respective phenomena. Hence, the non-establishment of those phenomena—in their mode of abiding—as entities named and symbolized in language is the meaning of those phenomena not being established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses. Therefore, establishment by way of their own character as the referents of terms and conceptual consciousnesses is an extreme of superimposition, and an awareness apprehending such is a conception of an extreme of superimposition.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[407] Furthermore, verbalization by terms and apprehensions by conceptual consciousnesses that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are not truly established, ultimately established, established by way of their own character, and established from their own side are deprecations. The conceived objects of such conceptions are extremes of deprecation, and conceiving such is the meaning of falling to an extreme of deprecation…

Therefore, the two extremes must be non-existents because they must be objects of refutation by correct signs and correct reasonings and it is not suitable for existents to be refuted by correct signs and correct reasonings.

2# MIDDLE PATH FREE FROM THE TWO EXTREMES IN THE MIND-ONLY SCHOOL

The opposite is the middle path.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The path realizing that phenomena are not established by way of their own character as foundations of terms and conceptual consciousnesses—the opposite of those [extremes]—is the middle path.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[408] With respect to how the two extremes are abandoned here [in the Mind-Only School], the way the extreme of superimposition is abandoned will be explained on the occasion of the two selflessnesses (391ff.). The way the extreme of annihilation is abandoned is to be taken in accordance with the explanation that if the middle wheel of doctrine as described in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is taken literally, all three characters [that is, imputational natures, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures] are deprecated. Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* says:[409]
>
> > Therefore, some persons [that is, only Consequentialists],[410] who have heard sūtras that are difficult to understand, profound, imbued with the Great Vehicle, endowed with the profound emptiness, and taught with a meaning in [Buddha's] thought [that is other than the literal reading][411] do not know, just as it is, the real meaning that is expounded. This being so, they make improper imputations and, with mere conceptions produced from illogicality upon improper analysis, view and propound, "Whoever view that all these [phenomena][412] are exhausted as mere imputations [by conceptuality][413] and that this is suchness are correctly viewing [the nature of phenomena]."
> >
> > Since, according to them, even the mere things that are the bases of imputation do not exist [by way of their own character],[414] the imputing[a] [persons, conceptual consciousnesses, and terms][b] themselves also come to be nonexistent in all ways, in which case how could a suchness that is a mere imputation exist! Thereby, through this avenue, they deprecate both suchness and imputed [phenomena].[c] Since through that format they

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[a] *'dogs pa, prajñaptiḥ.*

[b] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 393.3. S̄er-s̄hül (*Notes,* 28b.6) takes the reference to be to imputational factors (*kun brtags*).

[c] *btags pa, prajñaptir.* Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 393.5) takes the term as

> deprecate imputation and suchness, it is said that they are to be known as the chief of those having nihilistic views.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[415] Having heard the words of Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that are difficult to understand, they—not knowing that they have a basis in [Buddha's] thought—apprehend them as literal. Then, [Consequentialists] say:

> Except for only being imputed by conceptuality, all phenomena do not inherently exist, and this absence of inherent existence is suchness. Therefore, the view of the absence of inherent existence is the correct view.

If bases of imputation did not exist, imputing [that is, persons, conceptual consciousnesses, and terms that impute] also would not exist, whereby both taking all phenomena to be merely imputed and taking just that [absence of inherent existence] to be the meaning of suchness would be impossible. Hence, that is the chief view of annihilation.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[416] That once something is an effective thing, if it does not truly exist, it must not exist is a tenet in common for all Proponents of True Existence,[a] from this [Mind-Only School] on down. Hence, thinking that if other-powered natures are only imputed by conceptuality, other-powered natures could not be truly established, they debate [with Proponents of the Middle] in this way about whether other-powered natures truly exist or not. The reason for this comes from thinking that the bases of emptiness for the thoroughly established nature, the imputers of imputations, and the bondage and release of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa depend on this [true existence of other-powered natures].

b The Mind-Only School's Refutation of Mistakes about the Way the Two Extremes are Abandoned*

If all effective things are truly established, why it is said that even agents exist conventionally? There are two modes of existing as the two

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referring to all phenomena in the assertion by the Proponents of Non-Nature that all phenomena are (just) imputed. This may be the reason why the translators chose here to change the Tibetan term for *prajñapti* from *'dogs pa* to *btags pa.*

[a] *dngos smra ba.*

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truths. The first is the existence and the non-existence about which Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Mind-Only debate. About the second, being or not being suitable to give rise to thorough afflictions and being or not being bases of conventions are just called existing conventionally and existing ultimately. Because there are also two with respect to the substantial and the imputed, that effective things are falsely established is mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: If all effective things are truly established, what is the meaning of the statement that [even] agents, persons, exist conventionally? There are two modes of existing as the two truths—or existing conventionally and ultimately. From between these, the first is the ultimate existence and conventional existence in the debates by the Proponents of Mind-Only and the Proponents of the Middle about existing and not existing ultimately. The second is merely a case of:

- calling being suitable to give rise to thorough afflictions "conventionally existing" and calling not being suitable to give rise to thorough afflictions "ultimately existing"
- calling being entities imputed by names and terminology and being bases of signs of imputing conventions "conventionally existing" and calling not being entities imputed by names and terminology and not being bases of signs of imputing conventions "existing ultimately."

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[417] Many who do not understand that there are different meanings of the term "conventionally [existing]"[a] as explained by the upper and lower tenet systems and who, in particular do not understand the many very different ways in which the term "conventionally [existing]" is explained even in one school of tenets such as the Mind-Only School and D̄ak-tsang think:

> If even the lowest of our own schools, the Great Exposition School, does not assert that things unable to bear analysis [by reasoning dividing the object into parts] the way that minute particles are able to bear such analysis are truly established, what need is there to mention the Sūtra School and the Mind-Only School.

Thinking this, they say, "If other-powered effective things are necessarily truly established, then does this not contradict:[b]

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[a] *kun rdzob [tu yod pa].*

[b] For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's lengthy exposition of this topic, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 158ff. and 294ff.

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- the explanation in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*[418] that whatever is compounded must be non-ultimate, "If [selflessness] were a compounded phenomenon, it would not be ultimate."
- the statement in Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*[419] that the thoroughly established nature alone [among the three natures] is ultimate.
- the description in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* that the ultimate has five characteristics:[420]

  Not existent [in the sense of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject being different substantial entities] and not nonexistent [as a mere negative of a difference of entity of subject and object]
  Not the same [that is, not exactly the same as] and not another [entity from the phenomena that are empty]
  Not produced or disintegrating [when thoroughly afflicted phenomena and pure phenomena are produced and cease and hence] not diminished or increasing
  Also not purified [because of being naturally pure of defilements from the start]
  Yet becoming purified [of adventitious defilements];
  These are characteristics of the ultimate.[a]

and in particular:

- the statement in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments:*[421]

  Is it to be said that reasons [that is, mainly the other-powered

[a] Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (*Ocean of Definitive Meaning,* 195.1) cites this passage as showing that the ultimate is other-empty. He takes:

- "not existent" to mean that imputational natures and other-powered natures do not really exist;
- "not nonexistent" to mean that the thoroughly established nature is not not really existent;
- "not the same" to mean that the three natures are not the same entity;
- "not other" to mean that the three natures are not different entities—the reason for this and the previous point being that imputational natures and other-powered natures do not really have entities;
- since the thoroughly established nature that is the basis empty of imputational natures and other-powered natures is uncompounded, it is "not produced or disintegrating, not diminished or increasing";
- since the thoroughly established nature is naturally pure, its entity does not have anything that requires purification; and
- to attain the thoroughly established nature it must "become purified" of adventitious defilements.

natures that are the bases of imputation of imputational natures][a] exist conventionally or that they exist ultimately? They are to be said to exist conventionally.

- the statement in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments*:[422]
  Is it to be said that conceptual consciousnesses [that is, contaminated minds and mental factors][423] exist conventionally or that they exist ultimately? It is to be said that they exist conventionally.[424]
- the statement in the *Ultimate Emptiness Sūtra,*[b] "Actions[c] and fruitions[d] [substantially] exist but a [substantially existent] agent is not observed."
- Vasubandhu's statement of the meaning of that sūtra passage in his *Principles of Explanation,*[425] "Persons exist conventionally but do not substantially exist."

Response: Though it is true that conceptions of general terms by those of little intelligence who do not understand the many ways in which "conventionally existing"[e] and "ultimately existing"[f] are used in the upper and lower schools of tenets are cases of obscuration, [let me answer this objection by saying that] these are not at all contradictory:

1. because with regard to statements of "conventionally existing" and "ultimately existing":
   - many [meanings] of "conventional" (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) need to be understood

[a] A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 197.4) identifies "reasons" (*rgyu mtshan*) this way and also as *all* bases of designation of imputational natures, thus including permanent phenomena; see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 432.6) for a source in the *Compendium* itself. Less satisfactorily, Da-drin-rap-den (76.3) identifies "reasons" as the names (or phrases), "This is form," and so forth.

Phenomena are probably called "reasons" (*rgyu mtshan*) because they are reasons, or bases, for verbalizations.

[b] A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 218.1) identifies this as a Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra; Ser-shül (*Notes,* 55b.1-55b.5), as a text asserted by all Hearer schools except those propounding a self, these being the Saṃmitīyas and so forth; Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 482.3), as the *Sūtra of the Great Emptiness* (*stong pa nyid chen po'i mdo*); Da-drin-rap-den (*Annotations,* 88.1), as "a Great Vehicle sūtra."

[c] In the Mind-Only School actions (*las, karma*) are the mental factor of intention (*sems pa, cetanā*); see A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 218.6.

[d] According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 218.6), the main fruitions (*rnam smin, vipāka*) are the physical life support (*lus rten*), feeling, and so forth.

[e] *kun rdzob tu yod pa, saṃvṛtisat.*

[f] *don dam par yod pa, paramārthasat.*

- many [meanings] of “ultimate” (*don dam, paramārtha*) also need to be understood
- there are also many modes of existing those ways
- and for those reasons there are many explanations [of certain objects] as both conventionally existing and ultimately existing

2. and because there are a great many debates by the Proponents of Mind-Only against the Proponents of the Middle concerning these.

Kamalashīla states [many] modes of debates by the Proponents of Mind-Only against the Proponents of the Middle in his *Illumination of the Middle:*

> You should state what this “conventional” means [in your assertion that all phenomena conventionally exist]…

He describes twelve meanings of “conventional” [or “conventionally existing”]:[426]

1. That all do not ultimately exist[a] [in the sense of not truly existing] is called conventionally existing.
2. Existing inherently[b] is called conventionally existing.
3. Not having done analysis[c] is called conventional.
4. The world’s renown[d] [that is, consensus in the world] is called conventional, and established by the world’s renown is called conventionally existing.
5. Illusion[e] is called conventional, and established as like an illusion is called conventionally existing.
6. Mere name and term are called conventional, and merely posited by name and term is called conventionally existing.
7. Sound-generalities [or generic images based just on terms] are called conventional, and existing as a sound-generality is called conventionally existing.
8. Meaning-generalities [or generic images based on the meaning of a term] are called conventional, and existing as a meaning-generality is called conventionally existing.
9. Instability due to not remaining for more than a moment is

---

a *don dam par med pa.*

b *ngo bo nyid du yod pa.*

c *brtag dpyad ma byas pa.*

d *’jig rten grags pa.*

e *sgyu ma.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a’s *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a’s outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den’s *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

called conventional, and existing that way is called conventionally existing.

10. Untrue is called conventional, and existing that way is called conventionally existing.
11. Valid cognition or non-valid cognition is called conventional, and established that way is called conventionally existing.
12. Forms, feelings, and so forth[a] are called conventional, and existing as them is called conventionally existing.

Therefore, with respect to the statement in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments* that a Superior's exalted wisdom attained subsequent [to meditative equipoise] exists both conventionally and ultimately, it ultimately exists because it exists by way of its own character, and it conventionally exists from the viewpoint of its observing conventional signs. Vasubandhu's *Principles of Explanation* says:[b]

> *Objection* by a Hearer Sectarian [to a Proponent of the Great Vehicle]:[427] If the statement in the *Ultimate Emptiness,*[c]

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[a] *gzugs tshor ba la sogs pa.*

[b] This is a paraphrase; according to the Peking edition of Vasubandhu's text (5562, vol. 113, 283.2.7-283.3.3), the passage reads:

> [*Objection* by a Hearer Sectarian:] The *Ultimate Emptiness* says, "Actions exist, and fruitions also exist, but an agent is not observed," Are these so just ultimately or just conventionally? If just ultimately, how could all phenomena be natureless [as is said in the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]? If conventionally, then since agents exist conventionally, it could not be said that agents are not observed [since agents do indeed exist conventionally].
>
> [*Answer* by Vasubandhu:] What is this called "conventional"? What is ultimate? Through this, one will understand what exists conventionally and what exists ultimately.
>
> [*Response* by a Hearer Sectarian:] Names, verbalizations, designations, and conventions are conventionalities. The own-character of phenomena [that is to say, establishment by way of own character] is the ultimate.
>
> [*Answer* by Vasubandhu:] Then, in that case, since actions and fruitions exist as names [that is, as conventionalities that are the bases of affixing of names] and also exist as [ultimates established by way of] their own character, let them be considered as both [conventionally existing and existing ultimately], in accordance with how you assert these.

[c] A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 218.1) identifies this as a Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra; S̄er-s̄hül (*Notes,* 55b.1-55b.5), as a text asserted by all Hearer schools except those propounding a self, these being the Saṃmitīyas and so forth; Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 482.3), as the *Sūtra of the Great Emptiness* (*stong pa nyid chen po'i mdo*); D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en (*Annotations,* 88.1), as "a Great Vehicle sūtra."

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> "Actions[a] and fruitions[b] exist but an agent is not observed," is [in reference to such being so][428] ultimately, how could all phenomena be natureless [as is said in the literal reading of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras]?[429] If it is [in reference to such being so] conventionally, then, since agents exist in that way, how could it be said that they are not observed?
>
> [*Answer* by Vasubandhu:][430] "If one knows what the conventional and the ultimate are, one understands through this [what it means] to exist in those two ways; therefore, what [do you, Hearer Sectarian, take] those two to be?"
>
> [*Response* by a Hearer Sectarian:] Names,[c] verbalizations,[d] designations,[e] and conventions[f] are conventionalities. The own-character [that is to say, the establishment by way of their own character][431] of phenomena is [their] ultimate [existence].[432]
>
> [*Answer* by Vasubandhu:][433] Then, in that case since actions and fruitions exist as names [that is, as conventionalities that are the bases of affixing of names][434] and also exist as [ultimates in the sense of being established by way of][435] their own character, let them be considered as both [conventionally existing in the sense of existing as bases of the imputation of conventions, that is to say, as conventional truths][g] and ultimately existing in the sense of existing by way of their own character],[436] in accordance with how you assert these.[437]

[These two passages] speak of a way of existing both conventionally and ultimately that differ from the above [list of twelve]. Also, Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* says:[438]

> Why is [an object] posited as existing conventionally? How many are those that exist conventionally? Objects of observation that involve thorough affliction exist conventionally. Even

[a] In the Mind-Only School actions (*las, karma*) are the mental factor of intention (*sems pa, cetanā*); see A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 218.6.

[b] According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 218.6), the main fruitions (*rnam smin, vipāka*) are the physical life support (*lus rten*), feeling, and so forth.

[c] *ming.*

[d] *brjod pa.*

[e] *gdags pa.*

[f] *tha snyad.*

[g] Bel-jor-hlün-drup's *Lamp for the Teaching,* 51.6, and Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 89.2. A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 218.3) identifies this as existing as an object found by the rational consciousness distinguishing a conventionality (*tha snyad dpyod pa'i rigs shes kyi rnyed don du yod pa*).

all exist conventionally.[a]

and the same text says:

Why is [an object] posited as existing ultimately? How many are those that exist ultimately? That which is an object of observation of purification exists ultimately. Even all exist ultimately.[b]

These also put forth two different ways of existing conventionally and existing ultimately…As Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[439]

If, in that way, you distinguish in detail:

- the different ways substantial existence and imputed existence are posited
- the modes of existing conventionally and existing ultimately in the higher and lower tenet systems, and
- the different ways in which these are posited even in one tenet system,

you will be able to delineate well the important tenets. You will also understand the need for the Proponents of the Middle to prove as not ultimately existent many things that the Proponents of True Existence assert to exist imputedly and to exist conventionally. Otherwise, the differentiation of the upper and lower tenet systems would be reduced to mere whimsy.[c]…

Although there are modes of explaining "conventionally existing" and "ultimately existing," the chief are two:

1. To be established as a phenomenon posited through the force of name and terminology is to be conventionally established [or to conventionally exist], and to be established but not as a phenomenon posited through the force of name and terminology is to be ultimately established [or to ultimately exist]. This mode of establishment is the one about which Proponents of Mind-Only and Proponents of the Middle debate when they

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[a] Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den (*Annotations, dngos, za,* 159.1) cites the explanation in Gyel-tsap's commentary that all mistaken consciousnesses as well as their objects are said to exist as enumerative conventionalities (*rnam grangs pa'i kun rdzob tu yod pa*).

[b] Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den (*Annotations, dngos, za,* 159.2) cites the explanation in Gyel-tsap's commentary that since all phenomena are not [entities] other than [their own] ultimately existing nature, they are said to exist as enumerated ultimates (*rnam grangs pa'i don dam par yod pa*).

[c] That is, one's ranking of systems would be based solely on liking one system and not liking another, since their respective assertions and criticisms of each other would not be understood.

analyze whether [an object] is conventionally or ultimately established. The Proponents of Mind-Only assert that imputational phenomena are conventionally established in the sense of being established as phenomena posited through the force of name and terminology, and they assert that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are ultimately established in the sense of being established but not as phenomena posited through the force of name and terminology. They assert that if other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are not established that way, other-powered natures would not be fit to be causes and effects and able to perform functions, and thoroughly established natures would not be fit to be the mode of subsistence, as [indicated by] the many previously mentioned scriptural passages and reasonings.

2. To be established as a conventional basis suitable to give rise to thorough afflictions is said to exist conventionally and to exist as a conventional truth [and to be established as an object of observation of a path of purification is said to exist ultimately and to exist as an ultimate truth]. A Superior's individual self-cognition of meditative equipoise is merely said to exist as an ultimate upon its being included in the class of ultimate truths since it is the means destroying thorough affliction; the term "merely" [indicates that] it is not an actual ultimate that is an object of observation of a path of purification. This is because even though certain Proponents of Mind-Only assert—in reliance on reasoning from the Sūtra School—that the explicit object of a yogic direct perception is an effective thing…the foremost holy [Maitreya], Asaṅga, his brother [Vasubandhu], and so forth assert that [a Superior's individual self-cognition of meditative equipoise] is not an ultimate truth and is not an actual object of an exalted wisdom of purification, since it is explained that at the time of a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise the mind is non-appearing and since the exalted wisdom is described as the observer but not as the object of observation:
   - Asaṅga's *Grounds of Hearers* says, "At that time, appearance of the mind has as if ceased," and if he says this about the path of preparation, what need is there to mention the path of seeing!
   - About the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of a Great Vehicle Superior, Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great*

Vehicle[a] ... says that it is without appearance, "A non-conceptual consciousness is like a person whose eyes are closed."...

- Vasubandhu's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* says that thusness is the object of ultimate exalted wisdom...
- Even the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* explains that other-powered natures do not exist as objects of observation by a path of purification...
- Vasubandhu's commentary[b] on Maitreya's *Differentiation of Phenomena and Noumenon* explains that selflessness is directly realized:

  The path of seeing is individual knowledge of thusness; it is called attainment and experience...[440] How is experience posited? In the manner of direct perception.

- Also, the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* asserts that it is taught [that the object of an exalted wisdom of purification] is an effective thing so that trainees [who hold that the appearing-object of a direct perception is only a functioning thing out of not being able to fit in their minds how a non-affirming negative that is a mere elimination of an object of negation could be the explicit object of a direct perception][441] could get rid of their fear.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because there are also two and more divisions with respect to substantially existing and imputed existing, the assertion—upon citing dry words—that effective things are falsely established is mistaken.

With respect to the statement "Actions and fruitions exist but an agent does not exist," actions and fruitions are ultimately existent in the sense of being substantially existent, whereas the agent—that is, the person—in general ultimately exists but is imputedly existent and hence is not ultimately existent in the sense of being

[a] See Étienne Lamotte, *La Somme du grand véhicule d'Asaṅga,* reprint, 2 vols., Publications de l'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 8 (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1973), vol. 1, 78 (VIII.16), and vol. 2, 244-245; and John P. Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaṅga: Translated from the Chinese of Paramārtha* (Berkeley, Calif.: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992), 96-97. For Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's opinion that such passages indicate that Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* denies that mind truly exists, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 303ff.

[b] Either by Vasubandhu or by Sthiramati.

substantially existent…Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments* says:[442]

> It should be known that that of which its own character [can][443] be imputed without relying on [apprehending phenomena] other than it and [its apprehension][444] does not [need to][445] depend on [apprehension of phenomena] other than it is, in brief, substantially existent…

That which is apprehendable by an awareness without depending upon apprehension of another phenomenon is substantially existent; for example, objects of the senses such as blue.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[446] The meaning of substantially existent is a phenomenon that is such that when it appears as an object of awareness, it appears under it own power without depending of the appearance of another phenomenon whose character is discordant with it. Since even all phenomena exist in the sense of having their own entities, they are *enumeratively*[a] substantially existent.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[447] A phenomenon that is not apprehendable without depending on apprehension of another phenomenon and must be apprehended in dependence [upon apprehending a phenomenon whose character is discordant with it] is imputedly existent. Illustrations are:

- non-associated compositional factors—self, sentient being, and so forth
- all affirming negatives and non-affirming negatives
- forest and the like.

Since all phenomena exist as imputed by names and terminology, they are *enumeratively* imputedly existent…

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[448] [There are four meanings of "substantially existent":]

- substantially existent in the sense of being established by reasoning—all objects of knowledge
- substantially existent in the sense of being stable and immutable—uncompounded phenomena
- substantially existent in the sense of being able to perform a function—all effective things

[a] *rnam grangs pa;* this means non-actual, just called "substantially existent."

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- substantially existent in the sense of being self-instituting[a]…

There are four [meanings of] "imputedly existent" opposite to those.

3* Presentation of the Three Characters in the Mind-Only School {3}

This section has three parts: presentation of imputational natures, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures.

a Presentation of Imputational Natures in the Mind-Only School*

Factors of superimposition are imputational. There are two, completely nihil and enumerative. Non-existents and unproduced conventionalities are posited respectively as them.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Factors of superimposition by terms and conceptual consciousnesses, not being the mode of subsistence, are imputational. When divided, there are two, imputational natures of completely nihil character and enumerative imputational natures. Non-existents and unproduced conventionalities are posited respectively as those two.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[449] Regarding imputational natures there are five topics—definition, etymology, divisions, illustrations, and examples.

Definition

The definition of an imputational nature is: a factor superimposed to a basis, without being [in its] mode of subsistence, by terms and conceptual consciousnesses, or names and terminology…

Etymology

They are called character-non-natures[b] because, not established by way of their own character,[c] they are posited by names and terminology.[d]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[450] Being posited in reliance on name and terminology is the meaning of being only posited by name and terminology, and being established without relying on name and terminology is the meaning of being established by way of their own character or being truly established. The Mind-Only

[a] *tshugs thub tu grub pa.*

[b] *mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa, lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāva.*

[c] The "character" that imputational natures lack is establishment by way of their own character.

[d] See Hopkins, *Absorption in No External World,* #104.

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School does not assert, as the Proponents of Non-Nature do, that not being findable upon searching for the imputed object aside from being only imputed to there by name and terminology is the meaning of being only posited by name and terminology.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[451] Because they are mere factors imputed by conceptuality[a]—or thorough conceptuality[b] which is so called due to conceptualizing in all ways—they are imputations…

Divisions

When imputational natures are divided by the manner of superimposition, there are two—factors imputed in the manner of entity [such as "This is form,"] and factors imputed in the manner of attribute [such as "This is the production of form."] When imputational natures are divided by way entity [or nature], there are two—imputational natures of completely nihil character and enumerative imputational natures. The latter has many modes of division.

Illustrations

Hypothetically, utter non-existents such as a self of persons and a self of phenomena are imputational natures of completely nihil character, and conventional, uncompounded phenomena that exist but are not established by way of their own character—such as appearance as if established by way of its own character as a foundation of entity and attribute—are enumerative imputational natures.

Examples

That imputational natures are erroneously superimposed although not established that way is like factors superimposed by the eye consciousness of one with an eye disease, and that imputational natures are only imputed by names is like a flower of the sky.

b Presentation of Other-Powered Natures in the Mind-Only School*

Bases of mistake and mistake are other-powered natures. The pure and the impure are respectively non-conceptual exalted wisdoms and afflictive emotions.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Bases of mistaken dualistic perception or entities of mistaken dualistic perception are other-powered natures. When

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a *rnam rtog.*

b *kun rtog.*

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divided, there are two—pure other-powered natures and impure other-powered natures. Respectively, non-conceptual exalted wisdoms and afflictive emotions are posited as pure other-powered natures and impure other-powered natures.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[452] Regarding other-powered natures, there are four topics—definition, etymology, divisions, and examples.
>
> *Definition*
>
> [The definition of] an other-powered nature is: an effective thing that arises from causes and conditions. They[453] are bases of mistake in that they are the objects of observation by consciousnesses conceiving a self of persons and a self of phenomena and in that they are the bases imputed as a self of persons and a self of phenomena. They are appearances as:
>
> - abodes (the supports of the sense powers), objects (forms and so forth), and bodies (physical sense powers)
> - the mind-basis-of-all, afflicted mentality, five sense consciousnesses, and mental consciousness
>
> and so forth…
>
> *Etymology*
>
> Because of not being able to remain more than the moment of production, they are called other-powered natures, and because of not being produced from themselves[a] although produced by causes and conditions, they are called production-non-natures.
>
> *Divisions*
>
> When divided, there are two—pure and impure other-powered natures. Non-conceptual exalted wisdoms and pure marks and beauties [of a Buddha's body] are illustrations of pure other-powered natures. Afflictive emotions and the five appropriated contaminated aggregates are illustrations of impure other-powered natures.
>
> *Examples*
>
> The generation of appearances that are bases for a mistaken consciousness to make superimposition of something as existing whereas it does not exist is like the falling hairs, bees, and so forth[b] of one with an eye disease. Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle*

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[a] *rang las skye ba med pa.* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a takes *rang las skye ba* not to mean production of something from itself but intrinsic production (*ngo bo nyid kyis skye ba*) and hence causeless production; see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 87-88; *Reflections on Reality,* 178-199; and *Absorption in No External World,* #66-70.

[b] These are "floaters" that appear due to tiny blood clots in an eye.

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gives the examples of:

- [a magician's] illusions in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, there could be objects of [mental] activity
- dreams in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, one gets involved in activities of desire and non-desire
- mirages in order to overcome doubt wondering how minds and mental factors arise without external objects
- reflections in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, effects of virtuous and non-virtuous actions could arise

and so forth (see 341).

c Presentation of Thoroughly Established Natures in the Mind-Only School*

The emptinesses of the superimposed two selves are thoroughly established natures, the two selflessnesses, and even each has twenty and so forth. Terminologically, there are three—object, attainment, and practice ultimates.

Word Commentary on Root Text: A thusness that is an emptiness of establishment in accordance with superimpostions as [either of] the two selves is a thoroughly established nature. When thoroughly established natures are divided, there are the two selflessnesses, and even each of those has twenty emptinesses and so forth. When divided terminologically,[a] there are three—emptiness which is the object-ultimate, nirvāṇa which is the attainment-ultimate, and true paths which are the practice-ultimate.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[454] Regarding thoroughly established natures, there are four topics—definition, etymology, divisions, and examples.

Definition

The definition of a thoroughly established nature is: a thusness that is an emptiness of establishment in accordance with superimposition by [either of] the two conceptions of self—as a self of persons, that is, self-sufficiency, or the two selves of phenomena [that is, a difference of entity between apprehended-object and

[a] The word "terminologically" implies that not all the divisions are actual thoroughly established natures, or ultimates; only the object-ultimate and the attainment-ultimate are actual thoroughly established natures and actual ultimates.

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apprehending-subject and establishment by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses]. This is because Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* describes both objects of activity of the two pure exalted wisdoms of direct realization as thoroughly established natures. *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* says:[455]

> The objects of activity [of the path][456] of purification are twofold.
> [Both][457] are said to be only the single [thoroughly established nature].[458]

and Vasubandhu's commentary on that says:

> Pure suchness is of two types—the object of activity of the exalted wisdom purifying afflictive obstructions and the object of activity of the exalted wisdom purifying obstructions to omniscience.

and so forth.

Etymology

Because of not changing into something other, it is called "thoroughly established." Also, because of being the object of observation of a path of purification and the supreme of virtues, it is called "thoroughly established." Also, because of being the ultimate and being distinguished by just the naturelessness of the self that is an object of negation with respect to all phenomena, it is called the "ultimate-non-nature."…

Divisions

When divided, there are the two selflessnesses, and even each of those has twenty emptinesses each. When divided terminologically, Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* speaks of three—object-ultimate [that is, thusness],[459] attainment-ultimate [that is, nirvāṇa], and practice-ultimate [that is, the path directly realizing thusness].

Examples

Just as the falling hairs and so forth of one with an eye disease do not exist [in the perspective of] one who has been cured of eye disease, it is thoroughly established in the sense that all mistaken appearances are ceased. Just as space is a mere negative of obstructive contact and pervades all directions, so the thoroughly established nature also is a mere negative of the self that is the object of negation and pervades all phenomena.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[460] Just as an eye consciousness of

one without an eye disease searches for falling hairs in space but does not find them, a rational consciousness searches for the two selves [of persons and of phenomena] but does not find them; this non-finding is the meaning of realizing the suchness of selflessness.

4* As an Off-Shoot of those, the Unique Features of the Environment and Beings in it, Aggregates, and Constituents in the Mind-Only School {2}

This section has two parts: describing the similarities and elaborating on the differences.

a Describing the Similarities*

The formation, abiding, destruction, and so forth of the environment and beings in it are partially similar.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The formation, abiding, destruction, and so forth of the environment and beings in it [according to the upper manifest knowledge as presented in Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* and so forth] are partially similar to the lower manifest knowledge [as presented in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* and so forth].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[461]

- There are twenty [intermediate] eons of vacuity, during which the external environment—ranging from Mount Meru and the continents to buildings—and the internal persons who are the beings in the Third Concentration on down are completely absent.
- After that, there are also twenty intermediate eons of formation, during which the environment forms—ranging from the formation of the environment or domiciles of the Third Concentration to the formation of the environment or domiciles of the Land Without Combat[a] [which exists in space] and above—and the persons form there, and after that, the foundational spheres of wind, water, and gold form in series, and on the sphere of gold, an ocean arises, and from its being churned Mount Meru, the in-between oceans, and the continents form together, and after that, [sentient beings are born in the various levels until] one sentient being is born in the Most Torturous Hell, which is the lowest among the types of beings from the

[a] *'thab bral, yāma.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 8: The Three Realms of Cyclic Existence

(from the highest levels to the lowest)

- Formless Realm
  - Peak of Cyclic Existence[a]
  - Nothingness[b]
  - Limitless Consciousness[c]
  - Limitless Space[d]
- Form Realm
  - Fourth Concentration
  - Third Concentration
  - Second Concentration
  - First Concentration
- Desire Realm
  - Gods of the Desire Realm
    - Those Who Make Use of Others' Emanations[e]
    - Those Who Enjoy Emanation[f]
    - Joyous Land[g]
    - Land Without Combat[h]
    - Heaven of Thirty-Three[i]
    - Four Great Royal Lineages[j]
  - Demi-gods
  - Humans
  - Animals
  - Hungry ghosts
  - Hell-beings.[462]

a *srid rtse, bhavāgra.*

b *ci yang med, ākiṃcaya.*

c *rnam shes mtha' yas, vijñānānantya.*

d *nam mkha' mtha' yas, ākāśānantya.*

e *gzhan 'phrul dbang byed, paranirmitavaśavartin.*

f *'phrul dga', nirmāṇarati.*

g *dga' ldan, tuṣita.*

h *'thab bral, yāma.*

i *sum cu rtsa gsum, trayastriṃśa.*

j *rgyal chen rigs bzhi, cāturmahārājakāyika.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Heaven of the Thirty-Three. Since similarly the eons of abiding must be posited after that, the period up to the performance of the ten great non-virtues must be posited as the eons of formation, and so forth. The upper and lower manifest knowledges and all four schools of tenets agree about those distinctions and so forth.

- There are twenty intermediate eons of abiding, ranging from its beginning to when there are no new births of sentient beings in the Most Torturous Hell.
- There are twenty intermediate eons of destruction which is an emptying out beginning when there are no new births of sentient beings in the Most Torturous Hell through to the peak of destruction by any of the three:
  1. fire [which destroys up through the First Concentration fifty-six times]
  2. then water [which destroys up through the Second Concentration seven times]
  3. then wind [which destroys up through the Third Concentration].

With respect to the causes of these…they agree in asserting that they are produced from various karmas shared in common [by the beings born there]. There is rough agreement also about the presentation of the transmigrating beings who partake of that [environment]…The eighty intermediate eons comprise a great eon.

b Elaborating on the Differences*

However, the thirty-six of the desire realm and the eighteen of the form realm, the shape of the mountains, and so forth are not similar. There are differences with respect to the purification of definite actions, the ways of dividing the aggregates, virtues, and so forth, also.

Word Commentary on Root Text: However, the thirty-six of the desire realm and the form realm of eighteen abodes, the shape of the mountains, and so forth are not similar.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[463] In terms of location there are thirty-six in the desire realm:

- sixteen hells—[eight] hot hells and [eight] cold hells
- hungry ghosts
- demi-gods
- humans of the twelve areas [four continents and eight islands]

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- six types of desire realm gods (see 380).

Since animals do not have a separate location, they are not counted [here]…With respect to the form realm, there are eighteen locations:

- due to three levels—low, middling, and strong—of causal meditative absorptions [that bring about rebirth in the four concentrations], there are three locations each of common beings in the four concentrations…[a]
- five pure locations of Superiors in the fourth concentration
- above those, the Great Highest Pure Land where those who dwell on the ten grounds, upon having thoroughly cultivated the ten grounds, are born.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Also, as explained earlier, there are many differences, such as the purification of actions [the effects of which are] definite [to be experienced] and so forth, the way of dividing the aggregates and so forth, virtues, and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[464] Therefore, the meaning of definite actions is that they are certain to issue forth effects if they are not overcome by other conditions; indefinite actions are not certain to issue forth effects even though they are not overcome by other conditions…

The term "also" [at the end of the root text] indicates that their divisions and so forth differ, but it is also[b] necessary to know how the thoughts [behind] are contradictory due to the trainees of the upper and lower sūtras.

5* Presentation of the Two Truths in the Mind-Only School

Objects of knowledge are divided into the two truths as one entity and different isolates. An object of observation suitable to generate thorough afflictions is a conventional truth; synonyms are convention truth and so forth; when divided, there are three. A final object of observation of a path of purification is an ultimate truth; synonyms are noumenon, suchness, and so forth; the divisions have been explained.

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[a] For this and the next group, see Lati Rinbochay, Denma Lochö Rinbochay, Leah Zahler, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism* (rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom, 1997), 42-45.

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's comment is a window to seeing how *yang* means "but" and at the same time "also" since the disjunctive "but" indicates that there is something further to be said.

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Word Commentary on Root Text: Objects of knowledge are divided into the two truths as one entity and different isolates.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[465] The basis of division into the two truths is suitable to be objects of knowledge…For, when divided…there are two:

- ultimate truths, the noumenon which exists as the mode of subsistence, and
- conventional truths, which do not exist as the mode of subsistence,

and if either of those did not exist, it would not be suitable, due to which if there were less, they would not be inclusive, and relative to entry into and reversal from cyclic existence, more than those two are not needed…

Question: What is the mode of the two truths in terms of being one or different?

Answer: Though Tibetans' fabrications about this are manifold, the two truths are one entity and different isolates. If even their mere entity is not the same and hence the two truths are different [entities], four and so forth fallacies are incurred:

- It [absurdly] follows that those who have seen the truth have not separated from signs [that is, misapprehensions] of compositional phenomena.
- It [absurdly] follows that they are not released from apprehension of signs [that is, manifest conceptions of self] and the bonds of the assumption of bad situations [that is, the seeds of conceptions of self].
- It [absurdly] follows that they do not attain the liberation of unsurpassed bliss and perfect enlightenment.[a]

and so forth…Since the opposites of those four and so forth are established, the two truths are established as the same entity.

If the two truths are one in the sense of not being even different in terms of mere isolates…fallacies are incurred:

- It [absurdly] follows that common beings directly see the truth.
- It [absurdly] follows that common beings attain the nirvāṇa of unsurpassed bliss.
- It [absurdly] follows that, like compositional phenomena, ultimate truths would be various.

and so forth. Since the opposites of those four are established, it is established that the two truths are also different isolates. Hence, it

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a lists only three; for more elaboration, see 896 and 901.

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is ruinous if they are asserted as either different in the sense that even their mere entity is not the same or the same in the sense that even their mere isolates are not different.

Word Commentary on Root Text: From among them, a conventional phenomenon posited from the viewpoint of being an object of observation suitable to generate thorough afflictions is the entity of a conventional truth. Synonyms are convention truth, basal phenomenon,[a] and so forth. When divided terminologically, there are three:

- imputational natures, imputational conventionalities
- other-powered natures, mental conventionalities
- thoroughly established nature, verbal conventionalities.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[466] With respect to the individual definitions of the two truths, the definition of a conventional truth is: a conventional phenomenon that is an object of observation suitable to generate thorough afflictions…When conventional truths are divided [terminologically]:

- there are three—conventionalities that are persons, conventionalities that are factors imputed by persons, and conventionalities that are the factors of action, agent, and object of phenomena, as explained in the Mañjughoṣha chapter[467] of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,*
- or imputational conventionalities, mental conventionalities, and verbal conventionalities.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence:*[468] Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* [speaks of three types of conventionalities]:[469]

Imputational, mental, and likewise
The verbal are coarse.

It treats conventional truths, the coarse suchness,[b] as the three—imputational conventionalities, mental conventionalities, and verbal conventionalities.[c] Then it relates these three with the three

[a] *gzhi'i chos.*

[b] The thoroughly established nature is the subtle suchness (Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 485.2) since it is the final mode of being of phenomena.

[c] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 485.3) identifies:

- imputational conventionalities (*btags pa'i kun rdzob*) as imputational natures that are imputed by conceptuality to be truly existent whereas they are not truly existent;
- mental conventionalities (*shes pa'i kun rdzob*) as other-powered natures, which are illustrated by unreal ideation (*yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rtog*) since it is the principal

natures [that is, imputational, other-powered, and thoroughly established—treating thoroughly established natures as verbal *conventionalities*, whereas, as explained above, they are ultimate truths. In treating] the latter [that is to say, thoroughly established natures as verbal conventionalities], it should be understood that it is explaining the thought of other sūtras that say that thusness and so forth exist conventionally;[a] [Maitreya is not indicating that thoroughly established natures are *actual* conventionalities].[470]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[471] With respect to etymologies, because of being true or existing in the perspective of or through the power of those three conventionalities, they are conventional truths…For the Sanskrit original of "truth" [*satya*] that is part of this [term *saṃvṛtisatya*] is used for *sat* ["existent"] and so forth. Synonyms are convention truth, basal phenomenon, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: A final object of observation of a path of purification is the entity of an ultimate truth. Synonyms are noumenon, suchness, and so forth. The divisions have been explained earlier.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[472] The definition of an ultimate truth is: a final object of observation of a path of purification. Illustrations are, for instance, the selflessness of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth and the selflessness of persons…With respect to etymologies and synonyms:

- Because a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is the ultimate and this is the object of that ultimate, it is the object of the ultimate,[b] and because the mode of appearance and mode of subsistence are concordant, it is a truth…
- Because whether Buddhas appear or not, it permanently abides

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other-powered nature, and thus come to be called "mental;"

- and verbal conventionalities (*brjod pa'i kun rdzob*) as thoroughly established natures which, although they ultimately cannot be taken as objects by way of terms and conceptual consciousnesses, are suitable to be expressed through many *verbal* forms such as thusness and so forth.

[a] B̄el-jor-hlün-drup (*Lamp for the Teaching,* 54.1) cogently explains:

> There is a reason for saying that suchness and the thoroughly established nature exist as verbal conventionalities, because verbalizations are conventionalities and suchness and the thoroughly established nature are referents of verbalizations.

D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en (*Annotations,* 90.5) says that the meaning is that the *existence* of thusness must be posited by a conventional consciousness.

[b] *dam pa'i don, paramasya artha.*

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thusly, it is thusness (*de bzhin nyid, tathatā*).
- Because it is not perverse, it is the limit of reality (*yang dag mtha', bhūtakoṭi*).
- Because signs of proliferations are ceased, it is signlessness (*mtshan ma med pa, animitta*).
- Because from among the usages of *dhātu* in *dharmadhātu* as constituent,[a] element [or sphere],[b] seed,[c] phlegm,[d] and so forth, here [in *dharmadhātu*] it is explained from the viewpoint of cause,[e] and it acts as a cause giving rise to a Superior's attributes from the viewpoint of being an object of observation, it is the element of attributes (*chos dbyings, dharmadhātu*)…

The divisions, in brief, are the two selflessnesses of persons and of phenomena and, when extended, there are sixteen emptinesses in each of the two selflessnesses…The rest have been elaborated earlier with regard to the three characters (378) and elsewhere.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[473]
The sixteen emptinesses are treated in three groups:
Six in terms of stopping misapprehension of the afflicted class and the pure class

1. emptiness of the internal sense-spheres, that is, eyes and so forth that are the partakers[f]
2. emptiness of the external sense-spheres, that is, forms and so forth that are the partaken[g]
3. emptiness of the external and the internal, that is, the organs which are the locations of the senses, described as both external and internal, that is, not included within the senses but included within the continuum
4. emptiness of the great, that is, the world of the environment that is the foundational abode of those sense-spheres
5. emptiness of emptiness, that is, the exalted wisdom which is the awareness by which emptiness is seen just as it is
6. emptiness of the ultimate, that is, nirvāṇa which is the object

[a] *khams.*
[b] *dbyings.*
[c] *sa bon.*
[d] *bad kan.*
[e] *rgyu.*
[f] *za ba po.*
[g] *bza' bya.*

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of attainment for the sake of which emptiness is meditated…

Eight in terms of the ways different imprints arise from Bodhisattvas' meditating on emptiness by way of conjunction with special method

7. emptiness of the compounded, in order to achieve virtues of the path
8. emptiness of the uncompounded, in order to achieve virtues of the fruit
9. emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes, in order to always achieve the welfare of sentient beings
10. emptiness of beginningless and endless [cyclic existence], in order not to neglect cyclic existence
11. emptiness of the indestructible [Great Vehicle], in order not to neglect others at the time of the remainderless nirvāṇa
12. emptiness of nature, in order to purify the naturally abiding lineage
13. emptiness of characteristics, in order to achieve the marks and beauties [of a Buddha's body]
14. emptiness of all attributes, in order to achieve Buddha attributes such as the powers and so forth

Two in terms of clearing away superimpositions and deprecations about the entity of emptiness

15. emptiness of the unapprehendable, in order to clear away superimpositions holding that the two selflessnesses (which are the basis of division) and those fourteen emptinesses (which are the phenomena divided) are positive and self-powered such that their entities are not posited as only eliminations of objects of negation
16. emptiness of the nature of non-things, in order to clear away deprecations thinking that when those are posited as only eliminations of objects of negation, they would utterly not exist.

6* Prime Cognitions Confirming the Two Truths in the Mind-Only School

Due to manifest and obscure, there are two prime cognitions, direct and inferential. Four direct perceptions; lower sense direct perceptions are mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Due to their objects of comprehension being manifest and obscure, prime cognitions are divided into the two, direct perception and inference.

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Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[474] The definition and so forth of prime cognition are similar (see 280ff.) [in the systems of the Sūtra School Following Reasoning, the Mind-Only School, and Autonomy School]. All Mind-Only Followers of Reasoning and Followers of Scripture agree that when prime cognitions are divided, there are two—direct prime cognitions and inferences—due to [objects of comprehension being] manifest and obscure.[a]

Inference

An inferential prime cognition, according to Asaṅga's *Actuality of the Grounds,* is a consciousness newly comprehending an object of analysis through a manifestly analyzed reason. When the reasons that are its support are divided, there are five:…

1. sign,[b] or mark[c]: comprehension by way of a sign, or mark, is an analysis of an object from a mark that is presently seen or was seen formerly; for example, inferring a chariot from a banner, or inferring a country and retinue from a monarch, or inferring an ox from a hump and horns.
2. entity[d]:
    - inferring an obscure object from an obvious entity; for example, inferring the past from the present, or inferring the present from the past
    - inferring the rest from part of an entity; for example, inferring the whole adornment or clothing from one part of an adornment or clothing, or inferring that leftovers are good from good food, drink, and so forth[475]
3. activity[e]: analysis of the basis of an activity from an activity; for example, inferring a tree stump from not moving, having a bird's nest, and so forth, or inferring an elephant from a footprint, or inferring a horse and so forth from a whinny and so forth, or inferring a human from moving limbs[476]
4. phenomenon[f]: realizing from an inseparable phenomenon a phenomenon related with it; for example, inferring suffering

[a] Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* (P5709, vol. 130, 88.3.4, III.1a) says, "Because there are two [types of] objects of comprehension, there are two [types of] prime cognition."

[b] *rtags.*

[c] *mtshan ma.*

[d] *ngo bo nyid.*

[e] *las.*

[f] *chos.*

from relation with impermanence [that has a nature of finally deteriorating];[477] or inferring emptiness and selflessness from relation with suffering

5. cause and effect[a]: inferring an effect from a cause and a cause from an effect; for example, inferring arrival in another place from going, or inferring going from arrival in another place. This seems to need some refinement.[b] I have stated just a bare explanation.

Direct Perception

A direct perception is a consciousness that is not obscure, not already analyzed, not an object of analysis, and unmistaken. A phenomenon that has not been made obscure by causes of becoming obscure:

- the four obstructions:
  1. veiling such as darkness
  2. being made invisible such as by medicine, mantra, and magic
  3. being overwhelmed such as the form of stars by sunlight
  4. obscuration such as an eye disease, sleeping, and so forth
- the three—distant place, distant time, and distance due to subtlety

is taken to be manifest (*mngon gyur*).

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to direct perception, according to the [Proponents of Mind-Only] Following Reasoning, there are four: sense direct perceptions, mental direct perceptions, yogic direct perceptions, and self-cognizing direct perceptions. According to the [Proponents of Mind-Only] Following Scripture, the four—sense direct perceptions, mental direct perceptions, worldly direct perceptions, and pure direct perceptions—are asserted.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[478] In the statement that direct perception is non-mistaken, what constitutes mistake? There are five or seven direct perceptions mistaken with regard to objects, or quasi-direct-perceptions:

1. mistake in discrimination, as in discriminating a mirage as water
2. mistake in number, as in a double moon

[a] *rgyu 'bras.*

[b] Inferring an effect from a cause is not acceptable; Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den refers readers to the first chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* and its commentaries.

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3. mistake about shape, as in seeing a [twirling] firebrand as a wheel
4. mistake about color, as in apprehending a conch as yellow
5. mistake about activity, as in perceiving trees as moving [when riding in a boat]
6. mistaken mind due to liking those five
7. mistake, as in being attached to those five.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Sense direct perceptions included in the continuum of those on a ground lower [than Buddhahood] are mistaken because apprehended-object and apprehending-subject appear to be separate substantial entities.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[479] On this occasion of the Mind-Only School, except for Buddhahood all sense direct perceptions on a lower ground are polluted by mistake because among their five sense direct perceptions there are none not polluted by the appearance of external objects.

7* Detailed Explanation of the Suchness of Cognition-Only

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[480] As Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says, "When all are included, there are ten conceptualizations."[a] These are:

Five Conceptualizations Depending on the Thoroughly Afflicted Class [of Phenomena]

1. The mind-basis-of-all is the *root conceptualization* because of being the root of the generation of conceptualization.
2. The six objects, forms and so forth, are *conceptualizations of signs* because of being the objects of observation in the generation of conceptualizations.
3. The six constituents that are the eyes and so forth and the six constituents that are the respective consciousnesses are *conceptualizations perceiving signs* because of being actual conceptualizations or causes generating conceptualizations.
4. The changes of conceptualizations of signs into other states are *conceptualizations of changing signs* because of being objects to be analyzed.
5. The changes of conceptualizations perceiving signs into other states are *conceptualizations of changing perceiving signs* because of being objects to be analyzed.

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[a] *rnam rtog.*

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Five Conceptualizations Depending on the Pure Class [of Phenomena]

6. *Conceptualizations taught by others* are conceptualizations subsequent to hearing excellent doctrine and non-excellent doctrine.
7. *Improper conceptualizations* are Outsiders' conceptualizations arisen from hearing non-excellent doctrine.
8. *Proper conceptualizations* are conceptualizations of those in this religion that arise from hearing excellent doctrine.
9. *Adhering conceptualizations* are the sixty-two bad views together with [the minds and mental factors] in parallel association with them.
10. *Distracted conceptualizations* are Bodhisattvas' distractions to the signs of non-things and so forth.

Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[481] If initially you realize that [phenomena] are not established in accordance with how they are imputed by ideation, it is easy to overcome other mistaken conceptualizations. Moreover, Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:

> How is one who has not awakened through knowing suchness to infer cognition-only? It is to be inferred through scriptures and reasonings.

Accordingly, from among many scriptures and reasonings the threefold reasoning in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle*…is:

Because an awareness does not exist prior, that it is the nature of that is contradictory. Because of having many names, one object being many essences is contradictory. Because a name is not limited in usage to one object, that essences are mixed is contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: That phenomena are not established by way of their own character as foundations of language is proven by:

1. the reasoning of the contradiction that [the name] would be in the nature of a phenomenon, this being contradicted by the fact that prior to associating the name [with the phenomenon] an awareness thinking "That is a pot" with regard to a bulbous thing[a] is not generated
2. the reasoning of the contradiction that one object would have many essences because the names of that phenomenon are manifold, and

[a] "Bulbous thing" is an abbreviation for the definition of pot: that which is bulbous, flat-based, and able to hold water [that is, fluid] (*lto ldir zhab zhum chu skyor gyi don byed nus pa*).

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3. the reasoning of the contradiction that [various] essences would be mixed because one name is not limited in usage for only one object.[a]

   Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[482] If the appearance of a bulbous thing being the factor of the imputation of vocabulary for pot, or being the foundation or basis of vocabulary for pot, was the mode of subsistence of a pot, it would not be posited through the force of name or terminology [that is, language], and in that case, associating [that is, learning] terminology for pot would not be needed, and prior to imputing a name for pot an awareness thinking "pot" with regard to a bulbous thing would have to exist, whereas such an awareness is not generated…

   If the appearance of a phenomenon being the factor of the imputation of vocabulary for it, or being the foundation or basis of vocabulary for it, was the mode of subsistence of the phenomenon, just as many different names, such as Shakra,[b] Indra,[c] Grāmaghātaka,[d] and so forth, are used for one person, the sole object would have many contradictory essences in accordance with the many contradictory names, but that does not exist…

   If the appearance of a phenomenon being the factor of the imputation of vocabulary for it, or being the foundation or basis of vocabulary for it, was the mode of subsistence of the phenomenon, then when one name, such as "Upagupta," is used for four beings in the four directions, it [absurdly] follows that the selves of those four would be mixed as one…but they are not mixed that way…

   Hence, phenomena are not established that way.

   Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[483]

   1. It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a bulbous thing, that—prior to designating it with a name for pot—there exists an awareness thinking "Pot," with regard to it because [according to you] it is established through the force of its own mode of subsistence as a foundation of a convention for pot. There is entailment because, if it were established that way, a bulbous thing's being a foundation of a convention for pot would not be posited through the force of language, due to

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[a] For the passage from Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's commentary in *The Essence of Eloquence* see 326.

[b] *brgya byin.*

[c] *dbang po.*

[d] *grong 'joms;* perhaps also Nagaraghātaka or Puraṃdara.

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which a linguistic awareness also would be generated without depending on [learning] language [for it]. It cannot be accepted [that with respect to a bulbous thing—prior to designating it with a name for pot—there exists an awareness thinking "pot" with regard to it] because it is manifestly established that it is necessary to make a linguistic connection for pot in one who does not know any language for pot. In that case, since the generation of an awareness thinking "pot" does not exist prior to designating a name for pot, it is contradictory for the linguistic referentiality[a] "pot" to exist in the essence or the mode of abiding of a bulbous thing.

2. It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the Lord of the Heaven of the Thirty-three, is plural because [according to you] many names—such as Shakra, the god Indra, Grāmaghātaka, and so forth—are affixed for him through the force of the object itself,[b] since [according to you] he is established by way of his own character as the referent of those names. If those names were affixed through the force of the object itself, then what appears to a conceptual consciousness would have to abide [that is, exist] in the object itself in accordance with how it appears, and hence that object would have to be plural.[c]
3. It [absurdly] follows that the subject, two Upaguptas, one in the east and one in the west, are one because the name "Upagupta" is affixed to them through the force of the objects themselves, since [according to you] they are established—through their own mode of abiding—as the referent of that [name]. If the name "Upagupta" were established through the force of the objects themselves, then since (1) what appears to a conceptual consciousness would have to abide [that is, exist] in the object itself in accordance with how it appears and (2) a conceptual consciousness thinking "Both of them are Upagupta," perceives their natures as mixed, those [two persons] would have to be mixed.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[484] Through that [reasoning] you should understand that:

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[a] *brda byas pa.*

[b] *dngos dbang gis 'jug pa.*

[c] Since the names appear in different aspects to conceptual consciousnesses, there would have to be correspondingly plural objects.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- Although conventional phenomena, which are bases of emptiness, do not exist as the mode of subsistence, their appearance that way is mistaken like the horse in a magician's illusion.
- Although [external] objects are not established, the generation of mistaken afflictive emotions is…like a mirage and their help and harm are like dreams and so forth.
- The mode of subsistence is like space in that it is a mere elimination of the self that is the object negation.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[485] As Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:

> In all Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtras] non-conceptual exalted wisdom is taught as an antidote to ten distracting conceptualizations.

Thus, there are ten distracting conceptualizations of Bodhisattvas.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[486]

Two Distracting Conceptualizations Depending on a Self of Persons

1. Conceptualization of the non-existence of effective things—conceiving that the aggregates do not exist
2. Conceptualization of effective things—conceiving that a permanent, unitary, self-powered self exists

Eight Distracting Conceptualizations Depending on a Self of Phenomena

3. Conceptualization of superimposition—conceiving that apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are different substantial entities
4. Conceptualization of deprecation—conceiving that other-powered natures do not exist
5. Conceptualization of oneness—conceiving that other-powered natures and their noumenon are one isolate
6. Conceptualization of difference—conceiving that other-powered natures and their noumenon are different entities
7. Conceptualization of entity—conceiving that the object verbalized by the name "form" is ultimately established as the entity of form
8. Conceptualization of attribute—conceiving that the objects verbalized by the name "production," "cessation," and so forth are ultimately established as attributes of form
9. Conceptualization of an object as like the name—when hearing how the name "form" is imputed, conceiving that an

awareness perceiving the object verbalized is non-mistaken

10. Conceptualization of a name as like the object—when observing an object such as a form and so forth, conceiving that an awareness perceiving its name as like how it is observed is non-mistaken.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[487] It is explained that all meanings of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are included in antidotes to the ten distracting conceptualizations of Bodhisattvas:

1. Antidote to conceptualization of the non-existence of effective things: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "While existing as a Bodhisattva," and so forth.
2. Antidote to conceptualization of effective things: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "A Bodhisattva is not to be seen as real," and so forth.
3. Antidote to conceptualization of superimposition: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "The name Bodhisattva is not to be seen as real. A Bodhisattva is not to be seen as real. The perfection of wisdom is not to be seen as real," and so forth.
4. Antidote to conceptualization of deprecation: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "It is not due to emptiness."
5. Antidote to conceptualization of oneness: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "That which is the emptiness of form is not form," and so forth.
6. Antidote to conceptualization of difference: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "Form is not other than emptiness. Form itself is emptiness; emptiness is form."
7. Antidote to conceptualization of entity: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "Subhūti, it is thus: This so-called 'form' is only a name," and so forth.
8. Antidote to conceptualization of attribute: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "The entity is not produced, not ceased, not afflicted, not pure," and so forth.
9. Antidote to conceptualization of an object as like the name: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "Having individually assigned those phenomena with fabricated names, they impute conventions in accordance with adventitious names; they manifestly adhere to them in accordance with how conventions were imputed."
10. Antidote to conceptualization of a name as like the object: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say, "Bodhisattvas do not see all

those names as real. Due to not seeing them as real, they do not adhere to them," and so forth.

It is explained that [the antidotes to] conceptualizations of oneness and difference are antidotes to conceptualizations apprehending the two truths to be one isolate and to conceptualizations apprehending the two truths to be different entities.

The four examinations and four knowledges are set forth as antidotes to the four latter conceptualizations:

Because when investigated by way of the four thorough examinations in that way, this does not exist in those.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because of not existing when investigated by way of the four thorough examinations—examination into names, examination into objects, examination into imputing entities, and examination into imputing attributes—this establishment by way of its own character does not exist in those foundations of a name [that is, phenomena are not established by way of their own character as foundations of names].

Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[488]

It is thus: such Bodhisattvas making effort at entering into cognition-only thoroughly understand—with respect to the mental verbalization [that is, conceptual consciousnesses][489] to which letters [that is, names][490] and the meanings [to which those names refer][491] appear—that those lettered names are exhausted as only [posited by][492] mental conceptuality [and are not established in accordance with how they appear to refer to the object verbalized. This is the examination of names.][493]

They also thoroughly understand that the meaning depending on letters is just exhausted as only a mental verbalization [that is, as only imputed by conceptuality and not established by way of its own character as the referent of the verbalizing name. This is the examination of meaning.][494]

Moreover, they thoroughly understand that those names are only exhausted as factors imputed in the manner of entities and in the manner of attributes. [That is, they understand that the two imputational natures in the manner of entities and attributes—which are factors imputed individually by the two types of names imputing entities and attributes—are only exhausted as imputed by conceptuality and are not established by way of their own character. These are the examinations of factors imputed in the manner of entity and in the manner of attribute.][495]

Therefore, when they apprehend these as just exhausted as only mental verbalization and when they do not apprehend meanings as well as names involving factors imputed in the manner of entities and attributes nor [anything][496] involving [factors imputed] in the manner of entity and attribute [as other than only being imputed by conceptuality, that is to say, when they do not apprehend these][497] as having the factual character [of subsisting as external objects,[498] they attain] the four thorough examinations [which are entities of the path of preparation] and the four thorough knowledges [which are entities of the path of seeing], just as they are in reality. Through these, they enter into cognition-only concerning those mental conceptual consciousnesses to which letters and meanings appear. [By way of establishing that:

- although name, meaning, entity, and attribute *seem* to mental conceptuality to be different entities from the mind,
- the other-powered natures of forms and so forth are the same substantial entity as mind, and
- uncompounded phenomena are the same entity as mind,

they understand that name, meaning, entity, and attribute are of the essence of cognition.][499]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[500] Because of not existing and not being found while examined by way of these four, they are exhausted as cognition-only, and when examined, its meaning does not exist, whereby the non-existence of even cognition-only in the perspective of analysis of the ultimate is asserted as emptiness. Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:

> How does one understand the thoroughly established nature? It is understood upon overcoming even the discrimination of cognition-only…

If even the Proponents of Mind-Only explain that when meditating on emptiness mind is stopped, what need is there to mention that the Proponents of the Middle say so?

Because of the certainty of simultaneous observation, they are not other.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because of the certainty of simultaneous observation, blue and a consciousness apprehending blue are not other substantial entities.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[501] Dharmakīrti's *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition* says:

> Because of the certainty of simultaneous observation,
> Blue and an awareness of it are not other…

Therefore,[502] here the basis of debate is, for instance, blue and a consciousness apprehending blue since Dharmakīrti says, "Blue and an awareness of it." The predicate being proven is a mere negative of other substantial entities since Dharmakīrti says, "are not other." With respect to the meaning of the reason, "simultaneous" means at the same time; "observation" means realization; and "certainty" means mutual certainty, that is, entailment. Hence:

> The subjects, blue and a consciousness apprehending blue, although appearing to be different [substantial entities] are not other substantial entities because of the certainty of simultaneous observation, as is the case, for example, with two moons [when a double moon is seen]…

With respect to the presence of the reason in the subject:

> The subjects, blue and a consciousness apprehending blue, are certain to be observed simultaneously because it is entailed that when [something] is generated as an entity observing one of them, [something] is necessarily generated as an entity observing the other…

Whatever are certain to be simultaneously observed are necessarily not other substantial entities because there is no certainty of simultaneous observation with respect to those that are other substantial entities and those that are different entities.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry:* The statement of the reasoning is:[a]

> The subjects, a valid cognition apprehending blue and the blue appearing to it, do not exist as separate entities because of the certainty of being observed [that is, certified] simultaneously—

[a] The reasoning revolves around three basic notions:

- Whatever exists is necessarily certified through being observed by valid cognition.
- Whenever an object, such as a patch of blue, is observed by a valid cognition, the valid cognition that certifies it is also simultaneously certified through being observed by a self-cognizing consciousness.
- Whatever are necessarily simultaneously observed by valid cognition are not separate entities but one entity.

for example, like sound and object of hearing.[a]

The opponents of this [reasoning] are the Proponents of the Great Exposition and of the Sūtra School. The Proponents of Cognition state this to those who adhere to blue and the valid cognition apprehending blue as separate substantial entities due to their appearing to be separate substantial entities.

The proof of the presence of the reason in the subject [that is, that a valid cognition apprehending blue and the blue that appears to it are certain to be observed simultaneously] is:

The subjects, a valid cognition apprehending blue and the blue that appears to it, are certain to be observed simultaneously because, when any person[b] in any place at any time observes the one with valid cognition, that person at that place and at that time necessarily also observes the other with valid cognition.

Objection: The reason is not established.

Answer: It follows that such is necessary because:

- when that person at that place and at that time observes blue with valid cognition, there is a valid cognition observing the valid cognition apprehending blue, and
- it is not reasonable that such a valid cognition is produced *after* that person observes blue with valid cognition at that place and at that time.

Objection: The first reason is not established.

Answer: With respect to the subject, the valid cognition apprehending blue when that person at that place and at that time observes blue with valid cognition, it follows that there exists a valid cognition observing it because it is observed by valid cognition.[c]

Objection: The second reason is not established. [That is to

[a] Sound and object of hearing are equivalent, and thus when one is observed with valid cognition, the other is also observed. In the same way, the Proponents of Mind-Only hold that a patch of blue and the valid cognition apprehending it are necessarily observed by valid cognitions (an eye consciousness and a self-cognizing consciousness that accompanies the eye consciousness, respectively) and thus could not be separate entities.

[b] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso uses "person" instead of "consciousness" because, as in the case of apprehending blue with an eye consciousness, it is not just one consciousness that observes both blue and the eye consciousness. Rather, the eye consciousness observes blue, and a self-cognizing consciousness—that exists together with and is the same entity as the eye consciousness but is not the eye consciousness itself—observes the eye consciousness.

[c] The point is that there must be a valid cognition observing anything that exists simply because it exists, for the definition of an existent is: that which is observed by valid cognition.

say, it *is* reasonable that such a valid cognition is produced *after* that person observes blue with valid cognition at that place and at that time.]

Answer: If such a valid cognition were produced after that person observes blue with valid cognition at that place and at that time, then an other-cognizing consciousness that observes it also would have to be produced after it, due to which the number of consciousnesses required would be limitless.[a]

The proof of the [original] positive entailment [that is, if, when any person in any place at any time observes the object with valid cognition, that person at that place and at that time necessarily also observes this consciousness with valid cognition, it is entailed that those two are certainly observed simultaneously] is:

With respect to a valid cognition apprehending blue and the blue that appears to it, it follows that the relationship of mutual existence—that is, if they mutually exist at the same time, they must exist and, if they mutually do not exist at the same time, they must not exist—is established. This is because the relationship of entailment—that, if they mutually are observed by valid cognition at the same time, they must be observed—is established because they are certain to be observed simultaneously. You have asserted the reason.

If that is accepted, it follows that a valid cognition apprehending blue and the blue that appears to it are related as one entity because of being related and moreover, existing simultaneously.

Objection: It is not established that a valid cognition apprehending blue and the blue that appears to it exist simultaneously.

Answer: It [absurdly] follows that there is a time when blue is established, but the existence of blue is not established.[b]

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[a] It is likely that concern over such a regress causes the Indian master Dharmapāla to posit one more simultaneous self-cognizing consciousness but to cut the process there.

[b] The absurdity from which the reasoning stems, so to speak, is embodied in opposite form in the first of the three pivots of the argument mentioned above:

- Whatever exists is necessarily certified through being observed by valid cognition.
- Whenever an object, such as a patch of blue, is observed by a valid cognition, the valid cognition that certifies it is also simultaneously certified through being observed by a self-cognizing consciousness.
- Whatever are necessarily simultaneously observed by valid cognition are not separate entities but one entity.

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Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[503]

Objection: It [absurdly] follows that when Devadatta and Yajñadatta observe a single face, the two eye consciousnesses are generated as entities mutually observing each other because at that time the form observed by Devadatta is also observed by Yajñadatta's eye consciousness. It follows that at that time the form observed by Devadatta is also observed by Yajñadatta's eye consciousness because at that time they observe the form of one face in common.

Answer: That at that time they observe the form of one face in common does not entail that at that time the form observed by Devadatta is also observed by Yajñadatta's eye consciousness, but it is established that at that time they observe the form of one face in common because although they see such in common, what appears to the one does not have to appear to the other, like, for example, the fact that when a double moon appears to Devadatta and Yajñadatta, what appears to Yajñadatta does not appear to Devadatta. Although they see such in common, what appears to the one does not have to appear to the other because it is like the fact that enemy and friend have discordant modes of appearance with regard to one person—unattractive and attractive and so forth.

With respect to further means of refuting external objects, the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:[504]

I explain as mind-only
[What is held to be] the creator —
Person, continuum, aggregates, conditions,
Particles, principal, and Īshvara.[a]

These do not exist as [external] objects.
Seeing mind itself as external objects is wrong.
When analyzed with reasoning,[b]

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[a] In the section on the Consequence School (816; Taipei, 536.8) Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a explains this stanza as meaning:

> There are those who, though they are Buddhists, advocate as the creator a substantially existent person or a continuum or aggregates that are asserted to be the person. Also, some Buddhists advocate substantially existent conditions as the creator. The Vaisheṣhikas advocate particles as the creator of the world; the Sāṃkhyas, the principal; and the Aishvaras, Īshvara. Refuting them, Buddha said that only the mind is the creator.

[b] That this sūtra mentions reasoning is significant since few sūtras do.

Apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are refuted.

From between the two—the reasoning analyzing particles in Vasubandhu's *The Twenty* and the reasoning analyzing singular and plural with respect to person, continuum and so forth—first…Vasubandhu's *The Twenty* says:[505]

Due to simultaneous conjunction with six [particles]
A particle has six parts.[a]
Also, if the six were in the same place,
Even a mass would be of the size of a particle.[b]

Let us state the meaning of this, together with a dispelling of contradiction:

When a minute particle is encircled, if the eastern side does not face the western direction, it has parts. If it faces, they would not become a mass. Despite being minute, what contradiction is there in not being those of the Proponents of the Great Exposition?

Word Commentary on Root Text: When one minute particle is encircled by six minute particles—from the four directions and above and below—if the eastern side of the center particle does not face the western direction, it has parts. If [the eastern side of the center particle] faces [the western direction], the western particle also would exist on the area of the eastern particle, whereby no matter how many particles accumulate, they would not become a mass.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[506] The Vaisheṣhikas assert that a mass comes from partless minute particles sticking together. Proponents of the Great Exposition and Saṃgharakṣhita of the Sūtra School assert that a mass comes from the mere circling of many partless minute particles without meeting. Many from the Sūtra School, such as the Sūtra School's Bhadanta and so forth assert that a mass comes from the aggregation of many partless minute particles without any space between them but not touching. To

[a] Vasubandhu's own commentary on the first two lines is:

When a particle is simultaneously in conjunction with six particles from the six directions, it comes to have six parts, because the others are not in the place one occupies.

[b] Vasubandhu's commentary on the last two lines is:

If just the place occupied by the one particle were the place occupied by all six, then, because all would occupy the same place, the entire mass would have the size of a particle. Since they mutually would not differ from each other, no mass at all would be seen.

them Vasubandhu explains:

> When one minute particle is encircled by six minute particles—from the four directions and above and below—if the part that joins the eastern particle does not touch the western particle, a minute particle has six parts, and if it does not, then the area, or direction, of all six that touches all six would be the same, or the same direction, whereby it [absurdly] follows that even a great mass would be [the size of] a minute particle.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive:*[507] It follows that external objects do not exist because not even a single partless particle—which you Proponents of Truly Existent External Objects assert to be the building blocks of external objects—exists. This is because, when those minute particles that are the smallest of particles also are examined, they have parts. It follows that the reason is so because a single minute particle is surrounded by six minute particles—in the four directions, above, and below—and thus the central particle has six parts relative to where it is surrounded by the six minute particles.

Objection: The reason, that is, that a single minute particle is surrounded by six minute particles—in the four directions, above, and below—and thus the central particle has six parts relative to where it is surrounded by the six minute particles, is not proven.

Reply: Because you say that the reason is not proven, it absurdly follows that the side of the central minute particle that faces the east also faces the particles in the south, the west, and so forth. If you accept that the side of the central minute particle that faces the east also faces the particles in the south, the west, and so forth, then, because you accept this, it absurdly follows that, on the area of the one minute particle in the east, the remaining five particles also exist. If you accept that, on the area of the one minute particle in the east, the remaining five particles also exist, then, because you accept this, it absurdly follows that the mass of howsoever many particles aggregate is equal in measure only to a single minute particle. If you accept that the mass of howsoever many particles aggregate is equal in measure only to a single minute particle, it absurdly follows that even Mount Meru is the same size as a single particle.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[508] With respect to this, the Translator D̄ak-tsang says that the Superior [Nāgārjuna]

explains that whatever has directional parts is not a tiny particle.[a] Even on this occasion when he should say "minute particle,"[b] he says "tiny particle," but there are no Insider [Buddhists] who assert that tiny particles are partless because there is no one who does not assert that when a tiny particle is separated into minute particles, it is an aggregate of many minute particles.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although a particle is minute, what contradiction is there in its not being partless as the Proponents of the Great Exposition assert?

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[509] Also, since a great many [texts] such as Asaṅga's *Actuality of the Grounds* which says, "An aggregation is so due to being involved with directions; even a minute particle has directions," say that despite being a minute particle, what contradiction is there in its not being partless like the partless particles that Proponents of the Great Exposition, Proponents of Sūtra, and Vaisheṣhikas assert?

Not only that, but also the Translator Ḏak-tsang posits that there are partless minute particles in the systems of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School. Thus, let us point out further mistaken contradictions:

Because of being refuted by many, it is mistaken that Proponents of the Middle and of Mind-Only assert those.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because of being refuted by many scholars, it is mistaken to say that Proponents of the Middle and of Mind-Only assert those partless particles.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[510] Even many sūtras teach the lack of oneness and manyness; the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

Just as forms that have abandoned
Oneness and manyness appear in a mirror
But do not exist there,

and so forth. And many great chariots of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School…refute a self of phenomena through the lack of oneness and manyness with respect to:

- directional parts of physical things, space, and so forth
- aspect-parts and temporal parts in mind and mental factors

and likewise thusness and so forth. Therefore, Ḏak-tsang's

[a] *rdul phran.*

[b] *rdul phra rab.*

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assertions that in these [Middle Way and Mind-Only systems] there are partless particles, consciousnesses, and so forth are mistaken appearances to those of bad intelligence due to a great disease of ignorance, like the optical illusions of a great many bees, falling hairs, and so forth when the non-existent is seen as existent.

With respect to other kinds [of reasonings]:

Because of not existing in the perspective of meditative equipoise, because of many mentalities about one thing, because pleasant and unpleasant, because of yogic appearances and so forth, and because of being similar to dreams and so forth, objects do not exist; they are true as only mind. Since objects do not exist as referents of conceptual consciousnesses, their appearance to non-conceptual consciousnesses that way is mistaken; hence it is refuted that they are different substantial entities from those.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because there are many different modes of perception by the mentalities, that is, minds, of karmically endowed beings such as gods, humans, and hungry ghosts with respect to one thing such as a bowl filled with what is wet and moistening, external objects do not exist.[511]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[512] All of the many [categories of existents called] cognitions, such as cognitions of the enjoyer (see 308), mentioned in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* are not established as external objects whereas they appear to be external objects. Concerning this, a sūtra speaks of four doctrines:

If Bodhisattvas possess four doctrines, they will understand that the objects of all cognitions do not exist.

The four doctrines are:

1. THE REASONING OF THE GENERATION OF DISCORDANT CONSCIOUSNESSES WITH RESPECT TO ONE THING[513]

A sūtra says:[a]

Due to discordant consciousness, consciousnesses of, for example, hungry ghosts, humans, and gods see one thing with different cognitions.

and Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[514]

In accordance with their respective type

[a] For each of these four doctrines, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a provides sūtra citations; they are further examples of reasonings presented in sūtra, and thus although sūtra does not appear to emphasize reasoning as much as Indian treatises do, it is certainly present.

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As hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods,
The thing is one [but their] minds are different.
Hence, it is expressed that [external] objects are not
established.

Due to different modes of activation of predispositions of mental cognition even with respect to one thing, minds have different appearances of objects.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive:*[515]

[Correct position:] There are no external objects because consciousnesses that perceive external objects are mistaken with respect to their appearing-objects[a] [as, for example, is the case with dream-appearances].[516]

Objection: The reason is not established.

Reply: Then, because [according to you] the reason is not established, it [absurdly] follows that it is suitable to make assertions in accordance with how [objects] appear to sense consciousnesses of the short-sighted [that is, of those who have not realized emptiness] which have not been polluted by superficial causes of mistake.[b]

If you accept [that it is suitable to make assertions in accordance with how objects appear to sense consciousnesses of the

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[a] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 635.5) adds:

If a consciousness that perceives something as an external object is mistaken with respect to its appearing-object, then that thing is necessarily not established as an external object, because, if something is established as an external object, it must cast its aspect [that is, representation] to the sense consciousness to which it appears and, in that case, the sense consciousness must be generated into having its aspect [that is, representation] in accordance with how it casts the aspect [that is, representation].

[b] Four types of consciousnesses affected by superficial causes of mistake are enumerated:

- cause of mistake existing in the object: for instance, a consciousness perceiving a circle of fire due to a firebrand being twirled quickly
- cause of mistake existing in the basis: for instance, an eye consciousness that sees a single moon as double due to a fault in the eye
- cause of mistake existing in the abode: for instance, an eye consciousness that sees trees as moving when a person is riding in a boat (causing stationary objects on the shore to appear to move)
- cause of mistake existing in the immediately preceding condition: for instance, an eye consciousness that sees everything as red when a person is overcome by anger.

See Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 51-52.

short-sighted which have not been polluted by superficial causes of error], then, because you accept such, it [absurdly] follows that, even with respect to one object such as a bowl filled with what is wet and moistening,[a] when, due to the proprietary condition of very powerful karma, it appears to certain gods, humans, and hungry ghosts respectively as ambrosia, water, and pus and blood, those are established in accordance with how they appear to the eye consciousnesses of each of them.

If you accept this, it [absurdly] follows that on that spot where there is a bowl full of what is wet and moistening (1) there exists a bowl full of ambrosia and (2) water and so forth do not exist because [according to you] (1) there is establishment in accordance with the mode of appearance to such an eye consciousness of a god and (2) to such an eye consciousness of a god ambrosia appears but water, pus and blood, and so forth do not appear. You have asserted the first reason. The second reason [that is, that to such an eye consciousness of a god ambrosia appears but water, pus and blood, and so forth do not appear] is established because [a god] is a person having such karma; this is because such exists.

If it is accepted [that on that spot where there is a bowl full of what is wet and moistening (1) there exists a bowl full of ambrosia but (2) water and so forth do not exist], it [absurdly] follows that on that place there is a bowl full of water but not ambrosia, pus and blood, and so forth, because [according to you] (1) there is establishment in accordance with the mode of appearance to such an eye consciousness of a human and (2) to the eye consciousness of such a human the other two do not appear. The first reason has been asserted. The second reason [that is, that to the eye consciousness of such a human the other two do not appear] is established because [that person] is a human having such karma; this is because such a human exists. If it is accepted [that on that place there is a bowl full of water but not ambrosia, pus and blood, and so forth], you have explicitly contradicted yourself.

Reasonings with respect to hungry ghosts, animals, and so forth are to be applied similarly. Hence, it follows that external objects are not established because different modes of mental appearance even with respect to one thing as an object only are seen [to inflict] manifold damage [to an assertion of external objects].

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[a] That which is wet and moistening (*rlan zhing gsher ba*) is the definition of water—"water" here referring to all fluids.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because one being's face appears in many ways—unpleasant and pleasant—to enemies and friends, external objects do not exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[517] Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*[518] says:

Even if there were external objects,
How could experience [be explained],
Because there would be the fallacy
That a limited entity would by its own nature have many contrary [natures].

One person's body is observed in many ways—pleasant and unpleasant—by friends and enemies.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because [the appearance of external objects is] similar to dreams and so forth, external objects do not exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[519]

2. EXAMPLES OF THE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS OF OBSERVATION

A sūtra says:

Without [external] objects of observation cognition observes [objects], like, for example, observing the past, the future, dreams, and reflections.

and Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[520]

Since in cases of the past and so forth, dreams,
And the two types of reflections[a]
[External] objects of observation do not exist,
It is suitable for there to be observation of [objects despite the absence of external objects].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive:*[521] With respect to this, a Hearer Sectarian asks: What examples are there for external objects not being established but there being appearances as objects of observation of consciousness?

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[a] The two types of reflections are identified as reflections in a mirror and reflections, or images, that appear in meditation on the ugliness of the body and the like; see Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations for (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Tenets," dngos, da,* 121.2, and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 633.1. S̄er-s̄hül (*Notes,* 50a.3) identifies them similarly in dependence upon Vasubandhu's commentary (P5551, vol. 112) and Asvabhāva's commentary (P5552, vol. 113); he questions Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's identification of them as an appearance of falling hairs and the appearance of skeletons to meditative stabilization on ugliness, the problem being with the first of these.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Reply: Although external objects, like the horns of a rabbit, are utterly not established, there are many examples of how [external objects] appear as objects of observation of [consciousness] because the following are examples of this:

- The appearance of past and future [objects] to awarenesses at the present time
- Similarly, the appearance—in a dream of a person sleeping in a small room—of a herd of elephants intermingling
- Despite the appearance of falling hairs to someone with an eye disease, the non-establishment of such in accordance with how it appears
- Despite the appearance of an area filled with corpses in a meditative stabilization on ugliness, the non-establishment of such in accordance with how it appears.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[522] There are eight examples:

- [a magician's] illusions in order to overcome the doubt wondering how one could observe objects
- mirages in order to overcome doubt wondering how minds and mental factors arise without external objects
- dreams in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, one gets involved in activities of desire and non-desire
- reflections in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, one could accomplish the wanted effects of virtuous actions and the unwanted effects of non-virtuous actions
- hallucinations in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, the varieties of consciousness arise
- echoes in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, the varieties of expressions arise
- a moon [reflected in] water in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, the objects of activities of correct meditative stabilization arise
- emanations in order to overcome doubt wondering how, if there are no external objects, Bodhisattvas are born in accordance with their thought [to accomplish the aims of sentient beings].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[523]

3. Reasoning of the Absurd Consequence that Non-Conceptual Exalted Wisdom Would Not Exist

A sūtra says:

> Since even without striving one would know non-erroneously, if [external] objects existed, a consciousness observing [external] objects would know suchness without striving, due to which error would not exist.

and Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[524]

> If objects were established as [external] objects,
> Non-conceptual exalted wisdom would not exist.[a]
> Due to its not existing, it would not be feasible
> For there to be attainment of Buddhahood.

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry:*[525] If external objects existed, either sentient beings would be released without striving, or, despite striving, sentient beings would not be released. There is entailment because:

- If external objects existed, such would have to be established as the mode of subsistence of things, and, in that case, it would absurdly follow that common beings directly perceive the mode of subsistence of things.
- A Superior's exalted wisdom that realizes the non-duality of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject would not exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because to yogis earth appears as water in accordance with their imagination, and so forth, external objects do not exist. If external objects exist, they must exist in the perspective of the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, but they do not exist in the perspective of the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise; therefore, external objects do not exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[526]

4. Reasoning of Consciousness in accordance with Three Types of Consciousnesses

A sūtra says:

> Consciousness in accordance with three types of consciousnesses is as follows:
>
> - Bodhisattvas and those having concentration who have dominion over mind perceive objects in accordance with how they imagine them.

[a] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*Port of Entry,* 633.1) prefers *mi rtog ye shes yod mi 'gyur* to *shes pa rtog pa med mi 'gyur.*

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- Yogis who have attained calm abiding and are making effort at special insight into phenomena perceive objects in the way they take them to mind.
- Those dwelling in attainment of non-conceptual exalted wisdom do not perceive any objects.

Accordingly:

- There are emanations—obstructive, non-obstructive, and so forth—by those who have attained dominion over the mind, that is, have attained concentrations, [formless] absorptions, and so forth
- Having attained calm abiding…they perceive earth as water, and so forth, in accordance with their yoga, that is, in accordance with whatever they imagine.
- There is no appearance of objects such as forms in the perspective of a Superior's meditative equipoise.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[527] Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* says:[528]

> Bodhisattvas who have attained dominion
> And yogis as well observe
> Phenomena such as [all-pervasive] earth and so forth
> Through the force of their imagination.
>
> Whoever is endowed with intelligence[a]
> And has attained calm and the accomplishment [of special insight][529]
> Perceives objects in the way
> That all phenomena are contemplated [as of the nature of mind].[530]
>
> Moreover since, when non-conceptual exalted wisdom
> Is active, there is no appearance of any [external] objects,
> It should be understood that [external] objects do not exist.
> Since they do not exist, cognition does not exist.[b]

Word Commentary on Root Text: Therefore, external objects do not exist;

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[a] That is, Bodhisattvas; see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 633.2.

[b] The last line seems to suggest that even cognition, or consciousness, does not truly exist. In order to avoid this reading, Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos, da,* 121.3) creatively forces the line to mean that, when cognition-only is realized, a consciousness that takes things to be external objects also does not exist:

> Since external objects do not exist, in cognition-only the taking of things to be [external] objects also does not exist.

forms and so forth truly exist as only of the entity of mind.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[531] Hence, external objects do not exist, and [phenomena] are established as only of the entity of mind, and [other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures] truly exist. Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* says:

- Due to the [true] existence [of the other-powered nature that is the erroneous ideation apprehending object and subject as distant and cut off, the extreme of non-existence is avoided].
- Due to the non-existence [of distant and cut off object and subject—in accordance with how they are apprehended by that ideation—as their mode of subsistence, the extreme of existence is avoided.
- Ideation and emptiness[532] truly] exist.

and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says [about the Mind-Only School's assertions]:[533]

[Other-powered natures inherently] exist and have a nature that is not an object of all [terminological and conceptual] proliferations.

and with respect to the fact that [external objects] do not exist in the perspective of meditative equipoise, the *Collection of Meanings Sūtra* says:[a]

All whatever fraudulences (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) [put forth by consciousnesses concealing suchness] that exist in the world,
The Subduer does not assert [that is, Buddha does not assert that all nominal and terminological imputations are the mode of abiding of those respective phenomena].[534]
Because he does not make [superimpositional and deprecational] assertions with respect to what is seen and heard,

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[a] *don gyi sde tshan dag gi mdo, arthavargīyasūtra;* P5538, vol. 110, 145.2.3. The Sanskrit—as cited in Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*—from Unrai Wogihara, *Bodhisattvabhūmi: A Statement of the Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being the Fifteenth Section of Yogācārabhūmi),* (Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyūkai, 1930-1936), 48.12, is:

yāḥ kāścana saṃvṛtayo hi loke
sarvā hi tā munir nopaiti
an-upago hy asau kenopādatīta [Dutt: *kena upādatīta*]
dṛṣṭa-śrute kāntim a-saṃprakurvan.

See also Dutt, *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* 33.10.

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He does not assert those. How could he conceive them?

and Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* says:

Those which are imputed as "form" and so forth are called "conventionalities" (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*); it is not asserted that those imputational factors are the entities of those things.

and the *Story of Saṃtha Katyāyana Sūtra* says:[a]

The monk Saṃtha does not engage in meditation depending on the earth. He does not engage in meditation depending on any of these: water, fire, and wind, the spheres of [limitless] space, [limitless] consciousness, and nothingness, the spheres of non-discrimination and non-non-discrimination, this world and the next, the two—sun and moon, seeing, hearing, differentiation, knowing, finding, searching, mental investigation, and analysis.

and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[535] [The monk Saṃtha] does not meditate that imputation by name and terminology as "earth" is the mode of abiding of earth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Since objects—forms and so forth—do not exist by way of their own character as referents of conceptual consciousnesses, their appearance to non-conceptual consciousnesses as established by way of their own character as the referents of terms and conceptual consciousnesses is established to be mistaken; hence it is refuted that forms and so forth are different substantial entities from those sense consciousnesses.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[536] Since [phenomena] do not ultimately exist in accordance with how they are adhered to as referents—or places of adherence—and places of support,[b] it is considered that their appearance to non-conceptual consciousnesses as separate substantial entities such that they appear

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[a] *stums byed ka tya'i bu las brtsams te bka' stsal ba'i mdo, saṃthakātyāyanasūtra;* P5538, vol. 110, 145.3.1. The Sanskrit—as cited in Asaṅga's *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*—from Wogihara (*Bodhisattvabhūmi,* 49.15ff) and Dutt (*Bodhisattvabhūmi,* 33.23) is:

iha Saṃtha bhikṣur na pṛthivīṃ niśritya dhyāyati nāpaḥ na tejo [Dutt: *tejaḥ*] *na vāyuṃ* [Dutt: *vāyum*] *n'ākāśa-vijñān'ākiṃcanya-naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatanaṃ nemaṃ lokaṃ na paraṃ* [Dutt adds: *lokaṃ*] *nobhau sūryā-candramasau na dṛṣṭa-śruta-mata-vijñātaṃ prāptaṃ paryeṣitaṃ manasānuvitarkitam anuvicāritaṃ* [Dutt: *anuvicāritam*]. *tat sarvaṃ na niśritya dhyāyati….*

Wogihara (*Bodhisattvabhūmi,* 49, n. 4) identifies this sūtra as being Aṅguttara-Nikāya V, 224.28-329.19.

[b] *'khra sa;* perhaps "props."

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that way [that is, appear to be established by way of their own character as the referents of their respective terms and conceptual consciousnesses] is mistaken. Hence, it is refuted that they are different substantial entities from those minds.

8* How Ideation is Overcome through Refuting that, along with an Off-Shoot {2}

This section has two parts: (1) how ideation is overcome through refuting that and (2) an off-shoot, the difference between True and False Aspectarians.

a How Ideation is Overcome through Refuting That*

Because of being their support, removing this overcomes a hundred ideations and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena is the support, or final foundational root, of all that are to be abandoned, when this conception of a self of phenomena is overcome, a hundred—that is, many—ideations included within afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience as well as their seeds and predispositions included within the term "and so forth" [in the root text] all are overcome.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[537] In brief, it is necessary to know well, in accordance with D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence,*[a] how a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena acts as the foundation of a consciousness conceiving a self of persons. This being the case, when this [conception of a self of phenomena] has been stopped, all conceptualizations included within afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience, which depend upon the two conceptions of a self of persons and a self of phenomena, are overcome…All defects are overcome:
>
> - twenty-two—two obscurations each to be overcome on each of the ten grounds and two at the end of the continuum before being buddhafied described in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought…*
> - eleven assumptions of bad states described in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought…*
> - twenty-six—two conceptions of extremes each to be overcome with respect to teach of thirteen middle paths described in

[a] See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 220-224, 334-335.

Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*

- sixteen conceptions each of a self of phenomena and of a self of persons described in Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*…
- ten conceptualizations described in Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*…
- ten distracting conceptualizations described in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* (see 394ff.)…
- ten conceptualizations described in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*…
- one hundred eight conceptualizations of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject…

and so forth.

b An Off-Shoot, the Difference between Mind-Only True and False Aspectarians {4}*

This section has four parts: the mode of debate by True Aspectarians and False Aspectarians with respect to which basis of debate, meaning of the individual divisions, dispelling mistakes about mind-only, and ways the number of consciousnesses is asserted.

1# The Mode of Debate by Mind-Only True Aspectarians and False Aspectarians with respect to which Basis of Debate

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[538] With respect to the difference between True Aspectarians[a] and False Aspectarians[b] you should first understand the following. Let us illustrate this with respect to one base, a pot. All Outsider and Insider proponents of tenets agree in asserting that:

- a pot is a components-possessor[c] that is a composite of many particles that are its parts
- the many particles that are its parts are the components[d]
- the pot is a components-possessor.

However, there are various modes of assertion with regard to identifying the components-possessor that is called "pot." The Forder Vaisheṣhikas and Naiyāyikas assert that:

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[a] *rnam bden pa, satyākāravādin.*

[b] *rnam brdzun pa, alīkākāravādin.*

[c] *yan lag can,* literally, member-possessor.

[d] *yan lag.*

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- When the many particles that are the parts of a pot conglomerate, initially the quality of possession[a] that is a separate factuality [from the particles] is produced.
- After that, the substance that is the components-possessor called "pot" and that is a separate factuality is produced.

The two Hearer Schools [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School], seeing that reasoning damages [the assertion of] a substance that is a components-possessor which is a separate factuality assert that:

- The mere collection of the many particles that are the parts of a pot is the pot.
- Since there is no components-possessor that is not that collection, a pot imputedly exists.

The Proponents of Mind-Only assert that:

- The collection of the parts of a pot is not the pot.
- The factor of appearance that is an appearance as a pot due to the force of activation of a predisposition is the pot.
- Hence, a pot is established as the substantial entity of the mind.

The Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School agrees with the Sūtra School, and the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School agrees with the Mind-Only School. The Consequentialists assert that a "pot"[b] is merely imputed there by terminology and conceptuality to[c] the collection of many particles that are the parts of the pot.

Gross appearances to operative consciousness are the basis of debate. About the controversy, True and False Aspectarians debate whether true or not true, existing or not existing, or not polluted or polluted by obscuration—not about truth or falsity as Proponents of the Middle Way and Proponents of Mind-Only debate, or existence, effective thing, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Appearances as gross objects to operative consciousness[d] are the basis of debate by True Aspectarians and False

[a] *ldan pa.*

[b] The quotes do not imply that in the Consequence School all phenomena are just words and hence sounds, even though it asserts that all phenomena are name-only.

[c] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den uses "to" (*la*), but most Ge-luk-b̄a scholars prefer "in dependence upon" (*la brten nas*), since it more clearly indicates that the object imputed is not its basis of imputation, which here is the collection of parts.

[d] The term "operative consciousness" eliminates self-cognizing consciousness.

Aspectarians. About the mode of debate, True and False Aspectarians debate because they disagree about:

- whether [blue, yellow, and so forth] are true or not true—that is, exist or do not exist—in accordance with how they appear
- or whether those appearances as gross objects are not polluted or are polluted by obscuration, that is, ignorance.

They do not debate about whether:

- [appearances as gross objects][539] are true or false [that is, truly established or falsely established][540] as on the occasion of debates by Proponents of the Middle Way and Proponents of Mind-Only [since, according to Gyel-tsap's exposition,[a] all Proponents of Mind-Only agree that appearances as gross objects are truly established and not merely imputed by conceptuality]
- [blue, yellow, and so forth][541] exist or do not exist in general [since all Proponents of Mind-Only agree that blue, yellow, and so forth exist]
- [the apprehended-aspect of a sense consciousness, that is, the sense consciousness itself][542] is or is not an effective thing in general [since both True and False Aspectarians assert that the apprehended-aspect is the sense consciousness[543] and that sense consciousnesses are effective things]

and so forth.

> Ğön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets:* Proponents of Mind-Only are of two types, True Aspectarians and False Aspectarians. Differences exist between these two groups because:
>
> - an appearance of a blue [patch] as blue to an eye consciousness perceiving blue is the "aspect"[b] that is the basis of debate between the True and False Aspectarians
> - True Aspectarians assert that an appearance of blue as blue to

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[a] But not Ke-drup's exposition.

[b] The term "aspect" (*rnam pa*, *ākāra*) has many meanings. In general:

- "Object-aspect" (*yul rnam*, *viṣaya-ākāra*) means the object itself.
- "Apprehended-aspect," or "that which has [taken on] the aspect of the apprehended," (*gzung rnam*, *grāhya-ākāra*) means the perceiving subject. However, sometimes this refers to the object rather than the subject.
- "Apprehender-aspect," or "that which has the aspect of the apprehender," (*'dzin rnam*, *grāhaka-ākāra*) means the consciousness perceiving the apprehending subject, that is, a self-cognizing consciousness.

Here, "aspect" is none of the above, but refers to a mode of appearance of the object.

an eye consciousness apprehending blue exists as it appears, whereas False Aspectarians maintain that an appearance of blue as blue does not exist as it appears to an eye consciousness apprehending blue.[a]

The above presentation is correct because:

1. Both True and False Aspectarians are similar in asserting that blue appears as blue to an eye consciousness apprehending blue.[b]
2. They are also similar in asserting that blue appears as a gross object[544] to an eye consciousness apprehending blue and that blue [falsely] appears to be an external object.[c]
3. However, True Aspectarians assert that an appearance of blue as an external object to an eye consciousness apprehending blue is polluted by ignorance, but that an appearance of blue as blue and an appearance of blue as a gross object are not polluted by ignorance, whereas False Aspectarians assert not only that an appearance of blue as an external object is polluted by ignorance, but also that an appearance of blue as blue[545] and an appearance of blue as a gross object is polluted by ignorance.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[546] In the system of the False Aspectarians the appearance—to a sense consciousness—of blue, yellow, and so forth as gross objects and as forms covering an area[d] is a mistaken appearance polluted by ignorance. [However] it is not necessary to draw from this the extremely absurd consequence that therefore blue, yellow, and so forth are not gross objects, are not

[a] True Aspectarians hold that a blue patch that appears as a gross or coalesced object does in fact exist as a gross or coalesced object in the manner in which it appears, whereas False Aspectarians say it does not. Being Proponents of Mind-Only, True Aspectarians agree with False Aspectarians that the appearance of a blue patch as an external object is false. However, unlike False Aspectarians, True Aspectarians maintain that, within the context of this false appearance, the portion of the appearance as a gross object is correct. False Aspectarians, on the other hand, hold that there is a sense of grossness beyond what is actually there.

[b] Both accept that there are eye consciousnesses that perceive blue as blue and not as yellow, for there are objects that are the same entity as a perceiving consciousness even though there are no external objects. Similarly, both agree that there are eye consciousnesses that perceive blue as yellow, due to some fault in the eye.

[c] Both True and False Aspectarians agree on the undeniable point that a patch of blue appears to be a gross object—something composed of many particles and not just a single particle—and that even to valid sense consciousnesses objects appear falsely as if they were entities external to the perceiving consciousness.

[d] *go sa gnon pa'i gzugs su snang ba.*

colors, and are not forms covering an area:

- because if blue and yellow were not gross objects, colors, and forms covering an area, then the three—gross objects, colors, and forms covering an area—would not occur, and
- because it is not contradictory to assert that although the appearance—to a sense consciousness—of blue and yellow as gross objects, colors, and forms covering an area is a mistaken appearance, blue and yellow are gross objects, colors, and forms covering an area, since:
  - The statement, "The appearance—to a common being's sense consciousness—of blue, yellow, and so forth as gross objects, colors, and forms covering an area is a mistaken appearance," means "Because to a common being's sense consciousness a blue—*that is established as a substantial entity separate from itself*—appears as a gross object, color, and form covering an area, it is a mistaken appearance."
  - That statement is not at all explaining that whereas blue is not a gross object, it appears as a gross object, due to which the appearance as a gross object is a mistaken appearance.
  - For example, the statement, "A sense consciousness to which a white conch appears as yellow is mistaken with respect to the shape of the conch," means "Because that appears as the shape of a yellow conch, it is mistaken about the shape," but it does not mean "Because it appears as a shape other than the shape of a conch, it is mistaken about the shape."

Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets:* Therefore, the definition of a True Aspectarian Proponent of Mind-Only is: a Proponent of Mind-Only who asserts that an appearance of a gross object to a sense consciousness exists as it appears. The definition of a False Aspectarian Proponent of Mind-Only is: a Proponent of Mind-Only who asserts that an appearance of a gross object to a sense consciousness does not exist as it appears [since even the factor of the appearance as a gross object is infected by appearance as an external object].

2# MEANING OF THE INDIVIDUAL DIVISIONS {2}

This section has two parts: True Aspectarians and False Aspectarians.

a# Mind-Only True Aspectarians

With respect to True Aspectarians, there are three—Split-Eggists, Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects, and Non-Pluralists. Respectively, Brahmin asserts that the apprehended-object and the apprehending-subject of consciousness are different; Shākyabuddhi asserts aspects equal in number to apprehended-objects; the honorable Dharmakīrti asserts that there is a single aspect of consciousness of the various.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When True Aspectarians are divided, there are three—Split-Eggists, Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects, and Non-Pluralists. With respect to those three respectively:

1. Split-Eggists, such as Brahmin Shaṃkarānanda, assert that the apprehended-object and the apprehending-subject [of the single entity] of consciousness are different substantial entities [in terms of when they are produced].

   Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets:*[547] Split-Eggists are so called because they assert that although a blue [patch] and an eye consciousness apprehending the blue are serial relative to the time of their establishment [or coming into existence], they are one substantial entity relative to the time of their observation.
2. Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects, such as Shākyabuddhi [in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*], assert that many minds—having the aspects of the number of apprehended-objects—are produced simultaneously.

   Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets:*[548] Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects are so called because they assert that when an eye consciousness apprehending the mottle [of colors on the wing of a butterfly] looks at the mottle, consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the number of colors—blue, yellow, and so forth of the mottle—are produced simultaneously.
3. Non-Pluralists, such as the honorable Dharmakīrti, assert that a single apprehended-aspect of consciousness [that is, a single consciousness] is generated in the aspects of the various objects that are appearing.

   Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets:*[549] Non-Pluralists are so called because they assert that it is not the case that when an eye consciousness apprehending a mottle looks at its

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object, consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the number of colors—blue, yellow, and so forth of the mottle—are produced simultaneously. Rather, they assert that the mere eye consciousness apprehending the mottle is the sense consciousness apprehending the blue, yellow, and so forth of the mottle.

Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[550] When True Aspectarians are extensively divided, there are indeed many minor ones, but who could explain their tiny differences? There are three of wide renown—Split-Eggists, Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects, and Non-Pluralists. The last also has three levels:

- those who assert that all the various mistaken appearances are ultimately the entity of a single consciousness
- those who assert one consciousness
- those who assert that the varieties of blue, yellow, and so forth [are generated] as aspects of a single consciousness.

Thus there are five widely renowned divisions of True Aspectarians.

1. Split-Eggists:[a] Appearances of the entity of consciousness as different object and subject are ultimately non-dual:
   - because since both object and subject are of the nature of consciousness, they are the mere entity experienced by a self-cognizing consciousness, and
   - because although a conceptual consciousness arisen from the force of the mere entity experienced by a self-cognizing consciousness—this being the entity of the basis-of-all—superimposes that object and subject are [separate substantial entities of] apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, duality as it is superimposed by that conceptual consciousness is false, whereas non-duality is not false…

   It is evident that Split-Eggists assert that the two—a consciousness apprehending blue and the blue that is its object—are different substantial entities *relative to* when they are produced, or when they are established, and hence are not certain to be observed simultaneously…

   D̄ak-tsang's proposition that Split-Eggists assert that apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are different substantial entities is not correct because they assert that both of

[a] Or, Egg Split in Half (*sgo nga phyed tshal lam phyed gshags*).

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those are of the nature of consciousness. Their assertion that both apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are of the nature of consciousness entails that it is not correct that they assert that apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are different substantial entities because it is like the fact that although the earlier and later moments of a mind-basis-of-all are different, they are not fit to be other substantial entities of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject since they are of the nature of internal apprehending consciousness…

2. Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects assert that not only do consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the blue, yellow, and so forth of a mottle arise simultaneously, but also consciousnesses of similar type equal in number to the petals of even a single blue *utpala* lotus, for instance, are simultaneous…

   Objection: This contradicts the scriptural passage in sūtra, "All sentient beings have a single continuum of consciousness."[a]

   Answer: The sūtra passage was spoken in terms of the mind-basis-of-all, not operative consciousnesses because if many mind-bases-of-all were simultaneous, there would have to be many persons, whereas there are no more than one, but although there are many operative consciousnesses, there do not have to be many persons like, for example, a single person having many eye consciousnesses…

3. [Non-Pluralists] who assert that all the various mistaken appearances are ultimately the entity of a single consciousness hold that:
   - There are not at all any objects aside from the entity of a single consciousness.[b]
   - Although those appearances as objects are one entity with consciousness, ignorance individually perceives them as external and internal, due to which they do not exist as

[a] *sems can thams cad ni rnam par shes pa'i rgyud gcig pa'o;* Taipei, 335.20.

[b] This does not mean that there is only a single consciousness for all beings or even a single consciousness for one person; rather, as Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos, ja,* 214.4) says, it means:

> There are no apprehended objects that are different substantial entities from the [respective] consciousnesses [apprehending them]. (*rnam shes las rdzas tha dad pa'i bzung don med*)

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entities of the two—apprehended-object and apprehending-subject.
- Cognitions empty of that are true…

4. [Non-Pluralists] who propound one consciousness assert that at all times a single mental consciousness is produced as only having various aspects. When perceiving any object, many different operative consciousnesses are not produced; one mental consciousness apprehends form by way of the eyes, apprehends sounds by way of the ears, and so forth, like, for example, a speedy monkey inside a six-window house showing up at the individual openings…
5. True Aspectarian Non-Pluralists [assert that the varieties of blue, yellow, and so forth are generated as aspects of a single consciousness]. This is held to be the assertion of Dharmakīrti. Ke-drup asserts that on all occasions of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School, except for differences with regard to the object of negation [in selflessness], it has to be that plural aspects appear to a single consciousness and that this is more weighty than the other types of True Aspect and False Aspect.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[551] The Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects assert that when looking at the colors of a mottle, not only are eye consciousnesses equal in number to the blue, yellow, white, and red produced simultaneously, but also many consciousnesses of similar type [that is, eye consciousnesses]—equal in number to the particles that are the same substantial entity of establishment and abiding as those colors—are produced simultaneously. Accordingly, just as there are various objects within the mottle:
- outer and inner particles, that is, particles on this side and on that side
- former and later particles, that is, particles in the middle and the ends
- blue and non-blue, that is, yellow, white, and red

and so forth, many consciousnesses also would have to be produced simultaneously into having the aspects of outer and inner, former and later, blue and non-blue, and so forth.

Unlike this, Non-Pluralists assert that a single consciousness produced in the aspect of the variegated object—without divisions

of outer and inner, former and later, blue and non-blue—ultimately exists.

b# Mind-Only False Aspectarians

With respect to False Aspectarians, there are two. It is *reputed* that they are Tainted and Untainted since a Conqueror does or does not have taints of dualistic appearance.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to False Aspectarians, there are two. It is *reputed* that they are [called] Tainted and Untainted since [respectively] they assert that a Conqueror does or does not have taints of dualistic appearance. However, our own system is that there are two—Tainted and Untainted—since they assert that the entity of the mind is polluted or is not polluted by taints.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[552] When False Aspectarians are divided subtly, there are many, but with regard to the more renowned there are two modes of explanation:
>
> 1. Here in Tibet it is *reputed* that due to [asserting] whether a Conqueror [Buddha] has or does not have taints of dualistic appearance [they are called] Tainted and Untainted.
> 2. The scholar-adepts of the country of Superiors [that is, India] explain that due to [asserting] whether the entity of a consciousness having apprehended-object and apprehending-subject is polluted or is not polluted by taints or falsity, [they are called] Tainted and Untainted…
>
> "Reputed" [in the description of the first explanation] is a word [indicating] non-approval[a] of another's explanation. Since the second presentation accords with many texts such as Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* and *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition,* it is correct because…:[b]
>
> • The assertion—in accordance with Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* and Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on*

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[a] *ma rangs pa'i tshig;* three words are occasionally used this way—*lo* (as an unsuitable terminator of a sentence, translated as "§"), *grags* ("reputed" or "renowned"), *zer* ("it is said").

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a inserts here a description of how to re-word his root text so that, instead of giving the wrong explanation, it gives the right one:

> In [my] root text, drop out "a Conqueror" (*rgyal la*) and [change "dualistic appearance" to] "dualistic appearance and so forth," making it, "They are Tainted and Untainted since even the entity of the mind does or does not have taints of dualistic appearance and so forth."

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(Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"—that since defilements are adventitious, they do not in the slightest exist in the entity of the mind, which is like a pure crystal, is the system of Untainted False Aspectarians.

- Tainted False Aspectarians propound that although these consciousnesses ultimately abide as having the aspect of apprehenders of pleasure, pain, and so forth, they appear in the aspect of external objects apprehended through the force of ignorance, due to which a consciousness's own entity is polluted by falsity or mistake.

J̄ang-ḡya Röl-b̄ay-dor-jay's *Presentation of Tenets:* [553] [There are problems in both explanations:]

- It would be difficult for it to be correct that Tainted False Aspectarians hold that the entity of the mind is polluted [since this contradicts the general assertion that the nature of the mind is clear light, whereas defilements are adventitious].
- If the presence and absence of dualistic appearance at Buddhahood is taken to be the presence and absence of the dualistic appearance of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject and if this, in turn, is taken to mean that Untainted False Aspectarians propound that there is in general utterly no appearance of object and subject in Buddhahood, it is easy to realize that this is incorrect [since all accept that in Buddhahood there is appearance of object and subject, for otherwise omniscience, which includes knowledge of conventional phenomena, would be impossible].
- If the presence and absence of dualistic appearance at Buddhahood is taken to be the presence and absence of the appearance of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as distant and cut off from each other, it would be extremely contradictory in this mind-only system if Tainted False Aspectarians propounded that in Buddhahood there is appearance of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as distant and cut off [since it is held in common that Buddhahood must be without erroneous appearance].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[554] In addition, there is also a [False Aspectarian] proponent of a single consciousness…It is evident that this is the proponent of a single consciousness mentioned in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle.*

J̄ang-ḡya Röl-b̄ay-dor-jay's *Presentation of Tenets:*[555] From between the two—True Aspect and False Aspect—the omniscient Gyel-tsap asserts that the False Aspectarian School is weightier, and the omniscient Ke-drup explains that True Aspect Non-Pluralism is weightier. Since both of them say that their own mode of explanation is the thought of the Foremost Great Being [D̄zong-ka-b̄a], how could one such as I know in general the status of the thoughts of these great, fantastic beings! Still, since concerning Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises the omniscient Gyel-tsap mainly takes Dharmottara's commentary to be chief, whereas Ke-drup, sun of expounders, mainly takes Devendrabuddhi's commentary to be chief, I wonder whether these are differences in explanation dependent on the systems of the individual commentaries when the Foremost Great Being gave expositions on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition."*

3# DISPELLING MISTAKES ABOUT MIND-ONLY {2}

This section has two parts: dispelling mistakes and the meaning of mind-only.

a# Dispelling Mistakes

For False Aspectarians there are effects of prime cognitions that take external objects as objects.§ That is not correct. If external objects are established, what is Mind-Only? If it is said to be in the perspective of conceptual consciousness, it is the same for True Aspectarians; that is mistaken. Saying all phenomena are mind also is an incorrect crudeness. There would be many fallacies—defects and good qualities, cyclic existence and nirvāṇa would be one, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: A certain [D̄ak-tsang] says that in the system of the False Aspectarians there are effects of prime cognitions that take external objects as objects.§ That is not correct, for if external objects are established, what is the meaning of "mind-only"? It would not have any meaning.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[556] "§"[a] is a mark of

[a] *lo;* this is an unsuitable terminator, like a period at end of an English sentence that is replaced by an odd mark.

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disapproval. Since the Sanskrit *kila* is also used for "babble,"[a] concerning what object is babble uttered? The Translator Ḏak-tsang takes the meaning of the statement in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* and *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition* about the third in the series of [considerations of] the effect of prime cognition, "Even if external objects exist," as being that both False Aspectarians assert that an external object is the object [in this third consideration of] the effect of prime cognition. He says:

> These [assert that] external objects exist in the perspective of conceptual consciousness.

and his commentary says:

> Both of these False Aspectarians assert that [external objects] exist [in the perspective of] non-investigatory and non-analytical conceptual consciousness.

and:[557]

> In the third consideration of the effect [of prime cognition] a presentation is made in which external objects are treated as the object of comprehension…

In that case an otherness of substantial entity between apprehended-object and apprehending-subject would be established. Well then, it would be wrong for sūtra to say, "These three realms are mind-only," and all reasonings refuting external objects would be wrong, and you yourself are contradicting your own assertions that forms and so forth are mind.

Objection by Ḏak-tsang: Although external objects exist in uninvestigated and unanalyzed conventions as in the system of the Consequence School, reasoning analyzing the ultimate damages [external objects], whereby there is no fallacy [in asserting that external objects exist conventionally].

Answer: Since you propound…that external objects are established by conventional prime cognition, then it would be unsuitable to have confidence even in prime cognition analyzing the ultimate because [according to you, prime cognition analyzing the ultimate] damages even objects proven by prime cognition and because damage applies even to objects proven by conventional prime cognition…It [absurdly] follows that the mode of subsistence does not exist, and it [absurdly] follows that form and the mode of subsistence of form are not fit to be support and that which is

[a] *ca co.*

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supported, and it [absurdly] follows that those two are not one entity because the non-existence of an object proven by conventional prime cognition is the object found by a rational consciousness analyzing the mode of subsistence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: If this is said to be taken as the existence of external objects in the perspective of conceptual consciousness apprehending external objects, then since such an assertion is the same in the system of True Aspectarians, applying this only to False Aspectarians is mistaken.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[558]

> *Objection:* It is not that [external objects exist] in the perspective of conventional prime cognition; [external objects exist] in the perspective of a [wrong] conceptual consciousness apprehending external objects, or in the perspective of a conceptual consciousness of a Proponent of Sūtra.
>
> *Answer:* Well then, it is not right to apply this only to False Aspectarians, for True Aspectarians also assert this…
>
> About this, the first of the three [considerations of] the effect of prime cognition is a system of the Sūtra School:
>
> - An external object is the *object of comprehension.*
> - That which is [generated in] the aspect of the apprehended and is newly non-deceptive with respect to that [object of comprehension] is the *prime cognition.*
> - The newly non-deceptive consciousness that is knowledge of the object is the *effect.*[a]
>
> The second [of the three considerations of the effect of prime cognition] is a system of the Mind-Only School:
>
> - Blue and so forth that are of the entity of an internal consciousness are the *objects of comprehension.*
> - Those which are [generated in] the aspect of the apprehended and are newly non-deceptive with respect to blue and so forth that are of the entity of an internal consciousness are *prime cognitions.*
> - Newly non-deceptive knowledge of blue and so forth, objects of comprehension that are of the entity of an internal consciousness, is the *effect.*
>
> [With respect to the third of the three considerations of the effect of prime cognition,] *even if* a form asserted by Proponents of Sūtra

[a] As J̄ang-ḡya (*Presentations of Tenets,* 199.4) says:

> Although this is not an effect produced by prime cognition, it is an effect posited [by prime cognition], and hence is called "effect."

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to be an external object is taken as the object of comprehension:

- That [external object] is the *object of comprehension.*
- That which is [generated in] the aspect of the apprehended and is newly non-deceptive and to which the aspect of that form appears is the *prime cognition.*
- The newly non-deceptive knowledge[a] of an object of comprehension that is an entity of internal consciousness is the *effect.*

Word Commentary on Root Text: Saying all phenomena are mind [also] is incorrect crude talk because there would be many fallacies—defects and good qualities would be one, cyclic existence and nirvāṇa would be one, and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[559] Also, the statement by D̄ak-tsang…and many others that all phenomena are mind is not correct because of being as crude as holding that the far side and the near side of an ocean are one. About this, there are many fallacies in accordance with Ke-drup's *Ornament for the Seven Treatises* which is a commentary on the difficult points of Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition. Well then, the exalted body of a Buddha and the body of a common being must be mind, in which case they must be the mind of whatever being sees those two, whereby fallacies such as that the two—cyclic existence and nirvāṇa—would be one are incurred. For example, when one common being with pure karma simultaneously sees the two—the exalted body of a Buddha and the body of [his attendant] Sunakṣhatra[b]—those two would be the one sense consciousness of that ordinary being. Since it would similarly be the case for other persons, in brief the two—the exalted body of a Buddha and the body of a sentient being—would be all minds. Elaboration is easy.

b# Meaning of Mind-Only

What is the meaning of mind-only? Just as in a dream an appearance as a human is not said to be a mind and hence is not a mind and is not other, those which appear and are renowned are not minds and are not substantial entities other than minds.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Well then, what is the meaning of

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[a] Here the effect is a self-cognizing consciousness.

[b] "The monk Sunakṣhatra spent twenty-five years as lord buddha's attendant, and yet, because he did not have the slightest faith and held only wrong views, ended up being reborn as a preta [hungry-ghost] in a flower-garden." (Rangjung Yeshe Dictionary)

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"mind-only"? Just as in a dream an appearance as a human is not said to be a mind and hence is not a mind and is not a substantial entity other than a mind, phenomena that appear and are renowned to minds are not minds and are not substantial entities other than minds.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[560]

Objection by D̄ak-tsang and so forth: Since blue and so forth are described as being the nature of mind and internal essence, then if they are not the minds apprehending them, what is the meaning of "mind-only"? Is it not "just mind"?

Answer: Alas, even those who do not know that whatever is the essence of mind, the nature of mind, and the entity of mind does not have to be a mind are emptily swollen with manifest pride thinking they are involved as commentators and expositors of the Conqueror's scriptures and have crossed the ocean of scriptures and schools and tenets! Not even the glorious Dharmakīrti could overcome the absurd consequences:

- In that case, [that is, if all existents are minds,] then even the noumenon [or emptiness] of the mind would be [a mind and hence] compounded.
- If [the emptiness of the mind] is not [a mind], then [since according to you it cannot be the same entity as a mind,] the four fallacies and so forth of difference [of entity] of the two truths—such as that it [absurdly] follows that [emptiness] is not the mode of subsistence of the mind (see 383 and 896)—are incurred.
- [If all existents are minds,] it [absurdly] follows that even all that are involved with mind[a] and all that are one substantial entity of establishment and abiding with a mind are minds [because they are the same entity as a mind].

Therefore, [in "mind-only"] "mind" indicates mentality[b] as well as accompanying [mental factors], and since the Sanskrit original of "only" *mātra* is used for measure/quantity (*tshad*), duration/measure of time (*yun tshad*), grandmother (*ma mo*) or primal/model (*phyi mo*), and so forth, it does not indicate that [all phenomena] are minds; it indicates that they are of the essence of mind. It is an indicator that, aside from just the essence of mind they do not exist as other factualities because of indicating "External objects outside of only mind or only cognition do not exist."

[a] *sems kyi rjes 'brang dag;* the meaning is unclear to me.

[b] *yid;* mind (*sems*), mentality (*yid*), and main consciousness (*rnam shes*) are equivalent.

For example, although not existing the way they appear in dreams, when someone sleeps in a small room, consciousness itself appears in the aspects of the five objects (forms and so forth), houses, forests, vast stretches of earth, great mountains, and so forth, but in that small room there are no mountains and so forth aside from mind, and if the appearances of those each is a mind, then all parts of a mind would be minds, and if that is so, then the upper, lower, and middle and the ten directions of the appearance as a mountain to the mind each would [absurdly] have to be a mind…

Hence, just as the five objects, mountains, and so forth of dreams are not minds, but mountains and so forth, aside from in the mind, are also not other factualities, if all that appear to and are renowned to the mind—present five objects (forms and so forth), houses, and so forth—are mind, there are many damages [to such an assertion], due to which they are not. Also, in dependence upon reasonings such as the certainty of simultaneous observation and being of an essence of illumination, it follows that they are not other substantial entities or other entities aside from being in the mind because this is proven by those reasonings and many scriptural passages…The Maitreya Chapter of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[561]

> "Supramundane Victor, is the image that is the object of activity of meditative stabilization different from the mind or not different?"
>
> The Supramundane Victor spoke, "Maitreya, it is said to be not different. Why? I explain that consciousness is distinguished by [the fact that its] object of observation[a] is just cognition-only."[b]…

The rest of the examples were mentioned earlier (341); in brief, just as an image in a mirror is not the mirror and is not something aside from it, forms and so forth also are not consciousnesses and do not exist aside from being in consciousness. The Maitreya Chapter says:

> For example, with form acting as a condition, form itself is seen [in a mirror], but one thinks, "I see an image." In that, the form and the appearance of the image appear as different

[a] *dmigs pa, ālambana.*

[b] For the context, which extends this to usual perceptions, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 440ff.

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> factualities.[a] Likewise, the mind generated in that way also appears to be a different factuality from that."[b]…

Though something is the substantial entity of illumination, the essence of knowledge, and so forth, it does not have to be a mind and so forth…Therefore, do not emit cries of bewilderment.

4# WAYS THE NUMBER OF CONSCIOUSNESSES IS ASSERTED IN THE MIND-ONLY SCHOOL

The basis-of-all is a non-defiled and neutral mind—subtle, obscure, and possessing all seeds. The afflicted mentality has the specific feature of observing it and thinking "I." Eight collections of consciousness are asserted by the brothers and followers. For those not setting it forth there are not eight because two conceptual consciousnesses are not simultaneous, and so forth; six collections is the system of the Seven Treatises and followers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to the mind-basis-of-all, its entity is a non-defiled and neutral mind that, due to being difficult to realize, is subtle and obscure and, due to being the basis of infusion of various virtuous and non-virtue predispositions, is the possessor of all seeds.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[562] In brief, among

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[a] *don tha dad pa.*

[b] With respect to the rendition of the example, the Peking edition of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* (P774, vol. 29, 14.1.3-14.1.7) differs considerably from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation of the sūtra as well as the Peking edition of Asaṅga's citation of the sūtra; therefore, let us cite it, along with an additional question and answer from the sūtra that, even though not cited by Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, confirms the points made above (for Lamotte's remarks on the difference in texts, see *La Somme,* vol. 1, 27):

> "Maitreya, it is thus: For example, although form itself is seen in a very clean mirror in dependence upon a form, one thinks, 'I see an image.' In that, the form and the appearance of the image appear as different factualities. Likewise, the mind generated in that way and the object of activity of meditative stabilization called an image also appear to be different factualities."
>
> [Maitreya:] "Supramundane Victor, are the appearances of forms and so forth of sentient beings, which abide in the nature of images of the mind, not different from the mind?"
>
> He said, "Maitreya, they are said to be not different. With respect to those images, childish beings with distorted awareness do not know cognition-only just as it is in reality, due to which they consider [them] wrongly."

In this version, the progression of first establishing the sameness of entity of subject and object in meditative situations and then extending this understanding to all appearances of forms and so forth is even clearer.

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Proponents of True Existence[a] there are six [assertions of the number of consciousnesses]:

- one consciousness—the mind-basis-of-all, described by the Kashmīri Lakṣhmi as being one of four types within the Yogic Practice School; there are also assertions of one consciousness as the mental consciousness, as mentioned earlier with regard to True Aspectarians (423)and False Aspectarians (425)
- two consciousnesses, posited by Bodhiruci[b] in dependence on Vasubandhu's *Establishment of Cognition-Only:*
  1. noumenal mind; it is not a mind having objects of observation and subjective aspect
  2. mind of parallel association, which is in parallel association with mental factors such as faith, desire, and so forth.
- six consciousnesses—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses, described by the Kashmīri Lakṣhmi as being one of four types within the Yogic Practice School[c]
- seven consciousnesses—the six operative consciousnesses and afflicted mentality, described by the Kashmīri Lakṣhmi as being one of four types within the Yogic Practice School
- eight consciousnesses—the six operative consciousnesses, afflicted mentality, and mind-basis-of-all, described by the Kashmīri Lakṣhmi as being one of four types within the Yogic Practice School[d] and also propounded by the Chinese master Hsüan-tsang in dependence upon the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra*
- nine consciousnesses, posited by Paramārtha[e] in dependence on the *Treasury of Ascertainments*:[f]
  1.-6. the six operative consciousnesses
  7. appropriating consciousness, which is similar to the afflicted mentality in observing the mind-basis-of-all and misapprehending it as I and mine

[a] *dngos smra ba, bhāvavādin;* in this context *dngos po* (*bhāva*) is taken to mean true existence. These are the Great Exposition School, Sūtra School, and Mind-Only School.

[b] *bo de le'u ji;* an Indian who arrived in China in 508 C.E.; Wilson, *Meaning of Mind,* 219.

[c] In Ge-luk-b̄a descriptions this is Mind-Only School Following Reasoning and also occurs in the Great Exposition School and Sūtra School.

[d] In Ge-luk-b̄a descriptions this is the Mind-Only School Following Scripture.

[e] *yang dag bden pa;* an Indian scholar whose translations in China in the sixth century had great influence.

[f] *rnam par nges pa'i mdzod.*

8. three mind-bases-of-all
    - natural mind-basis-of-all, which is a mind suitable for buddhafication
    - fruitional mind-basis-of-all, which is the mind-basis-of-all as it is widely renowned [described below]
    - thoroughly afflicted mind-basis-of-all, which is a mind apprehending a self of phenomena
9. stainless consciousness, which is twofold—thusness and a mind realizing thusness…

Fifty-one mental factors are described in manifest knowledge (see 238).[a] Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland*[563] of the Middle Way School speaks of [fifty-seven divisions of what are to be abandoned][564] in accordance with the fifty-seven—faulty undertakings, repetition of faults, and so forth—in the *Scripture of Minor Discipline.*[b]…

MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

From among the eight consciousnesses, the basis-of-all[c] is twofold—support and supported. With respect to the support basis-of-all…there are four topics, objects of observation, aspect, entity, and accompaniers. Observing the five objects, five sense powers, and predispositions of manifest adherence,[d] its [subjective] aspect is that although it perceives those environments and the beings in them, it cannot induce ascertainment and hence is subtle.[e] From between being obstructed and non-obstructed, its entity is non-obstructed,[f] and since it exists even in the continuums of those who do not have roots of virtue, it is neutral.[g] It is a mind in parallel association with

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[a] For explanation of the fifty-one mental factors see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 238-268.

[b] *lung phran tshegs / 'dul ba lung phran tshegs;* this is one of a collection of four texts in the Lesser Vehicle scriptural collection of discipline.

[c] For an extensive treatment of the two types of basis-of-all, see Wilson, *Meaning of Mind,* 215-764.

[d] *mngon zhen gyi bag chags.* Even though the seeds, or latent predispositions, are not actually its objects of observation, they are *called* such because they produce appearances of objects and of consciousnesses perceiving them.

[e] Even though a mind-basis-of-all is a consciousness and thus has objects of observation, its aspect is constituted by the fact that it does not notice its objects, nor can it draw another consciousness into noticing them.

[f] Due to not being accompanied by afflictive mental factors such as desire, hatred, ignorance, and jealousy, it is non-obstructed.

[g] It receives infusion of seeds by both virtuous and non-virtuous actions, and thus it must be neutral, that is, neither virtuous nor non-virtuous.

the five omnipresent mental factors [that is, feeling,[a] discrimination,[b] intention,[c] mental engagement,[d] and contact[e]] as its accompaniers, or assisters. Continuous at all times like a river, it holds all seeds—virtuous and so forth…

[Some] say it is non-obstructed because it is not obstructed with respect to liberation…However, it is non-obstructed because it is a mind that is not in parallel association[f] with any afflictive obstruction and is in parallel association with only the five omnipresent mental factors…

The second, the supported seed-basis-of-all,[g] is the potencies of seeds deposited by virtue and so forth in [the mind-basis-of-all,] a basis of infusion which has the five features of being:[h]

1. *steady*[i] [or enduring], due to being continuous—unlike lightning, for instance
2. *neutral,*[j] since it is a mind that is not very manifest or unmanifest.
3. *infusible*[k]

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[a] *tshor ba, vedanā.* The feeling that accompanies the mind-basis-of-all is only neutral (that is, neither pleasure nor pain).

[b] *'du shes, saṃjñā.* Since a mind-basis-of-all does not notice its objects, discrimination in this case is merely a non-confusion of its objects.

[c] *sems pa, cetanā.* The intention that accompanies a mind-basis-of-all is merely the movement of the mind to its object and thus is more like attention, although it is non-retentive attention.

[d] *yid la byed pa, manaskāra.*

[e] *reg pa, sparśa.*

[f] *mtshung ldan, saṃprayukta;* a main mind and its accompanying mental factors have five parallel associations in that they have the same:

- support (*rten*), which is the sense power on which it relies
- object of observation (*dmigs pa*)
- subjective aspect (*rnam pa*)
- time (*dus*)
- substantial entity (*rdzas*).

This means that whatever the one experiences, the other does also; whatever the one observes, the other also observes, and so forth. The difference is that a certain mental factor observes or perceives by its own power and the others do so by way of the power of that mental factor.

[g] The seed basis-of-all is discussed at length in Wilson, *Meaning of Mind,* 380-394.

[h] These are discussed at length in Wilson, *Meaning of Mind,* 336-353.

[i] *brtan pa.*

[j] *lung du ma bstan pa.*

[k] *bsgo bar nus pa.*

4. *related with the infusers*[a]
5. *invariably a support*[b]...

When [seeds] are divided, there are six:

1. external seeds [such as barley]
2. internal seeds in a basis-of-all

[The same two are re-framed in two ways:]

3. unmanifest, or neutral [external seeds]
4. unmanifest, or neutral [internal seeds]
5. conventional [external seeds, appearing to external conventional consciousnesses]
6. ultimate [internal seeds, established by reasoned analysis].

Also, there are three:[c]

1. predispositions of verbalization[d]
2. predispositions of the view of self[e]
3. predispositions of the branches of cyclic existence.[f]

Also, there are four:

1. shared [seeds that create environments]
2. unshared [seeds that create beings]
3. having feeling [these being the same as unshared seeds which create beings]
4. unfeeling [these being the same as shared seeds which create environments]

Also, there are four:[g]

1. seeds for the assumption of bad situations [creating thoroughly afflicted phenomena]
2. seeds of the thoroughly purified [creating purified phenomena]
3. seeds that have been used [which have already given rise to their effects and thus are just called seeds]
4. seeds that have not been used [which are the predispositions of verbalization which are beginningless and remain inexhaustible until mistaken dualistic appearance has been eliminated]...

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[a] *sgo byed dang 'brel ba.*

[b] *mtha' gcig tu rten du gyur pa.*

[c] For an explanation of four types of predispositions in relation to four types of appearances, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 219-226.

[d] *mngon brjod kyi bag chags, abhilāpavāsanā.*

[e] *bdag lta'i bag chags, ātmadṛṣṭivāsanā.*

[f] *srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavāṅgavāsanā.*

[g] These four are sometimes treated as two groups of two, since there does not appear to be a reason for making them one group.

There are three systems with regard to how predispositions are deposited:[a]

1. old [that is, naturally abiding,] predispositions are merely nurtured
2. only new predispositions are deposited
3. old [that is, naturally abiding, predispositions] are nurtured, and new predispositions are produced.[b]

The *Explanation of the Secret Meaning*[c] says:

> This is considered in three ways. (1) Some say that predispositions do not depend on means of infusion but abide naturally. Through being produced and ceasing together [with the predispositions], desire and so forth only nurture them; they do not produce them.

and:

> (2) Others assert that, it being seen that the infusion of odors into sesame seeds and so forth depends on new means of infusion, means of infusion produce previously non-existent [predispositions] and also means of infusion nourish those produced earlier.

and:

> There are no causal conditions for the first moment of a Superior path.

and:

> (3) Others say that among predispositions the naturally abiding are nurtured, and there are also those that are newly produced.

The first of those is not feasible, for it [absurdly] follows that desire and so forth would not be causes of the basis-of-all. If this is accepted, it contradicts the explanation that they are causes of the basis-of-all in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* [which says that such consciousnesses and the seed-basis-of-all are reciprocally cause and effect]. The *Explanation of the Secret Meaning* says:[565]

> Let us discuss the first consideration. Since desire and so forth would abide as only nurturers, they would not be causal conditions [of the seed-basis-of-all]...This contradicts the statement

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[a] See Wilson, *Meaning of Mind,* 607-619.

[b] This is the position favored by Ḏzong-ka-ḇa and Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa.

[c] *The Secret Meaning Unveiled: Condensed Explanation [of the First Chapter of Asaṅga's "Summary of the Great Vehicle"]* (*don gsang rnam par phye ba bsdus te bshad pa*); P5553, vol. 113; author unknown.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> that the thorough afflictions are causal conditions [of the seed-basis-of-all].

The second is also not feasible, for if [you say that] predispositions are deposited through observing a [mind-]basis-of-all, then predispositions would have to be deposited even through observing another's mind [in clairvoyance]. In that case, all sentient beings would [absurdly] be one continuum. The *Explanation of the Secret Meaning* says:

> Let us also discuss the second consideration…Are you not saying that a predisposition of a mind like the one observed is produced? That is not reasonable…The predispositions produced by that [clairvoyant observation of another's mind] would be causal conditions of another's mind and mental factors, due to which it would [absurdly] follow that all sentient beings are the same continuum.

and:

> Your saying "There are no causal conditions for the first moment of a Superior path," is also not feasible because it is said that "The naturally abiding lineage is a specific from among the six sense-spheres," and because all schools say that all minds and mental factors are produced by four conditions.

Since he did not refute the third, [I] think that he also asserts it.[a]

The omniscient Bu-d̄ön asserts that the first is Sthiramati's, the second is venerable Paramārtha's, and the third Paramasena's and Nandasena's.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The afflicted mentality has the specific features of observing it and thinking "I."

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[566]

AFFLICTED MENTALITY

The afflicted mentality[b] has specific features of:

- Object of observation: it observes the basis-of-all.[c]
- [Subjective aspect:] it considers the mind-basis-of-all in the

[a] D̄zong-ka-b̄a says that the author of the *Explanation of the Secret Meaning* holds the first position (see Wilson, *Meaning of Mind,* 609); however, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a has presented the evidence that the author of the *Explanation of the Secret Meaning* refutes the first two positions. My guess is that D̄zong-ka-b̄a statement is a notational error, confusing the first and the third. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's "also" in this sentence refers to the fact that D̄zong-ka-b̄a also asserts the third.

[b] *nyon yid, kliṣṭamanas.*

[c] It does not perceive the actual entity of the mind-basis-of-all as it is, for if it did, it would not apprehend it as a self-sufficient person.

manner of a [substantially existent self-sufficient] ego, thinking "I" and thinking "mine."

- Entity: Since it is in parallel association with four afflictive emotions, it is obstructed. Because it does not possess faith and so forth, it is not virtuous, and because it is a mind that is not in parallel association with any of the three non-virtuous roots [that is, desire, hatred, and ignorance] included within the levels of the Desire [Realm],[a] it is neutral.
- Accompaniers: It is accompanied by nine—the five omnipresent mental factors [that is, feeling, discrimination, intention, mental engagement, and contact] and four [mental factors that defile it]: view of self, obscuration about self, pride in self, and, attachment to self.[b]
- Continuum: it operates except during two times—the meditative absorption of cessation and the meditative equipoise of supramundane paths…

[The Mind-Basis-of-All is the Person]

The *Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned* says that the eighth consciousness is also called "person" and "basis-of-all":

The person of the eight consciousnesses
Is also called "basis-of-all."

and moreover, the same text says that it is also the self partaking of causes and effects and the internal self dependent on external aggregates:

The self of effects, the self of causes,
And also the internal self
Dependent on the body of the embodied
Continually imputed by the childish to just that.[c]

and the same text also describes it as the object of observation by a view of the transitory thinking "I":

The consciousness conceptualizing various selves
Apprehends it as self and mine.

and since many sūtras and many [texts]—Asaṅga's *Summary of the*

[a] The afflictive emotions of the Form Realm and Formless Realm are not non-virtuous; they are neutral.

[b] When these four defiling mental factors are cleared away, the entity of an afflicted mind still exists, but it is then pure. At Buddhahood an afflicted mind is transformed into a wisdom of equality which views all objects equally as not different entities from the consciousness perceiving them.

[c] The meaning of the last line is unclear.

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Great Vehicle and commentary, Asaṅga's *Compendium of Ascertainments,* Vasubandhu's *The Thirty,* and so forth—speak in that way, look in those for more. Having asserted the basis-of-all, to not assert it as the self is to be very confused about the reasons for it and is the greatest contradiction.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Eight collections of consciousness are asserted by the master Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] as well as their followers. Those not setting forth a mind-basis-of-all do not assert eight collections of consciousnesses because of many scriptures and reasonings, such as that two conceptual consciousnesses having different modes of apprehension are not manifest simultaneously, and so forth; [six collections] is the system of Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises of Prime Cognition and followers.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[567]

Some—the Translator D̄ak-tsang and so forth—say: It is not correct that Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] assert a basis-of-all but Dignāga and Dharmakīrti do not because:

- many sūtras speak of the basis-of-all
- the brothers [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] do not refute it
- and Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* mentions it once, "There is no arising aside from the basis-of-all."

and because it is not suitable if there is no very stable continuum of consciousness.

Answer: That is extremely incorrect because:

- It [absurdly] follows that [Dignāga and Dharmakīrti] also set forth the explanations in many sūtras such as the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra*[a] and so on that the basis-of-all is not feasible and that statements of it have a thought behind them.
- It [absurdly] follows that it is incorrect that these were not set forth in the brothers' system.
- Since there is no more than that phrase in Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises of Prime Cognition, and, moreover, it means—within the context of refuting a position—that the operation of

[a] Kensur Lekden explained that the reference is to the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* (see 295) where it says:

Just as a doctor distributes
Medicines to the ill,
So Buddha teaches even mind-only
To sentient beings in that way.

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many minds simultaneously is suitable in the system of the basis-of-all but is not seen elsewhere, it [absurdly] follows that if merely clarifying and explaining something makes it into one's own system, then all—the existence and non-existence of external objects—are in their own system, and it [absurdly] follows that even all the explanations of the ten,[a] and so forth, schools of True and False Aspectarians are in their own system.

- If the assertion of a stable mental consciousness other than the basis-of-all is not suitable on this occasion [of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's system], it [absurdly] follows that yogic direct perception is not feasible, and in particular all the reasoned proofs of omniscience by many scholar-adepts of the Middle Way School and Proponents of Prime Cognition.[b]…
- On many occasions concerning predispositions of karma, afflictive emotions, and paths when they should have set forth a basis-of-all if they asserted it, they did not speak of it…

Not only that, but also with respect to proofs of the unsuitability [of eight consciousnesses] Dharmakīrti, thinking of the statement in sūtra:

> This arising of two minds, not in succession, is not possible; there is no opportunity.

and the statement in another sūtra:

> All sentient beings have one continuum of consciousness.

says in his *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*:[568]

> If [you say that] it itself experiences it,
> Two simultaneous conceptual consciousnesses are not seen.[c]…

The intelligent should understand that in the systems of Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition,* Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition,"* their followers—

[a] As Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dngos, kha,* 221.2) points out, what Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a means by "ten" needs to be examined since his *Great Exposition of Tenets* speaks of five True Aspectarians and two False Aspectarians, and so forth.

[b] These are mainly the Sūtra School Following Reasoning and the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning. The development of yogic direct perception and of omniscience depends upon the steady continuum of a mind (see Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on [Dignāga's] "Compilation of Prime Cognition,"* II.120), and these schools do not assert a mind-basis-of-all.

[c] This refutes the possibility of the simultaneous presence of a conceptual mental consciousness and an afflicted mentality, the seventh consciousness in the eight consciousness system.

Devendrabuddhi, Dharmottara, and Prajñākaragupta—Jetāri, and so forth six collections of consciousness are asserted.

2: Presentation of the Paths in the Mind-Only School {2}

This section has two parts: explanation from a beginner through the path of preparation and explanation of the features of the ten grounds and the perfections.

A: EXPLANATION FROM A BEGINNER THROUGH THE PATH OF PREPARATION

Skill in methods of meditation, mental contemplation, and in meditative observation is needed. Hence there are the seven actual mental contemplations, the other forty, and the objects of observation—that is, signs—four and thirty-two. When condensed, there are two, or the nine minds also as well as abandoning the five and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Skill in mentally applying methods of cultivating meditative stabilization and in meditative observation is needed.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[569] Many highly realized early monastics and intermediate scholar-adepts who attained high realization while performing hearing and thinking and activities of the Buddhist teaching without solely doing retreat were very skilled in methods of meditative cultivation (location, time, behavior, and so forth), in how to do mental contemplation, and in antidotal meditative observation. It is like, for instance, the Elder father [Atisha] and his spiritual son [Drom-d̄ön-b̄a], the second Conqueror father [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] and his spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup] as well as their circle since it is said that actual calm abiding was generated in many within his circle when [D̄zong-ka-b̄a was teaching] at Ra-dreng[a] over several months. From the mouth of the foremost precious one:
>
>> Do not say that more than a year is needed even for any meditative stabilization if one is skilled in how to meditate and skilled in how to sustain meditative observation…
>
> If you are not skilled in those, meditation will not be generated even over a whole lifetime, and although a mental abiding mixed with laxity is generated, you will not be able to achieve any high status [within cyclic existence] or definite goodness [that is,

[a] *rwa sgreng.*

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liberation]...Hence, even though your location, time, and behavior are perfect, you need to be skilled in taking to mind and observing antidotes to the individual faults that, when despite aiming this mind in one direction, rise up from still another direction.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Hence, you should know:

- the seven actual mental contemplations ranging from the mental contemplation of individual knowledge of the character through to the mental contemplation which is the fruit of final training

  Gedün Lodrö's *Calm Abiding and Special Insight:*[570] An actual absorption [ranging from the first concentration to the meditative absorption of the peak of cyclic existence][a]...is achieved by way of seven mental contemplations:

  1. mental contemplation of individual knowledge of the character[b] (also known as thorough knowledge of the character[c])
  2. mental contemplation arisen from belief[d]
  3. mental contemplation of thorough isolation[e]
  4. mental contemplation of joy-withdrawal[f]
  5. mental contemplation of analysis[g]
  6. mental contemplation of final training[h]
  7. mental contemplation that is the fruit of final training.[i]

- the other forty mental contemplations

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[571] The other forty range from the mental contemplations of doctrine, of meaning, of body, of feeling through to the omnipresent mental contemplation.

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[a] These are:

1. first concentration
2. second concentration
3. third concentration
4. fourth concentration
5. meditative absorption of limitless space
6. meditative absorption of limitless consciousness
7. meditative absorption of nothingness
8. meditative absorption of peak of cyclic existence.

[b] *mtshan nyid so sor rig pa'i yid byed, lakṣaṇapratisaṃvedīmanaskāra.*

[c] *mtshan nyid rab tu rig pa.*

[d] *mos pa las byung ba'i yid byed, adhimokṣikamanaskāra.*

[e] *rab tu dben pa'i yid byed, prāvivekyamanaskāra.*

[f] *dga' ba sdud pai' yid byed, ratisaṃgrāhakamanaskāra.*

[g] *dpyod pa yid byed, mīmāṃsāmanaskāra.*

[h] *sbyor mtha'i yid byed, prayoganiṣṭhamanaskāra.*

[i] *sbyor mtha'i 'bras bu'i yid byed, prayoganiṣṭhaphalamanaskāra.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- the objects of observation—that is, signs. When divided, there are four signs—observation (the aspect of realizing things that are objects of knowledge),[572] basis (causes such as prerequisites for meditative stabilization), those that are to be thoroughly abandoned (signs of laxity, excitement, distraction, and attachment), and those that are to be depended upon (for instance, the antidotes to those four). Moreover, there are also thirty-two signs described in Asaṅga's *Actuality of the Grounds,* ranging from the signs of one's own mind through to the signs of manifest achievement.
- When those mental contemplations are condensed, there are two, taking imagination to mind and taking suchness to mind. Or they are also included in the explanation of the nine mental abidings[a]—setting the mind only internally and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[573] You need to be skilled in the nine mental abidings, four mental engagements, and six powers described in many sūtras, Asaṅga's *Grounds of Hearers,* Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge,* and so forth.

Chart 9: States and Factors in Achieving Calm Abiding

(Read from bottom to top.)

Six Powers	*Nine Mental Abidings*	*Four Mental Engagements*
6. familiarity	9. Setting in equipoise	4. spontaneous engagement
	8. Making one-pointed	3. uninterrupted engagement
5. effort	7. Thorough pacifying	
	6. Pacifying	
4. introspection	5. Disciplining	
	4. Close setting	
3. mindfulness	3. Resetting	2. interrupted engagement
2. thinking	2. Continuous setting	
1. hearing	1. Setting the mind	1. forcible engagement

Gedün Lodrö's *Calm Abiding and Special Insight:*[574] Asaṅga's *Grounds of Hearers* sets forth the achievement of calm abiding by way of the nine mental abidings…

1. In the first mental abiding, setting the mind,[b] one is able to set

[a] *sems gnas dgu, navākārā cittasthiti.*

[b] *sems 'jog pa, cittasthāpana.*

the mind a little on the object of observation that has been indicated by a teacher or chosen through one's own study, but one is not able to set the mind there continuously. What appears to the meditator is mostly not the object of observation but many other types of conceptions. It seems that there are more appearances than usual. This is not the case, however; it is not that there is more conceptuality than usual; rather, this is a sign that conceptuality, or discursiveness, is being identified…

At this point, the meditator has the *power of hearing* (*thos pa, śruta*) because of having heard about and chosen the object of observation through a teacher's instruction; the reading of texts that explain the object of observation is also included in the meaning of "hearing." Even looking at a painting or statue of a Buddha in preparation for visualizing is included in "hearing," since this is done on the advice of a teacher.

2. The second mental abiding is called continuous setting.[a] At this point one is able to lengthen a little the continuum of observing the object of observation. During this time, distractions and so forth cannot create great interference. In terms of one's own experience, it is as though conceptuality is resting a little.

   During the second mental abiding, the meditator has the *power of thinking* (*bsam pa, cintā*) because he or she "again and again contemplates the object [of observation]" and thinks about the teacher's instructions concerning it. In the second mental abiding, as in the first, the main faults are laziness and forgetting the instruction.

3. At the third mental abiding, resetting,[b] one is able to set the mind back on the object of observation when the mind has wandered from it. The length of the continuum of meditative stabilization is greater than during the second mental abiding: one can maintain the non-distracted setting of the mind on an object of observation longer than before.

   In the third mental abiding, the meditator has the *power of mindfulness* (*dran pa, smṛti*); Lati Rinbochay explains that as a result of the strong mindfulness applied during the

[a] *rgyun du 'jog pa, saṃsthāpana.*
[b] *slan te 'jog pa, avasthāpana.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

first two mental abidings, the meditator has the power of mindfulness in the third.

4. The fourth mental abiding is called close setting.[a] Through the strong force of mindfulness, the mind now remains on its object of observation. From the fourth mental abiding on, the object of observation is not lost. However, within not losing the object of observation, one is bothered by strong laxity and excitement.

   The fourth mental abiding is characterized by very strong mindfulness; the power of mindfulness has now matured.

5. At the fifth mental abiding, disciplining,[b] yogic practitioners, through their own power, know the good qualities of meditative stabilization. At this point, they generate the power of introspection; although they had introspection earlier, this is when the *power* of introspection is generated. During this period, too, there is great danger of laxity because previously, in the fourth mental abiding, the mind was strongly withdrawn. Thus, it is necessary to revivify or heighten the mind.

   At this point, through the meditator's earlier exercise of introspection, the *power of introspection* (*shes bzhin, samprajanya*) is generated.

6. During the sixth mental abiding, pacifying,[c] meditative stabilization is improved through knowledge of the faults of distraction, laxity, excitement, and so forth. The power of introspection is fulfilled; through one's own power, one is able to inspect for laxity and excitement. However, through excessive heightening of the mind, there is danger of subtle excitement.

   In the sixth mental abiding the power of introspection is fully developed; thus, the meditator can easily inspect for laxity and excitement.

7. The seventh mental abiding is called thorough pacifying.[d] At this point, the power of effort is generated. There is no longer much danger—as there was during the fifth and sixth mental abidings—that laxity or excitement will arise. If they do arise, however, one is able to suppress them.

   In the seventh mental abiding, the meditator has generated

[a] *nye bar 'jog pa, upasthāpana.*

[b] *dul bar byed pa, damana.*

[c] *zhi bar byed pa, śamana.*

[d] *nye bar zhi bar byed pa, vyupaśamana.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

the *power of effort* (*brtson 'grus, vīrya*). According to Gedün Lodrö, effort included within the power of effort has six qualities that "are not qualities of effort in general but must be present in the power of effort discussed here":

1) intense application (*gus sbyor*)—that is, "a sense of intentness with regard to the qualities of meditative stabilization"
2) continuous application (*rtag sbyor*)—"that one continuously applies oneself to the task of cultivating meditative stabilization; one does not just do it sometimes"
3) causally concordant application (*rgyu mthun pa'i sbyor ba*)—"a single continuum of effort"; namely, that the meditator's progress, from the beginning of the task, "flows from the same stream of effort"
4) effort arising from application (*sbyor ba las byung ba'i brtson grus*)—"effort generated from application in this lifetime," not in past lifetimes
5) undisturbed effort (*mi 'thugs pa'i brtson grus*)—"that effort which is not disturbed by hardships such as heat"
6) effort which is insatiable (*chog ma shes pa'i brtson grus*)—"that effort which is motivated by one's not being satisfied with what has been accomplished up to now."

8. In the eighth mental abiding, making one-pointed,[a] one is able, by merely relying on mindfulness and introspection at the beginning of the session, to remain with the object of observation. Because the strength of laxity and excitement has deteriorated, it is not necessary to rely on mindfulness and introspection while one is actually cultivating meditative stabilization.

   In the eighth mental abiding, the power of effort is fulfilled.

9. In the ninth mental abiding, setting in equipoise,[b] one is able, through merely directing the mind toward the object of observation, to stay in meditative stabilization spontaneously. It is automatic; the meditation has its own flow. At this point one has achieved the power of familiarity;[c] one is free from

[a] *rtse gcig tu byed pa, ekotīkaraṇa.*
[b] *mnyam par 'jog pa, samādhāna.*
[c] *yongs su 'dris pa, paricaya.*

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> laxity and excitement, is able to set the mind continuously in meditative stabilization, and has subjective and objective clarity. Which of the eight antidotes applies at this time? Desisting from application[a] is equivalent with the ninth mental abiding. It is through the functioning of such desisting that one is spontaneously able to maintain the continuum of meditative stabilization in the ninth mental abiding…
>
> > The meditator has achieved the *power of familiarity* (*yongs su 'dris pa, paricaya*). Laxity and excitement are not present; the meditator has no need to apply antidotes and refrains from applying them unnecessarily.

FOUR MENTAL ENGAGEMENTS

Now I will explain how [the nine mental abidings] are achieved by way of the four mental engagements.[b]

The first two mental abidings are achieved by way of forcible engagement.[c] The third through seventh are included within the mental engagement of interrupted engagement.[d] The eighth is included within uninterrupted engagement[e] and the ninth, within spontaneous, or one-pointed, engagement.[f]

The first two mental abidings are included within forcible engagement because the meditator must tighten the mind and force it to stay on the object of observation. At this point, one engages in techniques designed not to *keep* the mind on its object of observation but to *put* it there. From the third through seventh mental abidings, one engages in techniques to cause the mind to remain on its object of observation. During these mental abidings, the mind is sometimes able to stay on its object of observation and sometimes not; thus, they are characterized by interrupted engagement.

During the eighth mental abiding the mind stays on its object of observation without being interrupted by laxity and excitement. It is thus characterized by uninterrupted engagement.

The ninth mental abiding is included within spontaneous, or one-pointed, engagement. This is because the ninth mental abiding does not depend on the exertion that observes whether laxity or

[a] *btang snyoms, upekṣā.*

[b] *yid la byed pa, manaskāra.*

[c] *sgrim ste 'jug pa, balavāhana.*

[d] *bar du chad cing 'jug pa, sacchidravāhana.*

[e] *chad pa med par 'jug pa, nischidravāhana.*

[f] *lhun grub tu 'jug pa, anābhogavāhana.*

excitement has arisen: the mind is one-pointedly engaged with the object of observation and is able to operate according to the meditator's own intention. For all these reasons, the ninth mental abiding is included within spontaneous, or one-pointed, engagement. This, in brief, is how the nine mental abidings are included within the four mental engagements.

- Furthermore, one should know how to abandon the five faults and how to possess the eight antidotes.

Chart 10: Faults of Meditative Stabilization and their Antidotes

Faults	*Antidotes*
laziness	faith aspiration exertion pliancy
forgetting the instruction	mindfulness
[non-identification of] laxity and excitement	introspection
non-application	application
application	desisting from application

Gedün Lodrö's *Calm Abiding and Special Insight:*[575] Let us relate the five faults and the eight antidotes as set forth in Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* to the nine mental abidings set forth in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*, Asaṅga's *Grounds of Hearers*, and Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*. Whoever cultivates the nine mental abidings overcomes the five faults through the eight antidotes, and whoever overcomes the five faults through the eight antidotes must cultivate the nine mental abidings.

Among the eight antidotes, faith, aspiration, and exertion are important in the beginning; mindfulness and introspection are important in the middle, and desisting from application of the antidotes is important at the end. The application of the antidotes is important from the first through the eighth mental abidings. What remains? Pliancy, which is important for all

nine mental abidings. It is called a branch which is a benefit.[a] Pliancy is posited as an antidote to laziness; it is the fourth of the four antidotes to laziness but it is important in the beginning, middle, and end.

Pliancy is called a branch which is a benefit because it is a benefit, or effect, of having cultivated the nine mental abidings…The purpose of cultivating the nine mental abidings is to attain calm abiding, which is conjoined with the pliancies. Thus, because they are the aim, the pliancies are important throughout all nine mental abidings.

Faith, aspiration, and exertion are techniques for striving toward meditative stabilization. Mindfulness and introspection are techniques for aiming the mind at meditative stabilization. The application of the antidotes is an incentive to meditative stabilization; it urges one on. Desisting from application is a technique for stopping the application of antidotes when, because the mind is spontaneously set in meditative stabilization, they are no longer necessary.

Whose system is it to put together the five faults, eight antidotes, and nine mental abidings with regard to the cultivation of calm abiding? This is a system of the Ḡa-dam-b̄a[b] School, which stems from Atisha. There are two Ḡa-dam-b̄a lineages—the preceptual[c] and the textual.[d] The preceptual lineage consists of those who mainly engage in practice by way of a transmission of preceptual instructions.[e] The textual lineage consists of those who engage in practice from the viewpoint of maintaining a continuum of explanation of the great texts. The system explained above is that of the textual Ḡa-dam-b̄as.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The term "and so forth" [in the root text] indicates that one should be skilled in the four objects of observation of calm abiding and should know how to associate those mental contemplations with whichever of the five paths, and so forth.

Gedün Lodrö's *Calm Abiding and Special Insight:*[576] Four types of object of observation are described:

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a *phan yon gyi yan lag, *anuśaṃsāṅga.*

b *dka' gdams pa.*

c *gdams ngag pa.*

d *gzhung pa pa.*

e *gdams ngag, avavāda.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

1. pervasive objects of observation[a]
2. objects of observation for purifying behavior[b]
3. objects of observation for [developing] skill[c]
4. objects of observation for purifying afflictive emotions.[d]

Meaning of their Names

"Pervasive" refers to the fact that this type pervades all objects of observation; this is an etymology. Objects of observation for purifying behavior are used by persons in whom one of the afflictive emotions predominates and are named for their ability temporarily to pacify afflictive emotions. Objects of observation for developing skill have the feature that, by training in them, one becomes skilled. This third category includes objects of observation such as the four noble truths[e] and the twelve-linked dependent-arising;[f] if one studies the texts on these subjects, one becomes skilled in them; "of skill"[g] is an abbreviated expression meaning "to make, or bring about, skill."[h] The fourth type of object of observation is for purifying afflictive emotions. What are posited here as afflictive emotions? They are afflictive emotions included within either the Desire Realm or the two upper realms,[i] the Form Realm[j] and the Formless Realm.[k] In dependence on the seven preparations[l] for each of the concentrations and formless absorptions, one separates from the afflictive emotions of desire, and so forth, pertaining to the level below the concentration or the formless absorption [that one is trying to attain].

There is a difference between objects of observation that purify behavior and those that purify afflictive emotions. Objects of observation that purify behavior are for the sake of pacifying a specific afflictive emotion that is predominant, whether it be desire, hatred,

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[a] *khyab pa'i dmigs pa, vyāpyālaṃbana.*

[b] *spyad pa rnam sbyong gi dmigs pa, caritaviśodanālaṃbana.*

[c] *mkhas pa'i dmigs pa* (*mkhas par byed pa'i dmigs pa*), *kauśalyālaṃbana.*

[d] *nyon mongs rnams sbyong gi dmigs pa, kleśaviśodanālaṃbana.*

[e] *'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi, catvāry āryasatyāni.*

[f] *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba, pratītyasamutpāda.*

[g] *mkhas pa'i.*

[h] *mkhas par byed pa.*

[i] *khams gong ma.*

[j] *gzugs khams, rūpadhātu.*

[k] *gzugs med khams, ārūpyadhātu.*

[l] *nyer bsdogs, samāntaka.*

obscuration, pride, or discursiveness. The fourth type of object of observation, for purifying afflictive emotions, purifies all afflictive emotions equally. Thus, in dependence on one of the preparations for a concentration or on an actual[a] concentration, a meditator achieves a state of having separated from all afflictive emotions pertaining to the Desire Realm or to a particular concentration or formless absorption.

B: EXPLANATION OF THE FEATURES OF THE TEN GROUNDS AND THE PERFECTIONS IN THE MIND-ONLY SCHOOL

Twelve, four, so forth are the features of the grounds and perfections.

Word Commentary on Root Text: You should know the features of the grounds and perfections through:

- the twelve groups of qualities
- the four features of advance in the number of qualities, advance in power, advance in the surpassing perfection, and advance in fruitional births[b]

so forth.

3: Presentation of the Fruit of Buddhahood in the Mind-Only School

Twelve sets of one hundred; transformations of eye and so forth; four, five, and so forth exalted bodies; ten and two exalted activities and so forth are described in Maitreya's two *Differentiations,* Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,* and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: You should know:

- the twelve sets of one hundred qualities that arise individually with respect to all five senses
- attainment of seven fortunes through seven transformations
    1. through transformation of the five senses (eye and so forth), the fortune of [each] engaging all five objects[c]

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[a] *dngos gzhi, maula.*

[b] For these, see the description of the Consequence School, 975ff.

[c] The five senses become cross-functional.

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2. through transformation of mentality,[a] the fortune of pure non-conceptual exalted wisdom
3. through transformation of apprehensions together with objects, the fortune of pure lands
4. through transformation of conceptuality, the fortune of exalted wisdom and exalted activities unimpeded at all times
5. through transformation of the support, the fortune of non-abiding nirvāṇa
6. through transformation of sex,[b] the fortune of abiding in bliss and so forth
7. through transformation of the discrimination of space, the fortune of the sky-treasury and so forth.

- four exalted bodies—nature body, wisdom truth body, enjoyment body, and emanation body; five exalted bodies—body of attributes, enjoyment body, and three emanation bodies [that is, artisan, incarnation, and great enlightenment emanation bodies]; and so forth[c]
- twelve deeds[d]
- ten exalted activities and the two exalted activities of setting [trainees] in high status and definite goodness described in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras;* twenty-seven exalted activities described in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization;* thirty-two exalted activities described in the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra*[e]
- and, furthermore, features of the basis, path, and fruit—not explained here—that are described in Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes, Differentiation of the Noumenon and Phenomena,* and *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* and in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* and its commentaries [by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva], and so forth.

This has been the tenth chapter, the section on the Proponents of Cognition who, having refuted a coarse self of phenomena—external objects and so forth—prove a selflessness of phenomena.

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[a] *yid.*

[b] This does not mean gender; it refers to modes of sexual enjoyment such as looking, smiling, holding hands, and intercourse.

[c] For these, see the description of the Consequence School, 991-1002.

[d] See 232.

[e] See 1007ff.

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Introduction to the Middle Way School

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[577] About this, Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas* says:[a]
>
> One who knows that
> Initially the non-meritorious is overcome,
> In the middle self is overcome, and
> Finally all views are overcome is wise.
>
> Accordingly, the supreme of the wise, who eliminate all proliferations of views are the Proponents of the Middle.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[578] Initially, by way of teaching that a substantially existent self that accumulates karmas and experiences effects exists, the non-meritorious—the causes of bad transmigrations—are overcome. In the middle, a substantially existent self is refuted, making [trainees] into vessels of the path. Finally, release is brought about through teaching the subtle emptiness, overcoming all proliferations of bad views.

2' Indicating the Middle Way System of the Supreme Scholars {5}

This section has five parts: definition, etymology, divisions, history, and individual assertions.

a' Definition

They propound a middle free from extremes and propound naturelessness.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They propound a middle that is free from the extremes of permanence (that is, that phenomena ultimately exist) and annihilation (that is, that phenomena do not exist conventionally), and they propound the non-existence of a nature—true establishment.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[579] Those among our own schools:

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[a] In accordance with Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's commentary which follows, I have expanded Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation of only two lines to include the entire stanza; for discussion of the stanza see 914ff.

- who refute from the depths the extreme of permanence, or existence, (that is, that any phenomenon ultimately exists) and the extreme of annihilation, or non-existence, (that is, that phenomena do not even exist conventionally)
- and who assert that phenomena are established as truthless like illusions

are Proponents of the Middle. This is because, having asserted the lion's roar and so forth of selflessness which the Subduer set forth as an antidote to the disease of the conception of true existence, Proponents of the Middle, even when lecturing and debating, like the Sovereign of Subduers [Buddha]:

- proclaim the lion's roar of selflessness causing fright in the wild animals of the proponents of true existence among our own and others' [schools]…
- beat the drum of the excellent doctrine unlike any other
- blow the conch of the melodies of the element of attributes which pervade the three realms with the great sound, "Phenomena are natureless,"
- and spread to all transmigrating beings the ambrosia of the doctrine of dependent-arising and profound emptiness, antidote to all diseases of afflictive emotions.

b' Etymology

They are called Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Non-Nature.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [For those two reasons respectively] they are called Proponents of the Middle and Proponents of Non-Nature.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[580] The meaning of the profound dependent-arising, the center free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation—which are like great chasms in that if you fall into them, they are places of harm—through having refuted them, is the middle or center, [the *madhyama* of] *madhyamaka,* because it is like a center away from extremes. The honorable Bhāvaviveka, a supreme son of Nāgārjuna, says:

> Since it is like a center that is away from the two extremes, it is the middle (*dbu ma, madhya*); the very center [or centermost] (*dbus nyid*) is *madhyama,* which is *madhya* with the *taddhita*

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affix [*ma*][a]...

Therefore, although the names "emptiness" and "dependent-arising" are different, their meanings as the path free from the two sorrowful extremes do not differ, because the meaning [of emptiness] is the absence of true existence and the meaning [of dependent-arising] comes to be that which is not self-instituting or substantially existent in the sense of true establishment. For all phenomena from the start abide free from the two extremes, like, for example, the fact that since from the start water does not exist in a mirage, it is free from the [extremes of] annihilation and permanence of something that is established as water...

The *ka* [of *madhyamaka*] is used with the sense of teaching or proclaiming the center, since, when explained from the viewpoint of the verbal root,[b] it comes to mean that. Thus, a treatise on the middle is *madhyamaka,* and a person who has the name "middle" is a *madhyamaka.* Or, in another way, it is permissible in general to impute *madhyamaka* to tenets of the middle...Hence, let us make clear the meaning of those three in brief:

- The subject, the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle,* is called "*madhyamaka*" because of being a treatise mainly teaching abandonment of the two extremes, the path of the actual middle, just as, for example, texts that take as their object of expression the mother, the perfection of wisdom, are imputed as [that is, are called] perfection of wisdom.
- The subject, the father Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons, are called "*madhyamaka*" ("Proponents of the Middle") because of being persons who mainly explain and hold the middle path that has abandoned the two extremes, just as, for example, those who propound objects of knowledge as cognition-only are called *vijñaptika* ("Proponents of Cognition").
- The subjects, (1) reasonings proving that the path of the middle has abandoned the two extremes and (2) the basis, path, and fruit, are called "*madhyamaka*" because of being positions or factors that are established by reasoning as free from the two extremes, just as, for example, the midland, which is separated from the chasms, is called the center.

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[a] *madhyama* is a derivative noun that means the same as its base, *madhya,* but with the sense of "very middle" or "middlemost."

[b] The verbal root is *kai,* which means to sound, or to proclaim; see Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 4a.1ff.

Below (458) I will explain the way of being free from the two extremes and the way of falling into them.

Objection: If that is the case, what is the meaning of the explanation in the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra* of not abiding even in the center:

Existence and non-existence are both extremes.
Clean and unclean are also extremes.
Therefore, having abandoned both extremes
The wise do not at all remain even in the center.

The meaning is not to abide in accordance with holding a truly existent center that is a negation of trifling extremes of existence and non-existence, as the Proponents of Mind-Only do. How could it teach that there is not any center that is a negation of all extremes of existence and non-existence!

Because they propound that all phenomena are natureless in the sense of not having true existence, they are renowned as Proponents of Non-Nature.

c' Divisions {2}

This section has two parts: divisions and explanation of these as Proponents of the Middle.

1" Divisions

The divisions are two, Consequence School and Autonomy School; the others are only names.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The divisions are two, Consequence School and Autonomy School, and those claiming to be Proponents of the Middle other than those two are only imputed with the name "Proponents of the Middle"; in fact, they are not suitable as Proponents of the Middle.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[581] When Proponents of the Middle are divided, there are two, the Consequence School and the Autonomy School, which will be explained below. All others than those—aside from being distinctions of names—are not suitable in fact. What are these [that are Proponents of the Middle only in name]? Even in India others' schools and our own schools—Mind-Only School and below—who claim to be Proponents of the Middle and those in Tibet who assert nothingness are not [actual] Proponents of the Middle because they have fallen to extremes.

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Hence, when Proponents of the Middle are divided, they are definite as twofold:

- those who assert external objects and those who do not
- and the Consequence School and the Autonomy School from the viewpoint of how the profound view is generated in the continuum.

2" Explanation of These as Proponents of the Middle

Both are Proponents of the Middle, similarly refuting the extreme of non-existence, which is not to exist even conventionally, and the extreme of permanence, which is true establishment, and thereupon asserting as the middle dependently arisen phenomena. However, that free from all subtle extremes is the system of the Consequentialists.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Both Consequentialists and Autonomists are Proponents of the Middle because they are similar in refuting

- the extreme of non-existence, which is that nothing exists even conventionally
- and the extreme of permanence which is that [phenomena] are truly established

and thereupon asserting as the middle a non-affirming negative that is a mere elimination of the true existence of dependently arisen phenomena. However, that which is free from all extremes of subtle permanence and annihilation—such as establishment from its own side and the non-establishment as external objects—is the system of the Consequentialists.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[582]

Objection: If someone thinks that it is not correct to assert that the Autonomists are Proponents of the Middle because Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says that it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms],[a] and if these [Autonomists] refuted the two extremes, they would not differ from Consequentialists.

Answer: I will explain this. Although [Chandrakīrti] says such, there is no fault in positing them as Proponents of the Middle because both Middle Way Consequentialists and Middle Way Autonomists have mostly similar ways of:

- extensively refuting the extreme of non-existence that nothing exists even conventionally and the extreme of permanence that

[a] For the quotation, see 795.

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phenomena ultimately exist, truly exist, or substantially exist
- and thereupon asserting a coarse presentation of dependent-arisings as like illusions and dreams.

And, therefore, both must be posited as Proponents of the Middle, but if [the Autonomists] are not posited as Proponents of the Middle, they cannot be posited as another tenet system, since they are one of our own schools whose view is very much higher than the Mind-Only School…Therefore, although it is not suitable for a monastic—who has [vowed not to break] the formulated code[a]—to commit a fault, it is not contradictory that there are monastics who do such.

The way the Middle Way Autonomists refute the two extremes differs greatly from the Proponents of Mind-Only and is very close to the Consequence School in how, within citing the path of reasoning of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], they abandon the two extremes. Also, among them, the exposition of the Middle Way Autonomy School by the master Bhāvaviveka and his spiritual son is without mixture with the Mind-Only School in accordance with [his saying] that rather than getting dirty and then washing, it is better not to get dirty. Due to this, even Atisha, the unparalleled sole eye of the world, expounded on the *Blaze of Reasoning* many times in both India and Tibet. And it is also D̄zong-ka-b̄a's thought [that Autonomists are Proponents of the Middle].[b]

Nevertheless, [Autonomists] assert establishment from its own side and inherent establishment—such as in positing that the basis of imputation of a pot (that is, the mere collection [of the parts] of a pot and special shape of a pot) is a pot—and, therefore, that which is free from all subtle extremes of true establishment does not exist anywhere other than in the system of the Consequence School.

d' History of the Great Vehicle Teaching

With respect to the history, four hundred years after the Subduer,

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[a] There are infractions of natural codes and of formulated codes; thus, there is naturally unseemly behavior (*rang bzhin gyis kha na ma tho ba*), such as murder, and unseeingly behavior that breaks formulated codes, such as sleeping on a high bed.

[b] In his *The Essence of Eloquence* D̄zong-ka-b̄a makes this point within using the example of a monastic's breaking a formulated code but still being a monastic.

Nāgārjuna brought the Great Vehicle and opened the way of commenting on it as the middle.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to the history of the commentators on the thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, the Great Vehicle teaching, four hundred years after the Teacher, Sovereign of Subduers, passed away, the glorious protector Superior Nāgārjuna brought the Great Vehicle—the Mother *One Hundred Thousand Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* and so forth—from Nāga Land, and thereupon opened the chariot-way of commenting on the thought of the Mother Sūtras as the middle that has abandoned the two extremes.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[583] The *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* and so forth emerged within the year of the Teacher's displaying buddhafication;[a] therefore, the word of the Great Vehicle arose [at that time]. For it is explained that the word of the Great and Lesser Vehicles arose simultaneously, such as, for instance, in the foremost venerable Maitreya's statement, "Not revealed earlier, they arose together."
>
> The Great Vehicle sūtras remained in human lands for up to forty years after the Teacher passed away and then due to disturbances and so forth vanished. For, some sūtras say that Ānanda sustained the [Great Vehicle] teaching for up to forty years even after the Teacher passed away, and the *Great Cloud Sūtra* also explains that it remained so. This is because (1) the *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:[584]
>
>> Children of gods,[b] after I have passed away, those who have created roots of virtue and those who have served many Buddhas will explain sūtras such as this, teaching them also to others extensively. Furthermore, the *Great Cloud Sūtra* will be used in the Land of Jambu [that is, this world] for up to forty years and will be disseminated. After that, at a later time, the excellent doctrine will be abandoned, the king[doms] will be disturbed, and the excellent doctrine will vanish.
>
> and so forth, and (2) as will be explained, it was necessary for the Great Vehicle to be brought [here by Nāgārjuna from Nāga Land, and so forth] and to establish it as the word [of Buddha].[c]

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[a] That is, displaying the achievement of enlightenment, although he had achieved it many eons earlier.

[b] *lha'i bu, devaputra.*

[c] See, for instance, Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland,* stanzas 367-398; also, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 358.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

One hundred twenty years after the Teacher passed away, the Brahmin Kauṇḍinya, who [had discussion] with the Lichavi [Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World][a] about whether or not the One-Gone-Thus would have relics,[b] emerged again as the religious king Ashoka, worshipping the Three Jewels and making many periodic religious services. The *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:[585]

> Goddess,[c] the prophesied master, the Brahmin Kauṇḍinya also will be born one hundred twenty years after I pass away in the royal lineage of a half universal emperor[d] called the Maurya[586] lineage…Goddess, he will become the lay-practitioner[e] King Ashoka. Goddess, that half[587] universal emperor called Ashoka will proclaim the initial great lion's roar of the treatises of doctrine[588] and will manifestly make worship.

It is evident that although there were many Foe Destroyers at this time, the Great Vehicle was non-existent.

When four hundred years had elapsed after the Teacher passed away, the Lichavi Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World—who had conversation about relics with the Brahmin Kauṇḍinya at the time of the Teacher [Buddha Shākyamuni] and who [was the rebirth of] King-Nāga-Of-Great-Effort[f] during the age of an earlier Buddha, Lamp-Of-The-Nāga-Lineage [g] —was born again, as explained

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[a] *'jig rten thams cad kyis mthong na dga' ba, sarvalokapriyadarśana.*

[b] Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World speaks with Kauṇḍinya about whether Buddha would leave relics upon passing away. Kauṇḍinya, inspired by Buddha, answers that because a Buddha's body is not made of blood and bone, there could not be any such relics but that Buddha, out of skillful means, would nevertheless leave relics. Nāgārjuna is a rebirth of this illustrious youth.

An almost identical conversation is also reported in the *Excellent Golden Light Sūtra* (*gser 'od dam pa, suvarṇaprabhāsottama*); see *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra, Das Goldglanz-Sūtra*, ed. Johannes Nobel, (Leiden: Brill, 1944), Text chapter II, 12.13-17.6. Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World is mentioned three times in the sūtra: 13.2, 14.1, and 16.2. Thanks to the late Professor Shotaro Iida of the University of British Columbia for identifying and providing this edition.

[c] Buddha is speaking to Vimalaprabhā (*dri ma med pa'i od*) who earlier was the wife/queen/consort of King Nāga-Of-Great-Effort (an earlier incarnation of Nāgārjuna). The conversation begins on P898, vol. 35, 250.4.7.

[d] *'khor los sgyur ba'i rgyal po, cakravartin.* Such a ruler has dominion over from one to four of the continents of our type of world system (there are only four) by means of a wheel made, respectively, from different metals—iron/steel, copper, silver, or gold.

[e] *dge bsnyen, upāsaka.*

[f] *brtson 'grus chen po'i klu.*

[g] *klu rigs sgron me, nāgakulapradīpa.*

earlier, in a clan in south [India] of the Shākya lineage because:

- the *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:[589]

  That King, King-Nāga-Of-Great-Effort, is presently this Lichavi youth, Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World.

- the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says:[a]

  When four hundred years have passed
  After I, the One-Gone-Thus, have passed away,
  A monk called Nāga will arise.

- the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says, "Living for six hundred years," and so forth
- the *Great Cloud Sūtra of Twelve Thousand Stanzas* says:[b]

  Ānanda,[c] four hundred years after I [Shākyamuni Buddha] pass away, this Licchavi youth Liked-When-Seen-by-All-the-World will become a monk known as Nāga and will disseminate my teaching. Finally, in the land known as Very Pure Light[d] he will become a One-Gone-Thus, a Foe Destroyer, a completely perfect Buddha named Light-Which-Is-a-Source-of-All-Wisdom.[e]

- and the master Bodhibhadra also says:

  The Supramundane Victor [said], "When four hundred

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[a] For the full passage, see 297.

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a specifies the version of the sūtra in twelve thousand stanzas because this material is not in the version represented by the Tibetan translation of the sūtra; this particular citation is found in Chandrakīrti's commentary on his *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle."*

[c] In his translation, Poussin (*Muséon* 11, 275) incorrectly has Buddha identifying the Licchavi youth as Ānanda ("*Prince Licchavi, cet Ānanda, ainsi nommé parce que toute créature se réjouit en le voyant, quatre siécles aprés le nirvāṇa, sera le bhikṣu nommé Nāga*"). However, it is clear that Buddha is talking about the Licchavi youth who is a contemporary of Ānanda, and thus Buddha is addressing Ānanda and talking about the Licchavi youth. There is considerable justification for the latter reading because the *Great Drum Sūtra* indicates that Buddha is talking to Ānanda *about* the Licchavi youth who is called Liked-When-Seen-by-All-the-World (*'jig rten thams cad kyis mthong na dga' ba, sarvalokapriyadarśana*), this phrase constituting his name and not describing Ānanda as Poussin has it. For the Sanskrit see *Suvarnaprabhāsottamasūtra, Das Goldglanz-Sūtra,* ed. Johannes Nobel (Leiden: Brill, 1950), Glossary, 65). Poussin was perhaps misled into thinking that *'jig rten thams cad kyis mthong na dga' ba* refers to Ānanda because the literal meaning of the name "Ānanda" is "thoroughly happy."

[d] *rab tu dang ba'i 'od.* Poussin (*Muséon* 11, 275) gives the Sanskrit as "*Suviśuddhaprabhābhūmi,"* whereas Obermiller (*History of Buddhism by Bu-ston,* 129) gives "*Prasannaprabhā."*

[e] *ye shes 'byung gnas 'od.* Both Poussin (*Muséon* 11, 275) and Obermiller (*History of Buddhism by Bu-ston,* 129) give the Sanskrit as *Jñānākaraprabha.*

> years have elapsed after I have thoroughly passed from sorrow, in a family in the south…

The assertions that this master [Nāgārjuna] was born at a time when the [average] lifespan of humans was eighty years and that he did not live for more than a hundred years are not correct. For, the time when the [average] lifespan was eighty years is the time of the last of the master [Nāgārjuna's] three proclamations of the great sound of doctrine in the lands of humans, and a hundred years is the length of his setting forth that [third proclamation of] doctrine. This is because:

- Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:

  > That prophecy in the *Great Drum Sūtra* is said[a] to [refer to Nāgārjuna's] final appearance in the south."

- and there is much damage [to these assertions], such as that if [Nāgārjuna] did not live more than one hundred years, one would [absurdly] have to assert that even the master Bhāvaviveka was never contemporaneous with the master.

With regard to how this master [Nāgārjuna] found realization, according to the Mantra system, he became buddhafied in that lifetime, and even according to Sūtra he attained the eighth ground and finally passed away together with Āryadeva, the foremost of his spiritual sons, who had attained the eighth ground. Leaving his fruitional body in the Blissful [Pure Land], he listened to doctrine from the Protector Maitreya through one of many emanations. In the future he will further display the mode of complete purification [that is, attainment of Buddhahood]. For:

1. Chandrakīrti's *Brilliant Lamp*[590] explains that [Nāgārjuna] became buddhafied [in that lifetime through the path of Highest Yoga Tantra].[591]
2. The *Great Drum Sūtra* (see 466) says:[592]

   > Having set him on the seventh ground, I will bless him as an ordinary being. Then, when the [average] lifespan is eighty years…

   and so forth.

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[a] In a later verse summation of the prophecy the sūtra itself (P888 vol. 35, 99.4.8) says:

> That is his final emergence
> In the southern direction.

See Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Four Interwoven Annotations to (Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's) "Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,"* 153.6.

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3. and the *Great Drum Sūtra* says:[593]

> Then, dying after a hundred years pass, you will be born in the worldly realm of the Blissful [Pure Land]. At that time you will emit many great magical emanations. Staying on the eighth ground, one body will be set in the Blissful [Pure Land], and upon emanating one body you will set it in the Joyous [Pure Land],[a] questioning the Undaunted Protector [Maitreya] about this sūtra."

In this case, if [from the Sūtra point of view, Nāgārjuna] is considered to be a seventh ground Bodhisattva who, upon assuming the manner of an ordinary common being, displayed the manner of newly attaining the first ground in that lifetime, it connects with [the statement in the *Great Drum Sūtra* given in the second quote just above] "as an ordinary being." If Avalokitavrata's explanation [that Nāgārjuna attained the first ground during that lifetime] and [the prophecies in] the *Descent into Laṅkā* and the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* are taken as prophecies of [common] appearance, it fits together extremely well.

That [Nāgārjuna] newly attained the eighth ground in that lifetime accords with the general Sūtra system; hence, [I] think that is good. Also, the *Great Drum Sūtra* says:[594]

> Later he[595] will become a Buddha. After a thousand Buddhas have thoroughly passed away, sixty-two eons will pass. One hundred thousand Solitary Realizers will pass, and then when eight Protectors have also passed, this monk Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World, who bears my name [in that he is a member of the Shākya clan][b] will become a One-Gone-Thus, a Foe Destroyer, a completely perfect Buddha called Light-Which-Is-A-Source-of-All-Wisdom in a Buddha Land [in] just this world.

and the *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:[596]

> Child of lineage, once this good eon has passed, after one thousand Buddhas have thoroughly passed away, for sixty-two eons a Buddha will not arise; one hundred ten million Solitary

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[a] *dga' ldan, tuṣita.*

[b] See the *Great Cloud Sūtra* (P898, vol. 35, 250.5.3) for *śākya'i rus.* Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, na,* 5.8) reports that he has heard explanations by some scholars that "bears my name" and "monk concordant in name with the One-Gone-Thus" (see 465) refers to being renowned as a second Buddha. However, it seems to me that this would be out of place in reference to Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World at that time.

> Realizers will arise. Child of good family, after those sixty-two eons have passed, seven other Buddhas will arise. Then, when the seventh has thoroughly passed away, at that time this worldly realm will be called Manifest Faith.[597] In this worldly realm called Manifest Faith this [Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World, that is, Nāgārjuna,] will become a One-Gone-Thus, a Foe Destroyer, a completely perfect Buddha called Light-Which-Is-A-Source-of-All-Wisdom.

and it also says that:

1. The lifespan of that One-Gone-Thus [the Buddha who Nāgārjuna will become] will be fifteen intermediate eons.
2. He will be born in [lands called] Manifestly Liking Doctrine and so forth.
3. Those places will be without Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Forders, will be without absence of leisure [for the practice of doctrine], and will have many Bodhisattvas and be adorned always with pleasant sounds.
4. Even after [that Buddha] passes away, [his] teaching will remain for one thousand ten million years.

[THREE PROCLAMATIONS OF DOCTRINE]

With respect to how this master [Nāgārjuna] raised the doctrine of the Great Vehicle, the *Great Cloud Sūtra* says that in accordance with wishes[a] that he made in the presence of the [earlier] One-Gone-Thus, Lamp-of-the-Nāga-Lineage, to proclaim three proclamations and so forth of the excellent doctrine during the time of the teaching of Shākyamuni, he proclaimed three proclamations of doctrine here. The *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:[b]

> Furthermore, look at the greatness of my hearer [Nāgārjuna], a monk concordant in name with the One-Gone-Thus, who will manifestly proclaim three times great proclamations of doctrine and then the time of death will come…

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[a] *smon lam.*

[b] P898, vol. 35, 255.2.6-255.2.7. The sūtra itself (vol. 35, 254.4.6) gives the specific wish:

> …consider the greatness of the monk [Nāgārjuna] similar in name to the One-Gone-Thus. For, that monk made a promise and planted wishes in the presence of the One-Gone-Thus, Lamp-of-the-Nāga-Lineage. Having made [the promise and wish], "I will give my life to protect the excellent doctrine also during the teaching of the Supramundane Victor Shākyamuni," he will manifestly proclaim proclamations of the excellent doctrine three times.

[The First Proclamation]

Initially, he emerged [from the householder's way of life] and took full ordination from the abbot Rāhulabhadra,[a] whereupon he was designated with the name Shrīmān Glorious Mindful One.[b] He proclaimed the first great proclamation of doctrine by:

1. protecting the spiritual community from the fright of famine through alchemy while acting as steward of the spiritual community at Nālanda
2. giving advice on the twelve qualities of training in the doctrine and so forth to some within the spiritual community [at Nālanda] such as Shaṅkara[c] who were indolent regarding the precepts
3. and expelling the wayward [at Nālanda].

The *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:[d]

> In the Land of Jambu at a time of the thorough degeneration of the excellent doctrine a monk[598] similar to Mahākāshyapa will be born. Arising in the midst of my hearers, he will, in stages, wipe out[599] famine and will express praise of the sūtras spoken by the One-Gone-Thus among unruly ones difficult to tame…He will stay[600] in the monastery, express praise of the discipline, and defeat the unruly.

and the *Great Drum Sūtra* says:[e]

> Having set him on the seventh [Bodhisattva] ground, I will bless him as an ordinary being. Then, when the [average] lifespan is eighty years at a time of the diminishment of the teaching, he—having been born in the family lineage called Kayāgaurī[f] in a village called Base-of-the-Great-Garland[g] in a district called Ayodhyā[h] on the banks of a river in a southern

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[a] Identified as Saraha; see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, n. 229.

[b] *dpal ldan blo 'chang, *buddhidhara.*

[c] *bde byed.*

[d] P898, vol. 35, 253.4.8. Through the power of Buddha, Mahākāshyapa is answering a question about who would bear the teaching after Buddha's passing away put by a devaputra king of Smell-Eaters called Liked-When-Seen (*lha'i bu mthong na dga' ba dri za'i rgyal po*) in the presence of the Lichavi youth Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World.

[e] P888, vol. 35, 97.5.4. Buddha is speaking to Mahākāshyapa in the presence of a group of Bodhisattvas including Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World.

[f] *ka yo ri.*

[g] *phreng ba chen po rten.*

[h] *dmag gis mi tshugs pa.*

> area called Muruṇḍa[a]—will become a monk bearing my name [in that he will be a member of the Shākya clan]. Through skill in sustaining the community he, having emerged from the householder's life among those indolent with regard to my training in virtue, will gather them together through the modes of gathering.[b]
>
> Having found this sūtra, he will hold it to his body, and having purified the spiritual community, initially he will thoroughly eradicate the great bases of unsuitability [at Nālanda], proclaiming the great sound of doctrine. He will proclaim the conch of the doctrine and victory banner of the doctrine spoken in the *Great Drum Sūtra.*

This is the direct source for his first proclaiming the great sound of doctrine thoroughly removing the points of unsuitability [at Nālanda]. The description of [the time as when the average] lifespan is eighty years and of finding the *Great Drum Sūtra* are in consideration of the latter [part of his six hundred year lifetime], for if these were from this time [of the first proclamation], it would contradict the explanation [in the *Great Drum Sūtra* itself] that he would proclaim the three great proclamations of doctrine in stages.

[The Second Proclamation]

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle: Ocean of Reasoning"* says:[601]

> [Nāgārjuna's] coming at four hundred years [refers] to [his] second appearance in south [India].

In accordance with that statement, at a point somewhere after four hundred years after Buddha's passing away and before five hundred years had elapsed, the master [Nāgārjuna]—then about one hundred years old—brought back sūtras of the Perfection of Wisdom

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[a] The Taiwan (368.19) edition misreads *ru mun de;* the Dalama edition (*nga,* 3a.3) reads *mu run de.* The Sanskrit might also be Murunta.

[b] As Nāgārjuna himself says in the *Precious Garland of Advice* (stanza 133), the four modes of gathering students are by way of giving gifts, giving doctrine, teaching others to fulfill their aims, and oneself acting according to that teaching:

> You should cause the assembling
> Of the religious and the worldly
> Through giving, speaking pleasantly,
> Purposeful behavior, and concordant behavior.

"Speaking pleasantly" is conversation based on high status and definite goodness. "Purposeful behavior" is to cause others to practice what is beneficial. "Concordant behavior" is for one to practice what one teaches others.

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class, such as the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra,* from Nāga Land and composed treatises commenting on [Buddha's] thought, these being his Collections of Reasonings—the *Treatise on the Middle* and so forth—opening the chariot-way [of the Middle Way School] by commenting on [Buddha's own] thought as being the middle that abandons the two extremes. [At that time] for his name he was called "Nāgārjuna." [Thereby] he proclaimed the second great proclamation of doctrine by way of the profound emptiness.

For, at that time, when the master [Nāgārjuna] was explaining the three scriptural collections to many beings, two children came to listen, due to which a fragrant odor pervaded everywhere, and when those two left, the odor disappeared. Asked the reason for this, one of them said:

> We are children of the Nāga King Takshaka.[a] In coming to the land of humans we are protected by *gośīrśa*[602] sandalwood.

The master [Nāgārjuna] asked if that sandalwood was obtainable, whereupon they said they would ask their father. They asked their father, who said, "If Nāgārjuna comes, [I] will offer it [to him]." Hence, in dependence upon that, [Nāgārjuna] went [to Nāga Land] in order to bring back mainly the Perfection of Wisdom and to construct many stūpas from the mud of the Nāgas.

[Nāgārjuna] taught doctrine to the Nāgas and took alms [there], due to which the Nāgas asked him to stay, but he did not, returning to the land of humans bringing Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—the *One Hundred Thousand* and so forth—and Nāga mud, constructing around ten million stūpas and many images. The *Great Drum Sūtra* says:[603]

> As the second [proclamation of doctrine] he will set forth Great Vehicle sūtras, discourse on emptiness.

and the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says:

> He will know many treatises and the suchness of the meaning of no inherent existence.

and the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

> Destroying the [extreme] positions of [inherent] existence and
> [conventional] non-existence,
> He will thoroughly teach in the world
> The unsurpassed Great Vehicle—my vehicle.

The [Sanskrit] equivalent of [the Tibetan] *klu sgrub* is Nāgārjuna.

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[a] *'jog po.*

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Nāga means "dragon," and *arjuna* is used for "achieving temporal affairs" (*srid sgrub*) [the heroic person by that name famous in the *Bhagavadgītā*]. Just as Nāgas have the three [qualities of] dwelling in the ocean, possessing treasures of jewels such as wish-granting jewels, and burning fuel and overcoming others through the poisonous fire from their mouths, so the master [Nāgārjuna] also possessed understanding of the profound that eradicates duality, possessed the treasure of profound excellent doctrine, and burned away the fuel of bad views, clearing away mental darkness. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[604]

> Homage to that Nāgārjuna
> Who cleared away those dwelling in the situations of the two extremes,
> Who found birth in the ocean of perfect Buddha awareness,
> Who out of compassion taught the profundity of the treasure
> Of excellent doctrine just as he realized[605] it,
> Whose fires of the view [of the emptiness
> Of inherent existence] moreover destroy
> The fuel of textual systems of opponents
> And the darkness of mind of the world,

Just as Arjuna protected the kingdom and tamed his enemies, so the master [Nāgārjuna] also protected the kingdom of doctrine and conquered the hosts of foes in cyclic existence. That same text [Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*] says [continuing from the above citation]:

> Whose shower of arrows of the speech of non-dual exalted wisdom,[606]
> Brings about the welfare of the kingdom of the three realms
> Of the world of trainees including gods,
> Conquers the army of foes in mundane existence.

When it is taken this way, Abhayakāraguptapāda's statement that "Nāgārjuna" is the master's name when he had gained yogic feats[a] is also feasible.

[The Third Proclamation]

There is a way that the master [Nāgārjuna] proclaimed the third great proclamation of doctrine. The *Great Cloud Sūtra* says:[607]

> When seven hundred years have passed after I thoroughly pass away through [my skill in] means, this goddess Vimalaprabhā

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[a] *dngos grub, siddhi.*

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will arise in a lineage of a king of the realm, called Udayana,[a] in a city called Definite-As-Endowed-With-Glorious-Qualities[b] on the southern bank of the river Auspicious-Blackness[c] in the district of *Mun can*[d] in a southern area.

and so forth. It explains that when seven hundred years elapsed after the Teacher passed away, there was a king called Udayana, and when three generations of his royal lineage elapsed, the daughter of King Shrīmāla,[e] Lo-d̄ok-jor-ma,[f] that is, the goddess Vimalaprabhā, was born [in that family]. In accordance with that explanation,[g] seven hundred years had gone after the Teacher passed away when the master [Nāgārjuna]—on the road while going to [the northern continent called] Unpleasant Sound three hundred years [into his lifetime]—made a prophecy in the city of Definite-As-Endowed-With-Glorious-Qualities in a letter to the child Jitaka that he would become king.

[Nāgārjuna,] having brought about the welfare of transmigrators in [the continent called] Unpleasant Sound for two hundred years, again came to the Land of Jambu [that is, this world]. When the [average] lifespan of humans had become eighty years and the master [Nāgārjuna] was in his sixth century, he proclaimed the third great proclamation of doctrine, composing the *Praise of the Element of Attributes* and so forth teaching the existence of the permanent matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus—the basic constituent, element of attributes—in all sentient beings [in accordance with] the *Great Drum Sūtra*, the *Great Cloud Sūtra*, and so forth. Lecturing on such for up to a hundred years, he finally passed away in the south. This is because:

- the *Great Drum Sūtra* says:[h]

When the Protector called Shākyamuni emerges in this

[a] *bde spyod.* For *bde spyod ces* in the Dalama edition (*ca,* 6a.7) the Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 266.1.4) reads *rgud pa gso ba zhes.*

[b] *dpal yon can nges pa.*

[c] *nag po bzang.*

[d] This is the Tibetan; the Sanskrit is not known.

[e] *dpal phreng.*

[f] *lo tog 'byor ma.*

[g] It appears that the sūtra citation is made in order to establish the time of Nāgārjuna's appearance in that city of the Shātavāhanas and nothing more.

[h] P888, vol. 35, 88.2.4. The earlier Buddha Lamp-Maker (*mar me mdzad, dīpaṃkara*) is speaking to an earlier birth of Liked-When-Seen, a prince, prophesying his appearance at the time of Shākyamuni Buddha.

> obdurate[a] world realm, you[608] will become the Licchavi Liked-When-Seen. Then, when the [average] lifespan is eighty[609] years at a time of the diminishment of the teaching after the Protector [Shākyamuni Buddha] has passed away in that worldly realm, you—having become the monk called Mindful[b]—will bring out this sūtra without concern for your own life.[610] Then, dying after a hundred years pass…

As before (464), [it goes on to describe his] displaying emanations.

- and the *Great Drum Sūtra* says:[611]

> As a third [proclamation of doctrine] he will expound discourse examining the basic constituent[c] [that is, the Buddha nature] of sentient beings and will discourse on the *Great Drum*…Later, hearing this sūtra at a time of great age, he will discourse on this sūtra for a hundred years, making the rain of doctrine fall. After a hundred years pass, he will display a great magical emanation among humans in the south and will display thorough passing beyond sorrow.[612]

- and the *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says:

> Treatises teaching the basic constituent and…[613]

Concerning this, I propound that the modes of teaching topics in Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes,* Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle,*[614] and the *Questions of King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra* are similar. Moreover, these are concordant with the meaning of the middle wheel since they:

- [teach that] a basic constituent for complete purification exists in all sentient beings
- posit that it, moreover, is emptiness
- and prove that there is one final vehicle.

Nevertheless, [Nāgārjuna's praises and so forth] are treated as a third proclamation of doctrine separate from the second in that they extensively [teach] the permanence of the continuum[d] of a Buddha and how [a Buddha]—in terms of the definitive

[a] *mi mjed.*

[b] *blo 'chang.*

[c] *khams, dhātu.*

[d] "Permanence of the continuum" (*rgyun gyi rtag pa*) is a way of saying the continuum goes on forever but is not actually permanent in the sense of not being momentary. Döl-b̄o-b̄a Ŝhay-rap-gyel-tsen holds that it is simply permanent.

meaning—does not pass away.

At nine hundred years Asaṅga opened the way of mind-only.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When nine hundred years had passed [since Buddha's passing away] the Superior Asaṅga opened the chariot-way of commenting on the thought of the Mother sūtras as mind-only.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[615] When nine hundred years had passed after the Teacher passed away, roughly the same period as when the master Nāgārjuna proclaimed the third great sound of doctrine, the master Superior Asaṅga came. He lived for one hundred fifty years:

- commenting on the meaning of sūtras requiring interpretation[a]—the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and so forth—in the Five Treatises on the Grounds, the Two Summaries, and so forth
- explaining the thought of sūtras of definitive meaning[b]—the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra* and so forth and the *Matrix of One-Gone-Thus Sūtra* and so forth—in his commentary on Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* in agreement with the Consequence School
- and mainly opening the chariot-way of the Mind-Only School.

The *Mañjushrī Root Tantra* says:[c]

> When nine hundred years have passed
> After I have gone beyond sorrow,
> There will be a monk called Asaṅga,
> Skilled in the meaning of treatises.
>
> He will differentiate many aspects
> Of definitive meanings and interpretable meanings.

Hence, these two—Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga—mainly opened the chariot-ways of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School, and, in connection with this, commented on the thought of even Lesser Vehicle sūtras in the manner of the Middle Way and Mind-Only systems. There are many instances such as:

- in the master Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* when the master

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[a] From the viewpoint of the Consequence School, the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* requires interpretation.

[b] These are definitive sūtras from the viewpoint of the Consequence School; Ge-luk-b̄a scholars hold that Asaṅga evinces the view of the Consequence School in his commentary on Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle.*

[c] For a longer citation, see 299.

explains that the abandonment of the entire aggregates [taught] in the Lesser Vehicle is in consideration of the perspective of meditative equipoise that has no remainder [of the appearance of inherent existence]:[616]

The absence of production taught in the Great Vehicle
And the extinction of the others are in fact the same emptiness
[Since they indicate] the non-existence of [inherently existent] production and the extinction [of inherent existence].
Therefore let [the Great Vehicle] be allowed [as Buddha's word].

- in his explanations that even in the Lesser Vehicle the selflessness of the Middle Way School is taught, such as [in the *Treatise on the Middle* when he cites,] "Forms are like balls of foam," and so forth (see 719).

The master Asaṅga also:

- explains…in his *Summary of the Great Vehicle* that "fundamental consciousness" and so forth teach the basis-of-all and so forth
- in his *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* cites three Hearer scriptural passages[a] on the occasion of refuting the two extremes
- in his *Grounds of Yogic Practice* mostly cites many Great Vehicle sūtra passages and comments on them as mind-only.

Buddhapālita commented on the *Fundamental* by way of consequences.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Buddhapālita commented on the *Fundamental* by way of consequences.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[617] Around just after the master Asaṅga opened the way of the Mind-Only School upon having come to this world, the master Buddhapālita wrote a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* and thereby opened the way of the Consequence School. For:

- in general there are eight commentaries on Nāgārjuna's

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[a] These are from the *Transmigration Sūtra,* the *Collection of Meanings Sūtra,* and the *Story of Saṃthakatyāyana;* for the latter two passages, see 412; for all three passages, including the Tibetan and the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 199 and 202 footnote a.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"

- and although the other six commentaries[a] mostly use syllogistic statements, this master flings many consequences.

Most of the explanations in the commentaries by masters [who wrote texts] other than the *Akutobhayā Commentary* and the *Clear Words* that are mentioned in Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* are seen to be in the class of syllogisms. Also, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says, "*Objection:* However, the extensive expression of syllogistic statements is the system of commentators." This [presents an opponent's position that] "Although syllogistic statements are manifest in Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom,'* this is due to its being a root text, but the extensive statement of syllogisms is done by its commentaries, and why did Buddhapālita not also do this?" The master Buddhapālita refutes each of the four extreme types of production through consequences and similarly does commentary within using many consequences. The *Buddhapālita Commentary*[b] contains many [statements of consequences] such as, for instance:[618]

> About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because [if they were][619] their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. [Also] if, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced; hence, that also is not asserted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.
>
> They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.
>
> They also are not produced from both self and other because the fallacies of both [production from self and production from other] would [absurdly] follow.
>
> They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless.

This master Buddhapālita [yogically] achieved [meeting with] the

[a] Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,* like Buddhapālita's commentary, mainly uses consequences.

[b] The commentary is called by the name of its author.

foremost venerable Mañjushrī, composed explanations of many treatises, and proceeded to an area of knowledge-bearers. Dzong-ka-ba's *Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Ocean of Reasoning* says:

> The one called Buddhapālita who achieved the word of the foremost venerable Mañjughoṣha and proceeded to a place of adept knowledge-bearers.

and the colophon to the translation of the *Buddhapālita Commentary* says:

> Written by one who achieved the word of the youthful Mañjushrī, composed explanations of many treatises, properly entered the Great Vehicle, and proceeded to a special place of those who have achieved the holding of knowledge-mantra.

Bhavya, apprehending fallacies, opened the way of the Autonomy Middle Way School.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The master Bhavyakara[a] (*legs ldan 'byed*), apprehending fallacies in those [consequences presented by Buddhapālita], opened the chariot-way of commenting on the thought of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* in the manner of the system of the Autonomy Middle Way School.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [620] The master Bhavyakara—that is, *legs ldan 'byed* and in some translations also *skal ldan* and also the master *snang bral*—according to Ke-drup's *Great Exposition of the Tantra Sets in General*[b] vowed to achieve the vajra seat [that is, Buddhahood] in that lifetime but in his next lifetime became the master Vajraghaṇṭapāda and attained the supreme feat [of Buddhahood]. In general, he wrote many treatises, and in particular he composed:

- the *Heart of the Middle,* which is like a condensation of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom,"* and its autocommentary, the *Blaze of Reasoning,* setting forth at length our own and others' assertions and mainly teaching both the profound and the vast of basis, path, and fruit—the mind of enlightenment, calm abiding, special insight, and so forth
- and the *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom,"* a commentary on

[a] That is, Bhāvaviveka.

[b] See Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, *Mkhas Grub Rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), rpt., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 89.

Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom."*

Apprehending fallacies in the assertions of many masters and in the [statement of] consequences by the master Buddhapālita when refuting production from the four extremes, he refutes them one by one extensively. Refuting the assertions by the Proponents of Mind-Only that imputational natures are not inherently established, and so forth, he newly opened the great way of Proponents of the Middle in which although phenomena do not ultimately exist, they conventionally exist inherently and by way of their own character. Though it is explained that this master followed Devasharma's commentary called *Shining White,*[a] the opener of the chariot-way of the Middle Way Autonomy School is only Bhāvaviveka because he is the first master who, subsequent to the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], extensively opened the way [of the system in which] the Mind-Only School is not correct and the Middle Way School is correct. This is also known from the statement by the master Ye-shay-day:[b]

> After them, the master Bhāvaviveka refuted the system of Cognition-Only and presented a system in which external objects exist conventionally.

[REFUTING PRODUCTION FROM SELF]

With respect to the way [Bhāvaviveka] apprehends fallacies in [Buddhapālita's] individual consequences,[c] Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says about [Buddhapālita's] consequences establishing the non-existence of production from self:

> That is not suitable:
>
> 1. because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example, and
> 2. because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would be expected to adduce].
> 3. Since these are phrases of consequences, they [must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, thereby revealing the opposite of the thesis and the reasons,[d] due to which it

a *dkar po rnam par 'char ba.*

b *ye shes sde;* fl. c. 800.

c This topic is treated at length in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 454-498.

d *de'i chos.* Avalokitavrata says:

> would be that things are produced from other, production has effects, and production has an end, whereby [Buddhapālita] comes to contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School].[a]

These are widely renowned. Their meaning is:

1. It does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self.
2. It does not avoid fallacies [adduced by Sāṃkhyas] questioning whether this is conventional or ultimate [in the Sāṃkhyas' own system].
3. Since the thesis—the non-existence of production from self—is not a non-affirming negative, it contradicts the tenet, or system, of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom."*[b]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[621] With respect to the three fallacies:

1. Since [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self, it is reduced to a mere thesis.
2. [Buddhapālita's commentary] does not avoid criticism by Sāṃkhyas upon examining the thesis:

   > About the meaning of your "from their own entities," if you are saying "from the entities of manifest effects," [you] are proving what is already established [for us] because we also do not assert that [things] are produced from the entities of already manifest effects. If you are saying "from

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The "property of that" (*de'i chos, taddharma*) is the property of that thesis, that is to say, [the reason which is] the property of the subject of that thesis: namely, "because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless." "What emerges is the opposite of those": what emerges is the opposite of "because their production would be just senseless"—namely because production has effects—and the opposite of "because production would be endless"—namely because production is finite.

[a] At the end of the second reason Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation (374.12) reads *ro*—the equivalent of a period—which might seem to terminate the list of reasons, making it look as if there are only two reasons. In other versions, there is an "and" clearly denoting that there is a third, additional reason. For more discussion of the third reason, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 817 n. 363 and 819 n. 375.

[b] According to D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his followers, the tenet being contradicted is that the reasonings prove a non-affirming negative.

potential entities that are non-manifest causes, the entailment is opposite because all that have production are only produced from those [non-manifest causes].

3. These are phrases affording an opportunity for censure[a] by another party.

The syllogism of the literal reading of the first commentary [by Buddhapālita] is:

The subjects, things, are not produced from self because production is senseless and endless.

The syllogism constructed by Bhāvaviveka as being what Buddhapālita was actually thinking is:

With respect to the subjects, things, production from self is not just eliminated because production is sensible and has an end.

[Bhāvaviveka] expresses the first two fallacies with respect to the syllogism of the literal reading and expresses the fallacy of affording an opportunity for censure mainly with respect to the syllogism constructed as what [Buddhapālita] was actually thinking.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[622]

[REFUTING PRODUCTION FROM OTHER]

[Bhāvaviveka] also speaks of fallacies in [Buddhapālita's] refutation of production from other. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[623]

The master Buddhapālita explains:

They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

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[a] The translation of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* in which Chandrakīrti cites Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapālita, by Mahāsumati and B̄a-tsap-nyi-ma-drak (*pa tshab nyi ma grags*), that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a uses just above reads "because these are phrases of consequences" (*thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir, prasaṅgavākyatvāc ca*), whereas the translation of Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for "Wisdom,"* by Jñānagarbha and Lui-gyel tsen (*glu'i rgyal mtshan*), that Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den uses reads "because there are phrases affording an opportunity for censure" (*glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir te, sāvakāśavacanatvāc ca*). The first version seems to be merely pointing out that Buddhapālita's refutation uses consequences, whereas the second version indicates the Buddhapālita's explanation is subject to another's censure. The first version could also mean that Buddhapālita's explanation is subject to another's drawing out consequences as is suggested by Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka that clearly supports the second translation. Nevertheless, the second translation does not appear to be the meaning of the same phrases, cited below, from Chandrakīrti's renditions of Bhāvaviveka's objections to Buddhapālita's refutations of production from other and of causeless production.

The master Bhāvaviveka discredits this, saying:

> Therefore, because this is speech of consequences, when the thesis and the means of proof are reversed, things would be produced from self, both, or causelessly and some would be produced from some, whereby the earlier position is contradicted. Also, in another way, it is because [things] would be produced from everything. Hence, since in that [commentary by Buddhapālita] there are no proof and refutation, it is senseless.

The meaning is:

- If the explicit thesis and means of proof are not reversed, then since that all are produced from all is not suitable as the reason, one's own position is not proven, and since [Buddhapālita] does not demonstrate any damage by direct perception and so forth to the assertion of production from other, the other's position is also not refuted, whereby [his commentary] is senseless.
- If the explicit thesis and means of proof are reversed, the opposite of the reason is: some are produced from some; and the opposite of the non-existence of production from other is: production from other exists. However, these are not suitable because this is an occasion of demonstrating that ultimately those do not exist.
- Therefore, it must be that, having turned away from a mere negation of production from other, [Buddhapālita] is proving that [things] are produced from self, both, or causelessly, whereby this contradicts the earlier position, that is, that the assertion that "[things] are not produced from other" in [Nāgārjuna's] root text is a non-affirming negative.

[REFUTING CAUSELESS PRODUCTION]

[Bhāvaviveka] also speaks of fallacies in [Buddhapālita's] refutation of causeless production. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[624]

The master Buddhapālita explains:

> They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything [and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless].

The master Bhāvaviveka discredits this, saying:

> If this is asserted as speech manifesting a thesis and proof, then it comes to indicate that things are produced from causes because at some times some are produced from some

and endeavor just has effects. However, that is not reasonable due to incurring the above-mentioned fallacy.

The meaning is:

- It is not suitable to reverse the literal reading,[a] and thus production from causes is implicitly indicated as the opposite meaning of the thesis of that consequence—[the thesis being] the non-affirming negative that [things] are not produced causelessly.
- The opposite meaning of the two signs that are the proofs must be stated as "because at some times some are produced from some and endeavor has effects."
- Hence, this has the fallacies of contradicting the assertion that the non-existence of production from the four extremes is a non-affirming negative.

BHĀVAVIVEKA'S OWN AUTONOMOUS SYLLOGISMS [REFUTING THE FOUR TYPES OF PRODUCTION]

1. The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing—as is the case, for example, with an existent consciousness.
2. The subjects, causes and effects such as semen and blood (which are causes of an eye) and the eye (which is their effect)…, inherently are not ultimately produced from other because of being other—as is the case, for example, with oil from clay.
3. Those subjects are not ultimately produced from both [self and other] because of incurring the fallacies described for both.
4. The subject, eyes, are not causelessly produced adventitiously because of possessing general characteristics and a specific characteristic—as is the case, for example, with a pot.

In such a way Bhāvaviveka extensively refutes [production from the four extremes]. Below (785ff.), these will be explained a little, together with sources.

Bhāvaviveka's opening the way in this manner occurred after Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] widely spread the system of the Mind-Only School; the fifth chapter of his *Heart of the Middle* says:

Due to pride in their own system

[a] The literal reading of Buddhapālita's thesis is "Things are not produced causelessly." The opposite of that is, "Things are produced causelessly." Bhāvaviveka's point is that this is obviously not what Buddhapālita is proving.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Others who boasted of being wise
Pronounced that entry into the ambrosia of suchness
Is taught well by the Yogic Practitioners.

and his autocommentary [the *Blaze of Reasoning*] says:

Other masters of the Great Vehicle itself—Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth—interpreted otherwise the systematic meanings thoroughly realized by Superiors who were prophesied by the One-Gone-Thus and who gained [Bodhisattva] grounds. Without shame and embarrassment, taking pride in knowing the meaning while they did not know it and taking pride in being wise, they propounded the following.

Hence, it is evident that the master [Nāgārjuna] composed the *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*[a] once the Mind-Only School had appeared, whereby:

- the two—the master Bhāvaviveka and the master Chandrakīrti—are feasibly [Nāgārjuna's] later-phase students
- and Nāgārjuna's living for six hundred years is also well established.

Chandrakīrti, having refuted Bhāvaviveka well, established it as not shared.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The master Chandrakīrti, having refuted Bhāvaviveka's system well, established the thought of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* as not shared with the Autonomy School and below.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[625] After Bhāvaviveka opened the way of the Autonomy Middle Way School, the master Chandrakīrti refuted autonomy in the master Bhāvaviveka's system. Having, moreover, not just refuted it but refuted it well, he established the system of the Consequence School as not shared with the Autonomy School and below. For although Buddhapālita opened the mere way of the Consequence School, it was not clear whether to assert autonomy or not, whereas Chandrakīrti demonstrated in many ways:

- that Buddhapālita did not assert autonomy
- proofs that it is not suitable for Proponents of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms]

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[a] Gung-tang (*Explanation*, 6a.5) says, "This book is called *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* because it explains the meaning of a stanza on the mind of enlightenment spoken by Vairochana in the second chapter of the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*."

- and, oppositely, the damages to autonomous syllogisms and establishment by way of the object's own character

and thereby established [the Consequence School] as unshared. For instance, Chandrakīrti's autocommentary on the *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says, "May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared."[a]

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[a] Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* cites and discusses the passage:

[Chandrakīrti] describes his own system as not shared with the commentaries [on Nāgārjuna's thought]* by other Proponents of the Middle. His *Autocommentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"* says (Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās,* Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 [Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 406.9, commenting on stanzas XIII.1 and 2):

> May scholars ascertain that just as, except for Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle,* this doctrine called "emptiness" is not expressed non-erroneously in other treatises, so the system that appears in this [treatise]—set out together with objections and answers to any [other] system—does not exist, in terms of the doctrine of emptiness, in other treatises. Therefore, it should be understood that a certain [scholar's] propounding that just what are propounded ultimately in the system of the Sūtra School are asserted conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle Way School is a proposition only by one who does not know the suchness of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle.*

At the end of also saying such with respect to the system of Great Exposition School (Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 407.1), [Chandrakīrti] says:

> This is because a supramundane doctrine is not fit to be similar to a mundane doctrine. May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared."

Through the reason of his own system's not being shared with other Proponents of the Middle Way School, [Chandrakīrti] posits that one who asserts that what are propounded ultimately by the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are propounded conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle Way School does not know the Middle Way suchness. The reason is that, in the [Consequentialists'] own system, even conventionally, phenomena that are established by way of their own character are not asserted, whereas those [Proponents of True Existence] only posit [all phenomena] in the context of that [establishment of objects by way of their own character].

If one falls from either of the two truths, one also falls from the other; therefore, it is not suitable that a supramundane doctrine which has not fallen from the mode of the two truths be similar in terms of either of the two truths with a mundane doctrine that has fallen from the two truths. Therefore, this system of the Superior [Nāgārjuna]—in terms not only of the ultimate but also of the conventional—is not shared with the schools of the Proponents of True Existence.

*The bracketed additions are mostly drawn from Ḏa-drin-rap-ḏen's *Annotations,* 270.5-272.6.

Concerning this, first [Chandrakīrti] refutes [Bhāvaviveka]:

- When Buddhapālita demonstrates internal contradictions in the other side, flinging at the Sāṃkhyas the [absurd] consequences of senseless and endless re-production by way of reasons such as being earth that exists in its own entity, why would the other side not be overcome?
- If, though they see their internal contradictions, they stubbornly persist, they would not be overcome even though syllogisms are stated to them.
- Both consequences and reasons [that is, syllogisms] can engender the mere perception of contradiction in an opponent.
- Therefore, Buddhapālita does not assert autonomous [syllogisms], and you [Bhāvaviveka] are reduced to only liking autonomous [syllogisms].

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[626]

> We [that is, Chandrakīrti] view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable. How? His saying "because [Buddhapālita] did not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example" is not reasonable.
>
> Why? [Buddhapālita] is inquiring in the following way of an opponent who asserts production from self:
>
>> You [Sāṃkhyas] propound that "from self" [means] that the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it [that is, the existent] is produced. However, we do not see that there is purpose in the production again of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. However, you [Sāṃkhyas] do not assert that the already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of correctness and contradicts your own assertion.
>
> When [Buddhapālita] debates through just these [consequences] that have the effects [derived] from stating a reason and example, would the opponent not accept it? However, if opponents are not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting their own assertions, then due to their shamelessness they also just would not be overcome by [stating] reasons and examples. We [Consequentialists] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhāvaviveka] sets out inferences at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just

his own liking for inference.

It follows that it is not suitable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences:

- because when those are asserted, any of the four positions has to be asserted, but Proponents of the Middle do not assert any of the four positions, and
- because that is the thought of a Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva].

And:

- Since Buddhapālita does not assert an autonomous [syllogism] such as "Eyes ultimately are not produced from self because of existing," it is not necessary to clear away fallacies adduced by another with respect to that reason.
- Even if one needs to state an other-renowned reason and example, he stated them.
- Since only the opponent has asserted the opposite of the consequences, how could it be that we have contradicted [a tenet of the Middle Way School], and so forth!
- Also, that consequences clear away another's position is the Superior [Nāgārjuna's] thought.
- Though the Superior [Nāgārjuna] made a commentary, he did not use syllogistic statements.

Therefore, [Chandrakīrti] established well that it is not suitable to use autonomous [syllogisms]. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

> Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes]. Moreover, Āryadeva [*Four Hundred,* XVI.25] explains:
>
> > Even over a long period of time
> > Censure cannot be expressed
> > For one who has no position of [inherent] existence,
> > Non-existence, or existence and non-existence.
>
> Also, Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* [stanzas 29 and 30] says:
>
> > If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
> > Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
> > Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
> > I am only faultless.
> >
> > If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities

Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension],
Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in your own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognitions observing
Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me.

When in that way a Proponent of the Middle just does not express autonomous inferences, how could [Buddhapālita] have an autonomous thesis [such as Bhāvaviveka stated]—"The inner sense-spheres are not produced from self"—which the Sāṃkhyas would cause to be overturned as follows:

What is the meaning of this thesis? Does "from self" mean from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cause? Which is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fault of] proving what is already established [for us]. If it is from the entity of the cause, then it has the sense of [proving] the opposite because [according to us Sāṃkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes.

Also, how could we [Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti] have a reason [such as that stated by Bhāvaviveka]—"because of existing"—which would be either [a case of] proving what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya] or of having the opposite meaning [for a Sāṃkhya] and with respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the fault that we would be] proving what is already established or [the fault of] having the opposite meaning!

Therefore, just due to not being susceptible to the consequence of those faults, answers to them did not [need] to be expressed by the master Buddhapālita.

[Bhāvaviveka] might think, "[I might allow that] since, according to Proponents of the Middle, the position [that is, thesis], the reason, and the example [of an *autonomous* syllogism] are not established, autonomous inferences are not to be expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and would not clear away the other's thesis through an inference established for both [parties]. Still, one must express contradiction of the other's thesis through one's own [other-approved] inference. Hence,

one must have a position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of the faults of position, reason, and example. Thus, since [Buddhapālita] did not express such and did not avoid the fallacies of those [which a Sāṃkhya would be expected to draw, Buddhapālita] just has those faults [of not stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would cite upon examining what no production from self means]."

Answer: That is not so. Why? Those [such as Sāṃkhyas] who [upon being pressed by the consequences set forth by Buddhapālita] wish to generate ascertainment of something—which they hold as a thesis—in others in just the way that they have ascertained it, should demonstrate to others [that is, Proponents of the Middle] just that logical proof through which that meaning is understood. Therefore, it is respectively the custom for just the other party [here, the Sāṃkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a thesis that they themselves assert [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapālita's consequences rather than for Buddhapālita to proceed to set forth an other-approved inference]. However, this [reasoning that Sāṃkhyas state to a Proponent of the Middle to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reasoning for the other [party, the Proponent of the Middle]. Because the reason and the example [which Sāṃkhyas cite] are not [valid], the proof of the meaning of their thesis is just a statement of outflows of [their own] assertions. Therefore, since they have asserted a position that is devoid of logical correctness, it deceives just themselves, due to which it cannot generate ascertainment in another. In this way, just this inability of their attempt to prove the meaning of their thesis is, [due to being faulty,] the clearest eradication of their [position]. What need is there here to still express damage [to their position] by way of inference! [For, the contradiction of their view that something exists and yet needs to be re-produced has been shown, and upon the Sāṃkhya's presentation of their own view in syllogistic inference, the Proponent of the Middle has given answers showing its illogicality.]

[Bhāvaviveka] might say, "Nevertheless, the fault of contradiction with one's own inference [that is to say, with an inference acceptable to Sāṃkhyas] must, without question, be expressed."

Answer: The master Buddhapālita also just expressed such. How? For he said, "Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless." In that, the [word] "their" (*de dag, tad*) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] "those which already exist in their own entities." Why? This is because [Buddhapālita's subsequent statement], "The production *again* of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless," is his commentary on that abbreviated statement [and we must, therefore, carry it over to the shorter statement]. Also, this [longer] statement ["those which already exist in their own entities"] bears a similar example ["a manifest pot"] approved by the other [party, the Sāṃkhya] which possesses the qualities of [the predicate of] the probandum ["senseless production again"] and the proof ["already existing in its own entity"].

In [Buddhapālita's longer statement], "already existing in their own entities" bears the reason. [In the shorter statement itself], "because production would be just senseless" holds the predicate of the probandum [once it is changed to "production *again* (*yang skye ba, punarutpāda*) is senseless" in accordance with the longer statement]. In:

> A sound is an impermanent thing because products are [necessarily] impermanent things. It is seen that products are impermanent things, as in the case, for example, of a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product. Therefore because of being a product, [a sound] is an impermanent thing.

product which is manifested [or used] due to its connection [with the predicate of the probandum] is the reason. Just so, here also [the syllogism is]:

> Things [such as a non-manifest pot and so forth] are not produced from self because the production again of what already exists in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen that pots and so forth that already abide in front [of oneself] and that already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again, so if you think that there are pots and so forth that already exist in their own entities at the time of the lump of clay and so forth, then production even at that time of what already exist in their own entities does not exist.

In that, the reason—"already existing in their own entities"—which is manifested [or used] due to its connection [with the

predicate of the probandum, "senseless production again"] and which is unmistaken with respect to refuting re-production expresses contradiction through the Sāṃkhya's own inference [that is, an inference acceptable to a Sāṃkhya].

Therefore, how is it that [Bhāvaviveka] says, "That is not suitable because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason as well as an example"!

Not only is it just not the case that a reason and example were not expressed, but also it is not that the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Sāṃkhya] were not avoided. How? For, Sāṃkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of oneself] which has a manifest form[a] manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something that already exists in its own entity and is not produced again]. Since the probandum is:

> those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature, predicated with a negation of production,

how could [the Sāṃkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapālita's syllogism has] the fault of a position [that is, thesis] that is proving what is already established [for them] or has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are].

Therefore, even if [Buddhapālita] did express contradiction [of the Sāṃkhya view] through self[-approved] inference [that is, a syllogistic statement approved by the Sāṃkhyas], they would not set forth the fallacies that [Bhāvaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that [Buddhapālita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the other [party, since they would not adduce them]. For these reasons, it should be known that these [two] objections [to Buddhapālita's remarks by Bhāvaviveka] are just senseless.

Because the phrase "and so forth" in "a pot (*bum pa, ghaṭa*) and so forth" was expressed with the intention of including all things asserted as being produced, [Buddhapālita's syllogistic statement] also does not become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (*snam bu, paṭa*) and so forth.

Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapālita indicates] this other syllogism:

Objects other than the person that [Sāṃkhyas] propound

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[a] *mngon par gsal ba'i rang bzhin, abhivyaktarūpa.*

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> as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as is the case, for example, with the person.

[In that] this example [that is, person] is expressed.

[Sāṃkhyas might object that] a refutation of production does not harm a proponent of *manifestation*. Even so, manifestation is designated with the term “production,” and—due to the qualitative similarity [of production and manifestation] with respect to earlier non-apprehendability and later apprehendability—the term “production” just expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting it [that is, production] does not damage [the assertion of the manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest state].

[Bhāvaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapālita’s] having anything that expresses the meanings you have expounded, how was such analysis discovered?

Answer: These meaningful statements [by Buddhapālita], due to having great import, contain the above-mentioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence, there is nothing [in what I have said] that is not indicated in them.

The opposite meaning of the consequences[—that things are produced *again* sensibly and not endlessly—]is related only with the other [party, the Sāṃkhya], not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how could we be contradicting [the tenet of the Middle School that the refutation of production is a non-affirming negative]? Through proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party], we only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the other party [so that they will give up their assertion of production from self]. Therefore, how could the master Buddhapālita—following the unerring system of the master Nāgārjuna [in which production from other, as well as sensible and finite re-production, are not asserted]—have said any words that would make him susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for another [to show contradiction with the system of the Middle School]!

When proponents of the absence of inherent existence adduce a consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how could it follow that they are subject to the opposite meaning of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker powerless

like [an executioner] with a club or noose [forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do words indicate what they express]? If they have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they accord with the speaker's intention in speaking. Therefore, [Buddhapālita's] adducing consequences [here] has the effect only of refuting the other party's thesis [that re-production is sensible and finite]; hence they do not come to have the opposite meaning of the consequences.

In this way, the master [Nāgārjuna] mostly eradicates others' positions by way of merely adducing consequences as through (V.1):

> Space does not at all exist
> Before its definition.
> If space existed before its definition,
> It would follow it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist].

and (IV.2):

> If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently]
> Separate from the form's causes [that is, the elements],
> It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence].
> Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is causeless.

Likewise (XXV.4):

> Nirvāṇa is not an effective thing (*dngos po, bhāva*).
> [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death.
> There are no effective things
> Without aging and death.

and so forth.

If the master [Nāgārjuna's] statements are considered to be causes of many syllogisms due to being meaningful statements and thus of great import, why are the master Buddhapālita's statements also not considered that way?

Objection [by a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka]: It is the custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at length.

Answer: That also is not so because when even the master [Nāgārjuna] commented on his *Refutation of Objections*, he did not set out syllogistic statements.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[627] According to Chandrakīrti, it is

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not suitable for a Proponent of the Middle to assert autonomous syllogisms because autonomous syllogisms do not exist, since the two—autonomous syllogism[a] and self-powered syllogism[b]—are equivalent. For Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* explains that something generating an inference realizing a thesis upon having ascertained the two subjects[c] and the mode of the reason in the manner of [their being] self-powered, without involvement in the opponent's assertions, is the meaning of an autonomous [syllogism].

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[628] This assertion opposite to the Proponents of the Middle non-assertion of autonomous [syllogisms] is a locus of many fallacies because it has the fallacy of affixing "ultimately" to production from self and it has fallacies of the subject, position [that is, thesis], reason, and so forth individually not being established, and so forth, whereas we assert that consequences do not have those fallacies. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

> Furthermore, this logician [Bhāvaviveka], while wishing merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises of logic, expresses autonomous syllogisms that are realized to be the locus of collections of a great many fallacies, despite his asserting the view of the Middle Way School. How? Respectively, here he states this syllogism, "Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from self because of existing, like existent consciousness."
>
> Why is the qualification "ultimately" put in this [syllogism]?
>
> [Hypothetical answer by Bhāvaviveka: It is affixed to the predicate] because production that is asserted in accordance with the world's conventions is not to be refuted and because, if [production] were refuted [conventionally], it would follow that one would be damaged by [one's own] assertion [of conventionally existent production].
>
> *Response:* This is not suitable because [a Proponent of the Middle] does not assert production from self even conventionally. [The *Rice Seedling*] *Sūtra* says:

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[a] *rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba.*

[b] *rang dbang ba'i sbyor ba.*

[c] That is, the subject of the thesis and the subject of the example.

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> Also, when a shoot is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by others, not created by both, not produced causelessly, not created by Īshvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature (*rang bzhin, prakṛti*), and does not arise by its own entity.

Similarly [the *Extensive Sport Sūtra*] says:

> If a seed exists, the shoot does also.
> The shoot is not what the seed is.
> It is not [inherently established as] other than it nor just it.
> Hence the noumenon (*chos nyid, dharmatā*) is not permanent and not annihilatory.

Also, this very [text, Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*[629]] says:

> Whatever arises dependently is respectively
> Not just those [that is, its causes] and is not
> Also other than those. Hence [causes]
> Are not annihilatory nor permanent.

[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] The qualification is made relative to the other's [that is, the Sāṃkhya's] system.

Answer: That also is not suitable because their presentations are not asserted [by Proponents of the Middle] even conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous to refute in both ways [that is, conventionally and ultimately] the [non-Buddhist] Forders who have fallen from non-erroneous perception of the two truths. Thus, to express the qualification relative to the other's system (*gzhung, mata*) is also not suitable.

Furthermore, the world—in relation to which the qualification would be meaningful [if it asserted production from self]—does not construe production from self. The world does not employ analysis such as "from self" or "from other" and so forth. The world understands only this, "An effect arises from a cause." The master [Nāgārjuna] presented [cause and effect] this way too.

Therefore, the qualification ["ultimately"] is ascertained as meaningless in all respects.

[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] This qualification was made wishing to refute the conventional production [of subjects that are asserted to exist ultimately].

Answer: Then, you would have a fallacious position [that is, thesis] in which the base [that is, subject] is not established (*gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra*) and a fallacious reason in

which the base [that is, subject] is not established (*gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha*), since you do not assert sense-spheres—eyes and so forth—ultimately.

[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] Since eyes and so forth exist conventionally, there is no fault.

Answer: Then what does "ultimately" qualify?

[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:] Since the ultimate production of conventionalities such as eyes is being refuted, "ultimately" qualifies the refutation of production.

Answer: In that case, you should have said, "Ultimately there is no production of conventionalities such as eyes," but such was not said. Even if you had, because the other party [that is, a Sāṃkhya] asserts eyes and so forth just as substantially existent (*rdzas su yod pa, dravyasat*) and does not assert them as imputedly existent (*btags par yod pa, prajñaptisat*), the position [that is, thesis] would be fallacious in that the base [that is, subject] would not be established. Hence, that is not suitable.

[Hypothetical response by Bhāvaviveka:

> For example,] in [the proof] that sound is an impermanent thing, just generalities are to be taken as the subject and the predicate, without their being specified [with the particular tenets of the debaters]. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference [that is, inferring consciousness] and object inferred would be non-existent. For, if one used [as the subject] "sound that is derived from the elements," it would not be established for the other party [the Vaisheṣhika]. However, if one used "sound that is a quality of space (*nam mkha', ākāśa*)," it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.
>
> Similarly, even when Vaisheṣhikas posit the thesis that sound is an impermanent thing, if they used [as the subject] "sound that is a product," it would not be established for the other [party, a Jaina]. However, if [the subject were specified as "sound] manifested [by conditions]," it would not be established for themselves.
>
> Similarly, [with respect to the predicate] if [impermanence were specified as] that of which the disintegration is caused, it would not be established for the Buddhist themselves. However, if [it were specified as] causeless, it would not be established for the other party [a Vaisheṣhika].

> Therefore, just as here [in these examples] mere generalities are to be used as the subject and the predicate, so here also [in the refutation of production from self] a mere subject devoid of qualification is to be used.

That is not so because at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration [or non-establishment] of the entity of subjects [eyes and so forth]—the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self]—which are found by a mere erroneous [consciousness. Bhāvaviveka instead holds that the subjects of his syllogism, eyes and so forth, are found by a non-erroneous or non-mistaken consciousness in which case they would not be falsities; however, they *are* falsities since they appear to exist inherently but do not, and thus the subject is not established.] The erroneous and the non-erroneous are different [that is, a dichotomy].

Therefore, like the falling hairs [seen by] one with an eye disease and so forth, when what does not exist [by way of its own character] is apprehended by [that is, appears to] an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing [that way], how could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed?

Like the falling hairs and so forth of one without an eye disease, when a non-erroneous [consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness] does not superimpose the unreal [that is, establishment by way of the object's own character], how could it observe the merest portion of a conventionality that does not exist [by way of its own character]? Therefore, the honorable master [Nāgārjuna] says [in his *Refutation of Objections*]:

> If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities
> Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension],
> Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in one's own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognitions observing
> Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me.

Because, in that way, the erroneous and the non-erroneous are

different, on an occasion when the non-erroneous [is realized by the wisdom of meditative equipoise], the erroneous does not exist [in its perspective]. Hence, how could a conventionality [that is to say, a falsity such as] an eye which is the subject [in this syllogism] be [in its perspective]? Therefore, due to the irreversibility of having a fallacious position [that is, thesis] in which the base [that is, subject] is not established (*gzhi ma grub pa, asiddhādhāra*) and a fallacious reason in which the base [that is, subject] is not established (*gzhi ma grub pa, āśrayāsiddha*), this [attempt at an answer—that commonly appearing generalities are to be used—]is just not an answer [since there is no valid cognition, mistaken or non-mistaken, to certify the existence of such subjects].

There also is no similarity with the example. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence that are not asserted as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [the Buddhist and the Vaisheṣhika], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not [agree on] asserting a generality of eyes as conventionally [existent in the sense of not being established by way of its own character] or as ultimately [existent]. Hence, there also is no similarity with the example.

Just this mode of expressing the fallaciousness of the position [that is, thesis] which is that the basis [that is, the subject] is not established is to be applied also in expressing the fault of non-establishment with respect to [Bhāvaviveka's] reason—"because of existing." For, this logician [that is, Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes to] assert the points explained above. How? Another stated this proof :

> Causes and so forth producing the internal sense-spheres just exist because the One-Gone-Thus said so. Whatever the One-Gone-Thus said is that way, as, for example, is the case with his saying that nirvāṇa is peace.

At that time [Bhāvaviveka] expressed the following fault:

> What are you asserting as the meaning of the reason? [Are you saying] "because the One-Gone-Thus said such [in terms of] conventional [existence]" or "because the One-Gone-Thus said such [in terms of] ultimate [existence]?" If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not established for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as Nāgārjuna, I.7ab, says,] "When [one analyzes whether] the phenomena

> [of effects] exist, do not exist, or [both] exist and do not exist [at the time of their causes], they are [understood as] not established [by causes]." At that time, conditions [producing] effects that have a nature of existence, non-existence, or both [at the time of their causes] are refuted. Therefore (I.7cd) "How could [an ultimately established definition, such as] that which establishes (*sgrub byed, nirvartaka*) [or that which produces], be [the definition of] causal [condition (*rgyu'i rkyen, hetupratyaya*)]? In that case, it is not feasible [to say that because the definition of causal condition ultimately exists, causal conditions ultimately exist.]" The meaning of [Nāgārjuna's] statement is that those [ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing [effects]. Therefore because [we Proponents of the Middle assert that] what is established [that is, effects] and establishers [that is, causes] do not exist ultimately, [for a Proponent of the Middle] that reason is just non-established [if the referent is to ultimate existence]. Or it is just contradictory [if the referent is to ultimate existence due to being very contradictory with a predicate of the probandum that should be a conventionality].

Because this one [Bhāvaviveka] himself [comes] in this way to assert the non-establishment of reasons, in all inferences in which he states inherently existent phenomena (*dngos po'i chos, vastudharma*) as reasons, the reason and so forth are not established for him. Hence, all [his] proofs are destroyed. For, in:

> Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from their conditions which are other [than them] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with a pot,

or:

> The producers of the internal sense-spheres such as eyes, which others want to say [exist] ultimately, are not ascertained as conditions [producing the internal sense-spheres] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with threads and so forth,

"other" and so forth are not established for oneself [that is, Bhāvaviveka].

On an occasion when another expressed the following reason:

> The internal sense-spheres are only produced because of making the special designations of those which possess

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their objects [that is to say because of being the reasons why their respective consciousnesses are called "eye consciousness" and so forth],

this one [Bhāvaviveka], wanting to speak of the non-establishment of that reason, says that if production, going, and so forth were established as existing ultimately by the eye of wisdom of a yogi in meditative equipoise seeing the reality of things just as it is, then that reason—"because of performing special conventions in connection with their objects"—would just have the sense of being established, [but it is not established] because [ultimately existent] going is also refuted just through the refutation of [ultimately existent] production.

This [sort of reasoning that Bhāvaviveka used against his opponent] likewise is to be applied also to a reason that he formulates:

Ultimately the not-yet-gone-over is not being gone over because of being a path, like the path already gone over.

In that, the reason—path—is not established for him [due to not being established by the meditative equipoise of a yogi seeing suchness, this being the only unmistaken consciousness that a non-Buddha has]. Also, in:

An eye that serves as a basis [of an eye consciousness], does not ultimately see forms because of being an eye sense power, as, for example, is the case with [an eye sense power] that is similar [to one that serves as the basis of an eye consciousness but does not actually serve as a basis of an eye consciousness such as during sleep],

and likewise:

An eye does not [ultimately] see forms because of having arisen from the elements, as, for example, is the case with form,

and:

Earth is not [ultimately] an entity of hardness because of being an element, as, for example, is the case with wind,

and so forth, it is to be applied that the reasons and so forth are not established for yourself [Bhāvaviveka].

Also, this reason—"because of existing"—is indefinite in that the other party [would wonder], "Is it that the internal sense-spheres because of existing, are not produced from self in accordance with how consciousness exists or is it that, like pots and so forth, they are produced from self?"

[A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka objects:] It is not indefinite because pots and so forth are equally proven [not to be produced from self because of existing].

Answer: That is not so because such was not expressed.

Having refuted the other's [that is, Bhāvaviveka's] system, [Chandrakīrti shows that] it is not the same for other-renowned reasons:

[Hypothetical objection by Bhāvaviveka:] Is it not that just those faults that you ascribe to another's [that is, my, Bhāvaviveka's, own] syllogisms accrue to your inferences, due to which they would just have the fallacies of non-establishment of the subject, reason, and so forth? Therefore, do not object to one [of us] with the faults that are incurred by both. Therefore, all these faults are not suitable.

Answer: Proponents of autonomous inferences (*rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna*) come to have these faults, but we do not use autonomous inferences because our inferences have the fruit of only refuting others' theses.

It is as follows. Another who thinks that the eye [inherently] sees is refuted by an inference approved by themselves:

> You assert that an eye has the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also assert that if it does not have the attribute of [inherently] seeing other [forms such as blue, then that an eye sees] just does not occur. Hence, whatever [substratum] does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue and so forth], as, for example, is the case with a pot [which does not inherently see others because of not seeing its own entity]. Also, an eye does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity; therefore, it also does not possess [the attribute of inherently] seeing others [such as forms]. Hence, seeing others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is contradicted just by an inference approved by yourself.

Since only such is expressed by our inferences, how could our position be subject to those faults as mentioned and due to which fallacy would be equally incurred?

[Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhāvaviveka:] Is there damage by inference even from an inference established for either [of the parties]?

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> *Answer:* There is. It is just by a reason established for oneself, not by one established for the other [disputant], since such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge which both take to be valid, and sometimes, by just one's own word, but victory or defeat is not by the other's word. Just as it is in the world, so it is also in logic because only the conventions of the world are appropriate in treatises of logic.
>
> Therefore, some say, "There is no harm by inference that is through the force of being approved by the other [party] because [we] wish to refute mere renown to others." Also, there is someone who thinks, "That [reason] which expresses ascertainment [established] for both is [capable of] proof and refutation; that which is either established for just one or about which there is doubt [by either party as to whether it is established] is not capable of such." In dependence upon the world's presentation of conventions they also should assert just this mode, as described above, with respect to inference. For, damage through scripture is not only by way of scripture established for both [parties]. Then how? It is [also] by way of [scripture] established for [the other party] themselves. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself just what is established for oneself is weightier at all [times], not what is established for both.
>
> Therefore, expression of the definitions of logic [as they are renowned in the systems of the Autonomists and below] is not needed because the Buddhas help beings who are trainees and who do not know suchness with reasoning as it is approved by them.

About this master [Chandrakīrti], the foremost venerable Mañjughoṣha told the great foremost being [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] that he was a sovereign of the ten grounds who, from a high realm of the world took birth in accordance with his own wish to spread the Superior Nāgārjuna's system, and Mañjushrī said that when making explanation on any and all aspects it is suitable to take him as valid. This indeed is the case because no one—such as followers of Bhāvaviveka and so forth—in the country of Superiors [India] refuted this master within mentioning his name, whereas this very master made refutations within mentioning the names of the master Bhāvaviveka, the master Dharmapāla, the master Dignāga, and so forth, but no Proponent of the Middle or Proponent of

Mind-Only was able to do as he had done even though they disagreed with him. And he overcame [others'] adherence to true existence upon milking a cow in a painting, and even his coarse body resided in lands of humans for three hundred years, and having gained a rainbow body resides [here] even now, as is explained in the speech of lama Dor-jay-den-b̄a,[a] translated by B̄a-tsap,[b] and so forth.

With respect to how the chariot-way of the Middle Way Autonomy School, in which there are no external objects, was opened:

After that, Shāntarakṣhita made the second Autonomy School.

Word Commentary on Root Text: After that, the master Shāntarakṣhita made the second Autonomy School, the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[630] Some Tibetans, mistaking a statement by the master Ye-s̄hay-day,[c] assert that prior to Shāntarakṣhita there did not arise a Proponent of the Middle who asserted that external objects do not exist and that all phenomena are conventionally established and do not ultimately exist. This is not correct:

1. because prior to him Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization*

[a] *rdo rje gdan pa.*

[b] *spa/pa tshab nyi ma grags;* b. 1055. See Karen Lang, "Spa-tshab Nyi ma grags and the Introduction of Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika into Tibet," in *Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie,* ed. Lawrence Epstein & Richard F. Sherburne (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990).

[c] Ye-s̄hay-day says that "the master Shāntarakṣhita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects conventionally do not exist and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence." This is taken as meaning that he *opened the way* for this system; Ye-s̄hay-day does not address whether other Proponents of the Middle had these assertions earlier than Shāntarakṣhita. Ye-s̄hay-day's statement with more context is:

> In the Middle Way treatises by the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], whether external objects exist or not is not clear. After them, the master Bhāvaviveka refuted the system of Cognition-Only [or Mind-Only] and presented a system in which external objects exist conventionally. Then, the master Shāntarakṣhita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects conventionally do not exist and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence. Thereby, the Middle Way School arose in two forms; the former is called the Sūtra Middle Way School and the latter, Yogic Middle Way School.

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had already appeared in the land of humans[a]

2. and because Haribhadra's *Clear Meaning Commentary*[b] says:[631]

> Having seen that those [commentaries] done by those [two earlier masters][c] did not treat [the meaning of the Mother Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras exactly as it is either because their commentaries accorded with the texts of Cognition-Only or because they did not express the contextual meaning and had not abandoned adherence to cognition-only,
>
> He][d] revealed [the meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization*] with an awareness dwelling in the Middle Way.

and, accordingly, Āyravimuktasena also comments on its meaning as the Middle Way and also explains that the types of realization of the three vehicles[e] are different[f] in accordance with the statements in the root text [Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization*]:[632]

> Abandoning conceptualization of apprehended objects [as external objects]
>
> And not abandoning [conceptualization of] apprehending [subjects as truly existent are features of Solitary Realizers' paths].

and:

> [The Great Vehicle path of preparation] is superior to [the path of preparation of]
>
> Hearers as well as the Rhinoceros-like [by way of the aspect of realizing the absence of true existence].

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[a] Since this Middle Way text was brought here by Asaṅga after visiting Maitreya in the Joyous Pure Land, it has to predate Shāntarakṣhita.

[b] This is one from among the twenty-one Indian commentaries on Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* contained in the Translation of the Treatises (*bstan 'gyur*). Both Haribhadra and Āyravimuktasena, who preceded Shāntarakṣhita, comment on Maitreya's text in accordance with the Middle Way School and also assert the absence of external objects.

[c] Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

[d] That is, Āyravimuktasena.

[e] Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicles.

[f] Hearers meditate on the subtle selflessness of persons; Solitary Realizers mainly meditate on the absence of external objects, which is the coarse selflessness of phenomena; Bodhisattvas meditate mainly on the absence of true existence, which is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

3. and because even the master Bhāvaviveka:[a]
   - takes Proponents of the Middle who refute external objects as the opponent, [their system being] first to cause [followers] to assert that external objects do not exist and that the mind is truly established and then later to present [to them] that even the mind does not truly exist
   - and explains—through the example of its being better to not get polluted in the first place rather than first getting contaminated with filth and then washing—that rather than first teaching Mind-Only and later teaching the Middle Way, it is better to teach the Middle Way from the beginning. Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says:

     > Even if it is asserted that first one takes up cognition-only and later completely gives it up, rather than getting contaminated with filth and then washing it is better to keep a distance, not touching it from the beginning. Just as an inherent nature of external objects is considered to be non-existent, so it is fitting to consider consciousness also to be selfless and unproduced.

Even though Avalokitavrata's *Commentarial Explanation* associates this [passage] with the Mind-Only School and even though Bhāvaviveka's explanation of such on the occasion of the Mind-Only School in his *Blaze of Reasoning* are similar in thought:

- The meaning of this passage appears to be that "it is fitting to realize the mind to be without a self of persons and to be without truly existent production."
- Also, when Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says, "If others" and so on, it uses the word "others" to separate these from Proponents of Mind-Only.
- And when Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* speaks of other assertions by Proponents of Mind-Only, no more than the likes of "These propound" and "If" appears.

Hence, this also refutes well the statement that before Chandrakīrti such Proponents of the Middle did not arise.

Furthermore, prior to Shāntarakṣhita, there arose both Proponents of the Middle who assert external objects and Proponents of the Middle who do not assert external objects because from Bhāvaviveka's having refuted Proponents of the Middle who assert

[a] Bhāvaviveka obviously precedes Shāntarakṣhita.

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that external objects do not exist, Shāntarakṣhita analyzed those two and thereupon asserted the system of former Proponents of the Middle [that is, prior to Bhāvaviveka, those who assert that external objects do not exist]. This is because:

- Shāntarakṣhita's own commentary on his *Ornament of the Middle* says:

  > Those conventional effective things asserted by all bad proponents [that is, proponents of truly existent things][633] in answer [to the refutation of true existence] through asserting cause and effect are to be analyzed.

- and Kamalashīla's *Commentary on the Difficult Points* concerning that passage says:[634]

  > With respect to "those are to be analyzed" the two aspects of Middle Way paths are the means of analysis…This was set forth in the master Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle.* "Others[a] think" are those that see only the opposing position as correct.

Therefore, "the two aspects of Middle Way paths" are systems of Proponents of the Middle:

- because although Proponents of Mind-Only assert themselves as Proponents of the Middle, not any Proponent of the Middle calls Proponents of Mind-Only Proponents of the Middle, and
- because "others" is a dual term, and since the plural marker[b] in "those that see" indicates that the others are plural, although the thought of the foremost [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] is that Shāntarakṣhita is an illustration of them, they are not necessarily [just] Shāntarakṣhita.

Hence, although prior to that time there were indeed mere Proponents of the Middle who accorded with the Yogic Practitioners, only the master Shāntarakṣhita is the opener of the chariot-way of the Yogic-Autonomy Middle Way School because this master, just after even Chandrakīrti, set up a great way upon extensively composing texts such as the *Ornament for the Middle*—root text and commentary—which present such a system. Although even prior to this there existed the mere way, this does no damage [to Shāntarakṣhita being the opener of the chariot-way] because it is like the fact that in the world for a road on which great chariots can travel the mere existence of a road is not sufficient, a broad and great

a *gzhan dag;* as is clear below, this is dual, since it means "the other two."

b *rnams.*

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highway is needed. The master Ye-s̄hay-day says:

> Then, the master Shāntarakṣhita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects conventionally do not exist and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence.[a] Thereby, the Middle Way School arose in two forms.

This is the thought also of the foremost great being [D̄zong-ka-b̄a]; his *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> Therefore, such a system also arose here and there [prior to Shāntarakṣhita]; however, it is a good [to hold], in accordance with the master Ye-s̄hay-day's assertion, that through extensively composing texts the master Shāntarakṣhita opened the way of the Middle Way tenet system in the mode of the conventional non-existence of external objects.

However, some Tibetans say that prior to Bhāvaviveka there were no Proponents of the Middle, such as the Superior Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son [Āryadeva] who refuted the Mind-Only School since the master Ye-s̄hay-day says:

> In the Middle Way treatises by the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], whether external objects exist or not is not clear. After them, the master Bhāvaviveka[635] refuted the system of Cognition-Only [or Mind-Only] and presented a system in which external objects exist conventionally. Then, the master Shāntarakṣhita made a different Middle Way system, teaching—based on Yogic Practice [that is, Mind-Only] treatises—that external objects conventionally do not exist and that the mind ultimately is without inherent existence.

It follows that their thinking this is not correct because the master Superior Nāgārjuna clearly refutes the Mind-Only School because his *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* individually refutes the self asserted by Other Schools, the partless particles asserted by the Hearer schools, and the three characters and the mind-basis-of-all asserted by Proponents of Mind-Only, and so forth:[636]

> When the self imputed by Forders
> Is analyzed with reasoning,
> It is not found anywhere
> Among all the aggregates…
> The teaching by the Subduer

[a] According to Ge-luk-b̄a presentations of Shāntarakṣhita, the mind conventionally exists inherently but does not ultimately exist inherently.

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That all these are mind-only
Is in order to get rid of the fears
Of the childish. It is not suchness.

and so forth. It is also the thought of the foremost great being [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] that Ye-s̄hay-day is correct about the mere order of the opening of ways [that is, systematic traditions] by Bhāvaviveka and Shāntarakṣhita, but not all his explanations on the literal level are correct. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:[637]

With respect to his explanation, the order of events is evident that way; however…

I say:

Through setting my lama at the crown of my head,
The two Mañjushrīs[a] at my heart, and Daughter of Brahmā[b] on my tongue,
And summoning the middle path on the strings of a melodious lute,
May the Conquerors, their children, and the wise smile with pleasure.[c]

e' Individual Assertions {2}

This section has two parts: refuting the mistaken and individual explanations of the meaningful Middle Way systems.

1" REFUTING THE MISTAKEN {2}

This section has two parts: general refutation of the divisions of the mistaken and particular refutation of a pile of self-contradictions.

a" General Refutation of the Divisions of the Mistaken

Those fallen to extremes—utter non-existence, propounding an other-empty permanent self, not asserting the two truths, no system, nothing established by valid cognition, and so forth—claim to be Proponents

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[a] White and yellow Mañjushrīs; see 59.

[b] Svarasvatī; see 60.

[c] In this transitional stanza Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa uses the three main syllables of his name; Jam (*'jam*) in the "Mañju" of Mañjushrī, ȳang (*dbyangs*) in "melodious"; shay (*bzhad*) in "smile." "Melodious" (*dbyangs can*) is also a play on the name of the Daughter of Brahmā, Svarasvatī (*dbyangs can ma*). The allusions harken back to the obeisances to the two Mañjushrīs and Svarasvatī at the beginning of the root text, 59ff.

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of the Middle, but are not.

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to those who have fallen to extremes of permanence and annihilation, some, mistaking [the statement that phenomena] are not established as able to bear analysis by a rational consciousness, say that all phenomena do not exist at all.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[638] There are those in the class of the Great Completeness[a] of the Chinese abbot Ho-shang[b] who:

- with respect to the basal state, assert that all conventionalities are not established as anything, like the horns of a rabbit and the hairs falling in space for one with an eye disease
- when meditatively cultivating the path, refute all factors of wisdom upon thinking that all whatsoever applications to mind are the devilous activities of apprehending signs [that is, misapprehending reality]
- when practicing behavior, refute all—the ten behaviors of practice, the five perfections, and so forth—since these are for the stupid who ascend from below[c]…

There are those who think that the explanations that it is not suitable to use conceptuality during meditative equipoise in the completion stage of Highest Yoga Tantra are the system of practice for beginners having sharp faculties. Understanding this as concordant with Ho-shang's system, they designate Ho-shang's descent from above [procedure] as simultaneous[d] and his ascent from below [procedure] as gradualist.[e]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[639] In general there are limitless modes of the dawning of the view, as D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Questions on Points of Virtuous Endeavor: Shining Intention* says:[f]

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[a] *rdzogs pa chen po.*

[b] *hwa shang;* eighth century.

[c] *mas 'dzeg.*

[d] *cig car.*

[e] *rim gyis.*

[f] *dri ba lhag bsam rab dkar / dge sbyor gyi gnad kyi dri ba snyan bskul lhag bsam rab dkar;* Toh.5275. In this text D̄zong-ka-b̄a puts questions to his students, to which the First Paṇ-chen Lama (*blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan*) wrote responses in his *dri ba lhag bsam rab dkar gyi dri lan blo bzang bzhad pa'i sgra dbyangs.* Thanks to Professor Geshe Lhundup Sopa for the identification.

- One group says that all whatsoever conceptual consciousnesses—whether good or bad—are to be stopped.
- One group says that all good and bad conceptual consciousnesses are not to be stopped and that as much as conceptual consciousnesses increase, so much does spiritual realization increase, like, for example, the increase in fire with more fuel. Those two are in opposition to each other.
- One group says that conceptuality is ignorance.
- One group says that conceptuality is the body of attributes. Those two are in opposition to each other.
- One group says that when this mind does not disperse but remains focused,[a] it is a Buddha, or nirvāṇa, and when the mind disperses a little, it is a sentient being, or cyclic existence.
- One group says that when conceptuality disperses, no matter how many dispersal streams there are, through viewing their entities nakedly, they vividly dawn as the body of attributes. Those two are contradictory.
- One group says that the evanescent visions[b] arisen from [staying in] a totally dark room, physical postures, and merely stopping conceptuality are the body of attributes and that since these visions are emptinesses endowed with the supreme of all aspects, they identify that even common beings directly perceive the body of attributes.
- One group says that such are not perceptions of the complete body of attributes, but are perceptions of a fraction, branch, or part of the body of attributes.
- One group says that such are not perceptions of either the complete body of attributes or part of it, but perceptions of mere emptiness, and moreover, from between the two types of emptiness—self-emptiness and other-emptiness—this emptiness is not the bad self-emptiness asserted by Chandrakīrti and Haribhadra but the other-emptiness asserted by Asaṅga, a Great Proponent of the Middle.[c]
- One group says similarly [that such are not perceptions of either the complete body of attributes or part of it, but perceptions of mere emptiness, and moreover, from between the two types of emptiness—self-emptiness and other-emptiness—this

[a] *tsen ni gnas pa.*

[b] *mthong snang ban bun.*

[c] *dbu ma pa chen po.*

emptiness] is self-emptiness. Those two also are contradictory.

- One group says that this is not the actual emptiness, but the forms, or expressions,[a] of emptiness; they are not the body of attributes, but signs of the body of attributes, like, for example, seeing smoke as a sign of fire coming.
- One group says that the two—the actual view of the Great Seal and individual withdrawal [which is the first] of the six-branched yoga—are the same as self-emptiness and that above it is the view of concentration, [the second] of the six-branched yoga, which is the view of other-emptiness, due to which the view of the six-branched yoga is higher than the Great Seal.

and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[640] In brief, all five features of these systems are not correct:

1. The mode of instruction is not correct because explaining emptiness from the beginning to the stupid contradicts Sūtra and Mantra. When emptiness is explained from the beginning to the stupid, their confusion increases greatly, whereupon they are ruined; hence, not teaching in that manner is the assertion of all excellent Superior beings. Without ascertaining the substrata, it is difficult to ascertain the emptiness that is a property of them; hence, initially the aggregates and so forth—all of these—must be taught.
2. The mode of delineating objects is not correct because the assertion that emptiness is realized without analyzing objects does not agree with either Sūtra or Mantra. All of Sūtra and Mantra say, in harmony, that delineation of objects requires analysis, working through hearing and thinking. Also, the mode of analysis should be to analyze with reasonings such as the lack of being one or many, and so forth. After the two attitudes of definitely seeking to emerge from cyclic existence and wishing to attain Buddhahood have been made firm, then through working hard at analysis one delineates that even oneself is empty [of inherent existence]. Sources, such as the *Dohas,* indicate that although through analytical meditation one should sustain the view itself delineated through analysis at the time of hearing and thinking during the generation stage [of Highest Yoga Tantra] and below, it is not suitable [to analyze]

[a] *stong pa'i gzugs sam mdangs.*

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during the innate completion stage. However, to apply these to beginners is seen to be like applying the measurement of a tree to its shoot. Therefore, [you who call for no analysis] still need to rely on an excellent spiritual guide. In brief, if it is not necessary to analyze in this way, think about who needs these explanations in tantras and treatises.

3. The mode of meditation is not correct because setting the mind blankly without meditating on emptiness contradicts Sūtra and Saraha's *Essence of Means of Yogic Achievement*[a] and so forth.[b] The assertion that meditation on emptiness and so forth are not needed on the occasions of both Sūtra and Mantra contradicts both of them because it is explained that one should meditate that ultimately aspects, hopes and fears, desires and ill-deeds, beginning and end, and so forth—objects as apprehended to be truly existent—are just non-existent, like space. Always meditate on this emptiness, the means of destroying cyclic existence, that is the quiescence of all terminological and conceptual proliferations, such as same and different and so forth, in the perspective of the element of attributes. Although the phenomena that serve as the foundations of all qualities of abandonment and realization of the three vehicles do not exist from their own side, they appear to exist from their side, like illusions.

   Question: Well then, what about if one cultivates a blank mind without taking anything to mind and without thinking about anything—no matter whether this is asserted as not meditating on emptiness or meditating of emptiness?

   Answer: That is the worst because it is explained that this is the way to cultivate ignorance, and if it is cultivated a lot, one will be born as an animal. Mostly, the stupid who have not attained calm abiding and so forth and cultivate such obscuration are born as animals; if those who have attained a [worldly] union of calm abiding and special insight, a concentration, or a formless absorption meditate on space that is a mere negative of the appearance of form, they are born in a Formless Realm; if those who have a flawless [worldly] union of calm abiding and special insight meditate on a mere vacuity, they fall into a

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a *grub snying, dohakośa,* Toh.2224.

b For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's extensive treatment of this point in his *Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions* see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 553-558.

Hearer's [meditative equipoise of] cessation.

4. Name and meaning are not correct because treating all references to "seal"[a] in Sūtra and Mantra as equivalent is a sign of great ignorance because "Great Seal" is the designation of a name for a woman [to an innate wisdom of great bliss realizing emptiness], whereas in the Perfection Vehicle "seal" is designated within taking a manual sign as an example but does not have either the name or meaning of "Great Seal."

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[641] There are explanations in Highest Yoga Tantras that when one has meditated for a long time on the meaning of emptiness by means of innate great bliss, then without even observing essential places in internal channels and without even the support of observing the other three types of seals[b] but just through observing emptiness, one is capable of generating innate bliss, due to which emptiness is called the "Great Seal."…

"Seal-impression,"[c] as on a letter having a great monarch's manual sign,[642] is a mark made on the outside in order (1) to make known that it is not suitable to dispose of it and (2) to make known who the owner is and (3) sometimes to indicate not to show a secret letter inside to others. The four seals testifying to [Buddha's] Word (see 71), for instance, have the full meaning of the first two…since all Inner schools of tenets must assert that compounded phenomena are impermanent and so forth, and it is to be understood that scriptures having those four phrases are the teaching of the Buddha…

In texts of the Perfection Vehicle[643] emptiness is not taught with the term "Great Seal." However, there are cases of its being taught with the term "seal," that is suchness, the mode of subsistence of phenomena, and hence ["seal" here] must be explained as having the meaning that it is not suitable to dispose

a *phyag rgya, mudrā.*

b There are many descriptions of these three. One version is:

- a Wisdom Seal (*ye shes kyi phyag rgya, jñānamudrā*)—a meditated consort
- a Pledge Seal (*dam tshig gi phyag rgya, samayamudrā*)—an actual consort who possesses the qualifications of being of the same lineage as oneself, youthful, and so forth
- an Action Seal (*las gyi phyag rgya, karmamudrā*)—an actual consort who does not have all the qualifications.

c *phyag rgyas btab.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

of it for something else, due to which neither the term nor the meaning of "Great Seal" is present. In the Perfection Vehicle there are cases of using the vocabulary of "mother" for emptiness, but that must be explained in accordance with the three ways of positing clear realization as the mother and persons as children or in accordance with the usage of the vocabulary of father and mother for method and wisdom from the viewpoint of wisdom being the common cause and method [or motivation] being the uncommon cause.[a] However, this is not at all a case of designating the vocabulary of a consort who generates great bliss…

The Great Seal described in Saraha's *Essence of Means of Yogic Achievement* is taken to be the metaphoric and actual clear lights—these being innate exalted wisdoms of great bliss (which arise from the entry, abiding, and dissolving of winds in the central channel through skill in external and internal means such as concentrated focusing on important places in the vajra body) realizing emptiness—but the Great Seal is not taken to be emptiness alone.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[644]

5. The effects of meditation are not correct since the assertion that the effect is the extinguishment of awareness and the extinguishment of phenomena without there being something attained contradicts pure Sūtra and Mantra:
   - because attainers of Buddhahood and nirvāṇa exist, and
   - because a Teacher who has extinguished all defects and completed all good qualities exists, and
   - because it is the thought of Saraha's *Essence of Means of Yogic Achievement* and so forth that Conquerors endowed with the seven branches (that is, complete enjoyment, face-to-face, great bliss, absence of inherent existence, completely filled with compassion, uninterrupted, and non-ceasing) and eight riches of power (riches of exalted body, exalted speech, exalted mind, magical display,

[a] This is said to be like the old custom that if a wife has husbands of different ethnic backgrounds, the children are said to have the ethnicity of the father. In the same way, according to the Consequence School the three vehicles have the same wisdom (hence mother) but different methods or motivations (hence father) that determine whether practitioners are Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

omnipresence, abode, generating whatever is wished, and eighth quality [?]) exist.

Moreover, through meditating on emptiness the mind does not come to be extinguished as in your assertion; rather, defilements are extinguished, but this does not extinguish the mind-constituent because mind and defilements of mind—desire and so forth—are suitable to be separated, since although defilements dwell in the mind, they do not permeate its nature, due to which many sūtras explain again and again that the nature of the mind is luminous. Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes* teaches the attainment of gradual purification of the seed:

Just that basic constituent which is the seed
Is asserted as the basis of attributes.
From gradually purifying it
Buddhahood will be attained.

Then with respect to the means of purification he also clearly says:[645]

Through the three called impermanence, [coarse] emptiness,
And suffering, the mind is purified.
The doctrine supremely purifying the mind
Is the absence of inherent existence.

and the same text says:[646]

When an [asbestos][a] garment stained
With various contaminations and to be cleansed by fire
Is put in fire, its stains
Are burned but it is not.

So, with regard to the mind of clear light
Which has the stains of desire and so forth
Its stains are burned by wisdom's fire
But not clear light, its suchness.

and:

All the sūtras teaching emptiness
Set forth by the Conqueror
Overcome the afflictive emotions,
[But] these sūtras do not diminish this basic constituent.

Question: Well then, what is the meaning of the praises—

[a] Asbestos is not just recent; unfortunately, I have lost a reference to this ancient product.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

in many earlier translations and later translations of sūtras and tantras—of the extinguishment of awareness and the extinguishment of phenomena?

Answer: That is one with the import of:

- defilements do not permeate the nature of the mind
- [the mind] is naturally luminous
- ultimately cyclic existence and peace have the same taste

because:

- the element of attributes, which is so called because meditation within observing it acts as a cause of generating a Superior's attributes,[a] is both the earlier voidness of the permeation of the nature [of the mind] by afflictive emotions and the later voidness of those [afflictive emotions brought about by antidotes], and [the nature of the mind] is a natural nirvāṇa since an extinction of all actions and agents of birth and death and of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa abides from start, like a nirvāṇa
- [the nature of the mind] is naturally luminous since in that way it is naturally free from defilements
- [the nature of the mind] is an equal taste of cyclic existence and peace, and so forth, since factors of its cyclic existence and factors of its abandonment do not exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Some, in dependence upon the literal reading of sūtras teaching a permanent stable matrix, propound a permanent self called "matrix-of-One-Gone-to-Bliss" that is empty of other, that is to say, empty of conventional phenomena.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[647] The omniscient great Jo-nang-b̄a [Döl-b̄o-b̄a S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen],[b] taking it to be the thought of ten sūtras on the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus,[c]

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[a] *khyod la dmigs nas sgom pas 'phags chos kyi rgyu byed pas chos dbyings zhes bya.* The explanation of the element of attributes (*chos dbyings, dharmadhātu*) is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, pha,* 15.8.

[b] *dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan;* 1292-1361. Kensur Ngawang Lekden reported that S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen reincarnated as Jam-ȳang-chö-jay, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's student who founded Dre-b̄ung Monastic University, who, in turn, reincarnated in what is now the Republic of Mongolia to disseminate the teaching. Jam-ȳang-chö-jay had leanings toward the Jo-nang doctrine of other-emptiness, due to which some of his works were later put under wraps.

[c] The ten sūtras on the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus are:

1. *Matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus Sūtra*
2. *Questions of King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra,* also known as *Teaching the Great Compassion of a One-Gone-Thus Sūtra*

Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle,* and the *Kālachakra Tantra,* asserts in his *Ocean of Definitive Meaning* and *Annotations on the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* that:

- When a form is analyzed with ultimate analysis, a form's emptiness of form is a self-emptiness.
- That is what is described as an annihilatory emptiness in the *Kālachakra Tantra.*
- Therefore, since the emptiness of true existence of any [compounded] phenomenon's own entity is also annihilatory, the mode of emptiness that is the thoroughly established nature's emptiness in the manner of not being other-powered natures and imputational natures—as described in the *Conquest Over*

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3. *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*
4. *Angulimāla Sūtra*
5. *Lion's Roar of Shrīmālādevī Sūtra*
6. *Ornament Illuminating Exalted Wisdom Sūtra*
7. *Sūtra Teaching Non-Diminishment and Non-Increase*
8. *Great Drum Sūtra*
9. *Retention for Entering into the Non-Conceptual*
10. *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*

See Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, *Mkhas Grub Rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 48-51. Döl-b̄o-b̄a's *Ocean of Definitive Meaning* quotes many other sūtras and does not mention a list of ten.

Ge-luk-b̄a scholars hold that there is a difference between the ten sūtras of the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus and the *Sūtra of the Matrix of One-Gone-Thus* that Buddha himself cites in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* as requiring interpretation, since the latter speaks of a matrix endowed with ultimate Buddha qualities of exalted body, speech, and mind already present in the continuums of sentient beings. According to Ge-luk-b̄a scholars, the ten sūtras are actually sūtras concordant with the middle wheel of doctrine and hence definitive because these sūtras teach one final vehicle and teach that all phenomena are without true establishment. Thus, they also assert that the thought of the ten sūtras is Consequentialist and that Asaṅga's commentary on Maitreya's *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum* is Consequentialist, not Mind-Only.

As A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso (*Precious Lamp,* 169.1, 170.2) puts it, both the Jo-nang-b̄as and Bu-d̄ön have as the source of their confusion the notion that the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus and the matrix endowed with ultimate Buddha qualities—called the permanent, stable matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus (*rtag brtan snying po*)—are the same. For Ge-luk-b̄a scholars, the ten sūtras of the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus do not teach this latter type of Buddha-nature which is taught in a separate sūtra that is known in Tibet only through the mention of it in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra.* For S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen's radically different reading of the sūtra passage that Buddha discusses in the *Descent into Laṅka Sūtra,* see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* chaps. 16-17d.

Objections about the Three Mother Scriptures (see 306)—is the emptiness endowed with all supreme aspects [as set forth] in the *Kālachakra Tantra* and so forth.

- In accordance with the literal reading of the *Matrix-of-One-Gone-to-Bliss Sūtra,* an undefiled entity of:
  1. a permanent, stable, everlasting exalted body with manifest and complete marks and beauties,
  2. exalted speech having all aspects, and
  3. exalted mind of uncontaminated exalted wisdom

  as well as all the powers and so forth dwell in the continuums of all sentient beings[a]—ultimately established, ultimate truths, and covered by adventitious defilements.

and so forth.

Somewhat similar to this, the great Shākya-chok-den[b] explains in his *Ascertainment of the Middle* that:

- Since conventionalities are not established by valid cognition, merely existing in the perspective of conceptuality is the meaning of existing conventionally.
- The ultimate is truly established and is substantially existent in the sense of not depending on anything, like what Jo-nang-b̄a [S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen asserts].
- During meditation, one meditates a voidness of proliferations, not contemplating anything and not abiding in anything, [this assertion coming] from mistaking D̄ak-tsang's *Tenets.*

Moreover, writing commentaries on Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge,* on the Perfection of Wisdom [that is, Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization*], on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom,"* and so forth and explanations of Vasubandhu's *The Twenty* and *The Thirty* and so forth without comparison with any Indians and Tibetans, it appears that in all of these he made effort by way of pretending to refute the foremost precious [D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] system. Also, when one looks at the great

[a] Döl-b̄o-b̄a S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen asserts that these *ultimate* qualities presently reside in sentient beings' continuums but that sentient beings are not Buddhas since they are yet to develop a Buddha's compounded qualities. See Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* chaps. 16-17d.

[b] *gser mdog paṇ chen shākya mchog ldan,* 1428-1507. For Shākya-chok-den's criticism of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's views, see Komarovski Iaroslav, *Three Texts on Madhyamaka* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 2000). See also David Seyfort Ruegg, "The Jo naṅ pas: A School of Buddhist Ontologists According to the Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 83, no. 1 (1963):89-90.

Go-ram-b̄a S̄ö-nam-s̄eng-ge's[a] refutations, devoid of scripture and reasoning, in his *Commentary on (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement"* and in writings that are like drunken song and dance, they seem to be foolish and even crazy.

Jam-ȳang-ga-way-l̄o-drö,[b] great scholar-adept, lord of proponents of scripture and reasoning, and Jay-d̄zün Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen,[c] actual great scholar who mastered an ocean of textual systems—father and spiritual sons—refuted those two [Shākya-chok-den and Go-ram-b̄a S̄ö-nam-s̄eng-ge] and posited their own systems through scripture and reasoning, like great scholars of the country of Superiors [India], such that the darkness of bad propositions was hit with the light of the sun.

Mañjushrīnātha Glorious Paṇ-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a Leader of Supreme Analysis,[d] Lord of Proponents, in his *Presentation of the Three Vows* analyzed Ḡün-ga-gyel-tsen's[e] *Discrimination of the Three Vows*[f] on up, in answer to minor refutations of the foremost [D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] *Explanation of the Root Infractions: Fruit Cluster of Yogic Feats*[g] and so forth by both the great Shākya-chok-den and the great Go-ram-b̄a S̄ö-nam-s̄eng-ge. Therefore, I will not elaborate refutations of Shākya-chok-den and Go-ram-b̄a S̄ö-nam-s̄eng-ge here.

Although Karma Mi-ḡyö-dor-jay[h] made some refutations of the foremost precious [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] in his explanations of the Perfection of Wisdom and of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*[i] and in his

[a] *go ram pa bsod nams seng ge,* 1429-1489; a S̄a-ḡya critic of D̄zong-ka-b̄a.

[b] *'jam dbyangs dga' ba'i blo gros,* 1429-1503; see, for instance, his *lta ba ngan pa thams cad tshar gcod pa'i bstan bcos.* His works comprise the old textbook literature of L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing College of Dre-b̄ung Monastic University, which were replaced by those of Paṇ-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a.

[c] *rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan,* 1469-1546; he is the textbook author of the Jay College of S̄e-ra Monastic University and the Jang-d̄zay College of Gan-den Monastic University. See, for instance, his *go shak gnyis kyi dgag lan.*

[d] *'jam mgon paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa dpal rnam dpyod mchog gi sde,* 1478-1554. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's usage of such an elaborate name masks his frequent refutations of Paṇ-chen S̄ö-nam-drak-b̄a's opinions.

[e] *sa skya paṇḍita kun dga' rgyal mtshan* (1182-1251).

[f] *sdom gsum rab dbye.*

[g] *rtsa ltung gi rnam bshad / gsang sngags kyi tshul khrims kyi rnam bshad dngos grub kyi snye ma;* P6188, vol. 160.

[h] *karma mi bskyod rdo rje;* the eighth Karmapa, 1507-1554.

[i] *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dpal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa'i zhal lung dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta.*

commentary on the *Dri-gung Single Thought,* and so forth, it is explained in [his] *Official Letter*[a] and *Songs*[b] that he was under others' influence, and he repeatedly says that the foremost precious [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] system is flawless. Hence, he will not be refuted here; even both Jay-ḏzün Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen and Paṇ-chen Sō-nam-drak-ḇa wrote *Responses to the Karmapa.*[c]

[REFUTATION OF JO-NANG-BA]

The other refutations of Jo-nang-ḇa [Döl-ḇo-ḇa Shay-rap-gyel-tsen's] assertions by many—such as Bu-ḏön Rin-ḇo-chay,[d] the foremost venerable Ren-da-wa [Shön-nu-lo-drö],[e] Ne-ñying-wa,[f] Yar-drok-ḇa,[g] and so forth—are widely renowned, but the great chariot Ren-da-wa Shön-nu-lo-drö's *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle": Illuminating the Profound Thought* says:

> Certain ones—who, although they have entered Buddha's teaching in this lifetime, were earlier accustomed not just one time with the views of Forders and so are disturbed from the depths of the mind through merely hearing the term "emptiness" like a poisonous snake smelling the odor of musk[h]—say:

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[a] *chab shog;* perhaps this is found in his *gsang sngags snga 'gyur las 'phros pa'i brgal lan rtsod pa med pa'i ston pa dang bstan pa'i byung ba brjod pa drang po'i sa bon,* since Lo-drö-gyel-tsen (*blo gros rgyal mtshan,* 1552-1624) refers to it as *chab shog* in the title of his *rgyal ba'i dbang po karma pa mi bskyod rdo rjes gsang sngags rnying ma pa rnams la dri ba'i* ***chab shog*** *gsang ba'i dris lan lung dang rig pa'i 'brug sgra.*

[b] *gsung mgur;* perhaps this is found in his *rdo rje'i mgur dang zhal gdams tshigs bcad kyi skor.*

[c] See Jay-ḏzün Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen's *kar lan klu sgrub dgongs rgyan / karma mi bskyod rdo rjes mdo sde rgyan gyi dgongs pa rnam brdzun du 'grel pa la dgag sgrub zhus pa'i lan klu sgrub dgongs rgyan;* and Paṇ-chen Sō-nam-drak-ḇa's *karma mi bskyod rdo rje'i gsung lan le tshan gnyis.*

[d] *bu ston rin chen grub,* 1290-1364.

[e] *red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros,* 1349-1412; a Sa-ḡya who was one of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's principal teachers.

[f] *gnas rnying ba.*

[g] *yar 'brog pa / yar 'brog pa dge bsnyen 'jigs med 'bangs,* fifteenth century. W̄el-mang Ḡön-chok-gyel-tsen's *Notes on (Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-ḇo's) Lectures* (399.5) reports that Yar-drok-ḇa (*yar 'brog pa*) initially wrote *rdo rje'i thog tog* to refute Shay-rap-gyel-tsen, an answer to which was composed by the latter's student Nya-ḇön (*nya dpon*) and that, in response to it, Yar-drok-ḇa wrote a text entitled *dbang po'i rdo rje,* which is filled with slurs against Shay-rap-gyel-tsen such as "messenger of an evil devil" (*ngan bdud kyi pho nya*) but has few effective refutations of his views.

[h] Ngawang Lekden reported that musk is used to keep poisonous snakes away since they

The basic constituent called "the matrix-of-One-Gone-to-Bliss"—perfection of permanence, purity, bliss, and so forth—is ultimately established separate from conventional phenomena, integrally endowed with all qualities[a] of omniscience, having a nature of exalted wisdom, and dwelling pervading all the stable and moving.

This is the system of:

- the Forder Sāṃkhyas, Mīmāṃsakas, and Guhyakas who assert that a self that is an entity of experience, pervading all the stable and moving
- the Forder Vaiṣhṇavas who assert a self-arisen omniscient one called "Viṣhṇu," like Īshvara, that is non-physical and pervading all the stable and moving from the start
- the Vedāntins who assert a self-arisen omniscient one—called "the great sage having a color of the sun," "Maheshvara," and "Brahmā—pervading all the stable and moving from the start and who assert that when a yogi through cultivating yoga sees it directly with the divine eye, liberation is attained.

Among the followers of the One-Gone-to-Bliss, the assertion of such a tenet system never occurred earlier anywhere in the three—India, Tibet, and Nepal…

That if one makes assertions in accordance with the literal reading of the *Matrix-of-One-Gone-to-Bliss Sūtra,* it is the view of Forders is the thought of the Supramundane Victor because in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* [Mahāmati] questions [Buddha]:[648]

Mahāmati said, "The matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus taught in other sūtras spoken by the Supramundane Victor was said by the Supramundane Victor to be naturally radiant, pure, and thus from the beginning just pure. The matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus is said to possess the thirty-two signs [of a Buddha] and to exist in the bodies of all sentient beings.

"The Supramundane Victor said that, like a precious gem wrapped in a dirty cloth, the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus is wrapped in the cloth of the aggregates, constituents, and

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cannot stand the odor.

[a] As mentioned above, Döl-b̄o-b̄a Shay-rap-gyel-tsen holds that the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus is endowed with all ultimate, or uncompounded, Buddha qualities, not the conventional, or compounded, Buddha qualities, which must be attained through practice of the path in order to become a Buddha.

> sense-spheres, overwhelmed by the force of desire, hatred, and ignorance, and dirtied with the defilements of conceptuality.
>
> "Since this which is dirtied with the defilements of conceptuality was said to be permanent, stable, and everlasting, Supramundane Victor, how is this propounding of a matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus not like the [non-Buddhist] Forders' propounding of a self? Supramundane Victor, the Forders teach and propound a self that is permanent, the creator,[a] without qualities, pervasive, and non-perishing."

and in answer [Buddha] explains that he taught with words in accordance with Forders:

1. in consideration of the three doors of liberation as the basis in his thought
2. for the purpose of leading those adhering to the view of Forders and so that the childish might get rid of their fears of emptiness
3. [but] the damage to the explicit [teaching] is that it is not suitable, if taken in accordance with the Forders, for future and present Conqueror Children to adhere to a self or person in accordance with the literal reading.

The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:[649]

> The Supramundane Victor said, "Mahāmati, my teaching of a matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus is not like the Forders' propounding of a self. O Mahāmati, the completely perfect Buddhas, Ones-Gone-Thus, Foe Destroyers, teach a matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus for the meaning of the words emptiness, the limit of reality, nirvāṇa, no production, signlessness, wishlessness, and so forth. So that children might avoid the fear of selflessness, they teach through the means of a matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus the state of non-conceptuality, the object [of wisdom]

[a] Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement"* (P5263, vol. 98, 136.1.8) reads "non-creator" (*byed pa po ma yin pa*), in accordance with which Poussin's translation is "non-agent" (Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 251), and the Sanskrit, which he cites (251 n. 1), reads *nityo 'kartā;* however, the two commentaries on the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* by Jñānashrībhadra (P5519, vol. 107, 113.2.5) and Jñānavajra (P5520, vol. 107, 246.5.1) read "agent/creator" (*byed pa*), as does Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (*Ocean of Definitive Meaning,* 66.6). It is likely that the ambiguity arises because *nityo 'kartā,* without the virama, is *nityo kartā,* and hence "permanent [and] agent," or as Suzuki translates it, "eternal creator" (Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, trans., *The Lankavatara Sutra* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932], 69). According to Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry* (454.6), it should be "non-creator [of the manifestations]."

free from appearances.

"Mahāmati, future and present Bodhisattvas—the great beings—should not adhere to this as a self. Mahāmati, for example, potters make a variety of vessels out of one mass of clay particles with their hands, manual skill, a rod, water, string, and mental dexterity. Mahāmati, similarly the Ones-Gone-Thus also teach the selflessness of phenomena that is an absence of all conceptual signs. Through various [techniques] endowed with wisdom and skill in means—whether they teach it as the matrix of One-Gone-Thus or as selflessness—they, like a potter, teach with various formats of words and letters.

"Therefore, Mahāmati, the teaching of the matrix of One-Gone-Thus is not like the teaching propounding a self for Forders. Mahāmati, in order to lead Forders who are attached to propounding a self, the Ones-Gone-Thus teach the matrix of One-Gone-Thus through the teaching of a matrix of One-Gone-Thus."

1. The basis in [Buddha's] thought: "teach a matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus for the meaning of the words emptiness, the limit of reality, nirvāṇa, no production, signlessness, wishlessness, and so forth."
2. The purpose: "So that children might avoid the fear of selflessness, they teach through the means of a matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus," and "Mahāmati, in order to lead Forders who are attached to propounding a self, the Ones-Gone-Thus teach the matrix of One-Gone-Thus through the teaching of a matrix of One-Gone-Thus."
3. Damage to the explicit [teaching]: "Future and present Bodhisattvas—the great beings—should not adhere to this as a self."[a]

Objection: Well then, is even the explanation in the *Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mother Scriptures,* renowned to be by Vasubandhu, that taking the thoroughly established nature of an eye as the basis of emptiness, it is empty of the two—the other-powered nature and the imputational nature incorrect?[b] The *Conquest Over Objections about the Three Mother Scriptures* says:

[a] For an extensive presentation of Döl-b̄o-b̄a's and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's understandings of this passage, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 361-380. Döl-b̄o-b̄a's position is far more nuanced than this refutation would suggest.

[b] For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's treatment of this topic, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 225ff.

> Concerning that [statement in Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, "The eye is empty of the eye,"][a] "The eye" is the eye of reality [that is, the reality of the eye].[650] "Of the eye" is of (1) the eye that is the imputational factor and (2) the eye that is the imputed. "Empty" means "devoid." Such is likewise to be applied to "The ear is empty of the ear," and so forth.
>
> *Answer:* That is very wrong because since all [descriptions] in that [text]—the basis of emptiness and the mode of emptiness—disagree with the great chariots of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School and are the Sāṃkhyas' modes of emptiness, the Teacher [Buddha] said that this mode of emptiness is the lowest or worst and many scholars also derided it. The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:[b]
>
> > Since this [emptiness that is] the-one-being-empty-of-the-other[c] is the lowest of all [seven types of emptiness], you should abandon it.
>
> and Sthiramati's *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes"*[651] also says that it is not like a temple's being empty of monastics and so forth[d] but like a rope's being empty of a snake; and Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* also says:
>
> > With respect to things, one's emptiness of the other is not ultimate; however, it is a conventional truth.
>
> This is the thought of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence;*[e] you should understand at length in the scriptures of the foremost father [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] and his spiritual sons, in Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle,"* and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Some do not assert that the two truths

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[a] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 52a.5; for a typical passage from the *Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra,* see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 349. S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen (*Ocean of Definitive Meaning,* 196.4) cites a similar explanation in the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra.*

[b] For Döl-ḇo-ḇa S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen's nuanced answer to this, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 349ff.

[c] *gcig gis gcig stong pa.*

[d] In just this way, Döl-ḇo-ḇa, in his *The Fourth Council* (Stearns, *The Buddha from Dol po,* 215), uses the similes of an empty village and an empty vase. However, Döl-ḇo-ḇa is aware of this apparent counter-evidence and deals with it head-on; see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 347ff.

[e] See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 225ff.

exist since [according to them] existing conventionally does not fulfill the role of existing.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[652] Also, Tang-s̄ak-b̄a[a] and so forth, in accordance with the too broad object of negation that is refuted in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,*[b] assert that all do not exist even conventionally, upon explaining the incorrectness of the Autonomy system's affixing the qualification "ultimately" in "All phenomena are not ultimately established."

Some great upholders of the teaching—thinking that if the ultimate truth existed, it would be found by a rational consciousness and that whatever is found by a rational consciousness would be able to bear analysis—do not assert that the ultimate truth is an object of knowledge.

Also, some followers of Tang-s̄ak-b̄a, thinking that existing in the perspective of conceptuality and conventionally existing are equivalent, assert that the two truths conventionally exist, but that this does not fulfill the role of existing, and hence they do not assert that the two truths exist.

In general, these are not the system of the Middle Way School, and in particular, these are not Chandrakīrti's system free from all extremes because they have fallen to an extreme of annihilation and because they refute dependent-arising, which is the means of refuting all bad views, whereas the father Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons mainly set forth dependent-arising. For Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* says:

For those for whom emptiness
Is feasible, all are feasible.
For those for whom emptiness
Is not feasible, all are not feasible.

and Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* says:

For those for whom emptiness
Is possible, all objects are possible.
For those for whom emptiness
Is not possible, nothing is possible.
Emptiness and dependent-arising

[a] This is the eleventh-century Ḡa-dam-b̄a Tang-s̄ak-b̄a Ye-s̄hay-jung-n̄ay (*thang sag pa ye shes 'byung gnas*), a student of B̄a-tsap-nyi-ma-drak (*spa tshab nyi ma drag*, b. 1055).

[b] See Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1989), 101-122, 176-180, 311-321, and so forth.

Are equivalent as the middle path.

and Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

Those who assert that dependent things
Are, like a moon in water,
Not real and not unreal
Are not tricked by views.

and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* also distinctly says:

We are not nihilists. Having refuted dualistic propositions of existence and non-existence, we illuminate the non-dualistic path going to the city of nirvāṇa. We also do not propound, "Actions, agents, effects, and so forth do not exist." Well then, what? We posit, "These are without inherent existence."

How these are incorrect, how these are not the system of the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons and the great followers, and so forth should be known at length from Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's two Stages of the Path [that is, *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*[a] and *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path*], Ke-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate,* and so forth.

These are not at all the assertions of the great translator Ḇa-tsap[b] Rin-ḇo-chay because in answers to Ge-s̄hay S̄har-wa's questions he says precisely that:

- for the basis the two truths are needed
- for the path the two collections and method and wisdom are needed
- for the fruit the two exalted bodies are needed.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Some, mistaking the statement that autonomous theses do not exist, say that Consequentialists have no system of their own.

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[653] Also, Jang-chup-ḏzön-drü,[c] S̄a-nyen,[d] Gang-gya-m̄ar,[e] and so forth who rush in the direction [of making] commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental*

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[a] Ibid.

[b] *pa tshab nyi ma grags,* born 1055.

[c] *byang brston / rma bya byang chub brston grus,* died 1185. His commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise* (called *'thad pa'i rgyan*) is still extant and is the oldest surviving Tibetan Consequentialist commentary; thanks to Kevin Vose for the note.

[d] *sa gnyan;* perhaps, *sangs rgyas gnyan ston chos kyi shes rab,* 1175-1255. The Taiwan edition (395.5) reads *gangs gnyan.*

[e] *gangs rgya dmar;* perhaps, *stod lung rgya dmar ba byang chub grags,* eleventh-twelfth century; one of Cha-ḇa Chö-ḡyi-s̄eng-gay's (*phya pa chos kyi seng ge;* 1109-1169) teachers of the Middle Way School and of logic and epistemology.

Treatise propound that since Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* says:[654]

If I had any thesis,
Then I would have that fault.
Because I have no thesis,
I am only faultless.[a]

Proponents of the Middle do not have any view to be asserted as their own position. And, due to that, there is no valid cognition for proofs, and Proponents of the Middle refute all extremes of existence and non-existence of others through consequences of their inner contradictions, as set forth in many explanations of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* and compilations on the Middle Way. There are those as well as those who, as explained in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Exposition of the Stages of the Path,*[b] in the meantime assert that they do not have a system of their own.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Some, mistaking the statement that an innate worldly awareness is not valid with respect to suchness, say that in the system of the Consequence School valid cognition does not exist and hence there is no establishment by valid cognition.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[655] As described in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Exposition of the Stages of the Path,* there are those who assert that there is no valid establishment, and there are those who, in dependence upon M̄a-ja Jang-chub-d̄zön-drü's[c] *Hammer of Logic,*[d] root text and commentary, assert that the name, meaning, and so forth of valid cognition are not at all feasible. The foregoing and so forth are not fit to be Proponents of the Middle because of having fallen to extremes. They are wrong because:

- if Proponents of the Middle did not have their own system,

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[a] In Ge-luk-b̄a scholarship this is taken to mean:

If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.

[b] See Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness;* and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 549-551.

[c] *rma bya byang chub brtson 'grus,* died 1185. Although he was a student of Cha-b̄a Chö-ḡyi-s̄eng-gay (*phya pa chos kyi seng ge;* 1109-1169), an adherent of the Autonomy School, he became a proponent of the Consequence School following B̄a-tsap Nyi-ma-drak (*spa/pa tshab nyi ma grags;* b. 1055). D̄ak-tsang shows admiration for M̄a-ja Jang-chub-d̄zön-drü (661).

[d] *rtog ge tho ba.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

yours would not be a Middle Way system, whereby it would be some other system, but you do not accept this
- it is also not feasible to not have a thesis since four theses[a] are posited and then proven
- whereas you should not have any theses and assertions, you set forth a great many assertions and modes of assertion.

Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* says:

> Without asserting conventionalities,
> We do not make expositions.

and Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

> Likewise the excellent also assert
> Cessation that is like a magician's illusion.

and:

> Those who assert that dependent things
> Are, like a moon in water,
> Not real and not unreal
> Are not tricked by views.

and Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Supramundane* says:

> Why not assert that those arisen
> From causes manifest
> As like reflections
> Since they do not exist without those [causes].

and:

> You [Buddha] assert that feeling also
> Is not inherently existent.

and:

> You assert establishment
> As having mutual reliance.

and:

> You asserted to teach
> Dependent-arising itself.

and Chandrakīrti's autocommentary to his *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:

> The wise should think that this position is flawless and beneficial and should definitely assert it. We are not forced into the absurd consequence of wiping out all conventions with respect to positions, and it is fitting for the opponent also to assert just this.

and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

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[a] Such as no production from self, other, both, and neither.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> Conventionalities are asserted by way of just this conditionality, not by way of asserting the four positions.

and Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

> The wise, upon getting rid of doubt with respect to the statement that transmigrating beings appear like illusions, believe it.

and:

> The thought is that whatever is not like an illusion only does not exist. This should, without doubt, be asserted that way.

and the first chapter of the *Pile of Jewels Sūtra,* Endowment with the Three Vows, says:

> Whatever is renowned in the world as existing I also propound as existing. Whatever is renowned in the world as not existing I also propound as not existing.

and so forth, and using this as a source, Buddhapālita says:[656]

> Just as the Supramundane Victor also…Therefore, when using the world's conventions, the Supramundane Victor speaks with what is renowned in the world as just correct.

and so forth. Since there are many such statements, do not emit awful cries!

b" Particular Refutation of a Pile of Self-Contradictions {3}

This section has three parts: brief indication, extensive explanation, and identifying the causes of his mistakes.

1: Brief Indication

In particular, boasting the system of Chandrakīrti but in all ways taking omniscience as a foe, you have many contradictions and mistakes.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In particular, boasting that you hold Chandrakīrti's system but in all ways taking the omniscient great Ḏzong-ka-ḇa[a] as the foe, you—Translator Ḏak-tsang—have many contradictions and mistakes.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[657] Even more than those bad proponents mentioned above, in particular the Translator Ḏak-tsang boasted that he would explain Chandrakīrti's system,

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[a] As can be seen from the paraphrase of Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's own commentary just below, the foes are Indians and Tibetans who hold that omniscience exists. Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's identification of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa as the foe is too narrow.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

but despite the omniscient great foremost venerable Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's extensive and clear commentaries, he did not quote them, but made explanations within citing passages from here and there in Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* and *Praise of the Element of Attributes* and repeated the systems of Tang-sak-ḇa[a] and so forth. Failing to see that his responses missed the meaning of the scriptural passages and reasonings [that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] cites as damages [to Tang-sak-ḇa's position] in his *Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and so forth, he claimed contradictions therein but then in his commentary refuted himself, like wiping out his handprint with his footprint.

[Excerpts from Ḏak-tsang Šhay-rap-rin-chen's *Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence*][b]

BRIEF INDICATION [OF ḎZONG-KA-ḆA'S CONTRADICTIONS]

They who, though following the glorious Chandrakīrti,
Assert—upon analyzing with many reasonings—
That impure mistaken appearances are established by valid cognition[c]

[a] Ḏak-tsang himself (Dzongsar Institute edition, 170.5) speaks of Tang-sak-ḇa as being unskilled in both the words and the meaning of Chandrakīrti's system.

[b] Following are lengthy excerpts that I have added from Ḏak-tsang's *Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets* (*grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*) and his autocommentary, *Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence* (*grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho*) (Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-bzang-stobs rgyal, 1976; and Dzongsar Institute, 2001), to provide both a sense of his own overall system and the details of his criticism of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's presentation. The first citation is a combination of Ḏak-tsang's root text and his autocommentary (Thimphu, 88a.5ff.; and Dzongsar Institute, 93a.4ff.). I have added the number of each contradiction for the sake of easy access.

Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Annotations* (*dbu ma pa, dza,* 16.5) refers to the text of the eighteen contradictions (with an additional stanza before and afterwards) as Ḏak-tsang's Essay of Objections (*rtsod yig*); given that the quotation is almost entirely found word-for-word (except for three variations in the fourteenth contradiction) in Ḏak-tsang's root text and given that a separate essay of objections has not been reported, I take the Essay of Objections to be this very section in Ḏak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets.*

[c] In his *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī* the Fifth Dalai Lama makes reference to these lines:

Have the following great burden of contradictions.

Some[a] latter-day Tibetan great scholars upholding the teaching asserted Chandrakīrti's system straight out in the early part of their lives, but later, although their discrimination had not indeed improved, the country of Tibet was filled in general with the conventions of logic and in particular with conventions dependent on collected topics, and with respect to the Middle Way School became used to such statements as "The power of the non-deceptive dependent-arising of conventionalities" propounded by the Autonomy School, and they became as if worked up by conversation that "If actions and their effects are posited only in the perspective of mistaken [consciousness], they would not be reliable." Such scholars who, despite following the glorious Chandrakīrti, though not analyzing with ultimate reasoning, analyze with many conventional reasonings, saying:

- It [absurdly] follows that the ways a dream-elephant and a waking-elephant perform functions are the same.
- It [absurdly] follows that an awareness to which falling hairs appear and an awareness to which blue appears are similarly mistaken or not mistaken.
- And mainly: It [absurdly] follows that it is not suitable to put confidence in actions and their effects.

and so forth. These scholars, despite asserting that theirs is Shāntideva's and Chandrakīrti's system, have the following great burden of contradictions.

Concerning that, in general in accordance with [Nāgārjuna's] extensive statements:

Homage to the Sovereign of Subduers,
Whose supreme unequalled speech
Is that emptiness and dependent-arising

Mañjushrī told the Foremost Lama [Ďzong-ka-ba] that it was necessary to value the varieties of appearances. His thought was based on a qualm that, in the future, trainees who did not understand such an essential would fall into a view of nihilism. Thus, many modes of establishing the existence of appearances are [presented] in Ďzong-ka-ba's great and small expositions of the *Stages of the Path* and in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*. However, the lion of proponents, the translator Ďak-tsang [criticizes Ďzong-ka-ba] saying, "Upon analyzing with many forms of reasoning, he asserts that impure mistaken appearances are validly established." [This criticism] is seen to arise from the same source of error.

[a] Ďak-tsang is speaking about Ďzong-ka-ba and his followers.

Are equivalent as the middle path.

and:[a]

We explain that dependent-arising
Is emptiness.
That itself is dependent imputation.
That itself is the middle path.

it is the system of the Middle Way that "emptiness and dependent-arising are equivalent as the middle path" [means that]:

- Whatever is truly established would not rely on even anything, due to which it could not feasibly be a dependent-arising.
- Whatever is established dependently and in reliance, is not truly established.
- Hence, the two—appearances of action, object, agent, and so forth and emptiness that is the absence of an inherent nature—are contained in one substratum.
- Not only that, but also for a person who has realized dependent-arising, appearance and emptiness must serve as mutual assisters in the sense that appearance induces ascertainment of emptiness and emptiness induces ascertainment of appearance.

However, Autonomists put it together that it should be an absence of a *true* inherent nature since a mere inherent nature,[b] or mere intrinsicality,[c] is conventionally established with the object, but here [in the Consequence School] such is not affixed; rather, an inherent nature, or intrinsicality, does not exist with the object, and the likes of a fire's performing the function of burning is solely mentally imputed.

However, [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa and his followers] wrote again and again, not just once, that, unlike this, a fire's performing the function of burning exists merely conventionally in the context of the object, non-deceptively and self-instituting, due to which those two [emptiness and appearance] must induce mutual ascertainment, whereas if the performance of function were posited merely in the

[a] P5224, vol. 95, 9.3.4, XXIV.18. With brackets from Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's commentary (P6153, vol. 156, 148.3.2ff and 148.5.1ff.) this reads:

We explain "arising dependent [on causes and conditions]"
As [the meaning of] the emptiness [of inherently existent production].
That [emptiness of inherently existent production] is dependent imputation.
Just this [emptiness of inherently existent production] is the middle path.

[b] *rang bzhin tsam.*

[c] *ngo bo tsam.*

perspective of mistaken [consciousness], it would not be reliable. This is their main contradiction because in the Great Middle Way there is not the slightest inherent nature to be refuted beyond self-instituting performance of function from the object's side. (579)

Objection: We did not say "self-instituting."

Answer: It is contradictory for what is not self-instituting to be established by valid cognition because the meaning of being established by valid cognition is non-deceptive, and the meaning of non-deceptive does not pass beyond self-instituting. (586)

Furthermore, having considered theirs to be the glorious Chandrakīrti's system, their taking valid cognition discriminating obscurational truths to be a Buddha's exalted wisdom knowing the diversity [of phenomena] is the root of all their contradictions. (575) In his autocommentary on the *Supplement* where it says:[658]

> Because bewilderment obstructs [perception of] the nature, it is obscurational (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*).

Chandrakīrti indicates that with regard to the two—obscurational truth (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*) and mere false conventionality[a] (*rdzun pa'i kun rdzob*)—the means of positing the first is afflictive ignorance itself:

> Thus, respectively, obscurational truths are posited through the force of the afflictive ignorance included within the [twelve] links of cyclic existence.

He indicates that the means of positing the second is the mere ignorance of those endowed with exalted wisdom having appearance, since Hearer and Solitary Realizer non-learners and Great Vehicle learner Superiors, having already abandoned the former means of positing, have non-afflictive ignorance:

> For them, these have an artificial nature; they are not truths because they do not fancy them to be truths…Moreover, these appear to Superiors having objects of activity involved with appearance because of coursing in mere ignorance having the character of obstructions to omniscience.

He says that never mind these being obscurational truths for Buddhas, Buddhas do not even have the means for positing mere-conventionalities:[b]

> This is not so for those having objects of activity without appearance. Since Buddhas are manifestly and completely

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[a] Or, mere false fraudulence.

[b] *kun rdzob tsam.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

enlightened with regard to all aspects of phenomena, the movement of minds and mental factors has utterly stopped.

and later,[659] "Minds having ceased, it is actualized by the body," (583) and:[660]

Due to understanding reality in the manner of sameness of taste,
This wonderful knowledge understands objects of knowledge instantaneously.

and when Chandrakīrti explains that non-dualistic exalted wisdom is without objects, he states the objection that if there is no appearance of objects, a consciousness knowing objects is not feasible,[661] "When it is quiescent, intelligence would not engage those," and so forth, to which he responds that just as due to being generated into having the aspect of an object, an awareness is renowned as realizing that object, so with respect to the object that is the absence of production an awareness becomes without production like water in water, whereupon the convention of an awareness realizing an object is designated to the very concordance of the object's mode of subsistence and the awareness's mode of appearance. He does not say that [exalted wisdom] without appearance of an object is not established [that is, does not exist]. And Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* also explains that exalted wisdom is without appearance of an object:[662]

When things and non-things
Do not dwell in front of awareness,
Then since there is no other aspect,
It is thoroughly pacified in non-apprehension.

In response to an objection that in that case exalted activities such as the teaching of doctrine would not be feasible, [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] says:[663]

Just as a wheel turned due to hard striving
By a powerful potter here turns after a long time—
Although exertion is not still generated now—
And is seen to be a cause of pots and so forth,

So while there is no presently produced exertion
The operation [of the activities] of [a Buddha] dwelling in that having the nature of the body of attributes
Is impelled by the virtues of beings [who are trainees]
And by special prayer-wishes [when that Buddha was a Bodhisattva and hence] is inconceivable.

and so forth, and [Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*] says:[664]

Just as a wish-granting jewel and a wish-granting tree
Completely fulfill hopes,
So through the power of trainees' wish-prayers
There are appearances as exalted bodies of Conquerors.

and in response to an objection:[665]

Through worshipping what is mindless
How could effects emerge?

he says that it is not established [that worshipping what is mindless] entails [the non-emergence of effects]:

Because it is taught that [worshipping a Buddha still] living
Or [worshipping relics once a Buddha] has passed away are just similar.

but he does not say, "The mindless is not established [that is, does not exist]."

Making mistakes due to these, Ka-rak Jang-shön[a] and so forth indeed propound that these two masters [Chandrakīrti and Shāntideva] assert that a Buddha has no exalted wisdom; however, [Chandrakīrti's and Shāntideva's] examinations of objections described above demonstrate that an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise without appearance has thorough and complete realization of the thusness of all objects of knowledge—the one taste of the manifold.

Objection: That exalted wisdom must have mind and mental factors (584), in accordance with the explanation in Haribhadra's small *Clear Meaning Commentary:*

How are non-dualistic minds and mental factors—which unquestionably must be asserted—included?

Answer: Since that is the Autonomists' assertion, [I] will not put forth any sort of refutation dependent on another school of tenets.

And similarly, a statement such as "Pervading all the sphere of objects of knowledge" and so forth is from [the Autonomist] Jñānagarbha's *Commentary on the "Two Truths."*

Objection: Then what about Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* itself which says,[b] "Valid cognition is single—omniscient exalted wisdom," and (576):[666]

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[a] *kha rag byang gzhon.*

[b] The first citation is from Chandrakīrti's autocommentary.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

The exalted wisdom knowing all aspects
Has a character called "direct perception."

and his extensive description of the presentation of the ten powers—knowledge of sources and non-sources and so forth?

Answer: The former two are suitable to be explaining the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise without appearance. The last and Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (585) which says:[667]

Buddhas and Bodhisattvas
Are endowed with unimpeded perception.

and so forth express the mode of knowing objects of knowledge by a causally concordant exalted body which is displayed in trainees' perspective of appearance, the mode of birth of an exalted body, and so forth. A causally concordant emanation body is something like a Buddha's emanation or something like an exalted body;[a] if by displaying the mode of knowing, knowing were to be posited, then by displaying the mode of newly becoming fully purified, one would also [absurdly] be newly buddhafied. (585)

Moreover:

- it [absurdly] follows that these environments and animate beings appearing to persons having karma and afflictive emotions are not produced from karma and afflictive emotions as their causes, and
- it [absurdly] follows that these environments and animate beings are not appearances through the power of karma and afflictive emotions as causes of mistake, and
- to perfect Buddhas darkness would appear as an obstructor of other forms, red flaming burning iron would appear as means of burning their bodies, rains of weapons would appear as means to cut up their bodies, and so forth

because [according to you] these do not just *appear* to be true, but these appearances as corporeality and so forth to common beings are established by valid cognition in accordance with how they appear, and moreover they are principally established by the valid cognitions of Buddhas. (577)

Furthermore, meditative cultivation of the paths of illusory body and so forth in order to achieve a Buddha's exalted body—a body of exalted wisdom devoid of material phenomena, a body devoid of the elements—would be senseless because [according to

[a] *sku 'dra tsam; sku 'dra* also means an image, a statue, and the like.

you] an exalted mind's comprehension of all material phenomena is a quality [of enlightenment]. Paths and fruits would not be concordant because prior to a learner's exalted wisdom and also prior to maṇḍala [meditation] in the Mantra path appearances must deliberately be stopped, whereas [according to you] at the time of the fruit everything appears. [When progressing] higher and higher from the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise on the path of seeing, in meditative equipoise the subjects [qualified by emptiness, that is, all phenomena,] would [absurdly] have to become clearer because [according to you] all subjects [qualified by emptiness, that is, all phenomena,] appear to an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise on the fruit [stage of Buddhahood].

Hence, [Dzong-ka-ba's] taking the principal valid cognition distinguishing obscurational truths to be a Buddha's exalted wisdom is the principal fault relative to this system because:

- it [absurdly] follows that affixing "worldly" (*'jig rten, loka*) to "obscurational" (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) would have no impact when [Nāgārjuna] speaks of:

  Worldly obscurational truths
  And ultimate truths.

- it is said again and again that obscurational truths are posited by what has the name of bewilderment, worldly innate apprehension of I, whereas pure exalted wisdom does not perceive them—there being very many statements such as [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (534)]:[668]

  That self regarding which an awareness apprehending I
  Intensively arises in transmigrating beings
  And regarding whose [eyes and so forth] an awareness apprehending mine arises
  Is from bewilderment in [the perspective of] uninvestigated renown.

  and [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*]:[a]

  Though these do not exist, for the sake of effects
  I propound in the perspective of the world that these exist.

  and [Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*]:[669]

  For whom is there compassion?
  Those imputed by obfuscation
  Asserted for the sake of effects.

  and [Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*]:[670]

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[a] VI.81cd.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

If sentient beings do not exist, whose are the effects?
True, but they are asserted from obfuscation.

and so forth.

Objection: In that case adoption [of virtue] and discarding [of non-virtue] would not be needed.

Answer: Due to just such realization one makes great effort to adopting and discarding. When those with an eye disease understand that the falling hairs appearing to them do not exist objectively and hence that these do not appear to those with healthy eyes, they perceive the falling hairs as a fault of the degeneration of their own eyes and thereupon seek out a doctor, pay great respect to the doctor's speech, drink awful medicine, and make effort at prescribed modes of behavior. Like that, such pure behavior of the three doors [that is, body, speech, and mind] of the Great Elder Atisha and his emanations—B̄a-tsap-nyi-ma-drak[a] and the Great Translator Ḡyap-chok-b̄el-sang-b̄o[b]—and those who accord with them [but] nowadays are assigned as Proponents of Nihilism [by the likes of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's followers] does not exist among those proclaiming with loud laughter who, upon propounding that conventionalities are established by valid cognition, ascertain actions and their effects with valid cognition. Enough elaboration.

Objection: You have said a lot, but this clear description of four valid cognitions—direct perception, inference, scripture, and comprehension [by example]—at the end of [Chandrakīrti's] *Clear Words* compilation[c] is the Consequence School's own system because the statement by earlier Tibetans also that:

> Greater and lesser enumerations of valid cognitions constitute a difference between the Consequence School and the Autonomy School because the Consequentialists assert four and the Autonomists assert that they are limited to two, direct perception and inference, as in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition."*

is correct.

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[a] *pa tshab nyi ma grags,* born 1055.

[b] *skyabs mchog dpal bzang po,* 14th century.

[c] *tshig gsal stong thun;* this refers to a section of the *Clear Words,* but I have not determined where it begins and end. In the summary of his discussion of Nāgārjuna's first stanza, Chandrakīrti proclaims the validity of these four valid cognitions "in the world" (*loke*); see Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās,* 75.2. It also became the short title of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's work on valid cognition in the Consequence School.

Answer: Both earlier and later Tibetans do not understand this because [Chandrakīrti] is stating the world's assertion of four valid cognitions, but he is not positing his own system, since in the summary conclusion he says:

> Therefore, in that way the world posits that meanings are realized from the four valid cognitions.

If that did not establish such, then it would not be reasonable [for him] to propound that "Real and unreal conventionalities are the system of the world, but are not our own system" through saying:[671]

> Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
> By the six unimpaired sense powers
> Are true from just [the viewpoint of] the world. The rest
> Are posited as unreal from just [the viewpoint of] the world.

Objection: Since those are seen to be very parallel, from henceforth [I] will propound even real and unreal in my own system.

Answer: That is not reasonable; [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] says:[672]

> Just as here [in the world all three—object, sense power, and consciousness—]exist for the waking [when they are asleep dreaming],
> As long as one has not awakened [from the sleep of ignorance], those three [that is, object, sense power, and consciousness] exist.
> Just as when awakened [from sleep] those three [of the dream] do not exist,
> So from extinguishing the sleep of bewilderment, it is likewise.

He says many times that until the cause of error is extinguished, dream and waking horses and elephants similarly exist, and once the cause of error is extinguished, they are similarly non-existent, and, therefore, propounding that real and unreal do not exist in the Middle Way's own system subsists in fact. Hence, without discarding that correctness, you should assert that, in the context of conventionalities, valid cognition and non-valid cognition do not exist in the Middle Way's own system. Therefore, through this voluntary assumption of:

- what Autonomists do not assert, namely, that Hearers and Solitary Realizers must realize the selflessness of phenomena
- and a poetic phrase, "yoked necks of the lions of the Middle Way School and the Epistemology School"[a] [used by

[a] *dbu tshad seng ge mjing snol gyi snyan ming;* 93a.3.

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Autonomists (83) but] not asserted by Consequentialists

[Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] was trying to make a collection of good factors, whereby many contradictions were drawn together.

EXTENSIVE EXPLANATION [OF ḎZONG-KA-ḆA'S CONTRADICTIONS]

FIRST CONTRADICTION. That all objects are false and that [consciousnesses] having them as objects are non-deceptive are contradictory.

[Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] explanation that if one does not understand that [objects] are false, one does not realize the meaning of "obscurational" (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) is very good, but while realizing that conventionalities are false:

- his assertion that in the Consequence School's own system all conventional objects are false and deceptive
- and his assertion that awarenesses that have those as objects are non-deceptive

are contradictory. For if an object is a deceptive phenomenon, it is not possible for an awareness of it to be a valid cognition, as is the case, for example, with an awareness to which falling hairs appear. Saying that even [consciousnesses to which] falling hairs, double moons, and so forth appear are valid cognitions is a greater apprehension of true existence than even the Proponents of True Existence. There are many [passages teaching] that conventionalities are deceptive phenomena, such as [Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* (see also 808) which says]:[673]

The Supramundane Victor said that
Deceptive phenomena are falsities;
All compounded things are deceptive phenomena,
Therefore, they are falsities.

SECOND CONTRADICTION. Being mistaken with respect to an object and being a valid cognition of it are contradictory.

It follows that the subjects, these eye consciousnesses of the short-sighted [that is, of those who have not realized emptiness] are not valid cognitions with respect to forms because of being consciousnesses mistaken with respect to forms. Never mind what is being cleared away [that is, that such consciousnesses are valid cognitions, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] even explicitly asserts the reason, saying that these are consciousnesses mistaken with respect to forms due to being polluted by the conception of true existence. Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* says:[674]

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> Moreover, having superimposed that sense consciousnesses are just direct perceptions, their conceptualization that sense consciousnesses are just valid cognitions with respect to [their] objects of comprehension is extremely senseless. It being the case that non-deceptive consciousnesses are seen as just valid cognitions in the world, the Supramundane Victor also said that because consciousnesses are compounded phenomena, they have the attribute of falsity and deceptiveness and are like a magician's illusions. Those that have the attribute of falsity and deceptiveness and are like a magician's illusions are not non-deceptive[675] because they are effective things that abide one way but appear in another aspect. Such are not fit to be designated as a valid cognition because it would [absurdly] follow that all consciousnesses would be valid cognitions.

Whereas [Chandrakīrti] clearly says that awarenesses compounded by karma and afflictive emotions and polluted by the conception of true existence are not valid cognitions and that a valid cognition comprehending a false conventionality does not occur, [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] has to explain it backwards, explicitly writing:

> That if [a consciousness] is mistaken with respect to an object, it necessarily is not a valid cognition with respect to it is the system of Proponents of True Existence, whereas even though an eye consciousness is mistaken with respect to a form, Proponents of the Middle do not assert that it is necessarily not a valid cognition.

This inflicts great damage on Chandrakīrti because it amounts to:

> It follows that even all consciousnesses are just valid cognitions because although [a consciousness] perceives a thing—that abides in one way—in another aspect, it is reasonable to designate it as a valid cognition.

thereby explicitly contradicting Chandrakīrti with regard to the three spheres. Claiming and proclaiming that such a gross contradiction is the supreme of knowledgeable propositions, whereas it is ignorant, is only a defect ruining the teaching.

Similarly, when Chandrakīrti responds to the proposition that production from other is established by worldly valid cognition,[676] "The arising of what is other from what is other is realized by the world," he says that[677] "The stupid is not fit to be valid cognition," but [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] does not explain this as meaning that "In general in our own system those are not valid cognitions even in terms of both of the two truths, and in particular they do no damage

when analyzing suchness." Rather, [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] repeated proposition that "Relative to suchness they are not valid cognitions, but conventionally they are valid cognitions" constitutes an immediate contradiction [of Chandrakīrti]. If it were as he says, then production from other would be established conventionally, but this cannot be accepted because, as Chandrakīrti says,[678] "Due to that reasoning those are not feasible even conventionally," the non-assertion of production from other even merely conventionally is a distinguishing feature of this system, and he says this many times.

Objection: Chandrakīrti's saying,[679] "Production from other does not exist even in the world" makes a direct response to[680] "The arising of what is other from what is other," due to which even worldly valid cognition does not establish production from other.

Answer: If this is taken as the ordinary non-investigatory and non-analytical world, it is so, but you [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] are treating [worldly valid cognition] in terms of the Middle Way's own system and moreover in terms of slight analysis, in which case since the two—seed and shoot—are established as things, if they are not established as other substantial entities, they would have to be one substantial entity. Hence, do not assert worldly valid cognition in the Middle Way's own system.

Thus, here "world" is not to be taken as not involved in tenets, or not having attained a Superior path, or not having emerged [from a householder's life], and so forth. Rather, in the context of, for instance:

- not at all having generated the view of the middle way
- or having generated the view of the middle way but its manifest functioning having deteriorated, whereupon one lacks memory and apprehension of it

an awareness apprehending former and later to be one without investigation and without analysis, called "beginningless worldly innate apprehension of 'I,'" is called "world" on this occasion. With respect to its:

- directly seeing smoke on a mountain pass and from the sign of smoke realizing that fire exists behind the pass,
- ascertaining, as meaningful, words in which one believes, and
- apprehending that an ox has hooves from the cause of being similar to a gayal

and so forth we use the conventions "established by valid

cognition," "seeing ultimately,"[a] and so forth. Thereby, those are posited as worldly valid cognitions, and since those differentiate true and false with respect to a waking-horse and a dream-horse, a division into real and unreal also is made. However, Chandrakīrti's own system is the ascertainment that those two are equal in having the ability to perform functions in the perspective of mistaken [awareness] and are equal in being non-existent in the perspective of reasoning[b]; hence, there is not even the slightest way to apprehend [worldly valid cognition and Chandrakīrti's system] as one.

THIRD CONTRADICTION. That inference exists and that proof statements do not exist are contradictory.

[D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] saying that proof statements [as asserted by] the Autonomists do not exist but that inferences exist is also not reasonable:

- because in that case whatever is an inference would [absurdly] be only an inference on the occasion of one's own purpose, which does not have a proof statement,[c] but here most inferences are to be asserted in accordance with Chandrakīrti's calling them other-approved inferences, and
- because if other-approved inferences exist, other-approved proof-statements must also exist
- and the Conqueror set forth many [proof-statements] such as "Whatever is impermanent is miserable," and so forth
- and there are many proof-statements such as when the master [Nāgārjuna] himself said:

  How could whatever does not
  See itself see another?

  and so forth, and both Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti in their commentaries extensively put forward five-membered proof-statements, and so forth.

FOURTH CONTRADICTION. That common appearance does not exist and that subjects [in logical statements] are established by valid cognition are contradictory.

[D̄zong-ka-b̄a] explains that when [Chandrakīrti] refutes

[a] *don dam par mthong ba.*

[b] *rig ngo.*

[c] Statements are sounds, and when one employs syllogisms for one's own sake, as in meditation, external verbal statement is not required, whereas such is required when syllogisms are stated for others.

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Bhāvaviveka's usage of autonomous syllogisms:

- [Bhāvaviveka holds that] it is not sufficient that the subject is merely established by the valid cognitions of the individual opponents, but it must be established in common appearance.
- [Chandrakīrti shows that] nevertheless, it is not so established because (1) in the system of the Proponents of True Existence it is asserted that whatever is a valid cognition necessarily becomes a valid cognition unmistaken with respect to phenomena established by way of their own character, (2) whereas in the system of the Proponents of the Middle whatever is a valid cognition necessarily becomes a valid cognition mistaken with respect to phenomena not established by way of their own character, and (3) there is no way that those two could come to be in common appearance.

This is indeed a great, eloquent explanation, but it has two fallacies—the fallacy that both corners of a reason are not established and the fallacy that the same is so for the example.

The first corner [of the reason, that is, that in the system of a Proponent of True Existence it is asserted that whatever is a valid cognition necessarily becomes a valid cognition unmistaken with respect to phenomena established by way of their own character] is not established because it is said many times that even Proponents of True Existence assert that continuums, gross objects, collections, and so forth are not established in suchness; [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says]:[681]

> Though these pots and so forth do not exist in suchness,
> They exist as thoroughly renowned in the world.

and:[682]

> You [assert] that since a pot is an entity not established as a
> [substantially established] effective thing,
> It is inexpressible as [either the same as or different] from form.

and:[683]

> You say that if, since a collection is nothing,
> The shape is not of the collection of components,
> How could this that depends on nothing
> Come to be viewed as shape?
>
> Just as you assert such,
> You should assert likewise that all aspects
> Of effects dependent on untrue causes
> Have a nature of untruth.

and so forth, and hence it [absurdly] follows that in the system of the Proponents of True Existence the subject, a valid cognition comprehending a pot, is a valid cognition unmistaken with respect to a phenomenon established by way of its own character because of being a valid cognition.

Objection: They propound that although [a pot] is not ultimately established, it is established by way of its own character.[a]

Answer: That is not so because they assert that whatever is a specifically characterized phenomenon[b] is necessarily an ultimate truth, or truly established, as in the statement in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition:"*[684]

> Whatever can ultimately perform a function
> [Is said to] exist ultimately here [in this system].
> Others exist conventionally.
> These are said to be specifically and generally characterized [phenomena].

Therefore, [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] writing many times that "Whoever is a Proponent of True Existence asserts that effective things necessarily are specifically characterized phenomena and truly established," is a great deprecation of Proponents of True Existence and is a case of not investigating texts finely and is reduced to [his] thinking that henceforth there probably would be no one who would analyze others' textual systems.

Objection: Then what about the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* [in which he describes the position of Proponents of True Existence]?[685]

> If effective things do not exist in suchness,
> Then even conventionally they would not exist
> Like a child of a barren woman.
> Hence these are inherently existent.

Answer: Like the statement in Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths:*

> Some known to be bad disputants
> Say that since effective things are not produced in reality,
> They are not produced even conventionally,
> Like the child of a barren woman and so forth.

either [these statements] are made in terms of the occurrence of a mere few bad disputants such as the Forder Vaisheṣhikas, or they are cases of assuming an opponent's position for the sake of

[a] This is not Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's position.
[b] *rang mtshan.*

analyzing positions even though such does not occur.

The second corner of the reason [that is, that in the system of the Proponents of the Middle whatever is a valid cognition necessarily becomes a valid cognition mistaken with respect to phenomena not established by way of their own character] also is not established. It [absurdly] follows that in the system of the Proponents of the Middle the subject, a Buddha's exalted wisdom, is a valid cognition mistaken with respect to phenomena not established by way of their own character because of being a valid cognition.

The same is also so with regard to the example [hypothetically] stated by Bhāvaviveka,[a] "This is like the fact that when Buddhists prove for Vaisheṣhikas that sound is impermanent, mere sound is held as the subject upon having laid aside their respective assertions." Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*[b] saying that "The example does not have similarity with the subject" is proved by the fact that:

- sound that is derived from the elements would not be established for the other party [the Vaisheṣhika]
- and sound that is a quality of space would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

About this, it follows that although sound is established by their individual valid cognitions, it is not established in common

[a] Chandrakīrti speculates that Bhāvaviveka would say:

> [For example,] in [the proof] that sound is an impermanent thing, just generalities are to be taken as the subject and the predicate, without their being specified [with the particular tenets of the debaters]. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference [that is, inferring consciousness] and object inferred would be non-existent. For, if one used [as the subject] "sound that is derived from the elements," it would not be established for the other party [the Vaisheṣhika]. However, if one used "sound that is a quality of space," it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 507.

[b] Chandrakīrti says:

> There also is no similarity with the example. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence that are not asserted as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [the Buddhist and the Vaisheṣhika], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not [agree on] asserting a generality of eyes as conventionally [existent in the sense of not being established by way of its own character] or as ultimately [existent]. Hence, there also is no similarity with the example.

See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 513-514. I do not understand how Chandrakīrti's actual statement jibes with D̄ak-tsang's depiction of it.

appearance because:

1. in the Vaisheṣhikas' system whatever is a valid cognition comprehending sound necessarily has become a valid cognition with respect to permanent sound that is a quality of space
2. and in the Buddhists' system whatever is a valid cognition comprehending sound necessarily has become a valid cognition with respect to impermanent sound that is derived from the elements.

If you respond that the two reasons are not established, then when [I] say that you have thrown out establishment of the two reasons in what the example is exemplifying,[a] you have no answer.

FIFTH CONTRADICTION. That external objects are established by valid cognition and that small particles[b] *have parts are contradictory.*(592)

Anything could occur within the scope of not investigating and not analyzing mistaken appearances that are not established by valid cognition, but once validly established matter is posited in the perspective of slight analysis [as Dzong-ka-ba does], in the end it is not fitting except to have partless small particles [but this impossible] because:

- no Buddhist asserts that these gross objects are partless
- and when divided into parts, as long as there are directional parts small particles are impossible.

The Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons say with one voice:

> How could what has directional parts
> Be a small particle!

Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* also says that in the perspective of valid cognition there are no particles:[686]

> Due to divisions of directional parts in particles…
> Because those do not exist, particles also do not exist.

and:[687]

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[a] This refers back to Dak-tsang's depiction of Dzong-ka-ba's position (541):

(1) in the system of the Proponents of True Existence it is asserted that whatever is a valid cognition necessarily becomes a valid cognition unmistaken with respect to phenomena established by way of their own character, (2) whereas in the system of the Proponents of the Middle whatever is a valid cognition necessarily becomes a valid cognition mistaken with respect to phenomena not established by way of their own character.

[b] *rdul phran.*

Direct perception of forms and so forth
Is by renown, not by valid cognition.

It is as these two masters advise—these are by worldly renown, without asserting valid cognition in their own system even conventionally. It is said that horses and elephants in a magician's illusion and actual sentient beings are not differentiated by way of truth and falsity [or] length of continuum:[688]

How could a sentient being be truly existent
Merely due to having a long continuum?

Likewise, as [indicated] below [in the tenth contradiction] "That true and false exist and that real and unreal do not exist are contradictory," [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] proposition—while proclaiming with loud laughter that in the Middle Way School's own system there is no division of conventionalities into real and unreal—that since dream-fire cannot perform a function but waking-fire can, the former is posited as not established by valid cognition and the latter is established by valid cognition is the hugest contradiction, as follows. (593)

[Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] is saying: It follows that fire when about to wake up from minor sleep that appears in a dream to be very hot is not able to perform the function of burning because if it did, it would have to burn right after waking but it does not.

Response: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, hot fire of a dream and the great fire when one is about to transmigrate from a hell, the dream of great sleep,[a] is not able to perform the function of burning because if it did, then for the time being after switching bodies [upon passing to the next life] and finally upon waking from the great sleep, it would have to burn the body but it does not.

Objection: It does not need to burn after switching body and mind; it is established as able to perform a function by the very fact that it strongly generates feeling in the unchanged body.

Answer: Then, it is the same also for minor sleep.

Hence, though [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] strives within wanting to be among the Great Middle Way, these assertions are leftovers of the apprehensions of inherent existence by Autonomists and below.

Since those [five] appear to be his main contradictions, [I] have spoken at length about them, and since the others appear to be

[a] *gnyid mo che'i* [or *tsha'i*] *rmi lam.*

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minor relative to those, they are as if not worth detailing.[a] Still, this system is an extreme case of holding one's own view to be supreme, making the huge, bad pronouncement about all scholars and adepts of snowy Tibet that they only appear not to be directed toward the Middle Way. In particular, since the two—the Great Translator Tam-j̄ay-kyen-b̄a,[b] emanation of our holy refuge the glorious Elder Atisha, and his holy senior spiritual son, great scholar of scholars Shön-nu-l̄o-drö[c]—are in great accord with respect to their thought on the great middle way, [D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his followers say that] because the object of negation by reasoning is too wide [in their system], they have fallen to a view of nihilism. [In this way] they cover the space of pages with black nets, stringing together in threads of letters a great collection of poisonous thorns of hateful propositions. Motivated by not being able to stand this, [I] have leveled a few consequences, but through the condition of great forbearance may all these splendiferous rainbows of mistaken appearances of desire and hatred be pacified within the sphere of reality, devoid of proliferation, due to their being without foundation and rootless.

SIXTH CONTRADICTION. That the six types [of appearances] are valid and that gross corporality[d] *is established by valid cognition are contradictory.*

This is because it is impossible for two instances of corporeal and obstructive matter—established by valid cognition and able to cover an area—to simultaneously occupy a single spot such as a full bowl. Furthermore, appearances of a bowl full of what is wet and moistening—to a god, a human, a hungry ghost, and so forth—as ambrosia, water, pus-and-blood, and so forth are karmic appearances, and hence this proposition [by D̄zong-ka-b̄a] that these are individually established by their individual valid cognitions, which he asserts to be the meaning of [Chandrakīrti's saying in the *Supplement*],[689] "A hungry ghost's awareness of a watery river as pus and blood," is not right because:

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a *brjod rin mi chog pa lta bu;* translation doubtful.

b *lo chen thams cad mkhyen pa.* Since earlier D̄ak-tsang stated that Great Translator Ḡyap-chok-b̄el-sang-b̄o (*lo chen skyabs mchog dpal bzang po,* 14th century), was an incarnation of Atisha, it is likely that this is his referent here. Thanks to Kevin Vose for the note.

c *zhon nu blo gros / red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros,* 1349-1412; a S̄a-ḡya who was one of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's principal teachers.

d *rdos bcas.* This is obstructive materiality.

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- with respect to the falling hairs appearing to one having a visual disease [mentioned in the line just] before it "Similar to one with a sense power having an eye disease," [Chandrakīrti's] commentary says that the statement [in the *Supplement*]:[690]

  Both of those are true relative to awarenesses,
  But both are false for those who see objects clearly.

  is to be carried over also to here, whereby he says that those two are similar, and
- that falling hairs do not exist and that the pus in the appearance [to a hungry ghost] as pus on the substratum of a watery river exists are contradictory. (592)

SEVENTH CONTRADICTION. That falling hairs do not exist and that a river of pus [appearing to a hungry ghost] exists are contradictory.

EIGHTH CONTRADICTION. That substantial establishment[a] *does not exist and that things*[b] *exist are contradictory.*
Those are contradictory because substance and thing are equivalent in any and all systems of tenets.

Objection: When [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"*] says:[691]

If the aggregates were the self,
Then because of the plurality of those aggregates, the selves
would also just be many.
Also the self would be a substantiality and viewing it as such
Would not be erroneous if it is acting on a substantiality.

and so forth, he refutes [that the self is] a substantiality; [he does not refute that it is a thing].

Answer: Things are also refuted in [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*][692] "Conceptions would be so if things existed," and so forth, and in:

If one has assertion of things,
Awful views giving rise
To desire and hatred become intractable.

Objection: [What is being refuted] is not mere things, but truly established things.

Answer: Then that would [absurdly] be the same also for substance.

However, although the lower schools of tenets each assert two,

a *rdzas grub, dravyasiddha.*
b *dngos po, bhāva.*

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saying that:

- objective phenomena[a] substantially exist
- mental phenomena[b] imputedly exist,

if this is put together with the thought here [in the Consequence School] that objects of knowledge are necessarily imputedly existent, it is likewise.

NINTH CONTRADICTION. That production from other does not exist and that seed and shoot are other substantial entities are contradictory.
If seed and shoot are not asserted as other substantial entities, they would be one substantial entity or one thing, but such an assertion is like Sāṃkhya [and hence unsuitable, due to which in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's system seed and shoot are asserted to be other substantial entities]. Also [his] not taking object produced and producer—that are other substantial entities—as production from other contradicts [his] assertion of worldly valid cognition in [the Middle Way School's] own system. Hence, this and the next contradiction have already been explained.

TENTH CONTRADICTION. That true and false exist and that real and unreal do not exist are contradictory.

ELEVENTH CONTRADICTION. That a pot is not found upon analyzing the components and that having-disintegrated[c] is found upon analyzing moments are contradictory.
The assertion that a pot that is other than its individual component phenomena is not found by reasoned analysis of a pot's components—form, odor, and so forth—and the assertion that a having-disintegrated that is an effective thing other than an action's continuum of similar type is found in the perspective of analysis of the moments of an action are contradictory. For, both the objects analyzed and the modes of analysis are in all ways parallel.

TWELFTH CONTRADICTION. That Autonomists[d] propound inherent nature[e] and that the absence of inherent existence is established in the perspective of their awareness are contradictory.
[Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] stating many proofs that Middle Way

[a] *don chos.*
[b] *blo chos.*
[c] *zhig pa.* This is the state of having disintegrated, not the activity of disintegrating.
[d] *rang rgyud, svatantra.*
[e] *rang bzhin, svabhāva.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Autonomists propound in their own system an assertion of establishment by way of [the object's] own character, intrinsic establishment, substantial establishment, and inherent establishment is internally contradictory with his explanation that an awareness directly realizing the absence of inherent existence is established in the perspective of those Autonomists' awareness [when he says that] this consequence:

> The subject, a yogi's exalted wisdom realizing that all phenomena are without an inherent nature, realizes emptiness in the manner of deprecating the inherent existence of things because things are established by way of their own character and it realizes that things are without inherent existence.

is a flawless consequence flung at Autonomists—[claiming that this is] the unmistaken meaning of this passage [from Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*]:[693]

> If establishment by way of the object's own character depended [on causes,
> A yogī realizing emptiness], by denying that, would be destroying phenomena.
> Therefore, [seeing] emptiness would be a cause destroying phenomena,
> But since this is not reasonable, phenomena do not [inherently exist].

For no Proponent of True Existence asserts such an exalted wisdom.

These two are contradictory because this is not different from asserting that a pot exists and then saying that there is a valid cognition realizing that it does not exist. Also, it follows that [Chandrakīrti] did not fling such at Autonomists, and it is unreasonable to fling such because no Autonomist asserts such [a subject], since they assert that inherent existence exists.

This is reduced to being the fallacy of omitting a word in what [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] should have put together as "a *true* inherent nature," but since he holds that even his own words are free from the three fallacies of excessiveness, omission, and error, I have made [this attribution of contradiction].

THIRTEENTH CONTRADICTION. That non-afflictive ignorance exists and that obstructions to omniscience that are not consciousnesses do not exist are contradictory.

Those are contradictory because:

- this system clearly asserts that the afflictive emotions are consciousnesses conceiving true existence and those [mental factors] in parallel association with them
- and there is no illustration of a non-afflictive ignorance other than the obscuration on the pure grounds [that is, the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds] which are free from the afflictive emotions, and this non-afflictive ignorance is not outside the obstructions to omniscience from between the two obstructions.

Objection: Although such occurs in sūtras and treatises of manifest knowledge, this system does not assert those, due to which predispositions obstructing thorough encompassment[a] of objects of knowledge, called obstructions to omniscience, is asserted as non-afflictive ignorance.

Answer: Though the glorious Chandrakīrti did not need [that is, did not bother to] refute the meaning of the sūtras of manifest knowledge, he would have written a separate presentation of afflictive emotions, secondary afflictive emotions, and so forth upon refuting many [such things in those sūtras] because [according to you] he did not assert in the least the ignorance that is the chief of the six root afflictive emotions described in manifest knowledge.

FOURTEENTH CONTRADICTION. It is contradictory to refute and thus not assert in your own system the basis-of-all, self-cognition, and so forth described in other texts and to refute the valid cognition described in the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition, but in your own system to know a presentation of valid cognition.

Similarly, when you refute the entirety of the definitions of [the basis-of-all, self-cognition, and so forth described] in other texts such as Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* and so forth, you do not assert even their mere names in your own system such that when the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his sons use the name "basis-of-all" and so forth with regard to *Guhyasamāja* and so forth, you avoid them, saying "It is not the occasion."[b] Then, it is contradictory that although you do not assert the definition of valid cognition—"that which is newly non-deceptive," [or] "that which comprehends the specifically characterized"—and so forth described in Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition, you know a

a *yongs su dpyod pa.*

b *skabs ma yin no.*

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presentation of valid cognition in the Middle Way School's own system, because the situations are entirely parallel.

FIFTEENTH CONTRADICTION. That realizations of impermanence and so forth are yogic direct perceptions and that through them one does not arrive at realization of the path of preparation are contradictory.

The assertions:

- that exalted wisdoms directly realizing impermanence and so forth are yogic direct perceptions
- and the assertion that through those realizations one does not arrive even at realization of the path of preparation because realization of the absence of inherent existence is required for the exalted wisdoms of the paths of preparation of all three vehicles

are contradictory. This is because you [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] have asserted that there are persons on the path of accumulation who have not previously proceeded on another path and who possess yogic direct perception in their continuum. And hence, this [means that] although whatever is a yogic direct perception is outside the exalted wisdom of a Superior, it is reduced to being only a direct realization of a conventional mode of subsistence—subtle impermanence—whereby it does not pass beyond mental direct perception. Through this, the next contradiction is also understood.

SIXTEENTH CONTRADICTION. That a consciousness of another's mind is a mental direct perception and that a consciousness of the four truths is a yogic direct perception are contradictory.

SEVENTEENTH CONTRADICTION. That an omniscient exalted wisdom comprehends all phenomena and that it is not a valid cognition with respect to half of objects of knowledge are contradictory.

You assert that although the single substantial entity of a Buddha's exalted wisdom knows both objects of knowledge—the mode of being and the diversity—it is differentiated by way of isolate factors such that just as when the productness and impermanence that are with a sound are differentiated by isolate factors due to the fact that their definitions are posited individually, their illustrations also exist individually, so the exalted wisdom of the mode of being and the exalted wisdom of the diversity have individual isolates that are illustrations of them. Hence, when an exalted wisdom knowing the mode of being becomes a valid cognition with respect to the diverse objects of knowledge, has it become a valid cognition that is

an exalted wisdom distinguishing the ultimate or a valid cognition distinguishing the conventional? If the former, then the diversity would be ultimate truths. If the latter, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, an exalted wisdom knowing the mode of being, is a valid cognition distinguishing the conventional because of having become a valid cognition with respect to the diverse.

If you say that [becoming a valid cognition with respect to the diverse] does not entail [being a valid cognition distinguishing the conventional], then since it is a distinguisher of the ultimate with respect to the mode of being, positing it as that [that is, as a valid cognition with respect to the diverse] is contradictory. If you accept [that an exalted wisdom knowing the mode of being is a valid cognition distinguishing the conventional], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the mode of being, is the main of the objects of comprehension of a valid cognition distinguishing the conventional because of being the main of the objects of comprehension of a valid cognition knowing the mode of being, and it is a valid cognition distinguishing the conventional.

When analyzed this way, the exalted wisdom [of a Buddha] does not become either of the two valid cognitions with respect to diverse objects of knowledge, whereby it would not be a valid cognition with respect to half of the objects of knowledge, but this is not [your] explicit assertion.

EIGHTEENTH CONTRADICTION. That proponents of a substantially existent self are limited to the Vatsīputrīyas and that there are Proponents of Mind-Only and Proponents of the Middle who propound that consciousness is the self are contradictory.

[Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] explanation with respect to the statement [in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*]:[694]

> Some assert a substantially existent person inexpressible
> As one with or other [than the aggregates], permanent or impermanent and so forth.

that proponents of a substantially existent self are limited to the Vatsīputrīyas and his assertion that there are scholars of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School, such as Bhāvaviveka and so forth, who propound that the mental consciousness is an illustration of the self are contradictory. Therefore, our own schools, except for the Vatsīputrīyas, disagree about the basis of imputation that is imputed as the self, or person—whether all five aggregates, the mental consciousness, the basis-of-all, their continuum, and so

forth—but they all only assert that the object imputed, the actual person, is either a substantially existent or imputedly existent non-associated compositional factor. There is no one who asserts that there is a common locus of (1) form or consciousness and (2) person. Hence, this also is a very great basis for analysis, but it not being necessary to make the scriptures act as judge, [I] will be satisfied about many [points] for the time being.[a]

INDICATING THE CAUSE

The cause for his having such a great burden of contradictions
Is that even though he says again and again,
"This is from just the world without analysis,"
Due to being accustomed to logic, he analyzes and makes
proofs upon inserting logicality.

Since presentations of conventionalities are to be posited by way of just worldly renown without investigation and analysis, [Dzong-ka-ba] says again and again, "This is from just the world without analysis," but through the force of having trained well in and become accustomed in general to the logic in Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition and in particular to Autonomists' texts such as Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* and so forth, he analytically makes proofs with reasonings by the power of the fact,[b] inserting reasoned logicality into presentations of conventionalities. This entails my point because once he makes such proofs, if he left the Autonomy School as it is, the internal contradictions would be very few, but he puts it together with the great path system [of the Consequence School] that does not agree with them, in which real and unreal are not asserted and so forth.

Chandrakīrti, right from his promise to compose the *Clear Words,* promises, "I will make clarification undisturbed by the winds of logic." While the Logicians fall into a chasm between giving up one branch of a tree and grabbing the next, [Chandrakīrti] works within non-investigation and non-analysis of the ordinary world:[695]

Because aside from these experiences of objects,
I do not have such ponderings,
I see, think, and remember;
This also is the way of the world's conventions.

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[a] *gsung rab dpang por byed mi dgos pas mang po zhig 'phral du 'tshengs so.*

[b] *dngos stobs rig pa.* Dak-tsang uses *rig pa* in places where some others use *rigs pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

He says again and again that due to forsaking such and not understanding the Great Middle Way and making proofs and so forth of experience through other routes of pondering, one falls from suchness.

Ḏak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets:*[696]

I have realized that all of the supreme texts of the father Nāgārjuna
And his spiritual son [Āryadeva], Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, and Shāntideva
Are to be correlated in three phases—
Non-analytical, slightly analytical, and well analyzed.
Conventionalities are in the perspective of the non-analytical, worldly innate.
The ultimate is in the perspective of slightly analytical rational consciousness.
Freedom from proliferations is in the perspective of well analyzed non-verbalization.
Those who know these three well are Proponents of the Great Middle Way.
For from these three in stages
Initially the non-meritorious is overcome,
In the middle the two views of self are overcome,
And finally all proliferations of views are overcome.
Moreover, when initially in the perspective of innate mistakenness
One engages as usual in apprehending the agent and the analyzer as units,
Without being infected with logic,
Effects arise from actions that are without inherent existence.
At the end of analyzing whether it is permanent or impermanent,
They assert a continuum, non-wastage, and so forth.
Having refuted all those assertions by others,
The proposition is made that having-disintegrated and in addition the further having-disintegrated
Of that having-disintegrated and so forth are effective things and so forth—
Like the Great Exposition School's happy offering of acquisition—
But it is endless, due to which achievement of the first does not

occur.
Therefore, it is not suitable to analyze factors of moments.
Usual worldly analysis as to whether being inside or outside,
Whether going and coming, and so forth and this are not parallel.
During the second phase the non-production and emptiness of true existence—
The non-finding of the objects of the mode of apprehension of the two apprehensions of self
Upon being sought with the supreme of reasons—is non-deceptive, the supreme of objects,
And comprehensions of it are established only conventionally as valid cognitions.
Therefore, that the emptiness of true existence is the ultimate truth
And its existence is a conventional truth are indeed correct,
But those who at the end of good analysis assert just this
And those who assert it as an enumerative ultimate are both mistaken.
If in the third it is apprehended as even only a non-affirming negative,
Then since apprehended-object and apprehending-subject and object-possessors have not been stopped,
It cannot sever the proliferations of dualistic appearance.
Hence, with the expanse and knowledge like water placed in water
Without the slightest observation of object known and knower,
Like the expression "Space is seen," all proliferations are pacified
Because the honorable Nāgārjuna says that if object realized
And realizer exist, it is not enlightenment.
An inferential rational consciousness, generated into having the aspect
Of the emptiness of true existence and strongly inducing ascertainment of that,
Is a state arisen from thinking. How could it be a meditative awareness!
Therefore, it is an precursor to meditative equipoise.
Induced by this ascertaining consciousness, non-apprehension of anything

And Hwa-shang's view do not have any chance of being similar.
Therefore, setting aside initiative without the second [phase] as a precursor
And emphatic apprehension of a non-affirming negative in the third phase are mistaken.
Therefore, all—the basis, path, and fruit—in our own system
Are in the perspective of slight analysis, whereby those who propound
That in this system there is no analysis contradict the statements
That the analytical are released, and so forth.

Ḏak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets":*[697]

BRIEF INDICATION OF THE THESIS THAT ALL PRESENTATIONS ARE CORRELATED WITH THREE PHASES

I have realized that all of the supreme texts of the father Nāgārjuna
And his spiritual son [Āryadeva], Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, and Shāntideva
Are to be correlated in three phases—
Non-analytical, slightly analytical, and well analyzed.

I have realized that…in general, all of the scriptures of the Conqueror and, in particular, all of the supreme texts of the father the Superior Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son [Āryadeva], Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, and Shāntideva are to be correlated in three phases—non-analytical, slightly analytical, and well analyzed. For when they are correlated in the phase of non-investigation and non-analysis, in the phase of slight analysis by a rational consciousness, and in the phase of good analysis devoid of verbalization, they are very conveniently practiced. Moreover, with respect to those [tenets] that are manufactured by the respective conceptualizations of the Autonomists and below, what is explicitly indicated in each of them must be explained in connection with individual schools, but in general in the middle word of the Conqueror and specifically in the texts of these Proponents of the Great Middle Way—father and sons—[there are the following three phases].

Non-Analytical Phase

Conventionalities are in the perspective of the non-analytical, worldly innate.

The basis (the aggregates, constituents, and sense-spheres), the

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paths that are practices in the class of method, and the fruits (exalted bodies, deeds, and so forth) are to be correlated in the non-investigatory and non-analytical presentation of conventionalities. Furthermore, these are mostly worldly conventionalities in the sense of already being renowned in the world or of being suitable to be renowned in the world, and there are also those in line with yogic conventionalities, such as modes of appearance in meditative equipoise and states subsequent to meditative equipoise.

Slightly Analytical Phase

The ultimate is in the perspective of slightly analytical rational consciousness.

Those in the cycle of positing non-production, emptiness, and ultimate truth upon refuting the two selves that are the objects of negation are posited in the perspective of a slightly analytical rational consciousness.

Well Analyzed Phase

Freedom from proliferations is in the perspective of well analyzed non-verbalization.

The likes of most of what is explicitly taught in the Mother of Conquerors—in statements such as that [phenomena] are not established as existent, non-existent, permanent, impermanent, empty, non-empty, and so forth and that it is not suitable to apprehend anything—and the likes of the first three lines of this statement in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle:*

> "Empty" is not to be said.
> "Not empty" also is not to be said.
> Nor dual and non-dual.
> Those are uttered for the sake of designation.

are to be correlated with the phase of good analysis. Since [the three phases] are explained this way, there is not even the slightest contradiction with each other.

There are those [such as Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] who—for all instances of explanations in Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that forms, sounds, and so forth do not exist—seek refuge in an object of negation [called] "imputational [nature]" used by Proponents of Mind-Only or "ultimately" used by actual Autonomists and by those similar to them; doing this, they assert explicitly or implicitly that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras require interpretation in the sense of being unsuitable to be asserted literally and thereby explain the meaning of those sūtras. They are not within Nāgārjuna's system. Rather, since prior to whatsoever substratum of exposition, the Perfection

of Wisdom Sūtras say, "When Bodhisattvas course in the perfection of wisdom," it is suitable to assert literally that when the nature of whatsoever phenomena is contemplated, those respective phenomena do not exist, and when set in the sphere of the intensive quiescence of objects of observation, phenomena are inexpressible as "exists," "not exists," "is," "is not," and so forth.

Hence, with the Conqueror himself putting it together this way, the explanation—that in their explicit teaching [the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] are sūtras of literal definitive meaning from the viewpoint of their mode of expression just not incurring any harm by reasoning—is, without question, the Superior [Nāgārjuna's] assertion. This being the case, the master Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says that meditation on a non-affirming negative, an ultimate truth that is the absence of production, the emptiness of true existence, and so forth is to meditate on self:

Those who meditate on an emptiness
Having a low nature by way of [thinking]
"No production," "empty," and "selfless,"
Meditate on self here.[a]

And concerning the attempt [by Ḏzong-ka-ḇa and his followers] to dispel the [apparent] contradiction of [Nāgārjuna's] also saying that emptiness is endowed with logicality and that if emptiness is not realized, liberation is not attained:

The mind of enlightenment itself
Is described as thusness,
The limit of reality, signlessness,
The ultimate, and emptiness.
Those who do not know emptiness
Have no lot for liberation.

they say that the former is in consideration of apprehending emptiness as truly established. Though such is suitable as merely tending in the direction[b] [of the actual meaning], it will be explained at length that the likes of the former [type of exposition] is in consideration of the third phase and the likes of the latter [type of exposition] is in consideration of the second phase.

Reason and Purpose for Correlating All Presentations in Three Phases: Brief Indication of the Individual Phases

Concerning the reason for correlation in three phases, in general,

[a] For Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's response to this quote, see 615.

[b] *phyogs 'gro tsam.*

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all phenomena are included in the basal two truths, and, moreover, confirmational mistaken [consciousnesses] posit obscurational truths, and confirmational non-mistaken [wisdom] posits ultimate truth. With respect to the first:

1. non-investigatory non-analytical mistaken awarenesses of common beings in which adherence to true existence has not been conquered by antidotes posit obscurational truths
2. and the three types of Superiors'[a] mistaken [awarenesses] endowed with a little appearance of true existence in states subsequent to meditative equipoise in which adherence to true existence has been conquered by antidotes posit mere-conventionalities (606), or yogic conventionalities, or Middle Way conventionalities,

and since all of these are posited without reasoned investigation and analysis:

> The subjects, conventionalities,[b] are not posited in the perspective of analysis by reasoning because they must be posited in the perspective of non-investigatory and non-analytical worldly innate [consciousness].

Furthermore, not only are worldly conventionalities not analyzed as to whether or not they are truly established, they are not analyzed as to whether or not they are only established momentarily. However, with respect to yogic conventionalities there are cases of analyzing with a conventional awareness whether something is merely established as momentary or not.

About the explanation in Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (667) that, in general, there is no establishment of conventionalities by valid cognition, [a hypothetical] question is raised: "Is it not said that compounded [phenomena] are established as momentary?" He says:[698]

> Even the momentariness of those that the Protector [Buddha]
> Explicitly teaches for the sake of the world's entry
> [Into the doctrine] is not so in suchness.

[The hypothetical objector then remarks that] when it is explained that in suchness [compounded phenomena] are not established as momentary:

> "Then, it is contradictory [for compounded phenomena to be

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[a] That is, Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva Superiors.

[b] *tha snyad kun rdzob;* this means "*saṃvṛti* in the sense of conventionality" as opposed to "*saṃvṛti* in the sense of ignorance."

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momentary] even conventionally."

[*Answer:*] There is no fallacy with respect to yogic conventionalities;

A suchness relative to the world is seen.

[Shāntideva] says that the sixteen [attributes] of the four truths—impermanence and so forth—are the conventional mode of subsistence, or conventional suchness, and yoga realizing those is conventional means of analysis. Hence, when in this system a sole awareness directly realizing merely this occurs, it is said that it is a mistaken consciousness subsequent to meditative equipoise involving appearance, whereby there is no way for it to be a yogic direct perception. Therefore, it is difficult to posit it as other than mental direct perception.

Objection: Well then, since [a yogic consciousness realizing the impermanence of compounded phenomena] is established as a valid cognition, establishment of conventionalities by valid cognition does indeed occur.

Answer: Even in the Logicians' own system direct perceptions are not necessarily valid cognitions,[a] and if [a consciousness] has become a valid cognition with respect to an object, it is non-deceptive, and if it comprehends [the object] non-deceptively, it must comprehend it as true conventionally, and if it comprehends it as true, this contradicts the extensive statement in the root text of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* and autocommentary that "[Superiors] perceive conventionalities as only false; they do not comprehend them as true." [The *Supplement* says,][699] "Fabricated things [exist] conventionally [that is, obscurationally]." Not only that, but also [if yogic conventionalities were worldly conventionalities, such yogic perceptions would] not even differ from an awareness that has adherence to true existence.

The subject, ultimate truth, is not posited in the perspective of either [first phase] non-investigatory and non-analytical [awareness] or [third phase] good analysis because the refutations of production from the four extremes and so forth are objects of comprehension established as existing in the perspective of rational valid cognition [the second phase, slight analysis].

Objection: Since the refutations of production from the four extremes and so forth are the finality of reasonings, they are good

[a] Ḍak-tsang holds that such yogic direct realizations, despite being mental direct perceptions, are not valid cognitions.

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analysis, not slight analysis.

Answer: They are [slight analysis] because Shūra (610) says:

With respect to the true suchness of the mind,
When it is analyzed a little in this way,
It is not from self, not from other,
Not from both, and not causelessly.

and so forth.

In the perspective of slight analysis all that are posited as any of the two selves dependent on persons and phenomena do not in the least exist, and the mode of subsistence that is the emptiness of self is ultimate truth. Many earlier ones who are renowned as Middle Way Autonomists and Consequentialists say that this is only a "enumerative ultimate" since it is a mere ultimate that is the negative of one portion of proliferations. This non-affirming negative noumenon that is such non-existence of production, emptiness of true establishment, and so forth is a special mode of subsistence that is established and exists through that [slight analysis] because:

- not just once do [Buddha's] words of Sūtra and Mantra and great chariots commenting on their thought say that if initially one does not delineate this and familiarize with it through states arisen from meditation, the mode of apprehension of afflictive emotions apprehending the two selves is not overcome, and if that is not reversed, one is not even liberated from cyclic existence
- and it is also established by reasoning.

Hence, those who assert that since this is an annihilatory emptiness, a trifling emptiness, and an enumerative ultimate, it is not to be meditated discard this presentation of the second phase of all scriptures that is just extensively set forth. Although they lay claim to cultivating total non-conceptuality, this does no damage to the mode of apprehension of self, whereby it is certain that it turns into something like a meditative absorption of no discrimination.

The subject, freedom from proliferations that is free from the four extremes even merely conventionally, is not positable in the perspective of slight analysis—never mind being positable in the perspective of non-investigatory and non-analytical mistaken [awareness]—because it is set forth in the perspective of the unpredicability and inconceivability of good analysis of all extremes of existence and non-existence. Moreover, this is the meaning indicated by (612):

Not existent, not non-existent, not existent and non-existent,

Also not not having a nature of both.

and so forth, and (612):

If the non-empty existed a little,
The empty would also exist a little.
When the non-empty does not exist a little,
How could the empty exist?

that appears even in sūtras and treatises. Also, the statement by earlier Tibetans, "Not being established as any object, do not apprehend anything with the mind," and the assertion by the great translator N̄gok L̄o-den-s̄hay-rap[a] and so forth that the ultimate truth is not an established base are in consideration of this.

I also do not assert this as a mere non-affirming negative that is a mere elimination of an object of negation, never mind a positive that is established in an inclusionary manner [upon negation of an object of negation] because:

- if it were [a mere non-affirming negative], the emptiness of emptiness would be a non-affirming negative that negates emptiness, in which case it would go on endlessly—the emptiness negating the emptiness of emptiness, the emptiness negating it, and so forth
- and since emptiness is a non-affirming negative, if there is some phenomenon to be established in place of the negation of it, it could not be anything but a positive [phenomenon], it would not even be suitable to use the mere convention [or vocabulary] of "emptiness" for it.

Question: Are all statements that the ultimate is beyond consciousness and expression in consideration of this?

Answer: They are in consideration of this, and also since with regard to the non-affirming negative noumenon—except for being a non-appearance that is only the negative of an object of negation, devoid of an aspect—there is nothing to dawn in an inclusionary way in the perspective of consciousness and verbalization, it is called unspeakable, inconceivable, and inexpressible.

Objection: Well then, it would not even be established as an object of mere awareness.

Answer: It does not become so merely due to that because [in the stanza that begins] "The perfection of wisdom unspeakable, inconceivable, and inexpressible," the third line itself "Object of activity of individual self-cognition," indicates—in consideration of

[a] *rngog blo ldan shes rab,* 1059-1109.

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the perfection of wisdom as object [and not the consciousness]—that it is the object of the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Those who know these three well are Proponents of the Great
Middle Way.
For from these three in stages
Initially the non-meritorious is overcome,
In the middle the two views of self are overcome,
And finally all proliferations of views are overcome.

In brief, there is a reason for correlating scriptures that are the means of expression and presentations of objects expressed in three phases because those who know this mode of correlation of these three well are Proponents of the Great Middle Way. For with respect to the purpose, the reason is that from knowing well the mode of correlating these three phases three special purposes of the teachings in scriptures are achieved in the beginning, middle and end because in stages:

- initially having overcome the non-meritorious through unanalyzed adoption and discarding [of behavior], the path of high status [that is, rebirth as a human or god] is achieved
- in the middle having overcome the two views of self through slightly analytical practice, the path of liberation is achieved
- and finally having overcome all proliferations of views, one brings to conclusion the path of omniscience.

REASON AND PURPOSE FOR CORRELATING ALL PRESENTATIONS IN THREE PHASES: EXTENSIVE EXPLANATION WITHIN CORRELATING THE PHASES

Reason and Purpose for the First Phase

Moreover, when initially in the perspective of innate mistakenness
One engages as usual in apprehending the agent and the analyzer
as units,
Without being infected with logic,
Effects arise from actions that are without inherent existence.

Let us explain at length what has been indicated in brief. Initially, when mainly performing adoption and discarding [of behavior], a non-investigatory and non-analytical mode of engagement is very important because these [activities] must be done in the mistaken perspective of apprehending former and later to be one, and when in the perspective of innate mistakenness one engages as usual in apprehending the agent and the analyzer as units, without being infected with logic, effects arise from actions that are without inherent existence.

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At the end of analyzing whether it is permanent or impermanent,
They assert a continuum, non-wastage, and so forth.
Having refuted all those assertions by others,
The proposition is made that having-disintegrated and in addition the further having-disintegrated
Of that having-disintegrated and so forth are effective things and so forth—
Like the Great Exposition School's happy offering of acquisition—
But it is endless, due to which achievement of the first does not occur.
Therefore, it is not suitable to analyze factors of moments.
Usual worldly analysis as to whether being inside or outside,
Whether going and coming, and so forth and this are not parallel.

However, if [such activities are] treated at the end of analysis, no matter how they are contrived, they become faulty in the following way:

[The Proponents of True Existence] are challenged with an objection analyzing an action as an effective thing established from the object's own side:

If it remains until the time of fruition,
That action would be permanent.
If it ceases, how could what has ceased
Issue forth an effect?

In response, at the end of analyzing whether an action is permanent or impermanent within the context of taking the substratum's true establishment and establishment by valid cognition as a foundation:

- Proponents of True Existence in general assert a continuum
- Proponents of Sūtra assert non-wastage
- Proponents of Cognition assert a basis-of-all

and so forth. Having extensively refuted all these assertions by others, [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] makes the proposition—like the Great Exposition School's happy offering of acquisition (239, 240, 935)—that an action's having-disintegrated and, in addition, the further having-disintegrated of that having-disintegrated and so forth are effective things and so forth. However, this is endless, due to which achievement of the first [having-disintegrated] does not occur. Also, this does not appear to be the thought of the text, since Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* at this point[700] says that an action has not

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disintegrated (597):

> According to those for whom an action is not produced by way of its own entity, its cessation does not exist, and it also is not that the arising of an effect from the non-disintegrated does not occur. Hence, since actions have not disintegrated, the connection of an action and an effect is very feasible.

and he does not say in the slightest that even though [an action] has disintegrated, [effects] arise from its having-disintegrated, this being established by valid cognition. Also, because if having-disintegrated is asserted this way in this [Consequence School], it would have to be asserted—with respect to the arising of memory from an experience—that memory arises from an experience's having-disintegrated, whereas Chandrakīrti says that memory arises from a worldly presentation in which, without investigation and analysis, former and later are apprehended as one:[701]

> For me this memory is not other[702]
> Than that [consciousness] by which the object was experienced,
> Hence, one remembers, "I saw [this]."
> This is also the way of worldly conventions.

Therefore, the facts that "Although this man today is not yesterday's man, he is a continuation of him,"[a] and so forth, are conventional truths infected with logic.

For this reason, when engaging in merely conventional adoption and discarding [of behavior], it is not suitable to do so within analyzing factors of moments with regard to time and factors of directions with regard to the physical because if analyzed, it comes that unsupportable fabrications[b]—such as asserting a common locus of small particle and that having directional parts,[c] and so forth—are needed.

Objection: It is indeed true that it is not suitable to employ ultimate analysis with respect to conventionalities, but if analysis of moments, components, and so forth is not suitable, it would not be feasible even to analyze whether a person is inside or outside a

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[a] *de'i rgyun.*

[b] *lus ma longs pa'i rang bzo.*

[c] That is, something is both a small particle and has directional parts; see Ḏak-tsang's fifth contradiction, 544.

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house, whether a person is going and coming, and so forth.

Answer: Those and this are not parallel:

- This analysis of parts and components can dispose of an awareness apprehending those as [things] established from the object's own side, whereby they are suitable to dispose of coarse apprehensions of true existence observing those, and hence great beings who are Proponents of Things explain [this analysis] at length, and it is also set forth in sūtras.
- However, scriptures do not say that what you are trying to make parallel to this has such a capacity, and no matter how much one thinks about it, reasoning also cannot [make it so]. This appearance is a fallacy of your analysis.

Reason and Purpose for the Second Phase

During the second phase the non-production and emptiness of true existence—
The non-finding of the objects of the mode of apprehension of the two apprehensions of self
Upon being sought with the supreme of reasons—is non-deceptive, the supreme of objects,
And comprehensions of it are established only conventionally as valid cognitions.

During the second phase the absence of true production and the emptiness of true existence—the nature that is found upon seeking and not finding the objects of the mode of apprehension of the two apprehensions of self with the supreme of reasons, the lack of being one or many and so forth—are said, for the time being, to be non-deceptive, "Only nirvāṇa is a truth,"[703] in consideration of the ultimate truth, the natural nirvāṇa. This which is the supreme of objects, since meditation within observing it is capable of generating a Superior path, is a truth in yogic conventions, and even inferential rational consciousnesses that can occur in common beings' continuums—never mind an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise comprehending it—are valid cognitions that are awarenesses non-deceptive with respect to the object of their mode of apprehension, while not being ultimately established. Therefore, during the second phase you should strive at this from many approaches in order to generate what has not been generated and to familiarize with what has been generated.

Therefore, that the emptiness of true existence is the ultimate truth
And its existence is a conventional truth are indeed correct,
But those who at the end of good analysis assert just this

And those who assert it as an enumerative ultimate are both mistaken.

Therefore, those who assert that the emptiness of true existence itself is the ultimate truth and its existence is a conventional truth are indeed correct in accordance with taking this to be an eloquent explanation, but (1) those who:

- assert that just this ultimate truth is established at the end of the good analysis of the third phase,
- assert that the aspect of a non-affirming negative dawns to non-conceptuality by way of asserting that even a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise has the aspect of the emptiness of true existence,
- and prove that since a pot's emptiness of true existence and a pillar's emptiness of true existence are different entities, the noumenon is not established as singular, and so forth

and (2) those of earlier generations and Autonomists who assert that [the emptiness of true existence] is not an actual ultimate truth but is an enumerative ultimate are both mistaken.

The first contradicts:

- the many statements that it is not suitable to apprehend the finality[a] as anything
- the statement in the *Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra:*[704]

  Analyze how space is seen as in the expression
  By sentient beings in words, "Space is seen."
  The One-Gone-Thus teaches that seeing the noumenon is also like that.

  and so forth
- the statement, "Non-seeing is excellent seeing," and so forth
- Nāgārjuna's statement:

  A mind devoid of observation
  Abides in the character of space.
  This meditating on space
  Is called meditating on emptiness.

  and so forth

because [according to you] meditative equipoise is not devoid of an object of observation. Moreover, it would be incorrect for Shāntideva to say:[705]

When things and non-things
Do not dwell in front of awareness,

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[a] *mthar thug.*

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because [according to you] a non-thing dwells in front of awareness. [This first position] is also damaged by such consequences as that it [absurdly] follows that it is not correct to say that an eye consciousness does not explicitly realize the absence of a pot [on, for instance, a table on which there is no pot],[a] and so forth.

The second is damaged by such consequences as that:

- It [absurdly] follows that the emptiness of true existence is not the main object proven by reasoning.
- It [absurdly] follows that the emptiness of true existence is not the main object comprehended by inference.

and so forth.

Reason and Purpose for the Third Phase

If in the third it is apprehended as even only a non-affirming negative,
Then since apprehended-object and apprehending-subject and object-possessors have not been stopped,
It cannot sever the proliferations of dualistic appearance.

Therefore, with respect to the third phase, it follows that the subjects, a common being's state arisen from meditation and a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise which is the completion of that, are not able to sever the proliferations of dualistic appearance because apprehended-object and apprehending-subject and object-possessors have not been stopped, since the object, a non-affirming negative, if expressed with the words of the stupid, is held to be merely partial[b] (?). The word "even" [in the root text indicates] "not only if it is held to have a positive aspect."

Hence, with the expanse and knowledge like water placed in water
Without the slightest observation of object known and knower,
Like the expression "Space is seen," all proliferations are pacified
Because the honorable Nāgārjuna says that if object realized
And realizer exist, it is not enlightenment.

Consequently, for a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise it must be such that, never mind the dualistic appearance of signs, even the mere dualistic appearance that is appearance[c] [itself]

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[a] This is implicitly realized by an eye consciousness. The point is that if, according to D̄zong-ka-b̄a, the mental consciousness can explicitly realize emptiness, which is a non-affirming negative, then one would absurdly have to say that an eye consciousness can explicitly realize the absence of a pot.

[b] *kha gang smu gang;* meaning unknown.

[c] *snang ba'i gnyis snang.*

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does not exist—with the expanse and knowledge[a] like water placed in water without the slightest observation of object known and knower; like the expression "Space is seen," all proliferations are pacified. This is because the honorable Nāgārjuna in the *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* clearly says that if there is appearance as object realized and realizer, object and object-possessor, it is not enlightenment:

No perception with a mind in the aspect of realizing
An object of realization is the One-Gone-Thus.
Whoever has object realized and realizer
Does not have enlightenment.

and so forth.

How to Meditate on Emptiness

An inferential rational consciousness, generated into having the aspect
Of the emptiness of true existence and strongly inducing ascertainment of that,
Is a state arisen from thinking. How could it be a meditative awareness!
Therefore, it is an precursor to meditative equipoise.
Induced by this ascertaining consciousness, non-apprehension of anything
And Hwa-shang's view do not have any chance of being similar.
Therefore, setting aside initiative without the second [phase] as a precursor
And emphatic apprehension of a non-affirming negative in the third phase are mistaken.

The Chinese Hwa-shang[b] and many who in fact are followers of him say that it is not necessary to examine with the wisdom of individual investigation, and that through just stopping conceptuality special insight is attained, and liberation and omniscience are attained. Right through to the present, let alone being renowned to great meditators, even some who are renowned as discriminating scholars recite this. In order to refute this, some say that, not to mention occasions of hearing and thinking, even during special states arisen from meditation, one is to repeatedly bring out an intensity of mind thinking, "Empty of true existence," and to emphatically say such in speech.

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[a] *dbyings rig.*

[b] Mid- to late-eighth century.

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These two contravene well the above-described presentation [of three phases]:

1. It is taught that an inferential rational consciousness, generated into having the aspect of the emptiness of true existence and strongly inducing ascertainment of that, must definitely precede meditative equipoise meditating on special emptiness. Therefore, the setting aside of initiative—in which there is mere stoppage of usual conceptuality without previously seeking initially a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate of the second phase—is mistaken. Non-apprehension of anything—induced by such a state arisen from thinking—and Hwa-shang's view do not have any chance of being similar.
2. This special inferential ascertaining consciousness and such maintenance of mindfulness of the conceptuality that is its continuation are states arisen from thinking; how could they be meditative awareness! Also, the previously cited passage from Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* (558):

   Those who meditate on an emptiness
   Having a low nature by way of [thinking]
   "No production," "empty," and "selfless,"
   Meditate on self here.

   is in consideration of conceptual apprehension, thinking "[It is] empty." Therefore, emphatic apprehension within maintaining mindfulness of a non-affirming negative even during special states arisen from meditation in the third phase is mistaken.

Since it is taught that both of these are mistaken, those who, in addition to having special intelligence, have accumulated special merit for the Great Middle Way should, with intense respect, rely on this mode [of the three phases].

Therefore, all—the basis, path, and fruit—in our own system
Are in the perspective of slight analysis, whereby those who propound
That in this system there is no analysis contradict the statements
That the analytical are released, and so forth.

Because initially one must strive at reasonings that are states arisen from thinking in which suchness is sought, those who propound that in this system of the Great Middle Way there is no analysis with the wisdom of individual investigation are not right because such assertions explicitly contradict the statements [in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*]:[706]

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The wise say that the overturning of conceptuality
Is the fruit of analysis.

and:[707]

Therefore, the analytical, having removed desire
And belligerence, are released.

and so forth, and, as will be explained below, this is the honorable Nāgārjuna's own system…

If one knows how to correlate all presentations and the three phases, one is a Proponent of the Great Middle Way, and if not, contradictions accumulate. Therefore, here I will mainly speak a little about the presentations of the basis, path, and fruit[a] in the system of the Middle Way in the perspective of slight analysis in accordance with how they occur in the texts of the honorable Nāgārjuna and how they were commented upon by Chandrakīrti and Shāntideva because—in the basal two truths—method and wisdom as well as the two [Buddha] bodies are established in the perspective of slight analysis as unions.

Ḏak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets:*[708]

Because all things are mentally imputed, and names also imputedly exist,
Even conventionally all the imputations by Logicians are abandoned.
Because in the perspective of analysis the non-deceptive is only nirvāṇa,
Compounded deceptive phenomena are without establishment by valid cognition.
Because the apprehension of true existence is definite as the root of cyclic existence,
The desire and so forth generated by it are only afflictive obstructions.
Because in the three vehicles the mode of perception of the noumenon is the same,
The path of seeing does not have plural moments.
Because appearances of objects of knowledge have vanished for [a Buddha's] own perspective,

[a] Excerpts from Ḏak-tsang's presentations of the basis, path, and fruit are included below at relevant points.

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The inconceivable exalted activities are the sport of [trainees'] other-appearance.[a]
These are the main unique features of this system.

Ḏak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"*:[709]

Question: Well then, what are the main unique tenets of this system?

Answer: The eight great features[b] posited by scholars are mostly so, but here the chief are five.

1.

Because all things are mentally imputed, and names also imputedly exist,
Even conventionally all the imputations by Logicians are abandoned.

All the presentations of valid cognition and non-valid cognition and so forth imputed by the Logicians of the Autonomy School and below are abandoned even in the mere conventions of both the Middle Way School's own system and the world's system, let alone in the perspective of a rational consciousness. This is because all external and internal phenomena of causes and effects are asserted as just existent in a mental context, not established even only conventionally from the object's own side. Many proofs were expressed earlier, the chief being just the assertion that a dream-horse and a dream-elephant and a waking-horse and waking-elephant are equal with regard to being true or false.

2.

Because in the perspective of analysis the non-deceptive is only nirvāṇa,
Compounded deceptive phenomena are without establishment by valid cognition.

Because:

- whatever is compounded necessarily does not stay for a second moment after the moment of its own establishment,

[a] The exalted activities of a Buddha do not exist in a Buddha's own-appearance; rather, their frame of existence is totally within their appearance to others, and thus are "other-appearances."

[b] For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's exposition of eight pairs of unique tenets see 927ff., and Daniel Cozort, *Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998), 285-426, and for an exposition of eight by J̄ang-ḡya Röl-b̄a'i-dor-jay see Cozort, 429-478.

- the performance of function does not exist in a moment,
- and the compounded are necessarily false deceptive phenomena, since not only can they not withstand analysis by reasoning but also do not exist even as only established in the perspective of a rational consciousness,

it is asserted that a common locus of the compounded and what is established by valid cognition does not exist. For although it is indeed the case that when analyzed well, the establishment nirvāṇa—or even a phenomenon surpassing nirvāṇa—does not exist, it is asserted that in the perspective of slight analysis by a rational consciousness the non-deceptive is only nirvāṇa in accordance with the statement [in Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*]:[710]

When the Conqueror said
That only nirvāṇa is a truth,
What wise person would think,
"The rest are not unreal"?

3.

Because the apprehension of true existence is definite as the root of cyclic existence,
The desire and so forth generated by it are only afflictive obstructions.

All afflictive emotions and their accompanying [mental factors]—the apprehension of true existence and the desire and so forth generated by it—are only afflictive obstructions. [The Consequence School] utterly does not assert a common locus of a consciousness apprehending true existence and an obstruction to omniscience as in:

Conceptualization of the three spheres [of action, agent, and object]
Is asserted as an obstruction to omniscience.

and, "The obstructions to omniscience are the one hundred conceptions of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject," and so forth because the apprehension of true existence is definite as the root of cyclic existence, in accordance with [Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland*] cited earlier:[711]

As long as the aggregates are conceived,
So long thereby does the conception of I exist.
Further, when the conception of I exists,
There is action, and from it there also is birth.

With these three pathways[a] mutually causing each other
Without a beginning, a middle, or an end,
This wheel of cyclic existence
Turns like the wheel of a firebrand.[b]

This also establishes that realization of the selflessness of phenomena is indispensable for Hearers and Solitary Realizers.[c]

4.

Because in the three vehicles the mode of perception of the noumenon is the same,
The path of seeing does not have plural moments.

It is asserted that the paths of seeing of the three vehicles do not have plural moments—sixteen, fifteen, twelve, four, and so forth—because in the three vehicles the mode of perception of the noumenon is the same, as is stated in [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*],[712] "These intelligent consciousnesses having suchness as their object also are not different," and because it is said:

If after doctrinal knowledge
This did have differences,
The unskilled who impute
Production to even
The very subtle would not see
The meaning of arising from conditions.

and so forth.

5.

Because appearances of objects of knowledge have vanished for [a Buddha's] own perspective,
The inconceivable exalted activities are the sport of [trainees'] other-appearance.

A Buddha's inconceivable, unutterable form bodies not only are non-conceptualized, like fulfillments from a wish-granting jewel and from a garuda's offering-tree, and so forth, but do not even require mere motivation. Rather, they are asserted as only the sport

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[a] The three are afflictive emotions, actions, and production. From among the twelve links of dependent-arising, the first of these three—afflictive emotions—is identified as ignorance, attachment, and grasping. The second—actions—is identified as compositional action and "existence." The third—production—is identified as the other seven of the twelve links: consciousness, name and form, six sense fields, contact, feeling, birth, and aging and death.

[b] When a firebrand is twirled, it looks like a complete circle, or wheel, of fire.

[c] D̄zong-ka-b̄a agrees with this.

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of other-appearance of this and that trainee[a] due to earlier prayer-wishes [when that Buddha was a Bodhisattva] and due to trainees' good karma because in a Buddha's own perspective all appearances of consciousness and objects of consciousness have vanished; [Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says]:[713]

When things and non-things
Do not dwell in front of awareness,
Then since there is no other aspect,
It is thoroughly quiescent in non-apprehension.

and:

When the sleep of deluded ignorance is awakened,
These cyclic existences are not observed…

Thus, these five are the main unique features of this system; they are a concluding summary of the extensive explanations above.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[714] In many places—earlier and later in his *Tenets,* his *General Meaning of the Kālachakra Tantra,*[b] and so forth—D̄ak-tsang propounds that omniscience does not exist, and in all ways he takes Indians and Tibetans who assert omniscience as foes. Even in his *Tenets* alone there are many contradictions and mistakes, but the following are the larger ones.

2: Extensive Explanation Refuting a Pile of Self-Contradictions {27}

This section has twenty-seven parts.

FIRST CONTRADICTION: [ASSERTING THAT A BUDDHA KNOWS ALL BUT DOES NOT KNOW THE DIVERSITY]

Knowing all but not knowing the diversity are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: What are [D̄ak-tsang's contradictions and mistakes?] Contradictory are:

- the assertion that a Supramundane Victor Buddha knows all

[a] For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation and refutation of this, see 621.

[b] Ngawang Lekden spoke of this work by D̄ak-tsang as being extremely good, except for several points about the system of the Consequence School. He said that just before his own escape to India in 1959 he had had it printed, but returned it to the printer to correct some omissions and thus was unable to bring it with him during his escape.

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- and the assertion that a Supramundane Victor Buddha does not know the diversity—that is, obscurational truths.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[715] About this D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (530) says:

> Their taking valid cognition discriminating obscurational truths to be a Buddha's exalted wisdom knowing the diversity [of phenomena] is the root of all their contradictions. In his autocommentary on the *Supplement* where it says:[716]
>
> > Because bewilderment obstructs [perception of] the nature, it is obscurational (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*).
>
> Chandrakīrti indicates that with regard to the two—obscurational truth (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*) and mere false conventionality[a] (*rdzun pa'i kun rdzob*)—the means of positing the first is afflictive ignorance itself:
>
> > Thus, respectively, obscurational truths are posited through the force of the afflictive ignorance included within the [twelve] links of cyclic existence.
>
> He indicates that the means of positing the second is the mere ignorance of those endowed with exalted wisdom having appearance, since Hearer and Solitary Realizer non-learners and Great Vehicle learner Superiors, having already abandoned the former means of positing, have non-afflictive ignorance:
>
> > For them, these have an artificial nature; they are not truths because they do not fancy them to be truths…Moreover, these appear to Superiors having objects of activity involved with appearance because of coursing in mere ignorance having the character of obstructions to omniscience.
>
> He says that never mind these being obscurational truths for Buddhas, Buddhas do not even have the means for positing mere-conventionalities.

Thus, [D̄ak-tsang] asserts that [Buddhas] do not know even one from among the diversity [of phenomena]…Even fools understand that this explicitly contradicts his assertion of omniscience in accordance with Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (see also 533):[717]

> The exalted wisdom knowing all aspects
> Is asserted as having the character of direct perception.
> Others are not asserted as direct perception
> Due to being limited…

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[a] Or, mere false fraudulence.

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The meaning of this is that even a single instant of an exalted wisdom directly knowing all aspects becomes a direct valid cognition with respect to all phenomena, whereas exalted wisdoms of Bodhisattvas and below, which are other than it, are comprehenders of a limited number—a portion—of the diversity, due to which these are not asserted as having become direct valid cognitions with respect to all phenomena…

Also, Ḍak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (533) says:

Moreover:

- it [absurdly] follows that these environments and animate beings appearing to persons having karma and afflictive emotions are not produced from karma and afflictive emotions as their causes, and
- it [absurdly] follows that these environments and animate beings are not appearances through the power of karma and afflictive emotions as causes of mistake, and
- to perfect Buddhas darknesses would appear as obstructors of other forms, red flaming burning iron would appear as means of burning their bodies, rains of weapons would appear as means to cut up their bodies, and so forth

because [according to you] these do not just *appear* to be true, but these appearances as corporeality and so forth to common beings are established by valid cognition in accordance with how they appear, and moreover they are principally established by the valid cognitions of Buddhas.

Considering this to be really damaging [to Ḍzong-ka-ḅa's position, Ḍak-tsang] proposes exactly this also in his *General Meaning of Kālachakra.*

Mere appearances as corporeality and so forth to common beings are established [in our own system], but your reason—"these appearances as corporeality and so forth to common beings are established by valid cognition *in accordance with how they appear*"—is not established because just as, for example, there are not any factors of the image of a face inside a mirror that are not polluted by appearing to be a face, so in the appearance of [a patch of] blue as corporeal there is not even a mere minute particle that appears to a common being separate from appearing to truly exist, due to which it is empty of being established in accordance with how it appears…That reason of yours seems to be a case of becoming afraid of a mirage and building a boat to cross over it…

Although appearances that are impure mistaken appearances—such as the appearance of true existence—appear to an omniscient consciousness, an omniscient consciousness does not have appearance of true existence, and hence it is suitable to assert that an omniscient consciousness is non-mistaken because:

- mistaken appearance exists, and
- it is established that [a Buddha] knows all existents since Chandrakīrti speaks of such again and again on the occasion of [a Buddha's ten] powers and so forth, and
- all mistaken appearances have been extinguished for perceived appearances in a Buddha's own terms, but since those exist relative to trainees, that [a Buddha] perceives them is very feasible,
- since it is like the fact that, for example, when one who has appearance of a snow mountain as blue speaks about this mode of appearance to a person who does not have appearance of a snow mountain as blue, an appearance of the aspect of that dawns also to that person, but for that person him/herself a snow mountain does not exist as blue…

D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Stages of the Path* says:[718]

> To a Buddha's exalted wisdom knowing the diversity, the appearance of objects such as forms and sounds—which appear in the perspective of those who have not abandoned ignorance to be established by way of their own character whereas they are not so established—is an appearance to a Buddha only from the viewpoint of [these phenomena] appearing to persons who have pollutions of ignorance. Without depending on their appearing thus to others, they do not appear from a Buddha's own side…

Moreover, your propounding that if darkness appears as darkness to a Buddha, it would [absurdly] follow that it would obstruct [that Buddha's perception of] other forms is a case of not even understanding the mere explanations:

- that the non-generation of an eye consciousness with respect to an object intervened by darkness and so forth is due to a sense power's having a material nature
- but that darkness and so forth cannot obstruct the *mental* consciousness.

Furthermore, D̄ak-tsang flings:

1. the consequence that if weapons used for cutting appear to a Buddha as weapons, it [absurdly] follows that they would cut

up [the Buddha's] body upon contacting it

2. and the consequence that if a Buddha perceives fire as hot, it would [absurdly] follow that fire would burn the Buddha's body…

However, in general:

- There is the case of fire heating a fabric woven from stone[a] but not burning it; Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes* says:[719]

  When a stone garment which has become stained with
  Contaminations and is to be cleansed by fire
  Is put in fire, its stains
  Are burned but the garment is not.

- There is the case of not even heating, never mind burning, cloth garments, for instance, implanted with a knowledge-mantra against burning…
- When Chandrakīrti explains that the fire at the end of an eon does not burn one in meditative equipoise on emptiness, what are you going to say about a Buddha who never rises from meditative equipoise?

Moreover, if from the point of dwelling on a pure ground [beginning with the eighth Bodhisattva ground] a diamond body is attained, whereby it is not burned by fire or cut by weapons, what need is there to mention a Conqueror's diamond body!…

Also, Ḏak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (529) says:[720]

> [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa and his followers] wrote again and again, not just once, that, unlike this, a fire's performing the function of burning exists merely conventionally in the context of the object, non-deceptively and self-instituting, due to which those two [emptiness and appearance] must induce mutual ascertainment, whereas if the performance of function were posited merely in the perspective of mistaken [consciousness], it would not be reliable. This is their main contradiction because in the Great Middle Way there is not the slightest inherent nature to be refuted beyond self-instituting performance of function from the object's side.
>
> *Objection:* We did not say "self-instituting."
>
> *Answer:* It is contradictory for what is not self-instituting to be established by valid cognition because the meaning of

[a] This is most likely asbestos.

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> being established by valid cognition is non-deceptive, and the meaning of non-deceptive does not pass beyond self-instituting.

This contradicts all systems of tenets because it has already been established that it is widely renowned that even the Great Exposition School, Sūtra School, and Mind-Only School assert that all imputed existents—which do not substantially exist—are established by valid cognition. Also, [D̄ak-tsang's] inability to distinguish [his own system from those who assert]:

1. that whatever is an established base [that is, whatever exists] has to be truly established, and
2. that whatever does not truly exist has to be non-existent

is confused bragging about not understanding the Middle Way view because Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* says:

> According to Proponents of True Existence as long as things exist, so does their intrinsic existence, and as long as [something] is devoid of intrinsic existence, that thing does not exist in every way, like the horns of a donkey.

and because it is explained that until the absence of true existence has been realized, false establishment, conventional establishment, and emptiness are not perceived, and because you [D̄ak-tsang] also propound this.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[721] [In D̄zong-ka-b̄a's system] the meaning of self-instituting or substantially existent:

- according to the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School is [for the object] to be established as bearing analysis by reasoning dividing it into parts (234)
- according to the Mind-Only School and Autonomy School is for [the object's] own entity to be apprehendable without relying on apprehending another phenomenon (372)
- according to the Consequence School is to be truly established or to be established without relying on another (823ff.).

Therefore, the Consequence School asserts that the self-instituting does not exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[722] Also, D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (534) says:

> It [absurdly] follows that affixing "worldly" (*'jig rten, loka*) to "obscurational" (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) [in "worldly

> obscurational truths"] would have no impact.

and (534):

> It is said again and again that obscurational truths are posited by what has the name of bewilderment, worldly innate apprehension of I.

and (539):

> here "world" is not to be taken as not involved in tenets, or not having attained a Superior path, or not having emerged [from a householder's life]

and (539):

> an awareness apprehending former and later to be one without investigation and without analysis, called "beginningless worldly innate apprehension of 'I,'" is called "world" on this occasion.

[Ḏak-tsang thereby asserts that:]

- The affixing of "world" in "worldly obscurational truths" and in "existing in the world's conventions" excludes that Consequentialists assert these.
- Persons who are common beings or Superiors, or persons who have entered or not entered into a tenet system, or persons who have or have not emerged [from a householder's life] are not to be posited as [the meaning of] "world" that occurs in various places in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*.
- Rather, an awareness apprehending former and later to be one that has operated beginninglessly is the "world" that occurs in various places in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*.

And he cites some passages [such as] "bewilderment" (534) [to make these points].

These show signs of confusion from either not even having read books or having read books but not having understood them, like a book in the hand of a clay statue. This is because [Nāgārjuna's] affixing "world" in "Worldly obscurational truths" is not from wanting to indicate that there is one type, conventionalities of the world, and again another type, conventionalities of yogis, such as Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, who are not the world, and so forth, but is for the sake of indicating that these are established in the measure of things, yet not for analysis other than that. For Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

> Are there non-worldly conventionalities more elevated than these called "the world's conventionalities"? This expresses how things abide and that analysis is not to be employed here.

Even if "world" is posited as excluding something, it is suitable to posit [what is excluded as] visual dimness as well as its objects [that is, falling hairs] and so forth that are not in the measure of things because Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

> In one way there are [non-worldly conventionalities]; those perverse things seen by sense powers degenerated by visual dimness, cataracts, yellow-eye, and so forth…

Also, [for D̄ak-tsang] not to posit even a single person as [the meaning of] "world" but to posit only the single apprehension of "I" is a case of being overcast with darkness because Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:…

> Persons imputed in dependence upon the aggregates are called "world."

and Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says:

> The others are falsities seen by common beings whose eye of awareness is entirely covered by the cataracts of ignorance.

and Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (86, 603)says:[723]

> Among those, two aspects of the world are seen,
> Yogis and the ordinary.

Positing "world" in "Worldly obscurational truths" as ignorance conceiving "I" is the confusion of not differentiating the illustrations of "world" (*'jig rten, loka*) and "obscurational" (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*).

1. That all conventionalities—mountains, rivers, and so forth—are posited by consciousnesses conceiving "I" is utterly too much wonderful analysis.[a]
2. That the four coarse conventionalities of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness can be distinguished by a consciousness apprehending former and later as one—which has operated beginninglessly—and by non-investigatory and non-analytical consciousnesses conceiving "I" is not the thought of Āryadeva who *analyzes* these over four chapters in his *Four Hundred.*
3. Also those [four absurdly] would not be [instances of] the second sphere of objects of comprehension [that is, they would not be slightly obscure since, being utterly erroneous, they would not be accessible by inference].
4. The extensive analysis of these in many commentaries on the thought, such as Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle*

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[a] *mchog tu rnam dpyod bzang drag,* 406.12.

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Sūtras and *Ornament for Clear Realization* and so forth would be inappropriate.

SECOND CONTRADICTION: [ASSERTING THAT A BUDDHA HAS NO MIND]

That it does not exist is to mistake the bad system of the Kṣhapanas and the Mīmāṃsakas to be the Middle Way.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Saying that on the Buddha ground mind does not exist is a case of mistaking—as the Middle Way system—the bad system of the Kṣhapanas and Mīmāṃsakas who assert that omniscience does not exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[724] Moreover, that bad commentary [by D̄ak-tsang (531)] explains that a Buddha is mindless:[a]

[Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] says,[725] "Minds having ceased, it is actualized by the body," and:[726]

Due to understanding reality in the manner of sameness of taste,
This wonderful knowledge understands objects of knowledge instantaneously.

and when Chandrakīrti explains that non-dualistic exalted wisdom is without objects, he states the objection that if there is no appearance of an object, a consciousness knowing objects is not feasible,[727] "When it is quiescent, intelligence would not engage those," and so forth, to which he responds that just as due to being generated into having the aspect of an object, an awareness is renowned as realizing that object, so with respect to the object that is the absence of production an awareness becomes without production like water in water, whereupon the convention of an awareness realizing an object is designated to the very concordance of the object's mode of subsistence and the awareness's mode of appearance. He does not say that [exalted wisdom] without appearance of an object is not established [that is, does not exist]. And Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* also explains that exalted wisdom is without appearance of an object:[728]

When things and non-things

[a] D̄ak-tsang asserts that a Buddha has exalted wisdom but no minds and mental factors; see 532.

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Do not dwell in front of awareness,
Then since there is no other aspect,
It is thoroughly pacified in non-apprehension.

In response to an objection that in that case exalted activities such as the teaching of doctrine would not be feasible, [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] says:[729]

Just as a wheel turned due to hard striving
By a powerful potter here turns after a long time—
Although exertion is not still generated now—
And is seen to be a cause of pots and so forth,

So while there is no presently produced exertion
The operation [of the activities] of [a Buddha] dwelling in that having the nature of the body of attributes
Is impelled by the virtues of beings [who are trainees]
And by special prayer-wishes [when that Buddha was a Bodhisattva and hence] is inconceivable.

and so forth, and [Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*] says:[730]

Just as a wish-granting jewel and a wish-granting tree
Completely fulfill hopes,
So through the power of trainees' wish-prayers
There are appearances as exalted bodies of Conquerors.

and in response to an objection:[731]

Through worshipping what is mindless
How could effects emerge?

he says that it is not established [that worshipping what is mindless] entails [the non-emergence of effects]:

Because it is taught that [worshipping a Buddha still] living
Or [worshipping relics once a Buddha] has passed away are just similar.

but he does not say, "The mindless is not established [that is, does not exist]."

Moreover, Ḏak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (532) explains that a Buddha does not have minds and mental factors and that the descriptions of [a Buddha's ten] powers and so forth are in the perspective of appearances to trainees and, therefore, do not exist in Buddhas:

Objection: That exalted wisdom must have mind and mental factors, in accordance with the explanation in Haribhadra's

small *Clear Meaning Commentary:*

> How are non-dualistic minds and mental factors—which unquestionably must be asserted—included?
>
> *Answer:* Since that is the Autonomists' assertion, [I] will not put forth any sort of refutation relative to another school of tenets.
>
> And similarly, a statement such as "Pervading all the sphere of objects of knowledge" and so forth is from [the Autonomist] Jñānagarbha's *Commentary on the "Two Truths."*
>
> *Objection:* Then what about Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* itself which says,[a] "Valid cognition is single—omniscient exalted wisdom," and:[732]
>
> > The exalted wisdom knowing all aspects
> > Has a character called "direct perception."
>
> and his extensive description of the presentation of the ten powers—knowledge of sources and non-sources and so forth?
>
> *Answer:* The former two are suitable to be explaining the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise without appearance. The last and Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (533) which says:[733]
>
> > Buddhas and Bodhisattvas
> > Are endowed with unimpeded perception.
>
> and so forth express the mode of knowing objects of knowledge by a causally concordant exalted body which is displayed in trainees' perspective of appearance, the mode of birth of an exalted body, and so forth.

Also, D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (533) propounds:

> A causally concordant emanation body is something like a Buddha's emanation or something like an exalted body; if by displaying the mode of knowing, knowing were to be posited, then by displaying the mode of newly becoming fully purified, one would also [absurdly] be newly buddhafied.

In this way, he is an asserter of the greatest extreme view, the bad system of the Kṣhapanas (Nirgranthas) and the Mīmāṃsakas (Jaiminis), who assert that defilements permeate the nature of the mind, due to which, when defilements are extinguished, the mind also would have to be overcome [and hence there is no omniscience] (141)—these being the opponents for whom the great lords

[a] The first citation is from Chandrakīrti's autocommentary.

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of reasoning of the Mind-Only School and Middle Way School prove that omniscience exists. Consequently, although he wants to go among the Middle Way School, the supreme system refuting the two extremes, he cannot move away from a pile of contradictions, though he lets out baleful cries of mistake, having fallen into a great chasm of a view of nihilism. If [a Buddha's] ten powers and so forth do not exist, this is a view of nihilism and contradicts all Great Vehicle scriptures of Sūtra and Mantra, but if, though existing, they are included in the continuums of trainees as some early Tibetans have said, then this contradicts the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* and *Autocommentary* that even at the end of the ten grounds [Bodhisattvas] strive for the sake of [attaining] the ten powers…and contradicts statements that although [Buddhahood] is devoid of conceptual and striving minds, mentalities, and consciousnesses, the mind operates spontaneously.

Also, the assertion that a Conqueror does not have minds and mental factors contradicts explanations of the branches of [a Buddha's] concentrations [which include the mental factor of feeling and so forth].

Objection: Since [a Buddha] does not rise from meditative equipoise, absorption in the meditative liberations (259) in forward and reverse manners is not feasible.

Answer: That is not so because it is only a Buddha's distinguishing feature and a Buddha's inconceivability that a single meditative stabilization of a One-Gone-Thus engages in all meditative stabilizations but does not need to rise from that meditative stabilization, and yet the meditative stabilizations are not mixed…

With respect to Chandrakīrti's saying, "Because the mind has stopped, that is actualized by exalted body," [see 989ff.].

THIRD CONTRADICTION: ASSERTING THAT THE MEANING OF VALID ESTABLISHMENT IS SELF-INSTITUTING ESTABLISHMENT

That the ultimate is a dependent-arising and is established as self-instituting is very contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Very contradictory are:

- the assertion that the ultimate is a dependent-arising
- and the assertion that the ultimate is established as self-instituting.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[734] D̄ak-tsang's taking established by valid cognition, non-deceptive, and self-instituting

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to be equivalent in his *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (530):

> It is contradictory for what is not self-instituting to be established by valid cognition because the meaning of being established by valid cognition is non-deceptive, and the meaning of non-deceptive does not pass beyond self-instituting.

and also his assertion that the absence of truly existent production is established by valid cognition and [hence] self-instituting in his root text (555):[735]

> During the second [phase] the non-production and emptiness of true[736] existence—
> The non-finding of the objects of the mode of apprehension of the two apprehensions of self
> Upon being sought with the supreme of reasons—is non-deceptive, the supreme of objects,
> And comprehensions of it are established only conventionally as valid cognitions.

are cases of wanting to eat the sky.

It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is not a dependent-arising because of being self-instituting. The three spheres of self-contradiction! Not even the Buddha could reply! If you reply that being self-instituting does not entail not being a dependent-arising, then it follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is not self-instituting because of relying on others. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

Also, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is established under its own power because of being self-instituting. The three spheres of self-contradiction!

Also, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is not merely imputed by conceptuality because of being self-instituting. There is no Insider [that is, Buddhist school of tenets] who propounds that being self-instituting does not entail not being merely imputed by conceptuality.

Also, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is truly established, established as [its own] reality, established from its own side, and so forth because of being established without reliance on others. If you say that the reason is not established, you have explicitly [contradicted yourself]. Being established without reliance on others entails being truly established, established as [its own] reality, established from its own side, and so forth, and it cannot be accepted that the emptiness of true existence is truly established, established as [its own] reality, established

from its own side, and so forth because there is no phenomenon that is not a dependent-arising, and even nirvāṇa is a dependent-arising and is established in reliance on others; also, established intrinsically, established inherently, established under its own power, and so forth have the same connotation, since Buddha said this, and the great chariots—father and sons—commented this way…

Although it is explained that [all phenomena including the ultimate] are none other than merely nominal and imputed [from the subject's side] to there, [Ḏak-tsang] still propounds—with striving—that [the absence of production and the emptiness of true existence] are self-instituting and established under their own power. This is a case of the sky of his intelligence being pervaded by black clouds of ignorance and is a bad sign even bigger than space.

Objection: What about the statement in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle:*[737]

> The nature is unfabricated
> And is without reliance on others.

Answer: This is explaining that the nature is not fabricated in the sense of being newly arisen like a compounded phenomenon and does not rely on other causes and conditions because…Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* applies reliance and non-reliance to causes and conditions:

> Because that which is fabricated and relies on others is not asserted as the nature, this statement that heat is the nature of fire is not feasible because [heat] relies on causes and conditions and because it is a product due to being a case of not arising earlier but arising later.

Objection: We also propound that [the absence of production and the emptiness of true existence] are self-instituting due to not relying on causes and conditions.

Answer: That is not at all feasible because although these are merely self-powered in the sense of not relying on causes and conditions, that does not make them self-powered and because, since otherwise all permanent phenomena would be self-powered, even meaning-generalities and so forth would [absurdly] be substantially existent. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[738]

> That which:
> - is the unfabricated fundamental nature unmistakenly [abiding] in fire even over the three times,
> - is not the later arising of something that did not arise before, and

- does not rely on causes and conditions like the heat of water or here and there or long and short

is called the "nature."

The statement "the unfabricated fundamental nature unmistakenly [abiding] in fire even over the three times" clearly explains the mode of non-fabrication, and the statement "is not the later arising of something that did not arise before, and does not rely on causes and conditions like the heat of water or here and there or long and short is called the 'nature,'" clearly explains how the mode of subsistence does not rely on others.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[739] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Ocean of Reasoning* speaks of differences between (1) the measure of what is renowned in the world, (2) the Consequence School's system, and (3) the mode of assertion by the Proponents of True Existence:

> In the world the convention [or vocabulary] of "nature"[a] or "basic disposition"[b] is not used for what is fabricated, and that is also asserted here [in the Consequence School]. Hence, although it is renowned in the world that the heat of fire is the nature, or basic disposition, of fire, [the Consequence School] propounds that even that is not the basic disposition of fire because of being devoid of the characteristics of a basic disposition, for fire is observed in reliance of causes and conditions such as a fire-glass, and since the heat of fire is also similar to this, it is clearly ascertained that because of being a product heat is not the nature of fire, just as the heat of water [is not the nature of water].
>
> Concerning this, it is renowned in the world that the heat of water and the heat of fire are the same in being made by causes and conditions, but since they are not the same as to whether they are fabricated [that is, artificial] or not, they are also not the same with regard to whether they are not or are the nature [that is, heat is not the nature of water, whereas heat is the nature of fire]. Nevertheless, since Proponents of True Existence do not assert a difference of not being inherently produced or being inherently produced with regard to water being produced hot and fire being produced hot, they do not assert the world's mode of not using the convention "nature" when

[a] *rang bzhin.*

[b] *gshis.*

something is posited as fabricated, whereas such is asserted in the [Consequence School's] own system.

In that case, it needs to be analyzed whether Proponents of True Existence assert that the heat of water is the nature of water.

FOURTH CONTRADICTION: NOT ASSERTING THAT THE SIX TYPES OF TRANSMIGRATING BEINGS HAVE VALID COGNITION IN THEIR CONTINUUMS

Asserting effects of actions and the utter non-existence of fruitions is contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion of virtuous and non-virtuous actions and their effects, pleasure and pain
- and the assertion of the utter non-existence of fruitions—that is, sense direct perceptions of hungry ghosts partaking of pus and blood and of gods partaking of ambrosia.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[740] D̄ak-tsang's root text (544 and 546) says:

That external objects are established by valid cognition and
that small particles[a] have parts are contradictory.
That the six types [of appearances] are valid and that gross
corporality is established by valid cognition are
contradictory.
That falling hairs do not exist and that a river of pus
[appearing to a hungry ghost] exists are contradictory.

His commentary does not appear to say much, but his propounding again and again here that small particles (*rdul phran*) are partless is a case of losing memory, for there is no Buddhist who says that an aggregate of seven minute particles[b] is partless. In Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* "small particle" (*rdul phran*) [which appears in the Tibetan translation of Āryadeva's text] is called a "minute particle" (*rdul phra rab*); hence, "small particle" (*rdul phran*) appears to be merely a misprint for *rdul phra* or *phra*

[a] *rdul phran.*

[b] *rdul phra rab.* Seven of these are the measure of a "small particle." Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is faulting D̄ak-tsang for using "small particle" where he should use "minute particle," which leads to having to explain Āryadeva's apparent usage of "small particle."

rdul; so, do not be amazed at the error [since it is merely scribal].

Therefore, although below in scattered places [Ḏak-tsang] asserts the ten virtues, the ten non-virtues, and moreover effects of actions, here on this occasion he says about the six types of beings that:

- the fire and boiling molten bronze of the [hot] hells and the snow and darkness of the cold hells appear
- but the consciousnesses by which those sentient beings experience those are not asserted as valid cognitions
- those objects also do not exist with their bases of imputation,[a] like falling hairs in space
- similarly, the pus and blood and so forth that appear to hungry ghosts, the ambrosia that appears to gods, the pleasant and unpleasant and fire, water, and so forth that appear to humans, the appearances to animals, and those to demi-gods—in brief, whatever appear as the five objects to the six types of beings—are not established by valid cognition.

He propounds that the two—dream-fire and fire—are not able to perform functions conventionally, and if functionality is propounded, one is not a Consequentialist. Ḏak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (544) says:

> That external objects are established by valid cognition and
> that small particles[b] have parts are contradictory.
>
> Anything could occur within the scope of not investigating and not analyzing mistaken appearances that are not established by valid cognition, but once validly established matter is posited in the perspective of slight analysis, in the end it is not fitting except to have partless small particles because:
>
> - no Buddhist asserts that these gross objects are partless, and
> - when divided into parts, as long as there are directional parts small particles are impossible.
>
> The Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons say with one voice:
>
> > How could what has directional parts
> > Be a small particle!
>
> Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* also says that in the perspective of valid cognition there are no particles:[741]

[a] *gdags gzhi'i steng na med pa.*
[b] *rdul phran.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Due to divisions of directional parts in particles…
Because those do not exist, particles also do not exist.

and:[742]

Direct perception of forms and so forth
Is by renown, not by valid cognition.

It is as these two masters advise—these are by worldly renown, without asserting valid cognition in their own system even conventionally. It is said that illusory horses and elephants and actual sentient beings are not differentiated by way of truth and falsity [or] length of continuum:[743]

How could a sentient being be truly existent
Merely due to having a long continuum?

Likewise, as [indicated] below [in the tenth contradiction] "That true and false exist and that real and unreal do not exist are contradictory," [D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] proposition—while proclaiming with loud laughter that in the Middle Way School's own system there is no division of conventionalities into real and unreal—that since dream-fire cannot perform a function but waking-fire can, the former is posited as not established by valid cognition and the latter is established by valid cognition is the hugest contradiction.

and (547):

That falling hairs do not exist and that the pus in the appearance as pus on the substratum of a watery river [to a hungry ghost] exists are contradictory.

There are many contradictions in his not accepting the fruitions of virtues and non-virtues thoroughly described in many sūtras, Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland,* Shāntideva's *Compendium of Learnings,* and Nāgārjuna's *Compendium of Sūtra* and his assertion that these utterly do not exist, as follows. When [D̄ak-tsang] (544) says:

Anything could occur within the scope of not investigating and not analyzing.

his thinking—in accordance with earlier Tibetans who said that because forms and so forth do not at all exist, they are whatever the mind constructs—that conventionally [phenomena are] whatever is constructed is not feasible. This is because even conventionally there are presentations of:

- existence and non-existence and of truth and falsity
- the six objects (forms and so forth), the five aggregates, the eighteen constituents, and so forth that are not polluted with

superficial causes of mistake[a]

and those are asserted even by Bodhisattva Superiors who realize the mode of subsistence of objects exactly as it is:

> Those do not exist as truly established and are not established as permanent, unitary, and self-powered, and a permanent Īshvara and so forth do not exist.

It is easy to realize that much damages this position, such as when the *Sūtra on the Inconceivable Mysteries* says:

> Caretaker of the Secret, Bodhisattvas properly making effort thoroughly know what exists as existent. They thoroughly know what does not exist as non-existent…Moreover, forms having the attribute of impermanence, suffering, and change exist. Permanent, steady, everlasting, and immutable forms do not exist.

and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says,[744] "Production from other does not exist even in the world."

[Ḍak-tsang's] assertion (545) that dream fire and actual fire, and a horse and a horse in a magician's illusion, do not differ in being true or false and in being able or not able to perform a function also is outside all of the Conqueror's scriptures and all Inner [Buddhist] systems (1) because even the Consequentialists assert that although those are similar in not existing in the perspective of reasoning, they differ in terms of being or not being damaged by conventional valid cognition since:

- Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* explains that the self imputed by the Forders, a horse as imputed in an illusion, an actual fire as imputed in an illusion, and so forth do not exist even in the world's conventions:[745]

  > Entities as they are imputed by Forders
  > Strongly affected by the sleep of ignorance
  > And those imputed to illusions, mirages, and so forth
  > Are only non-existent even for the world.

- and when Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:[746]

  > There is no sin in killing an illusory being
  > And so forth because it is mindless.
  > Merit and sin arise
  > Toward those that possess illusory mind.

  he makes a difference between killing and not killing those two

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[a] For identification of the four superficial causes of mistake, see 406, footnote b.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- and the *Buddhapālita Commentary* says:

  > It is said that when acting in the conventions of the world, what is renowned as real in the world the Supramundane Victor also says is real, and what is renowned as unreal in the world the Supramundane Victor also says is unreal.

- and if those are treated as not differing in being true and false, such is damaged by worldly renown in accordance with the Fifth Dalai Lama's *Instructions on the Path: Sacred Word of Mañjushrī* because in the world it is obviously renowned what is a horse or fire and what is not a horse or fire.[a]

and (2) because it also contradicts the statements in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* that consciousnesses conceiving the four—cleanliness, happiness, permanence, and self—are untrue and consciousnesses viewing impermanence, suffering, impurity, and selflessness are true and (3) because Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (827) says:[747]

> If the world does not harm you, based on the world itself
> Refute these [conventionalities].
> You and the world debate about these,
> And afterwards I will rely on the stronger.[b]

---

[a] The Fifth Dalai Lama says:

> If, having thought that horses and elephants are not inherently existent, you take horses and elephants and illusory horses and elephants to be similar even conventionally, then you would contradict the meaning of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (VI.25abc) which says:
>
> > Those objects realized by the world
> > Apprehended with the six unimpaired senses
> > Are true from [the viewpoint of] just the world.
>
> You would be deprecating conventionalities.
>
> Mañjushrī told the Foremost Lama [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] that it was necessary to value the varieties of appearances. His thought was based on a qualm that, in the future, trainees who did not understand such an essential would fall into a view of nihilism. Thus, many modes of establishing the existence of appearances are [presented] in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's great and small expositions of the *Stages of the Path* and in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*. However, the lion of proponents, the translator Ḏak-tsang [criticizes Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] saying, "Upon analyzing with many forms of reasoning, he asserts that impure mistaken appearances are validly established." [This criticism] is seen to arise from the same source of error.

See Jeffrey Hopkins, "Practice of Emptiness" (Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974), 24.

[b] As Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, ya,* 19.3) explains, Chandrakīrti gives

and Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary* says, "At that time, one should rely on the very powerful world itself," and with regard to not asserting conventional truths the Superior [Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections*] says:

> Without asserting conventionalities
> We do not make expositions.

Since [D̄ak-tsang] appears to be outside these and has a great many contradictions, it would be very beautiful if he relied on my system.

[D̄ak-tsang's] assertion that the falling hairs of one with an eye disease and the pus partaken by a hungry ghost with bad karma at a river are the same with respect to existing or not existing is outside the systems of all Insiders—Middle Way School, Mind-Only School, and so forth—because falling hairs in the sky are definite non-existents that are appearances to a sense power affected by superficial mistake,[a] whereas pus partaken by a hungry ghost at a river is water turned into puss by the maturation of karma…since it is explained in sūtra that food and drink obtained by a hungry ghost turn into pus. That a hungry ghost does not see a river of water is due to not having karma for making use of water with the five senses. For example:

- When three beings—a god, a human, and a hungry ghost whose stomach is bigger than a mountain—gather on single spot on the banks of the Ganges, the human does not see the other two, but they are not non-existent.
- On the expanse of a chariot wheel there are more beings than all those appearing to humans of Jambudvīpa [this world]; they do not appear to an ordinary human but are seen by a godly sage endowed with the five clairvoyances and likewise appear to Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva Superiors and to Buddhas.

---

this stanza in response to a challenge from the Mind-Only School:

> When you Consequentialists refute that other-powered natures are inherently established, we Proponents of Mind-Only also will refute the world's conventions—renowned to you—through reasonings refuting production from the four extremes and so forth.

[a] For identification of the four superficial causes of mistake, see 406, footnote b.

FIFTH CONTRADICTION: NOT ASSERTING THAT HAVING-DISINTEGRATED IS AN EFFECTIVE THING AND ASSERTING THAT AN EFFECT IS PRODUCED ALTHOUGH IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF [NON]ANALYSIS[a] A KARMA HAS NOT DISINTEGRATED

That a non-disintegrated action produces an effect is mistaken; they would be simultaneous.

Word Commentary on Root Text: If, mistaking the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"*:

> Because a shoot is not other than the seed,
> At the time of the shoot the seed has not disintegrated.

one asserts that in the perspective of innate non-analytical awareness a cause remains at the time of its effect without having disintegrated, and hence an action that has not disintegrated over many eons produces an effect, then cause and effect would be simultaneous. Consequently, [that a cause remains at the time of its effect without having disintegrated] is mistaken.[b]

SIXTH CONTRADICTION: DENIAL OF THE OBVIOUS

Actions not having disintegrated for eons and this being the Middle Way are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion of actions that have not disintegrated for eons
- and the assertion that this is the system of the Middle Way School.

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[748] [D̄ak-tsang's root text (548) says], "That a pot is not found upon analyzing the components and that having-disintegrated[c] is found upon analyzing

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[a] Both the Taipei edition (416.5) and its principal source, the Mundgod edition (706.6), read *dpyad* ***ngo'i*** *las,* whereas the Dalama edition (*ca,* 28b.6) reads *dpyad* ***pa'i*** *las.* All these seems to be to be incorrect; Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's word-commentary (*dbu ma pa, tsha,* 106.5) more cogently reads "in the perspective of innate *non*-analytical awareness" (*ma brtags pa'i blo lhan skyes gyi ngor*), and D̄ak-tsang's root text, which Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites just below, says, "In the perspective of a mistaken, *non*-investigatory [consciousness] a cause remains at the time of the effect," and D̄ak-tsang's own commentary says, "in the perspective of a mistaken, *non*-investigatory [consciousness] apprehending the former and later [parts of a] continuum to be one." Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a may mean that D̄ak-tsang is forced by reasoning to assert this in the perspective of analysis, but he does not explicitly make the case for such.

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a explains this contradiction together with the next one.

[c] *zhig pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

moments are contradictory," and about his own system he says,[749] "In the perspective of a mistaken, non-investigatory [consciousness] a cause remains at the time of the effect."[a] His commentary makes a quotation (564):[750]

> Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says that an action has not disintegrated:[751]
>
> > According to those for whom an action is not produced by way of its own entity, its cessation does not exist, and it also is not that the arising of an effect from the non-disintegrated does not occur. Hence, since actions have not disintegrated, the connection of an action and an effect is very feasible…

When one considers [D̄ak-tsang's] propositions and the way [D̄ak-tsang] makes a quotation within eliminating half of the passage,[b]

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a For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's rebuttal, see 656.

b With more context, the passage from Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* reads:

> In that way, due to the absence of inherent existence in both of the two truths not only are views of permanence and annihilation abandoned afar, but also even though a long time passes after actions have ceased, the effects and connection of actions are feasible without conceiving of a continuum of a mind-basis-of-all, non-wastage, acquisition, and so forth. How?
>
> Those [actions] do not inherently cease;
> Therefore, although a basis-of-all does not exist, these [effects] can [arise from actions].
> Hence, you should know that although for some a long time passes
> After the action has ceased, correct effects arise.
>
> In answer to the objection, "How would effects arise from actions that have ceased?" those for whom an action ceases respond that in order for the capacity of an action that has ceased to be deposited, a mind-basis-of-all, or a separate phenomenon [called] non-wastage which is like a seal on a loan, or acquisition, or a continuum of a consciousness infused with predispositions of an action is conceptualized.
>
> According to those for whom an action is not produced by way of its own entity, its cessation does not exist, and it also is not that the arising of an effect from the non-disintegrated does not occur. Hence, since actions have not disintegrated, the connection of an action and an effect is very feasible.

I presume that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a faults D̄ak-tsang for not including in his quotation the two instances when Chandrakīrti says that actions cease and only cites the final two sentences, in which Chandrakīrti says that actions do not cease and do not disintegrate. The conflict leaves room for Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a to make the case that in the latter two cases Chandrakīrti is referring to *inherently existent* cessation and *inherently existent* disintegration. It is amusing, given Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's accusation of incomplete citation, that when he cites D̄ak-tsang, he

what an awful abyss! Whew! Alas! Either you have not the slightest pity on trainees, or what a horrible confusion of the teachings you have made! [What Chandrakīrti is saying] is:

> If an action *inherently* ceases, then since an inherent nature is the mode of subsistence, it is not feasible for the mode of subsistence to change, due to which one falls to the second of the two extremes, permanence and annihilation. However, I, Chandrakīrti, do not assert that actions inherently cease, and, therefore, although a basis-of-all, [non-]wastage of actions, and so forth do not exist, and the earlier action, which is the indirect cause, has disintegrated, it is feasible—although a long time has passed—for an effect to issue forth in dependence upon an action, which has become an entity of having-disintegrated in the assertion that a having-disintegrated is an effective thing.

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* clearly says:[752]

> Those [actions] do not inherently cease;
> Therefore, although a basis-of-all does not exist, these [effects] can [arise from actions].
> Hence, you should know that although for some [actions] a long time passes
> After the action has ceased, correct effects arise.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [753] Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[754]

> Because a shoot is not other than the seed,
> At the time of the shoot the seed has not disintegrated.
> Also, because oneness [of them] does not exist,
> That the seed exists at the time of the shoot is not to be said.

This passage says that:

- In [our] position that a shoot is not an other—that is established by way of its own character—from the seed, it is not contradictory for the two, seed and shoot, to be cause and effect; therefore, at the time of the shoot the seed has not disintegrated in the sense of the continuum of the line[a] of the seed being annihilated.
- Seed and shoot are not one nature and hence the seed itself

leaves off the last sentence of his quote (which I have included), which might seem to cap D̄ak-tsang's point.

[a] *rigs brgyud.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> does not transfer to the shoot; therefore, it is not suitable to say that the seed exists at the time of the shoot.

Similarly, Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* also says:[755]

> Those [actions] do not inherently cease;
> Therefore, although a basis-of-all does not exist, these [effects] can [arise from actions].
> Hence, you should know that although for some [actions] a long time passes
> After the action has ceased, correct effects arise.

This passage says that:

> In the position that actions do not inherently cease, it is not contradictory that although the first moment has ceased, a later moment abides. Therefore, between [the action and] the arising of a fruition [the action] has not disintegrated in the sense that the continuum of the line of the action has been annihilated. Hence, know that although a long time has passed upon the first moment having ceased, fruitions arise.

It does not say that although the continuum of the line of virtuous and non-virtuous actions has been annihilated, fruitions arise, for Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (see just below) says, "In general, the cessation of the action that is the cause and the arising of the fruition that is the effect are simultaneous."

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[756] At this point in the *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* Chandrakīrti cites Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle:*

> Why is an action without production [that exists by way of its own entity]?
> It is because it is without inherent existence…

Moreover, in general, the cessation of the action that is the cause and the arising of the fruition that is the effect are simultaneous, but [Chandrakīrti's stanza] eliminates a qualm about a long time having passed upon the cessation of the earlier action, as in the case, for example, with certain indirect causes such as harsh speech and actions [the fruitions of which are] to be experienced in other lifetimes. Hence, he says:

> Although for some [actions] a long time passes
> After the action has ceased, correct effects arise.

Also, his *Autocommentary* says, "According to those for whom actions are produced by way of their own entity." Thus, who could be more blind than to take [the absence of production and

cessation of actions] as being in conventional terms rather than taking these as the production and cessation [of actions] by way of their own entity!

That an action abides at the time of its effect is also not correct in the conventions of the world. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[757]

> Though the cause has disintegrated, the effect is seen.
> Hence, even the world does not assert that they are the same.

and Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says:

> Though the cause, a "seed," has already disintegrated, the effect, a "shoot," is seen. Hence, even the world does not see that seed and shoot are not other.

and if the action that is the cause persisted in-between without ceasing, it would be permanent; Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* says:

> If it persists until the time of fruition,
> It would be permanent.

Whatever exists together with a cause is not suitable to be an effect of that cause; Nāgārjuna's *Autocommentary on the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:

> If it is imputed that it is the same [time] as the cause, then with cause and effect produced simultaneously, which is the cause of which? Which is the effect of which?

Hence, since the cause having disintegrated and the effect are simultaneous, [the effect] is not from the cause having disintegrated, and if the effect arose from a cause not having disintegrated, [cause and effect] would be simultaneous. Therefore, without investigation by ultimate analysis the two—the cessation of the cause and the production of the effect—arise, like an illusion, simultaneously like the higher and lower ends of a scale. Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* says:

> A shoot does not arise
> From a seed having disintegrated or not having disintegrated.

and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[758] If a shoot arose from an inherently established seed having disintegrated, seed and shoot would be separate continuums because with regard to whatever has inherently disintegrated the continuum of [its] line must be annihilated. If a shoot arose from an inherently established seed not having disintegrated, then since an inherent nature does not turn into something else, seed and shoot would exist simultaneously.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[759] And Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Supramundane* says:

Effects do not arise from causes
Having disintegrated and not having disintegrated.

and the *Rice Seedling Sūtra* says:

In the end the dying aggregates cease, and at that time the aggregates included in the factors of birth arise like the higher and lower ends of a scale…

Therefore, since there are cases of effects issuing forth after the passage of eons after an action is done, the view that the action persists until that [fruition] without having disintegrated is a view of permanence. Hence, with regard to asserting that this is the Middle Way there are millions of scriptures and reasonings in the Great Exposition School and above, and there is a burden of contradictions surpassing the three existences.[a] These are renowned to all like sun and moon, so I will not elaborate them.

If your thought is that [the persistence of actions until their effects] is in the perspective of non-investigatory mistaken [consciousness], it is not so. Do [beings] now remember earlier utterances of harsh words and so forth to others [in former lives and so forth]?

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[760] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

When the action (*las, karma*) by which aggregates of similar type remain in this life has been exhausted and the last consciousness of this life ceases, then like a desirous person's mind having an affinity for a remembered dream-beauty immediately upon waking, when about to die, the mind has an affinity for the action whose capacity for fruition in the next life has been awakened. It is not that one remembers [that action].

[Consequently, you cannot cite this occurrence near the time of death as an instance of memory of former actions of harsh speech and so forth.][b]

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[a] Above, below, and on the ground; or also the three realms—desire, form, and formless.

[b] For more discussion on having-disintegrated, see 933ff.

SEVENTH CONTRADICTION: MODE OF ASSERTING CONVENTIONALITIES AND DIVISIONS OF CONVENTIONALITIES

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[761] Having gathered together [D̄ak-tsang's] contradictions about the two truths, four are to be expressed, [the first of which is]:

The Middle Way and non-assertion of the profound and the vast in one's own system are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- not asserting the profound and the vast in one's own system since obscurational truths exist in the perspective of the world but not for Consequentialists
- and asserting that this is the system of the Proponents of the Middle skilled in presenting the two truths.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[762] In D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* the statements:

1. "It [absurdly] follows that affixing 'worldly' (*'jig rten, loka*) to 'obscurational' (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) would have no impact." (534)
2. "[Chandrakīrti] is stating the world's assertion of four valid cognitions, but he is not positing his own system, since in the summary conclusion he says:

   > Therefore, in that way the world posits that meanings are realized from the four valid cognitions.

   If that did not establish such, then it would not be reasonable [for him] to propound that "Real and unreal conventionalities are the system of the world, but are not our own system" through saying:[763]

   > Objects realized by the world that are apprehended
   > By the six unimpaired sense powers
   > Are true from just [the viewpoint of] the world. The rest
   > Are posited as unreal from just [the viewpoint of] the
   > world." (536)

3. "The basis (the aggregates, constituents, and sense-spheres), the paths that are practices in the class of method, and the fruits (exalted bodies, deeds, and so forth) are to be correlated in the non-investigatory and non-analytical presentation of conventionalities…"[764] (556)

4. "Between worldly conventionalities and yogic conventionalities, real and unreal are differentiated with regard to the first, but that is not our own system..."[765]
5. that an illusory horse and a horse do not differ as to whether they are or are not a horse, (540 and 545)
6. that all instances of "exists in the perspective of the world," "exists in the world's conventions," and so forth are not asserted by Consequentialists, and
7. "Also, that the world is posited by the consciousnesses of Superiors..."[a]

are what Chandrakīrti describes in the *Supplement:*[766]

Those who do not know the division of the two truths
Are involved in bad paths through their wrong conceptions...

Therefore, while wanting to be a Proponent of the Middle skilled in positing the profound and the vast, he has a pile—like the great earth—of what contradict many scriptures and reasonings. In this way, any and all phenomena ranging from forms through to omniscience become unfeasible in the Consequentialists' own system, and it becomes unsuitable for a Consequentialist to assert these.

Many sūtras explain that phenomena exist in the perspective of the world or in only the conventions of the world. The *Mother* [that is, a perfection of wisdom sūtra] says..."All these phenomena are imputed in dependence upon the conventions of the world."...Hence, how could it be that [Consequentialists] do not assert in their own system the entire scope of what is taken as only the conventions of the world! For not only do other Middle Way Superiors assert conventionalities but even the One-Gone-Thus[b] asserts illusory-like production...Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,* its commentary, and so forth explain that within the world in this [context] there are two—common beings and Superiors; Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (86, 582) says:[767]

Among those, two aspects of the world are seen,
Yogis and the ordinary.
Among those, the ordinary world
Is harmed by the yogic world.

[a] I have not found this citation, which likely is criticizing Ḏzong-ka-ḇa for not limiting the scope of the world to being posited by mistaken consciousnesses.

[b] A Buddha is also a Superior and thus "other" than the ones mentioned earlier in the sentence.

Yogis also are harmed
By the higher and higher through special awareness…

Among the world of yogis there are also common beings and Superiors…

Within the world there are dualistic consciousnesses…When worldly dualistic consciousnesses are divided, there are:…

- non-investigatory and non-analytical consciousnesses that, without distinction, treat [two factors] as one with coarse conventions [as in saying] "I planted that tree" from having only planted the seed of the tree, and "I produced that child" from having only deposited the semen for that child (see also 619).[a]
- non-investigatory and non-analytical consciousnesses that use the convention of, for instance, "touching a human" based on [touching] a human's body and conventions such as dark-complexioned and light-complexioned[b]
- awarenesses analyzing conventionalities that realize that something permanent, unitary, and self-powered does not exist; that substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency does not exist; and that the four—purity, happiness, permanence, and self—do not exist [in true sufferings]. Otherwise,[768] if the entire scope of what are renowned in the world were valid cognitions, it would [absurdly] follow that a worldly [consciousness] conceiving a woman[c] [or man] to be clean [after bathing] would harm a yogic [consciousness] realizing that women [and men] are unclean.

Moreover, each of those worldly awarenesses—the non-analytical and the analytical—has two types, rough and fine, ranging from common being through to Buddhas, since in the mental continuums of those common beings and Superiors, there are two each:

- investigation that is concerned with coarse conventions of the world, and
- analysis that is concerned with subtle conventions of the world,

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's source is Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (VI.32):

The world, from planting only seeds,
Says, "I produced this child,"
And also thinks, "I planted [this] tree."
Therefore, production from other does not exist even in the world.

[b] *sngo bsang dang dkar sham.*

[c] It is said that women are used as the example, since such books were written in India and Tibet mainly for men, but as Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* explicitly says, perspectives like this are also to be applied to males.

such as subtle impermanence and coarse emptiness and coarse selflessness.

Consequently, all of Ḏak-tsang's identifications of "world" are only the talk of one who drank the water of a mirage…

If all whatsoever conventionalities were capable of being posited without any analysis,…it is easy to elaborate awful damage such as that then it would [absurdly] follow that all the fine analysis analyzing the four—impermanence and so forth—in the first four chapters of Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas* is analysis of the ultimate, and it would [absurdly] follow that what are found by that analysis are ultimate truths, and so forth.

The reason for [Chandrakīrti's] saying that real and unreal are not posited [with respect to conventionalities] in the Middle Way's own system is:

- The object [that is, emptiness] perceived in a Superior's meditative equipoise is the middle,[a] and this middle is delineated in Nāgārjuna's Collections of Reasonings.
- Hence, relative to an awareness analyzing this middle, even dream-blue and blue do not differ in being true or false [since both are false relative to ultimate analysis].
- Thereby, it is said that in the Middle Way's own system, or in the uncommon system of the Middle Way, real and unreal are not posited with respect to conventionalities…

By implication, truth and falsity are also not differentiated with respect to whether [conventional objects] exist or do not exist in accordance with how they appear to a wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise [since they all appear to inherently exist but actually do not inherently exist]. Nevertheless, truth and falsity are individually very much asserted by way of whether [the object] exists or not in the basal appearance because:

- regarding a horse in a magical display, it is established by the direct perception of an eye consciousness unaffected [by the magician's spell] that the factor of a horse does not at all exist in the likes of the pebble or the twig[b] that is the basis of the appearance

[a] *dbu ma.*

[b] During a magical display created by putting a salve on a small object such as a pebble or a stick and using a mantra that affects the eye consciousness of all present, including the magician, a pebble appears to be a horse but is not.

- regarding the bases of imputation of a horse, even the head that is a basis of imputation of a horse exists as the head of a horse, and so forth, and even though it is not found by ultimate analysis, it is not the object [of such ultimate analysis], and not even one conventional analysis damages it.

If this were not the case, then assertions common to Proponents of the Middle and the world and a system common to Proponents of the Middle and the world would not exist. Therefore, what talk could be more silly than that if those are asserted, they must be asserted in the uncommon system of the Middle Way…

Objection: Well, when Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* (559) describes obscurational truths[a] and mere-conventionalities,[b] "Thus, respectively the Supramundane Victor spoke of obscurational truths and mere-conventionalities," if you do not associate these individually with common beings and Superiors, how will you posit them?

Answer: It appears that many fools and many fancying themselves to be scholars speak out mistaken nonsense about these. It appears that all of them think that whatever is a mere-conventionality[c] is necessarily a conventionality.[d] [However] the meaning of Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* is that the Supramundane Victor:

1. speaks of being true merely in the perspective of ignorance, or an obscurational[e] [consciousness, and called these "obscurational truths"]
2. and speaks of [all phenomena including emptinesses] ranging from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses[f] as mere-conventionalities,[g] merely terminological,[h] and mere-

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[a] *kun rdzob bden pa.*

[b] *kun rdzob tsam.*

[c] *kun rdzob tsam.* When I read this sentence, I was amused to find that I am one of these fools; this made me eager to test Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's evidence, which in this case I find convincing.

[d] *kun rdzob.*

[e] *kun rdzob* as in *kun rdzob bden pa.*

[f] This is a range of 108 classes of phenomena, which include all ultimate truths. Buddha described all of them, including emptinesses (which are not conventionalities), as mere-conventionalities. For the list, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 201-212.

[g] *kun rdzob tsam.*

[h] *brda tsam.*

nominalities,[a] whereby [through "mere" he refers to] their absence of true establishment[b] and their absence of intrinsic existence.[c]

Thus:

1. "Obscurational"[d] [in "obscurational truth] is taken to be ignorance, and the way [phenomena] are true in its perspective [is addressed in the last two lines of the following stanza] from the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* (see also 739):[769]

   The production of things [exists] conventionally (*kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā*);
   Ultimately it lacks inherent existence.
   That [consciousness] which is mistaken regarding the lack of inherent existence
   Is asserted as the obscurer of reality (*yang dag kun rdzob, satyaṃ saṃvṛti*).

   Chandrakīrti explains the meaning of the last two lines in his *Supplement*[770] and *Autocommentary:*

   The Subduer said that because bewilderment
   Obstructs the nature, it is obscurational (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*):
   Those fabrications it perceives as true are obscurational truths (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*).

2. All phenomena are posited as mere-conventionalities, merely terminological, and mere-nominalities in many sūtras. The *Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra* says:

   If in that way all phenomena are not observed, then here what is a Buddha? What is a Bodhisattva?…These are mere conventions,[e] mere-nominalities, merely terminological, mere-conventionalities, mere expressions,[f] mere imputations.[g]

   and the *Jewel Mine Sūtra*…and Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth.

Consequently, this is the non-contradiction of:

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[a] *ming tsam.*

[b] *bden par grub pa med pa.*

[c] *rang gi ngo bos med pa.*

[d] *kun rdzob* as in *kun rdzob bden pa.*

[e] *tha snyad tsam.*

[f] *brjod pa tsam.*

[g] *gdags pa tsam.*

- forms and so forth being mere-nominalities, merely terminological, [and mere-conventionalities] in the perspective of a person [who has realized emptiness], and
- forms and so forth being truths in the perspective of another's consciousness conceiving true existence.[a]

The single lion's roar[b] of eloquent explanation here has expelled afar millions of hoofed animals of wrong conceptions.

EIGHTH CONTRADICTION: THE BASIS OF DIVISION OF THE TWO TRUTHS

That the unanalyzed is the basis of the division and that an analyzed meaning is a division are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that mere objects of knowledge in the perspective of non-investigation and non-analysis are the basis of the division of the two truths
- and the statement that an object found in the perspective of an investigatory and analytical rational consciousness is a division.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[771] D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* says:[772]

> Although conventionalities are not objects of knowledge in the perspective of reasoning and the ultimate is not an object of knowledge in the perspective of mistake, mere objects of knowledge in the perspective of non-investigation and non-analysis without differentiation are said in sūtra to be the basis of division itself of the two truths.

This proposition appears to be a city where millions of contradictions gather. It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is an object of knowledge in the perspective of non-investigation and non-analysis because of being either of the two truths. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

If you accept [that the emptiness of true existence is an object

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[a] This is the context in which it is said the forms and so forth are mere-conventionalities for a Superior and also are known by Superiors as obscurational truths, since Superiors know that forms and so forth are truths for other persons' ignorance. In this way, followers of D̄zong-ka-b̄a hold that mere-conventionalities are not a separate category from obscurational truths.

[b] The title of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's root text is *Presentation of Tenets: **Lion's Roar** Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

of knowledge in the perspective of non-investigation and non-analysis], it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is not feasible as non-investigated and non-analyzed because of being an object found by reasoning analyzing an investigated object.[a] Again, you have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

If you say that it is not established [that the emptiness of true existence is an object found by reasoning analyzing an investigated object], you have explicitly contradicted [your own assertion that it is], and it would [absurdly] follow that ultimate analysis does not exist! You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

If you accept [that ultimate analysis does not exist], then it follows that the subject, the emptiness of true existence, is not feasible as non-investigated and non-analyzed because [according to you] it is an object established by reasoning[b] analyzing a conventionality. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction! And so forth.

Similarly, fling [such consequences] individually using the sixteen attributes of the four truths—impermanence and so forth—and the ten examples of the emptiness of true existence, a magician's illusions and so forth, [as subjects].

NINTH AND TENTH CONTRADICTIONS: IDENTIFICATION OF EMPTINESS AND MODE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS

That a non-emptiness is the path of liberation and that there is no second door to peace are contradictory. Not meditating on anything and meditating on emptiness are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that, although the emptiness of true existence has not been realized, this which is called "free from proliferations"[c] in the perspective of good analysis by a rational consciousness is the path of liberation
- and the assertion in accordance with Consequentialist texts that there is no second door to peace.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[773] D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* (554) says:[774]

[a] *brtags don.*

[b] *rig pa,* which is an alternative spelling of what nowadays tends to be *rigs pa.*

[c] *spros bral.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> The ultimate is in the perspective of slightly analytical rational consciousness.
> Freedom from proliferations is in the perspective of well analyzed non-verbalization.

and so forth, and (555):

> Therefore, that the emptiness of true existence is the ultimate truth
> And its existence is a conventional truth are indeed correct,
> But those who at the end of good analysis assert just this
> And those who assert it as an enumerative ultimate are both mistaken.

In this way [D̄ak-tsang's] root text and commentary put forth the assertion of a path of liberation that eradicates the conception of self but is not included in the view of emptiness—a "freedom from proliferations" in the perspective of the good analysis of a rational consciousness, it not being [apprehendable] as anything. The proposition in his commentary that "There is no way for it to be among the two truths because it is not an established base," contradicts:

- Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment:*

  > Those who do not know emptiness
  > Have no lot for liberation.

- Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas:*[775]

  > When selflessness is seen in objects
  > The seeds of cyclic existence are stopped.

- and Āryadeva's explanation that the door of peace is single, "There is no second door of peace," as well Chandrakīrti's commentary on that…

Also, the fact that D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (561) cites Shūra's statement:[776]

> With respect to the true suchness of the mind,
> When it is analyzed a little in this way,
> It is not from self, not from other,
> Not from both, and not causelessly.

as a source for positing ultimate truth as not existing in the perspective of good analysis but as only in the perspective of slight analysis exposes his own intelligence and summons contradictions. Shūra's passage is saying, "Here it will not be explained at length; however, if, upon condensation, it is analyzed a little with [reasonings] refuting the four extremes with respect to the true

establishment of the mind…" Hence, it is not that [ultimate truth] is not being analyzed well:

- because it is analyzed well upon being condensed, and
- because good analysis and a little analysis are not contradictory, and
- because all correct analyses are good analyses; otherwise, they would be wrong analyses.

If it is asserted that until one analyzes extensively in accordance with the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* and Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom,"* the freedom from proliferations of good analysis does not come, this would contradict all the scriptures because that Hearers and Solitary Realizers are naturally of dull and middling faculties and hence do not analyze the two truths at length is the general system of the scriptures and the general system of many scholars.

In particular, this [assertion of a "freedom from proliferations" separate from emptiness] is outside all the scriptures of the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons because they proclaim and assert again and again that meditative equipoise free from proliferations in which all proliferations have disappeared with regard to emptiness—in accordance with a Lesser Vehicle sūtra that says, "Profound, quiescent, free from proliferations, clear light, uncompounded," and so forth and the *Transmigration Sūtra* and so forth—is unique to all Superiors of the three vehicles. This is because the father and his spiritual sons say that the presence or absence of *thoroughly complete and full* analysis of emptiness is a difference between the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle [and thus the paths of liberation of both vehicles require realization of the emptiness of inherent existence]. Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says:

> It is also just reasonable that the Great Vehicle was taught in order to clarify the selflessness of phenomena because [Buddha] wished to express an extensive teaching. The selflessness of phenomena is reduced to only being briefly characterized in the Hearer Vehicle. The holy master [Nāgārjuna's] *Praise of the Supramundane* (see also 721) says:
>
> > Because you said that without realizing signlessness,
> > Liberation[777] does not occur,
> > You taught it fully
> > In the Great Vehicle.

and Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* at the

point of commenting on:

> For the sake of releasing transmigrators this selflessness
> Was described in two forms through a division of phenomena and persons.

says:

> Hearers and Solitary Realizers also do indeed perceive dependent-arising, mere conditionality; nevertheless, they do not have complete and full meditation on the selflessness of phenomena…It is posited that they have entire meditation on the selflessness of persons.

and such also exists in Nāgārjuna's Collection of Praises, *Precious Garland,* and so forth. Consequently, having stuck a finger in your nose, this mode of analysis went wrong, due to which you said that [this type of analysis mentioned in Shūra's text] is not the mode of good analysis; do not propound such about Shūra.

Wishing to propound in your commentary that the mode of freedom from the four extremes—not existent, not non-existent, not existent and non-existent, also not not having a nature of both—you cite a passage in the *Wisdom Vajra Compendium*[a] and in Mañjushrīkīrti (561):

> Not existent, not non-existent, not existent and non-existent,
> Also not not having a nature of both.

and Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom* (561):

> If the non-empty existed a little,
> The empty would also exist a little.
> When the non-empty does not exist a little,
> How could the empty exist?

The assertion in that way that it is not necessary for what is not existent to be non-existent is a source of immeasurable fallacies, giving the impression of being a system that is only a compilation of parts and so forth. If there were no explicit contradictories, refuting mistakes and positing one's own system would be utterly impossible. Prior to the lord of reasoning, Cha-b̄a Chö-ḡyi-s̄eng-ge,[b]

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[a] This is an explanatory Highest Yoga Tantra in the Guhyasamāja cycle.

[b] *cha pa* (also, *phywa pa*) *chos kyi seng ge;* 1109-1169. This may refer to D̄ak-tsang's disparaging mention (528) that "the country of Tibet was filled in general with the conventions of logic and in particular with conventions dependent on collected topics," since Cha-b̄a Chö-ḡyi-s̄eng-ge is known for composing the first Collected Topics on logic and epistemology.

reasonings employing explicit contradictories were used even by the Conqueror. Explicit contradictories are indicated in scripture:

> The wandering mendicant Ďö-ring[a] said, "I cannot stand anything." [The Buddha asked,] "Do you stand not standing anything?"

and not being existent and not being non-existent are described as contradictories in a statement also by the Superior Master [Nāgārjuna]:

> If the absence of inherent existence is overturned,
> Inherent existence would be thoroughly established.

and in his *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness:*

> Because of being qualitatively discordant, being existent and being non-existent are contradictory.

and also in his *Autocommentary on the "Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness"* on this:

> That an effect is not existent and is not non-existent are contradictory.

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* describes apprehending a pot as not being existent and apprehending a pot as non-existent as equivalent…and Buddhapālita also speaks likewise…

The *Commentary on the "Wisdom Vajra Compendium"* says:

> The final point of the Yogic Practitioners is existence; that is not asserted. For the Lokāyatas it is non-existence; that also is not asserted.

and so forth, whereby it speaks [of the four positions as]:

- not existent in accordance with the assertions of the Proponents of Mind-Only and so forth
- not non-existent even conventionally like the Ayatas
- not a third category that is neither existent nor non-existent
- and also not both existent and non-existent,

and Jetāri describes [the four] within applying them to inherent existence…In brief, all descriptions of "is not existent"[b] in Nāgārjuna's Collections of Reasoning and Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* are explained as "non-existent"[c] by way of either applying or not applying a qualification to the object of negation [such as "inherently"].

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[a] *stod ring.*

[b] *yod pa min pa.*

[c] *med pa.*

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Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion of not meditating on anything—that is, not taking anything to mind
- and the assertion that this is meditation on emptiness.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[778] Also, not positing emptiness as the object of a Superior's non-conceptual meditative equipoise but asserting a freedom from proliferations in which one is not mindful of any object of knowledge and so forth is the great bandit of the three existences removing the eye of exalted wisdom and cutting the life of liberation of all sentient beings:

- because emptiness is the eliminator of all proliferations, and
- because emptiness is the object to be individually known by oneself in a Superior's meditative equipoise, and
- because the ultimate is endowed with five characteristics.

With respect to sources for those, respectively, Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* says:[779]

When actions and afflictive emotions cease, there is liberation.
They arise from [false] conceptualizations.
These arise from proliferations.
Proliferations are ceased in emptiness.[a]...

Concerning how the ultimate is individually known by oneself and how it is endowed with five characteristics, Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* says:[780]

Not known from others, quiescent,
Not proliferated by proliferations,
Without conceptuality, without diversity—
These are asserted as the characteristics of the ultimate.

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[a] About this line, the Dalai Lama says in *The Meaning of Life: Buddhist Perspectives on Cause and Effect* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000), 86:

> Contaminated actions and afflictive emotions are produced from wrong conceptuality, which itself is produced from the proliferations of the conception of inherent existence. Those conceptual proliferations are ceased *through* emptiness (*stong pa nyid kyis*), or, those proliferations are ceased *in* emptiness (*stong pa nyid du*)—the final line being interpreted in both of these ways. With the instrumental, it means that conceptual elaborations are ceased *through* cultivating the view realizing emptiness, but also since that into which they are ceased or that into which they are extinguished is the reality of emptiness itself, it is also interpreted as that *into which* the fictive proliferations of the conception of inherent existence cease. That reality—the emptiness into which all of the afflictive emotions, ignorance and so forth, have been extinguished through the force of antidotal wisdom—is the true cessation that is liberation.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[781] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Great Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"* says that the ultimate is said to have five characteristics relative to removing misconceptions:

1. "not known from others"—it is not realized merely from another's teaching.
2. "quiescent"—it is devoid of inherent existence, like the nonperception of falling hairs by one without an eye disease.
3. "not proliferated by proliferations"—it is hence not verbalized by proliferations that proliferate meanings.
4. "without conceptuality"—conceptuality is the movement of the mind, and when actualizing suchness, one is free from that.
5. "without diversity"—in the way that one phenomenon is ultimately, other phenomena are also the same; hence, ultimately they do not exist as separate objects.[a]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[782] Furthermore, [D̄ak-tsang (558)] says that the statement in Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment:*[783]

> Those who meditate on an emptiness
> Having a low nature by way of [thinking]
> "No production," "empty," and "selfless,"
> Meditate on self here.

indicates that in the phase of meditation from among the three awarenesses of hearing, thinking, and meditating, it is not right to meditate on emptiness because meditating "True production does not exist," and "Self does not exist," is to meditate on self. [D̄ak-tsang's opinion] is the howl of fear even at the name of this doctrine, never mind meditation on it. As Āryadeva says:

> Even from the name of this excellent doctrine
> Fright is generated in the unholy.

For this reason, various proliferations of bad views are propounded, such as:

- If you meditate on emptiness, it will turn into an annihilatory emptiness; therefore, meditate on the mind as like an illusion.
- Meditate on the mind, luminous and without identification.
- According to Hwa-shang: If you apprehend any object as "It is

[a] For D̄ak-tsang's rendition of the five, see 662.

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> such-and-such," it becomes a conception of self; therefore, do not take anything to mind.

and so forth, but these have mostly been refuted (505ff.). This passage in Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* is saying that meditation on a nature, or mode of subsistence, lower than the absence of production, emptiness, and selflessness according to the system of the Middle Way is to meditate on self, or to meditatively cultivate a view of an extreme [by apprehending these three to truly exist].[784] If this were not so, one would have to propound that Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* has internal contradictions because it speaks again and again of meditating on emptiness. That passage, as translated by Rap-shi[a] and edited by Ba-tsap, reads:

> The Buddha-great-beings
> And all endowed with mercy
> At all times know emptiness as like space.
> Therefore, always meditate on this emptiness,
> The foundation of all phenomena,
> Quiescent, baseless like a magician's illusion,
> Destroyer of cyclic existence.
> Those who meditate on an emptiness
> Having a low nature by way of [thinking]
> "No production," "empty," and "selfless,"
> Are not meditating on those…

Also, the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra* explains how earlier Buddhas and moreover the Conqueror himself investigated and meditated on emptiness, and it speaks emphatically again and again about how to meditate on emptiness…

Furthermore, [Dak-tsang's] statement[b] that [his system of]:

- first developing states arisen from thinking that realize emptiness
- and afterwards not meditating on emptiness but placing the mind blankly without any object of observation

differs from Hwa-shang is also not correct. Although their preparations differ, they are very much in agreement with regard to the actual session[c] because:

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[a] *rab zhi bshes gnyen;* P2665, vol. 61; D1800, vol. *ngi.*

[b] See Dak-tsang's description of the second and third phases, 566ff.

[c] This refers to Dak-tsang's third phase.

- Hwa-shang says not to take anything to mind since no matter what is observed or apprehended, it turns into a misapprehension of signs
- and for [your system of] not thinking anything—exists, not exists, is, and is not—since if one apprehended "empty," "not truly existent," and "self does not exist," this would turn into a conception of self; you cite as a source:

  With regard to the noumenal freedom from proliferations,
  Place consciousness also in freedom from proliferations.

This is very awful:

- because once a common being's mind exists, it is not possible that it does not apprehend an object of observation, and
- also because if there is no mind, then even meditation on an absence of proliferations that is nothingness is not feasible, and
- because nowhere in any sūtra is it explained that a common being who has not attained the fourth concentration [attains] a stoppage of mind, a mind of nothingness, and
- because the statements—in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—of non-observation and not taking anything to mind are said in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras themselves to refer to the non-existence of the dualistic appearance of conventionalities when analyzing thusness…

The Elder, the father [Atisha] and his spiritual son [Drom-d̄ön] assert that it is wrong to say that at the time of hearing and thinking one analyzes with the view of selflessness, but at the time of meditating one does non-conceptual meditation without meditatively cultivating the view…It is explained that even during stabilizing meditation—having analyzed and [gained] a little non-perception of inherent establishment and become utterly empty in selflessness—one meditatively cultivates meditative equipoise like space, without investigating and analyzing…It is said that one meditatively cultivates meditative equipoise like space until Buddhahood.

Eleventh Contradiction: Asserting Production from Other

Asserting production from other merely due to their being other and not asserting production from self merely due to asserting a self are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- asserting production from other merely due to seed and shoot being other
- and not asserting production from self merely due to asserting that a self exists conventionally.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[785] D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* carries on as if the following are contradictions (547 and 548):

> That substantial establishment[a] does not exist and that things [b] exist are contradictory. That production from other does not exist and that seed and shoot are other substantial entities are contradictory.

His *Commentary* says, "If objects of knowledge are necessarily imputedly existent, it is likewise."…However, it is explained that it is not suitable to wipe out conventions [such as] stealing substance[c] for stealing a pot…His *Commentary* (548) says:[786]

> If seed and shoot are not asserted as other substantial entities, they would be one substantial entity or one thing, but such an assertion is like Sāṃkhya [and hence unsuitable, due to which in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's system seed and shoot are asserted as other substantial entities]. Also [his] not taking object produced and producer—that are other substantial entities—as production from other contradicts [his] assertion of worldly valid cognition in [the Middle Way School's] own system.

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the "other" of production from other exists because [you] take it that production from other exists if seed and shoot are merely other substantial entities conventionally. You have come to assert the three spheres of self-contradiction.[d]

If it is accepted that the "other" of production from other

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[a] *rdzas grub, dravyasiddha.*

[b] *dngos po, bhāva.*

[c] *rdzas;* property.

[d] *'khor gsum song.* That D̄ak-tsang "comes" to assert these means that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a recognizes that D̄ak-tsang himself does not assert production from other or that the "other" of production from other exists, since D̄ak-tsang does not hold that seed and shoot are merely other substantial entities conventionally. However, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a feels that D̄ak-tsang is forced to accept the principle that D̄ak-tsang aptly and correctly describes as belonging to D̄zong-ka-b̄a, namely, that seed and shoot exist, and since they are not one substantial entity, they must be other substantial entities. D̄ak-tsang, in fact, does not accept this principle, but Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a feels that he must do so in order to make any sense, and thus he forces on him these conclusions.

exists,[a] then all effective things would be made and produced by others, and in that case it would contradict the explanation in the *Rice Seedling Sūtra* that eyes and so forth are not made by self, and not made by others, and so forth, and would contradict the Superior [Nāgārjuna's] statement:

Logicians assert that suffering
Is made by self, made by other,
Made by both, or causelessly.
You say that it arises dependently.

and it contradicts Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,* "Effective things are not produced from other because other does not exist," and many explanations such as that the four extremes are not asserted. And it [absurdly] follows that merely by way of the convention "Things are produced," [effective things] cannot be posited with merely that because [according to you] if something is produced, it must be found when analyzed whether "it is produced from self, from other, from both, or causelessly," since [according to you] at that time production from other is found. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

It [absurdly] follows that even the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement,*[787] "Production from other does not exist even in the world," is not feasible because [according to you] production from other exists conventionally. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction![b]

If, by reason of seed and shoot being other substantial entities, production from other is definitely necessary, well then, it [absurdly] follows that even a planted tree and a child are produced from self because it is propounded and renowned in the conventions of the world "I planted that tree," and "I produced that child." The three spheres of self-contradiction! You have no reply! This would contradict many statements such as in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement:*[788]

The world, from planting only seeds,
Says, "I produced this child,"

[a] Ḏak-tsang would not accept this; Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's reasoning is merely instructive of what would be contradicted if one did accept production from other. Since Ḏak-tsang accuses Ḏzong-ka-b̄a of asserting production from other, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a a bit bombastically elaborates various similar accusations in return.

[b] The bombast ends here. What follows is provocative.

And also thinks, "I planted [this] tree."[a]

and so forth.

Twelfth and Thirteenth Contradictions: Not Asserting that Omniscience Knows, Yet having a System of Progressing on the Path

That one trains in all topics for many eons but at the time of the fruit does not know even one of the diversity is to mistake the stages of the path. That the remainderless is the utter non-existence of form and knowledge and that there are four exalted bodies are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: That one trains in all topics of knowledge for many periods of countless eons but at the time of the fruit, Buddhahood, does not know even one of the diversity is the mistake of being deluded about the stages of progression on the path. Contradictory are:

- the assertion that for a Buddha's own-appearance, having attained the remainderless nirvāṇa, there is utterly no form or knowledge
- and the assertion that there are four exalted bodies.

I wonder whether those are forced by reasoning [and not actual contradictions] because the opponent [Ḏak-tsang] asserts that [the four exalted bodies] are equally non-existent in Buddhas' own-appearance and equally existent in others' perspectives.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[789] As explained earlier (575), there is the former [that is, the twelfth] contradiction of [Ḏak-tsang's] asserting that a Buddha does not have an exalted wisdom knowing even one of the diversity [of phenomena]. Also, a second contradiction is made in his assertion that the four exalted bodies and exalted activities do not exist aside from trainees' other-appearance. His root text *Knowing All Tenets* (571, 574) says:[790]
>
> Because appearances of objects of knowledge have vanished for [a Buddha's] own perspective,

[a] The final line of the stanza, omitted by Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa, is, "Therefore, production from other does not exist even in the world." Chandrakīrti builds this conclusion on the world's usage of terminology, which does not enter into considering whether cause and effect are other substantial entities. Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa suggests that, for Ḏak-tsang, Chandrakīrti would have to be saying in the first three lines that cause and effect are one substantial entity; however, in fact Ḏak-tsang does not say this either. For Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's own opinion, see 604.

The inconceivable exalted activities are the sport of [trainees'] other-appearance.[a]

and his commentary says:[791]

A Buddha's inconceivable, unutterable form bodies not only are non-conceptualized, like fulfillments from a wish-granting jewel and from a garuda's offering-tree, and so forth, but do not even require mere motivation. Rather, they are asserted as only the sport of other-appearance of this and that trainee due to earlier prayer-wishes [when that Buddha was a Bodhisattva] and trainees' good karma because in a Buddha's own perspective all appearances of consciousness and objects of consciousness have vanished; [Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says]:[792]

When things and non-things
Do not dwell in front of awareness,
Then since there is no other aspect,
It is thoroughly quiescent in non-apprehension.

and:

When the sleep of deluded ignorance is awakened,
These cyclic existences are not observed…

His own words [describing]:

- the stages of progression on the path in which one trains in all topics of knowledge for many periods of countless eons,
- but at the time of the fruit one does not know even one of the diversity

contradict many sūtras and treatises, such as Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* and so forth.

If mind does not exist on the remainderless[b] Buddha ground, mental factors also must vanish, and if those have vanished, then since there is no proponent of Inner [Buddhist] tenets who asserts consciousness that is not included among minds and mental factors,[c] exalted wisdom also must not exist. If there are no minds and

[a] The exalted activities of a Buddha do not exist in a Buddha's own-appearance; rather, their frame of existence is totally within their appearance to others, and thus are "other-appearances."

[b] For the Consequentialists' unique way of presenting the remainderless nirvāṇa (which is not how the term "remainderless" it is used here), see 942.

[c] Ge-luk-b̄a scholars hold that any instance of consciousness, even exalted wisdom, requires both minds and mental factors, but D̄ak-tsang (532), Döl-b̄o-b̄a S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen, and so forth hold that a Buddha has exalted wisdom (*ye shes*), despite not having minds and mental factors. Thus, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is right to say that for D̄ak-tsang a Buddha does not

mental factors or no exalted wisdom body, the two form bodies must also not exist, whereby [Ḏak-tsang's] assertion of four exalted bodies is an internal contradiction, and contradicts all scriptures. Furthermore, his saying (533) that a causally concordant emanation body is something like an exalted body[a] is the proposition that one's own Teacher is matter, that the teaching is the imagistic teaching by that Teacher, and that oneself has entered the imagistic teaching of that Teacher…

Consequently, both of these are each a pile of millions of contradictions with all systems of progress on the path of the Conqueror's scriptures, with all systems abandoning obstructions, and with all systems of attaining good qualities…Here, let us briefly show how these contradict the modes of progress on the path and so forth in the system of the Consequence School…They contradict the explanation in Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes*…that exalted wisdom illuminates all through stating that the body of attributes endowed with abandonment and realization, which has been cleansed by practices expanding the basic constituent, is complete and illuminating like a full moon…It [absurdly] follows that all explanations of advancement are incorrect because not even one of the endless qualities [cultivated on the path] exists on the Buddha ground. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction! In particular, as Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* says:[793]

> It is said that the afflictive obstructions
> And those to omniscience are like clouds.
> The causes of separating from the two obstructions [preventing liberation and omniscience]
> Are asserted to be the two exalted wisdoms,
> The non-conceptual [meditative equipoise]
> And [the discrimination of the diverse objects of knowledge] attained after it.

Accordingly, [your presentation] contradicts the explanation:

- that the obstructions to omniscience are obstructions blocking all objects of knowledge, like clouds obstructing illumination of all the ground by the sun
- and that when separated from them, the two exalted wisdoms—the non-conceptual exalted wisdom knowing the

have minds and mental factors, but, for Ḏak-tsang, a Buddha still has exalted wisdom.

[a] *sku 'dra tsam; sku 'dra* also means an image, a statue, and the like.

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ultimate and the exalted wisdom knowing the entire diversity [of phenomena] arise

because, according to you, upon buddhafication the sun sets, and covered in darkness, nothing is known aside from just emptiness. And Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes* says:

Just as a butter lamp inside a pot
Does not in the least illuminate…
But when the diamond meditative stabilization
Has broken the pot,
Then it illuminates
To the ends of space.

Your presentation contradicts this explanation that:

- Just as although a good jeweled lamp exists inside a pot, it does not illuminate others, so due to the afflictive obstructions, there is no illumination.
- However, just as by making a small hole in a pot, a portion is illuminated, so due to having abandoned a little of a sentient being's obstructions, a portion of objects of knowledge are known.
- But when the diamond-like meditative stabilization breaks the obstructions to omniscience—the predispositions of the afflictive emotions, like a pot—the light of knowledge pervades whatsoever objects of knowledge throughout space.

For instead of asserting such, you assert that when the pot is broken, the light is non-existent. If though the obstructions to omniscience are extinguished, all objects of knowledge are not known, what is the point of asserting obstructions to omniscience?

If there are no obstructions that are the apprehension of the two truths as different entities, the two truths would [absurdly] be manifest simultaneously to all sentient beings. If there are obstructions that are the apprehension of the two truths as different entities, then [your assertion that a Buddha] does not simultaneously know the entities of the two truths despite having exhaustively abandoned these obstructions [means that] there is nothing to be understood about abandonments and antidotes other than images of sounds, like the sound of a hand striking an empty vessel…

How could yogis on higher grounds outshine those on lower grounds? This contradicts all explanations that Buddhas, like lions, outshine all Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. That a Buddha has such qualities and the assertion that the four bodies are appearances in the continuums of trainees are contradictory.

Even if it is said that through having extinguished karmas and afflictive emotions in a Buddha's continuum, the effects of that do not exist in a Buddha's own appearances, nevertheless that even mere *pure* environments and beings that are the imprint of completing endless forms of the two collections—these not being polluted by karmas and afflictive emotions—do not exist even in [a Buddha's] own appearance is a deprecation of the non-wastage of cause and effect and is outside all [the presentations] in the *Kālachakra Tantra* of empty forms, the mode of full buddhafication, and so forth.

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Contradictions: Not Asserting Valid Establishment

Asserting the two—direct perception and inference—and not asserting valid cognition are contradictory. That there are proofs and that there is no valid establishment are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion of the two—direct perception and inference
- and the non-assertion of valid cognition.[a]

Contradictory are:

- the assertion that there are reasonings that are proofs
- and the assertion that there are no validly established things.

These also are forced by reasoning because the opponent [D̄ak-tsang] asserts that these equally exist in the perspective of non-analytical mistaken consciousness and equally do not exist in the Consequentialists' own system.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[794] D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* (537) says:[795]

That all objects are false and that [consciousnesses] having them as objects are non-deceptive are contradictory.
Being mistaken with respect to an object and being a valid cognition of it are contradictory.
That inference exists and that proof statements do not exist are contradictory.

[a] D̄ak-tsang (560) makes the case that even a yogic consciousness realizing the impermanence of compounded phenomena is direct perception but not a valid cognition. Therefore, Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's statement, just below, that this position is forced on D̄ak-tsang does not appear to be right.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

and (550):[796]

It is contradictory to refute the valid cognition described in the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition, but in your own system to know a presentation of valid cognition.

and with respect to his own system (892):[797]

Mostly, those imputed by others are refuted with consequences.
Since reasons are stated without investigation, there is no contradiction
In generating inferential rational consciousnesses in oneself and others.
Why is propounding non-assertion even of mere autonomous [syllogisms]
Because the autonomy imputed by logicians does not exist,
Not the same also for consequences?

His commentary says:[798]

When generating the pure view in oneself and others earlier and later (?),[a] mostly, those imputed by others are refuted with consequences. Since reasons are stated without investigation, there is no contradiction in generating inferential rational consciousnesses in oneself and others because these called "Consequentialists" have passed to the limit of all schools of tenets, due to which they are skilled in revealing internal contradictions to others and in nurturing self and others. Why is propounding, "Even mere autonomous [syllogisms] are not asserted because the autonomy imputed by logicians does not exist," not the same also for consequences: "Even mere consequences are not asserted because the consequences imputed by logicians do not exist"? It is very well the same.

The many erroneous propositions in his commentary on these points come to be obvious contradictions with all scriptures and all scholars.

[Establishment by Valid Cognition Exists]

The lord of reasoning [Dharmakīrti] says, "Without establishment by valid cognition a thesis is contradictory,"...and even Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says, "Accordingly, the four valid cognitions,"...and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement,* "If valid cognitions did not exist, objects of comprehension..." and Nāgārjuna's description of four valid cognitions—direct perception and so forth—in

[a] *stod smad phal cher.*

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his *Refutation of Objections,*...uncountable mentions of scriptural valid cognition, valid beings, and valid cognition [in sūtras and treatises including]...Kalki Puṇḍarīka's *Stainless Light*...and Vajragarbha's *Commentary on the Condensation of the "Hevajra Tantra"*...[a]

[The Suitability of Quoting Autonomists]

[Ḍak-tsang] propounds that [on the occasion of explaining the Consequence School] it is not suitable to quote passages from the Autonomy School as Chandrakīrti says on the occasion of his promise to compose the *Clear Words* (553), "I will make clarification undisturbed by the winds of logic," and yet [Ḍak-tsang] cites [the Autonomist] Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* concerning the refutation of production of the four alternatives...Also, having asserted that Āryavimuktasena is a Superior, [Ḍak-tsang] treats him as a Logician and Autonomist...

As a source for it not being suitable to mix in any texts of the Autonomy School, he cites Chandrakīrti's promise to compose the *Clear Words*...[but this conflicts with] Chandrakīrti's own clear explanation—in the colophon to the *Clear Words*—of how he composed the text:[799]

Having seen the *Compendium of Sūtra*, the *Precious Garland of Advice,* the Praises of Reality, and with hard work over a

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites these last two because of Ḍak-tsang's fame with regard to the *Kālachakra Tantra,* these being two of the renowned three Bodhisattva commentaries:

- Kalkī Puṇḍarīka's (*rigs ldan pad ma dkar po*) *Great Commentary on the "Kālachakra Tantra": Stainless Light* (*bsdus pa'i rgyud kyi rgyal po dus kyi 'khor lo'i 'grel bshad rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi rjes su 'jug pa stong phrag bcu gnyis pa dri ma med pa'i 'od ces bya ba / 'grel chen dri med 'od, vimālaprabhānāmamūlatantrānusāriṇīdvādaśasāhasrikālaghukālacakratantrarājaṭīkā*), P2064, vol. 46
- Vajrapāṇi's (*phyag na rdo rje*) *Meaning Commentary on the "Chakrasaṃvara Tantra"* (*mngon par brjod pa 'bum pa las phyung ba nyung ngu'i rgyud kyi bsdus pa'i don rnam par bshad pa / phyag rdor stod 'grel, lakṣābhidhānāduddhṛtalaghutantrapiṇḍārthavivaraṇa*), P2117, vol. 48
- Vajragarbha's (*rdo rje snying po*) *Commentary on the Condensation of the Hevajra Tantra* (*kye'i rdo rje bsdus pa'i don gyi rgya cher 'grel pa / rdo rje snying 'grel, hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā*), P2310, vol. 53.

The latter two are done in the manner of the *Kālachakra Tantra,* that is to say, through the grid of the teachings in the *Kālachakra.* According to Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*dngos, ka,* 1.4), they are called the three cycles of Bodhisattva commentaries (*sems 'grel skor gsum*) because of being composed by Bodhisattvas. John Newman calls these three texts the "Bodhisattva Corpus"; see his "A Brief History of the Kālacakra," in *The Wheel of Time: The Kalachakra in Context,* ed. Geshe Lhundub Sopa (Madison, WI: Deer Park Books, 1985), 73.

very long time the stanzas propounded in the *Treatise*, the *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*, the *Finely Woven*, the *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*, and the *Refutation of Objections,*

And having seen the [*Four*] *Hundred*[800] and so forth and likewise many profound sūtras as well as the commentary done by Buddhapālita, I have gathered together good explanations by Bhāvaviveka, those transmitted from one to another—as well as what was received from analysis—and have expounded this in order to please those of great intelligence.

Thus, he composed the *Clear Words*—one half of the pair renowned in the saying, "In the sky are the two, sun and moon, and on the earth are the two *Clears* [that is, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words: Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* and *Clarifying Lamp*[a]]"—as a means to please those of great intelligence, upon having gathered together:

- the Six Middle Way Collections of Reasonings, *Precious Garland of Advice*, the Collection of Praises, and so forth composed by Nāgārjuna
- the *Four Hundred* and so forth composed by Āryadeva and so forth
- many profound sūtras
- in particular, Buddhapālita's *Commentary*
- also Bhāvaviveka's good explanations except for one or two modes of explanation
- the good explanations of those masters and so forth that were transmitted from one to another
- the texts of Shūra, Jñānagarbha, and so forth
- and what I, Chandrakīrti, received from Nāgārjuna's explanations distinguishing the meaning of words.[b]

[Thus Chandrakīrti himself says that he makes use of texts by Autonomists.] With this set in his mind, the foremost precious

[a] *sgron gsal, pradīpodyotana;* P2650, vol. 60; this is a commentary on the *Guhyasamāja Tantra.*

[b] Those who do not say that Chandrakīrti was an actual student of Nāgārjuna would not accept Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's explanation that Chandrakīrti is speaking of analysis gained from Nāgārjuna himself. Instead, they would say that it refers to Chandrakīrti's own analysis. If Chandrakīrti is an actual student of Nāgārjuna, it seems strange that he speaks of Nāgārjuna's teaching for a long time, his students' teaching for a long time, and then (in stanza 7 of the colophon) Nāgārjuna's teaching degenerating over a long time to the point where Chandrakīrti needed to compose his texts.

[Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] differentiated the uncommon within the assertions respectively of the Consequence School and the Autonomy School and the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School, and quoted whoever is clearer about what is common to them—modes of meditation and so forth…

[The Suitability of Fine Analysis of Conventionalities]

Thinking that fine analysis is not suitable with regard to even any conventionalities, [Ḏak-tsang says about Ḏzong-ka-ḇa (553)]:[801]

> The cause for his having such a great burden of contradictions
> Is that even though he says again and again,
> "This is from just the world without analysis,"
> Due to being accustomed to logic, he analyzes and makes
> proofs upon inserting reason.

[This is not feasible]…because Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says [about fifth ground Bodhisattvas' fine analysis of conventionalities]:[802]

> Their concentration is surpassing, and they attain great skill
> also in realization
> Of the fine natures of the truths of those with good awareness.

and his *Autocommentary* says:[803]

> "Those with good awareness" are Superiors. Their truths are "the truths of those with good awareness," which means the truths of Superiors [that is, the four noble truths]. "Natures" are their own entities. Natures that must be understood with fine consciousness are "fine natures." [Fifth ground Bodhisattvas] become greatly skilled in knowing the subtle entities of the truths of those with good intelligence.

[Valid Cognition of Deceptive Objects]

…Also, [Ḏak-tsang's] statement (537), "If an object is a deceptive phenomenon, it is not possible for an awareness of it to be a valid cognition,"…[is not feasible] because the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons assert that Superiors' realization that things—false and deceptive phenomena—are false and deceptive phenomena is a non-deceptive and correct mode of realization. Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

> The wise [realize] that things
> Are impermanent and deceptive phenomena.

and Chandrakīrti's commentary prior to that says:

> Upon *correctly* realizing the deceiving mind as just deceiving, they—not relying on it even for an instant—definitely have become Superiors.

Since he explains that realizing the deceptive mind as deceptive is *correct* realization, there is no horn-like non-deceptiveness [of valid cognition] exceeding "correct" (*yang dag*).[a] Likewise, Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[804]

> Their concentration is surpassing, and they attain great skill
> also in realization
> Of the fine natures of the truths of those with good awareness.

and his *Autocommentary* says:[805]

> Natures that must be understood with fine consciousness are "fine natures."

and with respect to their mode of fine skillfulness he quotes the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* about the fifth ground:

> They correctly, thoroughly, properly realize, "These are Superiors' truths of suffering. They correctly, thoroughly, properly realize, "These are Superiors' truths of origin." "These are Superiors' truths of cessation." "These are Superiors' truths of the path."

Are you going to take all instances of "truth" and "correct" as ultimate truths that are established as self-instituting?

Likewise, the *Cloud of Jewels Sūtra* says:

> They correctly, thoroughly, properly know, "Compositional phenomena are miserable." Similarly, they correctly, thoroughly, properly know, "The world manifestly like proliferation." They correctly, thoroughly, properly know, "All phenomena arise from conditions."

and so forth. It is suitable to assert a consciousness of the mode of dwelling of those phenomena—or a consciousness properly knowing the conventional entities and so forth of those phenomena—as being correct knowledge, non-deceptive knowledge, and valid cognition, but no one explains that it must be truly established in the sense of being self-instituting…

[Four Valid Cognitions in the Consequence School]

Moreover, since [Chandrakīrti] says that worldly objects are realized through the four valid cognitions, Ḏak-tsang's statement (536) that Consequentialists do not assert the four valid cognitions and his own assertion (530) that the meaning of valid cognition is

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[a] Non-deceptive knowledge is the definition of valid cognition, and aside from "correct" there is not any more appropriate meaning of "non-deceptive"—some more prominent (horn-like) meaning.

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"non-deceptive" are explicitly contradictory.[a] For Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred"* says[806] that "non-deceptive consciousnesses are seen as just valid cognitions in the world." You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!…

[Multiple Meanings of Sat and Satya]

Conventionally, when the object that is the basis of an appearance is not non-existent but exists, it even receives the convention "true," and the term "true" is used also for permanent and so forth. Amarasinha's *Treasury* says:[b]

Sat [is used] for true, essential, well said,
Exists, praiseworthy, worthy of worship.

Satya, the Sanskrit equivalent of true/truth (*bden pa*), is also used for "permanent"; *satya, sat,* and so forth[807] must be explained by context, and by way of their import the mode of falsity should be known, [as evidenced] in the way the upper and lower schools of tenets debate on the topic.

[Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's Assertion of Proof Statements]

Aside from the statement [in Ḏak-tsang's root text (540)], "That inference exists and that proof statements do not exist are contradictory," nothing seems to be said in his commentary [to show that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa asserts that proof statements do not exist]. Also, there is utterly not even merely a portion of a phrase even in any of the texts of either the foremost father [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] or his spiritual sons saying that proof statements do not exist…

[Valid Cognition in the Consequence School is Different]

Also, with respect to Ḏak-tsang's saying (550) that it is contradictory to refute the valid cognition [described] in the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition and to posit a presentation of valid cognition in one's own system,…well then it [absurdly] follows that the term "valid cognition" and any meaning of it is not feasible in any way at all because the Logicians' presentation of those two is refuted [in the Consequence School].[c] You have asserted the three

[a] When Ḏak-tsang says "the meaning of being established by valid cognition is non-deceptive, and the meaning of non-deceptive does not pass beyond self-instituting," he clearly indicates that, for him, "non-deceptive" requires being self-instituting. For Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa, as we have seen, "non-deceptive" merely means "correct," and thus his claim that Ḏak-tsang is here "explicitly contradictory" is within the framework of Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's own meaning of "non-deceptive."

[b] 3.3.513: *satye sādhau vidyamāne praśaste 'bhyarhite ca sat.*

[c] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa simplifies Ḏak-tsang's fourteenth contradiction (550), which in full is:

spheres of self-contradiction!

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[808] [With respect to the refutation of Logicians' presentation of valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*)] Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* asks about how valid cognitions are proven:[809]

If your objects are established
By valid cognition,
Say how your valid cognitions
Also are established.

If in response you think that valid cognitions are established by factually other valid cognitions, the valid cognitions would be endless, and if they are endless, then the first would not be established, and if the first does not exist, the middle [valid cognitions] are not established, and also the final [valid cognition] is not established:

If you think they are established by other
Valid cognitions, they would be endless.
Furthermore, the first is not established;
The middle is not, and the final also is not…

[On the other hand] if those valid cognitions are established without [further] valid cognitions, then your proposition that objects [including consciousnesses] are established by valid cognition falls away. If [you claim that] there is a difference in that some objects are established by valid cognition and some are not established by valid cognition, put forth the specific reason why they differ this way. [Nāgārjuna says:][810]

However, if even without valid cognition those [valid cognitions]

It is contradictory to refute and thus not assert in your own system the basis-of-all, self-cognition, and so forth described in other texts and to refute the valid cognition described in the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition, but in your own system to know a presentation of valid cognition.

D̄ak-tsang's point is that since D̄zong-ka-b̄a refutes the mind-basis-of-all and so forth in all respects, then he ought to refute valid cognition in all respects. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a ignores this issue of parallelism and emphasizes D̄ak-tsang's principle that if D̄zong-ka-b̄a refutes the mind-basis-of-all and so forth in all respects and thus cannot posit them in any fashion in the Consequence School, he should refute valid cognition in all respects, and thus he should not make a presentation of valid cognition in any fashion in the Consequence School. (It needs to be borne in mind that D̄ak-tsang holds that although the Logicians' presentation of the mind-basis-of-all, valid cognition, and so forth are to be refuted, they nevertheless should be accepted with different meanings in the Consequence School.)

Are established, your proposition has deteriorated.

Nāgārjuna states the position of his opponent, a proponent of self-cognition:

Just as a flame illuminates others
As it does itself,
Valid cognitions also
Establish self and other.

Nāgārjuna responds that since a flame is not obstructed by darkness, it is not feasible for it to illuminate itself:

What you are propounding is not similar.
Since [a flame] is not seen to be unobserved
Like a pot in darkness,
A flame does not illuminate itself.

It would [absurdly] follow that just as fire burns others, it burns itself:

If your words are saying
That a flame illuminates itself,
Well then, a flame would burn itself
Just as it burns others.

It would [absurdly] follow that just as a flame illuminates both self and other, so darkness also would obstruct both self and other [due to which darkness would never be seen]:

If your words are saying
That a flame illuminates itself and others,
Then darkness also would
Obstruct itself and others.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[811] Moreover, not any sense direct perception, mental direct perception, or yogic direct perception would be suitable because those three are refuted in the way that they are asserted in Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition. Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred"* extensively refutes how sense direct perception is asserted [by others] (845 and 940),…and his *Clear Words* refutes the Logicians' presentation of mental direct perception (931) with:[812]

They assert that only consciousnesses devoid of conceptuality are just direct perceptions (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*), but that also is not the way the world's conventions are used.

and so forth. Also, Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* extensively refutes the explanations in Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge* and Dharmakīrti's Seven

Treatises on Prime Cognition that through meditating on selflessness on the path of preparation, then—at the time of the path of seeing—the specifically characterized phenomena [of the aggregates] that are devoid of that self (279 and 285) are the object of yogic direct perception…Having refuted these, [Chandrakīrti] describes these three in terms of his own system…

[The Existence of Inferential Valid Cognition]

[D̄ak-tsang's] assertions:

- that the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words:*[813]

> A consciousness that has the obscure as its object and is generated from a sign [that is, reason] non-mistaken with respect to a probandum [that is, thesis] is an inference.

is literal

- and that inferential *valid cognition* does not exist

are a great internal contradiction…It is [easy] to understand that if a reason is non-mistaken—that is, non-deceptive—with respect to proving a thesis, it is contradictory for the inference ascertaining the thesis by means of that reason to not be non-deceptive [and hence not be a valid cognition].[a]

Even if you say that you are speaking about an inference realizing selflessness, well then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, an inference realizing selflessness, is not a non-deceptive consciousness because of being a mistaken consciousness. The reason[—that an inference realizing selflessness is a mistaken consciousness—]is easy [to prove because inferences are necessarily mistaken with respect to their appearing-object], and you have asserted this; you have also asserted that [being a mistaken consciousness] entails [being deceptive], and you have asserted the clarification[b] [that is, that an

[a] Again, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's point hinges on his not accepting D̄ak-tsang's explanation that "non-deceptive" requires being self-instituting.

[b] The Dalama edition (*ca,* 44a.7) and Mundgod edition (760.5) read *gsal* (clarification), which is an abbreviation for *gsal ba,* whereas the Taipei edition (447.15) reads *bsal* (eradication), which is an abbreviation for *bsal ba.* Despite the great difference in their meaning, the two terms are used interchangeably in this context; I take "clarification" here to mean "that which is being clarified as wrong," and "eradication" as "that which is being eradicated since it is wrong." For a possible Sāṃkhya source for the term, see 109.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a holds that an inference realizing selflessness is a non-deceptive consciousness even though it is mistaken with respect to its appearing-object in the sense that its appearing-object, a meaning-generality of the emptiness of inherent existence, appears to be the emptiness of inherent existence. D̄ak-tsang holds that being mistaken with respect to its appearing-object requires that a consciousness is deceptive. For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a if, despite

inference realizing selflessness is not a non-deceptive consciousness in the sense that selflessness appears to inherently exist].

[The Meaning of Non-Deceptive]

Therefore, with respect to the statement, "All compounded phenomena are deceptive," when the manner of deceptiveness is applied to objects, [it means that] the mode of appearance and mode of subsistence do not accord, and when applied to consciousnesses, object-possessors, it must be a wrong apprehension. How could it be sufficient for it merely to be mistaken [with respect to its appearing-object]!

If what are explicitly indicated in the statement "All compounded phenomena are deceptive," and valid cognition were mutually exclusive, then it would [absurdly] follow that the subject, a knower-of-all-aspects [that is, an omniscient consciousness], is not a valid cognition because of being deceptive. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction! For there are lower mental direct perceptions to which a knower-of-all-aspects appears [and thus the mode of appearance and mode of subsistence are in conflict, since to such a consciousness a knower-of-all-aspects appears to be inherently existent but actually does not inherently exist].

Sixteenth Contradiction: Positing Three Actual Cyclic Existences that do Not Accord with any Sūtra or Mantra

That the unshared and the powers have been attained and that one is a perfect Buddha in cyclic existence are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that the eighteen unshared attributes, the powers, and so forth of a Buddha as described in the Perfection Vehicle have been attained
- and the assertion that at that point one is a perfect Buddha who has not abandoned the 21,600 karmic winds that are the mounts of conceptual consciousnesses which are a root of cyclic existence.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[814] Concerning this, D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* says:[815]

Coarse cyclic existence is impure birth and death;

this type of mistakenness, a consciousness is non-mistaken with respect to its object of engagement—the object that it is understanding—then it is non-deceptive, and once it is non-deceptive, it is a valid cognition.

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Its root is afflictive obfuscation.
Subtle cyclic existence is the birth and death of pure mental body;
Its root is the ground of predispositions of ignorance.
Very subtle cyclic existence is the Perfection Vehicle Buddha;
Its root is subtle desire for emission.[a]

Ḍak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets":*[816] In general from among the three cyclic existences, an illustration of coarse cyclic existence is birth and death generated by impure karma and afflictive emotions, these being the opposite corollaries of pure mastery.[b] Hearers and Solitary Realizers having [a nirvāṇa] with remainder and below and those on the supreme mundane qualities level of the Great Vehicle path of preparation and below—who possess such [coarse cyclic existence] in their continuums—are beings of coarse cyclic existence.[c] Although those who have not separated [from life][d] do not newly take birth due to karma and afflictive emotions, they are posited [as beings of coarse cyclic existence] from the viewpoint of possessing in their continuum fruitional aggregates impelled by contaminated karma.

The root of this coarse cyclic existence is obfuscatory ignorance that has parallel association with afflictive consciousnesses conceiving true existence. Hence, although Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers are released through having severed the root of cyclic existence, they have a remainder of suffering and of karmic sources [of suffering].

An illustration of subtle cyclic existence is the pure masterful birth and death of one who has attained a body having a mental nature. Hearers and Solitary Realizers who have entered remainderless [nirvāṇa] and Bodhisattvas ranging from those who have attained the path of seeing through those abiding on the tenth ground are [beings of subtle cyclic existence]. These have exhaustively abandoned birth and death due to karma and afflictive emotions, as in extensive statements such as [Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* (672)]:[817]

Superiors have exhaustively abandoned

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a *'pho chags.*
b *dag pa rnam par byang ba.*
c *rags pa'i 'khor ba pa.*
d *ya ma bral ba;* 224.14.

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The sufferings of death, sickness, and aging.
For [beings] are born by the power of [contaminated] actions and afflictive emotions
And they do not have those, whereby they do not have [the sufferings of death, sickness, and aging].

The root of subtle cyclic existence is the ground of predispositions of ignorance set forth in the final wheel of the Word. Hence, afflictive emotions, uncontaminated karma, body having a mental nature, and death and transference of inconceivable control[a]—on the ground of predispositions of ignorance—are called pure masterful birth and death. The sūtras and treatises of the final wheel extensively say that through its becoming subtler and subtler over the ten grounds and having been entirely abandoned on the Buddha ground, there is permanence, stability, quiescence, and everlastingness, and there is perfection of purity, bliss, permanence, and self.

Very subtle cyclic existence is a Buddha Supramundane Victor of only the Perfection Vehicle, who, despite having entirely abandoned the two obstructions of his/her own path, has not abandoned subtle material phenomena that are hidden [that is, not explicitly taught] on their own path but are to be removed on the Mantra path. This is because the exalted wisdom of great bliss—the finality of antidotes taught in the —has not been engendered in their mental continuum. The root of this cyclic existence is the subtle wind and subtle tendency to, or changeability of,[b] emission of the essential constituent. Hence, it is said many times that:

Therefore, with all striving
Abandon desire for emission.

and so forth. Furthermore, there are 21,600 objects of abandonment,...the seeds of which are overcome by the same number of periods of immutable great bliss...

Most Indian and Tibetan scholars' assertion of full purification through the Perfection Vehicle alone without depending upon Mantra is good, like the attainment of Foe Destroyerhood through the path of only Hearers and Solitary Realizers. Hence, the assertion that *final* Buddhahood relative to all vehicles is attained is not good, like the fact that *final* Foe Destroyerhood is not attained through the paths of only Hearers and Solitary Realizers.

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[a] *bsam kyis mi khyab par bsgyur ba'i 'chi 'pho.*

[b] *chags pa'am 'gyur ba.*

Therefore, the three cycles of Bodhisattva commentaries,[a] the *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī,*[b] and so forth say that without the addition of a Mantra path, final Buddhahood is not attained through the Perfection Vehicle alone.

In dependence upon these statements, recent scholars [including Dzong-ka-ba] say that a mere Buddha of the Perfection Vehicle alone is not possible:

- The very subtle objects of abandonment are subtle defilements [in the continuum of a Bodhisattva] at the end of the continuum [of having obstructions yet to be abandoned] as explained in the Perfection Vehicle.
- Since those cannot be abandoned by the great-great path of meditation, the Mantra path is added.
- Therefore, after our Teacher gained the exalted wisdom of the tenth ground, the Buddhas urged him on, whereupon he added onto the end of the final path of the Perfection Vehicle two blissful stages[c]—the Mantra path of seeing called "the clear of the fourth stage"—and, after that, the [Mantra] path of meditation called "learner's union."
- Hence, although there is no certainty with regard to the lower limit of a Perfection Vehicle being's entry into Mantra, the upper limit cannot be higher than the tenth ground, and since when that being enters Mantra, substitutes for the Mantra paths of accumulation and preparation have already been accomplished, entry from lower than the path of seeing is not possible.

These are renowned as special good explanations; however:

- If the great-great path of meditation cannot abandon its respective objects of abandonment, it [absurdly] follows that the other eight paths of meditation also cannot abandon their respective objects of abandonment.
- If there is no enlightenment in the Perfection Vehicle, it [absurdly] follows that mind generation aimed at that enlightenment is a wrong consciousness, and it follows that a Mantra path of seeing is necessarily preceded by paths of accumulation and preparation of its own path.

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[a] See 626, fnt. a.

[b] This is perhaps Buddhashrījñānapāda's *dvikramatattvabhāvanā-nāma-mukhāgama* (Toh. 1853 and 1854); thanks to E. Gene Smith for the reference.

[c] *rim bde gnyis.*

- If there is no other path higher than the complete light [of the Perfection Vehicle Buddhahood], it [absurdly] follows that the twelfth ground for which that [ground of complete light] acts as the lower level is not feasible.
- If Mantra has an antidote that does not exist in the Perfection Vehicle, it follows that there is an object of abandonment that does not exist in the Perfection Vehicle.

When even a Buddha could not find fallacies in the entailments of these consequences in which the reasons and clarifications are explicitly contradictory, those with unbiased intelligence should realize how they are eloquent explanations.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[818] Let us clarify a little the damage to those and clarify a little our own system…Your positing that 21,600 karmic winds, on which conceptual consciousnesses of subtle true sufferings, or very subtle cyclic existence, ride, exist in the continuum of a Buddha Superior who has the finality of the uncontaminated qualities of the unsurpassed, complete, perfect Buddha described in the Perfection Great Vehicle—the ten powers, the eighteen unshared attributes of a Buddha, and so forth—is an explicit contradiction even in your own words…Even in the system of the Perfection Great Vehicle the exalted body of a perfect Buddha is a non-material vajra body, and that body has a nature of exalted wisdom without empty places, flesh, blood, and so forth because [the Perfection Great Vehicle] describes the exalted body of a perfect Buddha the way it is described in Nāgārjuna's *Five Stages:*

> There are no empty places in your body,
> No flesh, bone, and blood.
> Rather, it is like a rainbow in the sky.

and Āryadeva's *Lamp Compendium of Practice:*

> The bodies of the Lords of Conquerors dwelling in the ten directions
> Have no flesh, blood, and bone.

and the Exalted Wisdom Chapter [of the *Kālachakra Tantra*]:

> About the body, the small particles, equal and like space, are thoroughly complete by way of [the progression of empty forms], night and so forth.[a]

[a] The reference is perhaps to the four night signs of smoke, mirage, fireflies, and butter lamp followed by the six day signs of blazing, *kālāgni,* moon, *rāhu,* lightning, and blue drop.

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This is (1) because all the following are correct proofs that an exalted body has no materiality—the *Pile of Jewels Sūtra:*

> The exalted body of a One-Gone-Thus, like Nārāyaṇa, has an obstructive and hard essence, the nature of an indestructible diamond. Shāntamati, the exalted body of a One-Gone-Thus has no stomach or intestines, no puss, blood, saliva, urine, mucus, vomit, or filth. Shāntamati, the exalted body of a One-Gone-Thus is like the solid gold of Lake Jambu. It has no empty places and no holes.

and:

> The exalted body of a One-Gone-Thus is not differentiated into aggregates…It does not arise from an embryo of the great elements; it is not covered with flesh and blood; it is not connected together with bones and ligaments.

and so forth, and the *Sūtra of Excellent Golden Light:*

> If an exalted body has no flesh, bone, and blood, how could there be relics?

and also Bhāvaviveka:

> Or, the One-Gone-Thus of "momentary exalted wisdom" [displays] forms and so forth, the powers and so forth, and the exalted body of the One-Gone-Thus having a nature of exalted wisdom.

and likewise many sūtras such as the *Great Cloud,* and also the master Haribhadra's explanation that the exalted wisdom itself dawns as form bodies, and Āryavimuktasena's explanation that even a Buddha's eye consciousness knows all phenomena, and (2) because the facts that until non-striving spontaneity is attained, the powers and so forth are not attained, and so on, are unsurpassed proofs [that an exalted body has no materiality] and unsurpassed damages to the opposite.

Moreover, the assertion that a perfect Buddha [as described in the Perfection Vehicle] has 21,600 karmic winds…[is mistaken] because even in the Perfection Vehicle it is explained that a perfect Buddha has no conceptuality. [That a perfect Buddha has no conceptuality] entails [that the assertion that a perfect Buddha as described in the Perfection Vehicle has 21,600 karmic winds is mistaken] because it is explained that if there is no conceptuality, there must be no inhalation and exhalation of breath and so forth and because it is explained again and again in tantras that the two—wind and mind—are support and what is supported. Your assertion contradicts all of those. The *Inconceivable Mysteries Sūtra*

clearly says:

> The One-Gone-Thus is forever in meditative equipoise; the One-Gone-Thus, being non-conceptual and non-analytical, does not have inhalation or exhalation of breath. Being without conceptuality and analysis, speech does not arise.

and also the *Sūtra of Utter Quiescence* says:

> The One-Gone-Thus…knows all, perceives all, is endowed with the ten powers, has attained the excellent perfection of the four fearlessnesses, is non-conceptual, non-conceptualizing, unpolluted, equal to space.

and the many sūtras cited earlier and the doctrines of Maitreya speak similarly, and also Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says:

> Because [conceptual] signs do not arise,
> Stability is firm, due to which they do not rise [from meditative equipoise].

and his *Autocommentary* says:

> Because these Supramundane Victors have uprooted all seeds of conceptuality as well as its predispositions, signs do not arise; then how could they rise [from meditative equipoise]!

This is the speech of one who knows the essentials of the scriptures; for such [non-conceptuality] is needed for meditative equipoise and the state subsequent to meditative equipoise to become one.

Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* says [about the etymology of "buddha"]:

> Because of having cleared away (*sangs*) the sleep of conceptuality
> And because of having expanded (*rgyas*) due to the absence of conceptuality.

and his *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

> Because of having cleared away (*sangs*) the sleep of conceptuality and because of having expanded (*rgyas*) awareness due to realizing the unapprehendability [of] objects of knowledge[a] [as truly existent].

and Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Unexampled* says:

> Such various conceptualizations
> Do not disturb the exalted mind.

and:

> The Protector does not have intention
> And does not have the movement of conceptuality,

[a] *shes bya dmigs su med pa rtog pa nyid kyis;* 450.17.

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But naturally in the world
Engages also in the Buddha deeds.

The *Vajra Garland Tantra* speaks of 108 winds:

Conceptual consciousnesses having the nature of winds
Manifesting as the one hundred and eight,

and it also speaks of 108 conceptual consciousnesses:

Due to differences of location
It becomes various conceptual consciousnesses…
Always the one hundred and eight
Move having the nature of wind
Throughout day and night.

and all the eighty indicative conceptions and so forth appear to be just those [conceptual consciousnesses] mentioned in sūtra. If both Sūtra and Mantra agree that meditative equipoise in which all those conceptual consciousnesses have been abandoned does not come until becoming buddhafied, then how could there be a difference of high and low in the fruits [of Sūtra and Mantra]? If in that [Buddhahood described in Sūtra] even just inhalation and exhalation of breath does not exist, how could the 21,600 [winds] be posited?…

Chart 11: The Eighty Conceptual Consciousnesses

(Within the gross level of mind but subtler than the five sense consciousnesses, these eighty conceptual consciousnesses are in three classes, corresponding to three types of wind—strong, middling, and weak—on which they ride. The three are imprints, or reflections, of three subtler levels of mind that manifest at periods when the grosser levels of consciousness cease either intentionally—as in profound states of meditation—or naturally, as in the process of death, going to sleep, sneezing, fainting, and orgasm.)

I. The first group are thirty-three types of conceptions, or attitudes, that involve a strong movement of wind, or energy, to their objects:

strong non-attraction
middling non-attraction
lesser non-attraction
mentally moving back and forth to external and internal objects
great sorrow
middling sorrow
lesser sorrow
mental peace
excitement due to a bright object
strong fear

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middling fear
lesser fear
great attachment
middling attachment
lesser attachment
grasping at the desirous
doubt about virtuous activities
hunger
thirst
strong feelings of pleasure, pain, and neutrality
middling feelings of pleasure, pain, and neutrality
lesser feelings of pleasure, pain, and neutrality
conception of a knower
conception of knowing
conception of an object known
analysis of what is suitable and what is unsuitable
shame, which is to avoid misconduct due to your own disapproval or religious prohibition
compassion, which is to wish that others be free from suffering and the causes of suffering
mercy, which is mentally to protect others
desire to encounter the beautiful
qualm, which is for the mind to be captivated in the midst of uncertainty
accumulation, which is to be intent on gathering possessions
jealousy, which is to be disturbed by others' good fortune, such as youth, wealth, and intelligence.

II. The second group are forty types of conceptions, or attitudes, that involve a medium movement of wind to their objects:

attachment to an object yet to be attained
attachment to an object already attained
strong joy upon seeing the pleasant
middling joy upon seeing the pleasant
lesser joy upon seeing the pleasant
rejoicing in achievement
rapture, which is to repeatedly experience something desired
amazement at something that did not occur before
excited distraction to the pleasant
contentment with the pleasant
desiring to embrace
desiring to kiss
desiring to suck
stability, which is mental unchangeability
effort in virtue

pride
being intent on completing an activity
desiring to rob wealth
desiring to conquer another's forces
enthusiastic familiarizing with virtue
strong engagement in non-virtue due to arrogance
middling engagement in non-virtue due to arrogance
lesser engagement in non-virtue due to arrogance
vehement desire to quarrel with the holy for no reason
flirtatious desire upon seeing the attractive
angry resentment
wishing to make effort at virtue
wishing to speak clearly and truly
wishing to speak having altered knowledge of the fact
very steady intent
not desiring to hold onto an object
wishing to donate possessions
wishing to exhort the lazy to practice
wishing to overcome foes such as afflictive emotions
shamelessness, which is to engage in non-virtue without concern for your own disapproval or religious prohibition
hypocritical deception
taut conscientiousness
being perniciously accustomed to a bad view
non-gentleness, which is to wish to injure others
crookedness

III. The third group of seven conceptions involve a weak movement of wind to their objects:

forgetfulness
mistakenness, as in seeing water in a mirage
not wishing to speak
depression
laziness, which is a lack of enthusiasm for virtue
paralyzing doubt
ambivalence, which is mutually defeating desire and hatred

Therefore,[819] with respect to our own system, in the systems of both the profound Great Vehicle Sūtras—as well as the commentaries on their thought—and Mantra:

- Although the first two of the three [types of] bodies having a

mental nature[a] exist even on the occasion of lower paths and a vajra-body exists from the eighth Bodhisattva ground, in the Sūtra system until virtuous conceptual consciousnesses—never mind the obstructive [eighty] conceptual consciousnesses—have vanished there is no way for there to be a sameness of entity of meditative equipoise and states subsequent to meditative equipoise, or a sameness of entity of exalted body, speech, and mind, or a vajra-body for which non-material wind—that has none of the contaminations of the obstructions—acts as the cause.

- This is because until karmic winds are extinguished, the utter reversal of conceptuality does not occur, since until the capacity of innate wind is brought to fulfillment, means of extinguishing karmic winds do not exist, and if in order to fulfill the capacity of innate wind a mode of meditation furthering its capacity is necessary, such a mode of meditation does not exist in the Perfection Vehicle.
- Although the final Buddhahood, the fruit, is taught [in the Perfection Vehicle], aside from coarser paths for it, the final, secret, finer essentials are hidden. It is like the fact that, for example, in the Perfection Vehicle aside from just teaching a neutral subtle mind of death, it does not have an explanation of the four empties and so forth.[b]
- When such a sameness of entity of exalted body, speech, and mind as well as the non-material innate five aggregates and final vajra-body are attained, even each head hair knows all phenomena, engages in all meditative stabilizations, and sets forth doctrine in accordance with the respective languages and thoughts of sentient beings, but there is not even just subtle striving and exertion. Likewise, every part of the exalted body acts as a mouth-equivalent, speaking, partaking, and so forth, and acts as an arm-equivalent. Since at that time there are no material sense powers, the five clairvoyances and five exalted

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[a] For a discussion of mental bodies, see Gedün Lodrö, *Calm Abiding and Special Insight,* trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Hopkins (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1998), 117, 120.

[b] For an extensive discussion of the four empties, subtle consciousnesses preceding death, and the fundamental innate mind of clear light, see His Holiness the Dalai Lama, *Advice on Dying,* trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Atria Books/Simon and Shuster, 2002), 135-181; and Lati Rinbochay and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Death, Intermediate State, and Rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1985).

> eyes are wisdom bodies of attributes. These and the like are described in both Sūtra and Mantra as inconceivable.

The *Sūtra on the Inconceivable Mysteries*...speaks about [a Buddha's] display of exalted bodies despite not having striving and exertion, and says, "Shāntamati, wherever space pervades, the exalted bodies of the One-Gone-Thus pervade," and Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says:

> Even one moment of knowledge
> Pervades the entire sphere of objects of knowledge.

and:

> Only your exalted wisdom
> Pervades all objects of knowledge.

Accordingly, that whatever is pervaded by exalted wisdom is also pervaded by exalted bodies and exalted speech is due to the fact that very subtle wind and mind are one entity...[Buddha speech] emerges from all parts of the body and even from space, without striving and exertion...The *Sūtra Generating the Power of Faith*...and the fiftieth chapter of the *Chakrasamvara Tantra*...explain...that even [a Buddha's] hairs unimpededly and clearly—like vajras—understand all phenomena...Since even in the Sūtra system a perfect Buddha is described this way, Ḏak-tsang's consequences turn, of their own accord, into dust.

SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CONTRADICTIONS: THE WAY THE OBJECT OF THE VIEW OF SELF IS REFUTED

Proving and refuting the conceived object of the view of the transitory are contradictory. That the two views of the coarse and subtle selflessnesses have one object is contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When you refute the assertion that the modes of apprehension by the artificial and innate views of the transitory [as real I and mine] are discordant, you have to assert that the modes of apprehension by the two—the artificial view of the transitory that conceives "I" to be permanent, unitary, and self-powered and the innate view of the transitory that conceives "I" to be truly established—are concordant. In that case, it [absurdly] follows that our own schools from the Mind-Only School on down both prove and refute the conceived object of the view of the transitory, and hence this is contradictory. Also, since the objects of the mode of apprehension by the two views realizing the coarse and subtle selflessnesses would be one object, this comes to be an intersection of contradictions.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[820] At the beginning of his *Knowing All Tenets* D̄ak-tsang says:[821]

> Though there are many forms of divisions of others' and our own tenets,
> They are included into those adhering to extremes and those free from extremes
> Because of proving and refuting the mode of apprehension by innate mistaken [awareness].[822]

and his commentary says:[823]

> This explanation that even all views of the Proponents of True Existence are posited relative to innate mistaken [awareness] refutes well two great wrong conceptions:
>
> - the assertion that the two—innate and artificial modes of apprehension—are utterly discordant
> - and the assertion that reasonings refuting the artificial mode of apprehension do not refute the innate mode of apprehension
>
> because it is taught that the main modes of apprehension concord, and it is taught that disproving the artificially conceived object[a] greatly damages the innate[ly conceived object].
>
> Otherwise, there is much damage because:
>
> - It [absurdly] follows that a person whose awareness has not been affected by tenets does not have apprehension of last year's self and this year's self as one and does not have apprehension of oneself who went to the east and oneself who went to the west as a partless whole.
> - It [absurdly] follows that the great artificial tenets described by the great chariots lack a basis of mistake.
> - It [absurdly] follows that the statements—in the great textual systems—of only reasonings refuting the conceived objects of artificial views are senseless.
>
> *Objection:* Well then, what about the statement [in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] that realizing that the artificially conceived object does not exist does not damage the innate?[824]
>
> [You propound] that when selflessness is realized
> One abandons the permanent self, [but] it is not asserted
> As the base of the conception of self. Hence, it is amazing to propound

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[a] *kun brtags kyi zhen yul.*

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That through knowing [such] selflessness the view of self is eradicated.

That while seeing a snake living in a hole in a wall of your house,
Your fears can be removed and the fright of a snake abandoned
By [someone's saying] "There is no elephant here,"
Is, alas, laughable to others!

Answer: [Chandrakīrti] is saying that if the artificially conceived object is not asserted to be the base, or object, of an innate consciousness conceiving "I," there is this fallacy. Or, he is considering that if the artificial self made firmer by quasi-scriptures and quasi-reasonings must be the base of an innate consciousness conceiving "I," there is the fallacy that the innate would not occur in those born as animals and so forth for many eons.

[Ḏak-tsang]…propounds such with regard to the explanations in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* and so forth that:

- Although objects imputed by tenets *that do not have innate modes of apprehension* are refuted, this does not damage the innate.
- Refuting objects imputed just and only imputed by tenets does not damage the innate.[a]

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that refuting the conceived object of an artificial view of the transitory damages apprehension by an innate view of the transitory that the "I" truly exists because [according to you] the assertion that reasoning refuting the artificial does not refute the innate is a wrong conception. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

If you accept [that refuting the conceived object of an artificial view of the transitory damages apprehension by an innate view of the transitory that the "I" truly exists], then it [absurdly] follows that there are not endless innate apprehensions that the "I" truly

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's point is that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's meaning must be that refuting that the I, for instance, does not depend on causes and does not change is not *itself* a refutation of the innate misconception of the inherent existence of the I, because the conception that the I is independent and immutable does not constitute the innate conception that the I inherently exists, or exists in its own right. Rather, refuting such can be a branch of refuting the innate conception of inherent existence when it is understood that if things did inherently exist, they could not depend on causes and could not change.

exists even when the "I" is not apprehended as permanent, unitary, and self-powered because [according to you] when apprehension that the "I" is permanent, unitary, and self-powered is refuted, it is [perforce] refuted that the "I" is truly established. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

If you accept [that there are not endless innate apprehensions that the "I" truly exists even when the "I" is not apprehended as permanent, unitary, and self-powered], then this basically contradicts the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement:*[825]

> This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived
> By those spending many eons as animals,
> Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them.
> Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates.[a]

Also, if you do not accept [that there are not endless innate apprehensions that the "I" truly exists even though the "I" is not apprehended as permanent, unitary, and self-powered], you explicitly contradict yourself.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the Mind-Only School and below do not prove more firmly the conceived object of innate consciousnesses apprehending that the "I" is truly established because they extensively refute the conceived object of the view of the transitory imputed by Other [that is, non-Buddhist] Schools—a permanent, unitary, and self-powered ["I"]—and you propound that if this does not refute innate apprehension of true establishment, the great textual systems would be senseless. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

If you accept [that the Mind-Only School and below do not prove more firmly the conceived object of innate consciousnesses apprehending that the "I" is truly established], you have explicitly contradicted yourself. Do you not remember the proposition in your commentary:[826]

There are many forms of divisions of our own and others'

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[a] With bracketed additions from Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (P6143, vol. 154, 84.2.5) the stanza reads:

> Those who have fallen down senseless into [lives as] animals for many eons also do not perceive this unborn permanent [self]. Having seen that the conception of [an inherently existent] I operates even in them, [what intelligent being would think that such an unborn permanent self is the base of the innate conception of an inherently existent self?] Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates.

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> proponents of tenets, but when they are included by way of what they adopt and what they discard, they are included into two, since they are included into those adhering to and those free from extremes of permanence and annihilation, the reason being that they are included in the two—those who prove and those who refute the mode of apprehension by innate mistaken awareness. Illustrations are Proponents of True Existence among our own and others' schools—these being other than the honorable Nāgārjuna's system—and the system itself of the glorious protector Nāgārjuna.

Not only that, but also these Proponents of *Bhāva*[a] who [according to you] do not assert that the "I" is truly established [because they refute that the "I" is permanent, unitary, and self-powered] are really wonderful!

- It [absurdly] follows that the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement:*[827]

  > Some assert all five aggregates as the base
  > Of the view of self; some assert a mind.[b]

  and in his *Autocommentary* are not correct.
- It [absurdly] follows that there are none of our own schools among the objects of the refutation that persons are truly established.
- It [absurdly] follows that it is not suitable to refute them with scripture and reasoning.

and so forth.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that an inference realizing that sound is impermanent refutes the conceived object of a consciousness conceiving that sound is truly established because [according to you] refuting the conception that a person is permanent, unitary in the sense of being partless, and substantially existent in the sense of not being related with the aggregates refutes the conceived object of the conception that a person is truly established. No matter what answer you give to the three spheres, you contradict your own words.

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[a] *dngos smra ba,* usually translated as "Proponents of True Existence."

[b] Ďzong-ka-ba's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* (393.5) says:

> Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* explains that one Saṃmitīya sect asserts that all five aggregates are the object of observation of a view of self, whereas another Saṃmitīya sect asserts that just the mind is the basis, or object of observation of a view of self.

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Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement:*[828]

Hence there is no self other than the aggregates
Because apprehension of it [isolatedly][829] aside from [apprehending] the aggregates is not established.

is not correct because [according to you] the main modes of apprehension of the two—an innate consciousness conceiving that a person is truly established and an artificial consciousness conceiving that a person is permanent, unitary, and self-powered—are concordant. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

If you say that the reason[—that the main modes of apprehension of the two, an innate consciousness conceiving that a person is truly established and an artificial consciousness conceiving that a person is permanent, unitary, and self-powered, are concordant—] is not established, then you contradict the proposition in your commentary "it is taught that the main modes of apprehension concord" and so forth (646, 728).

Moreover, this is damaged by:

- It [absurdly] follows that artificial [apprehensions of self] exist in the continuums of those who have not engaged in tenets.
- It [absurdly] follows that when a permanent self not included in the aggregates is refuted, a truly established person is refuted.

and so forth, because Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* shows amazement:[830]

[You propound] that when selflessness is realized
One abandons [only] the permanent self, [but] it is not asserted
As the base of the conception of self. Hence, it is amazing to propound
That through knowing [such] selflessness the [innate] view of self is eradicated.

Furthermore, with respect to selflessnesses of persons there are:

1. a very coarse selflessnesses of persons: the non-existence of a permanent, unitary, and self-powered self in accordance with the description in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement:*[831]

    The [Sāṃkhya] Forders impute a self that is the experiencer [of pleasure, pain, and so forth], a permanent thing,

Non-creator [of transformations],[a] without [the three] qualities [of the nature—mental potency, motion, and darkness—], inactive.

As explained earlier (219), this selflessness is asserted even by the Vatsīputrīyas [who assert an inexpressible self].

2. a selflessnesses of persons a little subtler than that: the non-existence of a substantially existent person having a character discordant with the aggregates such that the two—the aggregates and the self—are apprehended as servants and master, or the controlled and the controller, like cattle and a herdsman. Autonomists and below assert that this type of self is the conceived object of innate consciousnesses conceiving a self [of persons].
3. a selflessnesses of persons a little subtler than that: a person's emptiness of apprehension in which even though the aggregates and the self have a concordant character, they are apprehended as being like servants and master.[b] This [type of self] is what is explicitly indicated in the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* [when speaking about the coarse level of misconception of self that is extinguished on the fourth Bodhisattva ground (876)],[832] "What is related with the view of a self is thoroughly extinguished."[c]

Coarse and subtle versions are to be distinguished with respect to [the conception of the person as being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient, described in items 2 and 3, in which the aggregates and the self are conceived as being like servants and master]. Regarding the former [that is, the coarser version described in item 2], once [the self] has a character discordant with the character of the aggregates, it is asserted to be permanent even if this is not [said so] in words, because [such systems] are speaking of a person that does not

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[a] See 519, fnt. a.

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle* (179b.5ff.) describes this level with the more apt metaphor of salespersons and head salesperson, since a head salesperson has the character of a salesperson and is also the other salespersons' boss.

[c] With bracketed commentary from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* this line reads:

> [The coarse level of consciousnesses conceiving that persons are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and of the "mine" as being objects of use of such a person, this being] what is related with [or preceded by] the [subtle] view of self [as inherently existent] is thoroughly extinguished.

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have the characteristics of compounded phenomena. This is why [when] Chandrakīrti [speaks about the innate misapprehension of self as it is presented by non-Consequentialist schools, he] says:[833]

> [You propound] that when selflessness is realized,
> One abandons the *permanent* self.[a]

4. a very subtle selflessness of persons: the absence of inherent existence of persons.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[834] The source for dividing awarenesses—apprehending [persons] as being substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient—into two versions, coarse and subtle, is D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought:*

> Apprehension that persons substantially exist in the sense of being self-sufficient also exists among those whose awarenesses are not affected by tenets, but [according to the Consequence School] apprehension that persons exist as other than the [mental and physical] aggregates in the sense of having a character discordant with them does not exist among those whose awarenesses are not affected by tenets.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> According to the other proponents of tenets among our own schools of the Great and Lesser Vehicles, the selflessness of persons is asserted as a person's absence of substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficient such that a person has a character that does not accord with that of the [mental and physical] aggregates.

Hence, it seems that it is to be analyzed whether in the Autonomy School an awareness apprehending a self having a character discordant with the aggregates is asserted or not, and is to be analyzed whether it is a wrong consciousness or not, and so forth.

Apprehensions that the self and the aggregates are like master and servants are not necessarily apprehensions that the self and the aggregates are other in the sense of having discordant characters because there are innate awarenesses apprehending the self and the aggregates as like master and servants, and it has already been explained that there are no innate awarenesses apprehending the self and the aggregates as other in the sense of having discordant

[a] For the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's clear contextualization of this, see the footnote to the citation on 728.

characters. It is established [that there are innate awarenesses apprehending the self and the aggregates as like master and servants] because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"* says:

> *Question:* If the self and the aggregates are apprehended as like master and servants, would the self and the aggregates not be apprehended as different entities?
>
> *Answer:* Apprehension of the self and the aggregates as other substantial entities does not occur in the conventions of the world. Otherwise, it would not be posited that when Devadatta's hand hurts, Devadatta hurts, or that when Devadatta's hand is cured, Devadatta is cured, like the fact that when Upagupta is sick and is cured, the conventions that Maitreya is sick and is cured are not used.

and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says, "In the world self and mine[a] are posited like master and servants." For apprehension of the self and the aggregates as having discordant characters also must contain the mode of apprehending that there exists an agent [of seeing and so forth] that is a factuality other than [the aggregates of] forms and so forth. In that case:

- Just as, for example, oneself is not posited as beautiful or not beautiful due to a servant being beautiful or not beautiful, so a person is not posited as beautiful or not beautiful due to form [that is, the body] being beautiful or not beautiful.
- Just as a master is not posited as being sick due to a servant being sick, so a person is not posited as being sick due to the form aggregate being sick.
- Similarly, a person [having a character discordant with the aggregates] is not posited as experiencing pleasure and pain due to the feeling aggregate experiencing pleasure and pain.
- A person [having a character discordant with the aggregates] is not posited as seeing forms due to the eye seeing forms.
- A person [having a character discordant with the aggregates] is not posited as hearing sounds due to the ear hearing sounds.

and so forth. This is because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> Concerning this, Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary* says that:
>
> 1. The Outsider [non-Buddhists], seeing that it is not suitable to posit phenomena such as eyes and so forth as the

[a] *bdag gi ba;* "mine" here refers to one's own mental and physical aggregates.

person, assert that the person who is the seer and so forth is a substantial entity other than those.
2. Our other [non-Consequentialist Buddhist] schools, seeing the damage to [the person's being] another substantial entity [from the aggregates], assert consciousness or another phenomenon from within the aggregates as the person.
3. However, those who non-erroneously understand the scriptures of the Conqueror are released through realizing that except for only being imputed conventionally, there are no entities.

It is necessary to know how to posit well, within just this mere imputation, the accumulation of karma, the experiencing of effects, and so forth.

And from among the three modes of positing persons apprehension in accordance with the first is the way the self is apprehended as having a character discordant with the character of the aggregates.

NINETEENTH CONTRADICTION: ASSERTION OF A MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

Asserting that a basis-of-all exists and asserting external objects are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that a mind-basis-of-all exists
- and the assertion that external objects exist.

Ḏak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets:*[835]

The former [that is, Asaṅga] proves that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are truly established.
The latter [that is, Nāgārjuna] refutes this also with many forms of reasoning.
He also does not assert self-cognition even conventionally.
The clear proclamations by some here [in Tibet]
That he does not assert even the three characters and the basis-of-all even [conventionally]
And that he asserts external objects as mere conventions
Are seen to contradict the text of Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment.*

Ḏak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets":*[836] That the former, that is, Asaṅga, proves at length in his *Grounds of Bodhisattvas*

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in the Chapter on Suchness that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are truly established is clear in [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] *The Essence of Eloquence.*[a] The latter, that is, the honorable Nāgārjuna, refutes that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are truly established, with many forms of reasoning—in general with:[837]

Inherent natures are unfabricated
And without reliance on conditions.

and so forth, and in particular with:

Just as a moment has an end,
So a beginning and a middle are to be considered.

and so forth.

Likewise, Nāgārjuna also does not assert self-cognition endowed with the three features—of what has the aspect of the apprehender[b]—even only conventionally, never mind ultimately; for in accordance with the extensive refutation in his *Refutation of Objections,* his main followers—Chandrakīrti and Shāntideva—also refute it. The clear proclamations by some here [in Tibet] that, like self-cognition, he does not assert even the three characters and the basis-of-all even [conventionally] and that he asserts external objects as mere conventions[c] are seen to contradict the text of Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment.* This is because it says:

Just as a quickly moving piece of iron
Drawn by a magnet
Does not have mind
But seems as if endowed with mind,

So although the mind-basis-of-all
Is false, it moves, going and coming,
As if it is true, always taking
The three cyclic existences.

Objection: This states the assertion of the Mind-Only School.

Answer: It does not, because it explains here that the basis-of-all is false, and because whereas it extensively refutes that a consciousness empty of true existence is truly established, it does not refute

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[a] See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 140-148 and 287-290.

[b] *'dzin rnam;* a self-cognizing consciousness takes on the aspect of the apprehending consciousness, and hence is said to have the aspect of the apprehender.

[c] With regard to the Consequence School, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa does not accept self-cognition, a mind-basis-of-all, or external objects, but he accepts the Consequence School's own version of the three characters (820 and 926).

this [mind-basis-of-all] and the three characters.

Although Chandrakīrti says merely that the term "basis-of-all" is used for emptiness (819), he does not make a refutation [of the mind-basis-of-all] even anywhere in the root text and autocommentary of the *Supplement* like the way he earnestly refutes that other-powered natures are truly established and that self-cognition [exists]. Nevertheless, it is clear that he does not assert even conventionally a substantially existent [mind-basis-of-all] the entity of which is non-defiled and neutral and is a substantial entity other than the six collections of consciousness [as the Mind-Only School asserts (432)].

D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets:*[838]

In the perspective of non-investigatory mistaken [awareness] the cause remains at the time of the effect,
Whereby the arising of effects is feasible a long time after an action has ceased.
As an offshoot to this, the modes of assertion of truly established predispositions in a basis-of-all,
Of the existence of other-powered natures, and of the non-existence of external objects are refuted.

D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"*:[839]

Question: Well then, how [do you take] the statements by the Conqueror that a long time after an action has ceased, effects—pleasure and pain—arise?

Answer: That an action has ceased is a presentation in the perspective of reasoning analyzing moments, but in that perspective even effects—pleasure and pain—are not established because even the Proponents of True Existence themselves assert that since a past moment of pleasure has ceased and a future moment of pleasure has not yet been produced and a present moment of pleasure does not stay for a second moment beyond the time of its own establishment, action and agent[a] are not feasible. In the perspective of non-investigatory mistaken [awareness] apprehending the prior and later [moments of a] continuum as one, the cause remains at the time of the effect, whereby effects are feasible.

Those who make propositions [trying] to avoid fallacies by

[a] *bya byed;* or, the performance of function, or functionality.

means of a basis-of-all (432), non-wastage (935),[a] and having-disintegrated (933) are flawed:

- in general by only having asserted that actions are established from the side of the object, whereby their cessation also is established from the side of the object
- and in particular they carry a burden of contradictions from having engaged in analysis with regard to causes but not engaging in such with regard to effects.

The honorable Nāgārjuna [says that] when actions are analyzed, they do not have an inherent nature, due to which they are not produced, and due to not being produced, they do not cease. Therefore, it is to be asserted that the ceased [action] itself [that the Proponents of True Existence posit] in the perspective of analysis, saying that [thereby] "Effects are not wasted," has not ceased in the perspective of mistaken [awareness], and because of it effects are feasible. It is easy to put together the texts [to support this].

As an offshoot to this presentation—that because in the perspective of mistaken [awareness] an action and the agent of that action have not ceased, it is feasible that the agent her/himself[b] also experiences the effect—the modes of assertion of truly established predispositions in a basis-of-all, of the existence of other-powered natures, and of the non-existence of external objects are refuted. Ancillarily, [Chandrakīrti] refutes the assertions of:

- a basis-of-all
- predispositions in it
- and that those are the creator of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa like the assertion of Īshvara as the cause

with[840] "Therefore, although a basis-of-all does not exist, these [effects] can [arise from actions]," and so forth. He states that:

- With respect to the three examples—dreams, figments seen with an eye disease, and meditation on ugliness—stated about the existence of mere consciousness without external objects, just as in the examples it is established that until the cause of mistake is removed, such awarenesses exist, and similarly the objects exist, so with regard to the meaning it is established that when the cause of mistake is removed, the objects do not exist, and similarly the awarenesses also do not exist.

[a] This type of phenomenon is also called "acquisition"; see 239, 240, and 935.

[b] *byed po nyid.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- With respect to other-powered natures[a] empty of duality that are mere experiential knowing, means of comprehending [such consciousnesses] do not exist, and memory [in their system] is an other[b] that is established from the object's side, due to which it is unrelated; therefore, like a consciousness in another's continuum, [other-powered natures] are not established [that is, are not confirmed to exist].
- Statements in scripture that there is only consciousness refute a creator that is a separate factuality.
- Statements clearly saying that external objects do not exist are of interpretable meaning in that they are for the sake of stopping strong desire toward forms.

Since if these were individually expressed, it would be too much, [I] have condensed them.

[Chandrakīrti] is showing that, in general, the positing of these in the perspective of analysis without just being imputed by awarenesses having mistaken perspective is not feasible and that, in particular, those that Proponents of Mind-Only construct through conceptuality are not feasible. However, there is no contradiction in asserting within non-investigation and non-analysis:

- a mere stable mental continuum
- predispositions of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa that are in it
- mere experiential other-powered natures dependent on other causes and conditions among those
- that external objects are mere appearances of mind;

and reasonings cannot even refute merely those. In particular, within being equally in a mistaken perspective if these appearances are taken as external objects, it is easier to generate an awareness apprehending them as established from the object's side, and if they are taken as mere appearances of mind, it is easier for them to dawn as posited by awareness:

- because the master [Nāgārjuna] also says in his *Precious Garland:*[841]

  Earth, water, fire, and wind
  Do not have a chance[c]

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[a] Ḏak-tsang takes all other-powered natures to be consciousnesses.

[b] That is, other than the consciousness remembered.

[c] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Precious Garland"* (24b.1) takes this as meaning that with respect to that consciousness "earth, water, fire, and wind do not find a location in the face of its perception" (*sa dang chu dang me dang ni rlung gis khyod kyi gzigs ngor gnas*

In the face of that undemonstrable consciousness
Complete lord over the limitless.

and Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

The great elements and so forth that are described
Are thoroughly included in consciousness.

and so forth, and Nāgārjuna in his *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment,* upon expressing at length the assertions of mind-only, extensively refutes just the *truly established* experience of the emptiness of duality, but does not refute the nonexistence of external objects, nor the existence of a basis-of-all, nor other-powered natures.

- and because in particular in the class of Mantra there are many statements of practices of appearances dependent upon mind and many statements of a basis-of-all.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[842] D̄ak-tsang's root text on the occasion [of the introduction to Great Vehicle tenet systems prior to the actual exposition] of the Mind-Only School says:[843]

That [Nāgārjuna] does not assert the basis-of-all
Is seen to contradict the text of his *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment.*

D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* cites Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment:*[844]

So although the mind-basis-of-all
Is false, it moves, going and coming,
As if it is true, always taking
The three existences.[a]

If on this occasion [of the Consequence School] a basis-of-all other than the six collections of consciousness is asserted, then there are inexhaustible damages such as:

- It [absurdly] follows that external objects do not exist.[b]
- It [absurdly] follows that the basis-of-all acts even as the mind

thob par 'gyur ba min). The *zhol* edition reads *rlung* ***gi*** *gnas* ***mthong*** *'gyur ma yin;* Michael Hahn, *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī*, vol. 1, The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese), (Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1982), 37, reads *rlung* ***gis*** *gnas* ***thod*** *'gyur ma yin* which is confirmed by Ajitamitra (Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 430.1) who then glosses it with *gnas skabs rnyed par mi 'gyur ro.*

[a] Above, below, and on the ground; or also the three realms—desire, form, and formless.

[b] As is evident above, D̄ak-tsang asserts that external objects do not exist, but Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a asserts that external objects exist.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

making the connection between death and birth.[a]

- It [absurdly] follows that when Chandrakīrti explains in his *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"*[845] that [the mind-basis-of-all] does not differ from the Aishvaras' Īshvara and the Vaidakas' person, it is not correct for him to thereupon rebut [the mind-basis-of-all]:

  > Similar to the proposition that Īshvara or the like is the creator of transmigrating beings, those who propound a mind-basis-of-all propound that the mind-basis-of-all is what has all seeds by way of being the support of the seeds for observing all things.

- It [absurdly] follows that it is not correct for Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* to explain that object and consciousness are equally existent in accordance with Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment:*

  > A consciousness realizes an object of knowledge.
  > Without an object of knowledge consciousness does not exist.

- It [absurdly] follows that a consciousness is posited as the object of observation of a view of self.[b]

and so forth. Therefore, the meaning of the passage from Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* is, in accordance with Dzong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought,* that the mental consciousness that is the basis of all thoroughly afflicted and pure [phenomena], despite being false, appears as if truly established and thereupon goes and comes and takes birth in the three existences.

Also, the fact that tantras [speak of] the purity of the eight consciousnesses also does no damage [to our assertion that the Consequence School does not assert a mind-basis-of-all] because it is like the individual explanations of the purity of forms, the five sense powers, the five objects, and the four elements [in which some items are represented more than once].[c] This should be

[a] D̄ak-tsang accepts this also, but Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a asserts that the mental consciousness is the consciousness taking rebirth.

[b] For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, the nominally existent self is the object of observation of a view of self.

[c] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's opinion is that when eight consciousnesses are listed in literally acceptable texts, the mental consciousness is represented in three categories, thus preserving the basic count of six consciousnesses.

known at length from Dzong-ka-ba's *Explanation of the "Wisdom Vajra Compendium."*[846]

TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CONTRADICTIONS: HIS YOGIC DIRECT PERCEPTION OF THE COARSE AND SUBTLE SELFLESSNESSES

That the ultimate is established by reasoning and that there is no object of meditative equipoise are contradictory. That it is not yogic direct perception and that selflessness is manifest are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that the ultimate truth is an object established by a rational consciousness
- and the assertion that there is no object of the mode of apprehension of an exalted wisdom of a Superior's meditative equipoise.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[847] Positing the definitions of the two truths, Dak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* says:[848]

> The definitions are that which is found in the perspective of the mistaken and that which is found in the perspective of the rational.

Dak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets":*[849] The definitions of the two truths are, respectively, that which is found in the perspective of non-analytical mistaken consciousness and that which is found in the perspective of a Superior's non-mistaken rational [consciousness]. This is like the explanation by Ma-ja Jang-chub-dzön-drü, the most prominent spiritual son of Ba-tsap,[a] opener of the way of the Great Middle Way in Tibet:

> An object of a non-analytical mistaken consciousness is an obscurational [truth], and an object of a Superior's non-mistaken consciousness is an ultimate [truth].

There are indeed many instances of positing [a consciousness] as a mistaken consciousness even merely due to being mistaken with respect to its appearing-object, in which case even an inferential rational consciousness is a mistaken consciousness; however, because an inferential rational consciousness is an analytical consciousness, [I] have inserted "non-analytical" in order to eliminate that an inferential rational consciousness is a mistaken consciousness [in the context of the definitions of the two truths].

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[a] *spa* [or *pa*] *tshab nyi ma grags;* b. 1055.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Still, [Chandrakīrti's] text itself also establishes that in this context "mistaken" and "non-mistaken" are to be treated in regard to the [consciousness'] mode of apprehension. Concerning this, Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[850]

> [Buddha] said that all things have two natures—
> Those found by perceptions of the real and of the false—
> That objects of perceptions of the real are suchness,
> And that objects of perceptions of the false are obscurational truths.

A certain version reads "mistaken perception" (*mthong ba 'khrul pa*);[a] truth and falsity of object-possessors [that is, consciousnesses] are taken as non-mistaken and mistaken, and truth and falsity of objects are taken as non-deceptive and deceptive, and hence [the two translations] are equivalent.

It would eat up ink and paper if [I] wrote down here the many definitions renowned nowadays that have many words and whose meanings are mixed with the Autonomy School and below.

Question: Well then, why are you not expounding [as the definition of ultimate truth] what the Superior [Nāgārjuna] says:[851]

> Not known from others, quiescent,
> Not proliferated by proliferations,
> Without conceptuality, without diversity—
> These are the characteristics of suchness.

Answer: Here [Nāgārjuna] is eliminating what is of discordant type, whereas this statement by Chandrakīrti sets forth [the definitions] in a positive way. [Nāgārjuna's] is done in terms of clearing away wrong conceptions:

1. [Ultimate truth] is not directly known by any object-possessor other than individual self-cognition in meditative equipoise.
2. Its entity is primordially quiescent.
3. It is not proliferated since it is not suitable to be dispersed by proliferations—sounds and statements.[b]
4. It is the object of exalted wisdom without the conceptuality of minds and mental factors.

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[a] Ḍak-tsang's text (184.23) reads *mthong ba 'khrul* ***pa'i*** which may be a mis-reading of *mthong ba 'khrul* ***pa'ang*** or *mthong ba 'khrul* ***pa*** (the latter being the reading of the original translation of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* by Nag-tso, available only in the Peking and *snar thang* editions of the *bstan 'gyur*), but this does not affect his point.

[b] *sgra dang brjod pa.*

5. Its entity does not have divisions, whereby it is without diversity.[a]

Objection: Does it not have divisions by way of the substrata such as pots, woolen cloth, and so forth?

Answer: In accordance with the statement, "Just as space does not have divisions by way of the divisions of vessels," since space, aside from a mere negation of obstructive impediment, does not have an entity that is established in an inclusionary way, one must be able to expunge [your notion] with "It is expunged that whatever is the space inside a clay pot is not the space inside a gold pot." If one cannot do that, [our opinion] would be no different from the identification of space by the Forder Vaisheṣhikas and our own Great Exposition School.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[852] And D̄ak-tsang's commentary (661) says:

> The definitions of the two truths are, respectively, that which is found in the perspective of non-analytical mistaken consciousness and that which is found in the perspective of a Superior's non-mistaken rational [consciousness].

He derides definitions [of the two truths] that have many words (662).[b] There is also [the seventeenth contradiction in his root text]:[853]

> That an omniscient exalted wisdom comprehends all phenomena and that it is not a valid cognition with respect to half of objects of knowledge are contradictory.

and his commentary (551). Also, [his root text says],[854] "Emphatic apprehension of a non-affirming negative in the third phase is mistaken," and there is his commentary on this (569). With respect to these passages from his root text and commentary, [I] made the first expression of contradiction above [that is, the twentieth contradiction].

[Criticizing D̄ak-tsang's Definition of Obscurational Truth]

It [absurdly] follows that each of the subjects, one moon being two moons, the hairs in space of one with an eye disease, and the bees in space [appearing to] one with an eye disease, are obscurational truths because of being objects found in the perspective of a non-analytical mistaken sense consciousness. You have asserted the three

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[a] For Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's explanation of the five, see 615.

[b] For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's wordier definitions, see 902ff.

spheres of self-contradiction! Alas, due to accepting this, your philosophy is so wonderful! If you accept [that the hairs in space of one with an eye disease, and the bees in space appearing to one with an eye disease are obscurational truths], it [absurdly] follows that these exist!

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, true establishment, is an obscurational truth because of being an object found in the perspective of a non-analytical, mistaken, innate consciousness apprehending truly established. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction! If you accept [that true establishment is an obscurational truth], it [absurdly] follows that it exists conventionally because you have accepted this. If you accept [that true establishment exists conventionally], it [absurdly] follows that it is not suitable to prove the absence of true existence conventionally. You cannot accept [that it is not suitable to prove the absence of true existence conventionally] because this would contradict the explanations that phenomena ranging from forms through omniscient consciousnesses exist in the world's conventions but do not exist ultimately.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows with respect to each of the three subjects, impermanence, coarse emptiness, and coarse selflessness, that they are not obscure objects and objects of comprehension by inference analyzing conventionalities because of being objects found by non-analytical mistaken consciousness. You have asserted the reason. It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, impermanence, coarse emptiness, and coarse selflessness, are objects found by non-analytical mistaken consciousness because of being obscurational truths.

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that each of the subjects, all very obscure objects of comprehension such as omniscient exalted wisdom, the subtle relationship of actions and effect, and so forth, are not very obscure objects and objects of comprehension by inference of belief because [according to you] they are objects found by non-analytical mistaken consciousness.

Fling such consequences with the three spheres [of self-contradiction], and fling the consequence that it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the illusion-like emptiness of true establishment, [is not an obscure object and an object found by an analytical consciousness because (according to you) it is an object found by non-analytical mistaken consciousness]. Show that those basically contradict millions of the Teacher's scriptures and reasonings.

This is a rain of hundred-node [vajras] destroying the mountain of bad propositions described in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence:*[855]

> If, without completing analysis differentiating finely those [points], one refutes ultimate establishment through a few quasi-reasonings and—holding that conventional existents exist by way of mistaken consciousnesses—thinks one can posit them merely through their existing in the perspective of those [mistaken consciousnesses] since the meaning [of conventionally existing] is merely to exist in the perspective of a mistaken [consciousness], then [absurdly] the production of pleasure and pain by Īshvara, by the principal [of the Sāṃkhyas], and so forth and the production of pleasure and pain [respectively] from wholesome and unwholesome actions would be equally feasible if feasible and also equally not feasible if not feasible because:
>
> - when analyzed as before, an analytical [consciousness] does not find even the latter [that is, the production of pleasure and pain respectively from wholesome and unwholesome actions], and
> - even the former [that is, production of pleasure and pain by Īshvara, the principal, and so forth] also exist in the perspective of mistaken consciousness.

[Criticizing Ḏak-tsang's Definition of Ultimate Truth]

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the subjects, omniscience, the subtle relationships of actions and effect, and so forth, are ultimate truths because of being objects found by an omniscience that is a Superior's exalted wisdom of non-mistaken knowledge. The reason is established by a hundred thousand scriptures and reasonings. You have asserted the entailment [that whatever is an object found by an omniscience that is a Superior's exalted wisdom of non-mistaken knowledge is necessarily an ultimate truth]. You have come to assert the three spheres of self-contradiction! Through this [illustration you can] easily elaborate [other refutations].

Also, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, omniscience, does not exist because [according to you] an exalted wisdom directly realizing it [that is, apprehending an omniscient consciousness] does not exist. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction! If you say that it is not established that an exalted wisdom directly realizing omniscience does not exist, then it follows that learners who directly realize [that is, apprehend] an

omniscient consciousness exist! You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

It [absurdly] follows that the subject, ultimate truth, is an object found [only] by a Superior's uncontaminated meditative equipoise because of:

- being an object found by a Superior's non-mistaken cognition
- and [according to you] non-mistakenness does not exist in a Learner's states subsequent to meditative equipoise and in [consciousnesses] having dualistic appearance.

Alas, you have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction! If you accept [that ultimate truth is an object found (only) by a Superior's uncontaminated meditative equipoise], then you have explicitly contradicted [your root text (554)], "Freedom from proliferations is in the perspective of well analyzed non-verbalization," and (556) "emphatic apprehension of a non-affirming negative in the third phase is mistaken." Even if you do not accept [that ultimate truth is an object found (only) by a Superior's uncontaminated meditative equipoise], you explicitly contradict your definition of ultimate truth, contradict Chandrakīrti's explanation [in his *Clear Words*][a] of how the erroneous and the non-erroneous[b] are different, and contradict the explanation in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* of (662) "objects of perceptions of the real" and in his commentary that [ultimate truth] "is found by special exalted wisdoms of Superiors," and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that an awareness directly realizing the selflessness described in Manifest Knowledge is not a yogic direct perception
- and the assertion that the selflessness described in Manifest Knowledge is manifestly realized.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[856] Also, a certain [D̄ak-tsang] (551) propounds:

That realizations of impermanence and so forth are yogic direct perceptions and that through them one does not arrive

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[a] See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 508ff.

[b] *phyin ci log dang phyin ci ma log pa dag, viparyāsāviparyāsa.* Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

> Because in that way the erroneous and the non-erroneous are different, on an occasion when the non-erroneous [is realized by the wisdom of meditative equipoise] the erroneous does not exist [in its perspective]. Hence, how could a conventionality [such as] an eye which is the subject [in this syllogism] be [in its perspective]?

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

at realizations of the path of preparation are contradictory.
That a consciousness of another's mind is a mental direct perception and that a consciousness of the four truths is a yogic direct perception are contradictory.

In his commentary (551) he says:

This is because you [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] have asserted that there are persons on the path of accumulation who have not previously proceeded on another path and who possess yogic direct perception in their continuum. And hence, this [means that] although whatever is a yogic direct perception is outside the exalted wisdom of a Superior, it is reduced to being only a direct realization of a conventional mode of subsistence—subtle impermanence—whereby it does not pass beyond mental direct perception.

However, aside from the stubbornness of turning a flat stone over and back again, one does not find that he had any scripture or reasoning to put forward, and [his criticism] does not appear to be the fact…About this [I] made the second expression of contradiction above [that is, the twenty-first contradiction]. Moreover:

- Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition*…indicates that a union of calm abiding and special insight clearly sees—with respect to specifics of the four truths set forth by the guru, the Supramundane Victor—meanings unmixed with term-generalities and meaning-generalities; also, many sūtras, such as *Lion's Roar of Shrīmālādevī Sūtra* and so forth, speak likewise…
- And even Chandrakīrti in his *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Sixty Stanzas of Reasonings*…does not say that [direct perception of impermanence and so forth] is not yogic direct perception, but merely refutes the way [Dignāga describes] how it actualizes [its object]…
- Chandrakīrti asserts yogic direct perception directly knowing the absence of production of true sufferings [as indicated] by many sūtras that say "Cessation is actualized." Since such yogic direct perception has no dualistic appearance and the mind also has adopted the aspect of thusness, it is posited as direct realization. With regard to how this accords with the world's conventions he uses the example of direct knowledge that water does not exist in a mirage…
- Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (559) also speaks of the sixteen aspects of the four truths—described in scriptures as the subtle conventional mode of abiding—as

being objects of yogis' individual self-cognition [and hence yogic direct perception of the sixteen aspects of the four truths is achieved even prior to the path of preparation]:[857]

> There is no fallacy with respect to yogic conventionalities [that although forms and so forth are renowned in the world to be permanent, they are not established by valid cognition as impermanent because yogic conventionalities such as impermanence and so forth are established by conventional valid cognition].
>
> [*Objection:* Well then, that compounded phenomena are momentary] even conventionally contradicts [the explanation that] even the momentariness of those that the Protector [Buddha] explicitly teaches for the sake of the world's entry [into the doctrine] is not so in suchness.
>
> [*Answer:* It is not contradictory because it is merely being said that] relative to worldly beings [who adhere to phenomena as clean, blissful, permanent, and so forth], suchness is seen…

- Atisha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* and many texts of the lower and upper manifest knowledges speak of clairvoyance of another's mind as existing from having achieved calm abiding [due to which it could not be yogic direct perception].

Objection: But [yogic direct perception and clairvoyance of another's mind] are, in accordance with Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,* fit only as paths of Superiors…

Answer: This contradicts many explanations that until special insight realizing emptiness has been attained, one does not pass to the heat level of the path of preparation, and it contradicts the explanation in Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* that there are [certain practitioners] who perceive themselves as Foe Destroyers when coarse afflictive emotions vanish due to meditating on the attributes of the four truths—impermanence and so forth—[and thus achieving yogic direct perception of them] but who at the time of death take birth through [contaminated] karmas and afflictive emotions:[858]

> *[Wrong opinion:]* "Through abandoning the afflictive emotions there is liberation."
>
> *[Answer:]* Then, immediately thereafter [extinction] would occur.
>
> Though [manifest] afflictive emotions are [temporarily] absent,

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

They are seen to have [rebirth by] the power of actions.[a]

TWENTY-SECOND CONTRADICTION: HIS MENTAL FABRICATION OF THREE CYCLIC EXISTENCES AND THREE ROOTS OF CYCLIC EXISTENCE

That there are three roots of cyclic existence and that the doors of peace are the same are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are

- the assertion that there are three roots of cyclic existence:
  1. a root of coarse cyclic existence, afflictive ignorance
  2. a root of subtle cyclic existence, the ground of predispositions of ignorance
  3. a root of very subtle cyclic existence, karmic winds and the desire of emitting the constituent
- and the assertion that the doors of peace are the same.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[859] A certain [D̄ak-tsang (634)] says:[860]

Coarse cyclic existence is impure birth and death;

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[a] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

The first line states the opponent's position which is that through cultivating the paths of the sixteen attributes of the four truths, impermanence and so forth, the afflictive emotions are abandoned and liberation is attained. At this point the debate concerns whether liberation from the afflictive emotions can be attained by means of only the paths of the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth…

The thought of Shāntideva's refutation is: The opponent maintains that a liberation extinguishing the afflictive emotions has been attained when the afflictive emotions that are also posited by the two Hearer schools are not manifestly active due to generating in the mental continuum the paths of the four truths. If so, then immediately after having temporarily abandoned only the manifest afflictive emotions, a liberation extinguishing all contamination would be attained. Shāntideva indicates that this cannot be asserted (IX.46cd):

Though [manifest] afflictive emotions are [temporarily] absent,
They are seen to have [rebirth by] the power of actions.

Though the manifest afflictive emotions are temporarily absent, [such persons] are seen to have the power impelling a future rebirth through the force of contaminated actions.

See Tsong-ka-pa, Ken-sur Nga-w̄ang-lek-den, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 156.

> Its root is afflictive obfuscation.
> Subtle cyclic existence is the birth and death of pure mental body;
> Its root is the ground of predispositions of ignorance.
> Very subtle cyclic existence is the Perfection Vehicle Buddha;
> Its root is subtle desire for emission.

and with regard to the three cyclic existences he does not say anything about which are actual or imputed cyclic existences. His commentary (635) says:[861]

> An illustration of subtle cyclic existence is the pure masterful[862] birth and death of one who has attained a body having a mental nature.

and so forth, whereby he asserts that [beings of subtle cyclic existence] are Hearers and Solitary Realizers who have entered remainderless [nirvāṇa] and Bodhisattvas ranging from those who have attained the path of seeing through those abiding on the tenth ground—[all of these] having attained a body having a mental nature and exhaustively abandoned birth and death due to karma and afflictive emotions. Furthermore, the root of this cyclic existence (636) is the ground of predispositions of ignorance set forth in the final wheel of the Word.

Hence, he explains that the afflictive emotions of the ground of predispositions of ignorance are the root of subtle cyclic existence,[863] and his commentary (636) also posits the attachment and wind in the continuum of a perfect Buddha as the root of very subtle cyclic existence:[864]

> The root of this cyclic existence is the subtle wind and subtle tendency to, or changeability of, emission of the essential constituent.

It is easy to realize that these contradict all scriptures, and they were also refuted earlier (638); they are also refuted by the reasonings of the great chariots of the Middle Way and Mind-Only Schools: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that there is birth in cyclic existence with desire alone acting as the root of cyclic existence—without apprehension of self—because [according to you] the mode of cycling of the third root of cyclic existence is correct. Not even Buddha could respond to the three spheres of self-contradiction! Such is needed [for effective refutation];[a] each of them has been asserted.

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is making a remark to his readers about how to debate.

If you accept [that there is birth in cyclic existence with desire alone acting at the root of cyclic existence—without apprehension of self—], then you have contradicted:

- the root text of Āryadeva's *Four Hundred:*[865]

  Just as the body sense power [pervades][866] the body,
  Bewilderment abides in all [afflictive emotions as their basis].[867]

  and Chandrakīrti's *Commentary*[a]
- Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,*[868] "The Conquerors said that all afflictive emotions thoroughly depend on bewilderment."
- the root text of Nāgārjuna's *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness:*[869]

  That which conceives things produced
  From causes and conditions to be real [that is, to be established as their own reality]
  Was said by the Teacher to be ignorance.
  [Since ignorance apprehending a self of persons arises from that apprehension of a self of phenomena, it is said that] from it the twelve links arise.

  If through seeing suchness one knows well
  That things are empty, ignorance does not arise.
  That is the cessation of ignorance,
  Whereby the twelve links cease.

  and his *Autocommentary*
- and many sūtras.

If you accept [that there is birth in cyclic existence with desire alone acting at the root of cyclic existence—without apprehension of self—], then you have also contradicted:

- many explanations that if bewilderment does not exist, attachment and so forth do not arise
- and explanations in sūtras that if the darkness of ignorance does not exist, the moisture of attachment does not exist.

In this way, the assertion of three different consciousnesses as roots of cyclic existence and yet the literal assertion of the statement in Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* that a second door of peace does not exist

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[a] Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* (D3865, *dbu ma,* vol. *ya,* 112b.7-113a.2) says:

> Also, desire and so forth engage in superimposing features, such as beauty and ugliness, on just the inherent nature of things imputed by bewilderment. Hence, they operate in a manner that is not different from bewilderment and also depend on bewilderment, for bewilderment is chief.

are contradictory.

Well then, it [absurdly] follows that even meditation on ugliness is an antidote eradicating a root of mundane existence because [according to you] even desire for emission is a root of cyclic existence. [You have asserted] the reason. If desire for emission can act as a root of cyclic existence in the continuum of a Buddha Superior, that it cannot act as a root of cyclic existence for a sentient being is also contradictory. If you accept [that desire for emission cannot act as a root of cyclic existence for a sentient being], you contradict many statements such as Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words:*[870]

> Nine forms of the Buddha's teachings based on the two truths—the sets of sūtras and so forth—
> Were proclaimed with respect to the extensive forms of behavior of worldly beings.
> Those spoken for the sake of removing desire [such as meditation on ugliness] do not remove hatred.
> Also, those spoken for the sake of removing hatred [such as meditative cultivation of love] do not remove desire.
> Also, those spoken for the sake of removing pride [such as meditating on the divisions of constituents] and so forth do not overcome the other defilements.
> Therefore, they are not very pervasive and those teachings are not of great meaning.
> But those spoken for the sake of removing bewilderment [such as meditating on dependent-arising] overcome all afflictive emotions,
> For the Conquerors said that all afflictive emotions thoroughly depend on bewilderment.

and Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*:[871]

> Because [the modes of apprehension of] love and so forth are not contradictory with obfuscation,
> They do not eradicate the very faulty [ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence].

and so forth.

Mistaking a passage in Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* (635), Ḏak-tsang's assertion that Great Vehicle Superiors necessarily do not have birth and death through the power of karma and afflictive emotions is a very coarse mistake. It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a being on the Great Vehicle path of seeing

who is included within the same physical basis as a being on the Great Vehicle path of preparation, does not have to discard his/her appropriated aggregates through the power of karma and afflictive emotions because of being a Great Vehicle Superior. You have asserted the entailment. You cannot accept [that a being on the Great Vehicle path of seeing who is included within the same physical basis as a being on the Great Vehicle path of preparation does not have to discard his/her appropriated aggregates through the power of karma and afflictive emotions] because [such a being] possesses in his/her continuum coarse cyclic existence assumed through the power of karma and afflictive emotions:

- because of being like, for example, a Foe Destroyer who has a [nirvāṇa having] remainder[a] and who possesses appropriated aggregates in his/her continuum, and
- because in order not to enact any birth and death by way of karma and afflictive emotions a mere path of the Great Vehicle Superior is not sufficient; rather, Bodhisattvas who have attained any of the three mental bodies are needed—in accordance with an exception [to Maitreya's statement in the *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* that Superiors do not have any sufferings of death, sickness, and aging][b]—whereas such beings on the path of seeing[c] dwell in a continuum of the impure cyclic existence of appropriated aggregates.

[D̄ak-tsang's] assertion (635) that all who assume and discard a Bodhisattva's body having a mental nature are in the phase of pure mastery[d] and his assertion (636) that the causes and conditions of assuming a body having a mental nature are only the ground of predispositions of ignorance and uncontaminated karma are also not correct:

- because on this occasion of Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle:*
    1. the path of preparation and below are called the phase of

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[a] This is a nirvāṇa having remainder as asserted in other than the Consequence School; see 942.

[b] Kensur Lekden added the refinement that those who attain the Great Vehicle path of seeing do not *newly* assume and discard mental and physical aggregates through the power of karma and afflictive emotions.

[c] That is, those having the same physical basis as a being on the Great Vehicle path of preparation.

[d] *dag pa rnam byang.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

impure grounds

2. and the path of seeing through the seventh ground is called impure and pure grounds—impure due to taking birth in cyclic existence while having actions possessing the contamination of attachment and pure due to not having thoroughly afflicted mind through method and wisdom's own power

- and because until afflictive emotions are extinguished, there is no enactment of the condition [of assuming a body having a mental nature] only by the ground of predispositions of ignorance, and uncontaminated action is posited as a conceptual consciousness[a] in which the seeds of the afflictive emotions have been extinguished.

Asaṅga's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum"* says:[872]

> During the impure and pure phase, Bodhisattvas who have attained a body having a mental nature do not at all have appearance [of birth that is the bridging of gap between lives through the power of karma and afflictive emotions since they have directly realized the meaning of emptiness upon its being qualified by vast method], and hence they have realized the utter absence of the burning of the three fires [of death, sickness, and aging—these being similar respectively to the fire at the end of an eon, the fire of a hell, and ordinary fire—which are sufferings that are effects].

and the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* also says:

> Mahāmati, mental bodies are of three aspects. What are the three aspects? The mental body of absorption in the bliss of meditative stabilization, the mental body of thoroughly understanding the nature of phenomena, and the mental body of innate compositional activity.[b] Yogis attain these through thoroughly knowing the character of the grounds—from the first ground on up.

According to the *Secret Treasury of Sky Travelers* and the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra,* the first two of the three mental bodies are called "mental bodies unimpeded and quick like the mind"; they are not mental bodies of undifferentiable entity with the mental consciousness. According to Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle"*:

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[a] *kun rtog.*

[b] *ris su lhan cig skye ba'i 'du byed kyi bya ba'i yid kyi lus;* meaning unclear to me.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

1. Bodies adorned with the marks and beauties from the first ground on up and those of universal monarchs, Shakra, and so forth are confirmed even by ordinary sense direct perception, and hence are coarse.
2. Bodies of the intermediate state and illusory bodies of Highest Yoga Tantra are subtle, non-material forms that are undifferentiable [in entity] from exalted wisdom.
3. The third mental body of this [description] is also such.

However, according to the *Kālachakra Tantra* the exalted body of a supreme emanation body that contains coarse constituents is seen by common beings; still, many sūtras, tantras, and treatises explain that common beings are blessed to see [a supreme emanation body], or they explain that it is an emanation.

That a Buddha's own form is of indeterminable color and so forth like a pure crystal jewel, as [explained in] the *Means of Achievement of the Conqueror Nāgendra* by the protector Nāgārjuna, is established by the aforementioned sūtras. It is explained that on the eighth ground a vajra-body is attained; hence, in accordance with the previous Conqueror's [that is, Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gya-tso's] [a] *Explanation of (Āryashura's) "Seventy Prayer-Wishes,"* although it has no birth or death, it merely displays these in the perspective of trainees. Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* says:[873]

> Though due to seeing reality as it is
> They have transcended birth and so forth,
> Having a nature of compassion they display
> Birth, death, aging, and sickness [thereby ripening sentient beings].

Asaṅga's *Commentary* says:

> They display birth; they also display aging, sickness, and death. They do not have even these phenomena of birth and so forth because of seeing just that basic constituent, without production and without arising, exactly as it is.

Although mental bodies in the continuums of Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers and Bodhisattvas are called "cyclic existences" and "nirvāṇas," they are not suitable to be cyclic existences and nirvāṇas. Those are only [based on their] etymologies; [b]

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[a] *dge 'dun rgya mtsho,* 1476-1542; *smon lam bdun cu pa'i rnam bshad.*

[b] Through the several preceding points Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a has made the case that D̄ak-tsang inappropriately uses the term "cyclic existence" for these states that are beyond

Asaṅga's *Commentary* says:

> In the sense that they are compounded through roots of uncontaminated virtue, they are cyclic existences; in the sense that they are not compounded through contaminated actions and afflictive emotions, just those are also nirvāṇas.

and a sūtra also says:

> There are compounded and uncompounded cyclic existences. There are also compounded and uncompounded nirvāṇas.

Twenty-Third Contradiction: His Explanation on the Occasion of Topics of Knowledge that Dharmakīrti's *Commentary* Is a Treatise Common to Outsiders and Insiders and Not Inner Knowledge

That treatises refuting those are the system of those is contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Since he refutes that Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* and Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition are treatises of inner knowledge, it must be that he asserts them to be Forders' treatises, and in that case his assertion that treatises refuting Forders' systems are treatises of those Forder systems is contradictory.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[874] About this, D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Topics of Knowledge*[a] says:[875]
>
> > Those who assert that because Inner texts teaching the four Topics of Knowledge
> > Are not other than [Dharmakīrti's] Seven Treatises as well as [Dignāga's] *Sūtra,*
> > These are inner knowledge are mistaken.
> > If it is said that they are inner knowledge because they are commentaries on [Buddha's] scriptures in general,
> > Then all grammar sūtras would also be inner knowledge…
> > [Dharmakīrti's *Commentary*] is just an extensive explanation
> > Of the expression of worship in [Dignāga's] *Sūtra on Prime Cognition*[b]…

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powerless birth and death; Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's opinion is that D̄ak-tsang should have distinguished between actual and imputed cyclic existences.

[a] This is a separate text on the five topics of knowledge—knowledge of (Sanskrit) grammar, knowledge of logic, knowledge of construction, knowledge of healing, and inner knowledge.

[b] *tshad ma mdo;* this is a common way of referring to Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition,* often shortened just to *Sūtra,* as above.

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In those the main subjects explicitly taught
Are the three spheres of objects of comprehension, the eight categories of logic;[a]
Hence, they are held to be just common[b] topics of knowledge.

In his *Commentary* not much is said. His main wrong conceptions appear to be that:

1. If [Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*] were inner knowledge, which is the fifth topic of knowledge, a fourth [that is, knowledge of logic] would be non-existent.
2. The eight categories of logic are asserted by both Outsiders and Insiders, and the main [topics] explained in this [*Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*] are included in the eight categories of logic.
3. The teachings of selflessness and the explanations of knowledge of it are just extensive explanations by Dharmakīrti's *Commentary* concerning the expression of worship in Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* but do not exist in the body [of Dignāga's text].

Let us refute these with reasoning in order. It [absurdly] follows that there are no texts that, drawing from the path of reasoning, teach how to tame the mental continuum because there is no common locus[c] of inner knowledge and a scriptural collection that is knowledge of logic. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction! If you accept [that there are no texts that, drawing from the path of reasoning, teach how to tame the mental continuum], then it [absurdly] follows that Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland,* Chandrakīrti's *Supplement,* and Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* as well as their commentaries do not extensively teach their own systems' basis, path, and so forth upon refuting others' systems by way of proofs and refutations! The three spheres of self-contradiction!

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that other topics of knowledge are not included in knowledge of construction; it [absurdly] follows that many [texts] such as the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,*

[a] These are correct direct perception, correct inference, correct proof statements, and correct refutations and quasi-direct perception, quasi-inference, quasi-proof statements, and quasi-refutations.

[b] That is, shared with non-Buddhists and Buddhists.

[c] That is, nothing that is both.

the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra,* and so forth do not extensively teach the grounds and paths upon refuting others' systems; it [absurdly] follows that Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* is not inner knowledge, and it [absurdly] follows that there are scriptures that do not teach syllogistic reasoning and do not teach pure reasoning. Stay put in the midst of a pile of such consequences!

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, Chandrakīrti's *Supplement,* is a treatise in common with Proponents of Mind-Only because it is a treatise extensively teaching the two selflessnesses—of persons and of phenomena—and Proponents of Mind-Only also assert two selflessnesses. The three spheres of self-contradiction!

Objection: There is no entailment because although the names of their two selflessnesses are similar, the meanings are not at all similar.

Answer: Although the explanations by Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* and Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* are included in the eight categories of logic, their meanings are utterly different from the non-Buddhist versions], and this being the case [the Outsiders'] meanings of the categories of logic are individually refuted, as explained earlier…

Therefore, may unbiased scholars analyze how contradictions could be propounded more amazing than proposing that a treatise mainly refuting the systems of Others' Schools individually is a treatise of the systems of those Others' Schools.

If the root [consequence that Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* is a treatise in common with Proponents of Mind-Only] is accepted, then you contradict the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement,"*[876] "May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared."

Similarly, it [absurdly] follows that [texts of] manifest knowledge teaching aggregates and so forth are sūtras in common with Others' Schools, and it [absurdly] follows that many tantras also are common tantras. Make such [consequences].

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that Others' Schools assert that, as explained by Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* and Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition, the four—correct direct perception, correct inference, correct proof statements, and correct refutations—are logical and the four—

quasi-direct perception, quasi-inference, quasi-proof statements, and quasi-refutations—are illogical because Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* and Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition describe those, and [according to you] those merely teach assertions in common with Others' Schools.

Similarly, it [absurdly] follows that Others' Schools assert four direct perceptions, and it [absurdly] follows that they assert reasons only as having three modes, and it [absurdly] follows that they assert that compounded phenomena are necessarily impermanent, and it [absurdly] follows that they assert that the permanent necessarily is empty of the capacity to performs functions. Proliferate collections of millions of such meteoric damaging consequences.

Also, it [absurdly] follows that there are not any extensive explanations of the body of Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* in all the central explanations of uncommon [features] of our own schools by Dharmakīrti's *Commentary*—the teachings of selflessness and explanations of valid cognitions knowing it, and so forth—because [you] propound that "those are only meanings expressed in the expression of worship in Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition.*" The three spheres of self-contradiction! If you accept [that there are not any extensive explanations of the body of Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* in all the central explanations of uncommon features of our own schools by Dharmakīrti's *Commentary*—the teachings of selflessness and explanations of valid cognitions knowing it, and so forth]—then millions of damages arise. [For the bodies of those two texts are aligned with regard to:]

- explaining the correctness of the three modes, the divisions, and numerical limitation of correct signs…
- explaining that Other Schools' reasonings are quasi-reasonings…
- describing the four direct perceptions,…how yogic direct perceptions arise, the features of their objects, the specifics of their objects of abandonment, and their fruits—the three nirvāṇas

and so forth…

Moreover, it follows that the subjects, Dignāga's *Compilation of Prime Cognition* and Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* and *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition,* are inner knowledge because they mainly explain the two truths, the attributes of the four truths, and so forth, as is the case, for example, with Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle*

> *Called "Wisdom"* and the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras…It is widely renowned that having extensively refuted in passages in all four chapters…the self that is the conceived object of a view of a transitory collection and the self of Others' Schools, [Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*] extensively expounds the selflessness of phenomena that is the nonduality of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject. Yet, he also extensively expounds the meaning of the absence of apprehended object by the True Aspectarians and False Aspectarians—indicating in general how external objects do not exist together with a dispelling of objections…and thereupon describing Non-Pluralism at length,…explaining how coarse appearances of forms and so forth are untrue or are mistaken…and [the reasoning of] the lack of being one or many that refutes that they are established the way they appear, as well as dispelling objections…
>
> Also, Ḏak-tsang states:
>
> > Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:
> >
> > > Because of manifesting, repeating, overwhelming,
> > > And realizing, there is manifest knowledge (*mngon pa'i chos, abhidharma*).
> >
> > Although it might be allowed that Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* fulfills [the features of] repetition and overwhelming, it does not fulfill the mode of manifesting the noumenon and the mode of manifestly realizing the path because of not describing the paths of accumulation and preparation and not describing the stages of meditation as [the scriptural division of] manifest knowledge does. [Hence, it cannot be included within manifest knowledge.]
>
> This is also the blind talk of ignorance because if it were that [a text's] explicit teaching and main explicit teaching did not fulfill all four features, it would not be manifest knowledge, then *The Five Aggregates,*[a] most of Vasubandhu's Eight Prakaraṇa Treatises,[b] and most of Nāgārjuna's Collections of Reasonings would not be manifest knowledge because they are not extensive in their explicit teaching with regard to the five paths and modes of meditation as [the scriptural division of] manifest knowledge is. The three spheres of self-contradiction! You have no reply!

[a] *phung po lnga pa / phung po lnga'i rab tu byed pa, pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa;* P5267.

[b] See the Bibliography for this and next sets of texts.

If you say that [you are referring] merely to indicating these, then you could not overturn the [absurd] consequence that all scriptures would be manifest knowledge because all of [Buddha's] Word tends and flows to selflessness and tends and flows to practical achievement.

However, the explicit teaching in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* fulfills all four [features] of manifest knowledge:[877]

1. being a door for manifestly approaching nirvāṇa
2. manifestly delineating again and again the general and specific characters
3. manifestly overwhelming opponents
4. manifestly realizing the meaning of the sūtras.

It is undeniable that it fulfills repeated [delineation] and overwhelming [opponents] by way of the specific and general characters, entities, enumerations, and so forth of objects and object-possessors—the two selflessnesses and so forth. With regard to how it makes selflessness manifest, it teaches the system common to the Sūtra School and the Mind-Only School—how to meditate after having delineated selflessness through hearing and thinking on the occasion of the paths of accumulation and preparation and, from that, how to manifest the specifically characterized mode of subsistence of the four truths on the occasion of the paths of seeing and meditation:

- initially how to rely on a spiritual guide, and thereupon to engage in hearing and thinking…
- how to analyze by means of hearing and thinking…
- the necessity also during the time of hearing and thinking to recognize that the root of all defects such as pain and so forth is the apprehension of self…
- whether or not great compassion—the means of separately differentiating the three vehicles—is meditatively cultivated, and if it is meditatively cultivated, how its increase becomes limitless, and so forth…It should be known that the way it proves omniscience refutes into chaos [Ḏak-tsang's] assertion that on the Buddha ground there is no consciousness of conventionalities, and so forth.
- how the selflessness of phenomena is meditated
- yogic direct perception
- how the obstructions are individually abandoned.

Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Contradictions: His Reasoning Delineating the Two Truths

That despite being devoid of logicality they are suitable and reasonable is contradictory. That all bases do not exist and that there are substrata and bases of imputation are contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that obscurational truths are devoid of logicality
- and the assertion that nevertheless the four truths, Enterers and Abiders, and so forth are suitable and reasonable.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[878] A certain [D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* (553)] says,[879] "He [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] analyzes and makes proofs upon inserting logicality."[a] The foundations of the bad conceptions in his root text and commentary (553) on this are:

- a few phrases at the beginning of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* such as:

  If that were not the case, would conventionalities not possess logicality? Hence, this is in suchness, and not conventionally.

- and a few phrases in Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement."*

Mistaking merely these, D̄ak-tsang thinks that all conventionalities must be posited in the perspective of ignorance or only innate consciousnesses apprehending earlier and later [phenomena] to be one. Regarding these, [I] made the first expression of contradiction above [that is, the twenty-fourth contradiction] because Chandrakīrti is explaining that if that logicality is applied [in this context], it is applied ultimately and because Chandrakīrti's similar statement also in his *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Sixty Stanzas of Reasonings,* "All worldly conventionalities are contradictory with logicality," is an occasion of analyzing the ultimate. Hence, [his reference on these particular occasions] is ultimate reasoning of logicality.

If that were not the case, there would be a great many contradictions with many scriptures. For:

- "That is logical," (*de 'thad*)
- "That is reasonable," (*de rigs*)

[a] *'thad pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- "That is suitable," (*de rung*)
- "That is permissible," (*de chog go*)
- and "That is viable," (*de nus*)

are equivalent and are just different words…

[Dak-tsang's assertions] are outside of all of the Middle Way School and Mind-Only School because even on the occasion of the Consequence School it is explained that just as emptiness is logical and suitable, all [phenomena of] the world and what transcends the world—the four truths, the eight Enterers and Abiders, the Three Jewels, and so forth—are logical and suitable. For:

- Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* says:[880]

  For whom emptiness is suitable,
  All is suitable.

- The *Buddhapālita Commentary* says:

  For whom emptiness is suitable, all [phenomena of] the world and what transcends the world are suitable.

- Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[a]

  Not only does the consequence [expressing] the fallacy [that all activities such as arising, disintegration, and so forth would not be feasible] set forth [by you Proponents of True Existence] just not apply to our position, but also [in our position] all presentations of the truths and so forth are very logical. In order to indicate this, [Nāgārjuna] says [in the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle*]:[881]

  For whom emptiness is suitable,
  All is suitable.
  For whom emptiness is not suitable,
  All is not suitable.

  For whom this emptiness of inherent existence of all things is suitable, all the above-mentioned are suitable. How? Because we call dependent-arising "emptiness." Hence, for whom this emptiness is suitable, dependent-arising is suitable, the four noble truths are suitable. How? Because just those that arise dependently are sufferings, not those that do not arise dependently. Since those [that arise dependently] are without inherent existence, they are empty.

[a] Dharmsala, Shes rig par khang, 422.2. For an expansive discussion of this quote, see Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness,* 184-185 and 329-332, from which this translation has been drawn. For the Sanskrit, see Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās,* 500.1ff.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

When suffering exists, the sources of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the paths progressing to the cessation of suffering are suitable. Therefore, thorough knowledge of suffering, abandonment of sources, actualization of cessation, and meditative cultivation of paths are also suitable. When thorough knowledge and so forth of the truths—suffering and so forth—exist, the fruits are suitable. When Approachers to and Abiders in the fruits exist, the spiritual community is suitable.

When the noble truths exist, the excellent doctrine is also suitable, and when the excellent doctrine and spiritual community exist, then Buddhas are also suitable. Thereby, the Three Jewels are also suitable. All special realizations of all mundane and supramundane topics[a] are also suitable as well as the proper and improper, the effects of those, and all worldly conventions.

- and it is explained by way of the two—logicality and scripture[b]—that "all aggregates, constituents, and sense-spheres are out of a purpose and not out of the mode of subsistence," since Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred"* says:

  Moreover, how is it ascertained that "Out of a purpose aggregates, sense-spheres, and constituents are taught, not out of the meaning of suchness"? These are ascertained from logicality and scripture.

  and:

  This is in consideration that "The world is only logical for just only conceptuality."

  There are many such individual statements.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that all bases do not exist—that is, are baseless and rootless
- and the assertion of substrata of impermanence and so forth and bases of imputation and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* 882 Also, a certain [D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (546)] says:

This system is an extreme case of holding one's own view to be supreme, making the huge, bad pronouncement about all

[a] *dngos po, padārtha.*

[b] *'thad pa dang lung.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

scholars and adepts of snowy Tibet that they appear only not to be directed toward the Middle Way. In particular, since the two—the Great Translator Tam-j̄ay-kyen-b̄a,[a] emanation of our holy refuge the glorious Elder Atisha, and his holy senior spiritual son, great scholar of scholars Shön-nu-l̄o-drö[b]—are in great accord with respect to their thought on the Great Middle Way, [D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his followers say that] because the object of negation by reasoning is too wide [in their system], they have fallen to a view of nihilism. [In this way] they cover the space of pages with black nets, stringing together in threads of letters a great collection of poisonous thorns of hateful propositions. Motivated by not being able to stand this, [I] have leveled a few consequences, but through the condition of great forbearance may all these splendiferous rainbows of mistaken appearances of desire and hatred be pacified within the sphere of reality, devoid of proliferation, due to their being without foundation and rootless.

and (528):[883]

Some[c] latter-day Tibetan great scholars upholding the teaching asserted Chandrakīrti's system straight out in the early part of their lives, but later, although their discrimination had not indeed improved, the country of Tibet was filled in general with the conventions of logic and in particular with conventions dependent on collected topics, and with respect to the Middle Way School became used to such statements as "The power of the non-deceptive dependent-arising of conventionalities" propounded by the Autonomy School, and they became as if worked up by conversation that "If actions and their effects are posited only in the perspective of mistaken [consciousness], they would not be reliable." Such scholars who, despite following the glorious Chandrakīrti, though not analyzing with ultimate reasoning, analyze with many conventional reasonings, saying:

- It [absurdly] follows that the ways a dream-elephant and a

[a] *lo chen thams cad mkhyen pa.* Since earlier D̄ak-tsang stated that Great Translator Ḡyap-chok-b̄el-sang-b̄o (*lo chen skyabs mchog dpal bzang po,* 14th century), was an incarnation of Atisha, it is likely that this is his referent here. Thanks to Kevin Vose for the note.

[b] *zhon nu blo gros / red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros,* 1349-1412; a S̄a-ḡya who was one of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's principal teachers.

[c] D̄ak-tsang is speaking about D̄zong-ka-b̄a and his followers.

waking-elephant perform functions are the same.

- It [absurdly] follows that an awareness to which falling hairs appear and an awareness to which blue appears are similarly mistaken or not mistaken.
- and mainly: It [absurdly] follows that it is not suitable to put confidence in actions and their effects.

and so forth. These scholars, despite asserting that theirs is Shāntideva's and Chandrakīrti's system, have the following great burden of contradictions.

and he propounds (545) that dream-fire and hell-fire, for instance, do not differ with respect to whether a factual[a] basis of appearance exists or not. Regarding these, [I] made the first expression of contradiction above [that is, the twenty-fifth contradiction].

Your wish-prayer, motivation, and works—all of them—are out of bounds…

Your "baseless and rootless Great Middle Way" simultaneously incurs the four—excess, omission, error, and contradiction…When either "base" or "root" are sufficient, saying both is excessive…Whereas the qualifications "ultimately," "in reality," and so forth should be affixed, there is the fault of omission. Regarding the assertion that the non-existence even conventionally of any basis and root of all phenomena is the middle, a pair of poisonous snakes of the bad view of permanence and annihilation—superimposition and deprecation—has simultaneously yielded two wounds of permanence and annihilation because if even conventionally the bases of appearance of the two—an awareness to which dream-fire appears and a sense direct perception to which a wood-fire appear—are similar as to whether they exist or not, well then it [absurdly] follows that there are descriptions by wise scholars in scriptures that "Such-and-such is the substratum and basis of imputation even of dream-fire and the falling hairs of one with an eye disease":

- because they explain that the bases of imputation of fire and of hair[b] are burning fuel and hair-strands[c] that are collections of many particles, and
- because they similarly speak of many [factors] such as the substrata of those and so forth.

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[a] *dngos gnas.*

[b] *skra.*

[c] *spu.*

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and so on. As before, you [students] should elaborate this with many scriptures and reasonings.

TWENTY-SIXTH AND TWENTY-SEVENTH CONTRADICTIONS: HIS MODE OF PROGRESSING TO THE END OF THE PATH

Being a perfect Buddha and entering again from the path of accumulation are contradictory. That one who has extinguished all obstructions to omniscience has predispositions of emission is contradictory.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Contradictory are:

- the assertion that someone is a perfect Buddha of the Perfection Vehicle
- and the assertion that this very person enters again from the path of accumulation of the Mantra Vehicle.

Contradictory are:

- the assertion that a person has extinguished all obstructions to omniscience
- and the assertion that predispositions of emission of the essential constituent exist in the continuum of that person.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [884] Also, a certain [D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets*] says:[885]

Hence, although one has completed lower realizations,
When entering the higher, one seeks its path of accumulation.
Because of this, [D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] presentations that Hearers and Solitary Realizers enter [the Sūtra Great Vehicle] from the path of accumulation
And that [Perfection Vehicle Buddhas] enter [the Mantra Great Vehicle] from the ten grounds [beginning with] the path of seeing are contradictory.

D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets"* (636):[886] Most Indian and Tibetan scholars' assertion of full purification through the Perfection Vehicle alone without depending upon Mantra is good, like the attainment of Foe Destroyerhood through the path of only Hearers and Solitary Realizers. Hence, the assertion that *final* Buddhahood relative to all vehicles is attained is not good, like the fact that *final* Foe Destroyerhood is not attained through the paths of only Hearers and Solitary Realizers. Therefore, the three

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cycles of Bodhisattva commentaries,[a] [Buddhashrījñānapāda's] *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī,*[b] and so forth say that without the addition of a Mantra path, final Buddhahood is not attained through the Perfection Vehicle alone.

In dependence upon these statements, recent scholars [including Dzong-ka-ba] say that a mere Buddha of the Perfection Vehicle alone is not possible:

- The very subtle objects of abandonment are subtle defilements [in the continuum of a Bodhisattva] at the end of the continuum [of having obstructions yet to be abandoned] as explained in the Perfection Vehicle.
- Since those cannot be abandoned by the great-great path of meditation, the Mantra path is added.
- Therefore, after our Teacher gained the exalted wisdom of the tenth ground, the Buddhas urged him on, whereupon he added onto the end of the final path of the Perfection Vehicle two blissful stages[c]—the Mantra path of seeing called "the clear light of the fourth stage"—and, after that, the [Mantra] path of meditation called "learner's union."
- Hence, although there is no certainty with regard to the lower limit of a Perfection Vehicle being's entry into Mantra, the upper limit cannot be higher than the tenth ground, and since when that being enters Mantra, substitutes for the Mantra paths of accumulation and preparation have already been accomplished, entry from lower than the path of seeing is not possible.

These are renowned as special good explanations; however:

- If the great-great path of meditation cannot abandon its respective objects of abandonment, it [absurdly] follows that the other eight paths of meditation also cannot abandon their respective objects of abandonment.
- If there is no enlightenment in the Perfection Vehicle, it [absurdly] follows that mind generation aimed at that enlightenment is a wrong consciousness, and it follows that a Mantra path of seeing is necessarily preceded by paths of accumulation

[a] See 626, fnt. a.

[b] This is perhaps the *dvikramatattvabhāvanā-nāma-mukhāgama* (P2716 and 2717, vol. 65; Toh. 1853 and 1854) by Buddhashrījñānapāda (*sangs rgyas dpal gyi ye shes*); thanks to E. Gene Smith for the reference.

[c] *rim bde gnyis.*

and preparation of its own path.

- If there is no other path higher than the complete light [of the Perfection Vehicle Buddhahood], it [absurdly] follows that the twelfth ground for which that [ground of complete light] acts as the lower level is not feasible.
- If Mantra has an antidote that does not exist in the Perfection Vehicle, it follows that there is an object of abandonment that does not exist in the Perfection Vehicle.

When even a Buddha could not find fallacies in the entailments of these consequences in which the reasons and clarifications are explicitly contradictory, those with unbiased intelligence should realize how they are eloquent explanations.

Due to those non-mistaken reasons, although one has completed lower realizations, when entering the higher, one seeks its path of accumulation. Because of this necessity, [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] presentations that Hearers and Solitary Realizers enter [the Sūtra Great Vehicle] from the path of accumulation and that [Perfection Vehicle Buddhas] enter [the Mantra Great Vehicle] from the ten grounds [beginning with] the path of seeing are contradictory because the reasons are in all ways entirely similar.

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[887] Ḏak-tsang does not appear to have commented on this [stanza]. Regarding these, [I] made two contradictions above [that is, the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh contradictions]. The assertion that even perfect Buddhas of the Perfection Vehicle enter from the Mantra path of accumulation, like [the way] Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers [enter the Great Vehicle from the path of accumulation] contradicts millions of scriptures and reasonings. It is the case that not only are Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers and those of the Great Vehicle not the same in terms of vehicle but also there is a huge difference of low and high, and without having meditatively generated the altruistic intention to become enlightened there is no way to enter a Great Vehicle path, due to which Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers must enter from only the Great Vehicle path of accumulation. It [absurdly] follows that just as this is due to a difference of lower and higher, so also with regard to the Perfection Vehicle and Mantra Vehicle—due to a difference in vehicle—although one completely progress to the finality of the Perfection Vehicle path, one must enter from the Mantra path of accumulation because [according to you] there is a burden

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of contradictions if the way those perfect Buddhas [of the Perfection Vehicle] and Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers enter a higher path. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

It [absurdly] follows that the two—the Sūtra Great Vehicle and the Mantra Great Vehicle—are different vehicles because [according to you], the fruits that are objects of attainment differ in level, like, for example, the positing of the vehicles of Hearers and Solitary Realizers as different since although their path-realizations are similar, their fruits differ in level.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that the paths of the lower tantra sets and of Highest Yoga Tantra also are different vehicles because the effects of progressing on their paths differ very greatly and because [according to you] even a perfect Buddha of those [lower tantra sets] must enter [Mantra] from the Highest Yoga Tantra path of accumulation.[a]

If those are accepted, inexhaustible damage lands:

- It [absurdly] follows that the statement in Vajragarbha's *Commentary on the Condensation of the Hevajra Tantra:*[888]

  It is not the Subduer's thought that a fourth [vehicle]
  Or a fifth [school of tenets] exists for Buddhists.

  is incorrect.
- It [absurdly] follows that the vehicles are not limited to three.
- It [absurdly] follows that even Hearer Superiors who simultaneously [abandon corresponding objects of abandonment with respect to all nine levels of cyclic existence in nine cycles, at the end of which, if they do not encounter a Buddha, become a Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer instead of a Hearer Foe Destroyer][889] enter [the Solitary Realizer path] from the Solitary Realizer path of accumulation.
- It [absurdly] follows that those of the Perfection Vehicle and those of the lower tantras who complete [spiritual development] do not rely on Highest Yoga Tantra.

and so forth. Not only that, but also it [absurdly] follows that the explanations in [Buddhashrījñānapāda's] *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī* and so forth—that those of the Perfection Vehicle and those of the lower tantras enter the Highest Yoga Mantra path from the tenth ground and that they enter the Highest Yoga Mantra path from

[a] Ḏak-tsang does not explicitly hold this, but Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a feels that he is forced by reasoning to assert this.

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[the level] that is renowned as "Buddha susceptible to being surpassed"[a] and "surpassed Buddha"[b] in the description of the tenth ground as "Buddha"—are incorrect because [according to you] even they enter [the Highest Yoga Mantra path] after having attained unsurpassed perfect Buddhahood. You have asserted the three spheres of self-contradiction!

This cannot be accepted because it contradicts many texts…such as even Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization:*

That Buddha ground on which the exalted wisdom dwells,
Having transcended the ninth ground,
Is to be known as the tenth
Ground of Bodhisattvas.

And the assertion that, within the context of one vehicle, upon having attained the final fruit of that vehicle, one enters again from the path of accumulation of that vehicle contradicts all pure scriptures and reasonings of scholars and adepts of Sūtra and Mantra. Hence, never mind a perfect Buddha, even to assert that at the end of the tenth ground one enters [Highest Yoga Mantra] from the generation stage is harmed by many scriptures and reasonings because Nāgārjuna's *Five Stages* and Āryadeva's *Lamp Compendium of Practice* explain that:

- all the Buddhas roused [the tenth grounder] Shākyamuni by snapping their fingers…and saying that his concentrative meditation was not complete…
- at midnight during the third initiation he was taught instructional advice on the clear light and union, and when the third initiation was bestowed, he attained the clear light and union at the same time as initiation…
- at dawn[c] of that day, having cut through all obstructions by means of a diamond-like [meditative stabilization], he was buddhafied…

and many maṇḍala rites say the same. If despite having attained such clear light and union at the time of initiation, one were still to enter [Highest Yoga Tantra] from the generation stage, this would contradict reasonings and contradict many tantras and texts by great adepts that indicate it as [laid out above]; it would be like proposing that, despite having completed crossing a river, one

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a *bla na bcas pa'i sangs rgyas.*

b *bla na yod pa'i sangs rgyas.*

c This is not sunrise but the period of the first appearance of light.

would need to proceed over jewelled mountains and so forth with a boat, and it would be like proposing that having gone to higher rungs on a ladder, one would have to proceed all over from lower rungs. For the generation stage is relied upon in order to attain the unfabricated completion stage, but if, having attained the unfabricated stage, [earlier levels] are left aside like a ship [once a river has been crossed], what need is there to mention [that the same is true upon attainment of] the high paths of clear light and union?…

Moreover, never mind subtle desire, and never mind emission of the essential constituent and so forth, if it is asserted that even just bad predispositions exist in the continuum of a Buddha Superior who has extinguished the obstructions to omniscience described by the Perfection Great Vehicle, this is like asserting that a sky-lotus exists and contradicts many scriptures and reasonings of the father, the Superior [Nāgārjuna], and his spiritual sons and so forth because Chandrakīrti proves with many sūtras that a perfect Buddha has abandoned the entirety of predispositions of the three poisons, and the Conqueror Maitreya also explains and Asaṅga comments likewise. Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says:

> The afflictive emotions are ignorance, desire, and so forth…Although Foe Destroyers have abandoned the afflictive emotions, they have the predispositions, due to which they will jump as they did when formerly they were monkeys…Those predispositions are overcome only in knowledge-of-all-aspects and Buddhahood, not in others.

and so forth, and as a source he cites the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra:*

> A One-Gone-Thus does not have predispositions of actions, does not have predispositions of afflictive emotions, and does not have predispositions of mistaken behavior. It is thus: for example, since space naturally is thoroughly pure, it does not dwell together with dust and smoke.

and so forth, and also the permanence, stability, quiescence, eternalness,[a] and so forth—mentioned in the *Great Cloud Sūtra,* the *Great Drum Sūtra,* and so forth with respect to Buddhas—require non-duality of mind and body, absence of subtle conceptuality, and absence even of mere subtle predispositions.

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[a] *g.yung drung.*

3: Identifying the Causes of his Mistakes

Labels such as voidness of predication and bad meditations are the causes of your mistakes.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Labels such as being devoid of predication, transcending awareness, not an object of awareness, and so forth and bad meditation manuals that accord with Hwa-shang's manuals are the causes of your mistakes.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[890] Concerning this, in accordance with the statement in a Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, "The non-dual is non-apprehension," not only true establishment but also dualistically appearing phenomena are called "apprehension," and contemplating this is called "contemplation with apprehension,"[a] and meditating on this is called "meditation with apprehension" and so forth. Synonyms of the noumenon without dualistic appearance are "non-apprehension,"[b] "non-appearance,"[c] "freedom from proliferations,"[d] and so forth, and—in terms of objects—contemplating this is called:
>
> - "contemplation of the non-apprehendable"
> - "contemplation of non-taking to mind" since one is not dualistically taking [anything] to mind
> - "not acting in signs" due to being without signs of true establishment and dualistic appearance, and
> - "non-conceptual" due to being without dualistically appearing conceptuality, which—in accordance with Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*—is [taken to mean being without] the consciousnesses of the five sense organs and so forth
>
> these being applied in terms of objects—the object of negation, proliferations, dualistic appearance, and so forth. They are also applied in terms of object-possessors such as inference and so forth, applied with respect to verbalization, and applied to not meditating and so forth in the style of the coarse two selflessnesses. The many ways that these are applied need to be known, but without knowledge of even one of these, [the causes of D̄ak-tsang's mistakes are]:
>
> - many bad Tibetan manuals of meditation that accord with

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a *dmigs par sems pa.*

b *dmigs med.*

c *snang med.*

d *spros bral.*

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manuals by Hwa-shang prohibiting all taking to mind, as explained earlier

- meditations on labels such as "freedom from verbalization,"[a] "beyond awareness,"[b] and so forth
- identifications by certain great personages such as Dor-jay-den-b̄a and so forth
- a little bit of seeking goods and respect
- and changing around the tenets of the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[891] Later on, D̄ak-tsang gained unbreakable faith [in D̄zong-ka-b̄a] upon seeing in detail the Foremost Lama's eloquence,[c] and he wrote praises, such as:

Upon seeing the lotus grove of sūtras and the *Ornament*[d] opened
By the sun of your intelligence when you were a youth,
The water-lily[e] of my puffed up intelligence totally closed.
Entreaty to the treasure of profound and vast knowledge!

and:

Homage to you, great treasure of unprecedented eloquence
Concerning all of Sūtra and Mantra and especially the Vajra Vehicle,
All the tantra sets and especially the meaning of Highest Yoga Tantra,
All the two stages and especially illusory body.

and so forth. Hence, D̄ak-tsang S̄hay-rap-rin-chen differs greatly from Go-ram-b̄a S̄ö-nam-s̄eng-ge,[f] Shākya-chok-den,[g] and so forth.

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[a] *brjod bral.*

[b] *blo 'das.*

[c] This is said to be D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Golden Rosary,* which is his presentation early in his life of Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization.*

[d] The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization.*

[e] This is a water-lily that opens at the appearance of the moon, *nymphoea esculenta.*

[f] *go ram pa bsod nams seng ge,* 1429-1489; a S̄a-ḡya critic of D̄zong-ka-b̄a.

[g] *gser mdog paṇ chen shākya mchog ldan,* 1428-1507. For Shākya-chok-den's criticism of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's views, see Komarovski Iaroslav, *Three Texts on Madhyamaka* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 2000). See also David Seyfort Ruegg, "The Jo naṅ pas: A School of Buddhist Ontologists According to the Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 83, no. 1 (1963):89-90.

11. Autonomy School

2" Individual Explanations of the Meaningful Middle Way Systems {2}

This section has two parts: describing the system of the Autonomists and the system of the Consequentialists.

a" Describing the System of the Autonomists {3}

This section has three parts: the meaning of the name together with the definition, divisions, and individual systems.

1: Meaning of the Name together with the Definition

Because autonomous sign and own-powered sign are the same, Autonomists are those who state a sign proving a thesis through the three modes and the subjects being own-powered as appearing in common.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because autonomous sign [that is, reason] and own-powered sign are equivalent, Autonomists are those who assert that a thesis must be realized through the force of (1) the sign's three modes,[a] (2) the subject [of the thesis] sought to be known, and (3) the subject of the example [all] having been previously established—under their own-power from the factual mode of abiding—as appearing in common to both opponents.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[892] With respect to the meaning of autonomy[b] and the difference between the Autonomy School and the Consequence School, a few Indians—such as Jayānanda and so forth—propound various things. B̄a-tsap[c] Rin-b̄o-chay says that among the followers of the master Nāgārjuna there are three logical[d] persons, two factions, and four great presentations. With respect to the three logical persons, the first to come was Buddhapālita; in-between was Bhāvaviveka; and in the end was Chandrakīrti. With respect to the two factions, Bhāvaviveka held the Autonomy position, and Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti held

[a] Presence of the reason in the subject, forward-pervasion, and counter-pervasion.

[b] *rang rgyud, svatantra;* literally, "own continuum" or "own power."

[c] *pa tshab nyi ma grags.*

[d] *'thad sbyor.*

the Consequentialist position, whereby there are the two, the Autonomy School and the Consequence School. What is the difference between the Autonomy School and the Consequence School? B̄a-tsap says that those who assert valid cognition engaging [objects] through the power of the fact[a] are Autonomists, and those who do not assert this are Consequentialists. However, if that were the case, all Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things would be Middle Way Autonomists, and Ayatas [Nihilists] and Shameless Ones[b] [Jainas] would be Consequentialists.

The scholar S̄ö-nam-dor-jay,[c] a student of M̄a Jang,[d] says that those who refute and prove the two positions[e] with autonomous [syllogisms] are Autonomists, and those who refute and prove the two positions with other-approved [syllogisms] or consequences are Consequentialists. This also is not correct because through this the meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist is not understood and because even both Autonomists and Consequentialists are similar in merely performing refutation and proof of both positions through consequences.

A certain person[893] says that those who make refutations with autonomous [syllogisms] established by valid cognition engaging [objects] through the power of the fact are Autonomists, and those who do it through consequential signs [that is, consequential reasons] of other-renown—the [three] modes of which are established by valid cognition renowned in the world—are Consequentialists. However, in that case, it [absurdly] follows that the master Dignāga and so forth are Middle Way Autonomists.

The scholar S̄ö-nam-n̄ying-b̄o[f] says that those who:

- having cleared away the other's position of an extreme of existence or non-existence through a sign [that is, reason] whose three modes in proving selflessness are established for both parties of the debate and through an awareness—coming from the sign—that they conceive[g] to be a valid cognition having an

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a *dngos po stobs zhugs kyi tshad ma.*

b *'dzem med pa.*

c *bsod nams rdo rje.*

d M̄a-ja Jang-chub-d̄zön-drü (*rma bya byang chub brtson 'grus,* died 1185; TBRC P1982).

e That is, refute the other's position and prove their own position.

f *bsod nams snying po;* perhaps *g.ya' bzang chos mdzad bsod nams snying po,* sixteenth-century Ḡa-gyü-b̄a; TBRC P5857.

g *rlom.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

unmistaken mode of apprehension,
- prove a thesis ascertaining their own position

are Middle Way Autonomists. He says that those who:
- having cleared away the other's position of an extreme of existence or non-existence through a sign whose three modes in proving the ultimate are asserted by the opponent or are an extension of assertions by the opponent and through an awareness—coming from the sign—that is renowned to the other [party],
- do not prove a thesis of their own position

are Consequentialists. However, in that case Chandrakīrti would be an Autonomist, and [with regard to this description of a Consequentialist] if one's own position is not proved, what is excluded and what is included would not be feasible. Since this appears to be what he thinks is the meaning of not having a position oneself, it has already been refuted (523).

Nevertheless, I have indicated just a little bit about those for those of new intelligence, and since [the above-mentioned scholars] have not identified [the Autonomy School] by way of either the term or the meaning of "autonomy," it is as follows. Autonomous sign (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*), own-powered sign (*rang dbang gi rtags*), and self-powered sign (*bdag dbang gi rtags*) are equivalent[a] because autonomous, own-powered, and so forth are synonymous in meaning.[b] For the *Vyutpatti*[894] glosses:
- *vinaśvara* as "having an evanescent nature" (*'jig pa'i ngang can*)[895]
- *svatantra* as "own power" (*rang dbang*)[896]
- *svabhāva* as "intrinsic nature/entity" or "inherent nature" (*ngo bo nyid dam rang bzhin*)[897]
- *svarūpam* as "own intrinsic nature/entity" or "inherent nature" (*rang gi ngo bo 'am rang bzhin*).[898]

Also, Amarasinha's *Treasury*[c] says,[a] "Autonomous (*rang rgyud*,

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a *don gcig.*

b *don rnam grangs pa.*

c There are four renowned sūtras of Sanskrit grammar (*sgra mdo bzhi*):

- Sarvarvarman, *Kalāpasūtra* (*ka lā pa'i mdo, kalāpasūtra;* P5775, vol. 140)
- Chandragomin, *Chandragomin's Grammar* (*lung du ston pa tsān dra pa'i mdo, cāndravyākaraṇaṃ;* P5767, vol. 140)
- Anubhūtisvarūpācārya, *Sarasvatī's Grammar Sūtra* (*dbyangs can sgra mdo/ dbyangs can ma, sārasvatavyākaraṇa / sārasvatīprakriyā;* P5886, vol. 148; P5911, vol. 149; P5912,

svatantra), own-powered (*rang dbang, svairī*), self-powered (*bdag dbang, svairī*)," and furthermore Chandrakīrti uses Amarasinha's *Treasury* as a source. Moreover, *svairī,* which is the Sanskrit original of "self-powered" (*bdag dbang*), is the original of "own-powered" (*rang dbang*) because Amarasinha's *Treasury* says,[b] "*Svairī* and self-willed (*rang 'dod, svacchanda*)." Also, *sva* is used for own (*rang*), and *irī*[c] is used for will/desire (*'dod*) and so forth, and *Sārasvata's Grammar* says,[d] "Letter, adventitious, elephant, powerful one, and so forth," and *Chandragomin's Grammar* says, "*Śakandhu* and so forth,"[e] or *pṛṣodara* and so forth,[f] [which calls for] an augment (*āgama*), the letter *a,* to be added between [*sva* and *irī*], whereupon through euphonic combination[g] there is *svairī* which [in addition to self-powered and own-powered] is used also for self-willed (*rang 'dod*).

The *tantra* in the Sanskrit original for autonomous *svatantra* (*rang rgyud*) is used, as was explained earlier (65 and 697), for established (*grub pa*), prove (*sgrub pa*), and so forth. Hence, by taking it here as "established," the meaning of autonomous (*rang rgyud*) and own-powered (*rang dbang*) on this occasion is:

- "established from its own side" (*rang gi ngos nas grub pa*) and established from the side of the mode of abiding (*sdod lugs kyi ngos nas grub pa*)
- established under its own power (*rang dbang du grub pa*),

and such a reason or application of a sign [that is, syllogism] is the meaning respectively of:

- autonomous sign (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*)
- own-powered sign (*rang dbang gi rtags*)

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- Pāṇini, *Pāṇini's Grammar Sūtra* (*brda sprod pa pāṇini'i mdo, pāṇinivyākaraṇasūtra;* P5914).

There is also a list of eight Sanskrit grammars.

[a] *Amarakośa* 3.1.32: *svatantro 'pāvṛtaḥ svairī svacchando niravagrahaḥ.* Among these five, *svatantra* is *rang rgyud; svairī* is *rang dbang; svacchanda* is *rang 'dod*. In the next sentence Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a says that *svairī* is also *bdag dbang.* The other two words, *apāvṛta* and *niravagraha* both mean "self-willed" and the like.

[b] *Amarakośa* 3.1.32: *svairī svacchando.*

[c] The Sanskrit *irin* means powerful, violent.

[d] I assume that it is glossing *irī.*

[e] This likely indicates a rule calling for a substitution, as in Pāṇini, VI.I.94.

[f] See Pāṇini, VI.III.109.

[g] *mtshams sbyar, saṃdhi.*

and:
- autonomous inference (*rang rgyud kyi rje su dpag pa*)
- own-powered inference (*rang dbang gi rje su dpag pa*).

This is because Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* on the thirteenth chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* says:

> Now the thirteenth chapter was composed for the sake of teaching naturelessness from the viewpoint of compositional phenomena, through the force of setting answers to refutations and own-powered inferences.[a]

and Avalokitavrata's commentary on that chapter also says:

> Concerning that, here the meaning of the chapter is to teach the naturelessness of compositional phenomena through the force of setting answers to opponents' refutations and demonstrating proper[b] own-powered inferences.

And since there are many clear sources and etymologies in this fashion, the second Conqueror, the foremost [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa], says in *The Essence of Eloquence* that the meaning of *svatantra* (*rang rgyud*) is the meaning of own-power (*rang dbang*). This is also Chandrakīrti's thought because he says that autonomy is not suitable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle and so forth (795)…

Even Ratnākarashānti in his *Commentary on (Dipaṃkarabhadra's) "Four Hundred and Fifty"*[899] describes "existing [by way of] its own nature" (*rang gi ngo bo yod pa*) as existing inherently" (*rang bzhin*), and the great paṇḍita Amarasinha says:[c]

> Established [as its own] reality (*yang dag grub, saṃsiddhi*), inherent nature (*rang bzhin, prakṛtī*), own-form (*rang gzugs, svarūpa*), intrinsic nature (*ngo bo nyid, svabhāva*), and true existence (*dngos po*).

Accordingly, Consequentialists assert that:
- established as [its own] reality (*yang dag par grub pa*)

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[a] *rang dbang du rje su dpag pa;* Ge-luk-ḇa scholars take this not as meaning "inferences under one's own power" in the sense of setting forth syllogisms from one's own viewpoint, or in the sense of setting forth syllogisms that are in one's own continuum, but as syllogisms in which the subject and so forth are held to be inherently established.

[b] *kha na ma tho ba med pa;* literally, "not unseemly."

[c] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa draws the first four from:
1.7.483: *adṛṣṭiḥ syādasaumye 'kṣṇi saṃsiddhiprakṛtī tvime.*
1.7.484: *svarūpaṃ ca svabhāvaśca nisargaścātha vepathuḥ.*
The source for *dngos po* is not apparent to me.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- inherently established (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*)
- own-form (*rang gzugs*), that is, inherent nature (*rang bzhin*)
- intrinsic nature (*ngo bo nyid*)
- substantially existent thing (*rdzas yod kyi dngos po*)

are similar in meaning.

The Sanskrit original for intrinsic nature (*ngo bo nyid*) is *svabhāvatā*. The Sanskrit original for both inherent nature (*rang bzhin*) and own-thing (*rang gi dngos po*) is *svabhāva*, and it means own-powered (*rang dbang*); such is not established as only nominally imputed there [that is, to the object], but whatever is merely nominal and only imputedly existent does not have inherent existence and so forth. For there are many [explanations of this, such as when] Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* says:

> If own-nature does not exist,
> How could other-nature exist?

and the *Buddhapālita Commentary* says:

> Those conditions do not come to be from themselves (*rang las gyur pa ma yin*), do not establish themselves (*rang nyid rab tu grub pa ma yin*), are not self-intrinsic (*rang gi bdag nyid ma yin*), are not arisen from themselves (*rang las byung ba ma yin*); they are natureless.

And when the Autonomists posit a chariot, for example, citing a Hearer sūtra that says:

> Just as a chariot is imputed
> in dependence on its parts,

they posit as a chariot either the mere aggregation of the axle, nails, wheels, and so forth—which are the basis of the imputation of the name or [verbal] convention "chariot"—or the special shape of the mere aggregation [of the parts]. Therefore, they assert that a chariot is not just imputed there nominally, and they assert that if the basis of imputation, which is the base to which the name is actually affixed, were not a chariot, a chariot would not exist, and so forth. Similarly, regarding the person, either the mere collection of the aggregates or the shape is the person. Either the mere collection of the top, bottom, and bulbous middle or the shape of that [collection] is a pot. Pillar and so forth are similarly posited.

Regarding this, the Consequentialists, in dependence on that sūtra passage, assert that although the mere collection of the parts of a chariot is established as the basis of imputation, it is not a chariot:

- because [if it were,] then all the parts, piled up without being arranged as a chariot, would have to be a chariot, but they are not, and
- because, even if one says it is the special shape of the arranged mere collection, when analyzed there is no difference in the shape of the individual parts whether arranged or not arranged,

and relative to one thing, the basis of imputation and the object imputed are mutually exclusive since, relative to it, the appropriator and the appropriated are mutually exclusive and since it is asserted that if they were not mutually exclusive, then relative to one thing, object and agent would not be different.

Therefore, [presenting the opinion of the common establishment of objects] Jñānagarbha's autocommentary on the *Differentiation of the Two Truths* says, "[Phenomena] as they are seen by cowherds and above abide as truths conventionally," and also the same text says, "No one has any debate concerning the factors appearing to the consciousness of the disputant and the opponent."

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[900] This passage is also the clearest source [indicating] that the Autonomy School asserts establishment of objects from their own side because this passage says that [objects] exist conventionally in accordance with how they are seen by cowherds on up, and it is undeniable that ordinary common beings such as cowherds perceive whatsoever appearing objects as established from the side of their own mode of abiding.

In brief, the meaning of commonly appearing subjects is to be taken as subjects established by valid cognition that is non-mistaken with respect to their being established by way of their own character within common appearance to both the disputant and the opponent. For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Great Exposition of Special Insight [in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*] says:

> The meaning of being established in common appearance also is that [the subject, reason, and so forth] are established also for the opponent through the same sort of valid cognition through which they are established for the disputant.

The meaning of autonomous syllogism is to be taken as a syllogism that generates an inference realizing a thesis after having earlier ascertained the mode of establishment of the two subjects—the subject of [the thesis] sought to be known and the subject of the example—and the [three] modes of the sign through valid cognition, not contingent upon the assertions of the other party but

autonomously from an objective mode of subsistence. For Dzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[901]

> The meaning of autonomous [syllogism] is that which generates an inference realizing a thesis upon having ascertained the two subjects [that is, the subject of the thesis and the subject of the example] and the [three] modes of the sign through valid cognition, not contingent upon the assertions of the other party but autonomously from an objective mode of subsistence.

Also, the meaning of "not contingent upon the assertions of the other party"[a] is that establishment by valid cognition renowned to the opponent himself/herself is not sufficient because Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of Special Insight says:

> When autonomy is asserted, valid cognition that is valid with respect to establishment by way of the object's own character is asserted as commonly appearing for both parties in the debate, whereupon a thesis must be proven by way of establishment—for both [parties]—of the three modes [of the reason] that are established by that [sort of valid cognition].

and:

> When autonomy is not asserted, establishment [of the subject and so forth] for the other side, the Proponent of True Existence, by that sort of valid cognition is sufficient; it is not necessary that they be established for oneself by that sort of valid cognition.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[902] Accordingly, the meaning of autonomous [syllogism] is that:

- without being contingent upon an opponent's assertions it is asserted that a non-defective consciousness—to which whatever object that appears to all, that is, from cowherds on up to the two opponents in a debate, appears to be established from its own side, or from the side of its basis of imputation, or by the power of its mode of subsistence—is a valid cognition
- the systems of both opponents agree that these objects are found by such valid cognitions, and, therefore, the subject is established as a common appearance
- reasoned proofs are stated with such a subject as a substratum for the sake of proving the predicate of a thesis that the

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[a] *phyi rgol gyi khas blangs la ma 'khris.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

opponent is engaged in wanting to infer, or in wanting to comprehend, or in wanting to know.

Those who assert that the stating of such reasons is correct are Autonomists, and such Proponents of the Middle are Middle Way Autonomists.

2: Divisions of the Autonomy School

There are two, Sūtra and Yogic Middle Way Autonomy Schools.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When the Autonomy School is divided, there are two, Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School and Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets*:[903] Divisions within the branches will be explained below (763ff.). The two main divisions are limited to:

- the Sūtra Middle Way School, or the Middle Way Autonomy School asserting external objects, and
- the Yogic Middle Way School, or the Middle Way Autonomy School not asserting external objects.

The etymologies of the latter of their two names are easy. With respect to etymologies of the former of their two names:

- Because they assert, like the Sūtra School, that subject and object as different substantial entities and the twelve sense-spheres and so forth but are Proponents of the Middle asserting the absence of true existence, they are called Proponents of the Sūtra Middle Way School…How this accords with Bhāvaviveka's texts will be explained below (731).
- Because they assert the non-existence of external objects like the Yogic Practice School but propound that internal mind lacks a true nature, they are called Proponents of the Yogic Middle Way School…

3: Individual Systems within the Autonomy School {2}

This section has two parts: explaining the system of the Sūtra Middle Way School and explaining the system of the Yogic Middle Way School.

A: EXPLAINING THE SYSTEM OF THE SUTRA MIDDLE WAY SCHOOL

This section has two parts: how mind-only is refuted and their own system.

1* How Mind-Only is Refuted in the Sutra Middle Way School {4}

This section has four parts: refuting that the [three] characters of the proponents of true existence is the meaning of [any] sūtra, explaining their own system's meaning of the three characters, features of how the collectors of the great and small vehicles and the two selflessnesses are taught, and how the non-existence of external objects is refuted with scripture and reasoning.

a The Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School's Refutation that the [Three] Characters of the Proponents of True Existence is the Meaning of [Any] Sūtra*

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [904] Do the two Autonomy Schools agree in refuting mind-only? To explain how they differ [the root text says]:

Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School

External objects are established by the former and refuted by the latter. They assert that the three characters are established by way of their own character. However, in consideration of the absence of true existence it was said that these and those do not exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: From between those two, the former [the Sūtra Middle Way School] prove that external objects are correct, and the latter [the Yogic Middle Way School] refute external objects.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[905] The former is the chariot-way of the Sūtra Middle Way School, the system of the one renowned as Bhavyakara—that is, Lek-den-jay (*legs ldan 'byed*)[a] or Ḡel-den-jay (*skal ldan byed*)—[also called] the master Nang-drel (*snang bral*) or Nang-wa-mi-jel-wa (*snang ba mi 'jal ba*). Here, [I] will explain a little by way of his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom,"* but there is nothing clearer than the root text and commentary of his *Heart of the Middle* for an extensive [explanation of] the three—basis, path, and fruit—the modes of meditation, and so forth of the Autonomy School's own system, due to which [I] will explain it that way. Also, all Autonomists cite it as a source.
>
> Hence, the former, the Proponents of the Sūtra Middle Way School [first] state the system of the Mind-Only School…and then refute the emptiness of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject…and prove the existence of external objects.

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[a] *legs ldan 'byed* is also the Tibetan for "Bhāvaviveka."

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> The opener of the chariot-way of the latter Middle Way Autonomy School, the master Shāntarakṣhita—that is, Shi-wa-tso (*zhi ba 'tsho*) or Shi-wa-s̄ung (*zhi ba srung*)—explains in his *Ornament for the Middle*...that the aspects of forms and so forth that appear upon the fruition of beginninglessly deposited predispositions in consciousness are mere appearances of the mind in those aspects, like illusory elephants and horses...and thus the assertion that forms and so forth are of the nature of the mind is virtuous, or good. Through "Are these established as [their own] reality, or are they established as conventionalities without analyzing the objects imputed?" and so forth they also refute external objects, as will be explained (731ff.).

Word Commentary on Root Text: Proponents of the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School[a] assert that the three characters are established by way of their own character.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[906] These two chariots [Bhāvaviveka and Shāntarakṣhita] and all their followers assert inherent establishment (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*) and establishment by way of its own character (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*) because although it is difficult to differentiate them from the Consequence School [since] even in their texts they speak of the absence of inherent existence and [not existing] in the face of analysis, Bhāvaviveka, as explained earlier (700), posits the basis of imputation of a person as the person and asserts, like the Proponents of Sūtra, that minute particles are substantially existent and that among collections there are both substantially existent collections and collections that do not substantially exist. And in particular:
>
> - Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* explains[b] that if the imputational natures in the statement [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] that imputational natures are character-non-natures were taken to be mental expression (that is, conceptual consciousnesses) and verbal expression (that is, names)

[a] As is evident in the commentary immediately below, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a takes this assertion as being shared by both branches of the Autonomy School, not just the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School; it is likely that Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den mentions only the Sūtra Autonomy Middle Way School because the discussion comes in the course of explaining this branch and utilizes only Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom."*

[b] Bhāvaviveka considers and rejects various possibilities of what the Mind-Only School might consider "imputational natures" to be; it is not that the Mind-Only School actually asserts these.

that do the imputing,[a] one would be deprecating other-powered natures, whereby he sets forth that effective things exist by way of their own character. Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says:

> If [the Proponents of Mind-Only] are saying that imputational natures that are the mental expression and the verbal expression of "form" do not exist [that is, are not established by way of their own character], they are deprecating other-powered natures because of deprecating mental expression and verbal expression.

and Avalokitavrata's *Commentarial Explanation* also says:

> [Bhāvaviveka] is indicating that if it is being said that imputational natures that are the mental expression (that is, conceptual consciousnesses) and the verbal expression that do the imputing of "form" are natureless due to being without the nature of character, then it is unsuitable to be deprecating other-powered natures conventionally.

In brief, if one were to explain that the imputational natures in the statement in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:*[b]

> Imputational natures do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be "character-non-natures."

is to be taken as terms and conceptual consciousnesses and thereupon were to explain that terms and conceptual consciousnesses do not subsist by way of their own character, then since those two are effective things, one would be deprecating

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[a] This is hypothetical since neither Bhāvaviveka nor his adversaries in the Mind-Only School take imputational natures to be conceptual consciousnesses and names, which are obviously other-powered natures. Bhāvaviveka is running through any and all possibilities of how the Proponents of Mind-Only might identify imputational natures and refutes them. The passage nevertheless is significant because it shows that Bhāvaviveka considers other-powered natures to have "character" and thus "establishment by way of the object's own character" because the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* itself identifies "character" as meaning "subsisting by way of their own character." This is one way that Bhāvaviveka shows that he asserts that effective things are established by way of their own character conventionally.

[b] The full citation is:

> Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be "character-non-natures."

See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 86.

effective things, as the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* [itself later says].[a]

- If [the Mind-Only School] is explaining that [the objects imputed in the imputation of entities such as "form" and attributes such as "the production of form" and so forth] are character-non-natures because they do not abide by way of their own character *ultimately,* they would be engaged in the reasoning of the Middle Way School, and [Bhāvaviveka] asserts that this is what they should do. Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says:

  > If you are refuting that things ultimately [exist], then you are making propositions following the Middle Way School.

  and:

  > Therefore, since you would be asserting that the imputational natures imputed in the manner of entity and attributes are character-non-natures, you should assert the reasoning of the Middle Way School.

- Someone might wonder whether it is necessarily the case that the reasoning of the Middle Way School—this being something [the Mind-Only School] does not have—is definitely needed [to refute] (1) that what is posited by name and terminology is the mode of subsistence of things and (2) that the objects posited by name and terminology are ultimately established. Neither of those [requires Middle Way reasoning to be refuted] because both the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School are similar [in holding that] even those who do not know terminology—the mute, the deaf, and so forth—are able to know objects such as pots and so forth, and even oxen and so forth are able to know their own and others' offspring through smell, form, and so forth, but they do not have even mere conceptual consciousnesses thinking with respect to those, "Its name is such-and-such." This entails [that neither the Mind-Only School or the Middle Way School requires Middle Way reasoning to refute those] because a consciousness conceiving true establishment with respect to a substratum lacking the appearance of existing that way does not occur. Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

  > Even those who do not know letters and terminology—the

[a] See 333 and 713.

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mute, the deaf, and so forth—know objects such as pots and so forth, and even oxen and so forth know their own and others' offspring through smell and so forth and through their eyes. Therefore, names are empty of meaning in all ways. Since such do not express the self-nature of things, this is the same for both of us [that is, the Proponents of Mind-Only and the Proponents of the Middle].

The meaning of that is:

The association of names and terminology for these and those phenomena is not in the mode of subsistence of these and those phenomena because, if it were in their mode of subsistence, then [even though] water alone is expressed by *pānīya, ap, sanīla, nīra*,[907] and so forth, [the referents of those individual terms] would [absurdly] have to be different.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [908] [Bhāvaviveka's] explanation should be understood by way of six features:

1. If the imputational natures in the statement [in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] that imputational natures are character-non-natures were taken by the Proponents of Mind-Only to be conceptual consciousnesses and terms that impute entities such as "form" and attributes such as "the production of form" and so forth, this would be a deprecation viewing other-powered natures as not established by way of their own character. For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

   [Bhāvaviveka] explains that if the imputational natures in the proposition that imputational natures are character-non-natures were taken [by the Proponents of Mind-Only] to be conceptual consciousnesses and terms that impute entities and attributes, then since those two are included in the aggregates, this would be the deprecation that other-powered natures are character-non-natures [that is, that impermanent phenomena are not established by way of their own character]. Thereby, [Bhāvaviveka] asserts that other-powered natures have the nature of character [that is to say, have establishment by way of their own character].

2. If these imputational natures were taken [by the Proponents of Mind-Only] to be the objects imputed[a] in the imputation of

[a] *btags don.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

entities such as "form" and attributes such as "the production of form" and so forth, this is damaged by what is renowned in the world. For Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> [Bhāvaviveka explains that] it is not reasonable to posit the non-existence of the object imputed in an imputation thinking "snake" with regard to a rope as an example for the character-non-nature of the objects imputed in the manner of entity and attribute with regard to forms and so forth, "It is this and that." For the other party [in the debate] can reply, "Just as although the object of this apprehension of a rope as a snake does not exist, the object of apprehension of a coiled snake as a snake does conventionally exist, so although the object apprehended within thinking with regard to a form 'It is a feeling' does not exist, the object of apprehension within thinking with regard to a form 'It is a form' does conventionally exist."
>
> Since here existence and non-existence is existence and non-existence of a nature of character [that is, presence and absence of establishment by way of the object's own character, Bhāvaviveka] is saying that the objects imputed in the manner of entity and attribute with regard to forms and so forth are not character-non-natures conventionally [and thus he indicates that the objects imputed in the manner of entity and attribute with regard to forms and so forth are established by way of their own character conventionally]. He says that if conventionally a snake did not exist in a coiled snake, then this would be damaged by renown; [this damage is incurred] if your position is that when you think with regard to a coiled snake, "This is a snake," the object apprehended does not exist conventionally.

3. If [the Mind-Only School] is explaining that the objects imputed in imputation in the manner of entity and attribute are ultimately character-non-natures [that is, are ultimately not established by way of their own character], then they would be followers of the Middle Way School. For Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> [Bhāvaviveka] says, "If [the Proponents of Mind-Only] are refuting that things ultimately [exist], then they are making propositions following the Middle Way School."

He is saying that if [the Proponents of Mind-Only] are

proving that the object apprehended within thinking that a coiled snake is a snake is ultimately without a nature of character [that is, ultimately is not established by way of its own character], then this is the system of the Middle Way School.

4. [Bhāvaviveka] explains that the Autonomy School and the Mind-Only School have different systems about how to take the object imputed[a] in imputation in the manner of entity and attribute. For Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

 [Although Bhāvaviveka holds that Middle Way reasoning is needed in order to refute that the object posited by terminology imputing "pot" with respect to a bulbous thing is ultimately established when ultimate establishment is taken to be the self of phenomena,][909] he is not propounding that Middle Way reasoning is needed in order to refute that the object posited by terminology[b] imputing "pot" with respect to a bulbous thing is ultimately established [when ultimate establishment is taken to be establishment from the object's own side without depending upon imputation by terms and conceptual consciousnesses]. This is because Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* explains that:

 - Even those who do not know terminology—the mute, the deaf, and so forth—can know objects such as pots and so forth, and even oxen and so forth can know their own and others' offspring through smell, form, and so forth.
 - Therefore, both the Yogic Practice School and the Middle Way School similarly explain that what is posited by verbal terminology does not abide in the suchness of things.

The object[910] posited by terminology in imputing "pot" to a bulbous thing is not established in the mode of subsistence of the bulbous thing because otherwise (1) it would follow that if one does not know the terminology, one would necessarily not know the object, or (2) it would follow that if one knows the object, one would necessarily know to associate the name. The first is harmed by the facts that even those who do not know terminology—the mute, the deaf, and so forth—can know objects such as pots and so forth, and even oxen and so forth can

[a] *btags don.*

[b] *brdas bzhag pa'i yul.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

know their own and others' offspring through smell, form, and so forth. The second is harmed by the reasoning [in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* (see 326 and 391)]:[911]

> Because an awareness does not exist prior to name,
> Because manifold, and because unrestricted,
> There are the contradictions of being in the essence of
> that, of many entities,
> And of the mixture of entities. Therefore, it is proven.

5. [Bhāvaviveka] explains the meaning of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* from the viewpoint of identifying the imputational natures in the description in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* of imputational natures as character-non-natures. For Dzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> [Explanation of the meaning of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* requires depending on Middle Way reasoning.][912] Therefore, [unlike the identification of imputation by the Proponents of Cognition, here] the conceived objects[a] in imputations such as, "This is form," "This is the production of form," and so forth are [identified as form and the production of form and are called] the objects imputed by those [conceptual consciousnesses imputing them]. Since those [that is, form and the production of form] conventionally exist by way of their own character, they are not character-non-natures [in the sense of not being established by way of their own character]. Due to this, their ultimate existence is refuted, whereby [Bhāvaviveka] explains that the meaning of the sūtra is that it is teaching that these [that is, form and the production of form and so forth] *ultimately* are character-non-natures [in the sense of not *ultimately* being established by way of their own character]. At that time [that is, therefore,] the imputational natures—about which [the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] says "imputational natures are character-non-natures"—are the conceived objects [such as form and the production of form] thoroughly imputed to be ultimate[ly existent]. That [the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] says that these are posited by name and terminology means that [these non-existent imputational natures] are exhausted as only imputed by terms and conceptual consciousnesses.

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[a] *zhen yul.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

6. Dispelling the objection that it would follow that in this mode of explanation imputational natures are not the substrata of the explanation. Dzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

   You should not hold that in that case [Bhāvaviveka] is saying that other-powered natures, and not imputational natures, are character-non-natures because otherwise, even in the Yogic Practitioners' system it would not be suitable to describe—as imputational natures' character-non-nature—other-powered natures' not being established by way of their own character as entities imputed in the manner of entity and attribute. [Although Bhāvaviveka takes the objects imputed by conceptuality to be the conceived objects of conceptual consciousnesses performing imputing—that is, forms and so forth—he takes the character-non-nature that is with them as being that forms and so forth do not exist by way of their own character as ultimately established entities.]

Word Commentary on Root Text: However, [Autonomists] assert that in consideration of three non-natures:

- character-non-nature, that is, that truly existent imputational natures do not have a nature of character [that is, lack being established by way of their own character]
- production-non-nature, that is, that other-powered natures do not have a nature of ultimate production, and
- ultimate-non-natures, that is, that thoroughly established natures are the ultimate and also are thoroughly distinguished by a mere absence of the nature that is the self of phenomena

in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras it is said that these and those phenomena—ranging from forms through omniscient consciousnesses—are natureless.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[913]

Question: If all three natures are inherently established, how do you explain the meaning [of the statement] in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* of the three—character-non-nature, production-non-nature, and ultimate-non-nature?

Answer: It is explained that all phenomena, the bases of emptiness—other-powered natures and so forth—do not exist by way of their own character in accordance with the superimposition of them as ultimately [existent] by imputation, due to which they are character-non-natures, and just as they are natureless in that way,

so they are not produced, and therefore do not cease and are quiescent from the start and are naturally passed beyond sorrow…[Bhāvaviveka] cites the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:*[914]

> That which does not exist by way of its own character is not produced. That which is not produced does not cease. That which is not produced and does not cease is from the start quiescent. That which is quiescent from the start is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow [that is, naturally devoid of the afflictive emotions without depending on an antidote]. That which is naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow does not have the least thing to pass beyond sorrow.

Although Shāntarakṣhita asserts that the three natures [as described] by the Proponents of Mind-Only is the secondary meaning taught by the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and so forth and that the three natures of his own system is the explicit teaching, Bhāvaviveka does not assert that [the three natures as described by the Proponents of Mind-Only] is the meaning of those [sūtras, either secondarily or explicitly or any way at all].

b Explaining the Meaning of the Three Characters in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School's own System*

Bases of emptiness, factors of superimposed true establishment, and emptinesses of that are respectively other-powered natures, imputational natures, and thoroughly established natures because of not being under their own power, because of being imputed, and because of being the mode of subsistence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The subjects—things that are the bases of emptiness, factors of superimposed true establishment, and the emptiness of that true establishment—are respectively posited as other-powered natures, imputational natures, and thoroughly established natures because respectively of being produced through the power of other causes and conditions and not being produced ultimately or under their own power, and because of being superimposed factors not in the mode of subsistence, and because of being the final mode of subsistence.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[915] It is suitable to explain [the three natures] having joined the subjects, predicates, and reasons respectively of the three parts [of the root text] because it is renowned that:

> Though what is related with something is far away,
> It is [to be put together] with that.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

OTHER-POWERED NATURES AND PRODUCTION-NON-NATURES

The subjects, bases of emptiness that are effective things such as forms and so forth, are called "other-powered" and "production-non-natures" because they are called those since they are produced in dependence on other conditions, due to which they are not ultimately produced inherently, or ultimately produced under their own power. There are many sūtras such as the *Questions of Anavatapta, the King of Nāgas, Sūtra* which says:[916]

> Those which are produced from conditions are not produced.
> They do not have an inherent nature of production.
> Those that depend on conditions are said to be empty.
> Those who know emptiness are aware.

and the *Questions of Sāgaramati Sūtra* which says:[917]

> Those that arise dependently
> Are free of inherent existence.

and so forth, and the honorable Superior [Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"*] says:[918]

> It is not reasonable for an inherent nature
> To arise from causes and conditions.

and Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

> When things are not analyzed,...they are conventionally produced through the power of other conditions like a magician's illusions, and just not [by] themselves, due to which they are posited as production-non-natures.

IMPUTATIONAL NATURES AND CHARACTER-NON-NATURES

The subjects, the factors of the imputation of true establishment with respect to forms and so forth, are called "imputational" and "character-non-natures" because, since they are superimposed factors not in accordance with the mode of subsistence, they are described as "imputational," and since forms and so forth are not established in accordance with a character imputed as ultimate, they are described as "character-non-natures." The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says, "The imputed entity is just non-existent," and:

> When mentally broken down,
> The other-powered does not exist, and the imputed also does
> not exist.

and Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

> The entity of ultimacy superimposed on the impermanent and so forth is a non-existent imputed entity. Moreover, because of not being established in accordance with the character imputed, it is posited as a character-non-nature.

THOROUGHLY ESTABLISHED NATURE AND ULTIMATE-NON-NATURE

The subject, the noumenon that is an emptiness of true establishment, is called "thoroughly established nature" and an "ultimate-non-nature" because since it is the mode of subsistence without being a superimposition, it is described as "thoroughly established" and, since it is an object of valid cognition analyzing the ultimate, it is described as "ultimate," and, since it is distinguished by the non-existence of the nature of true establishment, it is called "non-nature." The *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[919]

> Just the ultimate-non-nature that is distinguished by the selflessness of phenomena only subsists in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time.[a] It is the uncompounded noumenon[b] of phenomena, devoid of all afflictive emotions. Because that uncompounded [nature] which subsists for permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time in the aspect of just that reality is uncompounded, it is unproduced and unceasing. Because it is devoid of all afflictive emotions, it is quiescent from the start and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

and:[920]

> It is the ultimate and is distinguished by just the naturelessness of all phenomena; therefore, it is called the "ultimate-non-nature."

and Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

> That all phenomena ultimately always abide as only without the entity of an inherent nature is the thoroughly established nature because it is always established without superimposition. Moreover, due to being established as correct by valid cognition it is called "ultimate," and due to being distinguished by the non-existence of inherent nature it is also naturelessness.

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[a] *rtag pa rtag pa'i dus* (*nityaṃ nitya-kālaṃ*) and *ther zug ther zug gi dus* (*dhruvaṃ dhruva-kālaṃ*), (Noriaki Hakamaya, "A Consideration on the Byams Shus kyi Le'u," *Indobuk-kyogaku Kenkyu,* 14, no. 1 [Dec. 1975]: 28). Thanks to John C. Powers for the citation. Lamotte (*Saṃdhinirmocana,* 70 [9], n. 2) has *nityakālaṃ* and *śāśvatakālaṃ*.

[b] *chos nyid, dharmatā.*

c Features of how the Collectors of the Great and Small Vehicles and the Two Selflessnesses are Taught in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

The collectors are not the same; they do not realize. Because the Great Vehicle has meaning, the selflessness of phenomena is not in the Lesser sūtras. Just as fear of a snake with respect to a coiled rope is cleared away by an awareness apprehending it as a vine, obscuration is overcome by realizing selflessness; it is not the mode of subsistence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although the three Hearer scriptural collections—discipline, manifest knowledge, and discourses—were collected by the three, Upāli, Kāshyapa, and Ānanda, the three Great Vehicle scriptural collections were collected by Maitreya, Mañjughoṣha, and Vajrapāṇi. Hence, the collectors of the Word of the Great and Lesser Vehicles are not the same in being Hearers because Hearers do not realize in full the 84,000 behaviors of sentient beings and the meanings of the 84,000 bundles of doctrine set forth in accordance with them.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[921]

Objection: The Great Vehicle is not feasibly the Word [of Buddha] because the collectors of all the Word are necessarily Hearers and the meanings of the three scriptural collections, the three trainings, and so forth are not established except from just the explanations in the Hearer scriptural collections.

Answer: That is not so:

1. because although from the viewpoint of the common vehicle the Hearers Ānanda, Upāli, and Kāshyapa are suitable as the collectors of the Word, from the uncommon viewpoint, either they are not Hearers, or the three—the Great Vehicle discipline, manifest knowledge, and discourses—were collected by Maitreya, Mañjughoṣha, and Vajrapāṇi, and
2. because it is explained that Hearers are not capable of apprehending all the bundles of doctrine spoken by the Buddha, and
3. because in the retinue of the teaching of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* and the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds,* except for only Bodhisattva Superiors, there were no Hearers, and
4. because even seven scriptural collections are described, and
5. because in Great Vehicle discourses there are limitless meditative stabilizations, even the names of which Hearers are unable to reckon, as is the case on the three pure [Bodhisattva] grounds, and in the Great Vehicle discipline seven hundred and so forth topics of Bodhisattvas are taught, and in the Great

Vehicle manifest knowledge specific and general characters are set forth with limitless words and meanings…

Although [the Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle] mostly agree on positing—as the measure of a pile of doctrine—each complete antidote to each of the 84,000 activities of the afflictive emotions, they do not agree on the measure of a complete antidote. For:

- [With respect to the second reason,] according to those who assert three final vehicles, an antidote to predominantly acting out hatred—a complete path ranging from love until the state of a Foe Destroyer—is sufficient [as a single bundle of doctrine], and it is possible that even a Hearer could apprehend 84,000 piles of such doctrine…
- According to those who assert one final vehicle, although they [similarly] state that [a single bundle of doctrine] concerning an antidote to hatred ranges from love until the state of a Foe Destroyer, merely this does not finish the defilements of taming hatred as is established by scripture through the example of cleansing the stains of a jewel in the *Questions of King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra,*[a] and it is also established by reasoning

[a] The *Questions of King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra* (also called the *Sūtra Teaching the Great Compassion of a One-Gone-Thus* [*de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying rje chen po bstan pa'i mdo, tathāgatamahākaruṇānirdeśasūtra;* P814, vol. 32, 300.5.4ff.)]:

> O child of good lineage, for example, skillful jewelers, who know well how to cleanse a jewel, take a very impure jewel from a jewel-mine. They soak it in a strong solution of soda and thereupon clean it with a black haircloth. However, they do not leave off effort with just that; after that, they soak it in a strong solution of quicksilver and thereupon clean it with wool. However, they also do not leave off effort with just that; after that, they soak it in the juice of a great herb and thereupon clean it with a fine cloth. Having been thoroughly cleaned, the jewel—free from the three types of defilements—is called "the great lineage of *vaiḍūrya*" (cat's-eye gem).
>
> Just so, O child of good lineage, the One-Gone-Thus also, having ascertained the thoroughly impure [Buddha] constituent in sentient beings, causes sentient beings who like cyclic existence to be discouraged with it through disquieting discourse on its impermanence, suffering, selflessness, and uncleanliness, introducing them to the disciplinary doctrine of Superiors.
>
> The One-Gone-Thus does not leave off effort with just that; after that, he causes them to realize the One-Gone-Thus's own mode through discourse on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. Moreover, the One-Gone-Thus does not leave off effort with just that; after that, he causes those sentient beings with various causal natures to enter the land of a One-Gone-Thus through discourse on the irreversible wheel [and] discourse on the complete purity of the three spheres [of agent, action, and object]. When they have entered and realized the noumenon of

because although such hatred is extinguished, the stains of hatred are not extinguished and because it is the thought of the *Questions of King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra,* the *Lion's Roar of Shrīmālādevī Sūtra,* and so forth that one has not destroyed the foe to be abandoned and has not completed the activities of cultivating antidotes, and so forth. Therefore, the paths of a complete antidote to each of the activities of the afflictive emotions beginning from tiny defilements through to complete Buddhahood must be taught. Consequently, such 84,000 piles of doctrine do not exist in a Hearer, but only in Bodhisattvas who have attained the illusion-like meditative stabilization and the meditative stabilization of proceeding as a hero…

[With respect to the fourth reason,] in the scriptures of the Pūrvashailas and Aparashailas seven scriptural collections are mentioned, consisting of the Bodhisattva scriptural collection, the Scriptural collection of the Knowledge Bearers, the scriptural collection of discipline, the scriptural collection of discourses, the scriptural collection of manifest knowledge, the extensive scriptural collection, and the scriptural collection of birth stories. Also, Avalokitavrata describes the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras as ultimate manifest knowledge, and they are also [instances of] the scriptural collection of discourses.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because the separate setting forth of the Great Vehicle scriptural collections has a meaning, or purpose, the selflessness of phenomena is not explicitly taught in Lesser Vehicle sūtras.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[922] Even Hearer and Solitary Realizer Superiors who are definite in the Lesser Vehicle lineage do not realize the selflessness of phenomena because the selflessness of phenomena is mainly not taught in the Lesser Vehicle sūtras:[a]

- because only the afflictive obstructions are abandoned by trainees who are the objects of intent of the Lesser Vehicle, and they do not abandon the obstructions to omniscience, and
- because since consciousnesses conceiving a self of phenomena

a One-Gone-Thus, they are called "the unsurpassed boon."

[a] There is an excellent, lengthy treatment of this topic in Donald S. Lopez Jr., *A Study of Svātantrika* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986), 82-133. For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's principal treatment of this topic, see also Tsong-ka-pa, Ken-sur Nga-w̄ang-lek-den, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), chapter 8.

> are the obstructions to omniscience, meditation mainly on the selflessness of phenomena does not exist aside from the Great Vehicle.

Since there is a means of differentiation from the Lesser Vehicle—this being the Great Vehicle profound meaning [of emptiness]—[Bhāvaviveka] asserts that Buddhapālita is mistaken in asserting that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Lesser Vehicle scriptural collections. [In commenting on] the seventh chapter[923] of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* [Buddhapālita cites a Lesser Vehicle sūtra that] says:[924]

> Forms are like balls of foam.
> Feelings are like bubbles.
> Discriminations resemble mirages.
> Compositional factors are like banana tree trunks.[a]
> Consciousnesses resemble magical illusions.
> Thus the Sun Friend Buddha said.[b]

Bhāvaviveka's commentary on this [seventh chapter] in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says:

> Another [that is, Buddhapālita] says that the Supramundane Victor gives magical illusions [and so forth] as similes for the selflessness of compositional phenomena…"Selflessness" means "naturelessness" because the term "self" is a word for "nature."

[Bhāvaviveka,] having stated—as the opponent—Buddhapālita's explanation that the selflessness of phenomena is set forth by that passage, says in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"*…that:

- Buddhapālita's explanation that "self" in "All phenomena are selfless" means "inherent nature"[c] is not correct because the meaning of that pronouncement by the Supramundane Victor must be specifically explained as the selflessness of persons.
- The self of that selflessness is the self of persons because a self of persons does not exist aside from the five aggregates, and those aggregates are also not a self of persons, just as, for example, they are not Īshvara.
- If that passage teaches the selflessness of phenomena, the other vehicle, that is, the Great Vehicle, would be purposeless.

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[a] The plantain tree. This refers to the trunk of the tree which, much like an onion, has no core. These lines are cited in *Saṃyuttanikāya* III. 142.

[b] For Bhāvaviveka's extensive explanation of this passage, see 722; for Chandrakīrti's citation of it, see 807.

[c] *ngo bo nyid.*

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[925] The way the Consequentialists respond [to Bhāvaviveka's final point] is as D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Great Commentary on (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"* says:[926]

Concerning this, is [Bhāvaviveka] saying that [if the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Lesser Vehicle,] *in general* the Great Vehicle teaching would be purposeless, or that the Great Vehicle teaching of the selflessness of phenomena would be purposeless? In the first case, if his consequence that [in general the Great Vehicle teaching would be purposeless] did follow [from the reason that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in Lower Vehicle], then the Great Vehicle teaching would be limited to teaching only the selflessness of phenomena. However, this is not so because the Great Vehicle also teaches the Bodhisattva grounds, the practice of the perfections such as giving and so forth, the great waves of aspirational prayers and dedications, great compassion and so forth, the great waves of the two collections, the marvelous power of the altruistic intention to become enlightened, and a noumenon [that is, a Buddha's body of attributes] inconceivable by common beings, Hearers, and Solitary Realizers. Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:[927]

Bodhisattvas' aspirational wishes, deeds, and dedications
[of merit]
Were not described in the Hearers' Vehicle.
Therefore how could one become
A Bodhisattva through it?

The subjects concerned with the Bodhisattva deeds
Were not mentioned in the [Hearers' Vehicle] sūtras
But were explained in the Great Vehicle.
Hence the wise should accept it [as Buddha's word].

[These stanzas] were set forth to clear away the wrong idea that one can progress to Buddhahood through just the paths explained in the scriptural division of the Hearers, and, therefore, the Great Vehicle is not needed.

[Chandrakīrti] is saying that according to you [Bhāvaviveka, Nāgārjuna] should have said, "Because the selflessness of phenomena is set forth in the Great Vehicle, the explanations in the Lower Vehicle scriptures are not sufficient [for the attainment of Buddhahood]," but [Nāgārjuna] did not

say this but spoke of the other class, that is, the vast [compassionate motivation and deeds of the Great Vehicle].

In the second case [that is, if Bhāvaviveka means that it would be purposeless for the Great Vehicle to teach the selflessness of phenomena because it is taught in the Lower Vehicle], there also is no entailment because the selflessness of phenomena is taught no more than briefly in the scriptural collection of the Hearers, whereas it is taught very extensively from many viewpoints in the Great Vehicle. This also is the assertion of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] because his *Praise of the Supramundane* (611) says:

Because you said that without realizing
Signlessness, liberation[928] does not occur,
You taught it fully
In the Great Vehicle.

The first two lines indicate that without realizing suchness—signlessness—the afflictive emotions cannot be extinguished and, therefore, liberation cannot be attained. The next two lines indicate that the selflessness of phenomena—signlessness—is taught fully, or completely, in the Great Vehicle. Therefore, it is understood that the selflessness of phenomena is not fully taught in the Lower Vehicle.

Question: How does the reason given in [the first two lines of] that stanza explain why the selflessness of phenomena is taught *fully* in the Great Vehicle?

Answer: Those lines must be explained as saying: Since liberation, which is an extinction of the afflictive emotions, cannot be attained without realizing signlessness, the selflessness of phenomena must also be taught in the Hearers' vehicle, and there also must be a difference between the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle concerning this, due to which [the selflessness of phenomena is set forth fully in the Great Vehicle].

The Consequentialists do not assert that all statements of "selflessness" in Lesser Vehicle sūtras must be explained as meaning "naturelessness" because the Consequentialists also assert that in the sūtra passage of the first stage described in the *Questions of King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra*[a] the coarse selflessness is taught.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[929] In Bhāvaviveka's own system,

[a] See 717, footnote a.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

although a self-sufficient self and "mine" do not exist, such appear to exist, and, therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions a passage in a Hearer scriptural collection says:

> Forms are like balls of foam.
> Feelings are like bubbles.
> Discriminations resemble mirages.
> Compositional factors are like banana tree trunks.
> Consciousnesses resemble magical illusions.
> Thus the Sun Friend Buddha said.

The meaning of the five similes is that:

- Form is like foam because of not being able to bear analysis. Just as foam appears like a lump, but when divided individually, it becomes non-existent, so a form appears to be a single mass, but when analyzed by reasoning dividing it into individual parts, the apprehension of a mass is destroyed; therefore, it cannot bear analysis.
- Feeling is like bubbles because, having arisen, they disintegrate and become non-existent. Just as a bubble, at the very moment of arising, disappears, so feeling disintegrates in the second moment of its production and does not exist. Or, just as a bubble has the nature of water, so contaminated feeling has the nature of suffering.
- Discrimination is like a mirage because despite being unreal, it is superimposed. Just as a mirage appears to be water but is not established as that, so discriminations appear to belong to a self-sufficient person but are not established as belonging to a self-sufficient person.
- Compositional factors are like banana trees because of being essenceless. Just as although a banana tree is broken down to its many parts [or layers], a core does not appear, so although compositional factors are analyzed by many enumerations of reasoning, an essence of being a belonging does not appear.
- Consciousness is like a magical illusion because its nature is not apprehendable. Although a magical illusion appears to be a horse, elephant, or the like, but is not established as that, so consciousness appears to be a self-sufficient self, but is not established as that.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[930] As antidotes to the obstructions to omniscience, which are consciousnesses conceiving a self of phenomena, the *Diamond Cutter Sūtra* says:

View compounded phenomena
To be like stars, figments seen with an eye disease,
Butter-lamps, magical illusions,
Dew, bubbles, dreams, lightning, and clouds.

Although all phenomena are ultimately natureless, conventionally all compounded phenomena are like stars and so forth because this passage teaches the characteristics of products by way of explaining their four characteristics—nature, experience of the taste, realization of the faults, and realization of emergence:

1. The nature of products is similar to stars, figments seen with an eye disease, and butter-lamps:
   - Just as stars shine at night but do not exist during the day, compounded phenomena also appear if the darkness of ignorance exists but do not appear in the face of the sunlight of wisdom directly realizing [the emptiness of] all phenomena.
   - Just as figments seen with an eye disease are appearances of what does not exist, so all phenomena appear to be truly established objects in the perspective of the two conceptions of self but do not [truly] exist.
   - Just as butter lamps depend on a wick and oil, the dependent-arisings of consciousness arise and burn in dependence on the wick of karma and the oil of attachment.
2. The characteristic of objects that is the experience of their taste is like a magician's illusion because of being erroneous, or mistaken, appearances.
3. From between the two realizations of faults:
   - The simile for realization that compositional phenomena are impermanent is that they, like dew, do not stay for a long time.
   - As a simile for the realization of the fault of suffering, feelings are, like bubbles, fragile and sufferings.
4. From among the three similes for realizing renunciation:
   - Like remembering a dream later, one realizes all past products as empty of the two selves.
   - Just as lightning cannot be grasped, when one analyzes presently arisen products as to whether they are one or many, they cannot be apprehended, whereby they are realized to be empty of the two selves.
   - Effects, like clouds of future bad situations in seed form to be produced in the sky of the mind, are realized as without

a self of persons and a self of phenomena, unapprehendable upon being analyzed as to whether they are one or many.

In this way through nine similes it is explained how to view the characteristics of compounded phenomena.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[931] According to the system of the Consequence School:

1. The characteristic of nature is delineated by way of three similes—stars, figments seen with an eye disease, and butter-lamps:
   - Stars characterize the nature of a composite of appearance and emptiness. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:[932]

     [Buddha] said that all things have two natures—
     Those found by perceptions of the real and of the false.

     Accordingly, with all things are two natures—a mode of appearance to non-conceptual exalted wisdom and a mode of appearance to conventional conceptuality. The former is the final mode of subsistence, the ultimate, and the latter is the conventional mode of subsistence. The single simile of stars is able to characterize both of those features. Just as during the day stars are not seen, and the pure sky appears, so a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise does not perceive any proliferations of conventionalities and perceives only an emptiness that is an elimination of the object of negation. Just as when darkness covers the night, the constellations of stars shine very clearly, so in the perspective of conventional consciousness conventional phenomena shine in their varieties, and, in particular, to [consciousnesses] imbued with the obstructive covering of ignorance impure mistaken appearances shine in their varieties. The latter must be differentiated into two types—the factually concordant in the perspective of conventional valid cognition and factually discordant, erroneous, mistaken appearances.
   - Figments seen with an eye disease illustrate the nature of emptiness. Appearances of objects that—through the force of the predispositions of ignorance—dawn as being truly established from their own side exist only in the perspective of mistaken awarenesses, but do not exist in fact.

Hence, the simile of figments seen with an eye disease mainly illustrates the emptiness of being established in accordance with such a mode of appearance because Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:[933]

> Whereas there would be an awareness of falling hairs
> even for those without an eye disease,
> That is not the case, whereby those do not exist.

and, accordingly, if [objects] were ultimately established, they themselves would have to be their own final mode of subsistence, in which case they would have to be found at the end of analysis by a rational consciousness examining the mode of subsistence, but they are not established in the perspective of that rational consciousness. This is because it is like, for example, the fact that if the falling hairs seen by one with an eye disease definitely did exist, a person with flawless eyes would have to see them even more clearly, but does not see them, this being due to the falling hairs not being established in fact.

- Butter-lamps illustrate the nature of appearance. Just as although a butter flame does not naturally dwell in a butter-lamp cup, it is undeniable that when many factors such as butter, a wick, and so forth aggregate, a butter-flame arises, so due to the aggregation of various causes and conditions such as karma, afflictive emotions, and so forth all of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, such as birth in cyclic existence and so forth, arise.

2. The characteristic of experiencing the taste is indicated by the simile of a magician's illusions because just as, for example, when a magician makes mere pebbles or sticks appear as various attractive and unattractive things, various [reactions] such as attachment, fear, and so forth are generated, but no help or harm occurs in fact, so while sentient beings' oppression by the sufferings of cyclic existence is not established by way of its own factual nature, due to being polluted by ignorance conceiving true existence desire and hatred are generated, causing experience of suffering. Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas"* says:

> To be like a magician's illusion is to not be non-deceptive because things that abide in one way appear in another way.

Using a dog running after a stone or a closed, empty fist shown to a child as examples of being led into manufacturing various hopes and fears, the meaning is that one should reverse attachment without being led into experiencing the taste [of suffering].

3. The characteristic of faults is twofold—the way to view faultiness in terms of impermanence and the way to view faultiness in terms of suffering.
   - The former is indicated by the simile of dew. Just as a tiny drop of dew at the tip of a blade of grass—which dries at the very moment of mere slight conditions such as being hit by sunlight and so forth—has a nature of extreme instability, so all compounded things have an inner nature of disintegrating from their very establishment without depending on later causes, due to which they are not at all reliable. In consideration of this, the [Perfection of Wisdom] Sūtras and Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* speak of impermanence as "the aspect of non-being"[a] and "the aspect of non-existence,"[b] and say, "Finally, the meaning of impermanence is the meaning of non-existence," and so forth.
   - Faultiness in terms of suffering is indicated by the simile of water bubbles. Just as when bubbles come forth, they have a nature of water and also when they disappear, they go as having a nature of water, so with respect to contaminated feelings, it is as a sūtra says, "All whatsoever feelings here are sufferings," and thus (1) feelings of pain arise in the aspect of suffering from their very inception, (2) contaminated pleasures turn into aspects of suffering when they cease, whereby they are called sufferings of change, and (3) neutral feelings serve as the basis of all suffering, whereby they are called the "pervasive suffering of conditioning." Although in the perspective of childish thought all three of those have differences of pleasure and pain, better and worse, in the perspective of Superior persons they do not have the slightest nature of pleasure and do not pass beyond suffering, like the saying, "At the tip of the needle of cyclic existence, there is never any pleasure," whereby they

[a] *ma mchis pa'i rnam pa.*

[b] *med pa'i rnam pa.*

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are called "true sufferings for Superiors."

4. With respect to the characteristic of renunciation there are three modes of meditation of past things, present things, and future things as without inherent existence.
   - The mode of meditation on past things as without inherent existence is characterized by the simile of dreams…Just as desire and so forth are generated from remembering things dreamed in a dream, but it is manifestly established that those dream objects do not exist at that time, so the effects of past actions are experiencable, but those actions do not have to be established by way of their own nature…
   - The mode of meditation on present things as without inherent existence is characterized by the simile of lightning. Just as—without it being identifiable that initially it arose from here, in-between remained here, and finally went there—lightning appears for just a moment in a white flash and immediately goes, so present things also, aside from being mere factors of appearance of the mind, are not found though sought from whatsoever approach—whether by way of action, agent, or object, whether by way of cause, effect, or entity, and so forth. Like the instability of lightning, the target of apprehension disappears from just seeking the object imputed with a rational consciousness.
   - The mode of meditation on future things as without inherent existence is characterized by the simile of clouds. Just as though the immaculate sky does not have the capacity of rain and so forth, but rain falls from clouds accumulating in the sky, and those rains can continuously issue forth effects such as ripened crops and so forth, so from the accumulation of many predispositions of actions and afflictive emotions and predispositions of assumptions of bad sitations in the naturally luminous mind, various fruitional effects are suitable to arise in the future. Those, moreover, are only imputed by conceptuality, whereas if those future things were ultimately established, all effects would have to dwell in their causes, as in the Sāṃkhya assertion of a non-manifest shoot [existing in its seed], due to which it would [absurdly] follow that all effects that depend on clouds such as crops, cooked food, and so forth would have to exist even in clouds. Though conventional cause and effect do not have to meet each other, in the

> context of ultimately existent cause and effect object and agent must meet. Hence through the statement here that future effects are produced by maturation it should be understood that those future things are not ultimately established.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Just as fear in apprehending a coiled rope as a snake can be cleared away by an awareness apprehending "That is not a snake; it is a vine,"[a] afflictive obscuration can be overcome by directly realizing the selflessness of persons and thereupon meditating on it. Hence, liberation from cyclic existence upon abandoning afflictive emotions as well as their seeds does not necessarily require realizing the selflessness of phenomena, the final mode of subsistence of phenomena.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[934]

> *Objection by a Proponent of True Existence:* [According to you, Bhāvaviveka,] this selflessness of persons is not the mode of subsistence; moreover, if meditation of a path is not cultivated from the viewpoint of its being ultimately established, then it must be a false meditation, in which case this would be like apprehending a tree stump as a person. Therefore, how could it feasibly overcome afflictive emotions?
>
> *Answer:* Those fallacies do not exist because mistake can be cleared away even by falsity:
>
> - By telling a person—who is afraid because of mistaking a speckled rope to be a snake—that it is not a snake and is not a rope but is a coiled thin vine, the person apprehends it to be a vine, and even through this the apprehension of the rope as a snake and the fear are removed.
> - Similarly, being mistaken with respect to the mode of subsistence of forms and so forth, attachment arises through bad views and bad conceptions, like apprehending [a rope as] a snake. Then, for the time being, when the correct view realizing the selflessness of persons is generated, like apprehending [the rope] to be a vine and not a snake, the afflictive emotions are overcome, like apprehending the rope to be a vine, even though it is not the mode of subsistence.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[935] Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* (646, 650)says:[936]

> [You propound] that when selflessness is realized

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[a] *lcug ma;* a creeper.

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One abandons [only] the permanent self,[a] [but] it is not asserted

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[a] Chandrakīrti's criticism of other Buddhist schools for holding that realization of the selflessness of persons is concerned only with the non-existence of a permanent self *appears* to be misguided, since, as we have seen, those schools hold that the innate conception of the person as substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient must be overcome in order to achieve liberation from cyclic existence. In *Tantra in Tibet* the Fourteenth Dalai Lama addresses a similar seeming blunder by Ḏzong-ka-ḇa (93):

> The Sūtra School, the Kashmiri Great Exposition School, the Great Exposition School, Mind-Only School, and Middle Way [Autonomy School wrongly] hold that Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not realize that a person, even though empty of inherent existence in the sense of lacking establishment by way of its own character, appears like a magician's illusion to exist inherently. They [wrongly] say that a realization of the selflessness of persons involves realization that persons do not have a substantially existent entity *such as is imputed by non-Buddhists.*

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's statement is problematic since those systems, according to the many traditions of scholarship following Ḏzong-ka-ḇa, do not accept that in order to achieve liberation from cyclic existence it is sufficient to realize and become accustomed to the non-existence of self as such is imputed by non-Buddhists. Rather, a subtler conception of substantial existence that exists *innately* in beings must be overcome. The Dalai Lama (*Tantra in Tibet,* 40-41) speaks to this apparent deficiency in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's explanation:

> When he describes the type of selflessness that they realize, he says that they do not realize that the person is empty of establishment by way of its own character but realize that the person is empty of a substantial existence *as is imputed by non-Buddhists.* He seems to be saying that according to the Great Exposition and Sūtra Schools of tenets themselves, one need only realize that a person is empty of being a permanent, partless, independent entity. However, we have to say that the Autonomy School, Mind-Only School, Sūtra School, and Great Exposition School do not assert that realization of a person's emptiness of being permanent, partless, and independent opposes the *innate* misconception of self. In their own systems the conception of the person as permanent, partless, and independent is only artificial, intellectually acquired, not innate…Ḏzong-ka-ḇa here and in other places seems to say that in the lower systems themselves the subtle selflessness of the person is described as a person's not being permanent, partless, and independent.
>
> Many scholars say that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's reference is to the implications of the lower systems as seen from the viewpoint of the Consequence School. This means that when Consequentialists consider the reasons proving selflessness that are set forth in the lower systems, they find that the person's inherent existence, or establishment by way of its own character, is taken for granted and that their reasoning for refuting self has the ability only to refute the existence of a person that has a character different from the character of mind and body.

The Dalai Lama reports that many scholars explain away the problem by asserting that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa is speaking not about the actual explicit assertions of those schools but about the implications of their assertions *as viewed by the Consequence School.* For Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's statement of this, see 650.

As the base of the conception of self. Hence, it is amazing to propound
That through knowing [such] selflessness the view of self is eradicated.

That while seeing a snake living in a hole in a wall of your house,
Your fears can be removed and the fright of a snake abandoned
By [someone's saying] "There is no elephant here,"
Is, alas, laughable to others!

In this way, Consequentialists refute [the Autonomists' assertions that liberation from cyclic existence is attained through realizing and accustoming only to the selflessness of persons]:

It follows with respect to the subject, the selflessness of a substantially existent self-sufficient person, that abandoning afflictive emotions as well as their seeds through meditating on it is not feasible because it is not the final mode of subsistence of phenomena, since whereas it is the case that transmigrating beings travel in cyclic existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena, it is senseless to assert that—without meditating on the non-existence of its conceived object—cyclic existence is overcome through [merely] meditating on the selflessness of substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficient.

The Autonomy School responds:

It is indeed true that transmigrating beings travel in cyclic existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena and that the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of subsistence of phenomena, but it is not necessary to meditate on the selflessness of phenomena to be liberated from cyclic existence because, just as although a vine is not the mode of subsistence of a rope, fear from apprehending a rope as a snake can be removed by someone indicating "This is a coiled vine," so it is not contradictory that although the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of subsistence of phenomena, through meditating on it for the time being cyclic existence as well as its causes can be abandoned.

Also, Proponents of True Existence say:

It [absurdly] follows that reversal of afflictive emotions through meditative cultivation of the path is not feasible because [according to you] the path is not truly established, since it is a

falsity, like apprehending a tree stump as a person.

The Autonomy School responds:

It is not contradictory that although the path is a falsity, afflictive emotions are abandoned through meditative cultivation of it because although the statement, "A speckled rope is a coiled vine," is a false utterance, it is not contradictory that fear from apprehending a rope as a snake can be removed by someone indicating such and because this is like the fact that when persons suffer from mistakenly thinking they have eaten poison, a doctor skilled in technique [can] through giving medicine causing vomiting relieve this suffering—which is due to being deceived—as it would if poison [actually] were expelled.

d How the Non-Existence of External Objects is Refuted with Scripture and Reasoning in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

It is said that external objects do not exist ultimately. Saying that the sole mind is the abodes, bodies, and so forth is with respect to the aspects. The term "mind-only" refutes an agent; therefore, the non-existence of apprehended objects is not the meaning of sūtra. Sense consciousnesses are aspected. Apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are cause and effect sequentially. Aggregations of the separate—an army and so forth—are imputedly existent. Composites of particles of concordant type also are substantially existent. Even each is suitable as an observed-object-condition. The appearance of a double moon in dependence upon a single moon would not be produced if external objects did not exist, and it would be a deprecation. Because there is no appearance of an object, self-cognition of an object-possessor is not.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:[937]

[Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived.
The mind appearing variously
As like bodies [senses], enjoyments [objects of senses], and abodes
[physical sense organs and environments],
I describe as mind-only.

The statement that "[Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived" says that external objects do not exist *ultimately*. Then the statement that the sole mind becomes abodes, bodies, and so forth says that the mind is generated altered by the aspects of those objects, like a shadow. The term "mind-only" in the statement "I describe as mind-only," and the statement

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[in the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*][938] that "These three realms are mind-only" refute an agent accumulating karma and an experiencer of fruitions that are other that the mind; therefore, the non-existence of external apprehended objects is not the meaning of [any] sūtra.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[939] With respect to the meaning of the statement in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra:*

> In dependence upon observation
> Non-observation is thoroughly generated.
> In dependence upon non-observation,
> Non-observation is thoroughly generated.

Proponents of Mind-Only assert that:

- In dependence upon observation of internal mind-only, an awareness is generated realizing that external objects of apprehension are non-observable.
- In dependence upon that [non-observation of external objects], an awareness is generated realizing that a non-mistaken apprehending consciousness to which external objects appear is unobservable.

In response to this, Bhāvaviveka asserts that the non-observation to be cultivated is different [from the Mind-Only School's assertion] because it is the emptiness of true existence of forms and so forth…

[Bhāvaviveka][940] analyzes the statement by a Proponent of True Existence [that is, a Proponent of Mind-Only]:

> These three realms are mind-only because of being empty of external objects such as forms and so forth, as is the case, for example, with a dream consciousness and so forth.

His *Blaze of Reasoning* explains the although objects imagined[a] in dreams, such as persons, do not exist, a non-imagined object that is the factor being observed exists,[b] due to which the example is not established. His meaning is that although an elephant in a dream is not established as an elephant, it is a form that is [included within] the phenomenon-sense-sphere,[c] due to which a dream consciousness is not established as an example for the arising of a consciousness without an external object. D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:…

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[a] *sgro gtags pa;* I often translate this as "superimposed."

[b] This is because for Bhāvaviveka a dream form is classified as a form, not of any of the five sense consciousnesses, but a form included among objects of the mental consciousness, called a form that is a phenomenon-sense-sphere.

[c] *chos kyi skye mched pa'i gzugs.*

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When the master Bhāvaviveka answers that the example is not established, he is propounding that since there exists in a dream something that is apprehended by the mental consciousness—that is, a form included in the phenomena-sense-sphere—a consciousness without an object does not exist…

A dream consciousness is not without an object of observation, and since a dream does not exist as [its own] reality, or ultimately, it is not suitable as an example for an ultimately existent consciousness without an external object [as the Proponents of Mind-Only claim].

Word Commentary on Root Text: Sense consciousnesses possess the aspect of the object. Apprehended-objects such as forms and so forth and apprehending-subjects such as eye consciousnesses, ear consciousnesses, and so forth are cause and effect, and hence are established sequentially.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[941] Forms and so forth—which are the observed-object-conditions of the five sense consciousnesses—and the five sense consciousnesses having the aspects of those are established as apprehended-object and apprehending-subject [that are different substantial entities] and must also be asserted as cause and effect.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Aggregations of separate objects having discordant types—that are designated as armies, forests, and so forth—are aggregations[a] and are imputedly existent. Individual particles and also composites[b] of many particles of concordant type that depend on a single basis are substantially existent. Even each minute particle of a composite is suitable to be an observed-object-condition of a sense consciousness.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[942] Proponents of Mind-Only set forth a thesis saying that whether the Proponents of External Objects assert that separate individual minute particles are objects of operation of a sense consciousness or that an aggregate of many subtle particles is the object of operation of a sense consciousness, when these are thoroughly analyzed with reasoning, neither is reasonable. They then refute [the two positions]:

1. If you say that separate minute particles are objects of operation of a sense consciousness…then the subject, a minute particle of form, is not an object of operation of an eye consciousness apprehending form because it does not appear to an eye consciousness apprehending form, as is the case, for example,

[a] *'dus pa.*

[b] *bsags pa.*

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with a physical sense power.

2. If you say that a composite of many particles is the object of engagement of a sense consciousness,…then the subject, a composite of many particles, is not the object of operation of an eye consciousness apprehending form because of not being substantially existent, as is the case, for example, with a double moon.

The master Bhāvaviveka responds:…If you are proving that separate minute particles are not objects of operation of a sense consciousness, you incur the fallacy of proving [to me] what is already established [for me, since I agree with you]. If you are proving that a composite, or collection, of many particles of similar type that depend on a single basis are not objects of operation of a sense consciousness because of not being substantially existent, you incur the fault of the reason not being established because we assert that such a composite is substantially existent, since an aggregation[a] is imputedly existent but a composite[b] is substantially existent. For there is a difference between an aggregation and a composite, because as the *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

> *Question:* What is the difference between a composite and an aggregation?
>
> *Answer:* Subtle particles of similar type that depend on a single basis [such as a pot] are called a collection[c] [or composite]. An aggregation of different bases that are different types of substantial entities—such as elephants, horses, and so forth that are imputed as an army and such as barberry trees, acacia trees, and so forth that are imputed as a forest, and so forth—are called aggregations…

The inference:

> Whatever is a cause of an awareness to which [that cause] appears is necessarily an object of observation of that awareness, just as, for example, a composite such as a woman's form and so forth is an object of observation of desire; a composite of many minute particles also is a cause of an awareness to which it appears.[d]

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[a] *'dus pa.*

[b] *bsags pa.*

[c] *tshogs pa.*

[d] This is a formal proof statement (*sgrub ngag*), composed of two elements:

- the pervasion, or entailment, along with an example (the major premise)

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damages your thesis that a composite of particles is not an object of operation of a sense consciousness. Your thesis also contradicts scripture, such as the sūtra saying, "The grounds[a] and objects of observation of the five collections of consciousness are composites."

Word Commentary on Root Text: The appearance of a double moon in dependence upon a single moon—that is, with a single moon serving as the basis of appearance—and so forth would not be produced if external objects did not exist, and [the absence of external objects] would be a deprecation explicitly of two thirds of the eighteen constituents and implicitly of all objects of knowledge.

Because there is no appearance of a separate object, self-cognition experiencing a subject, that is, a consciousness, is not a consciousness.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[943] Those who assert self-cognizing consciousness say:

Consciousness has two natures[b] called "appearing as itself" and "appearing as an object" because of abiding as its own nature and because of being generated as like another, like a crystal. For example, a crystal's nature is pellucid and clear, but from being placed near something blue or the like, it is suitable to display an appearance of blue and so on. Similarly, with respect to consciousness, there are two [natures], a clear nature that is its appearance as itself and a nature that is its appearance as an object, which is its being generated in the aspect of the object.

The master Bhāvaviveka responds that this mode of assertion is not correct because the example and the exemplified do not accord, because:

- The vivid blue appearance—when a crystal jewel meets with blue—is a reflection; it is not an aspect of the crystal, whereas a consciousness generated like the aspect of an object is a consciousness, and, therefore, the example and the exemplified do not accord.
- When the crystal is separated from blue, it appears pellucid and clear, but when a consciousness is separated from objects, there is nothing left over that is a pellucid and clear entity, since a consciousness devoid of the aspect of an object of knowledge does not occur, and, therefore, the example and the

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- the presence of the reason in the subject (the minor premise).

The thesis, or conclusion, is unstated.

a *gnas.*

b *ngo bo.*

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exemplified do not accord.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[944] Also, Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says, "Self-cognizing consciousness is not consciousness," and his *Autocommentary* on that says, "Consciousness does not know itself because of lacking perceiving itself."…

Although the great master Bhāvaviveka had a great many followers, Jñānagarbha's mode of explanation accords with Bhāvaviveka's. Jñānagarbha asserts establishment by way of its own character because he asserts that [phenomena] are able to perform functions in the way that they appear to sense consciousnesses. His *Two Truths* (see 759) says:[945]

Though similar in appearing, there are those
Able and not able to perform functions as they appear,
Whereby a division of real and unreal
Conventionalities is made.

Similarly, Shāntarakṣhita, Āryavimuktasena, Haribhadra, Abhayākaragupta, Kamalashīla, Jetāri, Shrīgupta, Bodhibhadra, Avalokitavrata, and so forth also assert establishment by way of its own character, establishment from its own side, and intrinsic establishment[a] because they affix either ultimately established, established [as its own] reality,[b] or truly established to their refutations of these.

2* The Sūtra Middle Way School's Own System {6}

This section has six parts: identification of the object of negation; reasonings refuting the object of negation; presentation of the two truths, the bases delineated by reasoning; valid cognitions ascertaining the two truths; the features of the time of attaining the fruit and the entities of the fruit; and features of the paths, the means for attaining those fruits.

a Identification of the Object of Negation in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

Whatever truly exists must exist in the perspective of reasoning because of being truly established. But what exists for that is not necessarily truly established, like the noumenon. Although there are objects found by a rational consciousness, what is able to bear analysis by it must

[a] *ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa.*

[b] *yang dag par grub pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

stand to be truly established because true establishment is being analyzed. Establishment as bearing analysis by a rational consciousness is true establishment, the object of negation here.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[946] Identification of the object of negation is extremely important because unless the generality of the object of negation—true establishment—and the way it is conceived by a consciousness conceiving true establishment appear well [to your mind], you might utter many term-generalities such as, "True establishment does not occur, and establishment in the manner of the conceived object of a consciousness conceiving true establishment does not occur," and "If [phenomena] were established that way, there is such-and-such damage, and the proofs of non-establishment are such-and-such," but you would not have understood the meaning well.

Question: Therefore, [what are] the true establishment, establishment as [its own] reality, and ultimate establishment—which are other than establishment from its own side, inherent establishment, intrinsic establishment, and establishment by way of its own character—that are refuted?

Answer: D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[947]

> Anything clearer than that [identification of the object of negation in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning*][a] is not set forth in the scope of the texts by this master [Bhāvaviveka]. Also, a *clear explicit statement*[b] does not appear in the scope[c] of the master Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* and Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle* as well as his own commentary.

[D̄zong-ka-b̄a is saying:] The measure of the object of negation is not explained clearly in those texts, in Kamalashīla's three *Stages of Meditation,* the Lesser Bhāvaviveka's and Luipāda's two *Nine Modes of the Perfections,* in texts by Jetāri, Bodhibhadra, Āryavimuktasena, and Haribhadra, in texts by Maitripāda, and so forth, but that which I manifestly established is as follows. Although there are no others that are clear in that way [that is, as

[a] This will discussed below.

[b] *gsal bar* ***dngos su gsungs pa*** (Taipei, 501.19); Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a has substituted "clear explicit statement" for D̄zong-ka-b̄a's own "clear identification" (*gsal bar* ***ngos bzung ba;*** Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 126.10) in his quotation, most likely in order to draw out the significance of the word "clear." Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's point is that identifications of the object of negation can be ferreted out of those texts.

[c] "Scope" (*skor*) includes Jñānagarbha's own commentary.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

explicit statements, the way that artificial and innate consciousnesses misconceive true existence can be implicitly understood].[a]

1. In dependence on the way [the term] ultimate is analyzed in Bhāvaviveka and in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle,* [it can be implicitly understood that] what is able to bear analysis by a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate is, hypothetically,[b] true establishment and so forth [as conceived by an artificial consciousness conceiving true establishment and so forth].
2. A mode of abiding not established as posited by the force of conventional valid cognition is, hypothetically, true establishment and so forth [as conceived by an innate consciousness conceiving true establishment and so forth]:
   - because these assert, in accordance with [the earlier] explanation of autonomy (697), that [phenomena] are established in accordance with how they appear to sense direct valid cognitions not affected by superficial causes of error,[c] and
   - because they assert that the establishment [of those phenomena] in accordance with how they are apprehended by direct valid cognition is not damaged by valid cognition.

   This is because:
   - through the statement in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle:*[948]

     > Moreover, that [consciousness conceiving true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] an inherent nature in reality.

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[a] Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought,* his last word on this topic, says:

> Other reliable sourcebooks of the Autonomy School do not have a clear identification of the object of negation [of an innate consciousness conceiving true existence],* but the existence that is the opposite of the mode of conventional existence described in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* is to be known as ultimate or true existence, and, therefore, let us explain this.

* Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry* (codex edition, 458.16) which is based on Dzong-ka-ba's own clarification that here he is speaking of the way an innate wrong consciousness conceives true existence.

[b] *brtag pa mtha' bzung,* literally, holding an extreme [for the sake of] analysis. Jam-yang-shay-ba adds this qualification because true establishment does not exist.

[c] For identification of the four superficial causes of mistake, see 406, footnote b.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

it can be understood how an awareness—mistaking true existence although there is no true existence—arises by the power of innate ignorance, and

- through the explanation in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* that the mode of appearance to those [consciousnesses] is conventionally established:

  Therefore, all entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [sentient beings' non-defective] thoughts [that is to say, conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses unaffected by the conception of true existence]—are said "only to exist conventionally."

  it can be implicitly understood that what is not posited by the power of the thought of those [conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses] is ultimately established.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[949] With respect to how to identify the innate conception of true existence and the object of negation in the system of the Autonomy School, Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:[950]

> A mistaken awareness that superimposes—on things that in reality [or ultimately] are natureless—an aspect opposite to that [naturelessness] is called an "obscurer" (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) because it obstructs [itself] from [perception of] suchness or because it veils [other awarenesses] from perception of suchness. [The *Descent into Laṅkā] Sūtra* also says:[951]
>
> > The production of things [exists] conventionally (*kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā*);
> > Ultimately it lacks inherent existence.
> > That [consciousness] which is mistaken regarding the lack of inherent existence
> > Is asserted as the obscurer of reality (*yang dag kun rdzob, satyaṃ saṃvṛti*).
>
> Because of arising[a] from that [consciousness conceiving true existence], all false things that are seen displayed by that [consciousness conceiving true existence as if they are truly

[a] I take it that what arises from a consciousness conceiving true existence is not the false things themselves but the display, or appearance, of them as truly existent. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den offers a much more complicated possibility, "an artificial awareness in the continuum of a Proponent of True Existence," which strikes me as excessively complicated.

> established] are called "just conventionalities."[a] Moreover, that [consciousness conceiving true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] an inherent nature in reality. Therefore, all entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [sentient beings' non-defective] thoughts [that is to say, conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses unaffected by the conception of true existence]—are said "only to exist conventionally."

Regarding the meaning of this, the subject, an innate consciousness conceiving true existence, which conceives that phenomena ultimately exist inherently whereas they do not, is called an "obscurer" (*kun rdzob*, *saṃvṛti*) or obstructor (*sgrib byed*) because a consciousness conceiving true existence, like an eye obstructed by an eye disease, obstructs itself from seeing suchness [or] this consciousness conceiving true existence veils other awarenesses from seeing suchness, like covering something with a cloth. This is because the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

> The production of things [exists] conventionally (*kun rdzob tu*, *saṃvṛtyā*);
> Ultimately it lacks inherent existence.
> That [consciousness] which is mistaken regarding the lack of inherent existence
> Is asserted as the obscurer of reality (*yang dag kun rdzob*, *satyaṃ saṃvṛti*).[b]

[That the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says this] entails [that a consciousness conceiving true existence, like an eye obstructed by an eye disease, obstructs itself from seeing suchness (or) this consciousness conceiving true existence veils other awarenesses from seeing suchness, like covering something with a cloth] because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* on the occasion of explaining the meaning of this sūtra passage says:[c]

> That is the meaning of the statement in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* that an awareness making the mistake that what ultimately lacks inherent existence exists inherently is obscurational. Since the Sanskrit original for "obscurer" (*kun rdzob*,

[a] *kun rdzob pa kho na.*

[b] This stanza is quoted also at 607.

[c] Commenting on Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"* VI.28.

saṃvṛti) [does not just mean "convention" but] is also used for "obstructor" (*sgrib byed*), this obscurer (*kun rdzob*, *saṃvṛti*) [in the final line] is an obstructor. What does it obstruct? Since [the sūtra] says that it is "the obscurer of reality (*yang dag kun rdzob*, *satyaṃ saṃvṛti*)," it says that since it obstructs [perception of] the meaning of reality, it is asserted as an obscurer, or obstructor. It is not indicating that it is a right conventionality (*yang dag kun rdzob, tathya-saṃvṛti*) from between the two [categories of conventionalities], right and wrong [conventionalities].[a]

The [*kun rdzob* (*saṃvṛti*) translated as] "conventionally" indicated in the first line and the [*kun rdzob* (*saṃvṛti*) translated as] "obscurer" indicated in the last line should not be construed to be identical. For the first is the conventional way in which oneself asserts things to be produced and so forth, whereas the latter is the obscurer—[a consciousness] conceiving true existence—for which things are true [that is, a consciousness taking things to truly exist].

Since an artificial awareness in the continuum of a Proponent of True Existence arises from that consciousness conceiving true existence, all false things such as forms and so forth—which are the observed objects of such an artificial awareness that sees them displayed by that consciousness conceiving true existence as if they are truly existent—exist only conventionally, not ultimately. Not only does that artificial awareness arise from a consciousness conceiving true existence but also this consciousness conceiving true existence arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error. This consciousness conceiving true existence displays truly established phenomena to all living beings as if they exist, whether their awarenesses are affected by systems of tenets or not, and those living beings also perceive them that way.

Therefore, since it would not be suitable to posit phenomena

[a] Roughly speaking, conventionalities, or conventional phenomena, are of two types—right/real conventionalities (*yang dag kun rdzob*) and unreal/wrong conventionalities (*log pa'i kun rdzob*). Unable to find a single, evocative translation equivalent of *yang dag kun rdzob* that would apply to both consciousnesses and objects, I use "right conventionality" and "wrong conventionality" for consciousnesses and "real conventionality" and "unreal conventionality" for objects. Since the Tibetan for "right conventionality" or "real conventionality" is *yang dag kun rdzob* and the Tibetan for "obscurer of reality" is also *yang dag kun rdzob,* the two can be confused, and thus Ḏzong-ka-ḇa is pointing out that here in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* the term *yang dag kun rdzob* means "obscurer of reality."

as existing through the force of appearing to a consciousness conceiving true existence, existence that is posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness—its factors of appearance and conception not being affected by the force of a consciousness conceiving true existence—is the meaning of existing conventionally. Hence, the object of negation—true existence—does not appear to sense consciousnesses because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* says:[952]

> That which sees the display by a consciousness conceiving true existence as if [objects] are truly established is a conceptual consciousness, not a sense consciousness. For, Jñānagarbha's *Autocommentary on "Differentiation of the Two Truths"* explains that true [existence]—the object of negation—does not appear to sense consciousnesses, and it is the same here [in the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School].

Word Commentary on Root Text: If phenomena are truly established, they must exist in the perspective of a rational consciousness because a rational consciousness analyzes whether or not phenomena are truly established and [according to you] phenomena are truly established. You have asserted the latter reason. However, whatever exists in the perspective of a rational consciousness is not necessarily truly established, as is the case with the noumenon, which exists in the perspective of a rational consciousness but is not truly established. Although there are objects found by a rational consciousness, if something were established as bearing analysis by that rational consciousness, it must stand to be—that is, it would necessarily be—truly established because a rational consciousness analyzes it within considering whether it is truly established or not. Establishment as bearing analysis by a rational consciousness is the measure of true establishment and, in this context, is the measure of establishment as the self of phenomena, the object of negation [in terms of artificial misconception of true establishment].

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[953]

> *Question:* [In *don dam pa* (*paramārtha*)] what is the object (*don, artha*), and what is ultimate (*dam pa, parama*)…?
>
> *Answer:* Here *artha* (*don*) is not like the explanation of *artha* when nirvāṇa is called *paramārtha,* in which *artha* is explained as meaning "goal"[a] (*ched du*) or "purpose" (*dgos pa*) and thus the supreme of purposes (*dgos pa'i mchog*). Rather, here *artha* is taken as "the object that is to be known" (*shes par bya ba'i don*); *artha* is the object to be analyzed (*brtag par bya ba'i don*), or the object to be

[a] Literally "for the sake."

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

thought about (*bsam par bya ba'i don*), or the object to be understood (*go bar bya ba'i don*). The Sanskrit equivalent of *dam pa* is *parama,* which is also used for supreme (*mchog*); therefore, [it means] "supreme."

1. By applying both *artha* and *parama* to the object (*yul*) [from within the object (emptiness) and subject (wisdom)], *paramārtha* means the "supreme object to be known" [namely, emptiness].
2. Also, by taking *artha* similarly [as referring to the object] but taking *parama* as a non-conceptual subject [that is, a non-conceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise], *paramārtha* means the object of the supreme [wisdom] because it is its object. As to the reason why the exalted wisdom is called "ultimate" (*dam pa, parama*), Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

   It is just fitting to use the term "ultimate" (*dam pa, parama*) for that which achieves a great purpose because it causes attainment of special qualities.
3. Also, [by applying both *artha* and *parama* to the subject] even wisdoms of subsequent attainment—that is, wisdoms of hearing, thinking, and meditating realizing emptiness—accord with the ultimate (*dam pa, parama*) exalted wisdom that is the object (*don, artha*) [being sought] by those [wanting to abandon obstructions],[954] whereby wisdoms of hearing, thinking, and meditating that realize emptiness are posited as ultimate objects (*don dam pa, paramārtha*).

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[955] The "ultimate" in "ultimate truth" and the "ultimate" in "not existing ultimately"[a] are not similar because the "ultimate" in "ultimate truth" is like the above [triple] explanation, whereas the "ultimate" in "not existing ultimately" has two types:

1. A conceptual rational consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditating that analyzes suchness is taken as the ultimate, and not existing as able to bear analysis by that conceptual rational consciousness is posited as "not existing ultimately."
2. Existing in an objective mode of subsistence without being

[a] "Not existing ultimately" translates *don dam par med pa, don dam du med pa,* and *don dam par na med pa.* Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* glosses *don dam par na* with *don dam pa nyid du* and *don dam par;* see Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 503.18.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

merely posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness is posited as "existing ultimately," and not existing in that way is posited as "not existing ultimately."

Concerning these:

1. Both the ultimate in the first mode of positing [that is, a conceptual rational consciousness analyzing suchness] and something established in its perspective [namely, emptiness] exist.
2. Both the ultimate of the second mode of positing [that is, existing in an objective mode of subsistence without being merely posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness] and something established as it do not exist.

Moreover, in this way Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

> You need to understand that the qualification "ultimately" is affixed in two ways to the object of negation:
>
> 1. Rational consciousnesses of hearing, thinking, and meditating are taken as the ultimate, and what is not established by them [is not ultimately established].
> 2. Being existent in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of an awareness is posited as being ultimately existent [and not existing this way is posited as not being ultimately established].
>
> The first of these two ultimates [that is, a rational consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditating], as well as something that is established in its perspective [namely, emptiness], exists. However, both the latter ultimate [that is, existence in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of an awareness] and something that exists this way do not occur.

Also, Ke-drup's *Opening of the Eye of the Fortunate* says:

> It is crucial to know that there are two ways of positing the ultimate in "not existing ultimately" on the occasions of both the Consequence School and the Autonomy School.

and so forth.

Whatever is established as the ultimate of the second mode of positing [that is, as existing in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of an awareness] would [hypothetically] be established for the ultimate of the former mode of positing [that is, would be established in the perspective of a conceptual rational consciousness of hearing, thinking, or

meditating that analyze suchness] because whatever truly exists must be established as the final mode of subsistence, and whatever is established as the final mode of subsistence must be found by a rational consciousness examining the final mode of being.

Whatever is established in the perspective of the former ultimate [that is, in the perspective of a conceptual rational consciousness] is not necessarily established as the latter ultimate [as existing in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of an awareness] because having analyzed whether or not something truly exists, a rational consciousness finds non-establishment of true existence, and it does not find true existence.

If these are understood well, you will know that it is not contradictory:

- to say that something is not established in the mode of disposition[a] and is not ultimately established
- and to assert that ultimate truths exist and to propound that ultimate truths are the mode of subsistence and are ultimates.

Due to not distinguishing these, there arose explanations such as:

- The great translator Ngok [L̄o-den-s̄hay-rap],[b] sole eye of the snowy land, said that ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge.
- The lord of reasoning Cha-b̄a Chö-ḡyi-s̄eng-ge[c] asserted that ultimate truths are truly established in the sense of being able to bear analysis by reasoning.
- Dro-lung-b̄a's[d] *Stages of the Teaching* and so forth explain that by way of dividing one awareness by way of conceptually isolatable factors [it can be said that] there is no object of a rational consciousness, but there is an object of an inferential consciousness…

Objection:[956] It follows that your two explanations—that ultimate truth is beyond the objects of activity of awarenesses having dualistic appearance and that not existing in accordance with the

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a *gshis lugs su ma grub pa.*

b *blo ldan shes rab, rngog lo chen po,* 1059-1109.

c *cha pa* (also, *phywa pa*) *chos kyi seng ge,* 1109-1169.

d *gro lung pa blo gros 'byung gnas,* eleventh century, student of Atisha (born 972/982), L̄o-den-s̄hay-rap (1059-1109), Tsül-trim-jung-n̄ay (*tshul khrims 'byung gnas,* 1107-1190), and so forth and famed author of the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Teaching* (*bstan rim chen mo*), which also has a brief version. In his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* D̄zong-ka-b̄a acknowledges his reliance on L̄o-den-s̄hay-rap and Dro-lung-b̄a L̄o-drö-ye-s̄hay-jung-n̄ay.

mode of analysis by a rational consciousness is the meaning of not ultimately existing—are internally contradictory because there would be the fallacy that:

- since the refutation of inherent nature in the sense of true establishment must be an object of letters, that is to say, must be made by terms and conceptual consciousnesses, it would not be possible to refute inherent nature in the sense of true establishment [given that the ultimate is beyond such dualistic consciousnesses], or
- the ultimate truth would be an object of activity of awarenesses having dualistic appearance.

Answer: There is no fallacy because:

- from between the two rational consciousnesses, conceptual and non-conceptual, an awareness having dualistic appearance cannot realize emptiness in accordance with the way it is perceived by a non-conceptual rational consciousness, due to which it is explained that ultimate truth is beyond the objects of activity of awarenesses having dualistic appearance
- and not existing in accordance with the mode of analysis by a conceptual rational consciousness when it properly analyzes within considering the mode of being is the meaning of the thesis "Such-and-such does not ultimately exist."…

The meaning[957] of "not ultimately existing" should not be taken as "not existing *in the perspective of* a conceptual rational consciousness" [but should be taken as "not existing as able to bear analysis by a conceptual rational consciousness analyzing the mode of being"]:[a]

- because otherwise emptiness would be truly established [or ultimately existing, since it exists in the perspective of a conceptual rational consciousness, for it is found, or realized, by a conceptual rational consciousness], and
- because the statement that it is not suitable to affix "non-conceptual rational consciousness" as a qualification in a thesis of "not ultimately existing" [such that the thesis would be "not existing in the perspective of a non-conceptual rational

[a] One might think that since "ultimate" in this context was earlier identified as a conceptual rational consciousness, "not ultimately existing" would mean "not existing for, or in the perspective of, a conceptual rational consciousness," but it does not. Rather, as explained just below after the two reason clauses, it means "not existing as able to bear analysis by a conceptual rational consciousness properly analyzing the mode of being of phenomena."

consciousness"] would not be correct [since emptiness exists in the perspective of a non-conceptual rational consciousness, for it is found, or realized, by a non-conceptual rational consciousness].

[Also, with respect to *don dam par med pa* (translated as "not existing ultimately," but potentially even more ambiguous in Tibetan)] it is not that "conceptual rational consciousness" [which was identified earlier as the ultimate in this context] is in the locative case, as in "There is no lion *in* the valley," and thereupon taking "not existing ultimately" as "not existing *in* a conceptual rational consciousness" because otherwise it would [absurdly] follow that a rational consciousness itself is truly established. Therefore, not ultimately existing means:

> not established as able to bear analysis by a conceptual rational consciousness properly analyzing how the mode of being of phenomena is.[a]

This is because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's Great Exposition of Special Insight says:

> All of these masters agree that the meaning of "not ultimately existing" is to be taken as "not established as existing by a rational consciousness when it properly analyzes what the mode of being is."

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[958]

Question: Is there no difference between that which is able to bear analysis[b] and object found[c]?

Answer: With respect to the subject, a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate, its object found and that which is able to bear its analysis are different because:

- since an explicit object of comprehension by it exists, an object found by it exists, but

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[a] *rigs shes rtog bcas kyis chos rnams kyi yin tshul ji ltar yin tshul bzhin du rnam par dpyad pa'i dpyad bzod du ma grub pa.*

"Ultimately" in "not ultimately existing" is taken to mean "as able to bear analysis by a conceptual rational consciousness properly analyzing the mode of being of phenomena." Therefore, in "ultimately," "ultimate" here means "able to bear analysis by a conceptual rational consciousness properly analyzing the mode of being of phenomena," and "ly" means "as." Thus, "able to bear analysis by a conceptual rational consciousness properly analyzing the mode of being of phenomena" is the object of negation.

[b] *dpyad bzod;* this could also be translated as "that which withstands analysis."

[c] *rnyad don.*

- since, when analyzing, it does not find true establishment, that which is able to bear its analysis does not exist.

It follows with respect to the subject, a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate, that whatever can bear analysis by it must stand to be, or must abide as, truly established because it is a knower analyzing whether true existence exists or not.

That which is able to bear analysis by a rational consciousness, true establishment, and so forth are established here as objects of negation by reasoning.[a]

b Reasonings Refuting the Object of Negation in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

Because a similar example possessing the sign and predicate of the probandum is easier, mostly signs of a negative phenomenon that are observations of a contradictory object are stated. They state, for example: Because of being a physical sense power, an eye sense power does not ultimately see forms, as is the case with an ear sense power; and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because it is easier to prove a similar example possessing the sign and the predicate of the thesis,[b] Bhāvaviveka's root text, *Heart of the Middle,* and autocommentary mostly state syllogisms using signs of a negative phenomenon that are observations of a contradictory object. Let us state an example: Because of being a physical sense power, an eye sense power does not ultimately see forms, as is the case, for example, with an ear sense power.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[959] That this master [Bhāvaviveka] asserts the three types of signs—effect, nature, and non-observation—and so forth in accordance with the lords of reasoning Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is known by way of their expositions when refuting the assertions of our own and others' [schools]. What are the main reasonings used for delineating the absence of true existence? They refute true existence with signs of negative phenomena; except for a few signs, they refute true existence with just observations of contradictory objects. Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of*

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[a] That which is able to bear analysis by a rational consciousness is the object of negation in accordance with artificial misconception; that which exists in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of an awareness is the object of negation in accordance with innate misconception. These are both called "true establishment."

[b] *bsgrub bya'i chos;* also translated as "predicate of the probandum."

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the Middle says:[960]

Here earth and so forth
Are ultimately not entities of elements
Because of being products and
Because of having causes and so forth, like consciousness.[a]

Earth is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being a product, as is the case, for example, with consciousness.…Earth is ultimately not an entity of an element because of having causes, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Similarly, with the subject and predicate the same, the phrase "and so forth" [in "having causes and so forth"] indicates [other] reasons—such as effective thing, object of knowledge, object of expression, and so forth.[b]

Also, construct [syllogisms] as before, within taking the phrase "earth and so forth" as [indicating other] bases of debate, such as water, fire, and wind.[c]

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[a] For J̄ang-ḡya's presentation of this argument, see Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika,* 321-324.

[b] Specifically: Earth is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an effective thing, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Earth is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an object of knowledge, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Earth is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an object of expression, as is the case, for example, with consciousness; and so forth.

[c] Specifically: Water is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being a product, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Water is ultimately not an entity of an element because of having causes, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Water is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an effective thing, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Water is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an object of knowledge, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Water is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an object of expression, as is the case, for example, with consciousness; and so forth.

Fire is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being a product, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Fire is ultimately not an entity of an element because of having causes, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Fire is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an effective thing, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Fire is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an object of knowledge, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Fire is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an object of expression, as is the case, for example, with consciousness; and so forth.

Wind is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being a product, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Wind is ultimately not an entity of an element because of having causes, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Wind is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an effective thing, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Wind is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being an object of knowledge, as is the case, for example, with consciousness. Wind is ultimately not an entity

The way signs and so forth are asserted is like Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition."* Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

> Here "earth and so forth" are the subjects (*chos can, dharmin*); "are ultimately not entities of elements" is the predicate (*chos, dharma*). The combination of the subject and the predicate is the position (*phyogs, pakṣa*); certain ones skilled in reasoning say, "Due to making clarification for others, it is called the 'position.'"

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[961] Here [in "Earth is ultimately not an entity of an element because of being a product, as is the case, for example, with consciousness,"] the statement of a sign—of a negative phenomenon—that is an observation of a contradictory object [that is, "a product,"] is because[962] it is easier to prove a similar example having the sign [that is, "being a product,"] and the predicate [that is, "ultimately not an entity of an element,"] since there are no proponents of Buddhist tenets who assert that consciousness is not a product and also it is not seen that there is any Insider or Outsider [that is, Buddhist or non-Buddhist] who asserts that consciousness is one of the four elements, for even the Ayatas assert that consciousness is a derivative of the elements,[a] but do not assert that it is an entity of an element.[b]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[963] Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

> The demonstration of the forward concomitance[c] in the similar class[d] is:
>
> > Whatever is a product is ultimately not an arisen entity; for example, like a consciousness.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[964] Having explicitly demonstrated a proof statement using a qualitative similarity[e] [between the

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of an element because of being an object of expression, as is the case, for example, with consciousness; and so forth.

[a] *'byung 'gyur.*

[b] *'byung ba'i ngo bo.*

[c] *rjes su 'gro ba;* or "forward entailment/pervasion" (*rjes khyab*).

[d] *mthun pa'i phyogs, sapakṣa.*

[e] *chos mthun sbyor gyi grub ngag.* The syllogism has two members—in this case, the for-

example and the subject:

> Whatever is a product is ultimately not an entity of an element; for example, like a consciousness. Earth is also a product.]

then since not even a mere minute particle of an ultimately established dissimilar class[a] exists, a dissimilar example does not exist, due to which a proof statement using a qualitative dissimilarity[b] [between the example and the subject] is not explicitly[c] indicated.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[965] Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* [refutes the ultimate existence of phenomena with just reasons that are observations of contradictory objects]:[966]

> Earth is not an entity of hardness
> Because of being an element, like wind.
> The function of earth is not to hold together
> Because of being a product, as is the case, for example, with water.

and:

> Form is not apprehended by the eye
> Because of being a derivative of the elements, just as [an eye sense power [does not apprehend] its own form…

and:

> An eye sense power does not
> Ultimately see forms
> Because of being other than minds and mental factors,
> As is the case, for example, with a sense power of taste [that is, a tongue sense power].

and so forth. Whatever are ultimately products and ultimately arisen would have to be similar in hardness, non-hardness, and so forth, and [whatever is] a sense power [would have to be similar in seeing forms and so forth]…because whatever is truly established must be established as the mode of subsistence, and whatever is

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ward entailment together with an example and the presence of the reason in the subject:

> Forward entailment: Whatever is a product is ultimately not an entity of an element; for example, like a consciousness.
>
> Presence of the reason in the subject: Earth is also a product.

The conclusion ("Earth is ultimately not an entity of an element") is not explicitly stated.

[a] *mi mthun pa'i phyogs, vipakṣa.*

[b] *chos mthun mi sbyor gyi grub ngag.*

[c] It seems to me that "explicitly" could be dropped, since it is also not implicitly indicated.

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established as the mode of subsistence must be self-powered, not relying on others, due to which a reason for differentiating them is not found. Drawing parallels within thinking this is a great path system of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva].

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[967] It is as D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[968]

> [Bhāvaviveka] takes as the chief [means to prove the absence of ultimate existence] just those reasonings of parallelism frequently used in the texts of the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva] in which there is a parallel reason. His thought is that:
>
> - if hardness were established ultimately, then, within equally [being] elements, a difference of [earth being] hard and [water, fire, and wind] not being hard would not be feasible, and
> - if [the eyes] were ultimately established as entities viewing forms, then, within equally [being] sense powers, the difference of [the eye sense power] seeing forms and [the ear sense power and so forth] not seeing forms would not be feasible,
>
> because a reason for differentiating them thus is not found. It is thus: If [something] ultimately exists, then it is not posited through the force of the awareness—to which it appears the way it does—but exists through the force of its own objective mode of subsistence, and in that case it would exist under its own power, due to which it would not rely on even anything else. Hence, there is no valid cognition that can make those differentiations [of being hard and not being hard or of seeing and not seeing]. This is like, for example, flinging the consequence that if smoke arose without relying on causes, it would [absurdly] follow that either it would rely upon everything or it would not rely even on fire.
>
> Therefore, if existence from [the object's own] nature were ultimately so, then its own nature would have to abide solitarily in an isolated way, separate from entities of causes and conditions or an aggregation. However, elements and derivatives of elements do not exist without the mutuality of an

aggregation of the eight substances,[a] and minds and mental factors do not exist without their mutual existence, and since all things arise from the collection of their own causes and conditions and, if devoid of those, they do not in the least exist, they are explained as not existing ultimately and not existing substantially.

Furthermore, [Bhāvaviveka's] indicating that there is no entity separate from an aggregation shows his emphasis on indicating that, if [something] exists ultimately, then it must exist solitarily, whereupon he indicates the damage to that. He does not emphasize, as other masters do, refutation upon performing an analysis of one and many with respect to parts and whole.[b]

If you understand well the essentials of the reasonings that the great followers of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] emphasized, this serves to enhance the expansion of your awareness with respect to reasoning; therefore, you should also train well in this system's reasoning in the style of drawing parallels, in which if [phenomena] ultimately exist, their characteristics[c] are parallel.

c Presentation of the Two Truths, the Bases Delineated by Reasoning in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

Among objects of knowledge there are the two truths. "Ultimate" is an uncontaminated awareness; "object" is what is found by that; because of being non-deceptive, it is a "truth." Due to obstructing, it is obscurational, and because of being truths in its perspective, they are other. Because phenomena that are able and unable to function as they appear are conventional truths, obscurational truths are divided into the real and unreal; the first are effective things, and the second are reflections and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[969] Here I will explain the two truths briefly, and on the occasion of the Consequence School, expansively. Although the two truths are very clearly differentiated in sūtra and by the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons, they are difficult to realize, for even some of the great masters of our own schools, such as Dharmapāla and so forth,

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a The eight are earth, water, fire, wind, form, odor, taste, and tangible object.

b *cha can;* literally, "that which possesses the parts" or "parts-possessor."

c *rgyu mtshan.*

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did not realize them. Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says:

> Although the two truths were thoroughly differentiated,
> If even the great charioteers were confused,
> What need is there to speak about others?

and his *Autocommentary* says:

> Although in order to benefit beings of small intelligence the Supramundane Victor differentiated the two truths many times and the master Nāgārjuna and so forth illuminated them, even our own great members are obscured.

and Shāntarakṣhita's *Commentarial Explanation* on that says, "Our own members such as the master Dharmapāla and so forth."

Word Commentary on Root Text: Objects of knowledge, having been taken as the basis of division, are divided into the two, obscurational truths and ultimate truths.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[970] Although there are many superimpositions with respect to the basis of division (see 894), it is to be taken as objects of knowledge because:

- even ultimate truths are objects to be known by an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, in accordance with the commentary to the *Heart of the Middle* which says, "Because the ultimate is an object to be known,"
- and conventionalities are to be known by conventional valid cognition.

Hence, objects of knowledge are limited in number to the two truths because objects of knowledge are divisible into those two, and a third category that is neither of those or a third category that is both is negated, since it is proved by reasoning and scripture that those two are an explicit dichotomy. The sign and entailment are easy [to prove].

Word Commentary on Root Text: In ultimate-object-truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*):

- Ultimate (*dam pa, parama*) is a Superior's uncontaminated awareness of meditative equipoise.
- Object (*don, artha*) is the object found by that uncontaminated awareness.
- It is a truth (*bden pa, satya*) because of being non-deceptive,[a] since its mode of appearance and mode of subsistence agree.

Thereby it is the ultimate-object-truth [or ultimate truth].

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[a] *mi bslu ba.*

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Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[971] With respect to the definition and etymology of ultimate truth:

- An uncontaminated meditative equipoise of a Superior gives rise to the two purposes [that is, the fulfillment of one's own and others' welfare], due to which it is ultimate (*dam pa, parama*). Not only that but also reasoning analyzing the ultimate is ultimate because it accords with the production of that ultimate [that is, it is conducive to production of a Superior's uncontaminated meditative equipoise].
- The object (*don, artha*) found by that [consciousness] in a manner free from the extremes of superimposition and deprecation is called an ultimate-object-truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya*). For it is described as the object of non-conceptual exalted wisdom,…and it is also explained that the object found by an inferential rational consciousness is both ultimate and an object; Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says:[972]

  Non-deceptive reasoning
  Is ultimate.

  and his *Autocommentary* says:

  > That which is ascertained as an object by the power of reasoning will not be deceptive; hence, that which is realized within being generated by a sign having the three modes is ultimate and also is an object, whereby it is an ultimate-object (*don dam, paramārtha*).

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[973] Jñānagarbha's *Autocommentary on the Two Truths* says,[974] "That which is ultimately true is a truth of the ultimate."[a] This is saying that what is non-deceptive in the perspective of a rational consciousness and not just true in the perspective of a mistaken awareness is an ultimate truth. It is not saying that emptiness is ultimately true, since something that is ultimately true is not an established base [that is, does not exist]. For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

[a] *don dam par bden pa ni don dam pa'i bden pa te;* this type of grammar in other contexts usually would be taken to mean "That which is ultimately true is a truth of the ultimate, or ultimate truth," in which case it would be indicating that an ultimate truth ultimately exists, and this indeed is the Jo-nang-b̄a position. However, since it contradicts the basic Ge-luk-b̄a exposition that in the Middle Way School nothing ultimately exists, Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den explains that it means "That which is true in the perspective of the ultimate—that is, in the perspective of a rational consciousness—is an ultimate truth."

> We accept the proposition that "If an ultimate is not true ultimately [that is, for a rational consciousness called the ultimate], then a conventionality is not a truth conventionally [for a conventional valid cognition]."[a] However, to propound [as Döl-b̄o-b̄a S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen does[b]] that "If the ultimate is not established ultimately, then a conventionality is not established conventionally," is to [absurdly] say that if a negative of truth [that is, a negative of true establishment] is not truly established, then the subjects that are the bases of the negation would be truly established. This is because an ultimate truth is posited as just a negative of truth [that is, true establishment] in the subject that is the basis of negation and because the consequence that subjects are not established conventionally suggests that they are not falsely established.[c] Thus, [to propound such] would be even extremely senseless because the bases of negation must be established as false due to the very fact that the subjects—appearances—do not exist as truly established, that is, are not truly established.[d]

Word Commentary on Root Text: In obscurational truth (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*):

- Obscurational [or obscurer] (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) is so called due to obstructing suchness; it is the ignorance conceiving true existence.
- Since conventional phenomena such as forms and so forth are truths in the perspective of that obscurational awareness, they are called obscurational truths, which are other than the ultimate.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[975] The Sanskrit original of obscurational, *saṃvṛti* (*kun rdzob*), is taken here as obstructor (*sgrib byed*), the third [of three usages (see 904). The *Descent into Laṅkā] Sūtra* says:[976]

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[a] *don dam don dam du mi bden na kun rdzob kun rdzob tu mi bden no.*

[b] Döl-b̄o-b̄a's *Ocean of Definitive Meaning* (317.2) says:

> If something is not true conventionally, it is not suitable as an obscurational truth, and hence that which is an obscurational truth is conventionally true and is not ultimately true. Just so, if something is not true ultimately, it is not suitable as an ultimate truth, and hence that which is an ultimate truth is ultimately true and is not conventionally true.

[c] *chos can rnams kun rdzob tu ma grub par 'phen pa ni rdzun par ma grub par 'phen pa.*

[d] *chos can snang ba rnams bden grub tu med pa bden par ma grub pa nyid kyis dgag gzhi rnams brdzun par 'grub dgos pa'i phyir ro.* I take *bden par ma grub pa* as glossing *bden grub tu med pa.*

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That [consciousness] which is mistaken regarding the lack of inherent existence
Is asserted as the obscurer of reality (*yang dag kun rdzob, satyaṃ saṃvṛti*).

and [there is the earlier citation from] Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* (739), and Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says:

That which obstructs reality or that due to which
Reality is obstructed is asserted as obscurational.

Accordingly, since it is an awareness that obstructs, or due to the existence of which the meaning of reality is obstructed, it is obscurational, that is, ignorance. Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says:

Hence all these are truths,
But not truths for the ultimate [consciousness].

Accordingly, they are truths in the perspective of ignorance, but they are not true for the ultimate [consciousness], whereby although obscurational truths are undifferentiable in entity from ultimate truths, they are other than ultimate truths in the sense that they are mutually exclusive in terms of their isolates.

An etymology is set forth in a *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra:*

Subhūti, except for being perverse, not even the measure of a tip of a hair of a true compositional phenomenon exists among childish beings abiding in the world.

Regarding the definition, something is posited as an obscurational truth because of being a non-perverse worldly conventionality—that is, a conventional phenomenon that is an object of the world conventionally—an existent (*yod pa, sat*) object (*don, artha*) perceived.[a]...Here "conventionality"[b] refers to the two, objects and subjects. That is the meaning of many sūtras; the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra* says, "What are obscurational truths? Those imputed with the world's conventions."

The purpose of the two truths is for the sake of accumulating limitless forms of the two collections [of merit and wisdom]. Without conventional truths, ultimate truths cannot be realized,

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[a] *kun rdzob tu 'jig rten gyi tha snyad phyin ci ma log pa ste/ de'i yul tha snyad pa'i chos ni mthong ba'i don yod pas na kun rdzob bden par bzhag;* 507.16.

[b] "Conventionality" (*tha snyad, vyavahāra*) usually is said to be of three types—verbal (*sgra*), mental (*blo*), and physical (*lus*) conventionalities. The first is communication in words; the second is verbal thought; the last is body language, communication through physical signs. All of these are subjects—or, more literally, object-possessors (*yul can*)—and thus Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a makes the point that "conventionalities" in this context are not just subjects but also objects.

and without realizing ultimate truths, the two obstructions cannot be abandoned.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[977] Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom"* says:

Without depending on conventionalities,
One cannot realize the ultimate.
Without realizing the ultimate
One cannot attain nirvāṇa.

Since it is not suitable to explain the meaning of this explanation of the purpose of teaching of the two truths in accordance with the Consequence School, in this context it must be explained that without realizing the ultimate, one cannot attain a nirvāṇa that is an abandonment of the two obstructions [that is, the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience] because when explaining the meaning of the five examples, "Forms are like bubbles," and so forth, Bhāvaviveka clearly says that one does not need to realize the ultimate truth in order to attain a mere nirvāṇa.[a]

Word Commentary on Root Text: Obscurational truths have a division into real and unreal conventionalities because:

- phenomena—renowned in the world as real—that are illustrated by those able to perform a function in accordance with their appearance to the awarenesses to which they clearly appear
- and objects—posited from the viewpoint of being renowned in the world as unreal—that are illustrated by those unable to perform a function in accordance with how they appear

have differences of truth and falsity in accordance with conventions. Illustrations of real obscurational truths are effective things such as forms, sounds, and so on, and illustrations of unreal obscurational truths are reflections and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[978] The divisions of ultimate truths are similar in the Consequence School and the Autonomy School (see 905). There are two ways of dividing obscurational truths.

First Mode of Positing Divisions of Obscurational Truths

The first mode of division is into:

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[a] For Bhāvaviveka, the selflessness of persons is not an ultimate truth; so the ultimate does not have to be realized in order to attain a nirvāṇa that is a mere abandonment of the afflictive obstructions.

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- real obscurational truths—all things produced in dependence [upon causes and conditions], without being imputed as existing when [in fact] they do not exist
- unreal obscurational truths—all mental constructions[a] by the force of tenets such as real production [asserted by the Proponents of True Existence and so forth], the [five] objects [that is, forms and so forth, as asserted] by the Proponents of Mind-Only, the principal [asserted] by the Sāṃkhyas, and the production of sentient beings from the elements [asserted] by the Ayatas.[b]

Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* says:

> Mere dependently produced things
> Devoid of superimposed meanings
> Are to be known as real conventionalities.

and the same text says, "The non-real are superimposed."

Second Mode of Positing Divisions of Obscurational Truths

The second mode of division is into:

- real obscurational truths—phenomena able to perform a function in accordance with their appearance to the awareness to which they clearly appear, such as water, a horse, a sound, and so forth
- unreal obscurational truths—conventional phenomena that are not able to perform a function in accordance with their appearance to the awareness to which they clearly appear, such as a mirage, an illusory horse, and an echo, and so forth.[c]

Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* (see 736) says:[979]

> Though similar in appearing, there are those

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[a] *blos bzos pa.*

[b] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*dbu ma pa, ka,* 79.8) notes that J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets* explains that [those in this second category] are unreal conventionalities (*log pa'i kun rdzob tsam*) but are not unreal obscurational *truths* (*log pa'i kun rdzob bden pa*); however, he indicates that J̄ang-ḡya is mistaken since Jñānagarbha's autocommentary on the *Two Truths* says that these are non-real obscurational truths (*yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rdzob bden pa*). See Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika,* 333. J̄ang-ḡya takes this stance because whatever is an obscurational truth must exist, since the two truths are divisions of objects of knowledge, that is, existents.

[c] A mirror image is a real obscurational truth according to the first mode of division, but an unreal obscurational truth according to the second mode of division. A non-existent such as the principal asserted by the Sāṃkhyas is an unreal obscurational truth according to the first mode of division, but is not included in either of the two truths according to the second mode of division, since it does not exist.

Able and not able to perform functions as they appear,
Whereby a division of real and unreal
Conventionalities is made.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[980] Although similar in appearing to conventional consciousnesses that clearly perceive them, there are two types—those established and those not established in accordance with their mode of appearance—whereby a division is made into real and unreal obscurational truths. Although the explicit reading [of Jñānagarbha's text] is seen to put this together as being able or not being able *to perform a function* in accordance with the mode of appearance, this is a mere illustration with regard to such phenomena as water and a mirage because otherwise it would have to be asserted that uncompounded space is an unreal conventionality [because, being permanent, it cannot perform a function].[a]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[981] Although Yogic Middle Way Autonomists who accord with True Aspectarians [such as Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla, and so forth][982] and Sūtra Middle Way Autonomists [assert that things] are able perform functions *in accordance with their appearance in this way,* [this specification] is not suitable for those who accord with the False Aspectarians [such as Haribhadra, Jetāri, and so forth since they assert that things are not established in accordance with their appearance as gross objects to sense consciousnesses]...

[Concerning other topics:] Bhāvaviveka refutes a mind-basis-of-all. Also, he explains that an afflicted mentality[b] does not exist because he asserts that the fructification [which Proponents of Mind-Only call the mind-basis-of-all] and the I-mind [which Proponents of Mind-Only call the afflicted mentality] and cognition[c] [which Proponents of Mind-Only call a separate mental consciousness] are not three mutually exclusive consciousnesses but are names used for three states of mind.

[a] Uncompounded space is a real obscurational truth even though it does not perform the function of producing anything.

[b] *nyon yid, kliṣṭamanas.*

[c] *rnam par rig pa.*

d Valid Cognitions Ascertaining the Two Truths in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

The two, direct perception and inference; and three and four direct perceptions respectively.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Valid cognitions are twofold, direct perceptions and inferential cognitions. The Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School and Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School differ with respect to direct perceptions; the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School asserts three—sense, mental, and yogic direct perceptions—and the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School asserts four, those three and self-cognizing direct perceptions.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[983] Both Autonomists assert direct valid cognitions and inferential valid cognitions by way of manifest and obscure objects in accordance with Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* and Dharmakīrti's *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition.*

e Features of the Time of Attaining the Fruit and the Entities of the Fruit in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

Those of definite lineage simultaneously extinguish the two obstructions and are completely enlightened. The three bodies, three mysteries, three hundred unshared.

Word Commentary on Root Text: That those definite in the Great Vehicle lineage simultaneously abandon exhaustively the predispositions of the two obstructions and attain enlightenment is the system of the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School. That those definite in the Great Vehicle lineage simultaneously abandon exhaustively the two obstructions and attain enlightenment is the system of the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[984] According to the Yogic Middle Way School, those definite in the Great Vehicle lineage simultaneously abandon the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, as [is explained in] Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge.*
>
> According to Bhāvaviveka and his spiritual sons, those definite in the Great Vehicle lineage, as is explained in the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* (1) abandon—like a Foe Destroyer—the afflictive emotions together with their *seeds* on the eighth ground, and (2) by

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

means of the diamond-like meditative stabilization at the end of [the level called] "momentary application" simultaneously:

- utterly extinguish the two obstructions—the *predispositions* of the afflictive emotions and the final three cycles of consciousnesses conceiving true existence,[a] thereby extinguishing the entirety of predispositions for mistakenness, such as thorough conceptualization[b] and so forth,
- attain enlightenment
- and actualize the four bodies.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Concerning attributes of the fruit there are:

- The three bodies—truth, complete enjoyment, and emanation
- the qualities of the inconceivable mysteries of exalted body, speech, and mind
- a Buddha's three hundred unshared attributes

and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[985]

Objection: Since the holy[c] self asserted by the Forders is nonconceptual, permanent, and immutable, what is the difference between it and the truth body?

Answer: The Forders assert that due to possessing the qualities of subtlety, greatness, and oneness the self is subtle and so forth, and they assert that due to being omnipresent, the self pervades near and far. However, the Truth Body is not subtle and so forth because it does not possess such qualities and because it does not abide in a place.

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a There are nine cycles in three groups:

1. big of the big
2. middling of the big
3. small of the big
4. big of the middling
5. middling of the middling
6. small of the middling
7. big of the small
8. middling of the small
9. small of the small.

b *kun rtog.*

c *dam pa.*

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f Features of the Paths, the Means for Attaining those Fruits in the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School*

The three poisons are the afflictive obstructions. The obstructions to omniscience are the cycles of true existence. The paths of Hearers and Solitary Realizers agree; the differences are by way of time and fruit.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The three poisonous afflictive emotions together with their seeds are the afflictive obstructions. The obstructions to omniscience are the nine cycles of consciousnesses conceiving true existence together with their seeds. The paths—namely, the type of realization [of selflessness][a]—of Hearers and Solitary Realizers agree [in that both meditate on the subtle selflessness of persons]; differences are distinguished by way of different features of attaining the fruit:

- length of time—for instance, three lifetimes [of practice for Hearers at the fastest] and one hundred great eons [at least for Solitary Realizers]
- relying or not relying on the quintessential instructions of another master during the last lifetime
- attaining or nor attaining a similitude of the marks and beauties [of a Buddha's body]
- teaching doctrine to others with or without using sounds

and so forth.

B: EXPLAINING THE SYSTEM OF THE YOGIC MIDDLE WAY SCHOOL {4}

This section has four parts: divisions, assertions on the definitive and the interpretable and the three wheels, reasonings refuting the object of negation, and features of the path and so forth.

1* Divisions of the Yogic Middle Way School {2}

This section has two parts: divisions and individual explanations.

a Divisions*

Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School

The second Autonomists are twofold, those who accord with True Aspectarians and those who accord with False Aspectarians.

[a] "Path" here refers only to the type of realization of selflessness.

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Word Commentary on Root Text: The second Autonomists [the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] are twofold, those who accord with True Aspectarians and those who accord with False Aspectarians.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[986] Having seen Chandrakīrti's commentary in accordance with the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* that after one's continuum is ripened, one enters into the absence of true existence of external objects and then enters into the absence of true existence even of the mind, Shāntarakṣhita [opened the way for the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School].

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[987] Although the master Bhāvaviveka explained that the non-existence of external objects is not the meaning of [any] sūtra, the master Chandrakīrti demonstrated in the root text of his *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* and in his commentary to it that the non-existence of external objects is the meaning of [some] sūtras. His *Supplement* says:[988]

> The Buddha said that when objects of knowledge do not exist,
> The refutation of consciousness is easily found.
> Since when objects of knowledge do not exist, the negation of consciousness is established,
> First objects of knowledge are refuted.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* explains:[989]

> Just as [Buddha] initially connects those who have accumulated merit to discourse on giving and so forth as a method to easily understand the noumenon, so Buddha causes those trainees—who cannot initially realize the full meaning of the profound [emptiness]—to enter by stages into realizing the absence of inherent existence. Buddha said that if the non-existence of external objects of knowledge is taught first to such persons, then subsequently the refutation of inherently established consciousness is easily found. Thus, since the non-existence of objects of knowledge—the negation of external objects—is a method for fully realizing selflessness, the Buddha initially only refutes external objects because those who know the selflessness of external objects[a] easily establish the negation of consciousness, namely, the selflessness of consciousness.

Having seen the explanation in this way, Shāntarakṣhita opened the

[a] "Those who know the selflessness of external objects" glosses Chandrakīrti's "when objects of knowledge do not exist."

way of a Middle Way Autonomy School in which the non-existence of external objects is established as correct.

b Individual Explanations of the Divisions of the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School {2}*

This section has two parts: explaining the True Aspectarian [Yogic] Middle Way School and explaining the False Aspectarian [Yogic] Middle Way School.

1# EXPLAINING THE TRUE ASPECTARIAN [YOGIC] MIDDLE WAY SCHOOL

For the first—Shāntarakṣhita, the father, and his spiritual son—aspects are effective things.

Word Commentary on Root Text: From between those two [that is, those who accord with True Aspectarians and those who accord with False Aspectarians], the first—Shāntarakṣhita, the father, and his spiritual son [Kamalashīla]—assert that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are effective things.[a]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[990] It is as D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[991]
>
> > This system [that is, the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] asserts that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are effective things; they also explain Dharmakīrti's assertion in this way;[b] they are Proponents of the Middle who conventionally make assertions in accordance with True Aspectarians.
>
> For they conventionally assert that since the aspects of appearances as blue and yellow are objects of experience of direct valid cognitions, real conventionalities—established the way they appear—are

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[a] For discussion about True and False Aspectarians in the Mind-Only School, see 311ff. and 416ff.

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, perhaps deliberately, uses the conjunctive *'grel **la*** in place of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's instrumental *'grel **pas*** (Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 119.1), the latter translating as:

> This system [that is, the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] asserts that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are effective things; they also explain Dharmakīrti's assertion in this way; **hence**, they are Proponents of the Middle who conventionally make assertions in accordance with True Aspectarians.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a may be trying to counter the possible misreading that Shāntarakṣhita considers Dharmakīrti to be a Proponent of the Middle; see the next citation from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations.*

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established merely in a relaxed and comfortable way[a] in the perspective of non-analytical and non-investigatory awarenesses.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[992] It can most clearly be proven that the master Shāntarakṣhita accords with True Aspectarians through eight stanzas [in his *Ornament for the Middle*] refuting that aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are non-effective imputations.[b] It is as follows:

False Aspectarian: Sense consciousnesses are not generated in the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth. For example, due to colors being placed near it, though an unaltered crystal remains pure, aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth clearly appear [in it] through the force of the ripening of predispositions for error deposited beginninglessly [in the mind], as is the case, for example, with a lump of clay appearing as horses, elephants, and so forth through the force of mantra and substances.[c] Therefore, the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are non-effective imputations like the falling hairs that appear to someone with an eye disease.

Refutation: There are eight refutations.[993]

1. The consequence that experience of aspects would not be feasible: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth, are not feasibly clearly felt and experienced because of not being effective things. [Not being effective things] entails [not feasibly being clearly felt and experienced] because a consciousness separate from an effective thing that is an aspect—that is, devoid of an aspect—is not observed [that is, does not exist].
2. The consequence that consciousness would not be feasible: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, consciousness, is not feasibly consciousness of an aspect because it does not have an aspect, as is the case, for example, with pain not having pleasure and white not having blue.
3. Explicit experience[d] would not be feasible: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, an aspect, is not feasibly explicitly

[a] *nyams dga' dga' ltar.*

[b] *dngos por med pa'i kun brtags.*

[c] Nawang Lekden explained that the substance is a salve applied to the basis of illusion, which in this case is a lump of clay.

[d] *dngos su myong ba.*

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experienced because of not being the substantial entity of consciousness, as is the case, for example, with a sky-flower.

4. Experience of the imputational[a] is not feasible: It follows that the subject, consciousness, does not experience an aspect upon imputation because an aspect would not have the capacity of generating a consciousness into having [its] aspect, as is the case, for example, with a horse's horn.
5. The consequence of non-relation with consciousness: It [absurdly] follows that it is not feasible that when consciousness experiences, it experiences various aspects because aspects and consciousness are unrelated, since they are not related as one entity[b] and are not in a relation of derivation.[c]
6. Occasional arising would not be feasible: It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, an aspect, that if it does not have causes, [its] occasionally arising[d] is not feasible because of not relying [on causes], and it follows with respect to the subject, an aspect, that if it has causes, it is an other-powered nature because of being produced from causes.
7. The consequence of there only being [consciousnesses having] the aspect of the apprehender [that is, only self-cognizing consciousnesses]: If [consciousnesses having] the aspect of the apprehended [that is, consciousnesses knowing another object] do not exist, then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, consciousnesses, are only [consciousnesses having] the aspect of the apprehender [that is, only self-cognizing consciousnesses] because of being consciousnesses that do not have the aspect of the apprehended. If it is accepted [that consciousnesses are only consciousnesses having the aspect of the apprehender, that is, only self-cognizing consciousnesses], then it [absurdly] follows that [a consciousness having] the aspect of the apprehender [that is, a self-cognizing consciousness], like a pure crystal sphere, devoid of the aspect of the apprehended does not

[a] *brtags myong.*
[b] *bdag gcig 'brel.*
[c] *de byung 'brel;* provenance.
[d] That is, sometimes being produced and sometimes not being produced.

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exist because whereas it would be suitable to observe such, it is not observed.

8. The consequence that [an aspect] is an other-powered nature: If you are saying that although an aspect does not exist in fact, it appears through the force of mistake, then it follows that the subject, an aspect, is an other-powered nature because of relying upon mistake or arising from the force of mistake.

Also, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

> This system [that is, the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] asserts that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are effective things; they also explain Dharmakīrti's assertion in this way; hence, they are Proponents of the Middle who conventionally make assertions in accordance with True Aspectarians.

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa is explaining that by reason of [Shāntarakṣhita's] asserting that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are effective things, he accords with True Aspectarians; Ḏzong-ka-ḇa is not explaining that due to [Shāntarakṣhita's] way of asserting real conventionalities he is established as in accordance with True Aspectarians.

Also, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's saying that "they also explain Dharmakīrti's assertion in this way" explains that [Shāntarakṣhita] comments that [Dharmakīrti's] own system in his *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* is the system of Non-Pluralist Proponents of Mind-Only because in Shāntarakṣhita's own commentary of the *Ornament for the Middle* he quotes a passage from Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*…refuting Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehended-Objects and Apprehending-Subjects. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa is not explaining that [Shāntarakṣhita] comments that [Dharmakīrti's] own system in his *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* is the system of the Middle Way Autonomy School that accords with True Aspectarians because when Shāntarakṣhita in his own commentary on the *Ornament for the Middle* quotes a passage from Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*…and thereupon establishes the lack of being a truly established one or truly established many, Kamalashīla's *Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle"* says:

> This is not explicitly explained because it is an occasion of explaining the mode of Yogic Practitioners in Dharmakīrti's

> *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* and so forth…[Shāntarakṣhita] was thinking that these words of the master [Dharmakīrti] are just suitable in all ways due to the reasoning being shared.[a]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[994] Kamalashīla's three *Stages of Meditation* and *Illumination of the Middle* also explain it this way. Hence, Kamalashīla, Āryavimuktasena, and so forth are Proponents of the Middle who are like True Aspectarians.

2# EXPLAINING THE FALSE ASPECTARIAN [YOGIC] MIDDLE WAY SCHOOL

For the second, including Haribhadra, aspects are non-effective. Jetāri accords with Tainted False Aspectarians. Kambala accords with Untainted False Aspectarians.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The second are the master Haribhadra and so forth who assert that aspects are non-effective. Also, there are two types of those who accord with False Aspectarians, from among which Jetāri and so forth accord with Tainted False Aspectarians, and Kambala—that is, Lwa-ba-b̄a[b]—and so forth accord with Untainted False Aspectarians.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[995] There are three great Middle Way masters who accord with False Aspectarians—the masters Haribhadra, Jetāri, and Lwa-ba-b̄a…Although the master Haribhadra is a great follower of Shāntarakṣhita, he accords with False Aspectarians…If one infers from some passages by this master, it is evident that he asserts that:

- defilements [or taints] do not permeate the nature of the mind as is said in Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* and Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle* which says:

  It is asserted as pure like the purity

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[a] In his *Explanation of Obscurational and Ultimate Truths* (39.6) Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den explains that Shāntarakṣhita takes Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* to be a text of the Middle Way School:

> According to the assertions of Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta, Shāntarakṣhita and his spiritual son [Kamalashīla], Jetāri, and so forth who expound on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* as the system of the Proponents of Non-Nature…

See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 317. Therefore, Kamalashīla's point may be that in the passage cited by Shāntarakṣhita Dharmakīrti is merely presenting the opinion of the Yogic Practitioners. More analysis is needed.

[b] *lwa ba pa.*

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Of the water constituent, gold, and space.

- but the conventional entity of the mind is polluted by defilements just as the entity of water is polluted by dirt.

Hence, he is to be taken as a Proponent of the Middle who makes assertions like Tainted False Aspectarians.

Ḍak-tsang asserts: Since Haribhadra's *Small Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization"* says:

> Once it has been ascertained that "Just this non-dual exalted wisdom is an ultimately existent entity," that [non-dual exalted wisdom] also is a dependent-arising, due to which it is natureless, like an illusion.

Āryavimuktasena, Haribhadra, and so forth assert that an ultimate rational consciousness of meditative equipoise establishes illusion-like [appearance].[a]

Answer: This is very mistaken…For [Haribhadra] refutes that the nature of the mind is an object of non-mistaken meditative equipoise [because, if it were, it would have to be ultimately existent], whereupon he explains that Proponents of True Existence [especially Proponents of Mind-Only] assert that non-dual wisdom is truly established, after which…he explains that by way of the sign of being a dependent-arising this [non-dual wisdom] lacks true existence like an illusion. Hence, is Ḍak-tsang's assertion [that a reasoning consciousness establishes illusion-like appearance] not confusion generating amazement, like what the great translator L̄o-den-s̄hay-rap said?[b]

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[a] For an extensive discussion of the usage of the term "Thoroughly Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle Way School" for Consequentialists and "Reason-Established Illusionists" for Autonomists, see Appendix One in Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1989), 403-440.

[b] Ḍzong-ka-b̄a's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

> [Some earlier Tibetans] also [wrongly] said that from the viewpoint of how they assert the ultimate, Proponents of the Middle are designated as of two types:
>
> - those propounding an establishment of illusion by a rational consciousness, who assert that a combination of the appearances of the subject, such as a shoot, and of its absence of true existence is an ultimate truth
> - those propounding thorough non-abiding, who assert that an affirmative elimination (*yongs gcod*)—an elimination of the proliferations [of thing, non-thing, both, and neither, and so forth] with respect to appearances—is the ultimate truth.
>
> They asserted those propounding an establishment of illusion by a rational consciousness to be the masters Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla, and so forth. Some Indi-

Furthermore, Maitripāda and a couple of others posit the meaning of the name "establishment of illusion by reasoning" as that illusion-like [appearance] is the object of meditative equipoise, but this is not so because it has already been explained (759) that all correct conventionalities are established by reasoning and are logical.[a]

[D̄ak-tsang's] taking the master Buddhajñānapāda to be an Autonomist without distinguishing earlier and later parts of his life is also vain because Buddhajñānapāda held the system of Haribhadra in the early part of his life but in the later part he himself said that he found the great mode of subsistence [that is, he found the Consequentialist view]…

Jetāri in his *Autocommentary to the "Texts of the One-Gone-to-Bliss* quotes a False Aspectarian passage in Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*…and he also says:

> Thus, it is suitable for the intelligent to assert and familiarize with this suchness of the Middle Way—understood from the scriptural sayings of the Supramundane Victor, illuminated by the holy Superior Nāgārjuna [who is] thoroughly certified by valid cognition, and asserted by the holy master Dharmakīrti.[b]

[Jetāri asserts] Taintedness as above (769).

Kambala, which is Lwa-ba-b̄a's name [in Sanskrit],[c] is as D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[996]

> The paṇḍita Sahajavajra explains that Proponents of the Middle who conventionally assert, in accordance with False Aspectarians, that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth do not exist as effective things are as in the exposition by the master Lwa-ba-b̄a.

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ans also accepted the designations, "like illusion" and "thoroughly non-abiding."

The great translator [L̄o-den-s̄hay-rap rightly] says [in his *Letter, Drop of Ambrosia*],* "The positing of the two from the viewpoint of how the ultimate is asserted is an obscured presentation generating amazement."

* *spring yig bdud rtsi'i thigs pa;* see Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness,* 165, 271, 275-276, 405, 667 n. 75, and 740 n. 316.

a *'thad ldan.* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a posits that the actual meaning of the name "establishment of illusion by reasoning" is that "all correct conventionalities are established by reasoning."

b This passage was also cited earlier, 84.

c Both the Sanskrit and the Tibetan mean "one who has a woolen blanket."

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2* Assertions on the Definitive and the Interpretable and the Three Wheels in the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School

The system of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is that the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom* and so forth are of definitive meaning and that those in which "ultimate" is not affixed are similar in being the second wheel but are of interpretable meaning. The mode of the three characters is similar. External objects do not exist. The two meanings—principal and secondary—in the *Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned, Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra,* and so forth are respectively the systems of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[997] Here, regarding how the master Bhāvaviveka and so forth explain the interpretable and the definitive, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[998]

> Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* explains in detail this path system [of the Autonomy School][999]—opened by Bhāvaviveka—in which [Bhāvaviveka][1000] explains that the meaning of the three natures described in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* as commented on by the Yogic Practitioners is not the meaning of [any] sūtra but has a Middle Way meaning. If you understand in detail the mode of commenting on sūtra through these two ways [that is, by the Autonomy School and by the Mind-Only School], you will understand many expressions of reasoning and modes of commentary on the scriptures by great chariots.

If, in accordance with what D̄zong-ka-b̄a says, you understand [the two ways of commenting on the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*], you will discriminate well how the interpretable and the definitive in all the Conqueror's scriptures are differentiated and will discriminate well the boundaries where there is harm and no harm by scripture and reasoning, whereupon you will not be susceptible to being led astray by others with respect to the definitive meaning, and all the scriptures will dawn as practical instructions, and though you comment on the meaning of any Sūtra and Mantra, you will have fearless confidence.

Otherwise, not knowing that the great chariots [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga] made commentary within actually depending on the actual Mañjughoṣha and the actual Maitreya [respectively] and did not depend on others, you will set up your own system, like some

Tibetans, without depending on the great texts; or although depending on them, not training in detail, you will make expositions associating—as was explained earlier—three [roots of] cyclic existence (669), the non-existence of omniscience (526), the non-existence of a system [in the Middle Way School] (523), emptiness of the other (513), and so forth together with quasi-scriptures and quasi-reasonings, like a blind person wanting to put you in a frightful spot. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[1001]

> These two chariot ways [of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga] in which suchness is delineated—upon differentiating the interpretable and the definitive in [Buddha's] scriptures through the ways explained earlier—are extensive in the context of the Perfection Vehicle, but since even the paṇḍitas and adepts who made commentaries on the texts of Secret Mantra do not have a third way other than delineating the meaning of suchness in harmony with either of those two, you should recognize these modes as paths for delineating suchness in all of [Buddha's] scriptures, Sūtra and Mantra. Therefore, seeking suchness without relying on the great chariot ways of these two modes is like a guideless blind person rushing in a direction of fright.
>
> Those who, although they want to rely [on the texts of the great chariots],[1002] do not become familiar with their texts over a long period and, in particular, those who do not know the subtle essentials of their reasonings but, depending on some phrases of scripture differentiating the interpretable and the definitive, find their refuge in mere scriptural [citation] might make a try at talk about suchness but are reduced to having an essence of mere verbiage.

Therefore, the master Bhāvaviveka in the fifth chapter of his *Heart of the Middle*…and in his commentary to that, the *Blaze of Reasoning,* extensively states the system of the Mind-Only School's three natures, eight consciousnesses, and so forth, saying:[1003]

> Other masters of the Great Vehicle itself—Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth—interpreted otherwise the systematic meanings thoroughly realized by Superiors who were prophesied by the One-Gone-Thus and who gained [Bodhisattva] grounds. Without shame and embarrassment, taking pride in knowing the meaning while they did not know it and taking pride in being wise, they propounded the following…Such is the opponent's position generated by the Yogic Practitioners.

Then, he refutes all of those throughout the whole fifth chapter [of the *Heart of the Middle* and *Blaze of Reasoning*]—the Mind-Only School's three characters, mode of explaining the meaning of sūtra, valid cognition, generality-isolates, substantial and imputed [existence], system of meditation, and system of release, and makes a similar explanation also in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom."* Thereby, [Bhāvaviveka] initiated the opening of the way [showing that] the [three] characters of the Proponents of True Existence [that is, Proponents of Mind-Only] are not the intended meaning[a] of the sūtras and that [the three characters] have a Middle Way meaning.

Kamalashīla explained in that way each of those points with scripture and reasoning in detail. His *Illumination of the Middle* lays out a thousand objections by Proponents of Mind-Only:[b]

> With respect to this, some [Proponents of Mind-Only] did not penetrate the depth of the ocean of the profound ultimate…this is the opponent's position.

and he sets forth responses at length to each of these from proving that there is one final vehicle on up, saying, "Therefore, I will give answers to those…" If endowed [with the requisite] intelligence, you should look at those two [Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* and Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle*]. If you analyze [those texts] with this system of analysis by the foremost precious [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa], they are easily understood. Hence, a wise person does not become worn out trying to open a lock without a key.

How do Autonomy School masters differentiate the interpretable and the definitive? Except for a few topics such as the existence or non-existence of external objects, [they do it similarly] as follows. One should rely [on the definitive] in accordance with the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra* which says:

> Rely on the sūtras whose meaning is definitive; do not rely on sūtras whose meaning requires interpretation.

What is of definitive meaning? It must be something that explicitly teaches from the viewpoint of the ultimate because:

- since the ultimate has valid proofs, it is not suitable to be interpreted otherwise [both with regard to literality and with regard to being the mode of subsistence of phenomena]

[a] *dgongs don.*

[b] Notice the literary similarity between this citation and Bhāvaviveka's. (The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's.)

- and there is no valid cognition for the opposite, such as ultimate production and so forth.

Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

> What is taken as having definitive meaning? That which has valid cognition and is explained from the viewpoint of the ultimate because it cannot at all be interpreted separately from that by another. The non-production of all phenomena is established as correct by valid cognition; due to this, since it is reasonable, it is called "ultimate." The *Compendium of Doctrine Sūtra* says:
>
> > Non-production is true. Other phenomena, such as production and so forth, are not true, having the attribute of falsity and deception.

and [Kamalashīla] cites the *Sūtra Setting Forth the Two Truths* which states that there is no difference in cyclic existence and nirvāṇa with respect to the absence of true existence, and says such wishing to refute the Proponents of True Existence [that is, Proponents of Mind-Only] about differentiating the three natures into truly established [other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures] and not truly established [imputational natures].[a] Hence, those [sūtras] explicitly teaching ultimate truths are of definitive meaning, and those, though literal, explicitly teaching conventionalities such as production and so forth require interpretation.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1004] It is [correctly] explained that [Kamalashīla's reference to] "that which has valid cognition" means that [the sūtra] must teach an ultimate that is established by valid cognition and not an ultimate that is the object of negation, like true establishment [as when "established ultimately" means "truly established"], for instance. However, there are explanations [adding] that it does not [also] mean that the literal meaning is established by valid cognition. Nevertheless, those that explain it as [also meaning] that [the sūtra passage] is literal are correct:

- because due to the force of the phrase "at all" [in "it cannot *at all* be interpreted separately from that by another"] "that which has valid cognition" must be taken as literality, and
- because even the foremost precious [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] comments on "that which has valid cognition" as meaning literality, for

[a] Proponents of the Middle assert that all three natures are not truly established.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

his *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[1005]

> If, as the interpretable and the definitive, [Kamalashīla] were taking meanings that do not exist in accordance with how they are taught and those that do, having valid cognition would be sufficient [to characterize what is definitive].

and:[1006]

> The statement that things do not have truly established production is endowed with valid cognition and also cannot be interpreted as another meaning in the sense that the meaning, as taught, is not the suchness of those phenomena [and thus requires interpretation to determine its mode of subsistence]. Such sūtras are of definitive meaning, for they cannot be interpreted as anything else by way of either of the two modes of interpretation.[a]

and:[1007]

> You should not hold that since [statements of] no production and so forth in which on that occasion a qualification is not affixed to the object of negation are not literal, they are not of definitive meaning. For example, when in the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza* [*Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* a qualification] is affixed on one occasion [to the object of negation] with respect to the production of phenomena and so forth—"That also is in the conventions of the world and is not ultimately"—it is already implicitly affixed also on other occasions; therefore, those in which it is not explicitly mentioned also are literal.

[This] entails [that even the foremost precious Ḏzong-ka-ƀa comments on "that which has valid cognition" as meaning literality] because:

- This [last statement] is made for the sake of clearing away the qualm that "Since sūtras in which the qualification 'ultimately' is implicitly affixed are not literal, they are not sūtras of definitive meaning,"
- and if such sūtras were not literal, he should have cleared away the qualm by saying, "Although they are not literal, they are of definitive meaning," whereas his saying that they "are literal" could not clear away such a qualm [if he were holding them to be literal], and not only that but also

[a] For the two modes of interpretation, see the quote from Ḏzong-ka-ƀa's Great Exposition of Special Insight at the end of Nga-w̄ang-ƀel-den's explanation.

he would be unskilled in exposition.

and because Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of Special Insight explains that whatever are either non-literal sūtras or sūtras mainly teaching conventionalities are necessarily sūtras requiring interpretation:[a]

They are interpretable meanings, or meanings that must be interpreted, because:

1. their meaning is not fit to be taken in accordance with how it is taught and must be interpreted as something else upon explaining its thought
2. or though it is permissible to take [the meaning] as literal, merely this is not the final suchness, and its suchness must be sought as other than that.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [The Autonomy School] asserts that the system of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* is that:

- the middle wheel, like the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* and so forth, in which the qualification "ultimately" or the like is affixed to the object of negation, either explicitly or implicitly, are sūtras of definitive meaning
- and middle wheel sūtras, like the *Heart of Wisdom Sūtra*, in which the qualification "ultimately" is not affixed to the object of negation either explicitly or implicitly, are similar in being second wheel but are sūtras of interpretable meaning.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1008] Those [sūtras] in which:

- "ultimately" is explicitly affixed to the object of negation, such as the *Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* which says that although form exists in the world's conventions, ultimately it is non-dual, and so forth
- or "ultimately" is affixed implicitly to the object of negation, though not explicitly,

are of definitive meaning.

[Those sūtras in which "ultimately" is neither explicitly nor implicitly affixed to the object of negation such as] the *Heart of Wisdom Sūtra*...are of interpretable meaning, and they are illustrations of the middle wheel as [the middle wheel of doctrine is described in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*].

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[a] See Tsong-kha-pa, *The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment,* vol. 3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 2002), 114.

The objects of expression from which the middle and final wheels stem and the thoughts of the middle and final wheels are the same, but from among the three types of middle wheel:

1. those explicitly affixing "ultimately" and so forth [to the object of negation
2. those implicitly affixing such, and
3. those not affixing such,

Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* comments on the first two as being of definitive meaning despite the fact that [the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] explains the thought…[of the middle wheel of doctrine. This is because the middle wheel that is commented on as definitive (the first two types) and the middle wheel that is commented on as requiring interpretation (the third type) are separate sūtras.[1009] With respect to the third type,] those that do not affix the qualification "ultimately" to the object of negation, the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* explains—for the sake of dispelling contradiction with direct perception and with reasoning…and for the sake of eliminating that they should be taken in accordance with their literal reading—(1) that they have a thought behind them, selflessness, (2) that they require interpretation, (3) that the they are surpassable,[a] and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although the way the three characters are posited is similar to that explained above [regarding the Sūtra Middle Way Autonomy School], the assertion [by the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] that external objects do not exist is a feature of dissimilarity from the former.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1010] The etymologies of the three natures are similar [in the Mind-Only School and the Autonomy School]. Beyond that, it is evident that Bhāvaviveka thinks that if there were no phenomena that are a different entity from mind, this would be a great deprecation with regard to objects of knowledge.

- For while except for six of the eighteen constituents, twelve constituents would necessarily not exist, the Proponents of Mind-Only explicitly assert that two thirds of objects of knowledge do not exist.
- And, if objects do not exist, object-possessors [that is, subjects]

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[a] *bla na mchis pa, sa-uttara* (Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 86 [30], n. 14). For the passage from the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 116.

necessarily also do not exist, whereby they implicitly deprecate all objects of knowledge.

- Hence, such is not the meaning of any sūtra.

Although these [Proponents of the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] refute objects that are a different entity from mind, it is within explaining that this is not contradictory with there being eighteen constituents and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: This [Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] asserts that there are two modes of teaching meanings expressed in the context of such sūtras as the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, The Heavily Adorned,* and *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra:*

1. occasions of explaining to the principal trainees—who are able to realize that all phenomena do not truly exist—that all phenomena lack a nature of true establishment, this being the system of the Proponents of the Middle
2. occasions of teaching to secondary trainees—who are temporarily unable to realize that all phenomena are without true existence and must be led by stages—that external objects do not exist and that mind truly exists, this being the system of the Proponents of Mind-Only.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1011] Therefore, this [Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] asserts that:

1. Sūtras such as:
   - the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*
   - the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra*
   - the *Compendium of Doctrine Sūtra*...in which Buddha, Conqueror-Children such as Maitreya, Mañjughoṣha, Avalokiteshvara, and so forth, the supreme pair [Shāriputra and Maudgalyāyana], and many [others] such as Kāshyapa, Subhūti, and so forth ask questions, give answers, and relate their own realizations, thereby commenting on the thought of many of the Teacher's scriptures, due to which it is given such a name
   - the *Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned*
   - the *Kāshyapa Chapter Sūtra*
   - the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra*
   - the *Jewel Mine Sūtra*

   are the final wheel as described in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* the wheel of doctrine of good differentiation.
2. By differentiating the middle wheel into parts, those that affix the qualification "ultimately" are of definitive meaning, and

those that do not affix the qualification "ultimately" or those which, although literal, do not have an explanation of the definitive meaning are of interpretable meaning.[1012]

3. The sūtras of the wheel of good differentiation *mainly* teach the three characters in terms of the absence of true existence…and *ancillarily* teach the three characters of Mind-Only for the sake of ordinary trainees who are [temporarily] incapable of realizing simultaneously that all phenomena lack true existence.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1013]

Objection by Proponents of Mind-Only: The assertion that all phenomena do not ultimately exist is not correct because:

- a sūtra explains that external objects do not ultimately exist but that mind ultimately exists:

  Objects do not exist, just mind.
  Seeing external objects is wrong.

- and the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* the *Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned,* and so forth teach that all phenomena are the corpus of mind-only,[a] whereby they establish that just mind ultimately exists whereas external objects do not.

Response by Autonomists employing a parallel reasoning: It [absurdly] follows that external objects also ultimately exist because those sūtras explain that external forms also exist in the same way as the mind.

Response by Proponents of Mind-Only: [That those sūtras explain that external forms also exist in the same way as the mind] does not entail [that external objects also ultimately exist] because the existence of external objects is harmed by valid cognition and because other sūtras also refute the existence of external objects. Therefore, the statements in some sūtras that external objects exist are [utterances of] indirect intention[b] spoken for the sake of causing trainees of low intelligence to enter into the selflessness of persons.

Response by Autonomists employing a parallel reasoning: It follows that the assertion that mind ultimately exists is not correct because this is harmed by valid cognition and because other sūtras also refute that mind ultimately exists. Therefore, hold that statements that external objects do not exist and that the mind

[a] *sems tsam gyi lus.*

[b] *ldem dgongs, abhisaṃdhaya.*

ultimately exists are [utterances of] indirect intention spoken for the sake of causing trainees—who are temporarily unable to realize all phenomena as without true existence—to gradually enter into the ocean of the ultimate.

3* Reasonings Refuting the Object of Negation

It is agreed that not being posited through appearing to a non-defective awareness is the object of negation. They mostly state signs that are non-observations of related objects because of being set forth in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* and the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra.* Forms and so forth do not truly exist because of lacking being a truly established one or many, as is the case, for example, with a reflection. Whatever is true is limited to the two, whereby the entailments are established. Regarding the presence of the reason in the subject, it is not one because of having parts; it is not many because one does not exist. The vajra nodes, refutation of production of the existent and the non-existent, refutation of production of the four alternatives, and the sign of dependent-arising are chief.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The two Autonomists agree in asserting that

> existence by the power of the object's own mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of appearing to an awareness that is not harmed by another valid cognition with respect to [the object's] appearing to be established by way of its own character

is the object of negation in the non-existence of true existence.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1014] All phenomena exist as merely posited through the force of appearing to a sense [consciousness] not polluted by superficial causes of mistake.[a] All

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[a] Four types of consciousnesses affected by superficial causes of mistake are enumerated:

- cause of mistake existing in the object: for instance, a consciousness perceiving a circle of fire due to a firebrand being twirled quickly
- cause of mistake existing in the basis: for instance, an eye consciousness that sees a single moon as double due to a fault in the eye
- cause of mistake existing in the abode: for instance, an eye consciousness that sees trees as moving when a person is riding in a boat (causing stationary objects on the shore to appear to move)
- cause of mistake existing in the immediately preceding condition: for instance, an eye consciousness that sees everything as red when a person is overcome by anger.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> Middle Way Autonomists assert that establishment as an object of analysis that is not posited through the force of appearing to a sense [consciousness] not polluted by superficial causes of mistake is the measure of ultimate establishment.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1015] If even you Proponents of True Existence did assert that—without being analyzed by reasoning analyzing the ultimate—[phenomena] exist in accordance with how they appear to an awareness not harmed by other valid cognition relative to their appearance as established by way of their own character, then our assertions would be similar. When analyzed with reasoning analyzing the ultimate, all presentations are disturbed.
>
> Since phenomena are established in accordance with how they appear to an awareness not harmed by other valid cognition relative to their appearance as established by way of their own character, ultimate analysis does not apply to these. If they were analyzed with ultimate analysis, they would become otherwise—that is to say, non-existent—whereby such would be damaged by direct perception and so forth.
>
> In Middle Way texts non-analysis is taken to be a conventional consciousness not directed toward suchness; it is neither a non-conceptual exalted wisdom nor a mere non-conceptual consciousness.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because Shāntarakṣhita's *Autocommentary to the "Ornament for the Middle"* sets forth the reasoning of the lack of being one or many from citing the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* and the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra,* Shāntarakṣhita and his spiritual son [Kamalashīla] mostly state applications of signs [or syllogisms] that are non-observations of related objects.[a]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1016] What are the main reasonings refuting true establishment? Except for several reasons in which dependent-arising and existence are stated as signs, true establishment is refuted in dependence on signs that are non-observations of a related object. For Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle* sets forth the lack of being one or many in dependence

See Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 51-52.

[a] For an excellent extensive presentation of the reasoning of the lack of being one or many, see Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika,* 167-191 and 356-379.

on statements of the lack of being either one or many by the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra,* the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra,* and the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva]. The following are quoted; the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

Just as although forms devoid
Of oneness and otherness
Appear in a mirror but do not exist,
So is the inherent nature of things.

and the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra* says:

Just as reflections
Without inherent existence
Appear in a very clean mirror,
Understand phenomena [such as] trees.

and so forth, and Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas* says:

Things that are investigated
Do not have oneness.
In those in which oneness does not exist,
Manyness also does not exist.

Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says:

Things upon definite investigation
Are without thingness [that is, true establishment] in reality,
For they do not have a nature
Of oneness or manyness.

and so forth.

Also, Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* sets forth the vajra nodes,[a] the refutation of production of the existent and the

[a] Kensur Lekden said that this reasoning is called *rdo rje gzegs ma* because each of the four reasons is capable of overcoming a conception of inherent existence just as a piece of diamond has the hardness and so forth of a diamond. From this viewpoint, *gzegs ma* (**kaṇā*) would mean "piece," and hence "fragment" ("sliver" no longer strikes me as appropriate since it suggests a weak, thin piece, whereas these are fragments).

According to Apte's dictionary, the Sanskrit term also means "facet"; this would seem to be most appropriate when speaking of diamonds (and more appropriate to the meaning since each of the four reasons alone actually is not capable of refuting inherent existence); however, none of my Tibetan sources, oral or written, has explained it this way. The oral traditions that I have contacted are by no means always accurate; nevertheless, when put together, the various oral strains are quite full and no Tibetan scholar to date has given this explanation. One Tibetan scholar said that *gzegs ma* refers to the nodes, or points, of a vajra; this accords with the sense of these reasonings being instruments that break apart mountains of wrong view. Thus, for the time being, I am translating this as "vajra nodes."

non-existent, the refutation of production from the four alternatives, and the lack of being one or many; it also explains dependent-arising, which is a reason that is an observation of a contradictory object. Since all phenomena—compounded and uncompounded—are delineated by way of the lack of being one or many, that a certain [scholar] considers part and whole only with regard to effective things is a sign of weak intelligence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: To state an example: Because of lacking being a truly established one or many, forms and so forth do not truly exist, as is the case, for example, with the reflection of a face in a mirror. Whatever is truly established is limited to the two, truly existent one or many, whereby the forward-entailment and counter-entailment are established. Regarding the way the presence of the reason in the subject is proven, it is not a truly established one because of having parts; it is not a truly established many because a truly established one does not exist.

LACK OF BEING ONE OR MANY

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1017] These things do not truly exist because in reality they lack a nature of being one or many, as is the case, for example, with a reflection. Whatever truly exists is limited to being either a truly established one or a truly established many, and also whatever is not established as either of those is necessarily without true existence because those are contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion;[a] it is like the fact, for example, that whatever exists is necessarily either one or many…The presence of the reason in the subject is also established: It is not a truly existent one because of having parts, and it is not a truly existent many because a truly existent one does not exist.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1018] Regarding proving the presence of the reason in the subject, it is a little difficult to prove that all phenomena have parts and to refute that there is a common locus of having parts and being a truly existent one. Hence, these are to be known at length from the root text of and commentary to Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle,* D̄zong-ka-b̄a's own *Purification of Forgetfulness about (Shāntarakṣhita's) "Ornament for the Middle,"* J̄ang-ḡya's *Tenets,* and so forth. In brief, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:

With respect to the final boundary for demonstrating to an-

[a] *phan tshun spangs 'gal.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

other a composite of contradictions, they refute ultimately established phenomena:

- upon demonstrating that, among whatever is asserted by our own and others' schools, there does not occur anything partless that does not have many parts such as a temporal series, parts of an object, aspects of an object of consciousness, and so forth,
- they demonstrate that, if something is established as possessing many parts, although there is no contradiction among conventional objects for one phenomenon to exist as an essence [or entity] of many parts, within being ultimately established there is the damage that:
  1. if the two—parts and parts-possessor [or whole]—are different entities, they would be unrelated
  2. if they are one entity, the parts would become one or the whole would become many.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Moreover, the vajra nodes, refutation of production of the existent and the non-existent, refutation of production of the four alternatives, and the sign of dependent-arising are the chief reasonings refuting true establishment in this system.

VAJRA NODES

Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1019] The vajra nodes prove that effective things are ultimately without production because production from self, others, both, or causelessly does not exist.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1020] Whatever is ultimately produced is necessarily produced from one of the four extremes, and hence if production from the four extremes is rejected, ultimate production is also rejected, whereby the reasoning is not indefinite. Whatever is produced is not necessarily strictly produced in reality [that is, ultimately produced] because although a child and so forth in a dream and so forth are not true, such appears to be produced [that is, born].

Although whatever is produced necessarily exists intrinsically,[a] it is not suitable to prove that whatever is produced necessarily exists intrinsically in the sense of being truly established[b] because there is no entailment that proving intrinsic existence proves intrin-

[a] *ngo bo nyid kyis yod pa.*

[b] *bden grub kyi ngo bo nyid kyis yod pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

sic existence in the sense of being truly established, since this is like, for example, the fact that proving that a tree exists does not entail proving that a *shiṃshapā*[a] exists.

[With respect to proving the four reasons:]

Production from Self

A formerly non-existent shoot is not newly produced ultimately. The new production of the formerly non-existent is by reason of its having to rely on causes and conditions, and whatever is ultimately produced is not suitable to depend on causes and conditions, whereby if it does not exist at one time, it must not exist at all times, like the child of a barren woman. If it exists before, it does not need to be produced again because its selfhood is already established, as is the case, for example, with a consciousness.

Production from Other

If effective things are ultimately produced from other, are they produced from permanent causes, or are they produced from impermanent causes? If they are produced from permanent causes, then:

- effective things would not be produced serially; rather, the entirety of them would be produced simultaneously
- and either one thing would always be produced, or would not be produced even once.

If they are produced from impermanent causes, are they produced from causes that have disintegrated at the time of the effect, or are they produced from causes that have not disintegrated at the time of the effect? If they are produced from causes that have disintegrated at the time of the effect, then since a having-disintegrated is not an effective thing, the effect would be produced causelessly. If they are produced from causes that have not disintegrated at the time of the effect, then cause and effect would be simultaneous, whereby it would be contradictory for them to be producer and produced.

Objection: The first moment of eye consciousness is a present effective thing, and the second moment of eye consciousness is produced from it in a second period of time. Hence, although [the first moment of eye consciousness] has disintegrated at the time of the effect, there is no fallacy of it [absurdly] following that the cause is a non-effective thing.

Response: Well then, do those two, earlier and later moments—

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[a] A type of fruit tree.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

that are produced without intervention—have nothing intervening in all respects or are they partially without anything intervening? If the first, then the [absurd] consequence of [the two moments] being simultaneous remains as before. If the second, [the two moments] would have parts, whereby [your assertion that moments] are partless would deteriorate, whereby that they are truly established would deteriorate, and hence that cause and effect are ultimately other is blocked.

Production from Both Self and Other

The assertion of production from both self and other—as in [the theistic Sāṃkhyas] saying that due to being produced from the principal, there is production from self, and due to being produced from Īshvara there is production from other—was refuted earlier (474) and will be later (839) and is easy to understand.

Causeless Production

The assertion of causeless production—as in "Effective things are produced causelessly, as is the case, for example, with the sharpness of thorns"—was refuted earlier (101, 103, 479, 480), and will be later 839) and is easy to understand.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1021] Thereby the presence of the [four] reasons in the subject is established. Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

> In order to destroy all the specific effective things propounded by ourselves and others, the Great Ones intensively expounded on these four unimpeded vajra nodes.[a]

REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION OF THE EXISTENT AND THE NON-EXISTENT

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1022] The syllogism refuting production of the existent and the non-existent [has two wings]:

- The subject, a shoot, is not ultimately produced because even if it exists at the time of its causes, it is not produced ultimately. With regard to the way the presence of a reason in the subject is proved: The subject, a shoot that in all respects exists at the time of its causes, is not produced by any causes and conditions because other causes and conditions cannot make any previously non-existent difference, as is the case, for example,

[a] For more on the vajra nodes see also 829 and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 57-60, 131-150, and 639-650.

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with a sky-lotus.

- The subject, an ultimately produced shoot, is not the new ultimate production of what did not exist earlier because of not existing at the time of its causes, as is the case, for example, with a sky-lotus. [Not existing at the time of its causes] entails [not being new ultimate production of what did not exist earlier] because whatever is ultimately produced must exist at all times, since if it does not exist at one time, it must not ultimately exist at all times, for it is not suitable for what is ultimately established to rely on causes and conditions, whereby there is no difference of being produced when the causes and conditions are complete and not being produced when the causes and conditions are not complete.

Moreover, [the new production of the formerly non-existent] is also refuted by a consequence: It [absurdly] follows that at the time of a seed, the shoot exists because at the time of a seed a shoot's activity of approaching production exists, and [according to you] a shoot and a shoot's activity of approaching production are ultimately established support and what is supported.[a] It is as Dzong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

> The activity of growing an effect must depend on the shoot and so forth that are the agent in "This grew," due to which [the grower and the activity of growing] are support and supported. If support and supported are ultimately established, changing into another nature is not feasible, whereby at all times the activity needs a support, and hence even at the time of a shoot's approaching production, the shoot must exist as the support of the activity of production, due to which cause and effect would be simultaneous. Because of such damages [the new production of the formerly non-existent] is not feasible.
>
> In conventional production, if [phenomena] are support and supported during one period, they do not need to be so at all times, whereby [conventional production] is not parallel [to ultimate production]. A shoot's activity of growing, which is simultaneous with the seed, is a shoot's activity of approaching growing, but it is not contradictory that:
>
> - *in general* a shoot's activity of growing and the shoot are supported and support, but

[a] *rten dang brten pa.*

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- although the shoot does not exist at the time of the activity of growing, the activity exists.

This is like, for example, the non-contradiction that:

- *in general* when a related object is negated, the relater vanishes, and
- the seed is the related object, and the shoot is the relater, but although the seed has vanished at the time of the shoot, the shoot does not vanish.[a]

REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION OF THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1023] Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

> That which is ultimately devoid of production of the four alternatives is without an inherent nature in suchness, as is the case, for example, with a sky-lotus. Even all effective things that are the bases of debate in the likes of that [proof statement] are without an inherent nature in reality.

and so forth. Similarly, Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* refutes the four alternatives through his root text and commentary on it:

> Many do not make one thing.
> Many do not make many.
> One does not make many things.
> One also does not make one.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1024] The refutation of production of the four alternatives is: It follows that the subject, a shoot, is not ultimately produced because:

1. ultimately only one effect is not produced from only one cause
2. ultimately many effects are not produced from only one cause
3. ultimately only one effect is not produced from many causes
4. ultimately many effects are not produced from many causes.

Let us explain the proof of the presence of the reason in the subject within applying this refutation to the three conditions [producing an eye consciousness].

Refuting the First Alternative: Ultimately Only One Effect is Produced from Only One Cause

Does an eye sense power produce only the second moment of an eye sense power? Or does an eye sense power produce only an eye consciousness? If an eye sense power produces only the second

[a] For more on refuting production of the existent and the non-existent see also 840ff. and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 150-154.

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moment of an eye sense power, then it [absurdly] follows that all transmigrating beings are blind because the production of an eye consciousness from an eye sense power would not occur. Even if an eye sense power produces only an eye consciousness, it [absurdly] follows that all transmigrating beings are blind because the continuous production of two moments of an eye sense would not occur.

Refuting the Second Alternative: Ultimately Many Effects are Produced from Only One Cause

It [absurdly] follows that (1) the experiential factor of an eye consciousness is not the imprint [or effect] of an immediately preceding [moment of consciousness], (2) the factor of an eye consciousness that is the dawning of the aspect of the object is not the imprint of the observed-object-condition, and (3) the factor of an eye consciousness that is its ability to apprehend a particular type of object is not the imprint of [the eye sense power that is] its proprietary condition because [according to you] ultimately only one cause produces many effects.

Refuting the Third Alternative: Ultimately Only One Effect is Produced from Many Causes

If many causes produce only one effect, then it [absurdly] follows that only one from among the three factors of an eye consciousness—its experiential factor, the factor that is the dawning of the aspect of the object, or the factor of its ability to apprehend a particular type of object—is the imprint of all three conditions of an eye consciousness, due to which it [absurdly] follows that the other two attributes either do not exist or are produced causelessly.

Refuting the Fourth Alternative: Ultimately Many Effects are Produced from Many Causes

If those just mentioned three attributes of an eye consciousness that are set up by three conditions are ultimately produced:

1. Is it that those three imprints are not ultimately different but merely appear to an awareness to be different? If so, because their mode of subsistence would abide one way but their mode of appearance would be otherwise, they would be false, and their being truly established would fall away.
2. Or is it that those three imprints are not ultimately different and do not appear to any awareness to be different? In this case, the three imprints of the three conditions would be one, whereby [the notion] that many causes make many effects would fall away.

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3. Or is it that those three imprints are ultimately different? In this case, it would follow that an eye consciousness and the three attributes of an eye consciousness would be ultimately different. If it is accepted that an eye consciousness and the three attributes of an eye consciousness are ultimately different, then the subjects, an eye consciousness and its three attributes, do not exist as ultimately different because whatever exist as ultimately different must by perceived as different by a Superior's exalted wisdom knowing the mode of being, but it does not perceive them as different. It is established that whatever exist as ultimately different must by perceived as different by a Superior's exalted wisdom knowing the mode of being because whatever is ultimately established must be established as the mode of subsistence.

Through these reasons, it is blocked[a] that those are ultimately different, and by blocking this it is blocked that those are ultimately many, whereby it is blocked that ultimately many causes produce many effects.[b]

SIGN OF DEPENDENT-ARISING

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1025] Regarding the reasoning of dependent-arising, Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

> That which arises dependently is ultimately empty of an inherent nature, as is the case, for example, with an illusion, and so on.

and so forth.[c]

4* Features of the Path and so forth

They agree about the presentations of the selflessness of persons and of the two truths. The subtle obstructions to omniscience are consciousnesses conceiving true existence, and the coarse obstructions to omniscience are apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, and so forth. The sixteen aspects of the truths, the emptiness of duality, and the absence of true existence are the different types of realization of the paths of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Great Vehicle. Both agree about the

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[a] *khegs.*

[b] For more on refuting production of the four alternatives see also 842ff. and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 155-160.

[c] For more on the sign of dependent-arising see also 847ff. and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 53-56, 161-173, 659-676.

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features of there being meditative equipoise and subsequent realization on seeing and meditation.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The assertions of both Autonomy Schools agree about the presentation of the selflessness of persons and of the two truths.

> Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1026] The two Autonomy Schools agree:
> - about positing the selflessness of the person in terms of all phenomena[a]
> - and about the basis of division, definitions, and divisions of the two truths (see 753ff.).

Word Commentary on Root Text: [According to the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] the subtle and coarse obstructions to omniscience are respectively consciousnesses conceiving true existence as well as their seeds and awarenesses conceiving apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as different substantial entities as well as their seeds, and so forth.

> Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1027] [According to the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School,] if obstructions to omniscience are divided terminologically,[b] there are two, consisting of:
> - the subtle—consciousnesses conceiving true existence
> - the coarse—consciousnesses conceiving objects of apprehension as [external] objects and consciousnesses conceiving apprehended-object and apprehending-subject as different substantial entities.
>
> The phrase "and so forth" [in the root text] refers to the afflictive emotions. Those three are the main objects of abandonment of

[a] The coarse selflessness of persons is applicable to phenomena other than persons in the sense that they are empty of being objects of use of a permanent, unitary, and self-powered person. The subtle selflessness of persons similarly applies to phenomena other than persons in that all phenomena are empty of being objects of use by a substantially existent, or self-sufficient person. Hence, the substrata of the emptiness of persons are not just persons but all phenomena. Also, the substrata of the emptiness of phenomena are not just phenomena other than persons but also persons. Consequently, the substrata of the two emptinesses are the same; however, the object negated in, for instance, the subtle selflessness of persons is substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency, whereas the object negated in the subtle selflessness of phenomena is true existence. In sum, for both Autonomy Schools the substrata of the emptiness of a self of persons and the substrata of the emptiness of a self of phenomena are the same, but the object negated—that of which the substrata are empty—is different.

[b] The qualification "terminologically" is made since coarse obstructions to omniscience are not actual obstructions to omniscience.

those having the lineage of Bodhisattvas, Solitary Realizers, and Hearers.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [According to the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School] the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, the emptiness of duality of apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, and the absence of true existence are respectively the objects of comprehension of the three types of realization by the paths of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and those of the Great Vehicle; hence, those are the different types of realization of the three vehicles.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1028] With regard to the means of abandoning those [three objects of abandonment]:

- Those having the Hearer type of realization…mainly meditatively cultivate a path realizing the sixteen aspects of the four truths, impermanence and so forth.
- Those having the lineage of rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers…mainly meditatively cultivate a path realizing that apprehended-object and apprehending-subject are empty of being different substantial entities, whereby they abandon the coarse obstructions to omniscience.
- Those having the Great Vehicle lineage mainly meditatively cultivate the means of abandoning the conception of true existence, realizing the absence of true existence of the sixteen aspects [of the four truths]—impermanence and so forth [whereby they abandon the subtle obstructions to omniscience].

Word Commentary on Root Text: The assertions of both Autonomy Schools agree with respect to features such as there being both exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise and exalted wisdoms of subsequent realization on the path of seeing and on the path of meditation, and so forth.

This has been the eleventh chapter, the section on the Autonomy School which, having cleared away the extreme of truly established things, establishes the middle.

12. Consequence School

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1029] With respect to this system of the Consequence School the foremost lama, the great D̄zong-ka-b̄a, says [at the end of his *The Essence of Eloquence*]:[1030]

One respects from the heart all the eloquence
Of those like adornments among the wise of the world.
Still, the eye of intelligence, a garden of jasmine, is opened fully
By the white rays of eloquence flowing from the moon [Chandrakīrti],
Overcoming all extreme conceptions through the reasoning that cyclic existence
And nirvāṇa are inevitable dependent-arisings.
Having seen the path revealed by Buddhapālita,[a]
Who would not take Nāgārjuna's good system as chief?

Accordingly, the Middle Way Consequentialist system is the very acme of the best among all systems and schools of tenets. It is the great path of perfection traveled, being traveled, and to be traveled by all the Conquerors of the three times [past, present, and future], the incomparable unparalleled mother giving birth to the four types[b] of Superiors, and the sole, excellent path of passage. Without

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a would find support here for his position that Buddhapālita is the founder of the system of the Consequence School, but those who say the Chandrakīrti is the founder would also find support from the statement just above it that Chandrakīrti "opened the chariot-way" for the Consequence School through clearly differentiating this system from others. I find Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's position to be questionable in the face of (1) his own statement that even though Saraha preceded Nāgārjuna in holding the Proponent of the Middle view and even though Vimuktasena preceded Shāntarakṣita in holding the Yogāchāra-Autonomy School view (500ff.), those two are not posited as the founders of, respectively, the Middle Way School and the Yogic Middle Way Autonomy School because they did not clearly set off those schools in contradistinction to other systems and (2) his admission that Buddhapālita did not do that for the Consequence School whereas Chandrakīrti did (481). J̄ang-ḡya (288.last line) goes so far as to say that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a actually did not hold that, for the above reasons, Buddhapālita founded the Consequence School. However, the monastic college that uses Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's texts, Go-mang, currently holds that Buddhapālita was the founder and that this is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's view.

[b] The four types of Superiors (*āryan*) are Hearer, Solitary Realizer, Bodhisattva, and Buddha Superiors. *Āryan* (*'phags pa*) is translated as "Superiors" because, according to Kensur Lekden, these are beings who have risen above the level of common beings (*pṛthagjana, so sor skye bo*) through cognizing emptiness directly on the path of seeing.

considering body, enjoyments, and so forth, all the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Superiors made effort toward it, sought it, concentrated on it, and meditated on it. It is the unsurpassed ambrosia delighting others, the profound middle path clearing away all coarse and subtle extremes and extreme conceptions, the final thought of Nāgārjuna, which Buddhapālita established as the system of the Consequence School, and for its chariot a great way was made by the honorable Chandrakīrti.

b" Describing the System of the Middle Way Consequentialists {6}

This section has six parts: definition along with an etymology; synonyms; divisions; texts on which they rely; texts of definitive meaning and those requiring interpretation; and tenets.

1: Definition along with an Etymology

Because they do not assert autonomous inferences but mainly state consequences contradicting assertions by the other party, they are Consequentialists.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Not asserting autonomous syllogisms, they assert the statement mainly of consequences expressing contradictions in their opponents' assertions for the sake of generating in them the view of the Middle Way. Therefore, they are called Middle Way Consequentialists.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [1031] Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1032]

> It is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to use an autonomous [inference] because another position is not asserted.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations*:[1033] Here "autonomous inference" is a syllogism [literally, application of a sign] that is established from its own side. "Position" is a word for probandum, or thesis. "Another" means [a thesis that is] other than not established from its own side. Therefore, the meaning of this passage is: It is not admissible [for one who is a Proponent of the Middle] to assert the statement of syllogisms that are established from their own side because [Proponents of the Middle] do not assert probandums, or theses, that are established from their own side.

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Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1034] "Established under its own power" (*rang dbang du grub pa*),[a] "established inherently" (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhāvasiddha*), and "autonomous" (*rang rgyud, svatantra*) are equivalent. The application of a reason [that is, a syllogism] the three aspects of which exist inherently is an autonomous inference (*rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag, svatantra-anumāna*). Hence, if such autonomous inferences are asserted, then [other phenomena such as] production would perforce [be asserted to exist inherently].[1035] Thus, when analyzing, there would necessarily be a position that would be one of the four extremes [and that could withstand ultimate analysis]. In that case, a thesis that is a position of one of the four extremes[b] would have to be asserted. However, the assertion of any of the four extremes is not suitable [for Proponents of the Middle] because they must uphold the meaning of the middle that avoids those extremes. Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:[1036]

> Even over a long period of time
> Censure cannot be expressed
> For one who has no position
> Of [inherent] existence, non-existence,
> Or existence and non-existence.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1037] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

> [This passage] is cited [by Chandrakīrti] as a source showing that those who assert imputed existence—which negates substantial existence in the sense of [the object's] being established by way of its own nature—cannot be refuted by Proponents of True Existence[c] who assert that [phenomena] are established by way of their own nature and by Proponents of No Things[d] who assert a negation of all capacity to perform functions in things such as forms. Therefore, it is not suitable as a source

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[a] According to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (697), the Sanskrit original is *svairī. Siddha* (*grub pa*) and *sat* (*yod pa*) are often used interchangeably.

[b] To speak of a "thesis which is a position" might seem redundant since position (*pakṣa, phyogs*) and thesis (*pratijñā, dam bca'*) are often synonymous. However, according to Kensur Lekden, a position of one of the extremes is non-existent because it is an extreme, whereas an assertion or thesis of an extreme position does exist.

[c] *dngos po yod par smra ba, *bhāvavādin.*

[d] *dngos po med par smra ba, *abhāvavādin.*

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[showing that Proponents of the Middle] have no system…
With respect to the mode of refuting the four alternatives, it is suitable to take this as refuting:
1. inherent existence
2. utter non-existence
3. both
4. and a truly established category that is neither.
Or, as Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's Great Exposition of Special Insight in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says…:

If the four alternatives[a] were refuted without affixing such qualification, when [the first two alternatives, that is, that something is] an existent thing (*dngos po yod pa*) and a non-thing (*dngos po med pa*) are refuted and then both are refuted saying "not both," it would directly contradict one's own assertion to make the refutation, "not not both." If you insist that despite this there is no fault, [I can only say], "We do not debate with the insane."

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1038] Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* says:[1039]

If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis
that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.

Therefore, [a Consequentialist] does not assert autonomous [inferences or any other autonomous phenomena even] conventionally.

Nga-ẉang-ḇel-den's *Annotations:*[1040] Regarding this statement in Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* that he has no thesis, it is in the context of the following debate. A Proponent of the Middle has propounded:

Things are without an inherent nature.

To that a proponent of True Existence has objected:

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[a] Here the four are:
1. inherently existent thing
2. inherently existent non-thing (that is, inherently existent uncaused phenomenon)
3. both
4. a truly established category that is neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing.

> If you say these words have an inherent nature, then it is not feasible that all things do not have an inherent nature. And if you say that [those words] do not have an inherent nature, then they are unable to refute an inherent nature.

Therefore, regarding having or not having theses, this is not a debate about whether [Nāgārjuna] has theses or not *in general,* but is a debate about whether the words of the thesis, "Things are without an inherent nature," have an inherent nature or not. Therefore, it means that if I asserted that the words of a thesis such as this had an inherent nature, then I would have the fault of contradicting [my] thesis that all things are without an inherent nature. Because I do not assert such, I do not have this fault. Hence, [this passage from Nāgārjuna's *Refutations of Objections*] is not suitable as a proof [that Proponents of the Middle] have no theses.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1041] Even so, Consequentialists have a great many means of generating in opponents the view realizing that phenomena do not truly exist. For the definition of a Middle Way Consequentialist is:

> A Proponent of the Middle who mainly states refutations of an opponent's assertion of any of the four extremes through the expression of a correct contradictory consequence—a consequence that either implies or does not imply the opposite meaning, and so forth, as will be explained below.

This is also an etymology of "Middle Way Consequentialist."

In this system of the Consequence School, the statements of consequences and other-approved syllogisms have respectively greater and lesser usage, but they are not entirely mutually exclusive. For, the usage of an other-approved syllogism is mostly similar to that of a consequence. An example of an other-approved syllogism is:[a]

> The production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless, as in the case with a manifest pot.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1042] Since consequences must be stated on all [occasions of] generating inferences in others, they are of greater extent [or usage], but since other-approved syllogisms do not have to be stated for certain disputants of sharp faculties, they

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's example is from Buddhapālita's refutation of the Sāṃkhya view of production from causes that are of the same entity as the effect (474, 483ff., and 831ff.).

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are described as being of lesser extent.

2: Synonyms

They are renowned as Consequentialists, Only-Appearance Proponents of the Middle, and Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Their synonyms are:

- Consequentialists

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1043] They mainly use contradictory consequences to generate in others the view [that no phenomenon inherently exists]; hence, they are called Consequentialists.
- Only-Appearance Proponents of the Middle, so called because they are able to posit phenomena as existing conventionally from the viewpoint of their only appearing to one's own awareness when the object imputed is not sought

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [1044] Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1045]

  > The establishment of conventional phenomena is asserted by way of mere conditionality,[a] not by way of asserting [any of] the four positions.

  and:

  > When mere conditionality is asserted, both cause and effect are mutually dependent; hence, their establishment does not inherently exist.

  Accordingly, Consequentialists are also called Only-Appearance

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[a] *rkyen nyid 'di pa tsam, idaṃ pratyayatāmātra.* Since causes are not produced in dependence upon their own effects, the meaning of "mere conditionality" is not limited to just the usual sense of *pratyaya,* condition assisting in production of an object, but refers to the condition or situation that allows the positing of an object, whether that be its own basis of imputation or that in relation to which it is posited. A seed is imputed in dependence upon its basis of imputation, the two halves of the seed, as well as in dependence upon its presumed effect, a shoot. That appearances are posited from the viewpoint of such conditionality "when there is no analysis and no investigation" does not mean that conventionalities are beyond the sphere of analysis in the sense of the usual worldly investigation of an object to make sure it is there. In other words, conventional phenomenon are not just figments of the imagination or even beyond the sphere of logical reasoning in the sense of undergoing investigation by reasoned analysis, for this is how a permanent self and so forth are refuted. Rather, conventionalities cannot withstand ultimate analysis, analysis into their mode of being, such as investigation into whether the object is one with its basis of imputation or a different entity from its basis of imputation.

Proponents of the Middle. They are Proponents of the Middle who assert the existence of just these appearances from the viewpoint of conditionality when there is no analysis and no investigation [to find the object imputed].

- Thoroughly Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle, so called because they do not abide in any of the coarse or subtle extremes of permanence and annihilation.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1046] Shūra's *Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment* says:[1047]

[Buddha] proclaimed selflessness with the great roar of a lion.
Through synonyms such as emptiness, [suchness, final reality,] and so forth,
Limitless examples, such as likeness with a magician's illusions, [dreams, mirages,] and so forth
And the skillful means of a variety of vehicles,
[Buddha] made known the meaning of the middle way not abiding [in any gross or subtle extremes].[a]

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites this passage from Shūra's *Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment* to show that it is admissible to call Consequentialists Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle. Since Shūra's mere mention that the middle way does not abide in any of the extremes does not establish that he used these terms as names for the school, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a seems to be saying that these are suitable names for the Consequence School just because Consequentialists set forth a middle way that does not abide in any of the extremes. However, in that case it would be suitable to call Proponents of Mind-Only "Thoroughly Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle" as they also claim to propound a middle way that does not abide in the extremes. In other words, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's evidence is scant.

His position is an attempt to clarify this point made in passing by D̄zong-ka-b̄a in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and in the *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path,* when he says that earlier Tibetans mistakenly used the term "Those Who Hold That Illusion is Established by a Rational Consciousness" (*sgyu ma rigs grub*) for Autonomists and the term "Thoroughly Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle" (*rab tu mi gnas pa'i dbu ma pa*) for Consequentialists. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is trying to show that D̄zong-ka-b̄a's objection was not to the terms themselves but to the meaning assigned these by earlier Tibetans. J̄ang-ḡya (*Presentations of Tenets,* 290.6-290.12) agrees, citing this as the opinion of the great scholar and adept Nor-sang-gya-tso (*nor bzang rgya mtsho;* 1423-1513) and identifying him as using this quote from Shūra for his source. However, other scholars such as Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den hold that D̄zong-ka-b̄a was refuting both the meaning and the usage of the terms themselves.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, nya,* 117.7) gives a fascinating rendition of the controversy and Sha-m̄ar Gen-dün-d̄en-dzin-gya-tso (*zhwa dmar dge bdun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho,* 1852-1910) an even better one in his *Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of*

Accordingly, because [Consequentialists] do not abide in even any of the extremes of permanence or annihilation, they are called Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Proponents of the Middle.

3: Divisions of the Consequence School

Their divisions are three—model, partisan, and non-partisan.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are three divisions [of the Consequence School]: Proponents of the Middle of the model texts—the superior father [Nāgārjuna] and son [Āryadeva]; partisan Middle Way Consequentialists such as Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, and Shāntideva; and non-partisan Middle Way Consequentialists such as Nāgabodhi and Shākyamitra.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1048] With respect to the divisions [of the Consequence School], earlier Tibetans rightly called the superior father [Nāgārjuna] and spiritual son [Āryadeva] Proponents of the Middle of the model texts, since all—the two founders of the chariot-ways of the Consequence School and Autonomy School[a] and so forth—without difference treated Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva [as totally reliable sources].[b]

The partisan Consequentialists are Buddhapālita, the honorable Chandrakīrti, Shāntideva [and so forth]. Those who are non-partisan but maintain the Consequentialist view are posited as Shākyamitra, Nāgabodhi, Rik-b̄ay-ku-juk,[c] and so on. D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence* says:[1049]

> Also, there are many eminent scholars, the masters Shūra, Nāgabodhi, and so forth; however, there are no translations of their treatises on the Middle Way [here in Tibet].

The latter part of the second chapter of *The Five Stages* by Shākyamitra[d] clearly manifests [the Consequentialist view]. Also, upon

Special Insight" (lhag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnams brjed byang du bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me [Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972], 19.4-27.5).

[a] Buddhapālita or Chandrakīrti, and Bhāvaviveka, respectively.

[b] In this paragraph Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a paraphrases D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence,* P6142, vol. 153, 185.4.4. The word *phyi mo (mātṛkā)* has the sense of a root text or model. Nāgārjuna, in his *Precious Garland* (stanza 394), uses the term to refer to the model of an alphabet that a teacher first uses in instructing students. Although the term also means "grandmother," the translation of it as "grandmother" in this context is inappropriate.

[c] *rigs pa'i khu byug;* a student of Chandrakīrti, as identified in prayers of supplications.

[d] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, nga,* 117.6) points out that D̄zong-ka-b̄a's

consideration, Nāgabodhi's *Classification of the Ends of Actions*[1050] and so forth [clearly manifest the view of a non-partisan Consequentialist].

Shūra's view is very clearly that [of a non-partisan Consequentialist], but Ḏak-tsang's assertions that Shūra is a model [Proponent of the Middle] and that he explicitly refutes autonomy are contradictory. However, Buddhapālita, Nāgabodhi, and so forth are not seen to have quoted Shūra as a source [and they would have if he were a model Proponent of the Middle]. Though the two, Bhāvaviveka [and his chief follower Jñānagarbha],[a] as well as Chandrakīrti and those coming after them quoted Shūra, this does not of itself make Shūra a model. Also, [Ḏak-tsang[b] claims that] Shūra's statement [in his *Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment*],[c] "Also, illusions are not just illusions," and so forth, refutes autonomy. If [Ḏak-tsang were right], then it is clear that Shūra would be a partisan Middle Way Consequentialist [and not, as Ḏak-tsang claims, a model Proponent of the Middle].[d]

Quintessential Instructions on the King of Tantras, the Glorious Guhyasamāja, Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Five Stages (P6167, vol. 158, 179.3.7) says that it appears that Nāgārjuna, having completed the beginning of the second chapter of *The Five Stages* (*rim pa lnga pa, pañcakrama,* P2667), had Shākyamitra complete the chapter.

[a] A commentarial tradition, reported by Geshe Gedün Lodrö, says that the second is Jñānagarbha although it also could be the second Bhāvaviveka, known as the lesser (*chung ba*) who is the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (P5254) which is not to be confused with the *Prajñāpradīpa* (P5253) by the greater Bhāvaviveka, the founder of the Autonomy School (see J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets,* 283.11). Jñānagarbha is perhaps the more likely referent here because his works are widely cited, whereas the lesser Bhāvaviveka's are not.

[b] Ḏak-tsang (*Knowing All Tenets,* 204.1, Thimphu edition) says that this passage "indicates that due to [holding that] illusions and so forth are established, [Autonomists] do not perceive the inexpressible Mañjushrī."

[c] P5431, vol. 103. 246.4.8. Kensur Ngawang Lekden pointed out that the general teaching is that phenomena are like illusions in that just as illusions appear to be real but are not, so phenomena appear to inherently exist but do not; he added that compounded phenomena are *like* illusions and not just illusions because they can perform functions, whereas illusions cannot.

[d] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, nya,* 117.7) seems to make the absurd conclusion that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a agrees with Ḏak-tsang that this passage does directly refute the Autonomists. In that case, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a would be contradicting his own pronouncement that Shūra is a non-partisan Consequentialist. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den may have missed the meaning of the hypothetical "if" in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's refutation of Ḏak-tsang.

In any case, it is abundantly clear that in Ge-luk-b̄a works (except for Ḏzong-ka-b̄a's *Golden Rosary,* an early work presenting the view that even in meditative equipoise

Objection: If this Consequentialist text [the *Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment*] is Shūra's, then does it not contradict the statement in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence:*[a]

> Also, there are many eminent scholars, the masters Shūra, Nāgabodhi, and so forth; however, there are no translations of their treatises on the Middle Way [here in Tibet].

Answer: Shūra's *Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment* is a meditation manual; therefore, even though it does teach the Middle Way, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's remark was made [with reference to treatises on the Middle Way view and not its meditation], as in the case of the separate treatment of Nāgārjuna's Collections of Praises and his Collections of Reasonings.[b]

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phenomena qualified by emptiness appear, this being dismissed as not Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's final position) a rational consciousness does not establish conventionalities as like illusions but only establishes emptiness and that this holds true for both Middle Way systems. When one rises from meditative equipoise on emptiness, a wisdom consciousness subsequent to meditative equipoise realizes illusory-like phenomena through the continued force of the earlier realization of emptiness and the appearance of conventional phenomena.

[a] P6142, vol. 153. 185.4.6ff; the quote has been lengthened by including the first clause. Shākyamitra, Nāgabodhi, and Shūra were students of Nāgārjuna according respectively to *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ja,* 117.6; as well as Obermiller's *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston*, vol. 2, 132, and *Tu-ḡen*, 15.16.

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's statement that their books on the Middle Way School were not translated into Tibetan is challenged by a hypothetical objector. Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa somewhat apologetically explains that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa means that their *philosophical* treatises on the Proponent of the Middle *view* were not translated into Tibetan, and Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, ta,* 122.1) explains that although the text "is a Proponent of the Middle treatise, it is not a text on the view from among the division into view, meditation, and behavior." We are to understand that Shūra's *Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment* is a short *meditation* manual on emptiness according to the Proponent of the Middle system but not a philosophical treatise. Geshe Gedün Lodrö explained that this is similar to Nāgārjuna's Collections of Praises (*stod tshogs*), his many praises of the mind vajra and so forth, not being included among his Collections of *Reasonings* (*rigs tshogs*) even though they present emptiness by way of limitless forms of reasoning. The premise is that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's reading was so vast and his writing so free of internal contradictions that he neither could have missed nor could have forgotten about Shūra's text.

[b] Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 122.2) points out that some scholars say that the author of this book had the same name as Shūra but was not the Shūra, that is, Ashvaghoṣha, who was contemporaneous with Nāgārjuna. However, J̄ang-ḡya (409.13) dismisses the idea as a proofless thesis and says that the great scholars all consider the book to be reliably his. Kensur Lekden added that there were still more of Shūra's books in Tibetan because the S̄a-ḡya-ḇas kept some translations of Shūra secret.

For a discussion of works on practice ascribed to Ashvaghoṣha, Shūra, and so forth see D.S. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden:

4: Texts on which Consequentialists Rely

The texts are the profound sūtras, the Collections of Reasoning, *The Four Hundred, Engaging in the Deeds,* the two—*Compendium of Sūtra* and *Compendium of Learnings—Lamp for the Path,* and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The texts are:

- the profound Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras
- Nāgārjuna's Six Collections of Reasonings [that is, *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, The Finely Woven, Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, Refutation of Objections,* and *Precious Garland of Advice to the King*]
- Aryadeva's *The Four Hundred,* Shāntideva's *Engaging in The Bodhisattva Deeds,* Nāgārjuna's *Compendium of Sūtra*, Shāntideva's *Compendium of Learnings,* Atisha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment,* and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1051] The *Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* and above [that is, the texts of the early Consequentialists such as Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva] are taken as completely reliable…The master Chandrakīrti stated the names of Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and so forth [in commentary on his *Supplement*][a] and refuted them, but there is no one who stated Chandrakīrti's name and refuted him. The four great commentaries and so forth of this master [Chandrakīrti] who was renowned as a tenth ground Bodhisattva:
>
> - [*Clear Words: Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"*
> - *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"*
> - *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness"*
> - *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"*]
>
> and so forth…are completely reliable…
>
> One should take the good parts of Atisha's[b] *Explanation of*

Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 119-121.

[a] Chandrakīrti openly refutes Bhāvaviveka in the first, ninth, and eighteenth chapters of his *Clear Words* and criticizes Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla, and Dignāga in his commentary to the third stanza of the colophon to his *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"* for instance.

[b] According to Kensur Lekden, this does not mean that there are bad parts in Atisha's works; rather, Atisha tends to follow the Yogic Practice Autonomy Middle Way School with respect to the path, their description being renowned as the general Great Vehicle

(Shāntideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds" and *Commentary on the Difficult Points of "Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment"*. One can rely on Maitreya's *Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* and Asaṅga's *Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle"*. One should take whatever is common to the Consequence School and Autonomy School in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* and in Āryavimuktasena's and Haribhadra's discussions on the path, and so forth.

For an unconfused account with respect to what is uncommon [to the Consequence School I, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a,] having taken as valid the eloquent explanations of the three—the great being, the foremost [D̄zong-ka-b̄a], the father, and his two spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup]—will explain the system of the Consequence School just according to them, even though I might not cite them in quotation. For, free from error, they expounded clearly through millions of reasons.

5: Texts of Definitive Meaning and those Requiring Interpretation

Sūtras teaching the two truths are respectively those to be interpreted, because they must be interpreted otherwise, and the definitive, because the mode of subsistence is definite there. There are two modes of interpretation: because even the literal meaning is not suitable and because the literal meaning, though established, is not the final mode of subsistence. The first and last wheels require interpretation. The middle are definitive sūtras. Five sūtra sections in the *Descent into Laṅkā, Unraveling the Thought,* and *The Heavily Adorned*—in consideration that there is no other creator and in consideration of emptiness—teach mind-only, no external objects, a permanent matrix, the existence of a basis-of-all, the true existence of other-powered natures and of thoroughly established natures, and three final vehicles. These five teachings are proved to require interpretation.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1052] There are many purposes for the master, the Superior [Nāgārjuna], composing the *Treatise on the Middle* and differentiating what requires interpretation and what is definitive because it was for the sake of:

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explanation. However, Atisha held various opinions—such as that the study of logic was not needed in Tibet because there were no significant non-Buddhists to refute—that are clearly not accepted in Ge-luk-b̄a circles.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- non-obscuration with regard to the two truths,
- making known the purpose of the two truths
- and dispelling doubt in those who wonder just what requires interpretation and what is definitive and dispelling the wrong understanding that conceives what requires interpretation to be definitive, that is, to be the mode of subsistence.

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[a]

> This *Treatise on the Middle* was composed by the master [Nāgārjuna] for the sake of showing the difference between what requires interpretation and the definitive. With respect to this, those scriptural passages speaking of production and so forth of dependent-arisings were not spoken from the viewpoint of the nature of objects [as known by] the uncontaminated wisdom of those free from the dimness of ignorance. Rather, they were spoken from the viewpoint of the objects of consciousness of those whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the dimness of ignorance.
>
> From the viewpoint of perceiving suchness, the Supramundane Victor said:
>
> O monastics, this which is nirvāṇa, having the attribute of

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[a] P5260, vol. 98, 7.5.7ff.; Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās,* 40.7-42.8. This is partially quoted by Dzong-ka-ba in his *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* (P6153, vol. 156, 64.2.3).

Interpretation is not limited to scripture as it also applies to objects. The interpretation or hermeneutic of scripture is called *rjod byed drang nges*, literally, "the interpretable and the definitive with respect to means of expression," and the hermeneutic of objects is called *brjod bya'i drang nges*, literally, "the interpretable and the definitive with respect to objects of expression." "Objects of expression" means objects such as tables, chairs, bodies, emptinesses, and so forth which are the objects or referents of words (means of expression) such as "table," "chair," "body," "emptiness," and so forth. (From this it is clear that referential language is not the object of negation by Mādhyamika reasoning.)

In the Middle Way School the division of scriptures into the two categories of the interpretable and definitive is made based on the school's estimation of what final reality is, what the school's interpretation of emptiness is. It is a task of interpretation to determine why Buddha taught the non-definitive in terms of the need, or existential situation, of the listener. Thus, the hermeneutic is ontologically based within being inextricably involved with consideration of the levels of trainees.

With respect to the two classes of objects, emptinesses are definitive in that they are the final mode of subsistence of objects whereas conventional phenomena are in need of interpretation to determine their final mode of subsistence. Thus, a basic task of all beings is to interpret appearances—to recognize that what is appearing is not the final mode of being of those objects and to seek that final nature, not to obliterate the appearance of the object but to know its inner nature and thereby be better able to respond with respect to it.

non-deceptiveness, is the ultimate truth. All conditioned things are false, having the attribute of deceptiveness [appearing to exist in their own right when in fact they do not].

and so forth. Similarly:

There is here no suchness and no non-erroneous suchness. These have the attribute of deception. These also have the attribute of destructive allurement.[1053] These also are falsities; these are illusions, bewilderments of children.

Similarly:[1054]

Forms are like balls of foam.
Feelings are like bubbles.
Discriminations resemble mirages.
Compositional factors are like banana tree trunks.[a]
Consciousnesses resemble magical illusions.
Thus the Sun Friend Buddha said.[b]

and similarly:

If monastics—mindful and attentive, exerting effort—analyze phenomena day and night, they should realize peace, the auspicious abode of the extinction of conditioned things, the selflessness of phenomena.[1055]

and so forth.

Due to not understanding [Buddha's] thought in teaching this way, some would have doubt:

Here, what is the teaching having the meaning of suchness? What indeed is that having [some other] thought [as its basis]?

and due to having weak intelligence some think teachings that in fact require interpretation are definitive. In order to dispel with reasoning and scripture the doubt and wrong understanding of these two, the master [Nāgārjuna] composed this [*Treatise on the Middle*].

There are differentiators of scriptures requiring interpretation and those of definitive meaning:

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[a] The plantain tree. As mentioned earlier, I assume this to be referring to the trunk of the tree which, much like an onion, has no core. However, Kensur Yeshe Thupten of L̄o-s̄el-l̄ing College takes it as referring to the fact that such trees bear fruit only once and are useless thereafter. Poussin (41, n. 8) says that these lines are cited in *Saṃyuttanikāya III,* 142.

[b] For Buddhapālita's citation of this, see 719; for Bhāvaviveka's extensive explanation of it, see 722.

- because they are differentiated by the four reliances [the third being, "Rely on sūtras of definitive meaning, not on those requiring interpretation,"], and
- because they are differentiated by reasonings as in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle:*[1056]

  Things are never produced
  At all anywhere
  From themselves, other,
  Both, or causelessly.

  and so forth, and by many scriptural citations such as in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* (537):[1057]

  The Supramundane Victor said that
  Deceptive phenomena are falsities
  All conditioned things are deceptive phenomena,
  Therefore, they are falsities.

  When asked "Is a former limit [of cyclic existence][1058] discerned?"
  The Great Subduer said, "No."
  Cyclic existence is without beginning or end.
  [Ultimately] it has no former and later parts [and thus does not inherently exist].

  In the "Advice to Kātyāyana"
  "Exists," "does not exist," and "both"
  Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor, knower of
  [The nature of][1059] things and non-things.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Sūtras[a] that teach through taking obscurational truths as their main objects of explicit instruction are sūtras requiring interpretation because the final mode of subsistence of the phenomena [discussed therein] must be interpreted as other than what is explicitly indicated. Sūtras that teach through taking ultimate truths as their main objects of explicit instruction are definitive sūtras because the final mode of subsistence of the phenomena [discussed therein] is definite as what is explicitly indicated.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1060] The differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive is devised from the viewpoint of the subject matter [in the passage]. For, it is explained that a sūtra mainly teaching the ultimate [emptiness] is definitive, whereas one mainly teaching conventionalities

[a] "Sūtra" here does not necessarily mean an entire sūtra; it can refer to a sūtra passage.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

[phenomena other than emptiness] requires interpretation. The *Teaching of Akṣhayamati Sūtra* says:[1061]

> What are definitive sūtras? What require interpretation? Sūtras setting forth the establishment of conventionalities are called "requiring interpretation." Sūtras setting forth the establishment of the ultimate are called "definitive."

Question: How are conventionalities and the ultimate established?

Answer: There are ways of establishing them because, respectively, the setting forth of any of the varieties of actions and agents through various words and letters is the way that conventionalities are established and the setting forth of the doctrine of [emptiness which] is unapprehendable [as inherently existent], is beyond awareness, difficult to view, and difficult to realize is the way that the ultimate is established. The *Teaching of Akṣhayamati* says:[1062]

> Those sūtras teaching [about various objects] by way of various words and letters are called "requiring interpretation." Those teaching the profound, difficult to view, and difficult to realize are called "definitive." Those teaching, for instance, [the inherent existence of] an owner[a] when there is no [inherently existent] owner and teaching those objects indicated by various words [such as] self, sentient being, life, nourisher, being, person, progeny of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer are "requiring interpretation." Those sūtras teaching the doors of liberation—the emptiness of things, no [inherently existent] signs, no [inherently existent] wishes, no [inherently existent] products, no [inherently existent] production, no [inherently existent] sentient being, no [inherently existent] living being, no [inherently existent] person, and no [inherently existent] controller—are called "definitive." This is called "reliance on definitive sūtras and non-reliance on those requiring interpretation."

[a] J̄ang-ḡya (*Presentations of Tenets,* 316.1) points out that the long list of synonyms of self refers also to the instruments and objects related to the agent, the person. Geshe Gedün Lodrö said that though the addition of "inherently existent" in brackets to "owner" is appropriate, it is not necessary because the word "self" carries with it the force of inherent existence. He added that this still does not mean that all instances of the word "self" mean either "inherent existence" or "inherently existent person," since it often refers to a nominally existent person. Even a Buddha is a person, self, and I, but a Buddha speaks of his "self" based on a valid consciousness perceiving a nominally existent self. A Buddha's deeds are not based on a false view of a self as existing inherently in its basis of imputation.

The subjects, the teachings of conventional phenomena in, for instance, the first wheel of doctrine and in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* require interpretation because it is necessary to search out the mode of subsistence [of the phenomena mentioned in these texts] upon interpreting it as other than the meaning explicitly taught there. The subjects, the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra,* the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*, and so forth, have definitive meaning because the mode of subsistence of the phenomena [discussed in those texts] is definite as the meaning of their explicit teaching.

With respect to interpreting the mode of existence [of the conventional phenomena mentioned in the first and third wheels] there are examples [such as a magician's illusions that contradict them], but the interpretation is from the viewpoint of [there being a pedagogic] purpose [that gave rise to the teaching]. Most passages requiring interpretation should have [both examples contradicting them and pedagogic purpose]. With respect to interpretation of the subject matter, reasonings such as not being able to find [the object imputed] damage [the teaching of conventionalities if one takes merely that to be the final mode of subsistence]. Also, scriptures saying in one voice that all products are false and so forth damage [such].[a]

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[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 62a.3) finds this paragraph inexplicable; however, Geshe Gedün Lodrö explained it as if without problem. His commentary with the original underlined is: *dgongs gzhi gnas lugs kyi don ni bstan tshul de las gzhan du 'dren pa la dpe yod kyang (cing) de dag dgos pa'i sgo nas drang don du 'grel tshul te drang don gyi mdo sde phal cher la de ltar dgos shing brjod bya'i sgo nas drang don du 'grel tshul ni btags don btsal na mi rnyed pa sogs kyi rigs pas gnod*…

In any case, a passage is said to require interpretation due to having three factors:

- a basis in Buddha's thought (*dgongs gzhi*): this is not Buddha's intention or purpose in teaching, for instance, a mind-basis-of-all, but the ontological basis in the Buddha's own thought, which in this case is emptiness
- a purpose (*dgos pa*): the pedagogical intention, such as teaching a permanent self in order to provide a means for the connection of actions with their effects for those who temporarily are unable to understand such within the context of mere nominal existence
- damage to the literal teaching (*dngos la gnod byed*): contradiction of that teaching by reasoning and scripture. Even in the case of literally acceptable teachings such as those of the five aggregates, if one took such to be the final mode of subsistence of the phenomena discussed, this would be contradicted by the reasonings proving emptiness and scriptures on emptiness.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is using this format, with the addition of examples that contradict the explicit teaching.

> Also, [with respect to definitive sūtras] many examples such as illusions, many reasons such as "If [the object imputed] is sought, it is not found," and many scriptures teaching the profound absence of production determine that the final mode of existence is just this [that is set forth explicitly in the text].

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are two modes of interpretation:

- one when interpretation is necessary because it is not suitable to assert the passage literally
- and one when interpretation is necessary because the literal meaning, though established by valid cognition, is not the final mode of being [of the phenomena discussed].

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1063] Here [in the system of the Consequence School] the way that texts requiring interpretation are to be interpreted [or literally, "led"] does not refer to *leading* trainees—as by the indirect teachings [of a real self for the sake of] introducing them [to virtuous endeavor]—but to *interpreting* the subject being discussed. In brief, there are two ways of interpretation:
>
> - one when the literal meaning of the passage is not even suitable to be what is expressed by the sūtra as in, "Father and mother are to be killed," [which actually teaches that "existence" and "attachment" are to be abandoned[1064]
> - and the other when the literal meaning of the passage is suitable to be what the sūtra expresses but interpretation is required to determine the mode of subsistence of the phenomena discussed in the text, that is, their emptiness]. For instance, though the teaching that pleasures arise from wholesome actions and sufferings from unwholesome actions is literal, it would not be suitable to assert that the arising of pleasures from wholesome actions and the arising of sufferings from unwholesome actions is the mode of subsistence of the two actions. Rather, one must interpret their mode of subsistence otherwise, as lacking self [that is, inherent existence].
>
> Thus, there are, in brief, two modes of interpretation:
>
> 1. interpretation of that which is not literally acceptable [in order to discover the subject matter]
> 2. interpretation of the literally acceptable [in order to discover the final nature of the phenomena discussed].

Word Commentary on Root Text: The first and last wheels of doctrine as set forth in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* are non-literal sūtras requiring

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

interpretation. The middle wheel of the doctrine as set forth there are literal definitive scriptures. Therefore, on this occasion [of the Consequence School] it is not suitable to assert what requires interpretation and what is definitive according to their differentiation in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.*

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1065] *The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra* says:[1066]

> One knows the features of definitive sūtras
> In accordance with the teaching of emptiness by the One Gone to Bliss.
> All doctrines of a sentient being, a person, a being,
> Are to be known as requiring interpretation.

Therefore, [the Consequentialists'] differentiation of the three wheels of the teaching [as to whether they require interpretation] also does not accord with the system set forth in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.* [Lesser Vehicle passages] such as the *Extensive Sport Sūtra* which says:[1067]

> I have found a truth, profound, peaceful, lacking proliferations,
> Radiant, uncompounded, the ambrosia.
> Though I taught it, no one would understand.
> I should stay without speaking in the forest.

and the Lesser Vehicle sūtras quoted in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* that explicitly teach the ultimate are sūtras of the first wheel, but [the Consequentialists] say that these do not require interpretation. Hence, there is no necessity that the individual three wheels [as presented by the Consequentialists] be the first, second, and third wheels as identified in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* [which states that every scripture of the first wheel requires interpretation].

Of the three wheels [identified] in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought:*

- The first wheel explains that the four truths and so forth exist by way of their own character[a]
- The last wheel explains that imputational natures do not exist inherently[b] and that other-powered phenomena and

[a] *rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa, svalakṣaṇasat.*

[b] Here "do not exist inherently" (*rang bzhin med pa, svabhāva-asat*) is taken to mean "do not exist by way of their own character" (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis med pa, svalakṣaṇa-asat*) because, according to D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Proponents of Mind-Only assert that existent imputa-

thoroughly established phenomena exist ultimately and inherently.

[According to the Consequence School] these two types of sūtras require interpretation. Also, since the *Heart of Wisdom Sūtra*[1068] of the middle [wheel of the teaching], for instance, says, "[Avalokiteshvara] was viewing [the five aggregates] as empty of inherent existence," such [sūtras] are definitive [and, contrary to what the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says, do not require interpretation].

This way [that the Consequentialists divide scriptures into those requiring interpretation and the definitive] does not accord with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* [which states that the first and second wheels require interpretation and that the third wheel is definitive. However, the Consequentialists' disagreement with the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought*] does not mean that it contradicts the thought [of Buddha], for such [a system as is set forth in that sūtra] is suitable for certain types of trainees, and [no matter how much it differs from the final system] it does not contradict Buddha's thought. It is like, for example, the fact that Hearers are never permitted to kill, but certain Great Vehicle practitioners are permitted to do so in accordance with a purpose. Though these two are systems of one speaker, they are not contradictory [in that the difference is explained through taking into account the level of the listener].

Word Commentary on Root Text: Five types of passages in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra, Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned,* and so forth in consideration that:

1. there is no creator other than the mind
2. forms and so forth are only posited by the Brahmā of consciousness without existing inherently
3. emptiness
4. the two—other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures—have a conventional existence that is not posited by names and terminology according to how the Yogic Practitioners assert being posited by names and terminology
5. lineages [of spiritual potential of sentient beings] are temporarily different

and so forth, say:

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tional natures inherently exist but do not exist by way of their own character; see Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of Tenets,* 46.7 and 48.8.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

1. these three realms are mind-only
2. there are no external objects, only mind
3. a permanent, stable matrix of One-Gone-Thus and a mind-basis-of-all exist
4. other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are truly established
5. there are three final vehicles.

These five types of passages are established as requiring interpretation and non-literal.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1069] With respect to passages that are to be interpreted [and are non-literal], what are here on this occasion [in the system of the Consequence School] the basis in Buddha's thought, the purpose, and the refutation of the explicit meaning?…
>
> *Three Vehicles*
>
> The teaching of three vehicles is for the sake of leading those who do not understand the one vehicle…
>
> *Mind-Only*
>
> Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1070]
>
> > These passages [in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* and so forth]
> > Show that other sūtras of such type require interpretation.
>
> His own commentary on this says:[1071]
>
> > What are the "other such passages [that require interpretation"? The teaching of] the non-existence of imputational natures and the [inherent] existence of other-powered natures that occurs in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* when explaining the three natures—imputational natures, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures. Similarly, [the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* teaches]:[1072]
> >
> > > There is a deep and subtle consciousness, the taker [of rebirth],
> > > Having all the seeds and flowing like the continuum of a river.
> > > If it were understood as a self, it would not be proper,
> > > Thus I do not teach it to children.
> >
> > and so forth. [The *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra*] says:[1073]
> >
> > > Just as a doctor distributes
> > > Medicines to the ill,
> > > So Buddha teaches even mind-only
> > > To sentient beings in that way.

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> This passage [from the *Descent into Laṅkā*] clarifies that [those types of passages] require interpretation.

Accordingly, [the *Descent into Laṅkā*] says that just as a doctor distributes individual medicines in accordance with illnesses, so Buddha teaches trainees mind-only and so forth. And the *Descent into Laṅkā* says that all passages taught merely in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings require interpretation and that since if these teachings are taken literally, one comes into mistake, like apprehending water in a mirage, one should not be enamored of the words but seek the definitive meaning [emptiness]:[1074]

> Sūtras teaching in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings have meaning that is mistaken; they are not discourse on suchness. Just as a deer is deceived by a waterless mirage into apprehending water, so doctrine taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] pleases children but is not discourse establishing the wisdom of Superiors. Therefore, you should follow the meaning and not be enamored of the expression…

The explanation in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra*—through the example of [the distribution of medicine to] the sick—that the teaching of mind-only [requires interpretation] shows that the teaching of mind-only in the "Questions of Maitreya" chapter of the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* requires interpretation.

[Nevertheless[a]] like Bhāvaviveka, Chandrakīrti's *Supplement,* [drawing] from the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* itself, explains that the statement in the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*,[1075] "These three realms are mind-only," [means] that the creator propounded by the Forders does not exist and that only the mind is the principal creator:[1076]

> Bodhisattvas on the Manifest [sixth ground] nearing [the element of attributes]
> Who understand that the three realms are only consciousness
> Realize the negation of a permanent self as the creator,
> Whereby they realize that the creator is only mind.

[a] According to the Consequence School "mind-only" is not always a non-literal teaching requiring interpretation, since it is often taught for the sake of emphasizing that the principal creator of pleasure, pain, activities, and so on is the mind and not a deity or anything else. Thus, when the teaching of mind-only does not reject external objects, it is a valid, literal teaching even for the Consequence School. It requires interpretation only to determine the final mode of existence of the phenomena discussed.

Not only that, but also the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:[1077]

I explain as mind-only
[What is held to be] the creator —
Person, continuum, aggregates, conditions,
Particles, principal, and Īshvara.

There are those who, though they are Buddhists, advocate as the creator a substantially existent person or a continuum or aggregates that are asserted to be the person. Also, some Buddhists advocate substantially existent conditions as the creator. The Vaisheṣhikas advocate particles as the creator of the world; the Sāṃkhyas, the principal; and the Aishvaras, Īshvara. Refuting them, Buddha said that only the mind is the creator.

If [this passage from the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*[a] did mean that] there are no forms separate from a [truly existent] mind, [why did Buddha in the same sūtra] say,[1078] "The mind [is produced] by the cause of actions"? Also, he would not have spoken [of the production] of name and form [by consciousness if there were no form]. Also, [the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*] explains that the mind creates the varieties of the world. Hence, you should understand [that here the word "only" of mind-only] refutes a creator that is not mainly the mind [and thus in this context does not refute external objects].

Question: Well then, does the statement in the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* that says:[1079]

[Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived;
The mind appears as various [objects through the power of predispositions].
[Because the mind is generated] in the likeness of bodies [senses], enjoyments [objects of senses], and abodes [physical sense organs and environments],
I have explained [that all phenomena are] mind-only.

explain [that the mind is the main creator and does not refute ex-

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[a] Proponents of Mind-Only say that this passage from the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* refutes forms that are entities external to a perceiving consciousness and that this is done through understanding that the three realms are only the truly existent mind. However, as Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den* says, it would be inadmissible for Buddha to say in the same sūtra that the mind exists inherently and that the mind is produced from causes because inherent existence and dependent-arising are mutually exclusive.

* *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ya,* 128.8, which is based on Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement"* (P5263, vol. 98, 134.3.8).

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ternal objects]?

Answer: No. Here a doctrine of mind-only that refers to the non-existence of external objects is presented, and it is said that what is perceived as bodies, enjoyments, and abodes is the entity of the mind [perceiving them]. The teaching of such in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* and so forth is for the sake of overcoming trainees' attachment to forms and so forth. With respect to the basis of Buddha's thought [when he taught the non-literal teaching of mind-only meaning no external objects], it is clear that he was thinking that all phenomena are posited through their mental images as [is taught in] Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*.[a] In this context he set forth mind-only.

The refutation of this type of mind-only by both Bhāvaviveka and this master [Chandrakīrti] is the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] himself. Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:[1080]

The Subduer's teaching
That all these are mind-only
Was so that children would forsake their fears.

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[a] P5225, vol. 95, 11.5.3. The "basis in Buddha's thought" (*dgongs gzhi*) is not Buddha's intention or purpose in teaching mind-only but the basis in fact that he was speaking from. According to the system of the Consequence School, external objects exist; therefore, the teaching of mind-only meaning no external objects is not founded itself in fact. But on what fact is it founded—what was the basis in Buddha's thought? According to Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, ra,* 129.6), it was founded on the fact that phenomena are designated by way of their aspect or image (*rnam pa*) being posited in the consciousness observing them, and in this sense the elements and so forth are said in Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* to be included in consciousness (659), for they are only posited by consciousness. With this as the ontological basis in his own thought, Buddha taught that all phenomena are mind-only, intending to communicate that there are no external objects to those temporarily unable to realize this deeper fact. Hence, the thought of the speaker (*gsung ba po'i dgongs pa*) and the thought of what he said (*gsung rab kyi dgongs pa*) differ, as he was not, at that time, communicating his own deeper understanding.

A point to be gleaned from this type of explanation (as found in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence*) is that according to this tradition Buddha spoke from a basis of specific understanding; his skill in means wrought changes in what he said according to his audience, but it is not that there was no basis in his own thought. Thus, his word needs to be explained in terms of both the needs of the listener and his own grounding in actual fact. When the existential need of the trainee was at odds with the ontological fact, his teaching is subject to refutation by scripture and reasoning. Thus, the interpretation of scripture revolves around the triad mentioned above—the basis in Buddha's thought (or the ontological fact), the purpose (or existential need of the trainee), and damage to the explicit teaching (or refutation by valid sources of knowledge).

> It is not suchness.

and Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:[1081]

> Just as a grammarian [first] has [students] read a model of the alphabet, so Buddha taught trainees the doctrines they were able to bear. To some he taught doctrines in order to turn them away from ill-deeds. This was so that some [beings of small capacity] would achieve [the fruits of] merit [in rebirths as gods and humans]. He taught some [beings of middling capacity] doctrines based on the dualism [of object and subject as different entities]. To some he taught doctrines not based on dualism [teaching them that object and subject are empty of being separate entities and that consciousness ultimately exists]. He taught some [beings of heightened faculties] doctrines profound and frightening to the fearful, having an essence of emptiness and compassion, the means of achieving [highest] enlightenment.

Therefore, Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1082]

> These sūtras teaching no external objects of perception,
> Teaching that the mind appears as the varieties of objects,
> Turn away from forms those extremely attracted to forms.
> These also just require interpretation.[a]

...

Permanent, Stable Matrix of One-Gone-Thus and Mind-Basis-of-All

There is the teaching in the *Matrix of One-Gone-Thus Sūtra* of a permanent body adorned with the marks and beauties of a Buddha, possessing the powers and so forth, and existing in the continuums of all sentient beings. This is explained, as before [in the case of the teaching of mind-only that means no external objects] to require interpretation from the viewpoint of another basis in [Buddha's] thought, a purpose, and the fact that there are refutations of the explicit teaching.

Both this [teaching of a permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings] and the teaching of the existence of a basis-of-all have emptiness as the basis in his thought. The refutation of the explicit

[a] This quote has its own history of disputation because in Ge-luk-b̄a presentations of the Consequence School the self and the aggregates are asserted to exist conventionally, whereas the basis-of-all does not exist in any way whatsoever, and yet the three are treated similarly here without seeming to give the self and the aggregates any status that the basis-of-all does not have.

teaching is that if it were taken literally, such a teaching would be like that of the Forders. Hence, the teaching of a permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings is proved by reasoning to require interpretation. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1083]

> The teachings that a basis-of-all exists, that the person [inherently] exists,
> And that only the aggregates [inherently] exist
> Should be taken as teachings for those who would not understand
> The very profound meaning [of emptiness].

[For the Consequentialists, the teaching of an impermanent mind-basis-of-all actually is based on a permanent matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus—the emptiness of the mind.] The *Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned* says:[1084]

> [Just as] the lands are the basis of all the various [moving animate beings and non-moving inanimate things],[1085]
> The virtuous matrix of One Gone to Bliss is also [the basis of all of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa].
> Ones-Gone-Thus teach the matrix
> With the term "basis-of-all."
> Though the matrix is proclaimed as the basis-of-all,
> Those of weak intelligence do not understand.

Thus a natural lineage that is the emptiness of true existence of the mind in each sentient being—the matrix of One Gone to Bliss or Buddha-lineage—is called a basis-of-all. For it abides as the nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment possible, these terms all referring to the emptiness of the mind. The natural lineage or Buddha-lineage—the emptiness of inherent existence of the mind—is called *ālayavijñāna,* which here means "basis-of-all which is to be known well."] *Vijñāna* is so called because of being that which knows [that is, the knower] or because of being this which is to be known well or in detail [that is, the known]. Taking [the term *vijñāna* of *ālayavijñāna*] according to the latter etymology [as "that which is to be minded or known in detail"], the matrix of One-Gone-Thus is proclaimed as *vijñāna,* that which is to be known in detail. Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement"* says:[1086]

> It should be known that because it abides as the nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment possible], only emptiness is indicated by the term "mind-basis-of-all" (*ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi rnam shes*).

Other-Powered Natures and Thoroughly Established Natures that are Truly Established

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1087]

> Thus, one has understood the arrangement of scriptures [of definitive meaning and requiring interpretation]. Any sūtra setting forth non-suchness, teaching that which requires interpretation, is to be interpreted. Through realizing [this, these provisional teachings become a cause of entering into the realization that phenomena do not exist inherently]. Also, know that [any sūtra] that bears the meaning of emptiness is definitive.

Through such passages it is explained that the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* requires interpretation where it teaches the differentiation of the [true] existence and absence of [true] existence of the first two of the three natures of the Mind-Only School [respectively, other-powered natures and imputational natures]:

- because the teaching in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* that effective things truly exist and so forth [which needs to be interpreted as having their conventional existence as the basis in Buddha's thought] is explained by the *Teaching of Akṣhayamati Sūtra* and so forth to require interpretation, and
- because [Consequentialists] distinguish the existence and nonexistence of the three natures in accordance with the "Questions of Maitreya" [chapter] of the *Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra,* [saying that] all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses do not ultimately exist but exist only in the terminology and conventions of the world. For there it is said in answer to a question about the way that forms and so forth exist,[1088] "They exist according to the terminology and conventions of the world but not ultimately," and thus it is said that all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses [only nominally exist].

And therefore, Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says:[1089]

> I will say a little bit [about our own system's presentation of the three natures]. For instance, a snake is [only] superimposed on a coiled rope which is a dependent-arising, for there is no snake in the rope. However, a snake is thoroughly established in an actual snake because it is not superimposed. Similarly, that the final nature is in other-powered natures, which are products, is a superimposition [because] the final nature is not

a product, for [Nāgārjuna] says:[1090]

> The nature is not fabricated
> And is not dependent on another.

This final nature that is superimposed on presently apprehended products, which are dependent-arisings and like reflections [in that the way they appear and the way they exist do not agree], is the actual final nature as the object of a Buddha. For [as the object of a Buddha's realization] it is not superimposed. Not contacting [or being obstructed by] things that are products, [a Buddha's wisdom knowing the mode of subsistence] actualizes only the final nature. Since they understand suchness, they are called "Buddha."

Hence, one has thus understood the presentation of the three natures—imputational, other-powered, and thoroughly established. [In this way] the thought of the *Sūtra [Unraveling the Thought]* is to be explained [as requiring interpretation].

[The Proponents of Mind-Only treat a difference of entity of] the two, apprehending subjects and apprehended objects [imputed in dependence on other-powered natures] as a [non-existent] imputational nature. This should be considered [that is to say, analyzed], because apprehending subjects and apprehended objects [are other-powered natures and] other-powered natures [that are not subjects or objects] do not exist as effective things.

Let us illumine a little the meaning of his words. The way of superimposition is that whereas the final mode of subsistence does not exist as perceived in an other-powered nature, it is perceived there through superimposition. For the perception that other-powered natures exist as their own mode of abiding despite their not actually so existing is an imaginary superimposition, since it is like, for example, the superimposition by a consciousness apprehending a rope as a snake despite the snake's not existing in the rope. This is because other-powered natures do not fulfill the sense of a non-fabricated nature, and so forth.

Other-powered natures presently being seen or apprehended are like mirror reflections in that there is no agreement between the way they appear and the way they are. Their nature or mode of being is an actual thoroughly established nature [that is, an emptiness] according to the sight of Buddhas because they perceive without superimposing existence on what nevertheless does not exist. This is because it is like, for example, a snake's not being

superimposed on an actual snake, and thus the object apprehended is thoroughly established.

This establishes a definition and an etymology of "thoroughly established"[a] and also explains that other-powered natures are the bases of the superimposition of imputational natures as well as the bases of emptinesses—thoroughly established natures.

Word Commentary on Root Text: However, in the root text Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, upon enumerating six sūtra passages,[b] establishes that five sūtra passages require interpretation. This is because the teaching of mind-only for the sake of refuting that there is another creator is literal and hence there are five sūtra passages to be commented upon as requiring interpretation.

Question: Then, the explanation that the non-existence of a creator other [than the mind] is the basis in [Buddha's] thought[c] [for this type of teaching of mind-only] would be incorrect [since, if this teaching has a basis in his thought, this means that it requires interpretation].

Answer: I think that probably it should be explained that "He set forth mind-only *for the sake of understanding* that there is no other creator," and not that "He set forth mind-only *within considering*[d] that there is no other creator."[1091]

6: Tenets {3}

This section has three parts: presentations of the basis, paths, and fruits.

A: Presentation of the Basis {5}

This section has five parts: the features of the object of negation, of the reasonings refuting the object of negation, of the basal two truths, of unique features, and of the valid cognitions certifying those as well as an elimination of error.

1* Object of Negation {2}

This section has two parts: measure of what is negated and correctness of this measure.

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[a] *yongs grub, pariniṣpanna.*

[b] Those teaching mind-only, no external objects, a permanent matrix, the existence of a basis-of-all, the true existence of other-powered natures and of thoroughly established natures, and three final vehicles.

[c] *dgongs gzhi.*

[d] *dgongs nas.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

a Measure of what is Negated*

All of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa appearing and renowned—the diversity and the mode of being—are posited by innate non-analysis according to the conventions of the world. Therefore, existing objectively not imputed to there by conceptuality, substantially existing, established by way of its own character, established from its own side, truly established, inherently established, and so forth are equivalent as what is negated.

Word Commentary on Root Text: All phenomena—the forms and so forth[a] of cyclic existence (the afflicted class) and of nirvāṇa (the pure class)—included within the mode of being and the diversity appearing and renowned, that is, dawning, to awareness must be posited as existing according to the world's conventions by innate non-analytical and non-investigatory awareness. Therefore:

- established objectively without being only imputed to there by term and conceptuality
- substantially existing
- established by way of own character
- established from its own side
- truly established
- inherently established

and so forth are equivalent as what is negated.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1092] This does not mean that the mode [of being of phenomena, that is, emptiness] is posited in the perspective of a worldly innate awareness, but means that the *existence* of emptiness is posited in the perspective of a worldly innate awareness.
>
> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1093] Forms and so forth:
>
> - the phenomena of cyclic existence—the afflicted class
> - [the phenomena of nirvāṇa]—the pure class
>
> which are all included within the diversity and their mode of being, appearing and renowned—that is, dawning to the mind—must be posited in the perspective of the innate worldly [awareness] that does not analyze [to try to find] the object imputed and does not make superimpositions conceiving [phenomena] to be truly

[a] For a list of these 108 phenomena, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 201-212.

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established. Therefore, all the diversity and their mode of being [that is, their emptiness] are only imputed [from the subject's side to] there [the object's side] by terms and conceptuality because—except for those phenomena being just nominally imputed [from the subject's side] to there—neither their individual parts, nor the mere composite [of their parts], nor the continuum of the thing['s moments], and so forth are those phenomena. For example, in darkness a coiled speckled rope is imputed by conceptuality to be a snake, and from a distance a cairn[a] is merely imagined to be a human…Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland*…says:[1094]

If a person is not earth, not water,
Not fire, not wind, not space,
Not consciousness, and not all of them,
What person is there other than these?

The passage "a person is not earth, not water, not fire, not wind, not space, not consciousness" explains that a person is not each of the bases of the imputation "person." The statement "not all" explains that a person is also not the composite of the bases of imputation "person" [that is, not the composite of the six constituents]. The statement "What person is there other than these?" explains that there also is no person that does not depend on [the six constituents which are] the bases of imputation.

Hence, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say that even [the highest of phenomena,] nirvāṇas and emptinesses, are only posited [from the subject's side to] there [the object's side] by names and conceptuality. Accordingly, [the Consequence School,] unlike the Autonomy School and so forth, asserts that the following list, except for being different names, have similar meaning and are [hypothetically][b] equivalent as what is negated by the reasonings [proving emptiness]:

- existing on [that is, as integral to] the object imputed
- substantially existing
- established able to establish itself—these two [that is, this and the preceding one] are opposites of dependent-arising [as are all the others]
- established by way of its own character

[a] A vertical pile of stones.

[b] As Kensur Lekden emphasized, the terms are only hypothetical (*brtag pa mtha' bzung,* literally "holding an extreme for the sake of analysis" and thus heuristic) equivalents (*don gcig*) because equivalents are existent by definition, and no member of this list exists.

- established from [the object's] own side [rather than being imputed from the subject's side]
- established through its own power
- truly established
- inherently established.

b Correctness of the Measure of what is Negated*

Positing all actions and agents in this non-existence from their own side and imputation there by name and conceptuality is the middle, free from extremes. Anything coarser or finer than this is an extreme of permanence or annihilation.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The wise who know how to posit all phenomena—without blemish and without fissure—all the actions, objects, and agents of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa in this non-existence from [the object's] own side and imputation there by name and conceptuality are the Proponents of the Middle. Aside from this way of positing [phenomena], any other assertions—either coarser, such as the establishment from their own side, or finer, non-existence even as only imputed by name and conceptuality—fall to extremes of permanence and annihilation.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1095] That which is to be refuted [by reasoning] must be identified from its subtlest level in that way, since, if it is not, one does not realize the actual non-existent that is the negative [or absence of inherent existence] because Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:[1096]
>
> Without contacting the superimposed existent
> One cannot apprehend its non-existence.
>
> and because Buddhapālita, the honorable Chandrakīrti, and many others assert that the emptiness of former and later births, for example, is not realized through only an utter vacuity that is the non-perception of former and later births, without identifying the aspect that is their absence of inherent existence. Buddhapālita says [in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*]:[1097]
>
> > [*The Nihilists say:*] "This world [or life] does not exist [as an effect of past lives]. A future world does not exist. Also, spontaneously born sentient beings [such as hell-beings] do not exist," and so forth. What is the difference between their view and the view [of the Proponents of the Middle] that all things are not produced and do not cease?
> >
> > *[Answer:]* There is a great difference between these two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think that these

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two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar only in that both can be characterized as acting with equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors. Just as these two differ very greatly, so here also the perceptions [found in the texts of the Nihilists] such as, "This world does not exist," [meaning that this life is not the effect of other lives] are thoughts beclouded with ignorance. However, the others [that is, the Proponents of the Middle]—who see that all phenomena are not [inherently] produced and do not [inherently] cease because they are empty of inherent existence—have preceded their conclusion with the mind of analysis. Therefore, these two [Nihilists and Proponents of the Middle] are very different.

and [Chandrakīrti's] *Clear Words* says:[1098]

Here some say, "The Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds [that is, lives] are empty of inherent existence, and the Nihilists also say that these are non-existent. Therefore, Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists."

It is not so.

"How?"

Proponents of the Middle are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions[a] all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not ascertain that future worlds [future lives] and so forth do not truly exist[b] because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings.

Therefore, [Consequentialists] refute the subtle object of negation—that is, refute that even particles exist from their own side—

[a] The phrase "or reliant on causes and conditions" (*hetupratyayān prāpya*, more literally, "meeting to causes and conditions") is missing in the Tibetan. The translation of the last sentence follows the Tibetan.

[b] *dngos po med pa, abhāva.*

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but know how to posit all actions and agents of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa within [asserting] that all phenomena are only nominalities and only imputations by conceptuality. [A person who maintains such a system] is a Proponent of the Middle—one who does not abide in the extreme of existence or permanence [such as asserting that phenomena] exist inherently, and so forth, and who [through propounding] the suitability of the existence of all phenomena conventionally as only nominalities, does not abide in the extreme of non-existence or annihilation…

Moreover, through affixing "inherent existence"[a] [to the refutation of existence] the extreme of non-existence is avoided,[b] and the extreme of [inherent] existence is avoided by [affirming that phenomena are] only imputations [and hence not inherently existent]. Therefore, the Autonomists' estimation of what is to be negated [that is, merely true existence and not inherent existence] is coarser than that [of the Consequentialists who refute that phenomena inherently exist even conventionally]. Also, some Tibetans [wrongly] do not accept even worldly trueness and falseness within being only nominal imputations; however, though [it is correct that there is no difference between] an illusory horse created by a magician and an actual horse with respect to their existing or not in accordance with how they appear,[c] one contradicts Chandrakīrti (594) if one does not accept a [worldly][1099] trueness and falseness with respect to whether something does or does not exist:[1100]

If the world does not harm you, based on the world itself
Refute these [conventionalities].
You and the world debate about these,
And afterwards I will rely on the stronger.

and, "Do not lose the conventionalities renowned in the world," and, "Perceivers of falsities are asserted as two types [those perceiving the real and unreal relative to a worldly consciousness]." Understanding that these [assertions] do not pass beyond adhering to extremes, you should cast them aside.

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[a] *rang bzhin, svabhāva.*

[b] This is because that which is negated as a predicate of phenomena is only inherent existence and not existence in general; a negation of existence in general would be an extreme of non-existence because phenomena do exist conventionally.

[c] Both an illusory horse and an actual horse appear as if they inherently exist, but in fact do not; therefore, they equally do not exist even conventionally in accordance with how they appear. See the index under "horse" for multiple passages concerning the controversy between Ḏak-tsang and Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa about this topic.

2* Reasonings Refuting Inherent Existence {2}

This section has two parts: brief indication and extensive explanation.

a Brief Indication of the Reasonings Refuting Inherent Existence*

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1101] Are the two selflessnesses [that is, the lack of inherent existence in persons and in other phenomena] delineated by way of separate reasonings within having treated the objects negated in the two selflessnesses as differing, in accordance with the Autonomists and below [that is, the Proponents of Mind-Only] and some Tibetan "Consequentialists" [who hold that the selflessness of persons is coarser and the selflessness of other phenomena is subtler]? In order to indicate that even though the objects of negation and the two selflessnesses do not differ in coarseness and subtlety, the reasonings delineating [the two selflessnesses] are separate, the root text says:

There are the two selves of persons and phenomena. The non-existence of these there is asserted as the two selflessnesses. A self of phenomena is refuted by the four—the vajra nodes and so forth. A self of persons is refuted by the fivefold and sevenfold. Both also by dependent-arising.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The two selves—the inherent existence of persons and the inherent existence of [other] phenomena—are respectively the self of persons and the self of other phenomena. Hence, the non-existence of those there is respectively asserted to be the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of other phenomena. The self of [other] phenomena is refuted by four reasonings:

- the vajra nodes
- the refutation of production of the four extreme types—existent effects, non-existent effects, both, and neither
- the refutation of production of the four alternatives
- dependent-arising.

Also, the self of persons is refuted by two—the five-fold and seven-fold reasonings. Also, both selves are refuted by the reasoning of dependent-arising itself.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1102] Non-dependence, or non-reliance, on another—the "other" being terms, conceptuality, and so forth—is the self to be negated. Absences of this self on its bases—persons and [other] phenomena—are respectively posited as the selflessness of persons and of phenomena…Four types of

reasonings refute a self of phenomena [other than persons]. A self of persons is refuted:

- by the reasoning in sūtra and in Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called "Wisdom"*[a] that is a searching for it in five ways
- and by the reasoning in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* that is a searching for it in seven ways, adding—based on the explanation that the mere composite [of the aggregates] is the basis of the imputation [and not the I]—two refutations of the assertions that the mere composite is the self and that the shape [of the body] is the self.

Both selves [of persons and of phenomena] are refuted by the reasoning that they lack being one and many and by the reasoning that they are dependent-arisings.

b Extensive Indication of the Reasonings Refuting Inherent Existence {2}*

This section has two parts: reasoning refuting a self of phenomena and reasoning refuting a self of persons together with an elimination of error.

1# REASONING REFUTING A SELF OF PHENOMENA {4}

This section has four parts: the diamond slivers; simultaneous refutation of production of the four extremes and production of the existent, the non-existent, both, and neither; refutation of production of the four alternative types; and the reasoning of dependent-arising making known [the absence of true existence in] all phenomena, along with an elimination of error.

a# Vajra Nodes {2}

This section has two parts: statement of the reasons and proofs for the modes of the reasons.

1^ Statement of the Reasons

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1103] Proponents of Sūtra, Proponents of Mind-Only, and Proponents of the Middle agree that when stating reasons to prove a thesis there should be no statement of proof without first overcoming the pointedness of the wrong view—adhered to as true [by the opponent]—with a demonstration of a consequence. However, here for the sake of easy

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[a] Chapters 10 and 22.

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exposition [a syllogism is stated in the root text]:

Because they are not produced from self, other, both, or causelessly, inherently established production does not exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Inherently established production of eyes and so forth does not exist because they are not produced from self, from other, from both, and causelessly.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:* [1104] Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1105]

Because there is no production from self, or other, or both,
Or without relying on causes, things lack inherent existence.

2^ *Proofs for the Modes of the Reasons {4}*

This section has four parts: refuting production from self, from other, from both, and causelessly.

A^ Refuting Production from Self

If produced from themselves, it would be senseless and endless. That which exists is not from itself. Causes and effects would always be seen. It would contradict the world's perception. All agents and objects would be one.

Word Commentary on Root Text:

- If [eyes and so forth] are produced from themselves, production would be senseless and would be endless.
- That which exists in something is not produced from that, like yogurt that exists in a bell-metal bowl.
- If the two, a seed and its resultant shoot, were one entity, the seed that is the cause and the effect that is the shoot would always be seen.
- Although the cause—the white seed—has disintegrated and is non-existent, the effect—the produced green shoot—is seen; therefore, if the seed and the shoot were one entity, it would contradict the world's perception.
- The agents and objects of cause and effect would all be one.

and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1106] Some Sāṃkhyas say:

A shoot exists at the time of its seed or of its [causal] entity. Since the natures of both the seed and the shoot exist as a

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partless unit—being mutually each other—there is no confusion of effects [with inappropriate causes], and production is feasible. However, if at the time of the cause [the effect] were totally non-existent, a non-existent [effect] could not be produced. If [that which is non-existent at the time of its causes] were produced, then even the horns of a rabbit could be produced.

The Proponents of Sūtra and above [that is, Proponents of Mind-Only and Proponents of the Middle] agree that *in general,* a non-existent is not produced, and, therefore, an existent is produced and agree that production is for the sake of the attainment of an existent entity by what is non-existent previous to its production. Moreover, no one [among the Proponents of Sūtra, Proponents of Mind-Only, and Proponents of the Middle] asserts, like the Sāṃkhyas, that [a thing] is produced from its own entity or that it is produced again. Hence:

- It follows about the subjects, things that have production, that their production again would be senseless because of having previously attained their entity.

  Objection: There is no necessity [that if things had previously attained their entity, their production again would be senseless].

  Answer: It [absurdly] follows about the subjects, things that have production, that their production is endless because [according to you] production again of what is already existent is meaningful.

  Here also, a Sāṃkhya might say, "There is no necessity [that, if production again of what is already existent is purposeful,[1107] the production of things would be endless. For we Sāṃkhyas say that what already exists in a non-manifest state must be produced or made manifest.]"

  However, the answer does not hit the mark because Sāṃkhyas do not assert that a previously non-existent [manifestation] is newly produced. [They cannot say that the previously non-existent *manifestation* of a shoot is produced since they would fall away from their own theory of the production of the existent.]
- It follows that there is no point in production of something from itself because of having already achieved its own entity.
- It [absurdly] follows either that a white seed only continues endlessly or that the production of only a green shoot

continues endlessly because [according to you] that which has already been produced is produced again.

- Though a cause, such as a white seed, has disintegrated and is non-existent, its effect—a shoot—is seen. Hence, even the world does not accept the simultaneity of seed and shoot, and thus such also contradicts what is seen.
- It [absurdly] follows that the agents and the objects of cause and effect [that is, producer and produced] would be one because something would produce itself.

Buddhapālita [says in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*]:[1108]

> Things are not produced from their own entities because [if they were][1109] their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. [Also] if, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.

and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:[1110]

> There is no point in the production of something from itself
> [that is, from a cause that is the same entity as itself because it would have already attained existence].
> Also, it is just not reasonable that what already has been produced be produced again.
> If it is thought that the already produced is produced again,
> The growing of a shoot, and so forth, would not be found here [in the world];
> The seed would be produced endlessly.
> How could that [seed] be destroyed by that [shoot? For, according to you, seed and shoot are not other.]
> For you, the shoot's shape, color, taste, capacity, and maturation
> Would not be different from those of its creator cause, the seed.
> If, having forsaken the entity [of the state] of the seed, it becomes an entity [of a state] different from it,
> Then how could it have the nature of that [seed]?
> If for you the seed is not other than the shoot here [in the world],
> Just as the seed [is unapprehendable at the time of the shoot], the shoot would not be apprehendable.
> Or, because they are one, just as the shoot [is apprehendable],

So the seed would be apprehendable [at the time of the shoot].
Therefore, this [non-otherness of the seed and shoot] is not to be asserted.
Though the cause has disintegrated, the effect is seen;
Hence, even the world does not assert that they are the same.
Therefore, this ascription of things arising from self
Is not admissible in suchness or even in the world.
If production from self were asserted, the produced and the producer,
Object and agent, would be one. Since they are not one,
Production from self is not to be asserted
Because of the fallacies extensively explained [here and in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*].

B^ REFUTING PRODUCTION FROM OTHER {2}

This section has two parts: actual exposition and elimination of error.

1) Actual Exposition Refuting Production from Other

If produced from other, then darkness would arise from a flame, and all would arise from all, both causes and non-causes. Because other, they could not be one continuum, like wheat and barley. They would have to be simultaneous, but it is not so. How could another be produced from another?

Word Commentary on Root Text: If produced from other:

- It [absurdly] follows that thick darkness is produced from a tongue of flame.
- What are and are not effects would all equally arise from what are and are not causes.
- Because of being others that are established by way of their own character, a seed and its shoot would not be suitable to be one continuum, as is the case, for example, with wheat and barley.
- Because whatever are established by way of their own character never disappear, a seed and its shoot would necessarily exist simultaneously, but a seed and its shoot do not exist simultaneously.

Therefore, how could there be production of an effect from another cause established by way of its own character? It does not exist.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1111] If [it is claimed that there is] production from other, then it contradicts many

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scriptures and reasons. The reasons are:

- It [absurdly] follows that thick darkness arises from a flame because another arises from what is other by way of its own character.
- Also, in accordance with the statement by the Superior [Nāgārjuna]:[1112]

  An [inherently existent] otherness
  Of cause and effect is never admissible.
  If there were an otherness of cause and effect,
  A cause would be the same as a non-cause.

  it [absurdly] follows that all would arise from what are its causes and from what are not its causes because cause and effect would be others established by way of their own character.

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1113]

If depending on others another arises,
Then from a tongue of fire even thick darkness would arise.
All would also be produced from all
Because non-producers [non-causes] would have otherness the same [as producers or causes].

Objection: The fallacies of these consequences do not apply. [Though a cause and its effect are others established by way of their own character][1114] an effect that is helped [by a cause] is the effect of that [cause]. A substantial cause and its effect are included in the one continuum of [for instance] a seed; they must be one continuum. That which is of a continuum different [from the effect] is not suitable to be [its] substantial cause, and so forth. For example, a barley seed is the cause of a barley shoot that is in its same continuum but is not a cause of a *kiṃshuka* flower.[1115]

Answer: [There are these unwanted consequences:]

- It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, a barley seed (a substantial cause) and a barley shoot (its effect) are not one continuum because [according to you] they mutually are others established by way of their own character, as in the case, for example, with Maitreya and Upagupta or as in the case with wheat and barley.
- It follows that a seed and its shoot are not others established by way of their own character because they do not exist simultaneously and also because, when cause and effect are others established by way of their own character, the actions of production and cessation, and so forth, are impossible.

The Superior [Nāgārjuna says in his *Treatise on the Middle*]:[1116]

The entities of the things [that are effects such as shoots]
Do not exist in their causes [either collectively or individually or in something other than their causes].
If [the effect's] own entity does not exist [at the time of its causes],
Then how could there be an entity of otherness [in the causes without the existence of the effect in relation to which they are called other]?

and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1117]

Objection: Just this is called something's effect because that something is able to create it.
That which is able to produce it, even though an other [established by way of its own character], is the cause. [Therefore, because of being special others, two things are cause and effect but not because of just being others in general.]
Since there is production from what is included in the same continuum and from what is a producer,
A shoot of rice is not [produced] from a barley [seed], and so forth.

Answer: Barley, the *kesara* lotus,[a] the *kiṃshuka* flower, and so forth
[Because of being other than a rice shoot] are not asserted to be producers of a rice shoot, do not have the capacity [of producing a rice shoot],
Are not included in the same continuum [as a rice shoot], and are not [what precedes a rice shoot and is][1118] homogeneous [with a rice shoot].
Just so, a rice seed also does not have these [four qualities] because it is just an other [established by way of its own character].

Shoot and seed do not exist simultaneously. [The shoot in relation to which a seed is called "other" does not exist at the same time as the seed, and thus there is no otherness.]
Without otherness how could the seed be other [than the shoot]?

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[a] "Rottieria intcotira; Mimusops Elengi, Mesua Ferrara" according to Poussin (*Muséon,* v. 11, 289 n.4). He (n.5) identifies *kiṃśuka* as "Butea Frondosa."

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Hence, it is not established that a shoot is produced from a seed.
Therefore, cast aside this position that there is production from other.

Objection: Just as the ascending and descending of the two ends of a scale
Are not seen to be non-simultaneous,
So the production of what is to be produced and the cessation of the producer are [simultaneous. Hence, cause and effect exist simultaneously and thus can be other in relation to each other.]
Answer: [Even] if [the two activities of the ascending and descending of the two ends of a scale] are simultaneous, here [in what is exemplified] there is no [simultaneity]; it is non-existent.

Because that which is presently being produced [for example, a shoot] is approaching production, it is non-existent.
That which is presently ceasing [for example, a seed], though existent, is asserted to be approaching disintegration.
Then, how is this similar to a scale [the activities of the two ends of which exist simultaneously]?
When [the shoot that acts as the base of the action of growing and thus is] the agent is non-existent, [the existence of the activity of the shoot's] growing is also not an admissible entity.

About this, some Proponents of the Autonomy Middle School object:

It is true that there is no truly established otherness and no simultaneity of [truly established] actions of production and cessation. However, is it not the thought of the *Rice Seedling Sūtra* [when it gives the example of the two ends of a scale][1119] that without investigation the actions of the seed's cessation and of the shoot's production simultaneously exist from their own side?

Damage accrues also to this the same as before. The thought of the sūtra is that these activities exist conventionally, not from their own side.

Objection: [According to you Consequentialists, production is not admissible because of the non-existence of otherness, which in turn is due to the non-simultaneity of seed and shoot. If so, then

production would exist because of the existence of otherness in whatever exists simultaneously. For example][1120] an eye consciousness is produced through depending on an eye sense, a visible form and so forth, and feeling which just are simultaneous [with the eye consciousness]. Therefore, mere production from other is established.

Answer: It follows that the subject, an eye consciousness, is not produced from others that exist simultaneously with it and are its producers—that is, a visible form, an eye sense, feeling, and so forth—because of already being established simultaneously with these as another. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1121]

> *Objection:* An eye consciousness has otherness in relation to its producers, an eye sense and so forth that exist simultaneously [with the eye consciousness] and the discrimination and so forth which arise together [with an eye consciousness].
>
> *Answer:* Of what use is production [to what already exists]?
>
> *Objection:* [An eye consciousness] does not exist [at the time of its causes].
>
> *Answer:* For this the fallacy [that the eye sense, and so forth would not be other than a not yet existent eye consciousness] has already been explained.

2) Elimination of Error concerning the Refutation of Production from Other

Refuting temporally different others, a mass exactly the same, and so forth are mistaken. Because it is explained that the four extremes are not asserted and that production from other is non-existent even in the world, its assertion here is a dance of the insane.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It should be known that the following, and so forth, are mistaken:

- Certain Tibetans say that temporally different others are refuted because a cause is necessarily former and an effect is necessarily later and what is other must be simultaneous.

  Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1122] Here, as an avenue for affixing extremely absurd fallacies to the assertion of production from other, certain Tibetans say that it is by way of the essential that a cause is necessarily former and an effect is necessarily later and what is other must be simultaneous [without the qualification of being inherently existent]. This is extremely illogical because all of

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> the fallacies refuting such similarly apply to yourself [since you also assert temporally different cause and effect] and because if you persist by saying that you have no assertions about this, the tiring work of seeking avenues [to refute production from other] is senseless.

- Many Tibetans assert coercion by an army [of many reasons] of exactly the same [type].[a]

Because it is explained [in Chandrakīrti's autocommentary to the *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"*] that production from the four extremes is not asserted and that production from other does not exist even in the terminology of the world, D̄ak-tsang's assertion[b] that in this context [of the Consequence School] there is production from other is like a dance of the insane.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1123] As was explained earlier (617), D̄ak-tsang's assertion here again of production from other has only the nature of the insane's wanting to do a dance having cut off the head of a dancing peacock and hung it on his behind. This is because you [D̄ak-tsang] quoted the *Rice Seedling Sūtra:*[1124]
>
> > Also, when a shoot is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by others, not created by both, not created by Īshvara, not metamorphosed by time, not arisen from particles, not arisen from its own nature, and not produced causelessly.
>
> and are seeking to explicate the system of these passages from Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words:*[1125]
>
> > The world does not employ analysis such as "from self" or

[a] They cite the mere reason of not being other over and over again with respect to various subjects in order to show that there is no production from other. They themselves call this "coercion by an army [of many reasons] of exactly the same [type]." In his commentary on Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (P6143, vol. 154, 37.4.1ff.), D̄zong-ka-b̄a indicates that for him their very usage of this name indicates their lack of good reasoning and, rather, a resorting to bombastic coercion.

[b] As I mentioned earlier, D̄ak-tsang himself does not assert production from other or that the "other" of production from other exists, since D̄ak-tsang does not hold that seed and shoot are merely other substantial entities conventionally. However, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a feels that D̄ak-tsang is forced to accept the principle that D̄ak-tsang aptly and correctly describes as belonging to D̄zong-ka-b̄a, namely, that seed and shoot exist, and since they are not one substantial entity, they must be other substantial entities. D̄ak-tsang, in fact, does not accept this principle, but Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a feels that he must do so in order to make any sense, and thus he forces on him these conclusions. See 547 and 617.

"from others" and so forth. The world understands only this, "An effect arises from a cause." The master [Nāgārjuna] presented [cause and effect] this way too.

and his *Supplement,*[1126] "Production from other is non-existent even in the world."

C^ REFUTING PRODUCTION FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER

Because of not being from self and other separately, production from both is also perforce refuted.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because production from self and production from other do not exist, production from both is also perforce refuted.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1127] Both the [theistic] Sāṃkhyas who propound Īshvara [together with the nature] as the cause and the Nirgranthas [that is, Jainas] assert, as was explained before [in chapters three and seven], that pots and so on are produced both from themselves and from others. Hence, these assertions are not feasible because the part of the assertion that is production from self is damaged by the earlier refutations of production from self and the part that is production from other is damaged by the earlier reasonings refuting production from other. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1128]

Also, production from both is not an admissible entity
Because those fallacies already set forth accrue to it.

D^ REFUTING CAUSELESS PRODUCTION

If produced causelessly, striving would be senseless. It would contradict perception. All would also be produced from all.

Word Commentary on Root Text: If [things] are produced causelessly:

- the planting of seeds, buying and selling, and so forth for the sake of the arising of effects would be senseless
- it would contradict the world's perceptions
- all effects would also be produced from all things.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1129] It [absurdly] follows that planting seeds, cooking food, and engaging in commerce for the sake of the arising of temporary and final effects are senseless because, though there are no causes, effects arise. Also, because of being produced causelessly, it [absurdly] follows that:

- crows have the decorations of peacock feathers

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- horses have horns
- just as a bread-fruit tree is not a cause of that tree's fruit, so trees bearing *nimba* [a bitter fruit], mango, and so forth also are not be the causes of their own fruit,[a]

and it [absurdly] follows that the ripening of mangos and *lakuca*[b] do not depend on the seasons, and so forth.

Even if [these consequences] are accepted, it is not admissible because there is much damage, such as that not only does causeless production contradict what is seen by the world, it strongly contradicts what is seen by the world. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1130]

> If it is viewed that [things] are produced only causelessly,
> Then everything would always arise even from everything,
> And for the sake of the arising of certain effects
> The world would not gather seeds and so forth, doing many
> hundreds of things [for the sake of those effects].

These positions were refuted earlier [in chapter two on the Nihilists, 100ff.].[c]

b# Simultaneous Refutation of Production of the Four Extremes and of the Existent, Non-Existent, Both, and Neither

If produced from other, consider existent, non-existent, both, or neither. What use for the existent? The non-existent lacks object and agent. These refute being both. What could they do for what lacks both?

Word Commentary on Root Text: With respect to refuting production from others upon distinguishing effects as four alternatives, if [things] are produced from others, one should consider, or analyze, what is produced by those causes—an inherently existent effect, an utterly non-existent effect, an effect that is both existent and non-existent, or an effect that is neither existent nor non-existent. Concerning those:

- Of what use is a cause—a producer—to an effect that inherently exists?
- The utterly non-existent is devoid of objects and agents, produced and producer.

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[a] See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 150, for a different rendition of this.

[b] Artocarpus Lacucha; a type of bread fruit.

[c] For more on the vajra nodes see also 785 and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 57-60, 131-150, and 639-650.

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- An effect that both inherently exists and is utterly non-existent is refuted by the former reasonings.
- For an effect that lacks both—that is, is neither—what would a cause, a producer, do? There would be no need for a cause.

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1131] No things have any of the three—inherently existent production, abiding, or ceasing—or production from [inherently existent] others because the existent, non-existent, both, and neither are not at all produced. As before, [reasoning and others' systems establish that if things have inherently existent production, abiding, and ceasing or production from inherently existent others], it is necessary [that the effect must be either existent, non-existent, both, or neither]. Among the four modes of the reason:

  - That which has already attained an existent entity is not produced again because the damages to production from self are incurred.
  - The totally non-existent is not produced because of not involving activity.
  - That which is both existent and non-existent is not produced because, since the two—existence and non-existence—are mutually exclusive, they do not subsist in one entity.
  - That which is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced because such does not occur.

  Nāgārjuna's *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:[1132]

  > Because the existent exists, it is not produced.
  > Because the non-existent does not exist, it is not [produced].
  > Because the qualities are incompatible, the existent and non-existent is not [produced].
  > Because there is no production, there is no abiding and no ceasing.

  and Nāgārjuna's own commentary on this says:[1133]

  > Because a thing[a] exists, it could not be produced from causes, since the existent is explained as "the presently existent." Because the non-existent does not exist, it could not be produced from causes. Because the existent and non-existent are not concordant, such is not produced, for they are mutually exclusive. The existent and the non-existent possess mutually exclusive qualities; hence, due to their incompatibility how could that which is both existent and non-existent be produced? Because

[a] *dngos po, bhāva.*

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> there is no [inherently existent] production, there also is no [inherently existent] abiding and no [inherently existent] ceasing.

and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1134]

> If producers are causes producing products that are other [than themselves],
> It is to be considered whether they produce an existent, non-existent, that which is both, or that which lacks both.
> If it exists, of what use are producers? What could these producers do for the non-existent?
> What could they do for that which is both? What could they do for that which lacks both?

and in Chandrakīrti's own commentary the reasons are individually established.[a] Atisha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* says:

> The production of the existent is not admissible.
> The non-existent also is like a flower of the sky.
> Because both fallacies are entailed,
> That which is both is not produced.

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* applies [this refutation of production of the four extremes] to production from other, whereas the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and the Elder Atisha give general explanations [of it without limiting it to production from other]. They refute not only production but also abiding and ceasing.[1135]

Moreover, since there are four alternatives to be considered—only existent, only non-existent, both, and neither—this reasoning can be called a refutation of four alternatives [and not just four extremes]. Therefore, do not think that a refutation of the four alternatives (*mu bzhi*) precludes a refutation of the four extremes (*mtha' bzhi*).

c# Refutation of Production of the Four Alternatives {2}

This section has two parts: actual exposition and elimination of error.

1^ Actual Exposition of the Reasoning Refuting Production of the Four Alternatives

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1136] As is stated in

[a] For more on refuting production of the existent and the non-existent see also 787, and for Chandrakīrti's commentary (P5263 vol. 98, 122.5.2ff.), see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 150-154.

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Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle,*[1137] our own Buddhist schools that propound [truly existent] things say:

It is not admissible that there is no true production, for it is said and seen that there is production of many effects from one cause—[for example] a seed—and that many causes and conditions also produce many effects and one effect.

In order to refute the systems that assert such:

Things are not truly produced by causes. One does not produce one, nor many one, nor one many, nor also many many.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Things are not truly produced by causes because ultimately one cause does not produce one effect, ultimately many causes do not produce one effect, ultimately one cause does not produce many effects, and ultimately many causes also do not produce many effects.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1138] There are reasons captivating to the intelligent, such as, for example: If one eye consciousness has the imprints of many causes, then it would not ultimately be produced by one cause, and just as the causes are many, it would [absurdly] follow that the effect that is their imprint would be many consciousnesses. Jñānagarbha's *Differentiation of the Two Truths* says:[1139]

Many do not create one thing,
Many do not create many,
One does not create many things,
One also does not create one.

and:

You [Proponents of Truly Existent Things] assert that [an eye consciousness that is] the effect [of three causes—object, eye sense, and former moment of consciousness—]is not plural but that its qualities [that is, the qualities of its being produced in the image of the object, of its ability to apprehend a particular type of object such as visible forms rather than sounds, and of its being an experiencer], are different. Alas, therefore why not [assert] that Īshvara creates [everything]?

and:

Just as [it would be contradictory for an eye consciousness to be] simultaneously produced [from a form] and not produced [from a form], so say why would it not be contradictory [for the form to be] ultimately[a] a producer [of the eye

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[a] *yang dag par.*

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consciousness] and not a producer [of the eye consciousness]?

and:

If it is asserted that the [three imprints or] qualities are produced from [the composite of the three] causes, the individual [causes] would not be the producers. Also, if [the three causes] are [individually the producers, the eye consciousness which is] the effect would be causeless.

and:

If you assert that [the eye consciousness that is] the effect is produced from [the three] causes, then it [absurdly] follows that the [three imprints or qualities that are] plural and the [eye consciousness that is] non-plural would, as before, be causeless.

2^ Elimination of Error concerning the Refutation of the Four Alternatives

Because it is established that one produces one and because the others are suitable, not affixing here a qualification of what is negated is mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because it is established that one cause produces one effect and because the production of one effect by many causes, and so forth, are suitable—that is, exist—it should be known that not affixing the qualification "ultimately" to these four reasons is mistaken.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1140] Here also a certain D̄ak-tsang[1141] says that since the four alternatives—one cause producing one effect, and so forth—are non-existent, a qualification such as "ultimately" or "inherently" should not be affixed to what is negated [in the four reasons].[1142] This is not correct because it is asserted that [conventionally] a cause, such as one instant of the eye sense, produces one effect, one instant of an eye consciousness, and:

- Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,* when [giving an etymology of] dependent-arising,[a] [indicates that he asserts the production of one effect by one cause conventionally]:[1143]

  In a passage such as, "Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness arises," a particular object [of dependence, an eye sense] has been openly accepted. When the production of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye sense, has been asserted, how could the term

[a] *rten 'brel, pratītyasamutpāda.*

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pratītya have the meaning of multiplicity?[a]

- and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,* at the point of giving the meaning of the term "direct perception" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*),[1144] says:

  Because there is no meaning of [a single eye consciousness's depending on] a multiplicity [of sense powers], one eye consciousness that has as its base one moment of an [eye] sense could not be a *pratyakṣa* [according to the wrong etymology as "depending on a multiplicity of sense powers"].

- and also Chandrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:[1145]

  How could one moment of a consciousness be a *pratyakṣa* [that is, that which depends on a multiplicity of sense powers, according to the wrong etymology]? For [one moment of consciousness] does not engage [its object] through depending on a multiplicity of sense powers. [One moment of an eye consciousness does not depend on a multiplicity of sense powers of dissimilar type, such as also depending on an ear sense] because they are incompatible. [Also, one moment of an eye consciousness does not directly depend on a multiplicity of former and later moments of a sense power of similar type, that is, eye senses] because the moments of the sense power and of the consciousness disintegrate right after they are produced.

- and Asaṅga's *Summary of Manifest Knowledge,* for instance, contains collections of individual sūtra statements explaining that one action [in one lifetime] empowers many bodies [in other lifetimes], that many actions empower one body, that many actions empower many bodies, and that one action empowers one body.
- and such is asserted also here [in the Consequence School], for Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:[1146]

  The effects [produced] by one clear consciousness [that is enthusiastic in cultivating the first concentration, and so forth] are [births in the rank of] a Brahmā, and so forth. [However, if the mind is not powerful] the effect [of the consciousness] as well as of body and speech is not such because the activity is weak.

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[a] *zlos pa'i don.* For more context, see 856.

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- and as quoted earlier, it is explained that the fruits of one moment of faith in Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are immeasurable and that if one even makes a ritual object called *saccha*[a] the essence of which is a relic, one will be born as a universal emperor as many times as there are particles in it, and so forth. However, if one's base, or mind, is weak, though one performs virtues and so on for a long time, the effects are small; Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:[1147]

  The Knower of Suchness said
  That though one performs for a long time
  All the repetitions and asceticisms,
  Doing them with a mind distracted is useless.
- and this statement occurs in sūtra, "O monastics, asceticisms, recitations, and so forth when the mind is distracted to desire are fruitless."
- and Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:[1148]

  Due to a ill-deed done even for a single moment
  One dwells in the Most Tortuous Hell for an eon.
- and [that production of one effect from one cause, and so forth, exist conventionally] should be known from many biographies and [Buddha's] life stories,
- and you should look in Nāgārjuna's *Compendium of Sūtra,* Shāntideva's *Compendium of Learnings,* and so forth,
- and in brief, Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:[1149]

  Question: Is it not seen that many are produced from one and that one is produced from many? Therefore, how can these [views] be forsaken?

  Answer: These are not [ultimately] admissible, but even we are not proving that these are not seen.

  He explains that [the four alternative types of production] are not admissible ultimately but are not not manifestly perceived.
- and also Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:[1150]

  The master [Nāgārjuna] also saw that cause and effect exist conventionally and that conventionally there is, as reputed, production of many from one and of one from many, and he realized that the attributes of an eye consciousness and so forth exist through the concomitance or non-concomitance of an eye sense and so forth. Hence, in order

[a] Relics such as teeth and bone are made into powder, molded, and stamped with a holy image. These are called *saccha,* or *sāccha,* perhaps from *sac* meaning "to be devoted."

to take care of childish beings, when demonstrating the usage of effect-signs[a] he said that if the causes are plural, [the effects] would be plural.[b] However, it is to be known that it is not so *ultimately*.[c]

d# Reasoning of Dependent-Arising Making Known [the Absence of True Existence in] All Phenomena {2}

This section has two parts: actual exposition and refutation of errors.

1^ Actual Exposition of the Reasoning of Dependent-Arising

Because phenomena that are not dependent-arisings do not exist here, and dependent-arising is only established upon meeting, in reliance, and in dependence, all phenomena are not self-instituting and are not established from their own side. Profound and vast, eradicating the two extremes, this is the monarch of reasonings.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because:

- phenomena that are not dependent-arisings do not exist in this system
- and dependent-arising is [that is, means] only established upon meeting, established in reliance, and established in dependence,

all external and internal phenomena—forms and so forth—are not self-instituting and are not established from their own side. Because:

- practice of the profound is fulfilled in taking to mind the meaning of what is being proven [that is, all external and internal phenomena—forms and so forth—are not self-instituting and are not established from their own side]
- practice of the vast is fulfilled in taking to mind the meaning of the reason [that is, phenomena that are not dependent-arisings do not exist in this system and dependent-arising is only established upon meeting, established in reliance, and established in dependence]
- and respectively those two clear away the two extremes of permanence and annihilation,

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[a] *'bras rtags, phalaliṅga.*

[b] "The effects are plural because the causes are plural." Actually, this particular inference is based on the cause and not the effect; however, according to Geshe Gedün Lodrö it is customary to refer even to these as effect-signs.

[c] For more on refuting production of the four alternatives see also 789 and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 155-160.

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this is the monarch of reasonings.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1151] Unlike the Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things, here [in the system of the Consequence School] phenomena that are not dependent-arisings are not asserted because whatever exists must both be established relatively[a] and lack inherent existence. Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* says:[1152]

Because there are no phenomena
That are not dependent-arisings,
There are no phenomena that are not
Empty [of inherent existence].

and also Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:[1153]

There is not ever anywhere
Anything's existence without dependence.
Hence there is also not ever anywhere
Any permanent [self].

Common beings think
Space and so forth are permanent [realities].
The wise do not see these as factualities
Even with worldly [understanding].

and also [the *Questions of the King of Nāgas, Sāgara,*] *Sūtra* says:[1154]

The wise realize phenomena as dependent-arisings,
They also rely not on extreme views.
They know phenomena as having causes and conditions.
There are no phenomena without causes and conditions.

and also Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1155]

Thus, there are no phenomena that are not dependent-arisings, and dependent-arisings are also empty. Hence, there are no phenomena that are not empty.

and also Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* says:[1156]

We explain "arising dependent [on causes and conditions]"
As [the meaning of] the emptiness [of inherently existent production].
That [emptiness of inherently existent production] is dependent imputation.
Just this [emptiness of inherently existent production] is the middle path.

and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1157]

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[a] *ltos grub.*

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> Due to lacking the two extremes of [inherent] existence and non-existence, just this emptiness that is characterized as no inherently existent production is called the middle path, the middle passage. Therefore, emptiness, dependent imputation, and middle path are synonyms of dependent-arising [for those who have generated the view of the Middle Way in their continuum].

With respect to the term "dependent-arising" (*pratītyasamutpāda*)[a] and its meaning, the Grammarians say that if what depend and meet are cause and effect, then because effect would exist at the time of cause, "arising" would be impossible. Also, it would contradict the non-assertion of the existence of the effect at the time of its causes. Thus, they do not accept either the term *pratītyasamutpāda* or its meaning.

Moreover, [Buddhist] [1158] Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things assert that all dependent-arisings are truly established and are products. Therefore, [an attempt] to prove a selflessness [that means no true existence] through the reason of dependent-arising proves just the opposite for them. [A sample syllogism is: The subject, a shoot, is not inherently produced because of being a dependent-arising. About this] [1159] Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Praise of Dependent-Arising* says:[1160]

> How can those who see the opposite [proved] and those who see [the reason] as non-established understand your [that is, Buddha's] system [of emptiness as no inherent existence]?"

In [Chandrakīrti's commentary on] Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* [a qualm is raised by an objector about whether dependent-arising can serve as a sign of no inherently existent production]:[1161]

> Here some say, "Your way of speaking is one that never existed before. It is not reasonable that the term "dependent-arising" indicates no production and no cessation. Just as your saying "A child was born," would not mean you were saying "A child was not born," this [usage of dependent-arising to prove no production and no cessation] is just inadmissible.

For extensive [discussion concerning the Grammarians' non-acceptance of others' misinterpretations of dependent-arising] see Vasubandhu's own explanation of his *Treasury of Knowledge* and its *Commentary* by Rājaputra Yashomitra[1162] and also Vasubandhu's

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[a] *rten 'byung.*

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Commentary on the "Sūtra on Dependent-Arising" and its *Explanation* by Guṇamati.

Because there are also different ways of forming the term *pratītyasamutpāda,* I have arranged the interpretations of the former great translators and [grammatical references] to Sarvarvarman's *Kalāpasūtra* and *Chandragomin's Grammar* (*cāndravyākaraṇasūtra*) and will explain a little the thought of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* on the topic.

CORRECT WAY OF [UNDERSTANDING] DEPENDENT-ARISING

This is in two parts: formation of the term *pratītyasamutpāda* and explanation [of its meaning].

Formation of pratītyasamutpāda

To form *pratītyasamutpādaḥ*[a] put down the root for going, *iṇ.* Erase the *ṇ* since it is an indicatory letter. Put down *i;* before it put *prati.* [The nominative ending] *su* is added to this. Due to its being an indeclinable,[b] *su* disappears.

Chandragomin's Grammar (I.iii.129) says,[c] "*Ktvā* is suitable when *alaṃ* and *khalu* have a prohibitive [sense]. After *meṅ.* [Affix it] to the former in time of two [actions with] the same agent." Also, in Sarvarvarman's *Kalāpasūtra* the sixth section on verbal affixes says,[1163] "Also, *ktvā* [is affixed] when *alaṃ* and *khalu* have a prohibitive sense. After *meṅ.* [Affix it] to the anterior of [actions with] the same agent." Therefore, [the continuative] *ktvā* is added.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.iv.6) says,[d] "In a compound which does not have the negative particle, *lyap* [is substituted] for *ktvā.*" Therefore, *ktvā* changes to *lyap.* According to the sixth section on verbal affixes in Sarvarvarman's *Kalāpasūtra,*[1164] *ktvā* becomes *yap,* but Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* accords with *Chandragomin's Grammar.*

Because the *l* of *lyap* is for the sake of accent and the letter *p* is indicatory of the addition of the augment *tuk,* they are erased. Put down *ya.*

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's presentation of the formation of *pratītyasamutpādaḥ* is summarized in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 163.

[b] This is often called a gerund, not like the English declinable noun but the Sanskritic indeclinable continuative indicating often the anterior of two actions.

[c] P5767, vol. 140, 5.1.3. *Alaṃkhalvoḥ pratiṣedhe ktvā vā.* See *Pāṇini,* III.iv.18-20. Hereon, the Sanskrit is taken from the *Cāndravyākaraṇaṃ* (Jodhapura, 1967). Usually the continuative affix is affixed to the former of verbs in a temporal series; "After *meṅ*" indicates an exception.

[d] P5767, vol. 140, 13.4.7. *Anañsamāse ktvāḥ lyap.* See *Pāṇini,* VII.i.37.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.69) says,[a] "[Affix] *tuk* to a [root ending in] a short [vowel] which has no personal ending when [a verbal affix] having an indicatory *p* follows." Therefore, *tuk* is added between *i* and *ya*.

Because the *k* is indicatory and the *u* is for the sake of pronunciation, the two are erased. Put down *t*.

In Sarvarvarman's *Kalāpasūtra* the first section on verbal affixes says,[1165] "[Affix] *t* to the end of a root which has an indicatory *p*." [Because] the consonant has no vowel, it is drawn to the latter letter. Hence, *tya* is achieved.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.106) says,[b] "When a simple vowel [is followed by] a simple vowel, the long [corresponding vowel is the single substitute for both vowels.]" Hence, joining *prati* and *i*, make [the vowel long]. *Pratītya* is achieved; it is a stem.

Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.93) says,[c] "When the meaning only [of the noun is denoted], the first [case is employed]." Hence, the singular of the first case, *su* is added. According to Sarvarvarman's *Kalāpasūtra* it is *si*.

Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.38) says,[d] "The case affix is erased after an indeclinable." Sarvarvarman's *Kalāpasūtra* says, "After an indeclinable also [the case affix is erased]." Thus, the *si* [or *su*] is erased; thereby, *pratītya* is achieved. It is used for three [meanings]: "having met," "having relied," and "having depended." Here in the system of the Consequence School, it is explained [that *pratītya* refers to any of these three meanings] according to the context and that it does not necessarily mean just one of them.

Also, *pad* has the sense of "going." Put down *pad*. Before it, put down the prefix *ut*, and before it put down *sam*. *Su* is added to these two and is erased as before [due to their being indeclinables].

Chandragomin's Grammar (I.iii.7) says,[e] *"Ghañ*, [the verbal affix *a* causing the substitution of *vṛddhi* for the preceding vowel, comes] also when an action [is denoted]." [In Sarvarvarman's *Kalāpasūtra*] the fifth section on verbal affixes says,[1166] "[The affix] *ghañ* [comes] after [the roots] *pad, ruj, viś, spṛś,* and *uc*." Therefore, at the end of the root *pad, ghañ* is added. The significatory *gh* and

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[a] P5767, vol. 140, 11.5.7. *Hrasvasya atiṅi piti tuk.* See *Pāṇini,* VI.i.71.

[b] P5767, vol. 140, 12.1.4. *Akaḥ aki dīrghah.* See *Pāṇini,* VI.i.101.

[c] P5767, vol. 140, 6.2.5. *Arthamātre prathamā.* See *Pāṇini,* II.iii.46.

[d] P5767, vol. 140, 6.1.2. *Supaḥ asaṃkhyad luk.* See *Pāṇini,* II.iv.82.

[e] P5767, vol. 140, 4.3.6. *Ghañ kārake cha.* See *Pāṇini,* III.iii.16, 18, 19.

the *ñ* which signifies *vṛddhi* are erased. Put down the *a* that is the life of *gha*. The initial of the root is augmented. Putting [these parts] together in stages, one achieves *samutpāda*.

Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.93) says,[a] "When the meaning only [of the noun is denoted] the first [case is employed]." Thus, to this add *su;* erase *u*. Also, (VI.iii.98),[b] "For the [final] *s* and the *ṣ* of *sajuṣ*, *ru* [is substituted at the end of a word]." *S* becomes *ru*.

Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.119) says,[c] "[The *u* is the substitute] of *ru* when [it is followed by] a soft consonant and [preceded] by a non-protracted *a*." Thus, the *u*, being indicatory, is erased.

Chandragomin's Grammar (VI.iv.20?) says,[d] "When there is a pause, *visarga* [is substituted for *r*]." Thus, *r* is made into *visarga*; *samutpādaḥ* is achieved. It is explained at this point as meaning "arising," "established," and "existing."

Explanation of the Meaning of Dependent-Arising

In that way, the arising of things in reliance on causes is the meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* because:

- *prati* is a prefix meaning "meeting"[e]
- and *i* is the root for going, *iṇ*
- but with the continuative ending [*tya*] and modified by the prefix *prati, pratītya* is used for "meeting" and "relying"[f]

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[a] P5767, vol. 140, 6.2.5. *Arthamātre prathamā.* See *Pāṇini,* II.iii.46.

[b] P5767, vol. 140, 15.5.6. *Sasajuṣaḥ raḥ.* See *Pāṇini,* VIII.ii.66.

[c] P5767, vol. 140, 12.1.6. *Hashi ca ataḥ roḥ.* See *Pāṇini,* VI.i.113, 114.

[d] P5767, vol. 140, 16.1.7. *Virāme visarjanīyaḥ.* See *Pāṇini,* VIII.iii.15. The citing here is doubtful because the Tibetan quoted and the Peking translation do not, for the first time, agree.

[e] *phrad pa, prāpti.*

[f] The Tibetan translators adopted a code for handling this three-part discussion of the formation of *pratītyasamutpāda:*

prati = *rten cing*
i or *itya* = *'brel bar*
samutpāda = *'byung ba*

Their over-riding concern was with having a three-part translation equivalent that, when together, makes sense in Tibetan. As a result, the individual equivalents often make no sense when associated with the various ways that Indian scholars described the formation of the Sanskrit term *pratītyasamutpāda.*

Some Tibetan scholars claim that *rten cing* and *'brel bar* have different meanings; however, since Chandrakīrti says that *prati* (*rten cing*), which itself means *prāpti* (*phrad pa*), modifies the meaning of *itya* (*'brel ba*) into meaning *prāpti* (*phrad pa*), the two words come to have just one meaning, and thus it seems that the two were separated out in Tibetan merely in order to convey, albeit not very well, this discussion of the meaning of the

- and *pāda* with *samut* before it is used for "arising" and at other times is also explained as "existing"[a] and "established."[b]

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1167]

> *Prati* has the meaning of meeting.[c] [The verbal root] *i* has the meaning of going. Here the term *pratītya*, a continuative, is used for "meeting" or "relying" because of the modification of the meaning of the verbal root by the modifier [prefix]. It is explained, "The meaning of the verbal root is led forcefully elsewhere by a modifier [prefix], like the sweetness of the waters of the Ganges [being changed] by ocean water." [The root] *pad* preceded by *samut* means "arise"[d]; therefore, the term *samutpāda* is used for "arising." Hence, the meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* is "the arising of things in reliance on causes and conditions."

Many commentators who have written about this explanation think that *lyap* is the [Sanskrit] equivalent of [the genitive particle] *kyi* [in Tibetan]. They are also seen to make coarse errors about *prati* and *iti.* Also, though the great translator Sthiramati forms the term *pratītyasamutpāda,* it is not clear.[e] Having seen that without understanding these [explanations of the formation of *pratītyasamutpāda*] one does not understand the early part of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,* I have clearly expounded a little, free from error.

REFUTATION OF ERROR CONCERNING THE ETYMOLOGY OF PRATITYASAMUTPADA

This is in two parts: refutation of other commentators' formulation and of Bhāvaviveka's formulation.

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individual parts. Perhaps a better alternative would have been to transliterate the individual parts into Tibetan rather than attempt a translation.

In Chandrakīrti's exposition, *pratītya* has just one connotation as a continuative meaning "having depended" which in Tibetan is *rten nas* as in the commonly used *rten nas 'byung ba* or *rten 'byung.* Strictly speaking, therefore, in the Consequence School *rten nas 'byung ba* or *rten 'byung* is the most appropriate general term, with *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba* suitable only as a code equivalent for the three-part discussion; *rten 'brel* is a common usage that is neither.

[a] *yod pa, sat.*

[b] *grub pa, siddha.*

[c] *phrad pa, prāpti.*

[d] *'byung ba, prādurbhāva.*

[e] In the Peking catalogue five books are listed as being translated by Sthiramati (*blo rtan*).

Refutation of the Formulation of pratītyasamutpāda by Other Commentators

This is in two parts: statement of their assertion and refutation of it.

Statement of Other Commentators' Assertion on the Formulation of pratītyasamutpāda

Some former commentators on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*, other than Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka, say:[a]

> The term *prati* has a distributive meaning like "diversely" or "this and that."[b] [The verbal root] *i* or *iṇ* has the meaning of "going," or "departing and disintegrating." *Itya*, which is the affix *ya* added to the verbal root, means "that which goes." Taking *itya* as a secondary derivative noun, [*pratītyasamutpāda* means] the arising of what possesses departing or disintegrating diversely, diversely.

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1168]

> Others say that [the noun] *iti* means going, disintegrating. *Itya* means that which is conducive to going.[c] *Prati* has the sense of multiplicity. Having explained that the term *itya* has an ending for a secondary derivative noun, they say [*pratītyasamutpāda* means] the arising of those which go or disintegrate, diversely, diversely (*prati prati ityānāṃ vināśināṃ samutpāda*).

and Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* says,[1169] "Some others say that the arising of those that disintegrate diversely is *pratītyasamutpāda*," and Avalokitavrata's *Commentary* on this says:[1170]

> The "some others" are some other proponents of Middle Way tenets.[d] "The arising of those which disintegrate diversely" means the composition and arising of effects that disintegrate in each diverse moment and have definite, diverse causes and conditions; it is synonymous with "arising upon meeting."
>
> [In Bhāvaviveka's text] "is *pratītyasamutpāda*" indicates the conclusion of the meaning of the preceding words. It indicates that the composition and arising of effects that disintegrate in each diverse moment and have definite, diverse causes and conditions is *pratītyasamutpāda*. Proponents of Middle Way

a For a summation of this, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 163-164.

b *so so ba'am de de lta bu'i zlos don.*

c See *Pāṇini,* IV.iv.98.

d Stcherbatsky (p. 90) identifies these others as Hīnayānists.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

tenets other than the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] himself say this.

When they form the term *pratītyasamutpāda,* the *ṇ* of the verbal root for going, *iṇ,* is erased. [The zero affix] *kvip* is added and entirely erased. "*T* is suitable [to be affixed] at the end of a root which has an indicatory *p*."[1171] Because of the sense of "going" [an action noun], *t* is added. Since it was said, *"Ya* [is affixed] also as an affix for derivative nouns [meaning] "good in that," *ya* which is an affix for derivative nouns is added. [The case ending] *si* is added. When this is joined with *prati*, there is [the noun] *pratītyaḥ*. The rest [of their formation of *pratītyasamutpādaḥ*] is similar to that given above. Chandrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, and Avalokitavrata refute this assertion that there is a case ending [that is, a genitive ending making *pratītyānāṃ*] that has been deleted [in the compound].

Refutation of these Other Commentators' Formulation of pratītyasamutpāda

Their explanation of *prati* as meaning multiplicity and *itya* as being a derivative noun is not correct because the explanation of *prati* as meaning multiplicity, though suitable for just general [applications of the term], does not cover specific applications. This is because:

- A term for "many" or multiplicity is [hypothetically][1172] suitable when a general [reference for the term is given as in], "One who sees *pratītyasamutpāda,* that is, the arising of those that depart or disintegrate diversely, [sees suchness],"[a] and in *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati* the term *pratītyasamutpādaṃ* is a compound; therefore, it is [hypothetically] correct that a case-ending inside the compound could have been deleted.
- However, when a particular referent is given as in, "An eye consciousness is produced depending on an eye sense and a form" *cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpaṃ ca utpadyate cakṣurvijñānaṃ,*[b] multiplicity is not suitable in one particular, and here *pratītya* is not compounded with anything.

It is not suitable [to say that] there is a compound here:

- because the Sanskrit original for "and" (*ca*) in "an eye sense and a form" and [the accusative ending] *aṃ* of "on a form" (*rūpaṃ*)

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[a] *Rice Seedling Sūtra,* P876, vol. 34, 303.3.4. Here the word *dharma* (Tib. *chos*) equals *tathatā* (Tib. *de kho na nyid*) according to Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination* (P6143, vol. 154, 147.1.3).

[b] The Sanskrit has *rūpāṇi*, whereas the version given here follows Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's transliteration into Tibetan letters (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 668).

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were not deleted, and

- because there is no case ending to be seen at the end of *pratītya,*[a] since [*pratītya* is here just] fit to be an indeclinable, a continuative.

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1173]

Their etymology would be excellent in a passage such as, "O monastics, I will teach you *pratītyasamutpāda,*" or "One who sees *pratītyasamutpāda* sees suchness." For the meaning of multiplicity occurs, and there is a compound [thus allowing for the possibility that *pratītya* means *pratītyānāṃ*].

However, here in a passage such as, "Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced," a particular object [of dependence] has been openly accepted—"dependent on an eye sense." When the production of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye sense, has been asserted, how could the term *pratītya* have the meaning of multiplicity?

However, the meaning of "meeting" occurs in the term *pratītya* even when a specific object is not asserted; arising having met [causes and conditions] is dependent-arising. Also, [the meaning of "meeting"] occurs when a specific object is asserted, for it is said that dependent on an eye and forms—that is, meeting an eye and forms or in reliance on an eye and forms—[an eye consciousness arises].[b]

If the term *itya* were a derivative noun, then here in "Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced" (*cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi ca utpadyate cakṣurvijñānaṃ*) the term *pratītya* would [absurdly] not be an indeclinable. Also, since there would not be a compound, a case termination would be present [at the end of *pratītya*]. The reading would [absurdly] be: *cakṣuḥ pratītyaṃ vijñānaṃ rūpāṇi ca*, "That which departs to an eye sense and to forms, a consciousness, [arises]." And [since such is total nonsense] it is not so.

[a] The Tibetan text seems to say "there is no case ending to be seen between *pratītya* and *cakṣuḥ*" since it reads *rten nas dang mig gi bar du rnam dbye ma mthong;* however, this makes sense only with regard to the Tibetan *brten nas mig* in *mig dang gzugs la brten nas mig gi rnam shes 'byung* since there is no case ending in *brten nas mig* as *nas* is a continuative. If it were translated literally like that for the Sanskrit also, it would not fit the Sanskrit *cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpaṃ ca utpadyate cakṣurvijñānaṃ,* since between *pratītya* and *cakṣuḥ* there is *rūpaṃ,* which has an accusative ending. Hence, I have rendered it as "at the end of *pratītya*" to fit the Sanskrit, which is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's source.

[b] The Sanskrit has only "eye," not "eye and forms" in this sentence.

Therefore, its etymology as just an indeclinable, a continuative, is to be accepted.

The meaning [is that *pratītya* must be accepted as a continuative] because *cakṣuśca*[a] *rūpaṃ pratītya cakṣu[rvijñānaṃ]* appears [in the sūtra and no case ending is given for *pratītya*].

Refutation of Bhāvaviveka's Formulation of pratītyasamutpāda:[b]
Incorrectness of Bhāvaviveka's Refutation of Another

Both Bhāvaviveka's way of refuting another is not feasible, and the meaning of the term in his own system is incomplete; thus there are two fallacies. Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"* states Buddhapālita's way [of interpreting *pratītyasamutpāda*]:[c]

> With respect to *pratītyasamutpāda,* one [Buddhapālita] says that due to the sense of multiplicity in the prefix *prati* (*rten cing*), due to the sense of "meeting" (*'brel bar*) in *i,* and due to the sense of "arising" (*'byung ba*) in the term *samutpāda, pratītyasamutpāda* means "arising dependent on these and those [causes and conditions]" or "arising upon meeting these and those [causes and conditions]."

Bhāvaviveka also states [the other way of formulating the term cited] previously (854).

Chandrakīrti, thinking that such an explanation shows Bhāvaviveka's lack of skill in stating an opponent's position, asserts that Buddhapālita's thought is not as Bhāvaviveka stated it. For Buddhapālita says that *pratītya* means "meeting" (*phrad pa, prāpti*); and thus *prati* (*rten cing*) does not have a sense of multiplicity, and *itya* (*'brel ba*) does not mean "meeting." Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1174]

> Thus, he [Bhāvaviveka] states others' positions and refutes them. It is regarded that there is a lack of skill in his stating of others' positions. Why? He [Buddhapālita] who explains the term *pratītya*[d] as meaning "meeting" does not explain *prati* as having a sense of multiplicity or that *i* means "meeting."

Then, what [does Buddhapālita say]? Buddhapālita says that *prati*

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[a] Putting *ca* between the two words rather than after the second is irregular but still barely possible; thus, I have left it there. The original reads *cakṣurca.*

[b] For a summation of this section see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 165-166.

[c] P5253, vol. 95, 154.1.6ff. There are minor differences between the Tibetan translations of Bhāvaviveka's own passage and Chandrakīrti's citation of it but none of substance.

[d] The Tibetan mis-reads *rten cing 'brel bar* ***'byung ba*** where it should read *rten cing 'brel bar* in accordance with the Sanskrit *pratītya.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

(*rten cing*) means "meeting" and *itya* (*'brel bar*) means "going." Though individually they have different meanings, when these two are combined, the prefix [*prati*] changes the meaning of the latter word [*itya*]. It is like the sweet water of the Ganges becoming salty when it meets the salt water [of the ocean]. Thus, the two words indicate just one meaning, "meeting." Hence, the meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* is "arising upon meeting [causes and conditions]."

When the term *pratītyasamutpāda* is applied to all things in the sense of "arising upon meeting this and that collection of causes and conditions" and one says, "*hetupratītyasamutpāda*," it is taken as being related with multiplicity. However, Buddhapālita did not assert [that there is any sense of] multiplicity in a specific [application of the term] as in "Dependent on an eye sense and a form [an eye consciousness is produced]." Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1175]

> Then what [does Buddhapālita say]? He says that:
> - *prati* (*rten cing*)[a] means "meeting"
> - *i* (*'brel bar*) means "going"
> - the combination *pratītya* means just "meeting."[b]
>
> Now when a consideration of all possible entities is asserted as being expressed by the term *pratītyasamutpāda*—etymologized as "arising upon meeting" or dependent-arising—then a relation with multiplicity is being stated: "Arising upon meeting this and that collection of causes and conditions" is [the meaning of] dependent-arising. [However,] when a consideration of a particular instance is asserted, there is no relation with multiplicity, [as in] "Having met an eye sense and forms [an eye consciousness arises]."
>
> Such is the unskillfulness of the master [Bhāvaviveka] in citing [another's position].

Not only that, but also [Bhāvaviveka's] way of refuting the others' system is not correct because [his statement] is reduced to being just the thesis, "[Buddhapālita's explanation] is not correct," without any reason. However, even if Bhāvaviveka's thought was that because a consciousness has no form, it could not meet an eye sense

[a] As mentioned earlier, the Tibetan for these two terms is merely a code to refer to the Sanskrit in the context of discussion about the formation of the term *pratītya*.

[b] For Chandrakīrti *prati* alone means *prāpti* (meeting, *phrad pa*) as does *pratītya*. In its continuative form *prāpti* (*phrad pa*) is *prāpya* (*phrad nas*).

and a form since meeting exists only between the physical, it is not correct:

- because it is asserted in sūtra that monastics meet [that is, attain] the four fruits [Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, and Foe Destroyer, which are not physical], as in "This monastic is one who has met [attained] the fruit,"
- and *prāpya* ("having met" or "upon meeting," *phrad nas*) is a synonym of *apekṣya* ("having relied" or "in reliance upon," *ltos nas*)
- and the Superior Nāgārjuna [in his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*] asserts that the term *pratītya* (*rten cing 'brel bar*) means *prāpya* ("having met," *phrad pa*):[a]

> That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions]
> Is not inherently produced. (*tat tat prāpya yad utpannaṃ notpannaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ*)

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1176]

> [Bhāvaviveka says,] "That is not admissible because of the nonexistence of the meaning of these two [wrong formulations of *pratītyasamutpāda*][b] in "An eye consciousness is produced depending on an eye and forms."
>
> This refutation is not correct. Why? He does not state a reason why there is no occurrence [of a meeting], and, therefore, he has only a thesis.
>
> Then, this might be [Bhāvaviveka's] thought: "A consciousness has no form; therefore, it has no meeting with an

[a] Though the Tibetan here is *phrad pa*, "meeting," I have rendered it to accord with Nāgārjuna's *prāpya*, "having met." The alternation in the use of forms is due to Chandrakīrti's and Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's using the general term outside of this particular usage for the more specific term within this usage as a continuative.

The significance of Chandrakīrti's citation is lost in the Tibetan translation *de dang de brten gang 'byung ba/ rang gi ngo bor de ma skyes* which, nevertheless, is an excellent translation in general in that it conveys the meaning. However, to convey the point here it should read *de dang de phrad gang 'byung ba/ rang gi ngo bor de ma skyes.* (The second line could have been rendered as *de ni rang bzhin gyis ma skyes.*) By using *brten* for *prāpya* instead of *phrad* the purpose of Chandrakīrti's stunning citation is lost in the Tibetan.

The text is P5225, vol. 95, 11.4.1.

[b] Brackets are from Avalokitavrata (P5259, vol. 96, 170.1.6). He identifies the two interpretations as "arising upon depending on and meeting these and those [causes and conditions]" and "the arising of those that possess individual disintegration" (*de dang de la brten cing phrad nas 'byung ba'i zhes bya ba dang/ so so'i 'jig pa dang ldan pa rnams kyi* [text has *kyis*] *'byung ba zhes bya ba'i don de gnyi ga med pa'i phyir te*).

eye sense. For it is seen that there is a meeting just of those that have form."

This is also not admissible because of the assertion of "meeting" here in "This monastic is one who has met the fruit." Also, the term "having met" (*prāpya, phrad nas*) is a synonym of the term "having relied" (*apekṣya, bltos nas*). Also, the master Nāgārjuna accepts the term *pratītya* as meaning just *prāpti* "meeting," [or "having met" when used as a continuative, since his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:][1177]

That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced. (*tat tat prāpya yad utpannaṃ notpannaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ.*)

Therefore, others [that is, Chandrakīrti himself] say that even [Bhāvaviveka's] refutation is not admissible.

Refutation of Bhāvaviveka's Formulation of Pratītyasamutpāda: Incompleteness of Bhāvaviveka's Own Etymology and Meaning of Pratītyasamutpāda

Even Bhāvaviveka's own way of explanation[a] is incorrect because although he asserts that he will [etymologize *pratītyasamutpāda*] explaining [the parts] individually, he does not state individual meanings for *pratītya* and *samutpāda*. Also, [in his *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom"*] Bhāvaviveka says no more than:[1178]

The meaning of "conditionality" is the meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda*—"When this is, that arises; due to the production of this, that is produced."[1179]

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1180]

What then is [the meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* according to Bhāvaviveka? He] presents his own system as, "The meaning of conditionality is the meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda*—when this is, that arises; due to the production of this, that is produced." This also is incorrect because he did not state a particular meaning for each of the two terms, *pratītya* and *samutpāda*, and because he asserted that he would give an etymology.

Objection: Bhāvaviveka says such asserting that *pratītyasamutpāda* is a term the meaning of which is determined by conventional usage and does not have the character set forth in its etymological explanation. It is like *araṇyetilaka*

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[a] For a summation of this section see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 165-166.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

(*dgon pa'i thig le*) [which literally means "sesame in the forest"[a] but is conventionally used to mean anything not answering to one's expectations]. The phrase "and so forth"[b] [refers to other such non-literal terms derived] from the transmission of earlier forms of speech, such as "lakeborn" (*saraja, mtsho skyes*) for a lotus grown on dry earth and "lying on the earth" (*mahiṣa, sar nyal*) for a buffalo that is standing.

Answer: This also is not correct because the master, the Superior Nāgārjuna, [in his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*] individually differentiated *pratītya* and *samutpāda* as components of the term: *tat tat prāpya* "having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions]" and *utpannaṃ* "arisen":[1181]

That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced. (*tat tat prāpya yad utpannaṃ notpannaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ*)

Also, if you [Bhāvaviveka] wish to explain [the term] in accordance with Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland*:[1182]

When this is, that arises,
Like long when there is short.

you must explain this as [having the meaning of "depending" or "relying" or][c] "meeting." Therefore, what you have refuted becomes [what you yourself must assert]. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1183]

Objection: Such is said [by Bhāvaviveka] having asserted *pratītyasamutpāda* to be a conventional term [not necessarily following its etymological meaning] like "sesame in the forest" (*araṇyetilaka, dgon pa'i thig le*) [meaning anything that does not answer to one's expectations].

Answer: This also is not correct because the master [Nāgārjuna] asserts *pratītyasamutpāda* just in relation to its components: That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced (*tat tat prāpya yad utpannaṃ notpannaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ*)."

[Bhāvaviveka] explains *pratītyasamutpāda* with:

When this is, that arises,
Like long when there is short.

---

a Poussin calls attention to *Pāṇini,* II.i.44.

b The "and so forth" to which Chandrakīrti refers is found in Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's next quote from Chandrakīrti's text.

c See the quote from Chandrakīrti below and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 77b.3 (which is actually 76b.3 due to misplacement in printing).

Then, does he not assert just that depending (*rten te, pratītya*) on short, meeting (*phrad cing, prāpya*) to short, relying (*bltos nas, apekṣya*) on short, long comes to be? Therefore, it is not fitting that he assert just what he refutes.

Hence, *pratītyasamutpāda* means the dependent-arising of products—their arising in reliance on their own causes and conditions.

It also means the dependent-arising [of all phenomena, products and non-products]—their existence meeting to or in reliance on their own parts, their own bases of imputation, or their own components because:

- with regard to the Sanskrit original of "arising" (*samutpāda*), Vasubandhu's *Commentary on the "Sūtra on Dependent-Arising"* explains *sam* as "coming together," "aggregating," and so forth, and
- Rājaputra Yashomitra[1184] explains *pāda* as "existing" and so forth.

Also, because all phenomena are just established in dependence upon, in reliance upon, or meeting to [causes and conditions, their parts, and their basis of imputation], they are not self-instituting and do not exist through their own power. Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:[1185]

That which has a dependent arising
Cannot be self-powered; since all these
Lack being under their own power,
There is no self [that is, inherent existence].

and also the Superior Nāgārjuna says [in the *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*]:[1186]

That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced.

and it is as Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred"* says:[1187]

I am not a proponent of no phenomena[a] because I propound dependent-arising.

Question: Are you a proponent of [inherently existent] phenomena?[b]

Answer: No, [I am not a proponent of inherently existing phenomena] because I am a proponent of dependent-arising.

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[a] *dngos po med par smra ba, *abhāvavādin.*

[b] *dngos por smra ba, *bhāvavādin.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Question: What do you propound?

Answer: I propound dependent-arising.

Question: Then, what is the meaning of dependent-arising?

Answer: It means no inherent existence. It means no inherently existent production. It means the arising of effects that have a nature like that of magical illusions, mirages, reflections, magical cities of Smell-Eaters, emanations, and dreams. It means emptiness and selflessness.

Also, the way that here [in the syllogism, "The subject, such and such, does not inherently exist because of being a dependent-arising"] the profound is contained in the predicate being proven (does not inherently exist) and the vast is contained in the reason (dependent-arising) should be sought in detail in Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*, Chandrakīrti's commentary on it, Nāgārjuna's own commentary on his *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*, and his *Precious Garland* as well as in Gyel-tsap's commentary, and so forth. Nāgārjuna's *Friendly Letter* (*Suhṛllekha*) says:[1188]

This dependent-arising is the profound preciousness
Of the treasury of the Conqueror's speech.
Who sees this correctly sees the highest aspect
[Of the teaching] of Buddha, the Knower of Suchness.

and Mahāmati's commentary on this says:[1189]

This dependent-arising is the preciousness of the One-Gone-Thus's speech because one who knows this well realizes correctly the teaching of the One-Gone-Thus. "Profound" means "solely profound."

and:

Or, "One who sees this correctly" and so forth means seeing just the preciousness of the treasury that is the Conqueror's speech. The profundity is non-creation by self, non-creation by other,

and so forth. Accordingly, this dependent-arising overcoming all conceptions of both extremes is the monarch of reasonings. The foremost lama [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Praise of Dependent-Arising*] says:[1190]

Among teachers the teacher of dependent-arising
And among types of knowledge the knowledge of dependent-arising
Are like the Sovereign Conqueror [Buddha] among worldly beings.[a]

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[a] For more on the sign of dependent-arising see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 53-56

2^ Elimination of Error concerning Dependent-Arising

Therefore, that the ultimate is self-instituting is to eat space. No one takes "validly established" and "self-instituting" as equivalent.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Therefore, Ḏak-tsang's assertion (579ff.) that "ultimate," "validly established," and "self-instituting" are equivalent is like asserting that space can be eaten because no proponent of tenets takes "validly established" and "able to establish itself" as equivalent.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1191] Ḏak-tsang, as was explained earlier (586ff.), asserts that "ultimate object" (*don dam, paramārtha*), "self-instituting" (*tshugs thub*), and "validly established" (*tshad grub, pramāṇasiddha*) are equivalent. However, the three—the father, the Superior [Nāgārjuna], and his spiritual sons [Āryadeva and Buddhapālita]—explain that dependent-arisings are not autonomous, and, therefore, this assertion that the ultimate [that is, an emptiness] is self-instituting is like wanting to eat space.
>
> Also, Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"* says,[1192] "Because there are two [types of] objects of comprehension, there are two [types of] valid cognitions." Thus, Proponents of the Great Exposition, Proponents of Sūtra, and so forth assert that even generally characterized phenomena[a] [that is, permanent phenomena] are validly established [but, of course, do not accept that they are self-instituting]. There is not even one [school of tenets] asserting that "self-instituting" is necessarily present in the meaning of "validly established." Hence, do not scar the teaching!

2# REASONING REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS TOGETHER WITH AN ELIMINATION OF ERROR {2}

This section has two parts: actual exposition and elimination of error.

a# Actual Exposition of the Reasoning Refuting a Self of Persons

A self under its own power does not exist because the aggregates are not it; the person is not other, is not the base of the aggregates, also does not depend on the aggregates, and does not possess the aggregates; the shape is not it; and the collection is not it, like a chariot. Apply this to all phenomena.

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and 161-173.

[a] *spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣaṇa.*

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Word Commentary on Root Text: Except for only being imputed [in dependence] upon the aggregates that are its base of imputation, there is no self existing under its own power because:

- the aggregates that are its basis of imputation are not the person
- the person is not an entity other than the aggregates that are its basis of imputation
- the person is not the base of the aggregates that are its basis of imputation
- the person also does not ultimately depend on the aggregates that are its basis of imputation
- the person ultimately does not possess the aggregates
- the person is not the shape of the aggregates that are its basis of imputation
- and the person is not the collection of the aggregates that are its basis of imputation.

For example, if a chariot is sought as before (700), a chariot existing under its own power is not found. The root text and autocommentary of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*[1193] say that this sevenfold analysis is to be applied to delineating the absence of true existence of all phenomena—such as pot, woolen cloth, buckler, army, forest, and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1194]
>
> With respect to this, I have extensively refuted elsewhere[1195] many wrong notions about these sets of twos:
>
> - I and mine[a]
> - the view of the transitory collection as a real I and the view of the transitory collection as real mine
> - the conventional, mental valid cognition apprehending I and the conventional, mental valid cognition apprehending mine
> - basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, and so forth.
>
> Therefore, here I will just illustrate the difficult points.
>
> *[I and Mine]*
>
> A sūtra says:[1196]
>
> > O monastics, any devotee or Brahmin who views a self is viewing only these five appropriated aggregates.
>
> and the root text [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] says,[1197] "There is no [innate] apprehension [of a self] separate from the aggregates,"

[a] *nga gi ba;* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a takes this term as referring to the person who makes things into what is owned, whereas many others take it as referring to things qualified as being owned by the person. "Mine," therefore, is more like "my."

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

and:

> [The teaching by Buddha that the self is the aggregates] is [just] a refutation of a self different from the aggregates
> Because other sūtras say that forms and so forth are not the self.

and Chandrakīrti's own *Commentary on the "Supplement"* says:[1198]

> The object of observation of [a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as an inherently existent self] is the [nominally existent] self. For, that which conceives an [inherently existent] I has as its object [an inherently existent] self.

Thus, the appearance of a [nominally existent] I, or self, sentient being, god, and so forth, *in dependence on* the transitory aggregates, which are composites of plural [factors], is the [nominally existent] I, or self, sentient being, god, and so forth.

Furthermore, Buddhapālita says [in commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*],[1199] "That which the self possesses is called 'mine.'" Accordingly, the maker of eyes and so forth—which are the things owned and are qualified as being "mine"—into one's own is assigned as own,[a] mine,[b] a sentient being's mine,[c] a god's mine,[d] and so forth.

A viewing consciousness that, having apprehended a [nominally existent] I, conceives the I to be truly established is both a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as a real I and an ignorance. A viewing consciousness that, having apprehended [nominally existent] mine, conceives the mine to be truly established is both a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as real mine and an ignorance. These are explicitly said to be consciousnesses viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine] in Chandrakīrti's own *Commentary on the "Supplement,"*[1200]

> There [in VI.120] a "consciousness viewing the transitory collection" is an afflicted knowledge dwelling in thoughts of such [inherently existent] I and mine.

and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1201]

> Initially adhering to a self, I,
> And then generating attachment for things, "This is mine."

and his *Commentary on the "Supplement"* says:[1202]

---

[a] *bdag gi ba;* I mostly translate this as "mine."

[b] *nga yi ba.*

[c] *sems can gyi nga yi ba.*

[d] *lha'i nga yi ba.*

> These worldly beings, before adhering to mine, imagine through the conception of an [inherently existent] I that a self that does not exist does exist, and they adhere to just this as true. Then thinking "mine," they adhere also to all things other than the object of the conception of I [as truly established].

and Dzong-ka-ba's *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says in detail:[1203]

> A consciousness that observes the [conventionally existent] I—the base generating the thought "I"—and thereupon as its aspect apprehends it to be established by way of its own character is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection that [mistakenly] apprehends I and an obfuscatory consciousness with respect to a self of persons.
>
> A consciousness that observes the [conventionally existent] mine and thereupon as its aspect apprehends it to be established by way of its own character is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection that [mistakenly] apprehends mine and an obfuscatory consciousness with respect to a person's mine (*gang zag gi bdag gi ba*).

[Thus, "mine" refers not to things considered as belongings but to the *maker* of things into one's belongings; hence, mine is a type of person.][a] Nevertheless, the person does not become many continuums [I being one and mine being another] due to the fact that I and mine are one entity, only differentiated in the perspective of conceptuality through their isolates. For example, in the Superior Ānanda's continuum the I, monk, human, Stream Enterer, Shākya clan member, and royal caste member have different connotations but are one continuum. Therefore, it should be understood that the types of consciousnesses conceiving I in his continuum are manifold.

The appearance as I with respect to the aggregates and the appearance as I in dependence on the aggregates are I. However, not only are the aggregates not I, but also the aggregates appearing as I are not I because the appearance as an I established from its own side is not the object I.

Also, eyes, ears, and so forth are bases of the imputation "mine" (*nga yi ba*) and illustrations of what is owned (*nga yi yin rgyu*), but they are not mine:

- because they are not that which possesses the mine (*nga yi can*)

[a] For discussion on just what is an illustration (*mtshan gzhi*) of the "mine" see 865ff.

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nor the maker into mine (*nga yir byed pa po*), and

- because a consciousness conceiving eyes, ears, and so forth as established by way of their own character is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena, and a consciousness conceiving that the mine appearing in dependence on them is inherently existent is a consciousness conceiving mine.

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Ocean of Reasoning* [continuing from the above citation] says:[1204]

> A consciousness observing a basis of mine such as eyes, ears, and so forth and conceiving it to exist that way [that is, to exist by way of its own character] is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena. Therefore, "observing the mine" (*nga yi ba la dmigs*) does not refer to observing those [eyes, ears, and so forth].

and Ke-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* [seems to speak of eyes and so on as illustrations of mine but] is explaining that they are illustrations of the owned (*bdag gi yin rgyu*) and so forth:[1205]

> The eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own continuum are illustrations of both mine (*nga yi ba*) and phenomena in the division [of all existents] into persons and phenomena.

Even the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*,[1206] "That which pertains to the self (*bdag la phan pa, ātmani hitam*) is the mine (*bdag gi, ātmanīnaṃ*); it means one's own five aggregates," indicates the bases of mine (*bdag gi ba'i gzhi*). Ke-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* [continuing from the citation just above] says:

> [Eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own continuum] appear to innate awarenesses as mine established from the object's own side or they appear to innate awarenesses as mine, and a consciousness that upon observing such mine conceives that it is established by way of its own character is innate consciousness conceiving mine.

Therefore, within the context that [eyes, ears, and so forth in one's own continuum] are objects generating the view of the transitory collection that [falsely] conceives of mine, you should know that:

- When mine appears to Buddhas, it appears as only imputed [in dependence] upon its basis of imputation, but the basis of the imputation does not appear to be the phenomenon imputed.
- A composite of the two [the mistaken appearance of mine as inherently existent and [the mine's] emptiness of inherent existence] appears to lesser Superiors.

and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [1207] Two modes of explanation have arisen with regard to [what constitutes] an illustration of mine (*nga yi ba*):

1. Some of our own scholars explain that the thought of the foremost father [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] and his spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup] is that the eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own continuum are illustrations of mine but are not objects of observation of an innate view of the transitory apprehending mine.
2. The omniscient Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄ay-dor-jay[a] asserts:
   - Eyes, ears, and so forth are bases of imputation of mine but are not illustrations of mine because it is not feasible for bases of imputation to be the object imputed.
   - The explanation in Ke-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* that eyes, ears, and so forth are illustrations of mine merely indicates that they are illustrations of what is made into the mine (*nga yi bar byed rgyu*), but does not indicate that they are themselves the mine.
   - This mode of explanation is the thought of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"* because it says:

     > A consciousness that observes the [conventionally existent] I—the base generating the thought "I"—and thereupon as its aspect apprehends it to be established by way of its own character is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection that [mistakenly] apprehends I and an obfuscatory consciousness with respect to a self of persons.
     >
     > A consciousness that observes the [conventionally existent] mine and thereupon as its aspect apprehends it to be established by way of its own character is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection that [mistakenly] apprehends mine and an obfuscatory consciousness with respect to a person's mine (*gang zag gi bdag gi ba*).
     >
     > A consciousness observing a basis of mine such as eyes, ears, and so forth and conceiving it to exist that way [that is, to exist by way of its own character] is a

[a] This is a longer name for Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a.

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consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena. Therefore, "observing the mine" (*nga yi ba la dmigs*) does not refer to observing those [eyes, ears, and so forth].

[Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's] explanation that mine is, without exception, a person is a very great basis for analysis because the foremost great being [D̄zong-ka-b̄a] again and again says that eyes, ears, and so forth are the mine:

1. because his *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'": Ocean of Reasoning* in commenting on "Due to the pacification of self and mine (*bdag gi*)"[1208] says:

   In dependence upon continuously cultivating just that view—that has been found—delineating that I and mine are not established by way of their own nature, the signs of:

   - self, that is to say, the person that is the object of apprehension of I,
   - and the mine, that is to say, the aggregates that are the objects of apprehension of mine,

   are pacified—that is to say, without observation of any of them, object and subject becoming of equal taste.

   and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* also says:

   Self, that is to say, the object of apprehension of I, and the mine, that is to say, the things such as the aggregates and so forth that are the objects of apprehension of mine are pacified.

   and:

   At the very time the self is realized as selfless, it is definitely realized that the things of the aggregates, the mine, are also selfless.

2. and because D̄zong-ka-b̄a's Great Exposition of Special Insight says:

   It is said when the self is realized as without inherent existence, it is realized that the mine, the aggregates, also are without self, that is, inherent existence.

   and:

   With respect to the indication by the second that the mine also is refuted, when one searches with reasoning examining whether the self inherently exists or not, then due to not finding any of the seven [in the sevenfold analysis], inherent existence is refuted with respect to the self, at which

time how would one with reasoning find "These are that self's eyes and so forth"? In that way the mine also is without inherent existence, and when yogis do not apprehend any inherent existence of the self and the mine, they are released from cyclic existence.

and also Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:[1209]

When whether the self has or does not have inherent establishment is sought in this way through reasoning, it is not found to be either one or many, whereby inherent existence is negated with respect to the self. At that time, inherently established mine will not be found by the reasoning analyzing suchness, just as, for example, when the child of a barren woman is not observed, the mine of the child of a barren woman—eyes and so forth—are not observed.

and also at the point of explaining [the passage in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*]:[1210]

Homage to that compassion for transmigrating beings
Powerless like a bucket traveling in a well
Through initially adhering to a self, "I,"
And then generating attachment for things, "This is mine."

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

The view of the transitory collection as I generates the view of the transitory collection as mine, and hence these sentient beings initially—prior to the view of the transitory adhering to mine—adhere to the meaning of I as true[ly existent], which is the view of the transitory apprehending "I" thinking that a self, which [actually] does not inherently exist, inherently exists. Subsequently, the view of the transitory apprehending mine generates attachment for the truth of the mine, thinking, "This is mine," with respect to phenomena other than the I, such as forms and eyes.

and:

The self that gives rise to an awareness apprehending mine with respect to that self's mine—those having an internal nature such as the eyes and so forth, which are the basis of imputing this self, and those that are external.

and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa similarly says such in his *Illumination of the Thought* [1211] when explaining [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (534)]:[1212]

That self regarding which an awareness apprehending I

> Intensively arises in transmigrating beings
> And regarding whose [internal eyes and so forth and
> external things][1213] awareness apprehending mine arises
> Is from bewilderment in [the perspective of]
> uninvestigated renown.

3. and because with respect to the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement:*[1214]

> Because there is no object without an agent,
> There is no mine without a self.

Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says, "Just as without a potter a pot does not exist, so without a self the mine also does not exist," in which he gives a potter as an instance of self, and a clay pot as an instance of the mine, and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa speaks likewise in his *Illumination.*

4. and because in explaining the statement in Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called "Wisdom":*

> When thinking of the internal and the external
> As self and mine has been extinguished,
> Graspings cease, and
> Through their extinguishment birth ceases.

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"* says:

> By not observing self and mine in that way, the two views of the transitory—thinking of self and mine with respect to the internal self and the external mine—is extinguished, at which time the four graspings [desirous grasping, grasping at views, grasping at ethics and modes of conduct, and grasping at propounding self] cease.

and there is meaning in his affixing the term "external" to "mine."

[Resolving the Issue]

Question: Hence, how are the following non-contradictory?

1. the many explanations that eyes, ears, and so forth are the mine
2. the explanation in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* that eyes and so forth are illustrations of mine:

> The object of observation of an innate view of the transitory collection conceiving [inherently existent] mine is just the mine; it should not be held that one's own eyes, and so forth, are the objects of observation. The subjective aspect is, upon observing that object of observation, to conceive the mine to be established by way of its own character.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Objection: In Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary* on "This is mine,"[a] he says, "Thinking, 'This is mine,' one adheres to all aspects of things other than the object of the apprehension of an [inherently existent] I." [Given your explanation above that the object of observation of a view of the transitory collection as mine is not eyes, and so forth, but the mine itself,] how do you take [Chandrakīrti's] explanation that upon observing a base such as eyes and so forth adherence to it thinking, "This is mine," is an apprehension of mine?

Answer: This refers to adherence to the mine as truly established *upon perceiving eyes and so forth as mine;* it does not indicate that illustrations of mine—eyes and so forth—are the objects of observation.

3. the explanation in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom,'"* as cited above, that "observing the mine" (*nga yi ba la dmigs*) does not refer to observing eyes, ears, and so forth
4. and the statement in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence:*

In dependence on the eyes' seeing form, it can be properly posited that Yajñadatta sees [form], and, in dependence on Yajñadatta's viewing forms, it can be properly posited that his eyes see forms. Nevertheless, it is not contradictory that the eyes seeing forms are not Yajñadatta and that the Yajñadatta who is the seer of forms is not [his] eyes. Similarly, just as when the eye hurts and is cured, one designates the conventions "I hurt," and "I am cured," such can be posited, and just as the conventions, "My eye hurts" and "My eye was cured," are designated, such can be posited. However, it is not posited through the conventions of the world that the eye itself either is the self or is the mine.

Answer: The thought of the omniscient Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa concerning this is as above, and it should be known at length from his *Great Exposition of the Middle.* An analytical person other than him[a]

[a] This is in the last line of stanza I.3, cited above:

Homage to that compassion for transmigrating beings
Powerless like a bucket traveling in a well
Through initially adhering to a self, "I,"
And then generating attachment for things, "This is mine."

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

him[a] says that there is a way that those are not contradictory because although eyes, ears, and so forth are the mine, they are not the mine that is the object of observation of a view of the transitory apprehending mine, since among the mine:

- there are various external and internal phenomena—my body, my feelings, and so forth; my eyes, my ears, and so forth; my food and clothing, my home, and so forth
- there are various higher and lower persons whose continuum is different [from one's own continuum]—my father, my mother, my child, my spouse, and so forth; my horse, my ox, my mount, my reins, and so forth; my enemy, my friend, my teacher, my abbot, and so forth
- there are various higher and lowers persons of the same continuum—my former life, my future life, and so forth; my substantial cause, my substantial effect, and so forth; my first moment, my second moment, and so forth; my objects of attainment that are the four Abiders in the Fruit, my objects of attainment that are the enjoyment body and emanation bodies, and so forth.

For since those innate worldly awarenesses apprehending such are valid cognitions, from among those manifold [instances of] mine the mine that are objects of observation of a view of the transitory collection as mine are the mine that are of the same continuum with oneself, but not other persons whose continuum is different from oneself and not phenomena—whose continuum is different from oneself—that are not persons. This is because in order to make such a distinction Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"* says:

> A consciousness observing a basis of mine such as eyes, ears, and so forth and conceiving it to exist that way [that is, to exist by way of its own character] is a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena. Therefore, "observing the mine" (*nga yi ba la dmigs*) does not refer to observing those [eyes, ears, and so forth].

For otherwise [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] should have eliminated the qualm with the likes of:

> "Observing the mine" is not observation of eyes, ears, and so forth because eyes, ears, and so forth are not mine, since [the

[a] This is Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den himself, assuming a humble posture as a literary device.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Consequentialists] differ from the Autonomists and below with regard to how to posit the mine.

However, he did not say such.[a]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1215]

[Innate Apprehension of Self and Aggregates as Different]

Furthermore, D̄ak-tsang and so forth say:[b]

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[a] According to Geshe Lhundup Sopa, Jay-d̄zun Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen, the textbook author of the Jay College of S̄e-ra Monastic University, avoids the problem by dividing phenomena into not just two categories, persons and other phenomena, but also a third, mine. Here in the false view of mine, "mine" is not the person and not the eyes, etc., but just the mine itself, technically called the isolate of mine (*nga yi ba'i rang ldog*), or opposite from non-one-with-mine, which means *just* mine and not its illustrations, not the things that are mine, but mine simpliciter. The object of observation of the false view of mine is this mine, but the false view of mine is nevertheless a conception of a self of persons since it is conceiving the I involved in mine to be inherently existent. In this way, my own ear is an illustration of mine, and thus is mine, but is not an object of observation of the false view of mine as an object of observation of the false view of mine can only be the isolate of mine.

In any case, the Ge-luk-b̄a scholars agree that the conception of eyes, ears, and so forth included in one's own continuum as inherently existent is a conception of the inherent existence of phenomena, not of persons, and that in the false view of mine the mine is something different from the person that is conceived to exist inherently in the false view of I. The controversy over what this is draws one into noticing the I as owner.

[b] See Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 471a.3ff, for almost the same presentation. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a attributes this position to D̄ak-tsang in both his *Great Exposition of Tenets* and *Great Exposition of the Middle,* but in neither does he give a source to show that D̄ak-tsang actually asserts this position, and I have not found such. The absence of citation might mean that D̄ak-tsang does not explicitly assert such but, from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's viewpoint, is "forced" to do so as a consequence of other assertions, but this needs to be examined.

The opinion being forced on D̄ak-tsang here is that it is wrong to refute the existence of a person different from the aggregates first and then refute a self of phenomena, the supposed reason being that a consciousness innately misapprehending the person always views the person as one with the aggregates, whereby the very refutation of the inherent existence of the I constitutes a refutation of the inherent existence of mind, body, and so forth which are phenomena other than the person. D̄zong-ka-b̄a does indeed assert that persons are different from the mental and physical aggregates that are their bases of imputation, although not a different entity from them. Therefore, in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's system, the inherent existence of a person different from the mental and physical aggregates is initially refuted, after which the inherent existence of phenomena other than the person is refuted. D̄ak-tsang objects to applying subtle distinctions outside of the context of ultimate analysis such as determining that persons and their bases of imputation are different, since it introduces a logical and imputational level when one is trying to undermine innate misapprehension. Perhaps, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is reacting to such criticism here.

In any case, this discussion provides an opportunity for Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a to discuss the

> It is wrong that when the conception of self is analyzed, one refutes the identification of a self separate from the aggregates and afterwards refutes the true existence of the aggregates because the self and the aggregates appear as one to an innate [non-analytical awareness]. For the root text [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] says,[1216] "There is no [innate] apprehension [of a self] separate from the aggregates."

They thereby ridicule the instruction manuals on the view [of emptiness], and even one of our own logicians propounds [that there is no innate conception of the self and aggregates as different].[a] These assertions are the bad talk of those with partial vision much like the way a one-eyed yak eats grass.

It [absurdly] follows that an innate [non-analytical] awareness does not conceive [the self and the aggregates] as different as in "my body" and "my mind," and it [absurdly] follows that there would be no innate [non-analytical awareness mis]conceiving the self and the aggregates as like a master and servants.

If it is accepted [that there is no innate non-analytical awareness misconceiving the self and the aggregates as like a master and servants], then it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakīrti would be wrong to say (651),[b] "What is related with the view of a self is

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intricate topic of the appearance of an inherently existent I and its relation to the appearance of mind and body. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's response revolves around considering an innate consciousness apprehending I (*ngar 'dzin lhan skyes*) in two ways: valid and invalid. He first points out that there are valid conceptions of "my mind," "my body," and so forth in which I and mind or body are different and then points out there is a coarse innate misconception of I in which the I and the aggregates are viewed as like a master and servants; his point is that if the I and the aggregates did not appear to be different, such could not be misconceived.

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 471b.4. Although when the stomach is sick, persons say, "I am sick," they do not innately say, "I am my stomach." Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is making the point that even though the appearance of the I is inseparably mixed with that of the mental and physical aggregates like water in milk, when we conceive the I to exist inherently, we do not conceive it to be either one with or different from the aggregates.

[b] IV.2d; P5262, vol. 98, 101.2.3; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.8, 311. Brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought*, P6143, vol. 154, 27.1.1. D̄zong-ka-b̄a takes this line (*rang du lta ba dang 'brel*) as meaning that what is destroyed is that which is related to the view of self, not relation with the view of self as Poussin takes it ("est détruite toute relation avec l'idée de soi"). The view of self is the subtle misconception of the person as being inherently existent; that which is related with it or is produced in dependence upon it is the coarse view of the person as being self-sufficient. Thus, Chandrakīrti is explained as saying that on the fourth ground the Bodhisattva overcomes the corresponding level of the innate coarse misconception of the self in which the I and the aggregates are conceived to be like master and servants. If the I and the aggregates did not appear differently, such a

thoroughly extinguished," and it [absurdly] follows that the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* concerning the fourth ground [and quoted by Chandrakīrti][a] at this point [in the fourth chapter of his *Commentary on the "Supplement"*] would be wrong. There are many [such contradictory consequences].

It [absurdly] follows that it is incorrect [for Chandrakīrti] to make the distinction—through the statement [in the *Supplement*],[1217] "There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates"—that although a self that has a character discordant with the aggregates and a permanent self independent of the aggregates have been refuted, a self that is merely different from the aggregates has not been refuted because of your thesis [that the self and the aggregates appear as one to an innate awareness]. The three spheres of self-contradiction!

If it is accepted [that the self and the aggregates are not merely different], then since the self and the aggregates exist and a difference between them has been rejected:

- It [absurdly] follows that the self and the aggregates are one.
- It [absurdly] follows that Chandrakīrti is wrong when he clearly states in his root text [that the self and the aggregates are not different entities but are just different]:[1218]

> This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived
> By those spending many eons as animals,
> Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them.
> Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates.

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conception could not take place, in which case Chandrakīrti would absurdly be wrong to say that on the fourth ground the respective level of that affliction is overcome.

With bracketed commentary from Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* this line reads:

> [The coarse level of consciousnesses conceiving that persons are substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and of the "mine" as being objects of use of such a person, this being] what is related with [or preceded by] the [subtle] view of self [as inherently existent] is thoroughly extinguished.

See Tsong-ka-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism,* 226.

[a] P5263, vol. 98, 118.3.2, end of chapter 4. The sūtra is P761.31, vol. 25, 258.2.4. The sūtra speaks of the fourth ground Bodhisattva's overcoming the coarser view of self described in the previous footnote.

Furthermore, while saying such, [we][a] say that the way that the I in a human continuum appears is that it appears undifferentiable from the aggregates and as if standing on its own (*hrang hrang ba*) and concrete (*phob phob pa*). About this also, some [Ḏak-tsang and so forth][b] say:

> It follows that such an appearance of the I is totally incorrect because the I is a non-associated compositional factor [that is, a product that is neither form nor consciousness] and because non-associated compositional factors do not appear this way.

and so forth.

- It [absurdly] follows that there would be no appearance of I because [according to you] the appearance of the aggregates, which are the bases of the imputation I, is not the appearance of the I.[c] The three spheres of self-contradiction!
- It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears, an independent I would appear because [according to you] the I would have to appear without depending on the appearance of the aggregates.

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (*Great Exposition of the Middle,* 481a.1) identifies this as Ḏzong-ka-b̄a and his spiritual sons (Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup). In colloquial Tibetan *hrang hrang* is used to depict someone who is alone, someone standing on his own. *Phob phob* seems to mean forthright or concrete, the very sound suggesting the seemingly hard surface of a bubble.

[b] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 481a.2ff., in this same refutation, 481a.1-481b.5. Ḏak-tsang clearly says that all Buddhist schools hold that the person is a non-associated compositional factor; see 552. Beyond that, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a appears to be putting words in his mouth.

[c] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a seems to be saying that the appearance of the aggregates is the appearance of the I; however, his *Great Exposition of the Middle* (481b.2) words the same point differently: "It [absurdly] follows that when an embodied self appears to an innate [consciousness] it does not have to appear by way of the appearance of the aggregates" (*lhan skyes la lus can gyi bdag snang ba na phung po'i snang ba'i sgo nas snang mi dgos par thal*). He clearly holds the opposite of this absurd consequence, that is, that when the I appears, it appears *by way of* the appearance of the aggregates; this does not mean that the appearance of the aggregates *is* the appearance of the I. Thus, in this passage he is saying only that the I appears together with the aggregates and dependent upon the appearance of the aggregates. This seems more credible since despite their appearing together, the I, within that context, appears to be standing by itself and concrete.

Therefore, when here in the *Great Exposition of Tenets* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a says that the I and the aggregates appear inseparably, he does not mean that one could not identify the appearance of the I within this conglomerate appearance; he merely means that they appear together and that the I appears by way of the aggregates' appearing. The passage here might read better as "because [according to you] the appearance of the aspect of I is not by way of the appearance of the aspect of the aggregates which are the basis of imputation of I" (*nga'i gdags gzhi phung po'i rnam pa shar ba'i sgo nas nga'i rnam pa shar ba ma yin pa'i phyir*).

The three spheres of self-contradiction!

- It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears to an innate [non-analytical awareness], the appearance of an I—the phenomenon imputed which is merely neither form nor consciousness—would occur without the appearance of the aggregates that are the basis of the imputation. For [according to you] your thesis is correct! If that is accepted, it would contradict Chandrakīrti's statement,[1219] "There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates."

Not only that but also the way that the I appears to an innate [non-analytical awareness] is that it seems to exist from the side of the aggregates [and not just as an imputation from the subject's side] within the context that the basis of the imputation of I and the phenomenon imputed are inseparably mixed like milk and water. For at that time, it must appear by way of a mixture of the appearance of the aggregates, which are the basis of the imputation, and the appearance of the I, which is the phenomenon imputed. If the I appeared separately from the aggregates, then the self would not appear to have the character of the aggregates—production, disintegration, shape, and so forth, being the feeler, discriminator, accumulator of actions and so forth, knower, and so forth. Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* says:[1220]

> If [the self] were other than the aggregates,
> It would not have the character of the aggregates.

and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1221]

> If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would have the character of non-aggregates. The five aggregates have the character of suitability as form,[a] experiencing, apprehending signs,

[a] "Suitability as form" (*rūpaṇa, gzugs su rung ba*) is rendered by J. W. De Jong in his *Cinq Chapitres De La Prasannapadā* (Paris: Libraire Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1949, 4) as "le pouvoir d'etre brisé," "capable of being broken." The latter is how Ajitamitra interprets the term in his commentary on the *Precious Garland* (P5659, vol. 129, notation lost). Therefore, it appears that the translators into Tibetan were aware of both meanings and chose "suitability as form" here. Lati Rinbochay said that "capable of being broken" is not appropriate as a definition of form at least in those schools that assert partless particles as these cannot be broken down either physically or mentally. Perhaps this is the reason why the translation as "that which is suitable as form," meaning whatever one points to when asked what form is, was preferred. Still, Geshe Gedün Lodrö said that partless particles could not be further reduced without disappearing; thus, if we take their physical disappearance as their susceptibility to being broken, this interpretation of *rūpaṇa* as that which is susceptible to being broken would be an appropriate definition of form.

"That which is suitable as form" (*gzugs su rung ba*) appears to be almost a non-

> composition, and realizing objects individually. Also, just as consciousness [is different] from form, so the self that is being asserted to be different from the aggregates would be established as having a character different [from the aggregates]. Also, its different character would be apprehended just as [the character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form, but it is not apprehended so. Therefore, the self is not separate from the aggregates.

and Buddhapālita also says such. [If the person and the aggregates appeared totally separately] then a white horse, a speckled bull, and so forth would be impossible.

Also, the *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī* by [the fifth Dalai Lama,] the great master and foremost of Conquerors, says:[1222]

> Sometimes the I will seem to exist in the context of the body. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the mind. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the other individual aggregates [feelings, discriminations, and compositional factors]. At the end of the arising of such a variety of modes of appearance, you will come to identify an I that exists in its own right, that exists inherently, that from the start is self-established, existing undifferentiatedly with the mind and body which are [also] mixed like milk and water.
>
> This is the first essential [in meditation on the selflessness of I], ascertainment of the object to be negated [in the view of selflessness]. You should analyze until deep experience of it arises. Having generated such in your mental continuum, you thereby crystallize an identification of the I conceived by the innate consciousness conceiving I as self-instituting within the context that it and your own aggregates are like water put in water.

This appears to be an unprecedented good explanation, based on experiencing the meaning of the texts by the father Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons.

Therefore, although the objects generating the thought "I" in the mind of a person such as Devadatta are not of different continuums, there is a plurality of gods, humans, animals, and so

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definition since it repeats the very term being defined, form; however, it does illustrate the notion that reasoning meets back to common experience in that with form we are at a level of common experience with little else to come up with as a definition other than saying that it is what we point to when we identify form.

forth:[a]

- because the finer points should be known, such as that although the I and the mind of his continuum have operated beginninglessly and [the I and the mind] have been produced and have ceased [moment by moment], they have never been destroyed, but the states of being a god or animal, and so forth, are established through assuming such a body, and the states are destroyed through casting off such a body, and
- because if one [wishes to] penetrate the depths of the view, one should make analysis in accordance with Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Great Commentary* on it with regard to the facts that since gods, humans, and so forth are differentiated by way of their physical supports [that is to say, their bodies], the I [sometimes] seems to exist in the context of the body, and on the other hand, since the passage of the mere I through to Buddhahood depends on the mind [which leaves one body and assumes another], the I [sometimes] seems to exist in the context of the mind.

For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Ocean of Reasoning* says:[1223]

> Therefore, do not hold that the two, the human who is the imputer of the designation "I" and the [conventionally existent] self that is the basis being imputed with the designation, are co-extensive. Know that the human is one part of the self.

and:

> When Devadatta's selves of former and later lives are not individually differentiated, the self that serves as the basis of the [valid] conception of I is the mere I which has existed beginninglessly. Therefore, the selves of the individual transmigrators when they appropriate the bodies of gods and so forth are instances of the former[ly mentioned mere I].

and it is said in the word of the foremost Conqueror [the Fifth Dalai Lama's *Sacred Word of Mañjushrī*]:[1224]

> Sometimes the I will seem to exist in the context of the body. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the mind.

and Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement"* says:[1225]

> There is no [innate] adherence to a self anywhere except with respect to the aggregates. Hence, there is no fifth form of the [false] view of the transitory collection [as real I and mine].

Accordingly, there are twenty artificial views of the transitory

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[a] He was, is, and will be these at various times over his continuum of lives.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

collection, like twenty mountain peaks,[1226] and as antidotes to destroy them Chandrakīrti states as signs or reasons the meaning of a statement in sūtra that he quotes:[1227]

> Form is not the self; also the self does not possess form; the self is not in form; form is not in the self.…Just so, the self is not consciousness; the self does not possess consciousness; the self is not in consciousness; consciousness is not in the self.

[Chandrakīrti] establishes [through those reasons] the subtle selflessness, that is, the lack of inherent existence in all phenomena, mentioned in a sūtra that says,[1228] "All phenomena are selfless." Hence, this is the meaning of the foremost precious [Ḏzong-kaḇa's][1229] saying that the refutation of artificial [misconceptions] is a branch of refuting innate [misconceptions of persons and phenomena]. Also, refutations of extremes with respect to the selflessness of phenomena [other than persons] are used as reasons [in the sevenfold reasoning refuting a self of persons].[1230]

Let us summarize the meaning of these sūtras. The subjects, a One-Gone-Thus or a person,[a] do not exist autonomously or inherently because:

1. they are not the mental and physical aggregates that are the basis of their imputation, that is, they are not one with the aggregates that are the basis of their imputation
2. they are not others separate from the aggregates that are the basis of their imputation, that is, they do not exist as entities separate from these aggregates that are the basis of their imputation

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa now states the syllogisms establishing the emptiness of a person, citing the two subjects that Nāgārjuna used, the self (translated here as "person") and the One-Gone-Thus, as in chapters eighteen and twenty-two of the *Treatise*. In this context "self" is the nominally existent person and not "self" in the sense of inherent existence, and the One-Gone-Thus is merely an example of a person, albeit the most exalted person. The implicit point is that if even the most exalted person lacks inherent existence, then, of course, ordinary persons lack it.

In this context the term "One-Gone-Thus" refers to a fully developed Buddha, not the potentiality for Buddhahood which exists in all sentient beings. The emptiness of the mind is the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus or Buddha-lineage, which itself is empty of inherent existence and applies to all persons; however, here the referent of "One-Gone-Thus" is just the person of a Buddha. Thus, "One-Gone-Thus and self," the dual subjects in Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's syllogisms refuting a self of persons, are not synonyms because there are many selves that are not Ones-Gone-Thus. Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa is merely using the dual subject as a convenient means to establish that not only are persons empty of inherent existence but also, among persons, even a One-Gone-Thus lacks it.

3. inherently they are not like a tub, the support of the mental and physical aggregates that would then be like a juniper[1231]
4. they do not inherently depend on the mental and physical aggregates
5. they do not inherently possess the mental and physical aggregates in the manner of a sameness of entity, as in the case of Devadatta's possessing an ear, and they also do not possess the aggregates in the manner of a difference of entity, as in the case of Devadatta's possessing wealth.

In Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* the reason is indicated by:[1232]

> [The One-Gone-Thus] is not [inherently one with his own five] aggregates; [the One-Gone-Thus] is not [inherently] other than [his own five] aggregates; the aggregates are not [inherently dependent] on him; he is not [inherently dependent] on those [aggregates]; the One-Gone-Thus does not [inherently] possess the aggregates.

Then, the thesis is indicated by:

> What [inherently existent] One-Gone-Thus is there? [That is, there is no inherently existent One-Gone-Thus.]

Also, Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* indicates the reason with:[1233]

> The aggregates are not [inherently one with] the self; those [aggregates] are not [inherently dependent] on that [self]; that [self]is not [inherently dependent] on those [aggregates]; without those [aggregates] that [self] is not [apprehendable separately; the self] is not mingled with the aggregates like fire and fuel.[a]

The "mingling" [of the self and the aggregates] refers to possession [in which possessor and possessed] are one entity, as explained previously [on 883] when indicating what is negated [in the view of selflessness]. The thesis is indicated by, "Therefore, how could a self exist?"

Furthermore, the reasons are to be established individually:

1. If those two [a One-Gone-Thus or a person] are one with [their respective] mental and physical aggregates:
    - It [absurdly] follows that they are impermanent.
    - It [absurdly] follows that they are [each] multiple.
    - It [absurdly] follows that a self is not asserted.

[a] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, sha,* 170.3) says, "The self is not inexpressible as either one with or other than the aggregates." This is the assertion that the self and the aggregates are not mingled like fire and fuel.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- It [absurdly] follows that remembering other births is impossible.

The *Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise* says:[1234]

> Respectively, the aggregates are not the One-Gone-Thus. Why? The aggregates possess the qualities of arising and disintegration; therefore, it would follow that the One-Gone-Thus was just impermanent. Also, the appropriator [the self] is not suitable to be just one with the appropriated [aggregates].

and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1235]

> With respect to this [first stanza of the eighteenth chapter in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*], if the self were thought to be the aggregates, then the self would have production and disintegration because of depending on the production and disintegration of the aggregates. Also, the self is not asserted thus because of the consequence of many faults.[a] As [Nāgārjuna] will explain:[1236]
>
> > Also it does not arise [newly], not having existed [in a former life],
> > For fallacy follows there—
> > The self would be a product
> > And its arising would be causeless.
>
> and similarly:[1237]
>
> > The appropriated [aggregates] are not the self,
> > [For] the aggregates arise and disintegrate.
> > How indeed could the appropriated
> > Be the appropriator?

Furthermore, this position is to be understood from the extensive analysis in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement:*[1238]

> If the aggregates were the self,
> Then because of the plurality of those aggregates, the selves would also just be many.
> Also the self would be a substantiality and viewing it as such
> Would not be erroneous if it is acting on a substantiality.
> In nirvāṇa annihilation of the self would definitely occur.

[a] The Buddhist Sanskrit Texts edition of the Sanskrit (145.22) emends the text to read, "due to the consequence of the fault of manyness." However, the Tibetan accords with Poussin's Bibliotheca Buddhica edition (p. 341) and allows for fallacies other than manyness.

> There would be destruction and production of the self in the moments prior to nirvāṇa.
> Due to the destruction of the agent, effects of those [actions] would be non-existent.
> Also another would experience [the effects of actions] accumulated by another.

and so forth.

2. If these two [a One-Gone-Thus or a person] are entities different from their mental and physical aggregates [that are their bases of imputation], then:
   - It [absurdly] follows that they are not aggregates.
   - It [absurdly] follows that they would not be feelers and so forth.
   - It [absurdly] follows that they would be permanent.
   - It [absurdly] follows that they would be apprehended apart from the mental and physical aggregates.
   - It [absurdly] follows that they would not be existent selves.
   - It [absurdly] follows that they would be without activity and would not be agents.

   and so forth. The *Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise* says:[1239]

   > The One-Gone-Thus also is not other than his aggregates; he does not exist as a separate phenomenon that is not the aggregates. Why? He would not accord with the impermanent aggregates; therefore, he would just be permanent. If [the One-Gone-Thus and his aggregates] were other, it would follow that he would be apprehended [separate from the aggregates that are his basis of imputation]. Because he is not apprehended [separate from his aggregates], the One-Gone-Thus is not other than his aggregates.

   and Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[1240]

   > If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would have the character of non-aggregates. The five aggregates have the character of suitability as form, experiencing, apprehending signs, composition, and realizing objects individually. Also, if the self is asserted to be different from the aggregates, just as consciousness is different from form, the self would be established as having a character different from the aggregates. Also, its different character would be apprehended just as [the character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form, but such is not apprehended.

Therefore, the self also is not separate from the aggregates.

3.&4. Even if a self or a One-Gone-Thus inherently acted as the base of the mental and physical aggregates [that are in their continuum] or even if these two inherently depended over there on the aggregates, the fallacies of a self different from the aggregates would ensue. The *Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise* says:[1241]

> Aggregates do not exist in a One-Gone-Thus like a forest of trees in snow. Why? Those which are supported [aggregates] and their base [a One-Gone-Thus] would be other; therefore, it would follow that a One-Gone-Thus was permanent. Also, a One-Gone-Thus does not exist in aggregates like a lion in a forest of trees. Why? There would be the fallacy just indicated.

and Chandrakīrti's own *Commentary on the "Supplement"* says:[1242]

> If [the self and the aggregates] were [inherently] other, they would be fit to be the [intrinsically existent] entities of that which is supported and its support like yogurt in a metal bowl, for example. Since the two, yogurt and bowl, are just other in worldly conventions, they are seen to be the entities of that which is supported and its support. However, the aggregates are not thus different [entities] from the self, and the self also is not a different [entity] from the aggregates. Therefore, these two are not the entities of support and supported.

and so forth.

5. A One-Gone-Thus and a person do not possess the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of being inherently different or non-different entities. If they possessed the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of inherent non-difference as if mingled or like a core, the fallacies of their being one with the aggregates would ensue—it would [absurdly] follow that a One-Gone-Thus and a person were impermanent, and so forth. If they possessed the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of inherent difference, the fallacies resulting from a difference of the self and the aggregates would ensue. The *Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise* says:[1243]

> A One-Gone-Thus does not possess aggregates in the way that a tree possesses [its] core. Why? He would not be other than the aggregates; therefore, there would be the

fallacy of his being impermanent.

and Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1244]

It is not accepted that the self [inherently] possesses the body. For the self [has already been refuted as inherently one with or different from the aggregates and thus] is not [inherently existent]. Therefore, the relationship of the self's possessing the aggregates does not exist [inherently]. If it is said that they are other [entities, like Devadatta's] possessing a cow or that they are not other [entities like Devadatta's] possessing his body, [the answer is that] the self is not one with or other than the body. [Therefore, the self's possessing form does not inherently exist.]

and Chandrakīrti's own *Commentary on the "Supplement"* says:[1245]

Also, the suffix indicating possession [*mat-* or *vat-pratyaya*] is employed for the non-different in *rūpavān devadattaḥ*, "Devadatta is a possessor of a form [a body]." It is employed for the different in *gomān*, "Devadatta is a possessor of a cow." Since form and the self do not have [inherently existent] sameness or otherness, there is no saying that the self [inherently] possesses form.

Hence, when these are condensed, they are included within [the reasoning that the self and the aggregates] lack [true] oneness and difference. However, Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*[a] explains that [five positions instead of just two] are refuted in relation to the modes of operation of the consciousness viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine].

This reasoning is able to prove selflessness with respect to all phenomena since when any of the aggregates, constituents, or sense-spheres are analyzed into their basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, they do not exist in any of those five ways. Therefore, one takes as one's reason that which refutes the object adhered to by artificial conceptions and refutes the innate conception that the phenomenon imputed exists from the side of its basis

[a] Commenting on XXII.1; P5260, vol. 98, 66.5.4; Poussin, 435.3. In the eighteenth chapter of the Treatise Nāgārjuna presents the reasoning refuting the inherent existence of persons in abbreviated form. There just two positions are refuted: a self is shown to be inherently neither the same as nor different from the aggregates. In the twenty-second chapter on the One-Gone-Thus, the five-cornered reasoning is presented.

of imputation. Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:[a]

Just as a person is not real
Due to being a composite of six constituents,
So each of the constituents also
Is not real due to being a composite.[b]

and:

The three elements[c] are not earth, they are not in it,
It is not in them, without them it is not;
Since this also applies to each,
The elements, like the self, are false.[d]

Also, some Autonomists and some of our own schools that propound [truly existent] things explicitly posit the mind as the self that takes rebirth.[e] Some propound as the self the special

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[a] Stanza 81 (for stanza 80 see 824) and stanza 83; P5658, vol. 129, 175.2.7. The four elements conventionally exist in mutual dependence; the one cannot exist without the others. However, one of them is not the others because then it would have the character of the others, whereby the character of the elements would become mixed. They also do not inherently depend on each other, because then they would be inherently existent others, capable of standing alone whereas they are not. They also cannot subsist without the others. This is the fourfold analysis (dependence being considered two ways), which establishes that the elements do not inherently exist, that is, are not established as their own reality.

[b] With bracketed material from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*dbu ma pa, nga.* 133.4), the stanza reads:

> Just as the person is not [established as its own] reality because of being [only designated in dependence upon] a composite of the six constituents, so each of the constituents also is not [established as its own] reality because of being [designated in dependence upon] a composite.

[c] Water, fire, and wind; or cohesion, heat, and motility.

[d] With bracketed material from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*dbu ma pa, kha,* 174.5), the stanza reads:

> The three elements are not [one with] earth. The three elements are not [dependent] on this [that is, the element earth]. This [earth] is not [dependent] on those [three elements]. Without those [three elements] there is no earth. Like [earth] each [of the other three elements] is not [findable when analyzed in those four ways]; therefore the elements also are false like the self.

[e] The term *dngos smra ba* (*bhāvavādin*) usually refers to those schools that assert true existence (*bden grub*), these being the Great Exposition School, Sūtra School, and Mind-Only School, and thus is translated as "Proponents of True Existence" or "Proponents of Truly Existent Things." However, sometimes the term includes the Autonomists, who, although they do not propound true existence, assert inherent existence (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhāvasiddhi*). That they propound inherent existence is indicated by the fact that they assert the self *to be* a consciousness, for instance. In other words, when the object imputed as "person" is sought, something is found—a consciousness.

configuration [or shape] of the aggregates because gods and humans are posited by way of special configurations of the aggregates due to former actions.[a] In order to refute these, two facets of reasons are added:

6. The mere composite [of the five aggregates or of the consciousness aggregate] is not the self.
7. The physical shape is not the self.

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1246]

> A chariot is not accepted as other than its components [or parts]. That it is not other [but is one with its components] is not [established. Inherently] it does not possess its components. It is not [inherently dependent] on its components. Its components are not [inherently dependent] on it. It is not the composite [of its components]. It is not the shape [of its components. The self and the aggregates] are similar.

This sevenfold analysis is also a supreme of reasonings for delineating everything—forms and so forth—as selfless. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1247]

> All things whatsoever—pots, cloths, tents, armies, forests, rosaries, trees, houses, carts, hotels, and so forth, and likewise [other things] designated by beings from whatsoever point of view—are to be known [as existing only according to non-analytical renown]. For the King of Subduers did not dispute with the world. Quality, part, passion, definition, fuel, and so forth as well as qualificand, whole, the impassioned,[b] illustration,[c] fire, and so forth—these [objects] do not exist in the seven ways when subjected to the analysis of the chariot. They exist through [non-analytical] worldly renown, which is other than that.

Also, about this, Ḏak-tsang (552) says [in paraphrase]:

> The Saṃmitīyas and so forth assert that the five aggregates are the basis of the imputation of self. Also, Bhāvaviveka and so

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[a] *las, karma.*

[b] Ḏzong-ka-ḇa (Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 477a.1) identifies *chags pa* (*rakta*) in this context as referring to the mind or person that is desirous of an object—that which is made impassioned by passion, that is, the impassioned.

[c] "Illustration" (*mtshan gzhi*) most likely is *lakṣya* in Sanskrit, which is translated into Tibetan both as *mtshon bya* "definiendum" and *mtshan gzhi* "illustration," the latter being a basis in which the definition illustrates the definiendum. It seems to make no difference here whether the term is translated as "illustration" or "definiendum." I prefer the latter for broader symmetry but have deferred to the Tibetan translation and used "illustration."

> forth assert that only the mind is the basis of the imputation of the self. However, none of our own schools asserts that the mind *is* the self.

Without even reading any of Bhāvaviveka's and Chandrakīrti's texts, Ḏak-tsang has the courage to make distinctions, thereby making an external display of his own ignorant innards.

- Well then, it [absurdly] follows that when another [non-Buddhist] school proves [to Bhāvaviveka] that the mental consciousness is the self, it would not prove what is already established [for him].
- It [absurdly] follows that Bhāvaviveka does not assert that the collection of the body and the senses are a basis of the imputation of self because [according to you] (1) Bhāvaviveka does not assert that the mental consciousness is the self and (2) from among the five aggregates, he takes only the mental consciousness as the basis of the imputation of self. The three spheres of self-contradiction!

If both consequences are accepted, then:

1. It [absurdly] follows that it is wrong for [Bhāvaviveka] to explain in his *Blaze of Reasoning* [when another school tries to prove to him that the mental consciousness is the self] that they are proving what is already established [for him]:[1248]

   > This is a proof of what is already established [for me] since we also actually impute the term "self" to [the mental] consciousness conventionally. Because [the mental] consciousness takes rebirth, it is said that it is the self.

2. It [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for him] to say, "[we also] actually impute the term "self' to [the mental] consciousness," that is, that the term "self" is used as an actual name for [the mental] consciousness, and it is wrong [for Bhāvaviveka] to prove that [the mental] consciousness is the self through the reason of its being the taker of rebirth.
3. Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong for Bhāvaviveka in his *Blaze of Reasoning* to explain that the collection of the body and the senses is a basis of the designation "self" [and thus is the self]:[a]

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[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle* (475b.1) says that this passage posits consciousness as the self that continuously takes rebirth and indicates (1) that the mere collection of the body and senses is the self and (2) that the five aggregates—the body and so forth—are the basis of designation of the self, just as, for example, (1) the mere collection of

> Because [the mental] consciousness takes rebirth, it is said that it is the self. It is imputed to the collection of the body and the senses.

4. It [absurdly] follows that it is wrong for Bhāvaviveka to cite as a source for this [a sūtra] teaching that the collection of the aggregates is the basis of designation [of the self and thus is the self]:[a]

> It is said, "Just as one thinks "chariot," for example, with respect to a collection of parts, so in dependence on the aggregates "sentient being" is designated conventionally."

5. It [absurdly] follows that, when Chandrakīrti also quotes this sūtra, he is refuting that the aggregates are the basis of the imputation "self" [instead of that the collection of the aggregates is the self, since it is clear that he is refuting Bhāvaviveka's explanation, and you claim that Bhāvaviveka explains the passage as showing that the collection of the aggregates is not the person but is the basis of imputation of the person, in which case Chandrakīrti must be refuting this].
6. [For the same reason] it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakīrti does not assert that the mind and the aggregates are bases of the imputation "self" [whereas he obviously does].
7. It [absurdly] follows that the two—Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti—do not differ with respect to asserting or not asserting establishment by way of [the object's] own character[b] because [according to you] they are the same in not positing the phenomenon imputed as its basis of imputation.

and so forth. You have a pile of the three spheres of self-contradiction!

b# Elimination of Error

They assert that on some occasions there is valid establishment with

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the parts of a chariot is the chariot and (2) its parts are the basis of designation. Here, he words it slightly differently, indicating that the collection is the basis of designation and thus is the phenomenon designated.

[a] P5256, vol. 96, 36.4.6. Throughout this series of consequences Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is operating based on D̄ak-tsang's actual assertions, drawing them out so as to contrast their full import with D̄zong-ka-b̄a's teachings. This is not a case of pinning a "logically" forced extension of an assertion on D̄ak-tsang and then drawing absurd contradictions, as sometimes is the case.

[b] *rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa, svalakṣaṇasiddhi.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

the three modes commonly appearing and that there are mere reasons. However, since the self-powered is not valid, they do not assert autonomy. Autonomy in this system is mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: On some occasions when Consequentialists critically investigate certain meanings of the profound and the vast, they assert that the three modes are established by valid cognition within common appearance and that mere commonly appearing reasons exist. However, since they do not assert that these are established by self-powered valid cognition, they do not assert autonomous syllogisms. Therefore, D̄ak-tsang's assertion that here in this system autonomy [that is, autonomous syllogisms] conventionally exist is mistaken.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1249] D̄ak-tsang's saying that Consequentialists assert autonomous syllogisms conventionally[a] is, as was explained earlier (625), the tremendous mistake of confusing an other-renowned reason and an autonomous reason to be the same:
>
> - because on some occasions when Consequentialists critically investigate the meaning of the profound [emptiness] among themselves, there is valid establishment with the three modes [of the reason] commonly appearing as like a magical illusion to both parties in the debate[b] and there are subjects and reasons

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[a] D̄ak-tsang (625) implies that he asserts autonomous syllogisms when he criticizes D̄zong-ka-b̄a's position:

> Why is propounding, "Even mere autonomous [syllogisms] are not asserted because the autonomy imputed by logicians does not exist," not the same also for consequences: "Even mere consequences are not asserted because the consequences imputed by logicians do not exist"? It is very well the same.

However, this same statement indicates that he has a way of asserting mere autonomous syllogisms without the overlay of autonomy the way the Autonomy School and so forth describe it. Perhaps, he just takes it to mean syllogisms in one's own continuum, that is to say, accepted by oneself.

[b] Consequentialists do not accept that the subject, reason, example, and so forth, of a syllogism appear similarly to a Proponent of the Middle and a non-Proponent of the Middle. For the Consequentialists, a valid cognition that seems to an opponent to establish the subject, and so forth, is non-existent in the way that the opponent asserts it because a non-Proponent of the Middle views a valid cognition as certifying that the object is inherently existent, but for a Consequentialist nothing inherently exists. In this way, there can be no common establishment.

However, when Consequentialists debate among themselves, the subject, and so forth, are accepted as appearing similarly to both parties in the sense that both assert that the subject and so forth are certified by valid cognitions that are not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object. Still, there is no way to have commonly appearing subjects with

commonly appearing as like illusions
- but there is no valid establishment in which the three modes [of the reason] exist under their own power.

Also, [Consequentialists] do not assert that [autonomous syllogisms] exist even conventionally because they assert that inherent establishment does not exist even conventionally.

3* Features of the Basal Two Truths {2}

This section has two parts: actual exposition[a] and ancillary topics.

a Actual Exposition of the Features of the Basal Two Truths {10}*

This section has ten parts: basis of division, meaning of the divisions, definitions, etymologies, individual divisions, difference between method and what arises from method, purpose of teaching the two truths as well as a

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respect to proving emptiness even when Consequentialists debate among themselves, because if they can understand that the subject and so forth are established by a valid cognition that is not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object, they have come to be able to distinguish between existence and inherent existence, and this can only be done upon having realized emptiness, in which case there is no need to prove emptiness to such a person. As Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *The Essence of Eloquence* (194.17 Varanasi 1973 edition) says:

> If the subject is posited as established by a conceptual or non-conceptual mistaken consciousness that is such that [the object] does not exist in accordance with how it appears to be established by way of its own character, then the meaning of the absence of inherent existence—the probandum—has already been established. Therefore, how could [such a person] be suitable as another party for whom that would have to be proved?

Thus, Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa appears to contradict Ḏzong-ka-ḇa here when he speaks of commonly appearing subjects within the context of two Consequentialists examining emptiness. However, in the *Four Interwoven Commentaries* (536.5-537.2) he indicates that a Proponent of True Existence who has discarded the assertion of inherent existence and become a full-fledged second party about to realize the absence of inherent existence simultaneously has become someone for whom dependent-arising is a reason having the three modes of presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. Thus, that person has ascertained with valid cognition that whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily without inherent existence and is about to realize the particular subject, such as I, as not existing inherently. Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa is saying that at that point the other party has become a Consequentialist due to realizing that whatever is a dependent-arising is without inherent existence but has not realized emptiness, though is just about to. It is only in such a hair-splitting situation, however, that he can speak of commonly appearing subjects within the context of two Consequentialists' examining emptiness.

[a] For a thorough discussion of the two truths in the Consequence School see Guy Newland, *The Two Truths* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1992).

dispelling of mistakes, order of overcoming bad views, stages of meditation on the profound which are the means of overcoming bad views, and subsequent attainment as well as union.

1# BASIS OF DIVISION INTO THE TWO TRUTHS

The basis of division is objects of knowledge. The divisions are the two truths, no more. If less, non-inclusion. They are limited in number to those.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The basis of division is objects of knowledge.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1250] There are many systems of assertion with regard to the basis of division of the two truths—that is, what is divided into the two truths. These incorrect systems hold that:
>
> 1. Mere appearances are the basis of division of the two truths because ultimate truths are not objects of knowledge.
> 2. The entities of form through to omniscience are the basis of division because Chandrakīrti explains that phenomena have two entities.
> 3. Non-superimpositional objects are the basis of division.
> 4. Non-investigated and non-analyzed objects of knowledge are the basis of division (608).
> 5. Truths are the basis of division, and when truths are divided, there are two, obscurational truths and ultimate truths.
> 6. There is no necessity for a basis of division but there is much to be said about the two truths that are the divisions.
>
> Those are not correct because:
>
> 1. If [according to you] ultimate truths do not exist [because they are not objects of knowledge, and hence not existents]:
>   - It [absurdly] follows that the final mode of subsistence of forms and so forth does not exist.
>   - It [absurdly] follows that because what is seen now is the final mode of subsistence, all sentient beings are already liberated.
>
>   and so forth.
> 2. Just as the two truths are not among the entities of a form, so it is through to omniscience. [If the two truths were both included within, for instance, form, then the ultimate truth of a form, which is its emptiness, would be a form, due to which emptiness absurdly would not be an uncompounded

phenomenon which it actually is.]

3. Existing superimpositional systems [such as the Sāṃkhya system] are obscurational truths. [Even though the superimpositions of the Sāṃkhya system, like the principal, do not exist even as obscurational truths, the system itself exists and is not an emptiness, whereby it is an obscurational truth].
4. The two truths have much to be analyzed, and, therefore, the fourth is bad talk and the worst mistake (608ff.).
5. Obscurational truths, falsities, and so forth are synonymous. [If the basis of division of the two truths is truth, then everything divided from it is a truth in which case obscurational truths would be truths. Then how could they be falsities?]
6. If the base of division and the mode of division is not known, then [the two truths] become attributes without a substratum…

Therefore, that objects of knowledge are the basis of division [of the two truths] is proved by:

- scripture: The *Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra* which says,[1251] "Furthermore, objects of knowledge [that is, objects to be known] are exhausted as these two truths, obscurational and ultimate."
- and reasoning: [The two truths] are objects of two types of awareness—that is, objects to be known and objects of analysis by those two types of awareness.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In them exist the divisions, the two truths—obscurational truths and ultimate truths. There is no need for more than those, and if less, they would not be inclusive. Hence, they are limited in number to those two truths.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1252] The divisions [of the two truths] are two, obscurational truths—objects of operation of a worldly person who has dualistic appearance and objects of operation of worldly awareness that has dualistic appearance—and ultimate truths. Further, objects of knowledge have those two categories, and this is a definite number eliminating a third category that is not either of those two:

- because, within the context of objects of knowledge, if something is established as any one of the two truths—for instance, an ultimate truth—then it is perforce blocked in an exclusionary way from being the other one, that is, an obscurational truth, and if something is established as an obscurational truth, it is perforce blocked in an exclusionary way from being the

other one, that is, an ultimate truth, and hence the two truths are explicit contradictories by way of mutual exclusion, and

- because if any one of the two truths were not existent, then all objects of knowledge would not be included in the truths, and it is established by both scripture and reasoning that a third and so forth truth that is not any of those two does not exist.

The determination of the count is not like mere inclusion into a count, as is the case with the Four [Buddha] Bodies, but is a definite count eliminating a third category…Hence, saying that Proponents of the Middle and Consequentialists have no explicit contradictories has been refuted earlier (612).

2# Meaning of the Divisions

Because it would be unsuitable as the mode of subsistence and all would directly perceive it, and so forth, the two truths are an indivisible entity, distinguished by their isolates.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because there are the fallacies that:

- If the two truths were different entities, the absence of true existence of forms would be unsuitable to be the mode of subsistence of forms, and so forth.
- If the two truths were one isolate, the ultimate truth would be an object of operation of all ordinary beings' direct perception, and so forth.

the two truths are an indivisible entity, distinguished as different by way of their isolates.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1253]

Question: Here what is the style of difference [of the two truths]?

Answer: There are various propositions:

1. Confusing Sāṃkhya and the *Sūtra of the Great Emptiness,*[a] proponents of other-emptiness—the Indian Daṃṣhṭasena[b] and his followers, the Tibetan Jo-nang-b̄a [S̄hay-rap-gyel-tsen] and so forth—assert that a temple and a person abide mutually empty

[a] *stong pa nyid chen po'i mdo.*

[b] *mche ba'i sde* (Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 690.3; and Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, *Tāranātha's History,* 268, n. 18). The same *History* (417) gives as alternate names *Daṃṣṭrāsena, Diṣṭasena, Daṃṣṭasena, Daṃṣṭrāsena, Daṃṣṭasyana,* and so forth. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 225-233, 335-341.

of each other;[a] hence, they assert that even the entities of the two truths are different.[b] This is refuted due to contradicting [the descriptions of] three fallacies and so forth[c] (383 and 901) in the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought,* the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, Prajñāmokṣha's *Commentary on (Atisha's) "Quintessential Instructions on the Middle,"*[d] and so forth and due to contradicting the description [of the two truths as like] product and impermanent thing in Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment.*[e]

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a According to Ṣhay-rap-gyel-tsen, just as a temple is not a person, and a person is not a temple, and thus they are empty of each other, so the ultimate is empty of conventional phenomena, and conventional phenomena are empty of the ultimate; by meditating on their otherness, one ceases to confuse the two, whereby one is liberated. In Sāṃkhya also (119) the person is empty of the principal, and the principal is empty of the person; by meditating on their otherness the two are not confused, and the root of cyclic existence is severed. For a description of the Jo-nang-b̄a doctrine of other-emptiness, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* Chapter 17b.

b However, Döl-b̄o-b̄a Ṣhay-rap-gyel-tsen (*Ocean of Definitive Meaning,* 384.4) clearly says that the two truths are different but not different entities and also are not the same entity:

> An emptiness of everything does not occur because an emptiness of the noumenon does not occur. A basis of the emptiness of all phenomena occurs; it is the noumenon. A basis empty of the noumenon does not occur because that is damaged by immeasurable great absurd consequences [such as that the noumenon would not exist]. Therefore, "empty of all" and "empty of all phenomena" are extremely different because the mode of subsistence is empty of phenomena but is not empty of the noumenon. This also clears away the assertion that phenomena and noumenon are one but different isolates and the assertion that they are utterly not different because those two are different in the sense of negating that they are the same entity.
>
> *Objection:* Well then, this contradicts the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* which says that the two truths are not either one or different:
>
> The character of the compounded realm and of the ultimate
> Is a character devoid of sameness and difference.
> Those who consider that they are the same or different
> Are improperly oriented.
>
> *Answer:* That passage refutes that the two truths are the same entity or are different entities because, although ultimate entities are established in the mode of subsistence, conventional entities are not established [in the mode of subsistence].

c For discussion of lists of three and four fallacies, see Newland, *Two Truths,* 64ff.

d *dbu ma'i man ngag gi 'grel pa, madhyamakaopdeśavṛtti;* P5326.

e Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* (stanza 68) says:

> Conventionalities are explained as emptiness [that is, as empty of inherent existence]

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2. One of the great Tibetan upholders of the teaching asserts that the two truths are different in the sense of negating sameness.
3. Also, some [correctly] assert that the two truths are one entity and the opposites of their negatives are different. Others refute this, saying that such is not feasible, for a sameness of entity does not exist within the uncompounded. However, their refutation is incorrect because Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*[1254] explains that all phenomena [individually] have two natures, and in accordance with Dzong-ka-ba's *Stages of the Path,* sameness of entity is not contradictory even when both of what are different are non-effective things or when one of them is a non-effective thing, as is the case, for example, with all phenomena being the same entity as [their own] selflessness. Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* says:

   > *Objection:* The relationship of sameness of nature is only among effective things and not others.
   >
   > *Answer:* That is not reasonable because sameness of nature is a synonym of non-difference. Since non-effective things are similar in selflessness, there only is no contradiction.

   This also refutes the assertion that the two truths are different in the sense of negating sameness.

Nga-wang-bel-den's *Annotations:*[1255] As Dzong-ka-ba's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

Question: Since the two of the division into two must be different, what kind of difference is this?

> *Answer:* With respect to this, many earlier [scholars] propound: Pot and woolen cloth, for instance, are different entities.[a] Product and impermanent thing, for instance, are one entity and different isolates.[b] In these two cases, the two that are different are both effective things; however, in cases of difference when either is a non-effective thing [that is, a permanent

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> And just emptiness is [posited in relation to] the conventional
> Because of the definiteness that [the one] would not occur without [the other],
> Like product and impermanent thing.

See also Christian Lindtner, *Master of Wisdom: Writings of the Buddhist Master Nāgārjuna* (Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986), 54.

[a] *ngo bo tha dad.*

[b] *ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad.*

phenomenon] they have a difference that negates sameness.[a] Among these three [modes of] difference, the two truths are different in the sense of negating sameness.

However, some [correctly] assert that the two truths are one entity and different isolates.

It is good to take this in accordance with the statement in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* that the relationship of one entity is not contradictory even in non-effective things [that is, permanent phenomena].[1256] Therefore, a oneness of entity and difference of isolates is not contradictory even when both of the different phenomena are non-effective things or when one is.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1257]

4. Some who are confused about the mere words of scriptures say that the two truths are not either the same entity nor different entities because the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* says:[1258]

 The character of the compounded realm and of the ultimate
 Is a character devoid of sameness and difference.
 Those who conceive sameness and difference
 Are improperly oriented.

 Their assertion is also incorrect:

 - because the meaning of this scriptural passage is that it merely explains that (1) apprehending a basis of emptiness and an emptiness as a sameness in which even their isolates are one such that they are not to be individually differentiated and (2) apprehending them as different such that even their entities are not the same are wrong orientations, whereas if those two were not either the same entity or different entities, the entities of those two would necessarily not exist, due to which those two also would not exist, and
 - because such an assertion contradicts the great chariots' extensive explanations of the lack of oneness and manyness.

About the sameness of entity [of the two truths] and the undifferentiability of entity of the element of attributes [that is, emptiness], one D̄ak-tsang says that:[1259]

 The noumena of all phenomena must be mutually each other, and it is not sufficient that all phenomena are the same entity in the absence of true existence. Therefore, just as whatever is

[a] *gcig pa dkag pa'i tha dad.*

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the noumenon of a pillar must be the noumenon of a pot, so it is with respect to all phenomena, due to which it is explained that the noumenon of phenomena is indivisible. Otherwise, whereas it would have been said that all compounded [phenomena] are undifferentiable, such was not said. Also, because it has the sense of a non-affirming negative, even the space of all pots and of all houses must be mutually each other. So he says.

Like his saying earlier on the occasion of Sāṃkhya that the Sāṃkhyas' mode of assertion appears to be close to that of the Consequentialists, he has written down the Sāṃkhyas' assertion that the nature or ultimate is a partless unit, without altering its color. [According to the Sāṃkhyas] the fundamental nature pervades its manifestations, or objects of pervasion, which are very many, but it does not come to have many parts, and with respect to manifestations what pervades causes also pervades the effects, and what pervades the effects also pervades the causes, due to which there is no need for more than one fundamental nature, and it is indivisible. [I] wrote about such assertions and so forth earlier[a] on the occasion of Sāṃkhya and refuted them, and it is likewise here [with respect to Ḏak-tsang's assertion of a partless fundamental nature].

This assertion is extremely low. You must [absurdly] assert that:

- a pot's substantial existence is the meaning of a person's substantial existence
- the apprehension that a person substantially exists is the apprehension that a pot substantially exists
- the apprehension that a person truly exists is the apprehension that a pot truly exists
- a pot's absence of true existence is the meaning of a person's absence of true existence

and so forth because [according to you] the mode of subsistence of a person is the mode of subsistence of a pot. You have come to assert the three spheres of self-contradiction!

Likewise, [his assertion] is harmed by reasonings such as:

- It [absurdly] follows that the ultimate does not have parts.
- It [absurdly] follows that explanations that the ultimate has two, four, and so forth divisions are incorrect.

and so forth, and [his assertion] is contradicted by many scriptures,

[a] See chapter three.

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such as the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra:*

> Just as you understand the discrimination of a self,
> So it should be applied with awareness to all.

and similarly many scriptural passages delineating selflessness by stages—Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* and *Autocommentary,* Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland,* Shāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds.* The meaning of the statement that the element of attributes is indivisible will be explained below.

Therefore, the two truths are one entity and different isolates, like product and impermanent phenomenon. If the two truths are different without even a sameness of entity there are four fallacies:

- It [absurdly] follows that the absence of true existence of form must not be the final mode of subsistence of form.
- It [absurdly] follows that realization of the absence of true existence of form must not suppress with its power the apprehension of [truly existent] signs of form.
- It [absurdly] follows that yogis' meditation of high paths is senseless.
- It [absurdly] follows that even a Buddha has not abandoned all the bonds of apprehending [truly existent] signs and defilements of assumption of bad states.[a]

and so forth…If the two truths are one such that not even their isolates are individually differentiable:

- It [absurdly] follows that just as mistaken obscurational truths, [polluted] actions, and afflictive emotions are abandoned, so even the ultimate, the noumenon of those phenomena, is abandoned.
- It [absurdly] follows that like obscurational truths, the ultimate has dissimilar, different aspects.
- It [absurdly] follows that just as obscurational truths are defiled, so even the ultimate would be suitable to be tainted with defilements
- It [absurdly] follows that even common beings are able to apprehend ultimates manifestly.

and so forth…Therefore, although the two truths are undifferentiable in entity as empty of true existence, they are established as different from the viewpoints of their respective isolates that are their

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[a] Defilements of assumption of bad states are tendencies to unseemly behavior; for instance, when someone else is singing, the person will uncontrollably start singing, or upon seeing a monkey will uncontrollably jump up and mimic the monkey.

bases of dependence…

Question: Then, should all explanations that the two truths are not feasible as either the same or different be explained in this way?

Answer: No. There are many cases when they must be explained as not being either truly established one or different as in, for instance:

- the statement that if one treats those two as either one or different, one is coursing in signs [that is, engaging in misapprehension]
- and in the statement in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle,* "Not different, not the same."[1260]

These should be explained, as before, demonstrating the fallacies that if they are different, [the ultimate truth] would not be suitable as the final mode of subsistence and so forth, and if they are the same, then, as is the case with conventionalities, all would be engaging the final mode of existence and so forth.

3# Definitions

Definitions: That with respect to which an awareness—a rational consciousness—comes to distinguish the ultimate and that which is found by it. That with respect to which a conventional awareness comes to distinguish a conventionality and that which is found by it.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Definitions of the two truths:

- An object with respect to which a rational consciousness comes to be a valid cognition distinguishing the ultimate and which is found by that valid cognition is the meaning of an ultimate truth.
- An object with respect to which a conventional awareness comes to be a valid cognition distinguishing a conventionality and which is found by that valid cognition is the meaning of a conventional truth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1261] An object explicitly found by an awareness, that is, a rational consciousness distinguishing the ultimate—[called] a rational consciousness since it is a logical consciousness—is feasible as [the definition of] an ultimate truth…This is a general [definition]; it covers all those for whom meditative equipoise and the state subsequent to meditative equipoise have not become one, that is, those at the end of the continuum [of being a sentient being with obstructions yet to overcome] and below.

The convention of "finding" does not apply in cases when the

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aspect of an object does not appear to that awareness; hence, that which is implicitly realized is not suitable to be an object found…Since it is explained that the qualities of a Buddha's exalted body, speech, and mind are inconceivable, the idea that whatever is an object found by an omniscient consciousness distinguishing a conventionality necessarily is an object found by a rational consciousness distinguishing a conventionality is a fool's overextension [of the above, limited definition to include the mode of perception of a Buddha]…

Hence, if you wish to include even the separate positing of the two truths by one exalted wisdom [of a Buddha] in which meditative equipoise and the state subsequent to meditative equipoise have become one, then [the definitions] should be put together this way:

- ultimate truth: object found with respect to which [an awareness] comes to be a rational consciousness distinguishing the ultimate
- obscurational truth: object found with respect to which [an awareness] comes to be a rational consciousness distinguishing a conventionality.

4# Etymologies

An ultimate truth is because of being an object, ultimate, and also truth. An obscurational truth is because of being a truth for the perspective of the obscurational due to concealing.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It is called ultimate truth because of being:

- an object of knowledge
- the supreme or ultimate of objects
- non-deceptive, or true, in that the mode of appearance and mode of abiding are in accord.

Due to concealing perception of the mode of subsistence, ignorance conceiving true existence is obscurational (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*), and obscurational truths are so called because of being true for the perspective of that obscuring awareness.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1262] In the Sanskrit original of *don dam bden pa* (ultimate truth) *paramārthasatya:*

- *parama* is used for ultimate, supreme, and so forth
- *artha* is used for object
- *satya* is used for truth, permanence, and so forth.

On this occasion:

1. "object" (*don, artha*) does not mean purpose but means the object known, analyzed, and found by exalted wisdom.
2. Because of being both such an object and the supreme, or ultimate, of objects, it is ultimate.
3. It is called "truth" since it does not deceive trainees [by] not abiding the way it appears or since the mode of appearance and the mode of abiding are concordant—not being discordant like false conventionalities.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1263] Ultimate truths necessarily are established in accordance with how they appear to the awarenesses to which they clearly appear. Thus, obscurational truths are necessarily falsities. The meaning of falsity is deceptive, and the meaning of deceptive is discordance between the mode of appearance and the mode of abiding. [This conflict] is taken to be that although they appear—to the awarenesses to which they clearly appear—to be truly established, they are without true establishment.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1264] In the Sanskrit original of *'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa* (worldly obscurational truth) *lokasaṃvṛtisatya:*

- *Loka* (*'jig rten;* world) on this occasion is taken to be persons and also dualistic awarenesses…A person imputed in dependence on the aggregates is called "world"…but it is not suitable to take all occurrences of "world" as referring to common beings—it refers to both common beings and Superiors [depending on context]…Still, "world" on this occasion is not just persons because there are many instances of its referring to dualistic consciousness…acting in both erroneous and non-erroneous ways with regard to conventionalities…
- In general, *saṃvṛti* is used in many ways, but on this occasion *saṃvṛti* is obscurational (*kun rdzob*), or *samantavṛti* [meaning] concealing all (*kun sgrib*), or concealing reality (*yang dag sgrib*), that is to say, ignorance; "obscurational truths" (*kun rdzob bden pa*) are so called since they are true in the perspective of ignorance…Hence, *saṃvṛti* is used for concealing reality (*yang dag sgrib*), concealing all (*kun sgrib*), and concealing the nature (*rang bzhin sgrib*)…

  Saṃvṛti also means mutual dependence—falsity…[Because they are mutually dependent, that they have a self-instituting

nature is untrue.][a] Hence, the world's mutual dependence is called *saṃvṛti,* and "relative truths" (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*) are so called since they exist just in mutual dependence.

In addition, *saṃvṛti* means terminology (*brda*), or conventions (*tha snyad*), which include both objects expressed and means of expression, objects known and consciousnesses, and so forth…Because the world's objects expressed and means of expression and the world's objects known and consciousnesses are the world's terminology, or conventions, they are called "conventional" (*saṃvṛti*); "conventional truths" (*kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛtisatya*) are so called since their mode of appearance and mode of abiding accord with the world's terminology, or conventions.[b]

5# INDIVIDUAL DIVISIONS

Two, four, sixteen, and so on divisions of ultimate truth. The two—awarenesses of common beings and of Superiors as well as their objects—are enumerative and other. Real and unreal conventionalities are not in the Middle Way's own system. In the perspective of a worldly consciousness a human and a reflection and so forth are true and untrue, mere real and unreal.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The divisions of ultimate truths are two:

1. selflessness of persons
2. selflessness of phenomena

and four:

1. emptiness of effective things
2. emptiness of non-things
3. emptiness of own-entity
4. emptiness of others' entity

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[a] *rang la tshugs thub kyi rang bzhin yod pa mi bden pa;* Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, zha,* 185.4.

[b] From this triple etymology of *saṃvṛti,* it can be seen that the best translation of *saṃvṛtisatya,* though awkward, would be "obscurational/relative/conventional truth." It appears that since in the Great Vehicle systems, the predominant, but certainly not the only, meaning, however, is obscurational truth, the translators into Tibetan settled on *kun rdzob bden pa,* and thus I also mainly use "obscurational truth."

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and sixteen:[a]

1. emptiness of the internal
2. emptiness of the external
3. emptiness of the internal and external
4. emptiness of emptiness
5. emptiness of the great
6. emptiness of the ultimate
7. emptiness of the compounded
8. emptiness of the uncompounded
9. emptiness of what has passed beyond extremes
10. emptiness of what is beginningless and endless
11. emptiness of the indestructible
12. emptiness of nature
13. emptiness of all phenomena
14. emptiness of definitions
15. emptiness of the unapprehendable
16. emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things.

Included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text are the eighteen emptinesses and the twenty emptinesses.

When divided terminologically:

- common beings' awarenesses realizing emptiness through the route of generic images[b] as well as [the emptinesses that are] their objects are enumerative ultimates[c]
- Superiors' awarenesses directly realizing emptiness as well as [the emptinesses that are] their objects are other, that is to say, non-enumerative ultimates.[d]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1265] Many earlier Tibetans asserted that:
>
> - The emptiness that is a negative of forms' ultimately existent production and so forth is an enumerative ultimate, an imputed ultimate truth,[e] and a fully qualified obscurational truth.[f]

[a] For identifications of these, see the list of eighteen emptinesses in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 204-205. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den gives the first four of the sixteen; the last twelve are from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 576.13).

[b] *don spyi, arthasāmānya;* literally, "meaning-generalities."

[c] *rnam grangs pa'i don dam;* also called concordant ultimates (*don dam rjes su mthun pa*).

[d] *rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam.*

[e] *don dam bden pa btags pa ba.*

[f] *kun rdzob bden pa mtshan nyid pa.*

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- The non-enumerative ultimate truth cannot be taken as an object of any awareness and therefore is not an object of knowledge.

Those are very incorrect because not only does each ultimate—enumerative and non-enumerative—have, [when taken] as object [from between object and subject], the absence of true existence [which is an ultimate truth and hence not an obscurational truth], but also the enumerative ultimate has, [when taken] as subject [from between object and subject], awarenesses of hearing and thinking, and the non-enumerative ultimate has, as subject, exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise [which take the absence of true existence as their object, and, therefore, even the non-enumerative ultimate, as object, is an object of knowledge, and thus it is wrong to hold that the non-enumerative ultimate truth cannot be taken as an object of any mind]…

Although the absence of ultimately existent production, which is the mode of subsistence, does not have proliferations from its own side, an inference of determinative realization [of the absence of ultimately existent production] comprehends [the absence of ultimately existent production] together with proliferations of dualistic appearance in the perspective of its appearance factor despite the fact that proliferations have disappeared in the perspective of its ascertainment factor. Hence, since it accords with the ultimate that is the object of a Superior's meditative equipoise, it is called a "concordant ultimate." Since the absence of ultimately existent production is without all of the collections of proliferations both in the perspective of the ascertainment factor of meditative equipoise and even in the perspective of its appearance factor, it is called an "actual ultimate" or "non-enumerative ultimate." Therefore, how could even the object found by inference—the absence of truly existent production—be a conventionality!

Word Commentary on Root Text: A division of obscurational truths into real and unreal conventionalities does not exist in the Middle Way's own system. However, in the perspective of a worldly consciousness,[a] a human face and a reflection of a face, and so forth, are suitable to receive the conventions "true" and "untrue," and hence respectively are mere real conventionalities and mere unreal conventionalities.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1266] "In the Middle

[a] As will be seen below, Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den refines this to mean "*relative to* conventional valid cognition."

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Way's own system" is to be taken as "in the perspective of the Middle Way rational consciousness of the unique Middle Way system." In its perspective it is not suitable to make a division of obscurational truths into the real whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence agree and the unreal whose mode of appearance and mode of subsistence do not agree because not only Superiors' meditative equipoise but also their exalted wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise perceive forms and so forth as like illusions and do not perceive their mode of appearance and mode of subsistence as in agreement…Therefore, obscurational truths are divided into the two—real and unreal—relative to the perspective of coarse, innate, worldly consciousnesses because:

- the six senses free from superficial damage and the six objects apprehended by them are posited as real[a] in the perspective of innate coarse consciousnesses
- and the six senses having superficial damage and the six objects apprehended by them are posited as unreal[b] in the perspective of worldly consciousnesses…

Proponents of the Middle[1267] themselves also assert such real and unreal [conventionalities relative to worldly valid cognition], but they conventionally do not assert the former type of real [conventionalities relative to a rational consciousness] in their own system…Therefore:

- The worldly perspective in "existing conventionally,"[c] the worldly perspective in "existing in the world's conventions,"[d] the convention in "conventional truth,"[e] and the noble [or superior] in "noble truth"[f] are conventional valid cognitions.
- The worldly perspective in [Chandrakīrti's statement about real conventionalities] "They are true in just the world," is an innate ordinary [consciousness].
- The obscurational [consciousness] (*kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*) in the perspective of which forms and so forth are posited as true must be ignorance.

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[a] *yang dag;* this is better translated as "correct" for consciousnesses.

[b] *log pa;* this is better translated as "incorrect" for consciousnesses.

[c] *tha snyad du yod.*

[d] *'jig rten gyi tha snyad du yod.*

[e] *tha snyad bden pa.*

[f] *'phags pa'i bden pa.*

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1268] Hence, there are real conventionalities *relative to* worldly valid cognition, or conventional valid cognition, but real conventionalities *relative to* a rational consciousness do not exist because real conventionalities *relative to* the mode of analysis by a rational consciousness do not exist, since something established as real *relative to* a rational consciousness does not exist, for, according to the mode of analysis by a rational consciousness, all phenomena must be established as false and the truly established does not exist…

In this system:[1269]

- Since conventional phenomena are not established in accordance with how they appear and conventional consciousnesses are mistaken consciousnesses [in that objects falsely appear to inherently exist], a division of conventional objects and subjects into the real and unreal is not asserted.
- Among the six non-conceptual consciousnesses in the continuum of a common being there are none that are non-mistaken.

However, it is not contradictory that those consciousnesses are valid cognitions able to posit phenomena—forms and so forth—as existing because although a non-mistaken subject [that is, consciousness] is needed to posit a true object, a mistaken subject itself serves to assist in positing a false object.

It is explained that:

- The division of conventionalities into real and unreal by other [that is, non-Consequentialist] Proponents of the Middle derives from their assertion of establishment by way of the object's own character
- Here [in the Consequence School] their not dividing conventionalities into real and unreal derives from their not asserting establishment by way of the object's own character.

Since if forms and so forth were posited as real, this would be damaged by a rational consciousness realizing their emptiness, [the Consequentialists] do not divide conventionalities into real and unreal. However, *relative to* only conventional consciousnesses—and not *relative to* a rational consciousness—it is suitable to make a division into real and unreal because although dividing an illusory horse and a fully qualified horse into false and true *relative to* a rational consciousness is not feasible, these are suitable to receive the conventions "false" and "true" *relative to* conventional consciousnesses…

Thus, you should know that:

- Although [conventionalities] are divided into the real and unreal *relative to* conventional valid cognition, they are not divided into real and unreal *in the perspective of* conventional valid cognition.[a]
- Although conventional phenomena are posited as unreal *relative to* a rational consciousness, they are not posited as unreal *in the perspective of* a rational consciousness[b]…

Therefore, "real" in "real conventionalities are not asserted in the Middle Way's own system" and "real" in "they assert a distinction of real and unreal relative to worldly consciousnesses" are similar in name but not at all similar in meaning. This is because the former "real" is taken as establishment by way of the object's own character and the latter is taken as an object suitable to receive the convention "true" relative to ordinary worldly thought, just as, for example, in "some persons are coming, and some persons are not coming," the some who are coming and the some who are not coming do not refer to one substratum…

You should know that although[1270] the consciousness *in the perspective of which* forms and so forth are posited as real is necessarily a consciousness conceiving true existence, there is not the slightest contradiction that a conventional valid cognition is posited as the consciousness *relative to which* forms and so forth are suitable to receive the convention "true"…Moreover, you need to know the distinctions that:[1271]

- Although an eye consciousness apprehending a form is mistaken *in the perspective of* a conventional consciousness, it is not mistaken *relative to* a conventional consciousness.
- Although an eye consciousness apprehending a form is mistaken *relative to* a rational consciousness, it is not mistaken *in the perspective of* a rational consciousness…

The conventional consciousness[1272] *in the perspective of* which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as mistaken, and the conventional consciousness *in the perspective of* which an eye consciousness apprehending a form is posited as a non-mistaken subject on this occasion are separate…A conventional valid cognition realizing that an eye consciousness apprehending a form is

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[a] *tha snyad pa'i tshad ma la ltos te yang log gnyis su 'byed kyang tha snyad pa'i tshad ma'i ngor yang log gnyis su mi 'byed;* 192.6.

[b] *kun rdzob pa'i chos rnams rigs shes la ltos te log par 'jog kyang rigs shes kyi ngor log par 'jog pa min;* 192.7.

mistaken [with regard to its appearing-object since the object appears to inherently exist] and a conventional valid cognition realizing that an eye consciousness apprehending a form is a real [that is, correct] subject [in that it apprehends the form correctly] are not equivalent, and what is proven by the one is also not refuted by the other.[a]

6# Difference between Method And What Arises from Method

The conventional are preceders and assisters of a rational consciousness—the means and that arisen from the means.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Conventional consciousnesses are preceders and assisters of a rational consciousness because conventional consciousnesses are the means and a rational consciousness is that arisen from the means.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1273] Until the five aggregates, six constituents, twelve sense spheres, eighteen constituents, and so forth are established for one's awareness, their mode of subsistence cannot be taught because without ascertaining a substratum, its attributes cannot be ascertained. Therefore, not only must the appearance of the substrata, the qualificands, precede the appearance of the aspect of the ultimate, but also without valid cognitions realizing conventionalities as precursors, a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate will not arise, and a rational consciousness comprehending the ultimate arises from conventional valid cognitions…

Likewise, the two truths should assist each other, and awarenesses realizing them should serve to assist each other; it is not that when one of them is asserted, the other must be discarded because those two are in a relationship of sameness of entity, like product and impermanent thing, or a conch and its color…

It is explained that:

- although, when analyzed, a self does not exist, the relationship of actions and their fruits is feasible and not contradictory
- and although inherent existence, or establishment from the object's own side, does not exist, objects—the six manifest objects and so forth—as they are perceived by the six direct perceptions are feasible and not contradictory.

[a] For a thorough discussion of this topic see Guy Newland, *The Two Truths* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1992), 136-157.

Hence, the claim that when there is no inherent existence, establishment by valid cognition is not suitable is refuted thoroughly, and the claim that in the system of the Middle Way School all conventionalities—actions, their effects, persons, and so forth—are not asserted is refuted thoroughly…Though persons and all phenomena are no more than name-only, karma is accumulated, and fruitions are experienced…Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Three Principal Aspects of the Path* says:

As long as the two understandings—of conventionalities[a] as
non-deceptive cause and effect
And of emptiness as without assertion [of inherent existence]—
Seem to be separate, there is still no realization
Of the thought of Shākyamuni Buddha.

When simultaneously without alternation,
From only seeing dependent-arising as non-deceptive,
Definite knowledge destroys the mode of apprehension [of
inherent existence],
Then analysis of the view is complete.

7# PURPOSE OF TEACHING THE TWO TRUTHS, AS WELL AS A DISPELLING OF MISTAKES

The purpose is for the sake of overcoming all views and for the sake of discarding and adopting. Therefore, in the third phase a freedom from proliferations that is not emptiness is mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The purpose of teaching emptiness is for the sake of overcoming all bad views and so on and for the sake of discarding awarenesses conceiving true existence and adopting awarenesses realizing the absence of true existence. Therefore, Dak-tsang's assertion that in the third phase, or stage, one meditatively cultivates freedom from proliferations[b] that is not emptiness is mistaken.

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1274] Ḏak-tsang (557, 561, and 566) says that:

- the purpose of teaching emptiness is for the sake of overcom-

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[a] It is interesting that Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa (*Great Exposition of Tenets,* Taipei, 583.4) substitutes "conventionalities" (*kun rdzob*) for Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's "appearances"(*snang ba*). Perhaps he is making the point that the ultimate appears to a consciousness realizing it. Later (946) he uses the dyad of appearance and emptiness and refers back to his explanation and citation here. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's meaning undoubtedly is "conventional appearances."

[b] *spros bral.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

ing the conception of self
- and the purpose of "freedom from proliferations" that is not emptiness and is not existent, is not non-existent, is not both, and also is not non-both is to overcome all whatsoever good and bad views and all proliferations, or all apprehensions as anything.

He takes these as the thought of the explanation in Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas* that initially the non-meritorious is overcome, in the middle self is overcome, and finally all views are overcome. Also many others such as Shākya-chok-den,[a] thinking that this is true, assert freedom from proliferations as a means to refute even the profound emptiness. This is not correct…for it is the serious befuddlement of not realizing (1) the purpose of emptiness, (2) the characteristics of emptiness, and (3) the import of affixing inherent existence to the word emptiness as in "empty of inherent existence."[b]

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1275] It is explained that the meaning of reliance on conditions is the meaning of emptiness, that is, that [an object] does not have inherent existence in the sense of being self-instituting; hence, the very meaning of the term "dependent-arising" is the meaning of the term "empty of inherent existence." However, the meaning of not existing as a thing able to perform functions is not the meaning of the term "emptiness." Thinking that whatever is empty of inherent existence does not exist as a thing able to perform activities, you make the superimposition that such non-thingness is the meaning of the emptiness of inherent existence and thereupon put forward objections. Therefore, you have not understood even the meaning of the term "emptiness."

8# Order of Overcoming Bad Views

Sūtra and Mantra assert that initially the non-meritorious is overcome through actions and their effects, and so forth; in the middle the two selves are overcome through impermanence and so forth; finally all views as well as defilements are overcome through the stages of actualizing suchness.

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[a] *shākya mchog ldan / gser mdog paṇ chen shākya mchog ldan,* 1428-1507.

[b] For Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's detailed critique of D̄ak-tsang's presentation of freedom from proliferations see 912ff.

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Word Commentary on Root Text: With regard to the stages of the teacher Buddha's leading trainees, Sūtra and the four tantra sets in Mantra as well as commentators on them assert that [trainees] are made into suitable vessels for the path through:

- initially overcoming the non-meritorious, the causes of bad transmigrations, by way of teaching a substantially existent self that accumulates actions and experiences their effects, and so forth
- in the middle overcoming the two selves—a permanent, unitary, and self-powered self as well as a substantially existent self—by way of teaching the emptiness and selflessness and so forth that are among the sixteen attributes [of the four truths], impermanence and so on
- and thereupon finally overcoming all coarse and subtle views of permanence and annihilation and the defilements of afflictive emotions, such as desire as well as their predisposing latencies, through the stages of teaching how to realize and how to actualize the very subtle thusness and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1276]

Question: Then, with regard to the statement in Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas:*

> One who knows that
> Initially the non-meritorious is overcome,
> In the middle self is overcome, and
> Finally all views are overcome is wise.

in your system what are the selves and the views to be overcome and what are the features of the [three] occasions?

Answer: One who is skilled in means makes trainees into suitable vessels over three stages:

- Nihilistic views are overcome through actions and their effects, and so forth.
- A permanent, unitary, and self-powered self as well as the self in the mode of apprehension of the twenty views of the transitory collection [as a real self] in which the self is substantially existent in the sense of having a character discordant with the characters of the aggregates are refuted by [teaching] the four—impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness—as antidotes to conceptions that the unclean is clean, pain is pleasure, the impermanent is permanent, and the selfless is self.
- When through having taught such, trainees' continuums have ripened and they have become fit vessels for the profound, in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth not only are

consciousnesses conceiving that the coarse selflessness and the coarse absence of true existence are the final mode of subsistence overcome but also all whatsoever proliferations of bad views—consciousnesses conceiving true existence and so forth—are overcome.

This is the thought of sūtras—the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra,* the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra,* the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth—Nāgārjuna's Collections of Reasonings and his followers, the thought of the tantras in Mantra, and the systems of the great commentators on them.

9[#] STAGES OF MEDITATION ON THE PROFOUND WHICH ARE THE MEANS OF OVERCOMING BAD VIEWS

There are five stages of meditation. Look at the statements of the wise.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Look in detail at the scriptures of the powerful ones among the wise, such as the Foremost Great Being [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] and so forth, for the five modes of meditation:

- a beginner's mode of developing experience with respect to emptiness
- mode of meditatively cultivating a similitude of special insight in dependence upon a similitude of calm abiding
- mode of meditatively cultivating actual special insight in dependence upon actual calm abiding
- mode of meditation directly realizing emptiness
- mode of meditation on emptiness by the great bliss of Highest Yoga Mantra.[a]

Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Annotations:*[1277] The great scholar and adept J̄ang-ḡya Röl-ḇay-dor-jay says:[b]

The likes of what appears in the Foremost Omniscient [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's] scriptures—his Great Exposition of Special Insight, Medium Length Exposition of Special Insight, and *Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called 'Wisdom'"*—do not appear in any of the essays of instruction on the view or in any of the general presentations and critical analyses and so forth composed by scholars of later generations and renowned to be very clear. Therefore,

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[a] These five are described in detail in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 43-115.

[b] This appears at the end of J̄ang-ḡya's discussion of the final reasoning on emptiness, dependent-arising; see Hopkins, *Emptiness Yoga,* 352-353 and 428.

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it is evident that when those scriptures of the Foremost Lama [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] are explained by someone who knows how to explain them and heard by someone who knows how to listen, there are many sources generating joy.

Consequently, nowadays the intelligent who want to establish predispositions for the Middle Way view should understand that it is indispensable to study over a long period of time [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's]:

- *Great Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle*
- *Great Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle"*
- *The Essence of Eloquence*
- Great Exposition of Special Insight
- and Middling Exposition of Special Insight.

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1278] The last four of the five stages of meditation [on emptiness] have a mode of meditation that is like meditative equipoise and an illusory-like mode of meditation in the state subsequent to meditative equipoise.

1. A Beginner's Mode of Developing Experience of the View[a]

In general, there are many [reasonings] refuting [inherent existence], but from among the five reasonings:

1. The reasoning of the lack of being one or many has two phases, so there must be four essentials:
   - ascertaining the object of negation [inherent existence]
   - ascertaining the entailment [that is, that the lack of being one or many entails the absence of inherent existence]
   - ascertaining that the object and its basis of imputation are not one
   - ascertaining that the object and its basis of imputation are not inherently different.
2. The reasoning of dependent-arising has three essentials:
   - ascertaining the object of negation [inherent existence]
   - ascertaining the entailment [that is, that dependent-arising entails the absence of inherent existence]
   - ascertaining the reason [that is, that the subject being considered is a dependent-arising]
3. The sevenfold reasoning has seven phases, so there must be nine essentials:
   - ascertaining the object of negation [inherent existence]

[a] See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 43-66.

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- ascertaining the entailment [that is, that the lack of the seven positions entails the absence of inherent existence]
- ascertaining that the object and its basis of imputation are not one
- ascertaining that the object and its basis of imputation are not inherently different
- ascertaining that the object imputed does not inherently depend on the basis of imputation
- ascertaining that the basis of imputation does not inherently depend on the object imputed
- ascertaining that the object imputed does not possess the basis of imputation either as a different entity in the way a person owns a cow or as one entity in the way a tree possesses its core
- ascertaining that the object imputed is not the special shape of the basis of imputation
- ascertaining that the object imputed is not the collection of the bases of imputation.

and so forth.[a] Through analyzing this way, such a self-instituting I becomes vacuous, not existing in any place or at any time, and in the perspective of ascertainment, except for a mere elimination of the I that is the object of negation, there is nothing positive included.

When sustaining this mere elimination which is like space's mere negative of obstructive contact, if the force of the ascertaining consciousness weakens, recall a brief form of the reasoning, and repeatedly bring out the intensity of the view [of emptiness], since even a knowledgeable inference overcomes the proliferations of object comprehended and comprehender.

2. Mode of Meditatively Cultivating a Similitude of Special Insight in Dependence upon a Similitude of Calm Abiding[b]

Although the nine mental abidings are [loosely] called "calm abiding," the first (setting the mind) is by the power of hearing and the second (continuous setting) is by the power of thinking, due to

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a does not indicate what the other two of the five main reasonings are; it is likely that one is the vajra nodes, and, as Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, ka,* 210.2) says, the other may be refutation of production of the four extremes—an inherently existent effect, an utterly non-existent effect, an effect that is both existent and non-existent, or an effect that is neither existent nor non-existent.

[b] See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 67-90.

which although one is working at meditation, these are not meditation. Meditation is attained from the third mental abiding (resetting) because of attaining a power of mindfulness that is a mental familiarity and accustoming beyond hearing and thinking. Consequently, for any analytical meditation this level definitely has to be attained as the bottom line. For if contemplation analyzing an object of observation of a virtuous awareness with the likes of hearing and thinking and analytical meditation did not differ, the [first] three of [the nine mental abidings] could not be differentiated individually.

Since an actual similitude of meditative equipoise and an actual similitude of calm abiding mainly come beginning from the eighth mental abiding (making one-pointed), on this occasion [when actual calm abiding has already been achieved] powerful stability comes through the power of meditative equipoise. However, not taking this to be primary, through analyzing again and again, the two—*ascertainment* of the meaning analyzed and *stability* at the end of analysis—should be equally achieved because if analysis is not done, the ascertaining consciousness lessens, and if at the end of analysis, stability is not fostered, meditative stabilization is not achieved, due to which clarity is not gained…

3. Mode of Meditatively Cultivating Actual Special Insight in Dependence upon Actual Calm Abiding[a]

If, having achieved calm abiding, you do not want to analyze due to too firm stability, analyze again and again in dependence upon [the mental contemplation called] individual knowledge of the character (see Chart 12 below). If, due to this, stability lessens, again perform stabilizing meditation, whereby pliancy and calm abiding are quickly generated. Then, again and again analyze strongly. When the power of analysis induces pliancy and stability, special insight is attained, and you simultaneously pass to the heat level of the path of preparation and attain the preparatory mental contemplation of belief (see Chart 12 below). Analysis by this induces firm stability, and the two—*meditative stabilization* with very firm stability able to analyze very powerfully from within stability and *special insight* individually analyzing the meaning of the mode of being—are in equal strength…

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a See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 91-95.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Chart 12: The Seven Mental Contemplations

1. mental contemplation of individual knowledge of the character[a] (also known as thorough knowledge of the character[b])
2. mental contemplation arisen from belief[c]
3. mental contemplation of thorough isolation[d]
4. mental contemplation of joy-withdrawal[e]
5. mental contemplation of analysis[f]
6. mental contemplation of final training[g]
7. mental contemplation that is the fruit of final training.[h]

4. Mode of Meditation Directly Realizing Emptiness[i]

When meditating this way, dualistic appearance of object and subject is present and can be ascertained [by the power of experience even during meditative equipoise][1279] up through the heat and peak levels of the path of preparation. During the forbearance level of the path of preparation, the appearance of the object being meditated cannot be ascertained in meditative equipoise, but the presence of the subject's appearance [can be ascertained. Because there is this difference, the forbearance level is called "engaged in one portion of suchness."] During the supreme mundane qualities level of the path of preparation, although subtle appearances of object meditated and meditator have not vanished, they cannot be ascertained. After that [during the path of seeing and so forth] when all appearances of subject and object are extinguished in the face of the element of attributes, object and subject become like water put in water, and emptiness is directly realized, and so forth. Hence, at that time it is not suitable for appearances of object and subject as well as object comprehended, comprehender, and so forth to exist

a *mtshan nyid so sor rig pa'i yid byed, lakṣaṇapratisaṃvedīmanaskāra.*
b *mtshan nyid rab tu rig pa.*
c *mos pa las byung ba'i yid byed, adhimokṣikamanaskāra.*
d *rab tu dben pa'i yid byed, prāvivekyamanaskāra.*
e *dga' ba sdud pa'i yid byed, ratisaṃgrāhakamanaskāra.*
f *dpyod pa yid byed, mīmāṃsāmanaskāra.*
g *sbyor mtha'i yid byed, prayoganiṣṭhamanaskāra.*
h *sbyor mtha'i 'bras bu'i yid byed, prayoganiṣṭhaphalamanaskāra.*
i See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 96-109.

in the perspective of that awareness because it is separated from all proliferations…

5. Mode of Meditation on Emptiness during the Second Stage of Highest Yoga Mantra[a]

It is not suitable to engage in analysis on the occasion of the great bliss [of the completion stage[b] in Highest Yoga Tantra], and thus…it is repeatedly said that one must stop mental engagement. It is necessary to know:

- the approaches in this supreme system for generating the exalted wisdom of great bliss, with the distinctions described by the individual tantras, scholars, and adepts
- the qualitative difference in exalted wisdom of great bliss generated in dependence on quintessential instructions for generating exalted wisdom by way of those approaches
- the essentials of how emptiness is meditated by the exalted wisdom of great bliss
- when meditating on emptiness with that special consciousness, how such meditation is superior to meditating on emptiness with an ordinary exalted wisdom on the occasion of Perfection Vehicle
- how the clear light is speedily generated

and so forth…The order, entities, modes of meditative cultivation, and so forth of calm abiding and special insight are similar in the stage of generation in Highest Yoga Tantra and below.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1280] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

> *Question:* From the viewpoint of which Vehicles—Great Vehicle or Lesser Vehicle and Sūtra or Mantra—is this the mode of generating calm abiding and special insight in stages?
>
> *Answer:* It is common to the two Vehicles—that of the Hearers and Solitary Realizers and that of the Perfections—and moreover is common to the four schools of tenets. In my *Great Exposition of Secret Mantra* I have explained that the assertion of the individual tantras and their great commentators that [calm abiding and special insight is generated in stages] is similar also for the three lower tantra sets within the Mantra [Vehicle]…

[a] See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 111-115.

[b] *rdzogs rim, niṣpannakrama.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

> Even in Highest Yoga Tantra generation of understanding the view must be done in accordance with what occurs in the Middle Way texts. With respect to how it is sustained, on some occasions during states subsequent to meditative equipoise on the stages of generation and completion, one takes suchness to mind within analyzing it. However, when those on the completion stage who have attained the capacity to concentrate on essential points in the body sustain suchness in meditative equipoise, although they definitely must meditate within setting [the mind] in the context of the view, they do not perform the analytical meditation of special insight as it occurs in other texts.

Gedün Lodrö's *Calm Abiding and Special Insight:*[1281] It is definite that before achieving special insight, one must have calm abiding, and, similarly, before one can have special insight observing emptiness, one must have calm abiding observing emptiness. This is true in all forms of sūtra and the three lower tantra sets. In Highest Yoga Tantra, however, there are cases of achieving calm abiding and special insight simultaneously. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions* and other texts state that in Highest Yoga Tantra there are cases of achieving calm abiding and special insight simultaneously through the force of the blessed empowerment of various special objects of observation and the force of special meditative stabilizations. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's text on the concentrations and formless absorptions does not give a clear explanation of how this takes place because he explains it in detail elsewhere in relation to Highest Yoga Tantra, but we can explain it here in a rough way.

At the beginning of the completion stage in Highest Yoga Tantra, a yogic practitioner definitely must have the ability to take as an object of observation a composite of an ascertainment factor[a] (an absence of inherent existence) and an appearance factor[b] (a divine body). These are not two different consciousnesses but a single consciousness that is described as having two factors, ascertainment and appearance. For this type of yoga to be generated, all coarse conceptions[c] must be stopped, and this necessitates the stopping of

[a] *nges ngo.*

[b] *snang ngo.*

[c] *rnam rtog, vikalpa.* See Chart 9, 641.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

all winds that serve as the mounts of such conceptions. Before the completion stage, during the stage of generation, the yogic practitioner stops these winds of coarse conceptions.

When the yogic practitioner has achieved either the eighth or ninth mental abiding preceding calm abiding, she or he meditates on emptiness—on the lack of inherent existence of object, agent, and action.[a] Then, from within a meditative equipoise on emptiness, the practitioner emanates and withdraws a mandala. This emanation and withdrawal is done with the seal[b] of emptiness—that is, it is done while sustaining the force of the practitioner's realization of emptiness. Through just this practice, the eighty coarse conceptual thoughts are naturally stopped. Not only do the many types of coarse conceptions described in sūtra cease through this practice of emanating and withdrawing the mandala; even the altruistic mind of enlightenment ceases at that time.

As for the attainment of calm abiding and special insight, the main obstacles to it are two types of wind, one that interferes with analysis and another that interferes with stabilization. This practice purifies both of these winds simultaneously. Since these two winds are the chief obstacles to the attainment of calm abiding and special insight and since this yogic practitioner abiding in the eighth or ninth mental abiding preceding calm abiding engages in the emanation and withdrawal of the mandala, thereby purifying these winds, there is no reason why he or she should not attain special insight. Thus, in Highest Yoga Tantra, there is no need to engage in the additional preparatory practices explained in sūtra, nor is it necessary to achieve calm abiding specifically in order to calm and purify the winds.

The purpose in practicing the emanation and withdrawal of a mandala is to achieve the completion stage and not mainly to purify the winds. Nevertheless, the winds are automatically purified by this practice. Thus, for this practitioner, the attainment of calm abiding and special insight is also simultaneous with the attainment of the completion stage. In all probability, this attainment is also simultaneous with that of the mantric path of preparation, but this point is not clearly stated in the texts; in the sūtra system, the attainment of a union of calm abiding and special insight observing emptiness is simultaneous with the attainment of the path of

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a *bya byed las gsum.*

b *phyag rgya, mudrā.*

preparation.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1282]

Objection: Your claim that even the emptiness of form must be meditated within taking it as the object of the mode of apprehension of an awareness is not feasible because that is described as a mode of meditation fixed up to look like a perfection of wisdom.

Answer: In Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle* that which is fixed up to look like a perfection of wisdom is associated with the Mind-Only School. If forms and so forth that are qualified with being truly established are apprehended as empty, selfless, void, not void, permanent, and impermanent, that is the meaning of being fixed up to look like a perfection of wisdom.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1283] This is as D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says:

The meaning of the statements:

- in the *Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra,*[1284] "Even if Bodhisattvas conceive, 'This aggregate is empty,' they are enacting signs and do not have faith in the abode of non-production."
- and in the great mother [the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*], "If one considers, 'Form is empty and selfless,' one is enacting signs and is not enacting the perfection of wisdom."

is to be taken as holding emptiness and so forth to truly exist. Otherwise, it would even not be right for [Buddha to say] "they do not have faith in the abode of non-production" because to have faith in [the abode of non-production] also would be to enact signs, and it would contradict many [sūtras]:

- the same [*Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*] says,[1285] "One who thoroughly knows all phenomena as without inherent existence enacts the supreme perfection of wisdom."
- and:[1286]

When wisdom breaks down compounded and
uncompounded phenomena
As well as the wholesome and unwholesome, not even
particles are apprehended.
At that time in the world this is counted as the
perfection of wisdom.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- and the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra* also says:[1287]

  If phenomena are individually analyzed as selfless
  And what has been analyzed is meditated upon,
  That is the cause for attaining the fruit, nirvāṇa.
  Through any other cause one does not go to peace.

- and in the *Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra:*[1288]

  Shāriputra asks, "How do Bodhisattvas who want to practice the profound perfection of wisdom train?" In answer, Avalokiteshvara says, "They should thoroughly and correctly view even these five aggregates as empty of inherent existence."[a]

and so forth.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1289] Also the mode of non-apprehension or of non-taking to mind is not meditation stopping taking anything to mind or not seeing anything, like closed eyes. Rather, it must be meditation within seeing the mere negative of all proliferations of true establishment upon having analyzed with a rational consciousness:

- because there is no way for an awareness to meditatively cultivate those states without taking such a mere negative as the object of its mode of apprehension, or its object of engagement, and
- because [otherwise] it would contradict all descriptions of engaging emptiness through hearing, thinking, and meditating, and
- because without taking something as the object of its mode of apprehension, or its object of engagement, an awareness does not engage that object merely by its appearing to the awareness, since, for example, although an awareness to which true establishment appears exists in the continuum of Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers, they do not have an awareness involved in true establishment.

Therefore, many Tibetans' non-assertion of a mode of apprehension with regard to the view and their assertion of "appearing but not apprehending anything" are the worst mistakes…The *Cloud of*

[a] For the context of this citation, see His Holiness the Dalai Lama, *How To Practice: The Way to a Meaningful Life,* ed. and trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Pocketbooks, 2001), 159-165; and Donald S. Lopez Jr., *The Heat Sūtra Explained* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988), 49-56.

Jewels Sūtra says:

> Thus, those who are skilled with regard to faults perform yoga for meditating on emptiness in order to separate from all proliferations. Since they have done much meditation on emptiness, when they thoroughly investigate the nature of whatsoever places where the mind scatters and where the mind takes delight, they realize that those are empty. Also, when they investigate the mind, they realize it to be empty. When they completely investigate the nature of the mind by which this is realized, they realize it to be empty. Through such realization they enter into the yoga of signlessness.

10# SUBSEQUENT ATTAINMENT AS WELL AS UNION

Like emptiness, the borderline of positing conventionalities is difficult. Whichever of the two truths one falls from, one is ruined and falls to an extreme; therefore, it is unsuitable to be lopsided with respect to those two. Cherish their union.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Just as emptiness that is non-establishment from the object's own side is difficult to realize, so the borderline of positing conventionalities in which all activities and agents are feasible within name-only is very difficult. If one falls from either obscurational truths or ultimate truth, it is like being ruined and like falling to an extreme; therefore, it is unsuitable to be lopsided with respect to those two—existing conventionally and not existing ultimately. Hence, knowing and meditating both of those in union is to be cherished greatly.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1290] [Chandrakīrti's] *Clear Words* says:[1291]

> Here some say, "The Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds [that is, lives] are empty of inherent existence, and the Nihilists also say that these are non-existent. Therefore, Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists."
>
> It is not so.
>
> How?
>
> Proponents of the Middle are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions[a] all—this world, the next, and so

[a] The phrase "or reliant on causes and conditions" (*hetupratyayān prāpya*, more literally,

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> forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not ascertain that future worlds [future lives] and so forth do not truly exist[a] because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings.

Buddhapālita (see 825) also speaks of four distinctions—Nihilists' non-assertion and the Middle Way School's assertion of dependent-arising, Nihilists not understanding and Proponents of the Middle understanding the absence of inherent existence, and so forth. Consequently, the assertion that emptiness is realized having discounted conventionalities is a great sign of the stupidity of asserting that upon discarding the substratum the attribute can be apprehended.

Not only that, but also it is unsuitable to be lopsided with respect to the two truths because if one falls from either of the two truths, it is like being ruined and like falling to an extreme, and if one does not, it is like completing the two collections [of merit and wisdom] right through to attaining the two exalted bodies [that is, Truth and Form Bodies]. If one falls from conventionalities through not asserting them, one falls to an extreme of deprecation, severs roots of virtue, and as a result falls to a bad transmigration and drops from the means to accomplish Form Bodies and the fruits of those means…If in not wanting to deprecate conventionalities one asserts them but discards the profound emptiness, this causes one to fall to the extreme of permanence, to turn away from the truth body, liberation, and the collection of exalted wisdom, and to fall into the Most Torturous Hell…

Therefore, cherish the union of the two truths because with this one does not fall to an extreme, is not ruined, and accumulates the two collections right through to attaining the Two Bodies related with the two collections.

b Ancillary Topic: Three Characters*

The three characters are similar. It is asserted that for the childish the nature is superimposed on the other-powered, but for Conquerors the nature is thoroughly established.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The way the three characters are posited is

"meeting to causes and conditions") is missing in the Tibetan. The translation of the last sentence follows the Tibetan.

[a] *dngos po med pa, abhāva.*

similar to the explanation on the occasion of the Autonomy School. They assert that:

- Since a snake is non-existent in a rope, [its existence in a rope] is a superimposition, but in an actual snake it is thoroughly established, not superimposed, and similarly the basic disposition, or nature, is superimposed on other-powered, produced dependent-arisings, but is thoroughly established in the noumenon.[a]
- Also, that the basic disposition, or nature, exists among the objects known by a common being's non-conceptual consciousness is a superimposition, but its being the object of a Conqueror's exalted wisdom knowing the mode [of being of phenomena] is thoroughly established.

4* Unique Features {2}

This section has two parts: brief indication and extensive explanation.

a Brief Indication*

Because of not asserting establishment by way of the object's own character even conventionally, there are many unique features—eight and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because of not asserting establishment by way of the object's own character even conventionally, there are many unique features of assertions—eight and so forth.[b]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1292] In general, the existence of external objects, the non-existence of a body of attributes, and so forth are not unique, but assertions of this and that [tenet] are unique within only nominal, imputed existence, due to not asserting establishment by way of the object's own character.

b Extensive Explanation {11}*

This section has eleven parts: existence of external objects and non-existence

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[a] For elaboration on this, see 820ff.

[b] An excellent book-length treatment of the topic of the Consequence School's unique tenets is available in Daniel Cozort, *Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998), which includes a complete translation of this topic in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a root text and commentary as well as Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations,* 283-423. The book is an extension of Cozort's Ph.D. thesis at the University of Virginia. I have made extensive use of it throughout this section. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's list of eight pairs of unique features is in contrast to D̄ak-tsang's list of five (572).

of a mind-basis-of-all; distinctions about the two selflessnesses; distinctions about subsequent cognitions as valid cognitions and about the conventional; distinctions about mental direct perception and yogic direct perception; distinctions about assertions on the aspects of the four truths and on the three times; having-disintegrated is an effective thing and the feasibility of effects, as well as a dispelling of objections; non-assertion of autonomy and self-cognition; distinctions about *pratyakṣa* and true cessations; distinctions about nirvāṇas with and without remainder; distinctions about the two obstructions and how they are abandoned; and distinctions about how the two extremes are cleared away, along with subsidiary topics.

1# Existence of External Objects and Non-Existence of a Mind-basis-of-all

They assert that because of not being refuted by an awareness distinguishing conventionalities, external objects exist, and they assert that because of not being established by an awareness distinguishing conventionalities, a basis-of-all does not exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that:

- Because of not being refuted by an awareness distinguishing conventionalities, external objects exist.

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1293] External objects exist because:

  - Nāgārjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* and the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say that the two, apprehended-object and apprehending-subject, equally exist conventionally and equally do not exist on the occasion of analyzing the ultimate
  - external objects are extensively set forth in the texts of manifest knowledge
  - and external objects are not refuted by any awareness distinguishing conventionalities.

- Because of not being established by an awareness distinguishing conventionalities, a mind-basis-of-all does not exist.

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1294] A mind-basis-of-all necessarily does not exist because:

  - although many sūtras set forth a mind-basis-of-all, many sūtras on the profound [emptiness] describe [that teaching] as requiring interpretation
  - and since, with respect to positing a mind-basis-of-all, it cannot be posited without searching for the seeds of the fruition of

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actions and for the imputed object, it is not established by conventional reasoning.

Since these two also derive from an imputed object's non-existence upon being analyzed, they are unique [tenets of the Consequence School].

2# DISTINCTIONS ABOUT THE TWO SELFLESSNESSES

Conceiving true existence, one is not liberated. That is afflictive. The selflessnesses are equal.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Since it is said that while having an awareness conceiving that truly established things exist, one does not have attainment of liberation, a consciousness conceiving true existence is an afflictive obstruction. Because the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena are posited by way of their bases of emptiness [that is, persons and other phenomena], they are equally subtle.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1295] Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras explain that one who has discrimination of things [that is, true existence] does not have liberation. Hence, it must be asserted that a consciousness conceiving true existence prevents attainment of liberation, preventing release of the mind from afflictive emotions. Therefore, [the Consequence School] asserts that a consciousness conceiving true existence is an afflictive obstruction. For this reason, the modes of emptiness in the two selflessnesses do not differ, but must be posited by way of the bases of emptiness [that is, persons and other phenomena]. Hence, the two selflessnesses are equally subtle…

The Autonomists and below do not assert desire and so forth [on the level] of a consciousness conceiving true existence, but here it is asserted not only that [desire, hatred, and bewilderment] have the aspect of a coarse consciousness conceiving self but also that there are three poisons that have the aspect of a consciousness conceiving true existence. This is because of the unique assertion that, like the two levels of ignorance, there are two levels also with respect to attachment and so forth.

3# DISTINCTIONS ABOUT SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS AS VALID COGNITIONS AND ABOUT THE CONVENTIONAL

It is established that because there are none unpolluted, all consciousnesses of childish persons are mistaken, and it is established that

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because new realization is unsuitable, subsequent cognitions are valid cognitions.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because among consciousnesses in the continuums of sentient beings, except for the exalted wisdom of non-conceptual meditative equipoise, there are none not polluted by predispositions of consciousnesses conceiving true existence, all consciousnesses of childish—that is, common—persons are mistaken.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1296] Until Buddhahood is attained, except for a Superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, one does not have non-mistaken consciousness, and due to this even a consciousness of meditative equipoise of the supreme mundane qualities path of preparation in a childish, that is, common, being is polluted by mistakenness [in that there is still an appearance of inherent existence]. Hence, that all consciousnesses of common beings are mistaken is also unique [to the Consequence School].

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because it is not suitable to make an analysis of new realization (280 and 948) with respect to the mode of realization by valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*), subsequent cognitions are established as valid cognitions.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1297] Subsequent cognition also is established as valid cognition because:
>
> - new realization is refuted
> - Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,* having refuted self-cognition and other-cognition, explains that it is unsuitable to analyze in this way
> - and non-deceptive consciousness[a] is set forth as the definition of valid cognition.
>
> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1298] Both assertions—that all awarenesses of common beings are mistaken consciousnesses and that subsequent cognition is valid cognition—derive from non-assertion of establishment by way of the object's own character because:
>
> - objects necessarily appear to awarenesses of common beings to be established by way of their own character
> - and a newly non-deceptive consciousness would have to be found upon analysis by a rational consciousness.

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[a] *mi bslu ba'i shes pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

4# Distinctions about Mental Direct Perception and Yogic Direct Perception

They assert that because feeling is mental direct perception, there is conceptual mental direct perception, and they assert that because one who has actualized the sixteen aspects of the truths nevertheless is not necessarily a Superior, there are common beings who actualize the sixteen.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that because feelings that have the aspect of a conventionality[a] are mental direct perceptions, there is conceptual mental direct perception.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1299] They assert conceptual mental direct perception because Chandrakīrti:
>
> - speaks of [some] ordinary feelings that have the aspect of a conventionality as mental direct perceptions…
> - and refutes that direct perceptions are necessarily devoid of conceptuality.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1300] Direct perceptions are not necessarily non-conceptual consciousnesses:
>
> 1. because mental direct perceptions of the type called "on this occasion" as they are renowned to the Epistemologists[b] are asserted to be memory consciousnesses in the Consequence School, and
> 2. because feelings that are mental consciousnesses are asserted to be mental direct perceptions.
>
> The first reason is established because…Chandrakīrti says that an initial sense consciousness explicitly knows the object, a visible form or the like, whereas the mental consciousness knows it through the force of the sense consciousness, and does not

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[a] This excludes the mental factor of feeling accompanying a consciousness realizing emptiness.

[b] In the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system of epistemology, there are three modes of assertion with regard to a type of non-conceptual direct perception by the mental consciousness that is linked with sense consciousnesses. In one version, simultaneous with a sense direct perception there is a mental direct perception perceiving the same object non-conceptually. In another version, alternating with each moment of a sense direct perception there is a mental direct perception perceiving the same object non-conceptually. In yet another version, after the continuum of a sense direct perception there is a single moment of a mental direct perception perceiving the same object non-conceptually. Chandrakīrti says that such mental direct perception is merely a memory consciousness, not one explicitly knowing the object.

explicitly know it like the sense consciousness, and it is also said to be memory[a]…

The second reason is established because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* says:…

> Chandrakīrti says that with regard to manifest comprehension there are two types:
>
> - a sense consciousness's distinguishing forms and so forth, for instance
> - and internal experience thoroughly distinguishing that is like feeling [distinguishing] pleasure, pain, and so forth.
>
> The latter of these two must be asserted [as existing] even during the ordinary state, and because…it is not suitable to be posited as yogic direct perception, sense direct perception, or self-cognizing direct perception, it is posited as mental direct perception.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that although some who are described as Foe Destroyers in the lower and upper manifest knowledges have actualized the sixteen aspects of the truths, they are not [actually] Superiors, and hence there are common beings who actualize the sixteen aspects of the four truths—impermanence and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1301] It is explained that there are those who, although they have actualized the coarse four truths,[b] are born in a great hell through the force of doubting Buddha's enlightenment [when at death they see they will be reborn]. Therefore, they could not be Superiors, whereby it is asserted that there are common beings who possess in their continuum yogic manifest perception directly realizing the sixteen coarse attributes of the four truths.

5# Distinctions about Assertions on the Aspects of the Four Truths and on the Three Times

They assert that because special insight regarding emptiness and the path of preparation are simultaneous, direct perception of the sixteen has not reached even the path of preparation, and they assert that

[a] Since the consciousness is generated through the force of a sense consciousness and not in dependence on a logical reason, it is called "direct" despite its being conceptual.

[b] The coarse four truths are structured around the coarse selflessness of persons, that is, the non-existence of a substantially existent person in the sense of being self-sufficient. The subtle four truths are structured around the subtle selflessness, that is, the absence of inherent existence.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-ẉang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

because having-disintegrated is an effective thing, the three times are effective things.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert that:

- Because special insight observing emptiness and [the beginning of] the path of preparation are simultaneous, merely through directly realizing the sixteen aspects of the truths one has not reached even the path of preparation.
- Because having-disintegrated is an effective thing, the three times are effective things.

  Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1302] Because many [texts] such as the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds,* Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, and so forth say, "Due to the condition of birth, there is aging and having-died," a sentient being's having died,[a] having disintegrated,[b] and having passed away[c] are established as effective things, whereby it is implicitly established that all three times—past, future, and present—are effective things. This will be explained below.

6# Having-Disintegrated is an Effective Thing and the Feasibility of Effects, as well as a Dispelling of Objections

Because of being produced, having-disintegrated is an effective thing. Although much passes after an action ceases, effects issue forth even though acquisition, a continuum, and non-wastage do not exist. The mere propounding that having-disintegrated is an effective thing is without analysis, like pots being effective things. If harsh speech of a long time ago appeared to an innate awareness without having disintegrated, why are all previous deeds not remembered?

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because aging and having-died are produced by conditions, having-disintegrated is an effective thing.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1303] In the systems of other proponents of tenets it is asserted that:

- The two—having-disintegrated[d] and disintegration[e]—are mutually exclusive.

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[a] *shi ba.*

[b] *zhig pa.*

[c] *'das pa.*

[d] *zhig pa.*

[e] *'jig pa.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- A pot's not staying in the next moment after its own time is the meaning of a pot's disintegration, and a pot's not having stayed in the next moment after its own time is a pot's having-disintegrated.
- The first is a compositional factor aggregate,[a] and the second is uncompounded.

In the system of the Consequence School, having-disintegrated and disintegration are not mutually exclusive, and hence even a pot's having-disintegrated is a pot's disintegration. Moreover, although the Sūtra School and higher schools agree in asserting that "a pot's disintegration" is an activity of a pot's disintegration, the Consequentialists assert that both a pot's not staying in the next moment after its own time and a pot's not having stayed in the next moment after its own time are activities of a pot's disintegration, and hence they assert that both a pot approaching to having disintegrated and a pot's having-disintegrated are activities of a pot's disintegration. It is like, for example, the fact that both a shoot's approaching production and a shoot's production are activities of a shoot's production.

The three—the Sūtra School, the Mind-Only School, and the Autonomy School—assert that although both a shoot's approaching production and a shoot's production are activities of a shoot's production, a shoot's approaching having disintegrated and a shoot's having-disintegrated are not activities of a shoot's disintegration because a shoot's having-disintegrated is not an activity of a shoot's disintegration, since it is not an effective thing. Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

> In the Consequence School…having-died[b] is a sentient being's having-disintegrated, and it is produced by the condition of birth…Dying[c] performs two activities; it causes compositional things to disintegrate, and it acts as a cause for the non-severance of the continuum of non-knowledge [that is, ignorance]. Therefore, having-disintegrated has causes producing it, and having-disintegrated is able to produce effects.
>
> This is a continuum's having-disintegrated, but it is the

[a] *'du byed kyi phung po.* Just as a table, for instance, is included in the form aggregate and is a form aggregate, a table's disintegration is included in the compositional factor aggregate and is a compositional factor aggregate.

[b] *shi ba.*

[c] *'chi ba.*

same for the first moment's having disintegrated in the next moment. The first moment is also indicated to be a cause of [its] having disintegrated in the next moment. Hence, a sentient being's:

- having been born and having died
- and not staying in the next moment and not having stayed in the next moment

are equivalent with regard to whether they are posited or not as effective things.[a]

Word Commentary on Root Text: Therefore, although many eons pass after a virtuous or non-virtuous action ceases, it is feasible that effects issue forth even though acquisition, a continuum [such a mind-basis-of-all or subtle, neutral mental consciousness in which predispositions are infused (432)], and non-wastage do not exist.

Gōn-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Presentation of Tenets:* The Kashmiri Proponents of the Great Exposition accord with the Proponents of Sūtra in asserting that the continuum of the [mental] consciousness is the base that connects actions with their effects. All Proponents of the Great Exposition, except for the Kashmiris, assert that a compositional phenomenon that is neither form nor consciousness is the base that connects actions with their fruits. This is acquisition[b] and "non-wastage"[c] that is like a seal guaranteeing a loan.[d]

Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1304] Since having-disintegrated is an effective thing, although an action that has been performed and accumulated has disintegrated and many eons have passed, it actually issues forth effects. Hence, there is no need to assert acquisition, a basis-of-all, non-wastage, a continuum [of consciousness as the basis in which predispositions are infused], and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Like propounding that pots are effective things, the mere propounding that having-disintegrated is an effective thing

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[a] In other words, if you say that a sentient being's having been born is an effective thing, then you should say that a sentient being's having died is an effective thing, and if you say that not staying in the next moment is an effective thing, then you should say that not having stayed in the next moment is an effective thing. Or, you should say that none of these are effective things, although that would be wrong.

[b] *thob pa, prāpti.*

[c] *chud mi za ba, avipraṇāśa.*

[d] Just as a person's seal prevents a loan from becoming a loss to the lender, so non-wastage prevents an action from not issuing forth its effect.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-yang-shay-ba's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-wang-bel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

is not from having analyzed the object imputed.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1305] Merely propounding that having-disintegrated is an effective thing is not a case of searching for the object imputed because merely analyzing whether having-disintegrated is an effective thing or a non-thing does not come to be ultimate analysis. And, for example, it is like propounding that a pot is an effective thing. Otherwise, there would be multiple damage and contradiction, such as that even your propounding that having-disintegrated is a non-thing would be a case of searching for the imputed object. Even mere analysis, as above, with regard to whether having-disintegrated has causes or not does not come to be searching for the imputed object because it is only an explanation of the ways of acting as causes and conditions conventionally, like, for example, explanations of a compounded phenomenon's causes and conditions in the texts of manifest knowledge.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1306] That things and their nonexistence upon having disintegrated are called "compounded phenomena" derives from not asserting establishment by way of the object's own character. For D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:

> The crucial point is that for all parties that assert that effective things are inherently established, it is not suitable for having-disintegrated to be an effective thing, whereas in the Middle Way party [that is, the Consequence School] that asserts the absence of inherent establishment, having-disintegrated is established as an effective thing.
>
> The former systems assert that a having-disintegrated is utterly not an effective thing because when an effective thing such as a shoot has disintegrated, all effective things that are parts of the shoot are obliterated, and there is not any effective thing that is other than the shoot, such as a pot, to be gotten. They think that a having-disintegrated is not an effective thing because not any individual effective thing—the sense-spheres such as blue—nor any collection of effective things that are its parts, such as a pot, are fit to be an illustration of a having-disintegrated.
>
> In the latter system just as, for example, there is no contradiction in the fact that:
>
> - both Upagupta's individual five aggregates and the

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

collection of them as well as something that is a different entity from those two are not positable as an illustration of Upagupta [that is, they are not Upagupta], and Upagupta also is not suitable to be an illustration of those three [that is, Upagupta also is not those three]
- but the Upagupta imputed in dependence on his aggregates is an effective thing,

so:
- neither the effective thing that has disintegrated nor an effective thing that accords in type with it exists as an illustration of a having-disintegrated
- but since a having-disintegrated is produced in dependence upon the effective thing that has disintegrated, it is an effective thing.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1307] A wick's having been consumed, or having disintegrated, is a cause of a flame's having died…It is seen that due to the non-existence of water upon its having been consumed, grain is lost, and due to the non-existence of food upon its having been consumed, a child is lost…

Although[1308] D̄ak-tsang (548, 554, and 564ff.) pretends to be a follower of Chandrakīrti, he refutes that having-disintegrated is an effective thing with the reasonings of the Proponents of Sūtra and of Mind-Only and is flabbergasted [at D̄zong-ka-b̄a's assertion that having-disintegrated is an effective thing]. These are the faults of not knowing the need for a distinction between coarse and subtle conventions of the world. He does not appear to have replied to these scriptures and reasonings [that I have assembled based on D̄zong-ka-b̄a's exposition of passages in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* and *Clear Words*].[1309]

The future[a] also has causes because it is due to the non-completion and non-assemblage of the causes and conditions of its having come together on that occasion, even though causes for that [phenomenon] exist…

The definition of a past is the factor of another, produced effective thing's having-disintegrated. An illustration is a shoot's having-disintegrated…

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[a] *ma 'ongs pa;* literally, the not yet come. The meaning is "a phenomenon's not yet having come" or "the futureness of a phenomenon."

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> The definition of a present is that which (1) is neither a factor of another effective thing's having-disintegrated nor its future [that is, its not having come] and (2) has been produced but has not ceased. For instance, a shoot…
>
> The definition of a future is the factor of another effective thing's not having been produced due to the incompletion of conditions even though causes producing it exist. For instance, a shoot not arriving at the present time even though causes for a future shoot exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: If it is asserted that an action of harsh speech done a long time ago appears to an innate [awareness] without having disintegrated, what is the reason why all previously done actions of the three—body, speech, and mind—are not remembered?

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1310] If an action—such as harsh speech and so forth—that [according to you] has not disintegrated even though many eons passed produces an effect, then those actions that have not issued forth effects would have to exist even at the present time. Hence, why is it that [actions of] body, speech, and mind done previously, although not having disintegrated, not only are not seen but also are not remembered? Whoever made such an explanation was refuted earlier (596-602).

7# Non-Assertion of Autonomy and Self-Cognition

Because of not being without analysis, autonomy and self-cognizing consciousness do not exist.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because of not being positable without analysis, autonomy [that is, an autonomous syllogism][a] does not exist (820),

[a] This complex issue, crucial to the distinction between the Consequence and Autonomy Schools, is discussed at length in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 441-530. Briefly: Autonomous syllogisms are ones in which the subject, reason, example, and so forth of a syllogism are inherently existent. Consequentialists do not accept that these elements of a syllogism are similarly established, or certified, in the systems of Consequentialists and non-Consequentialists. For the Consequentialists, a valid cognition that seems to an opponent to establish these is non-existent in the way that the opponent asserts it because a non-Consequentialist views a valid cognition as certifying that these are inherently existent, but for a Consequentialist nothing inherently exists. In this way, there can be no common establishment. In other words, in the system of the opponent, the consciousness that certifies the existence of the subject and so forth certifies it as existing from its own side; hence there cannot be something established by valid cognition that exists in common appearance in the systems of the two parties.

and self-cognizing consciousness does not exist.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1311] Without finding something positable upon having analyzing the object imputed, autonomous [syllogisms] also cannot be posited. Also, if the object imputed—[a certifier] of consciousness—is analyzed, there is no mode of [ultimate] analysis exceeding this, and thus it is asserted that self-cognizing consciousness also does not exist.

> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1312] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says that this system's refutation of self-cognizing consciousness also derives from not asserting establishment by way of the object's own character. The reason for this is that if self-cognizing consciousness is asserted, it must be asserted that it can bear analysis by reasoning searching for the imputed object because investigation of the certifier of a consciousness[a] as to whether the certifier is self-experiencing or other-experiencing [that is, whether it knows itself or is known by another consciousness] is a way of searching for an imputed object that greatly exceeds even investigating whether a shoot is produced from self or produced from other…
>
> [The basic idea of those who assert self-cognizing consciousness is that] in the continuums[1313] of common beings presently apprehending blue with their eyes there exist both an experience of the object, blue, and an experience of the subject, the consciousness apprehending blue because when remembered later, there exist both memory of the object, "This blue was seen earlier," and memory of the subject, "I saw blue."

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1314] It is refuted that a mind knows itself and another [that is, it itself knows itself while it knows its respective object]…for it would [absurdly] follow that darkness would obscure itself, due to which darkness would not be perceived. Also, [it is a fact that] a butter-flame does not need an illuminator other than itself because it does not have any darkness.

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[a] The certifier of a phenomenon such as consciousness is the means by which one can know that this phenomenon actually does exist. For instance, a valid cognition apprehending blue certifies blue. The question here is: what certifies a valid cognition apprehending blue? Does it certify itself? Or, is it certified by another consciousness? If the first, does the edge of a sword cut itself? If the second, what certifies the consciousness that certifies the valid cognition apprehending blue?

8[#] DISTINCTIONS ABOUT *PRATYAKSHA* AND TRUE CESSATIONS

When related, the manifest (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) is for objects, not subjects. True cessations are the element of attributes. Superiors perceive the absence of true existence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: When object and subject are mutually related, the fully qualified manifest (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) are objects and not subjects.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1315] It is not said that in general direct valid cognition (*mngon sum tshad ma, pratyakṣapramāṇa*) is not manifest[a] (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*), but since the Sanskrit original of *mngon sum,* that is, *pratyakṣa,* is used for both *mngon sum* and *mngon gyur pa,* when the two—a pot and a sense direct perception (*dbang mngon / dbang po'i mngon sum*) apprehending it—are mutually related, the pot is the actual "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*), and "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) is used imputedly for the sense direct perception…Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:
>
>> The term manifest (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) means not obscure…[1316] Non-obscure phenomena such as pot, blue, and so forth are established as the manifest itself; consciousnesses distinguishing them are called manifest (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) due to having the manifest as their causes.
>
> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1317] Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred"* says:[1318]
>
>> In the world the actual term "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) is used only for objects [and not consciousness]; it is imputedly used for consciousness. According to others, the term "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) is used in actuality for consciousness and is used imputedly for objects.
>
> In accordance with Chandrakīrti's statement about the difference between the Consequence School and other schools of tenets with regard to actual and imputed usages of the term "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*), in the system of the Consequence School sense objects are actual "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*), and sense consciousnesses—object-possessors—are imputed "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*); since [sense consciousnesses] have the manifest as causes, they are called "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*), like grass

[a] When this term is used for consciousnesses, I usually translate it as "direct perception."

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fire and straw fire.

In the system of the other schools of tenets, it is asserted that a consciousness devoid of conceptuality is an actual "manifest" (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*), from thinking that this is the meaning of the statement in sūtra, "An eye consciousness knows blue, but without thinking 'blue.'" They set an etymology for *pratyakṣa,* saying it is called *pratyakṣa* because of depending on a multiplicity of sense powers, this being by way of its uncommon cause[a] in accordance with:

Its convention is made by way of the sense power
Due to being its uncommon cause.

The Consequentialists refute this, saying that it follows that this etymology is not feasible because it is not suitable for a momentary consciousness to depend on multiple sense powers (845). Also, reasoning does not damage such a refutation; since each minute particle of a sense power cannot act as a support of consciousness, there is no damage relative to minute particles, and also since the sense power imputed in dependence upon the minute particles that are the basis of designation ceases together with the consciousness, how could reasoning damage refutation [that a single moment of an eye consciousness] depends on multiple sense powers. That is the Consequence School's assertion.

Word Commentary on Root Text: True cessations are the element of attributes.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1319] Through the way that the four truths are included in the two truths,[b] it is understood that true cessations are the element of attributes [that is, the emptiness of inherent existence].

Word Commentary on Root Text: Superiors[c] directly perceive the absence of true existence.[d]

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[a] The uncommon cause of a sense consciousness is a sense power.

[b] True sufferings, sources, and paths are obscurational truths and true cessations are ultimate truths.

[c] This means all Superiors, whether of the Lesser Vehicle or Great Vehicle.

[d] It may seem as if here Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a breaks the pattern of having two points in each of these eleven sections; however, the tenets that true cessations are the element of attributes and that Superiors directly perceive the absence of true existence are connected in the following way and thus constitute one point:

> Once true cessations are the element of attributes, that is, the emptiness of inherent existence, then since Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle Superiors have attained at least the first level of true cessation, Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle Superiors

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1320] Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* explains that Superiors realize emptiness:

By thoroughly understanding things and non-things
The great beings are released.

Chandrakīrti again and again explains this, such as in his commentary on that passage:

The thorough understanding that those two [that is, things and non-things] are without inherent existence…[1321] [is non-erroneous knowledge]. Because of their many greatnesses, Superiors are called "Great Beings."

9# DISTINCTIONS ABOUT NIRVANAS WITH AND WITHOUT REMAINDER

Because it is explained that extinction of the aggregates is unsuitable and that feelings and discriminations are destroyed, without remainder and with remainder are the extinction and non-extinction of mistaken appearance.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Because it is explained that at the time of remainderless nirvāṇa extinction of the aggregates is unsuitable and feelings and discriminations are destroyed, the difference between a nirvāṇa without remainder and a nirvāṇa with remainder must be posited as the extinction and non-extinction of mistaken appearances, that is, appearances of establishment from the object's own side.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1322] The Supramundane Victor said that there are two types of nirvāṇa, with a remainder of aggregates and without a remainder of aggregates. Certain Proponents of Mind-Only and below assert[a] that the first is a mere abandonment of afflictive emotions; the second is a severance of the aggregates…Here let me explain this briefly. [The Consequence School answers that] this is not feasible because:

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have realized the emptiness of inherent existence. (This has to be direct realization because true cessations are attained only beginning with direct perception of emptiness on the path of seeing, which is the start of being a Superior.)

[a] The way the Consequence School asserts the two nirvāṇas is not shared with any of the lower Buddhist schools, including the Autonomy School. The specification of "Certain Proponents of Mind-Only and below" is only for the sake of excluding the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning and the Autonomy School because they do not assert that all forms of the continuum of mental and physical aggregates are ever severed; rather, they assert that the continuum of *contaminated* mental and physical aggregates is severed in a nirvāṇa without remainder.

- in that case there would be no actualization of nirvāṇa[a]
- even each Foe Destroyer's attainment of nirvāṇa is described as having entirely abandoned contaminated aggregates, and there is also a Lesser Vehicle sūtra that speaks of Shāriputra's recitation [of his accomplishment] upon having actualized such a nirvāṇa [whereby the nirvāṇa without remainder could not refer to a total severance of mind and body].

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1323] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:[1324]

A Lower Vehicle sūtra quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"* says:[b]

This which is entire abandonment of *these* sufferings, definite abandonment, purification, extinction, separation from desire, cessation, thorough pacification, disappearance, non-connection to other suffering, non-arising, and non-production is peace, this is auspiciousness. It is like this: the definite abandonment of all the aggregates, the extinction of cyclic existence, freedom from desire, cessation, nirvāṇa.

Commenting on this, Chandrakīrti says that because the phrase "these sufferings" uses the proximate term "these," the passage "complete abandonment of these sufferings, definite abandonment, purification, extinction, separation from desire, cessation, thorough pacification, disappearance" refers only to the sufferings, or aggregates, that exist presently in one's own continuum. The passage "non-connection to other suffering, non-arising, and non-production is peace, this is auspiciousness. It is like this: the definite abandonment of all the aggregates, the extinction of cyclic existence, freedom from desire, cessation, nirvāṇa" refers to future suffering.

Objection: "Sufferings" and "aggregates" are general terms

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[a] As is said below in Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's annotation, if a nirvāṇa without remainder means that the continuum of mind and body has been totally severed, then when the nirvāṇa that is to be actualized exists, the actualizer would not exist, or when the actualizer exists, the nirvāṇa to be actualized would not exist because the aggregates would not have been extinguished.

[b] *rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa, yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti;* Golden Reprint, vol. 113, 25.2. This sūtra passage may seem to support the lower schools' assertion of a nirvāṇa without remainder that involves a total severance of the continuum of mental and physical aggregates since it speaks of entire abandonment; however, Chandrakīrti, with D̄zong-ka-b̄a following him, explains that analysis of the passage shows that it does not mean this.

used here for their instances, the afflictive emotions [and thus the passage refers to the abandonment of the afflictive emotions by the path and does not refer to a primordial extinction of the aggregates].

Answer: This also is not feasible. If general terms are not amenable to explanation with a general meaning, they must be explained as referring to their instances, but here ["sufferings" and "aggregates"] are explicable in the context of [their] general [meaning].

Otherwise, in accordance with the Proponents of True Existence, it would not be fitting to explain [this sūtra passage] as primordial extinction in the sense that the aggregates have been primordially without inherently existent production as [the line] in Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum,*[a] "The afflictive emotions are primordially extinguished," is explained. Rather, it must [incorrectly] be explained as a total abandonment [of the aggregates] by means of the path. If it is [explained this way, then there are the following faults]: When the nirvāṇa that is to be actualized exists, the actualizer would not exist. Also, when the actualizer exists, the nirvāṇa to be actualized would not exist because the aggregates would not have been extinguished. Thereby, they are unable to explain this sūtra.

According to us, it is permissible to explain extinction here in accordance with the statement:

> Extinction [in this case] is not [caused] by means of an antidote.
> It is so called because of primordial extinction.[b]

Hence we are able to explain well the meaning of the sūtra [as referring to a natural, or primordial, absence of inherent existence in phenomena].

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[a] I.15 (*theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos, mahāyānottaratantraśāstra*; P5525, vol. 108):

> Due to realizing the quiescent nature of transmigrating beings, [that is, all persons and phenomena]*
> They [perceive] the very mode [of being of phenomena],
> This being because of the natural thorough purity
> And because the afflictive emotions are extinguished from the start.

*From Asaṅga's commentary, P5526, vol. 108, 35.3.7.

[b] Tāranātha cites this final line in his *The Essence of Other-Emptiness* (509.7) as being from the *Questions of King Dhāraṇīṣhvara Sūtra.*

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1325] When the afflictive emotions together with their seeds have been abandoned, nirvāṇa is attained. [The Consequence School's unique assertion on the two nirvāṇas is:]

- A nirvāṇa that although the afflictive emotions have been extinguished, has a remainder of the mistaken [appearance of inherent existence due to] the predispositions of those [afflictive emotions] is a nirvāṇa with remainder.
- A nirvāṇa that does not have a remainder of mistaken [appearance of inherent existence] is a nirvāṇa without remainder.[a]

This is because here the extinguishment of aggregates and so forth means extinguishment in the element of attributes [that is, primordial extinguishment in emptiness, this being the primordial absence of inherent existence].

10# Distinctions about the Two Obstructions and How they Are Abandoned

Predispositions are obstructions to omniscience. Non-afflictive ignorance is also asserted. Until afflictive emotions are removed, abandonment of obstructions to omniscience is not begun.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Predispositions are obstructions to omniscience. Non-afflictive ignorance is also asserted. Without having removed afflictive emotions, the start of abandoning obstructions to omniscience is not begun.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1326] The three poisons

[a] Whereas in the lower schools a nirvāṇa with remainder is attained first, and then a nirvāṇa without remainder is later attained at death. Based on their refutation of this, the Consequentialists assert that a nirvāṇa without remainder refers to the meditative equipoise on emptiness during which practitioners of the Lesser Vehicle become Foe Destroyers and later instances of meditative equipoise. At that time they have overcome the conception of inherent existence and thus possess a nirvāṇa, a passing beyond sorrow, with "sorrow" identified as the afflictive obstructions. Since at that time they are directly realizing emptiness, they also are temporarily free of the appearance of inherent existence and thus are said not to have any remainder of this mistaken appearance. However, when they rise from meditative equipoise, things falsely *appear* to exist inherently even though Foe Destroyers never again will assent to this false appearance and thereby conceive things to exist inherently. Thus, according to the Consequence School, Foe Destroyers first have a nirvāṇa without remainder and then a nirvāṇa with remainder. Gradually, Foe Destroyers enter the Great Vehicle and, after a great accumulation of merit, also purify their perception of the false appearance of inherent existence. They thereby eliminate the obstructions to omniscience and become Buddhas, thereby attaining a non-abiding nirvāṇa.

[that is, desire, hatred, and ignorance] are described as afflictive emotions, but there is non-afflictive ignorance and ignorance that is an obstruction to omniscience…Among the obstructions to omniscience there are two types, consciousness and non-consciousness.

J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets:*[1327] The omniscient [First] Paṇchen [Lama] L̄o-sang-chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen,[a] lord of both the explanatory transmission and practice transmission of the Foremost Lama [D̄zong-ka-b̄a], says along with reasons:[b]

Subtle obstructions to a single consciousness
Directly perceiving simultaneously the two truths
Are called "ignorance," but are not actual consciousnesses.
Hence, there is not the slightest contradiction in that.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1328] Obstructions to omniscience and impedimentary obstructions[c] are equivalent. Obstructions to omniscience must be abandoned [beginning] on the eighth ground when all afflictive emotions have been abandoned and not before that because until afflictive emotions have been abandoned, there is no way to abandon their predispositions, like, for example, the fact that without having taken away the oil that stains something, the stain cannot be removed.

11# Distinctions about How the Two Extremes are Cleared Away, along with Subsidiary Topics

Through appearance the extreme of existence is cleared away, and through emptiness the extreme of non-existence is cleared away. For many such uniquenesses and so forth, look in the Middle Way.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Through appearance the extreme of existence is cleared away, and through emptiness the extreme of non-existence is cleared away (see 911ff.).

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1329] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Three Principal Aspects of the Path* says:

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[a] *blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan,* 1567(?)-1662.

[b] This is from his *Response to Objections by the Sanskritist S̄hay-rap-rin-chen: Roar of the Lion of Scripture and Reasoning* (30b.6) where he answers D̄ak-tsang's thirteenth contradiction (549) leveled against D̄zong-ka-b̄a: That non-afflictive ignorance exists and that obstructions to omniscience that are not consciousnesses do not exist are contradictory.

[c] *thogs sgrib.*

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When simultaneously without alternation,
From only seeing dependent-arising as non-deceptive,
Definite knowledge destroys the mode of apprehension [of inherent existence],
Then analysis of the view is complete.

Accordingly:

- The mode of clearing away the extreme of existence through appearance is that as much as a person[a] who has completed analysis of the view takes to mind the meaning of dependent-arising, which is merely posited by name and terminology, to that same degree does the force of their awareness conceiving inherent existence diminish.
- The mode of clearing away the extreme of non-existence through emptiness is that as much as a person who has completed analysis of the view takes to mind the emptiness of inherent existence, to that same degree does the force of their awarenesses not believing in the cause and effect of karma and apprehending the cause and effect of karma to be non-existent diminish.

Word Commentary on Root Text: For many such unique [tenets], as well as those included in the phrase "and so forth" in the root text:

- distinctions about the equipoise of cessation
- how the view of the profound is generated
- the basis of infusion of predispositions
- how to posit an illustration of a person

and so forth, look in detail at Middle Way texts by the Superior [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual sons and the eloquent explanations by the Foremost [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] and his spiritual sons [Gyel-tsap and Ke-drup].

5* Valid Cognitions Certifying Those as well as an Elimination of Error {2}

This section has two parts: features of valid cognition and eliminating error.

[a] The reason for specifying "person" in both of these is that a single consciousness realizing dependent-arising does not realize emptiness, and a single consciousness realizing emptiness does not realize dependent-arising. Rather, realization of the one reinforces realization of the other.

a Features of Valid Cognition {3}*

This section has three parts: explaining the definiteness of the number of valid cognitions, the features of direct perception, and the features of inference.

1# DEFINITENESS OF THE NUMBER OF VALID COGNITIONS

Valid cognition is described as fourfold—direct perception, inference, comprehension, and scriptural—but by way of their objects of comprehension there are two, direct perception and inference.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Valid cognition is described as fourfold—direct valid cognition, inferential valid cognition by the power of the fact, valid cognition comprehending through analogy, and scriptural valid cognition. However, by way of the limitation of their objects of comprehension to two—the manifest and the obscure—they are limited to two, direct perception and inference.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1330] Here is a brief presentation of valid cognition in this system. In accordance with Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words:*
>
> > How many valid cognitions are there? What are their definitions? How many objects are there? Are they produced from self, other, both, or causelessly? These issues will be addressed.
>
> let us set forth a short presentation of the general meaning. Non-deceptive consciousness is the definition of valid cognition because Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* says:
>
> > Undeceived consciousness is seen in the world to be valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*) itself.
>
> With respect to an etymology, it is not suitable to take the *pra* of *pramāṇa* as *prathama* and so forth and hence as beginning, new, and so forth…Therefore, valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*) is so called because of thoroughly comprehending, like, for instance, the wisdom thoroughly distinguishing phenomena; for *pra* is used for "thoroughly" (*rab tu*), and *māṇa* is used for "comprehending" (*'jal ba*)…
>
> When valid cognitions are divided, there are four—direct valid cognition, inferential valid cognition, valid cognition comprehending through analogy, and scriptural valid cognition—because there are four objects of comprehension:

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

- manifest
- slightly obscure
- mixture—the example is manifest, and the meaning is obscure
- and very obscure…

Furthermore, those valid cognitions are included in the two, direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition, because objects of comprehension are limited in number to the two, manifest and obscure, and because…Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* says:

It is not that all things are objects understood directly; there are also objects realized by inference.[a]

Object apprehended by any of the five[1331] senses is the meaning of manifest because manifest, object of the senses, and non-obscure phenomenon are equivalent…since an object realized by a sense direct perception is described as manifest.

Object realized in dependence upon a sign [that is, a reason], or through the power of a sign, is the meaning of obscure because object of comprehension by inference, obscure, and non-object of the senses are described here as equivalent, and explanations in accordance with the Epistemologists are not suitable…since the Sanskrit original of non-manifest (*mngon sum ma yin pa*) *atīndriya*, is also used for "beyond the senses" (*dbang po las 'das pa*).[b]

2# Features of Direct Perception

A consciousness that, without a reason, is non-deceptive with respect to the manifest that is the object of its mode of apprehension is asserted to be a direct valid cognition. The divisions are sense direct perception, mental direct perception, and yogic direct perception.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It is asserted that the meaning [or definition] of direct valid cognition is a consciousness that, without depending on a sign [that is, a logical reason], is non-deceptive with respect to the manifest object of comprehension that is the object of its mode of apprehension.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1332] Concerning both the existent and the non-existent, their appearance to a dualistic consciousness

[a] This appears to be the only source in all of Chandrakīrti's writings for showing that he asserts that valid cognitions are included in these two; otherwise, Chandrakīrti insists on four in contradistinction to Dignāga's two.

[b] *dbang po las 'das pa* is a literal translation of *atīndriya.*

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is necessarily a manifest object of comprehension *of that consciousness.*

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1333] Not only that, but also even wrong consciousnesses such as those apprehending a double moon and those to which falling hairs appear [due to disease] are direct valid cognitions *with respect to their percepts.* Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

> Double moons and so forth are not manifest objects relative to a consciousness of one without an eye disease, but they are just manifest objects relative to those with an eye disease and so on.

Although those are direct valid cognitions with respect to their percepts, they do not have to be direct valid cognitions:

- because those are not non-deceptive consciousnesses, and
- because there are many consciousnesses that are not valid cognitions—concordant with the fact and discordant with the fact—and
- because it would be very absurd to assert that all consciousnesses are valid cognitions. This is because Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:[1334]

  Entities as they are imputed by the [non-Buddhist] Forders,
  Strongly affected by the sleep of ignorance,
  And those [horses, elephants, water, and so forth] imputed
  to illusions, mirages, and so forth
  Are just non-existent even from [the viewpoint of] the
  world.[a]

  and Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* says, "It [absurdly] follows that all consciousnesses are just valid cognitions."

Wipe your eyes and look over these passages without engaging in denial, O you:

- who assert that what exists for conceptuality exists conventionally

---

[a] Commenting on this in the *Medium Length Exposition of Special Insight* (469.6), D̄zong-ka-b̄a says:

> Since he says that the self, principal, and so forth imputed by the [non-Buddhist] Forders as well as the objects conceived as the horses, elephants, and so forth of illusions do not exist even conventionally, the proposition that it is the Consequentialist system that what merely exist for a mistaken mind are posited as existing conventionally is pithless talk; no great Proponent of the Middle Way asserts such.

- who assert that it is unsuitable [to discriminate] that "This exists, and that does not exist" with regard to the world's conventions
- who accept Chandrakīrti's system but are amazed at the assertion that wrong consciousnesses are direct valid cognitions with respect to their percepts
- who assert that all non-conceptual consciousnesses are valid cognitions.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are three divisions—sense direct perception, mental direct perception, and yogic direct perception.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1335] Mental direct perception does not have to be [a consciousness] that is devoid of conceptuality and knows its object clearly. Among mental direct perceptions there many conceptual consciousnesses—memory consciousnesses, subsequent cognitions induced by inference, valid mental consciousnesses induced by sense direct perception.
>
> Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1336] In the systems of the Autonomy School and below, the difference between direct perception and inference is that the former is a valid cognition directly realizing its object of comprehension, and the latter is a valid cognition realizing its object of comprehension in the manner of a meaning-generality [or through the route of a generic image]. However, in the system of the Consequence School direct perception and inference are posited by way of whether or not the object of comprehension that is the object of its mode of apprehension is manifest to the valid cognition itself.
>
> With respect to the meaning of "manifest," an object's being comprehended by a consciousness without relying on a sign [that is, a logical reason] is the meaning of an object's being manifest to a consciousness. They do not assert that clear appearance is necessary, whereas other proponents of tenets do.

3# Features of Inference

That which, in dependence on a reason, is non-deceptive with respect to an obscure object is an inference. Inferences comprehending the obscure, through analogy, and the very obscure are asserted as inference, comprehension, and scriptural.

Word Commentary on Root Text: A consciousness that, depending on a sign, or reason, is non-deceptive with respect to the obscure—that is, an obscure

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object that is the object of its mode of apprehension—is an inferential valid cognition.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1337] Sign,[a] reason,[b] and cause making known[c] are equivalent…When inferences are divided by way of the means directly producing them, there are two, those depending on a consequence[d] and those depending on a reason.[e] It is easy to understand that a consequence proving an asserted meaning[f]—such as [Buddhapālita's] two contradictory consequences[g] refuting production from self[h]—generates an inference.
>
> A consequences propelling the opposite[i] can directly generate an inference in one who has sharp faculties because through that consequence [one who has sharp faculties] can understand the two:
>
> - an unwanted consequence of the other's [that is, one's own] assertion
> - and a reason proving a thesis that the stater asserts.
>
> For, if such were not understood, the opponent would not understand the main point being indicated by that consequence and, not understanding anything aside from the mere words, would be a person of dull faculties who does not understand the stater's assertion, since to that person—except for the consequence—a syllogism[j] is not stated. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:[k]
>
> > Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of correctness and contradicts your

---

a *rtags.*

b *rgyu mtshan.*

c *shes byed kyi rgyu.*

d *thal 'gyur la brten pa.*

e *gtan tshigs la brten pa.*

f *'dod don sgrub pa'i thal 'gyur.* This is a consequence proving something that the stater asserts. In his *Great Exposition of the Middle* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a describes five types of consequences; see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 443-449.

g *'gal brjod kyi thal 'gyur.*

h These are:

- It follows about the subjects, things which have production, that their production again would be senseless because of having previously attained their entity.
- It follows that there is no point in the production of something from itself because of having already achieved its own entity.

See 831 and Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 441-498.

i *bzlog pa 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur.*

j *rtags sbyor.*

k For the context see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 474.

own assertion. When [Buddhapālita] debates through just these [consequences] that have the effects [derived] from stating a reason and example, would the opponent not accept it?

It has been explained earlier (798) that for a person of dull faculties both a consequence and a syllogism are to be stated in accordance with how the Epistemologists[a] do so.

Word Commentary on Root Text: It is asserted that when divided [by way of object of comprehension],[1338] there are three types of inference:

- inference by the power of the fact, comprehending the slightly obscure
- inference comprehending through analogy, which comprehends an obscure object that is like an analogy [as in apprehending an ox and a gayal as similar, or in apprehending a shoot and a reflection[1339] as similarly false][1340]
- scriptural valid cognition, or inference of belief, which comprehends the very obscure [as in realizing the relationship between a Buddha's auspicious physical marks and their causes, such as escorting a guru and so forth, in dependence upon Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland*[b] which is devoid of contradiction by the three means of analysis[c]].[1341]

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1342] Thus, valid cognition and object of comprehension exist in the world's conventions but not ultimately, as the Proponents of Truly Existent Things assert, because of being only established in mutual dependence. How could it be that these are not asserted in the Consequence School's own system! Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says:

When in that way it is posited that the aims of the world are realized by the four valid cognitions, those also are established in mutual dependence. When valid cognitions exist, there are objects of comprehension, and when objects of comprehension exist, there are valid cognitions. The two—valid cognition and object of comprehension—that are inherently established do not exist.

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[a] Here the term "Epistemologists" includes also the Autonomists.

[b] See Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland,* stanzas 176-196, in Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 118-120.

[c] The teaching is devoid of contradiction by the three means of analysis, or purified by way of three analyses, in that (1) what it teaches about manifest objects is not contradicted by direct perception, (2) what it teaches about slightly hidden objects is not contradicted by usual inference (called inference by the power of the fact), and (3) with respect to very hidden objects, inaccessible to either direct perception or usual inference, there are no internal contradictions within the teachings on those topics.

b Eliminating Error*

That which induces ascertainment with respect to the object of its mode of apprehension and is free from damage by other valid cognitions about this is non-deceptive with respect to this. Therefore, it is not contradictory to be a valid cognition even though mistaken. The meaning of non-deceptive is explained in many ways according to context and is also used for conventionalities. Hence, like the term "substance," it is not single.

Word Commentary on Root Text: That which can induce ascertainment with respect to the object of its mode of apprehension and is free from damage by other valid cognitions with respect to this object of its mode of apprehension is the meaning of being non-deceptive with respect to this object. Therefore, it is not contradictory to be a valid cognition with respect to an object even though it is mistaken with respect to that object. The meaning of non-deceptive is explained in many ways according to context [and "non-deceptive" is also used for conventionalities such as the cause and effect of karma, belief, and so forth]. Hence, like the term "substance," the term "non-deceptive" is not used for just a single meaning.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1343] D̄ak-tsang (529) says that there is no way for conventionalities to be validly established because the meaning of valid establishment is "non-deceptive," and the meaning of non-deceptive is "established as self-instituting."[a] This is to be refuted, but it has been refuted earlier (575ff. and 586ff.) by scriptures and reasonings. However, let us condense the meaning.
>
> A sense direct perception apprehending a pot becomes a valid cognition with respect to a pot because its apprehension of pot as existing is not damaged by any of the two—valid cognitions distinguishing the ultimate and valid cognitions distinguishing conventionalities—since although those distinguishing the ultimate do not find a pot, they do not refute that a pot exists. Hence, a sense direct perception apprehending a pot is a non-deceptive awareness with respect to a pot because it is an awareness comprehending a pot…Therefore, it is not contradictory to be a valid cognition even though mistaken because although it is mistaken with respect to its object [in that its object *appears* to inherently exist but does not inherently exist], it comprehends its object, like, for example, an inference [which is mistaken with respect to its object in that its

a *tshugs thub tu grub pa.*

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object *appears* to be the meaning-generality through which it appears].

On this occasion "non-deceptive" does not have to be taken as "self-instituting":

- because the meaning of a valid cognition's being non-deceptive is not explained by even one school of tenets as "self-instituting," (580) and
- because there is a validly established falsity in your own [that is, D̄ak-tsang's] system [when you describe conventionalities as false].

It follows that in sūtras and treatises all whatsoever usages of "non-deceptive" (*mi bslu ba*), "true" (*bden pa*), and "correct"/"real" (*yang dag*) do not need to be explained only as either ultimate truth or true establishment because according to context:

- in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* ["non-deceptive"] is explained as suitable as a convention for being non-erroneous and true with regard to the existence of an apprehended meaning
- Amarasinha's *Treasury* explains that the term "true" is used for existing, permanent, worthy of worship, and so forth
- how these are used in the *Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra, Compendium of Doctrine Sūtra* (775), and so forth has been explained earlier,

as, for example, is the case with the terms "substance" (*rdzas, dravya*) or "thing" (*dngos po, bhāva*).

B: PRESENTATION OF THE PATHS {2}

This section has two parts: explaining the definiteness of the number of vehicles upon including the meanings of all scriptures in the paths of beings of three capacities and describing the features of the individual vehicles.

1* Explaining the Definiteness of the Number of Vehicles upon Including the Meanings of All Scriptures in the Paths of Beings of Three Capacities {2}

This section has two parts: inclusion of all scriptures into the two methods for high status and definite goodness and inclusion of all scriptures into the paths of beings of three capacities, as well as the definiteness of the number of vehicles.

a Inclusion of All Scriptures into the Two Methods for High Status and Definite Goodness*

The means for achieving high status and definite goodness are the two, faith and wisdom. Faith, a prerequisite for wisdom, makes a suitable vessel. Wisdom is the cause of liberation because of achieving the non-conceptual aim.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The means of achieving high status and definite goodness are respectively the two, faith believing in the cause and effect of actions and wisdom realizing selflessness. The practice that is a prerequisite for the wisdom realizing selflessness is faith, which is the root of all wholesome attributes; it makes one into a suitable vessel for the doctrine. Wisdom is the cause of liberation from cyclic existence and the means of achieving the non-conceptual aim.[1344]

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1345] Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* describes high status together with its causes:[1346]
>
> Due to having faith one relies on the practices,
> Due to having wisdom one truly knows.
> Of these two wisdom is the chief,
> Faith is its prerequisite.
>
> One who does not neglect the practices
> Through desire, hatred, fear, or bewilderment
> Is known as one of faith,
> A superior vessel for definite goodness.
>
> Having analyzed well
> All deeds of body, speech, and mind,
> Those who realize what benefit self and others
> And always perform these are wise.
>
> Not killing, not stealing,
> Forsaking the mates of others,
> Refraining completely from false,
> Divisive, harsh, and senseless speech,
>
> Thoroughly forsaking covetousness, harmful intent,
> And the views of Nihilists—
> These are the ten gleaming paths of action;
> Their opposites are dark.
>
> Not drinking intoxicants, a good livelihood,
> Non-harming, respectful giving,
> Honoring the honorable, and love—

Practice in brief is that.

Practice is not done by just
Mortifying the body,
For one has not forsaken injuring others
And is not helping others.

Those not esteeming the great path of excellent doctrine
Bright with giving, morality, and patience,
Afflict their bodies, taking
An aberrant path like a cow path [deceiving oneself and those following].[1347]

Their bodies embraced by the vicious snakes
Of the afflictive emotions, they enter for a long time
The dreadful jungle of cyclic existence
Among the trees of endless beings.

A short life comes through killing.
Much suffering comes through harming.
Poor resources, through stealing.
Enemies, through adultery.

From lying arises slander.
From divisiveness, a parting of friends.
From harshness, hearing the unpleasant.
From senselessness, one's speech is not respected.

Covetousness destroys one's wishes,
Harmful intent yields fright,
Wrong views lead to bad views,
And drink to confusion of the mind.

Through not giving comes poverty,
Through wrong livelihood, deception,
Through arrogance, a bad lineage,
Through jealousy, little beauty.

A bad color comes through anger,
Stupidity, from not questioning the wise.
These are effects for humans,
But prior to all is a bad transmigration.[a]

Opposite to the well-known

[a] The fruits previously described are effects within a human life that accord with the causes, but rebirth as an animal, hungry ghost, or hell-being will occur prior to these results as a human; Ajitamitra, Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 388.3.

Fruits of these non-virtues
Is the arising of effects
Caused by all the virtues.

Desire, hatred, ignorance, and
The actions they generate are non-virtues.
Non-desire, non-hatred, non-ignorance,
And the actions they generate are virtues.

From non-virtues come all sufferings
And likewise all bad transmigrations,
From virtues, all happy transmigrations
And the pleasures of all lives.

Desisting from all non-virtues
And always engaging in virtues
With body, speech, and mind—
These are called the three forms of practice.

Through these practices one is freed from becoming
A hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal.
Reborn as a human or god one gains
Extensive happiness, fortune, and dominion.

Through the concentrations, immeasurables, and
formlessnesses[a]
One experiences the bliss of Brahmā and so forth.
Thus in brief are the practices
For high status and their fruits.

Wisdom in general is the root of all good qualities and in particular is like an eye seeing the profound mode of subsistence. According to the *Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra,* the other perfections are means leading to Buddhahood, but the non-conceptual wisdom of the profound is the sole door of peace. Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* extensively describes [the wisdom of the profound]:[1348]

Due to having faith one relies on the practices,
Due to having wisdom one truly knows.
Of these two wisdom is the chief,
Faith is its prerequisite.

and:

---

[a] These are the four concentrations (called the first, second, third, and fourth concentrations), the four immeasurables (love, compassion, joy, and equanimity), and the four formless absorptions (infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and peak of cyclic existence).

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The doctrines of definite goodness
Are said by the Conquerors
To be deep, subtle, and frightening
To the childish, who are not learned.

"I am not, I will not be.
I have not, I will not have,"
That frightens all the childish
And extinguishes fear in the wise.

By him who speaks only to help beings,
It was said that all beings
Have arisen from the conception of I
And are enveloped with the conception of mine.

"The I exists, the mine exists."
These are wrong as ultimates,
For the two are not [established]
By a thorough consciousness of reality just as it is.

The mental and physical aggregates arise
From the conception of I which is false in fact.[a]
How could what is grown
From a false seed be true?

Having seen thus the aggregates as untrue,
The conception of I is abandoned,
And due to abandoning the conception of I
The aggregates arise no more.

Just as it is said
That an image of one's face is seen
Depending on a mirror
But does not really exist [as a face],

So the conception of I exists
Dependent on the aggregates,
But like the image of one's face
The I does not at all really exist.[b]

Just as without depending on a mirror

[a] "In fact" means "ultimately" or "as existing able to bear analysis." See stanza 35 for a description of how misconception of I leads to rebirth, that is to say, the arising of new mental and physical aggregates.

[b] "Really exist" is often taken in Ge-luk-b̄a scholarship to mean "as its own reality," that is to say, "to be established as its own mode of abiding" (*khyod khyod kyi gnas lugs su grub pa*).

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The image of one's face is not seen,
So too the conception of I does not exist
Without depending on the aggregates.

When the Superior Ānanda
Heard what this means,
He attained the eye of doctrine
And repeatedly spoke of it to monastics.

As long as the aggregates are conceived,
So long thereby does the conception of I exist.
Further, when the conception of I exists,
There is action, and from it there also is birth.

With these three pathways[a] mutually causing each other
Without a beginning, a middle, or an end,
This wheel of cyclic existence
Turns like the wheel of a firebrand.[b]

Because this wheel is not obtained from self, other,
Or from both, in the past, the present, or the future,
The conception of I is overcome
And thereby action and rebirth.

One who sees how cause and effect
Are produced and destroyed
Does not regard the world
As really existent or really non-existent.

One who has heard thus the doctrine extinguishing
All suffering, but does not examine it
And fears the fearless state
Trembles due to ignorance.

That all these will not exist in nirvāṇa
Does not frighten you.[c]
Why does their non-existence
Explained here cause you fright?

"In liberation there is no self and are no aggregates."

---

[a] The three are afflictive emotions, actions, and production. From among the twelve links of dependent-arising, the first of these three—afflictive emotions—is identified as ignorance, attachment, and grasping. The second—actions—is identified as compositional action and "existence." The third—production—is identified as the other seven of the twelve links: consciousness, name and form, six sense fields, contact, feeling, birth, and aging and death.

[b] When a firebrand is twirled, it looks like a complete circle, or wheel, of fire.

[c] The referent of "you" is a practitioner of the Lesser Vehicle.

If liberation is asserted thus,
Why is the removal here of the self
And of the aggregates not liked by you?

If nirvāṇa is not a non-thing,
Just how could it have thingness?
The extinction of the misconception
Of things and non-things is called nirvāṇa.

In brief the view of nihilism
Is that effects of actions do not exist.
Without merit and leading to a bad state,
It is regarded as a "wrong view."

In brief the view of existence
Is that effects of actions exist.
Meritorious and conducive to happy transmigrations
It is regarded as a "right view."

Because existence and non-existence are extinguished by wisdom,
There is a passage beyond meritorious and ill deeds.
This, say the excellent, is liberation from
Bad transmigrations and happy transmigrations.

Seeing production[a] as caused
One passes beyond non-existence.
Seeing cessation as caused
One also does not assert existence.

Previously produced and simultaneously produced[b] [causes]
Are non-causes; [thus] there are no causes in fact,
Because [such] production is not confirmed at all
As [existing] conventionally or in reality.[c]

When this is, that arises,
Like short when there is long.
Due to the production of this, that is produced,
Like light from the production of a flame.

---

[a] The production of suffering is caused by the conception of inherent existence; its cessation is caused by the path.

[b] Previous to and simultaneously with their effects.

[c] Production from previously existent causes and simultaneously existent causes does not occur in the conventions of the world nor does it exist in the face of an ultimate rational consciousness; see Ajitamitra, Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 403.4-403.6.

When there is long, there is short.
They do not exist through their own nature,
Just as due to the non-production
Of a flame, light also does not arise.

Having thus seen that effects arise
From causes, one asserts what appears
In the conventions of the world
And does not accept nihilism.

One who asserts, just as it is, cessation
That does not arise from conventions
Does not pass into [a view of] existence.
Thereby one not relying on duality is liberated.[a]

A form seen from a distance
Is seen clearly by those nearby.
If a mirage were water,
Why is water not seen by those nearby?

The way this world is seen
As real by those afar
Is not so seen by those nearby
For whom it is signless like a mirage.

Just as a mirage is seemingly water
But not water and does not in fact exist [as water],
So the aggregates are seemingly a self
But not a self and do not exist in fact.[b]

Having thought a mirage to be water
And then having gone there,
Someone would just be stupid to surmise,
"That water does not exist."

---

[a] According to Gyel-tsap's exposition of this stanza (16a.1-16a.4) it would read:

One who asserts refutation [of inherently existent cause and effect]
Does not pass into [a view of exaggerated] existence
[As one would do by asserting] as real what does not arise from conventions;
Thereby one not relying on duality is liberated.

It seems that Gyel-tsap resorts to this explanation in order to avoid having to present the opinion that the ultimate does not conventionally exist.

[b] Gyel-tsap (16b.2) comments:

Just as the image of water in a mirage is in fact, that is to say, when analyzed, not water, so these aggregates are in fact not inherently existent because although they appear as if an inherently established self, they are not a self.

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One who conceives of the mirage-like world
That it does or does not exist
Is consequently ignorant.
When there is ignorance, one is not liberated.

A follower of non-existence goes to bad transmigrations,
And a follower of existence goes to happy transmigrations.
Through correct and true knowledge
One does not rely on dualism and becomes liberated.

If through correct and true knowledge
[Such wise persons] do not assert existence and non-existence
And thereby [you think] that they follow non-existence,
Why should they not be followers of existence?

If from refuting existence
Non-existence would accrue to them,
Why from refuting non-existence
Would existence not accrue to them?

They implicitly have no nihilistic thesis
And also have no nihilistic behavior
And due to relying on [the path to][1349] enlightenment have no nihilistic thought.
Hence how can they be regarded as nihilists?

Ask the Sāṃkhyas, the followers of Kaṇaḍa,[a] Nirgranthas,[b]
And the worldly proponents of a person and aggregates,[c]
Whether they propound
What passes beyond "is" and "is not."

Thereby know that the ambrosia
Of the Buddhas'[d] teaching is called profound,
An exclusive doctrine passing
Far beyond "is" and "is not."

How could the world exist in fact,[e]
With a nature passed beyond the three times,[f]

---

[a] The Vaisheṣhikas.

[b] The Jainas.

[c] Gyel-tsap (17b.3) identifies these as some Buddhist sects and non-Buddhist sects that assert a substantially existent person and/or substantially existent aggregates.

[d] Since it is a Sanskritic convention to use the plural as an honorific, this could refer only to Shākyamuni Buddha.

[e] I.e., ultimately.

[f] Past, present, and future.

Not going when disintegrating, not coming,
And not staying even for an instant?

Because the coming, going, and staying
Of the world and nirvāṇa do not exist
As [their own] reality, what difference
Is there in fact[a] between the two?

If, due to the non-existence of staying,
Production and cessation do not exist as [their own] reality,
How could production, staying,
And ceasing exist in fact?

If always changing,
How are things non-momentary?
If not changing,
How can they be altered in fact?

Do they become momentary
Through partial or complete disintegration?
Because an inequality[b] is not apprehended,
This momentariness cannot be admitted either way.

If momentary, then it becomes entirely non-existent;
Hence how could it be old?
Also if non-momentary, it is constant;
Hence how could it be old?

Just as a moment has an end, so a beginning
And a middle must be considered.
Thus due to this triple nature of a moment,
There is no momentary abiding of the world.

Also the beginning, middle, and end
Are to be analyzed like a moment.
Therefore beginning, middle, and end
Are also not [produced][1350] from self or other.

Due to having many parts there is no unity,
There is not anything without parts.
Further, without one, there is not many.
Also, without existence there is no non-existence.

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[a] Ajitamitra (Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 411.6) glosses this as "ultimately" (*don dam par na*).

[b] It is not seen that only part of a thing changes. Also, if a particle changed completely, it could not be said, as the Vaisheṣhikas do, that it is permanent but its states are impermanent.

If it is thought that through disintegration or an antidote
An existent becomes non-existent,
Then how without an existent
Could there be disintegration or an antidote?

Hence, in fact there is no disappearance
Of the world through nirvāṇa.
Asked whether the world has an end
The Conqueror remained silent.

Because he did not teach this profound doctrine
To worldly beings who were not receptacles,
The All-Knowing is therefore known
By the wise to be omniscient.

Thus the doctrine of definite goodness
Was taught by the perfect Buddhas,
The seers of reality, as profound,
Unapprehendable, and baseless.[a]

Frightened by this baseless doctrine,
Delighting in a base, not passing
Beyond existence and non-existence,
Unintelligent beings ruin themselves.

Afraid of the fearless abode,
Ruined, they ruin others.
O King, act in such a way
That the ruined do not ruin you.

O King, lest you be ruined
I will explain through the scriptures
The mode of the supramundane, just as it is,
The reality not partaking of dualism.

This profundity endowed with meanings drawn [from scriptures]
And beyond ill-deeds and meritorious deeds
Has not been tasted by those who fear the baseless—
The others—the Forders[b]—and even by our own.[c]

A person is not earth, not water,

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[a] "Baseless" means not providing a base for the conception that things inherently exist.

[b] "Forders" (*mu stegs, tīrthika*) are non-Buddhists who propound and follow a path, or ford, to liberation or high status.

[c] "Our own" refers to those following lower systems of Buddhist tenets.

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Not fire, not wind, not space,
Not consciousness, and not all of them.
What person is there other than these?

Just as a person is not real
Due to being a composite of six constituents,
So each of the constituents also
Is not real due to being a composite.

The aggregates are not the self, they are not in it,
It is not in them, without them it is not,
It is not mixed with the aggregates like fire and fuel.[a]
Therefore how could the self exist?

The three elements[b] are not earth, they are not in it,
It is not in them, without them it is not;
Since this also applies to each,
The elements, like the self, are false.

Earth, water, fire, and wind
Individually also do not inherently exist.
When any three are absent, an individual one does not exist.
When one is absent, the three also do not exist.

If when three are absent, an individual one does not exist
And if when one is absent, the three also do not exist,
Then each itself does not exist.
How could a composite be produced?

Otherwise, if each itself exists,
Why without fuel is there no fire?
Likewise why is there no water, wind, or earth
Without motility, obstructiveness, or cohesion?[c]

If [it is answered that] fire is well known [not to exist without fuel but the other three elements exist by way of their own entities],

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[a] According to Ajitamitra (Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 423.2) this means that if the aggregates and the self were mingled like fire and fuel, then they could not be distinguished, as is the case with a mixture of water and milk. According to Gyel-tsap (22b.2), this means that the aggregates and the self are not inexpressible as either one or different because all phenomena are either one or different.

[b] Water, fire, and wind; or cohesion, maturing, and motility.

[c] There absurdly would be water without motility, obstructiveness, or maturation. There absurdly would be wind without obstructiveness, maturation, or cohesion. There absurdly would be earth without motility, maturation, and cohesion.

How could your three exist in themselves
Without the others? It is impossible for the three
Not to accord with dependent-arising.

How could those—that themselves
Exist individually—be mutually dependent?
How could those—that do not themselves
Exist individually—be mutually dependent?

If it is the case that they do not themselves exist individually,
But where there is one, the other three exist,
Then if unmixed, they are not in one place,
And if mixed, they do not themselves exist individually.

The elements do not themselves exist individually,
So how could their own individual characters[a] exist?
What do not themselves individually exist cannot predominate.[b]
Their characters are regarded as conventionalities.

This mode [of refutation] is also to be applied
To colors, odors, tastes, and objects of touch;
Eye, consciousness, and form;[c]
Ignorance, action, and birth;

Agent, object, and action,
Number, possession, cause and effect,
Time, short and long, and so forth,
Name and name-bearer as well.

Earth, water, fire, and wind,
Long and short, subtle and coarse,
As well as virtue and so forth are said by the Subduer
To be ceased in the consciousness [of reality].

Earth, water, fire, and wind

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[a] In Tibetan scholastic literature the characters of the four elements are:

earth—that which is hard and obstructive
water—that which is wet and moistening
fire—that which is hot and burning
wind—that which is light and moving.

[b] The potencies of the four elements are said to be present in everything; the predominance of one element over the others determines what is manifested, but if they do not individually exist, how could one predominate?

[c] These three are the visual sense organ, the visual consciousness, and the form (color and shape) seen by the visual consciousness.

Do not have a chance[a]
In the face of that undemonstrable consciousness
Complete lord over the limitless.

Here[b] long and short, subtle and coarse,
Virtue and non-virtue,
And here names and forms
All are ceased.

All those that earlier appeared to consciousness
Because of not knowing that [reality][c]
Will later cease for consciousness[d] in that way
Because of knowing that [reality].

All these phenomena of beings
Are seen as fuel for the fire of consciousness.
They are pacified through being burned
By the light of true discrimination.

The reality is later ascertained
Of what was formerly imputed by ignorance.[e]
When a thing is not found,
How can there be a non-thing?

Because the phenomena of forms
Are only names,[f] space too is only a name.

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[a] Gyel-tsap (24b.1) takes this as meaning that to that consciousness "earth, water, fire, and wind do not find a location in the face of its perception" (*sa dang chu dang me dang ni rlung gis khyod kyi gzigs ngor gnas thob par 'gyur ba min*). The *zhol* edition reads *rlung* ***gi*** *gnas* ***mthong*** *'gyur ma yin;* Hahn (*Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī,* 37) reads *rlung* ***gis*** *gnas* ***thod*** *'gyur ma yin* which is confirmed by Ajitamitra (Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 430.1) who then glosses it with *gnas skabs rnyed par mi 'gyur ro.*

[b] "Here" means "in the face of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness."

[c] Gyel-tsap (24b.3) identifies what is not known as "the primordially existent absence of inherently existent production" (*gdod nas grub pa'i rang bzhin gyis skye ba med pa'i don*).

[d] Gyel-tsap (24b.5) glosses "for consciousness" with "in the face of perception by a Superior's meditative equipoise" (*'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag gi gzigs ngor*).

[e] The translation of these lines follows the Tibetan as well as Gyel-tsap's commentary (25a.2):

> *Objection:* Since in that case you have asserted that everything does not exist, you become a Nihilist.
>
> *Answer:* Not so. Afflictive ignorance previously imputed inherent existence where there is no inherent existence, and later upon having delineated the emptiness of inherent existence, one ascertains suchness and realizes the mode of abiding of things, but there is no fallacy of deprecating things even in the slightest.

[f] *gzugs kyi dngos po ming tsam phyir.* Chandrakīrti's citation of this in his *Prasannapadā*

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Without the elements how could forms exist?
Therefore even name-only does not exist.

Feelings, discriminations, compositional factors,
And consciousnesses are to be considered
Like the elements and the self.
Thereby the six constituents[a] are selfless.

b Inclusion of All Scriptures into the Paths of Beings of Three Capacities, as well as the Definiteness of the Number of Vehicles*

All doctrinal modes are included in the stages of the path of beings of low, middling, and supreme capacity because of stemming from two aims. Among the middling are the two, Hearers and Solitary Realizers, and their paths. The Great Vehicle is within the great. There are not four vehicles.

Word Commentary on Root Text: All doctrinal modes set forth by the Conqueror are included in the stages of the path of beings of low, middling, and supreme capacity because all—the Buddha's initial generation of an altruistic intention to become enlightened, his accumulation of the collections [of merit and wisdom] in the middle, and his finally becoming buddhafied—only stem from achieving the two aims, temporary and final, of trainees.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1351] All practices of the three foundations—giving, morality, and meditation—for attaining the happiness of cyclic existence are to be put in the paths of beings of small capacity…Practices of the three foundations by those wanting liberation from the fiery abyss or prison of cyclic existence are paths of beings of middling capacity…All the limitless practices of the three paths and so forth by the intelligent—seeing all transmigrating beings as mothers and wishing to relieve them

has a different reading, "because of being just the non-existence of form" (*rūpasyābhāva-mātratvād*). This reading is not reflected in any of the Tibetan texts, either of the *Ratnāvalī* or of the *Prasannapadā* (Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 346.6) or in their commentaries. Though both readings make sense, I am following the Tibetan because it was checked against three Sanskrit editions and here I am seeking to present a translation of the *Precious Garland* in the light of Gyel-tsap's commentary (25.5).

"Only name" means "merely nominally existent," the word "merely" eliminating that phenomena are established by way of their own character. In Ge-luk-b̄a scholastic literature it is said that "only name" does not mean "merely sounds" even though names are sounds, since otherwise the only phenomena that would exist would be sounds.

[a] The constituents are earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness, which are the basis in dependence upon which a self is imputed.

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> from suffering—in order to attain highest enlightenment for the sake of others' welfare are paths of beings of great capacity.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Among beings of middling capacity are the divisions of the two, Hearers and Solitary Realizers, and their paths. The Great Vehicle is included within beings of great capacity. Hence, the teaching of this Conqueror [Shākyamuni Buddha] does not have a fourth vehicle.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1352] Since methods for being born as a god or as Brahmā are [just] called their vehicles, they are not vehicles. Because Vajragarbha says that four vehicles are not suitable in the teaching of this Conqueror [Shākyamuni Buddha], the vehicles are limited to three.

2* Describing the Features of the Individual Vehicles {2}

This section has two parts: features of Hearer and Solitary Realizer vehicles and features of the Great Vehicle.

a Features of Hearer and Solitary Realizer Vehicles*

Here the realizations of Hearers and Solitary Realizers are similar. Eight grounds. By length of time and fruits they are differentiated.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Here in this system the types of realizations of Hearers and Solitary Realizers are concordant.[a] They also assert eight grounds of the Lesser Vehicle:

- the ground of lineage
- the ground of the eighth
- the ground of seeing
- the ground of diminishment
- the ground of separation from desire
- the ground of realizing accomplishment
- the ground of Hearers
- the ground of Solitary Realizers.

In some texts the ground of Hearers is dropped, and the ground of seeing the wholesome is counted [as the first of the eight].

> Ḡön-chok-jik-may-ẉang-b̄o's *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths:* Illustrations of these are:

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[a] For a discussion of differences in attitude between Hearers and Solitary Realizers, see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 59-61.

- The path of accumulation of Hearers is called the ground of seeing the wholesome because it is the path of initially seeing the wholesome attributes of purification.
- A Hearer path of preparation is called a ground of lineage because this is when non-mistakenness [that is, certainty] is attained with respect to one's lineage.
- A clear realization of an Approacher to Stream Enterer is called the eighth ground because it is at this point that the first of the eight Approachers and Abiders is attained.
- A clear realization of an Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer is called the ground of seeing because one first directly sees the selflessness of the person by means of a supramundane path.
- A clear realization of an Abider in the Fruit of Once Returner is called a ground of diminishment because one has abandoned two of the three sets of the afflictive emotions of the desire realm [that is, the first six of the nine afflictive emotions].
- A clear realization of an Abider in the Fruit of Never Returner is called a ground of separation from desire because one has separated from desire for all the afflicted [objects] of the desire realm.
- A clear realization of a Hearer Foe Destroyer is called a ground of realizing accomplishment [or "completion"] because one has realized complete accomplishment of the activities of one's path.
- The clear realizations of a Solitary Realizer are called grounds of a Solitary Realizer…All clear realizations of learner Solitary Realizers are included within this [category].

Word Commentary on Root Text: Although the types of realizations of Hearers and Solitary Realizers are similar, the fruits[a] [of practice] are differentiated from the viewpoint of time [spent in practice of the path], three lifetimes or one hundred eons, and so forth.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1353] On this occasion of the Consequence School the clear realizations that are the means of progress [for Hearers and Solitary Realizers] are similar because—with respect to the means of progress for both—wisdom must realize the subtle selflessness of persons, and although they

[a] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's own commentary (see below) does not support Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's reading of the root text such that the fruits of the path are what are differentiated; rather, Hearers and Solitary Realizers are differentiated by length of time spent on the path and the respective fruits of the path.

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have great compassion, they do not have the great compassion bearing the burden of others' welfare, and so forth…but are intent on their own welfare and so forth…

Objection: Then, Hearers and Solitary Realizers would not have different vehicles.

Answer: Also on this occasion [of the Consequence School] they have separate vehicles due to these differences:

- Their lineages are dissimilar.
- The mind-generation [that is, motivation] of Hearers is a wish for mere liberation due to being very fearful, and their length of time [practicing the path] is three lifetimes, and so forth. The mind-generation [that is, motivation] of Solitary Realizers is a wish to attain perfect enlightenment for merely their own sake, and in terms of time they are able to please Buddhas for a hundred great eons.
- In terms of fruits [of practice] Hearers do not have similitudes of a Buddha's marks and beauties, whereas Solitary Realizers do…

Although when they become Foe Destroyers, they have not attained the final liberation [that is, the great liberation of Buddhahood], they are not reborn through contaminated actions and afflictive emotions. Set in the sphere of non-contamination, they are roused by Buddhas [to enter the Great Vehicle path].

b Features of the Great Vehicle {2}*

This section has two parts: features of the grounds of practicing through belief and features of the grounds of Superiors.

1# FEATURES OF THE GROUNDS OF PRACTICING THROUGH BELIEF

With a stable root—altruistic mind generation—the perfections are the broad branches. Accumulation and preparation are differentiated by qualities, signs, meditations, and entities.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In dependence upon a stable root, an altruistic intention to become enlightened, one must achieve the sovereign of trees—the four Buddha bodies—with the full completion of the [broad] branches of the perfections[a] and the four modes of gathering students,[b] the

[a] Giving, morality, patience, effort, concentration, and wisdom.

[b] As Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland of Advice* (stanza 133) says, the four modes of gathering

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leaves of completion, maturation, and purification, and the fruit of compassion.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1354] Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:[a]

> If you and the world wish to attain
> Unparalleled enlightenment,
> Its roots are the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment
> Stable like the monarch of mountains,
> Compassion reaching to all quarters,
> And wisdom not relying on duality.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1355] It is said that the beginning of accumulating the collections [of merit and wisdom] for three periods of countless great eons is from coming to possess four attributes:

- powerful roots of virtue that are not overwhelmed by unfavorable factors such as taking to mind one's own welfare and so forth
- powerful prayer-wishes for always meeting Great Vehicle spiritual guides
- a stable attitude of not losing the altruistic intention to become enlightened
- not holding merely a few good qualities to be sufficient, but progressing higher and higher.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Moreover, the paths of accumulation and preparation are differentiated by:

1. qualities, such as the individual associations of the first three groups of

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students are by way of giving gifts, giving doctrine, teaching others to fulfill their aims, and oneself acting according to that teaching:

> You should cause the assembling
> Of the religious and the worldly
> Through giving, speaking pleasantly,
> Purposeful behavior, and concordant behavior.

"Speaking pleasantly" is conversation based on high status and definite goodness. "Purposeful behavior" is to cause others to practice what is beneficial. "Concordant behavior" is for one to practice what one teaches others.

[a] 174c-175. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a quotes just the third and fourth lines; the others have been added for context. The passage is an indication that in the root text Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a intends "stable root" to modify "altruistic intention to become enlightened"; the interlinear word-commentary unnecessarily sees it as referring to the root of the altruistic intention to become enlightened, compassion.

the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment (225 and 258), faculties, and powers

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1356] In Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* and in the higher systems of tenets:

- The first three groups [of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, that is, the four mindful establishments, the four thorough abandonings, and the four legs of manifestation] are associated with the three paths of accumulation—small, medium, and great.
- The five faculties are associated with the heat and peak levels of the path of preparation.
- The five powers are associated with the forbearance and supreme mundane qualities levels of the path of preparation.
- There are also individual associations of signs, such as lineage and irreversibility…Twenty[1357] signs of irreversibility are associated with the four levels of the path of preparation—eleven signs with heat, six signs with peak, two signs with forbearance, and one sign with supreme mundane qualities.

2. individual modes of meditation as explained in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization*

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1358] The path of accumulation is posited from the attainment of an altruistic intention to become enlightened, and the path of preparation is posited from the attainment of special insight realizing emptiness.

3. entities of states arisen predominantly from hearing, thinking, or meditating.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1359] The entity of the path of accumulation is predominantly a state arisen from hearing and from thinking, but since there is calm abiding, there are also states arisen from meditating.

2# FEATURES OF THE GROUNDS OF SUPERIORS

There are no divisions with regard to meditative equipoise on the ten grounds. The trainings and the twelve subsequent qualities of activities and so forth advance. Each is also explained by eight—etymologies, divisions, qualities, the supported,[1360] fruitions, two omens, objects of abandonment, and antidotes.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are no divisions with respect to how the exalted wisdoms of non-conceptual meditative equipoise on the ten grounds realize emptiness.

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought:*[1361] The *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* says:

> Just as the wise cannot express or see
> The trail of any bird across the sky,
> So none of the grounds of Conqueror Children
> Can be expressed. Then how can one listen?

Though a bird crosses the sky, the wise of the world cannot describe its trail in speech or see it with their minds. In the same way, though the ultimate grounds—like birds—progress through the sky of the noumenon, even expositors who are Superiors cannot describe the mode of progress in the way that Superiors themselves experience it. Thus, listeners cannot hear about the grounds the way they are perceived.

Word Commentary on Root Text: However, the ten grounds are individually posited by way of trainings in the welfare of trainees or in the perfections and so forth[1362] and by way of four differences:

- advance in the number of the twelve groups of qualities subsequent to meditative equipoise—the activities of seeing a hundred Buddhas and so forth

  Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-ḇo, *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths:*[1363] The twelve groups of a hundred qualities during one instant on the first ground after a Bodhisattva has risen from meditative equipoise are:

  1. seeing a hundred Buddhas in one instant
  2. receiving the blessings of a hundred Buddhas
  3. going to a hundred Buddha Lands
  4. illuminating a hundred lands
  5. vibrating a hundred worldly realms
  6. living for a hundred eons
  7. seeing with true wisdom the past and future of a hundred eons
  8. entering into and rising from a hundred meditative stabilizations
  9. opening a hundred different doors of doctrine
  10. ripening a hundred sentient beings
  11. emanating a hundred versions of one's own body
  12. surrounding each of the hundred bodies with a hundred Bodhisattvas

  The number increases with each ground:
  first ground: one hundred
  second ground: one thousand

third ground: one hundred thousand
fourth ground: one hundred ten million
fifth ground: one thousand ten million
sixth ground: one hundred thousand ten million
seventh ground: one hundred thousand ten trillion
eighth ground: a number equal to the particles of a billion worlds
ninth ground: a number equal to the particles of ten million billion worlds
tenth ground: a number equal to the particles of an inexpressible number of an inexpressible number of Buddha Lands.

- advance—on the individual grounds—in power for purifying defilements and for progressing on paths
- advance in the surpassing perfection [that is, the perfection of giving on the first ground, morality on the second ground, patience on the third, effort on the fourth, concentration on the fifth, wisdom on the sixth, skill in means on the seventh, prayer wishes on the eighth, power on the ninth, and exalted wisdom on the tenth]
- advance in fruitional births.

Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths:* On the first ground taking birth as a monarch ruling Jambudvīpa [this world], on the second as a monarch ruling the four continents, on the third as a monarch ruling the Land of the Thirty-Three, on the fourth as a monarch ruling the Land Without Combat, on the fifth as a monarch ruling the Joyous Land, on the sixth as a monarch ruling the Land of Liking Emanation, on the seventh as a monarch ruling Controlling Others' Emanations, on the eighth as a great Brahma lord of a thousand worlds, on the ninth as a great Brahmā lord of a million worlds, and on the tenth as the Devaputra Maheshvara of the Highest Pure Land.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Each ground is also explained by eight:

1. etymologies for the Very Joyful and so forth

Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths:* The first ground is called "the very joyful" because when, on that ground, one sees that one has become closer to perfect enlightenment and that the welfare of sentient beings is being accomplished [in the sense that one's capacity to achieve the welfare of sentient beings is enhanced] a special joy is generated.

The second ground is called "the stainless" because of being free from the stains of faulty morality and from the stains of the exertion of the mental application of a person of the Lesser Vehicle.

The third ground is called "the radiant" because from the third ground one strives at seeking the doctrine of verbalization without concern about one's own body and life and one pleases others through the light of doctrine.

The fourth ground is called "the effulgent" because of spreading out, like fire, the light of exalted wisdom burning away the corresponding two obstructions by way of teaching the practices harmonious with enlightenment.

The fifth ground is called "the difficult to tame" because one is ripening sentient beings and because, when ripening them, it is difficult for intelligent fourth ground Bodhisattvas and below to tame trainees whose perverse practices are difficult to bear, but here on the fifth ground [from the viewpoint of having attained a surpassing practice of the perfection of concentration] one is able to tame them.

The sixth ground is called "the ground of manifesting or approaching" because the Bodhisattva manifests a reversal from cyclic existence through meditating on the [twelve links] of dependent-arising in the forward process[a] and approaches a nirvāṇa through meditating on dependent-arising in reverse order.[b]

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[a] In the forward process:

Due to the condition of ignorance, action arises.
Due to the condition of action, consciousness arises.
Due to the condition of consciousness, name and form arise.
Due to the condition of name and form, the six sense spheres arise.
Due to the condition of the six sense spheres, contact arises.
Due to the condition of contact, feeling arises.
Due to the condition of feeling, attachment arises.
Due to the condition of attachment, grasping arises.
Due to the condition of grasping, the potentialized level of karma called "existence" arises.
Due to the condition of "existence," birth arises.
Due to the condition of birth, aging and death arise.

For a thorough discussion of the twelve links, see His Holiness the Dalai Lama, *The Meaning of Life: Buddhist Perspectives on Cause and Effect,* trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000).

[b] In the reverse order:

The unwanted sufferings of aging and death are produced in dependence upon birth.
Birth is produced in dependence upon the potentialized level of action called "existence".
"Existence" is produced in dependence upon grasping.
Grasping is produced in dependence upon attachment.
Attachment is produced in dependence upon feeling.
Feeling is produced in dependence upon contact.

The seventh ground is called "the gone afar" because, in dependence upon having cultivated the path for a long time, it is related with the two—the final paths having signs and exertion and the path of sole progress.

The eighth ground is called "the immovable" because one is unshakable by a discrimination having signs [that is, one no longer has manifest conception of true existence] or by discrimination having signless exertion [that is, within the context of no longer having manifest conception of true existence there is no discrimination involving exertion].

The ninth ground is called "the ground of good intelligence" because one has attained a forbearance that is called "the intelligence of individual correct knowledge."

The tenth ground is called "clouds[a] of doctrine" because as in the world, the sky fills with rain clouds and rain falls thereby increasing the harvest of the world, so the mental continuum of a tenth ground Bodhisattva is like the sky filled with the clouds of doctrine of the retentions [that is, retentive consciousnesses with the ability to maintain the meaning of the words of the doctrine for even an eon] and [limitless] meditative stabilizations and so forth [free from the faults of laxity and excitement], from which the rain of doctrine falls and increases the marvelous harvest of virtues in the continuums of trainees.

2. divisions in how they train in the three trainings [of morality, meditative stabilization, and wisdom] and in how the five uncontaminated aggregates are purified

   Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths:* On the first ground, one attains the quality [in general] of abiding in the three trainings by way of directly realizing the nature of phenomena. On the second ground, one attains this specifically with regard to the training in morality, and on the third ground, with respect to the training in higher meditative stabilization. On the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds, one attains the training in wisdom. On the remaining four grounds, one attains qualities that are

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Contact is produced in dependence upon the six sense spheres.
The six sense spheres are produced in dependence upon name and form.
Name and form are produced in dependence upon consciousness.
Consciousness is produced in dependence upon action.
Action is produced in dependence upon ignorance.

[a] "Clouds" means "many."

included within the three trainings.

3. differences in the twelve groups of qualities (see 975)
4. differences in that which is supported, the surpassing perfection (see 976)
5. differences in taking fruitional births, such as birth as a universal emperor controlling Jambudvīpa [that is, this world]

    Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1364] In general, there are two ways in which Bodhisattvas are born—births through power and fruitional births…There are four types of births through power:

    - Bodhisattvas on the paths of accumulation and preparation are born in the desire realm through the power of karma
    - Those who have attained a Bodhisattva ground are born in bad transmigrations through the power of prayer-wishes
    - Those who have attained [any of the four] concentrations and [four] formless absorptions are born in the desire realm through the power of meditative stabilization
    - Birth in an emanated Joyous Pure Land and so forth is through the power of having attained mastery.

    (For Bodhisattvas' fruitional births see above, 976.)

6. two omens—signs of irreversibility and omens of the individual grounds

    Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1365] There are sixteen signs of irreversibility of the path of seeing, such as the disappearance of discriminations of forms and so forth…With respect to the ten signs that are omens in dreams, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Golden Rosary* says:

    - On the first ground these trillion worlds are completely filled with a hundred thousand million ten million treasures.
    - On the second ground a hundred thousand million ten million jewels adorn the world, which has become like the palm of the hand.
    - On the third ground oneself is heroic and, brandishing hard weapons, tames all opponents.
    - On the fourth ground from the four directions four spheres of wind scatter various flowers on the earth endowed with all [qualities].
    - On the fifth ground a woman adorned with all adornments puts a rosary of magnolias on one's head.
    - On the sixth ground seeing a pool with four sets of stairs, strewn with gold sand, filled with water having the eight endowments, clear and unsullied, adorned with *utpala, kumata,*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

and white lotuses, one enjoys it with happy play.
- On the seventh ground seeing on the right and left sides abysses of hell-beings, one returns without falling there.
- On the eighth ground by carrying on the two shoulders a lion, king of beasts, with their manes as one's crown, all ferocious animals are frightened and stay still.
- On the ninth ground one sees a universal emperor, surrounded by many hundred thousand million ten million beings, with a white umbrella decorated with various jewels above his head looking straight ahead.
- On the tenth ground one sees the exalted body of a One-Gone-Thus of golden color, with light filling a yojana, surrounded by many hundred thousand million ten million Brahmās, and teaching doctrine while looking straight ahead.

7. differences in the objects of abandonment by the individual grounds

Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of Tenets:* The coarse and subtle conceptions of self, together with their seeds, and the three poisons that arise through their influence, together with their seeds, are asserted to be the afflictive obstructions from cyclic existence because the Consequentialists assert that a consciousness conceiving true existence is an obstruction to liberation. The predispositions of the conception of true existence, the mistaken appearances of [inherently existent] duality which arise through their influence, and the taints of apprehending the two truths as different entities are asserted to be the obstructions to omniscience.[a]

8. differences in purificatory antidotes

Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Presentation of the Grounds and Paths:* There are ten thorough means of purification on the first ground, eight on the second, five on the third, ten each on the fourth and fifth, twelve on the sixth, twenty on the seventh, eight on the eighth, and twelve on the ninth. Although thorough means of purification on the tenth ground are not explicitly indicated in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization,* it is not that there are none on the tenth ground, because on the occasion of attaining the

[a] The seeds of the conception of true existence produce a *consciousness conceiving* that phenomena and persons truly exist, but the predispositions of the conception of true existence produce an *appearance* of persons and phenomena as inherently existent. The taints of apprehending the two truths as different entities are what make it impossible for anyone but a Buddha to perceive directly both phenomena and their final nature, emptiness, at the same time.

tenth ground, one must advance to a higher ground by way of removing defects and increasing good qualities.

These should be known in detail from Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Golden Rosary.*

C: Presentation of the Fruits of the Paths {7}

This section has seven parts: signs of the completion of meditative equipoise, modes of perception by the two exalted wisdoms, divisions of Buddha bodies together with an elimination of mistakes, detailed explanation of the four exalted bodies, features of the three mysteries and so forth, infiniteness of the qualities of the powers, and uninterrupted inconceivable activities.

1* Signs of the Completion of Meditative Equipoise

Concerning the fruit, meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment do not alternate; they are one entity. The movement of mind—conceptuality—has been thoroughly pacified. Hence, one abides stably, without rising, yet also performs the activities of subsequent attainment.

Word Commentary on Root Text: On the fruitional Buddha ground[a] the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise and the wisdom of subsequent attainment do not alternate and have become one entity. The movement of mind—that is, all conceptuality—has been thoroughly pacified without exception. Hence, stability of meditative stabilization has been brought to completion, and there is no rising from meditative equipoise as long as cyclic existence lasts, yet the activities of the wisdom of subsequent attainment, such as teaching various doctrines in accordance with the lot of trainees, are also performed.

Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1366] Moreover, Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes* says:

> Just that basic constituent that serves as the seed
> Is asserted to be the basis of all phenomena.
> From gradually having purified it
> The state of Buddhahood is attained.

The fruit, Buddhahood, must be attained through the purification of the naturally abiding lineage—the basic constituent—by means of sixty purifications. With respect to this fact, Maitreya's *Sublime*

[a] For a discussion of Buddhahood, mainly based on J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets,* see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 117-123.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Continuum of the Great Vehicle says:[a]

> These [seven topics], in connection, [are to be known] by way of their own characteristics
> In this order in the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra*.

and so forth. [Commenting on this] Asaṅga's *Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle"* says:

> That [*Sublime Continuum*] clarifies the basic constituent of buddhafication upon indicating the sixty aspects of thorough purification, which are qualities thoroughly purifying that [basic constituent]. For if one possesses the qualities that are the means of thorough purification, the thorough purification that thoroughly purifies this [basic constituent] is feasible.

As [Asaṅga] says, there are sixty [means of purification]:

- The four ornaments—the three Bodhisattva trainings and retention.
- The eight illuminations—mindfulness, intelligence, realization, and so forth.
- The sixteen great compassions—mercy for those who are disturbed by various [wrong] views, mercy for those who are troubled by the four mistakes, and so forth.
- The thirty-two aspects of the activities of a Bodhisattva—awakening [sentient beings] from the sleep of obscuration, connecting those who have low interests to the vast, and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [1367] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle"* says:

> Concerning that, what are those sixty aspects of thorough purification which are qualities thoroughly purifying the Buddha constituent?
>
> *Four types of ornaments of a Bodhisattva which bring about beautification when engaging in the Bodhisattva practices*
>
> 1. training in ethics
> 2. training in meditative stabilization
> 3. training in wisdom—these being the three trainings

[a] I.2ab. The seven topics are given in the preceding stanza:

> Buddha, doctrine, community, basic constituent, enlightenment,
> Qualities, and finally, Buddha activities—
> The body of the entire treatise is in brief
> These seven diamond topics.

4. retention

Eight types of illumination making extremely clear the doors of doctrine through attaining the illumination of the holy doctrine and separating from the darkness of obscuration

5. mindfulness
6. intelligence
7. realization
8. doctrine
9. knowledge
10. truth
11. clairvoyance
12. achievement.

Sixteen types of great compassion seeking to free sentient beings from suffering who are observed as:

13. [disturbed by] various [bad] views
14. [disturbed by] four mistakes
15. having the conception of [inherently existent] I and mine
16. having the five obstructions
17. attached to the six sense-spheres
18. having the seven prides
19. deprived of a Superior's path
20. not under their own power
21. belligerent
22. having the karma of ill-deeds
23. without a Superior's wisdom
24. not realizing the profundity of dependent-arising
25. not having abandoned predispositions to [bad] views
26. not free from the burden of suffering
27. acting with deceit and pride
28. deprived of high states [within cyclic existence] and liberation [from cyclic existence]

Thirty-two activities of a Bodhisattva

29. awakening [sentient beings] from the sleep of obscuration
30. connecting those with low interests to the vast
31. connecting those who seek what is not the doctrine to seeking the doctrine
32. setting those with an impure lifestyle in a pure lifestyle
33. setting those who have bad views in correct views
34. setting those who have improper mental application in proper mental application

35. setting those who abide in wrong doctrines in correct doctrines
36.-41. the six types of connecting those who are discordant with the six perfections to the six perfections
42. connecting those without skill in means to skill in means
43. connecting those who possess afflictive emotions to being without afflictive emotions
44. connecting those with apprehension [of inherent existence] to being without apprehension [of inherent existence]
45. connecting those who are undisciplined to discipline
46. connecting those who do not reciprocate [kindnesses] done to reciprocating [kindness]
47. connecting those who have fallen into the four rivers to liberation from them
48. connecting those who do not appreciate authoritative instructions to appreciating authoritative instructions
49. connecting those who have much attachment to non-attachment
50. connecting those without a Superior's fortune to a Superior's fortune
51. connecting the ill to the absence of illness
52. connecting those devoid of the illumination of knowledge to illumination
53. connecting those who are without knowledge of the three realms to such knowledge
54. connecting those who have entered a left-sided path to a right-sided path
55. connecting those who are attached to life and limb to not being attached to those
56. connecting those who are separated from the [three] jewels to non-severance of the lineage of the [three] jewels
57. connecting those who are deprived of the doctrine to holding the doctrine
58. connecting those who are separated from the six mindfulnesses to the six mindfulnesses
59. connecting those who are obstructed by afflictive emotions to not having afflictive emotions
60. connecting those who possess non-virtuous practices to virtuous practices.

The *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* also speaks of revealing the basic constituent through attributes of thorough purification because

Gyel-tsap's *Commentary* says:

> That sūtra says:
>
>> Defilements of the minds of sentient beings and their mode of subsistence—the suchness that is together with the basic constituent that has not been previously purified of defilements—are gradually purified through the force of meditatively cultivating antidotes. From this perspective, the purification of pure gold is given as an example of how that which is to be abandoned by the paths of seeing and meditation are gradually purified even on the ten Bodhisattva grounds.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1368] In accordance with Asaṅga's *Explanation,* which states:

> From this perspective [the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*] gives gold as an example of that which is to be purified over the ten Bodhisattva grounds.

what fruits of having purified [the basic constituent] through those sixty [means of purification] over the ten [Bodhisattva] grounds are attained?

There are sixty qualities—the four bodies, the three mysteries, the [ten] powers, and so forth—and thirty-two exalted activities that arise [at Buddhahood].

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1369] The qualities of the seven adamantine topics are sixty-four:

- thirty-two exalted qualities of fruition—the thirty-two excellent marks[a]
- thirty-two exalted qualities of separation—ten powers, four fearlessnesses, and eighteen unshared attributes of a Buddha.[b]

These should be known from Gyel-tsap's *Commentary* on the third chapter of Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle.* The thirty-two exalted activities were briefly mentioned in the section on the Mind-Only School (453) and are to be extensively known from the fourth chapter of Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* and commentaries.

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[a] See Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 118-120, stanzas 176-196.

[b] See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 208-211.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1370] From these, one can know the [inadequacy of] Tibetans' assertions that the meaning of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment being one entity for a Buddha is that within meditative equipoise a Buddha can speak and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1371] I wonder [if Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a means that] since it is even said:

In a hair-pore, [a Buddha] can display in each moment
Innumerable exalted bodies of perfect Buddhas
Together with innumerable Bodhisattvas
And likewise gods, demi-gods, and humans.

then what need is there to mention that a Buddha can speak, and so forth, from within meditative equipoise in clairvoyance!

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1372] When one looks at what Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says about the qualities of a tenth grounder, one can know [the inadequacy of these Tibetans' descriptions]. Not only that, but also it is known from other magical emanations of meditative stabilization. Here, the single entity of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment is a composite in one instant of exalted knowledge of:

- meditative equipoise, involving the extinguishment of appearances in thusness
- and subsequent attainment, which is an exalted wisdom knowing all the diversity [of phenomena].

The reason why they are one entity is that, until Buddhahood, one has not overcome:

- the obstructions to objects of knowledge, that is, to thoroughly distinguishing [all] objects of knowledge by one moment of mind
- the basis of the obstructions to omniscience—conceptuality
- and the basis and producer of conceptuality—karmic winds.

This should be known by looking at the explanation in the *Sūtra Showing the Inconceivable Mysteries of the One-Gone-Thus* that the reason for [a Buddha's] not having conceptuality is the non-existence of the movement of wind.

Consequently, when conceptuality is pacified, all of the activities of a Buddha spontaneously arise without striving; the completion of the firmly abiding meditative stabilization is attained; and

the eight qualities—uncompoundedness and so forth—are attained. Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1373]

> Obeisance to the one who has no beginning, middle, or end,
> Who is quiescent, who through buddhafication became buddhafied in self-aspect
> And having become buddhafied, taught the path of fearlessness and permanence so that those who had not yet realized it might realize it,
> And who, brandishing the supreme sword and diamond of knowledge and mercy, cuts the shoots of suffering and destroys the walls of doubt surrounded by the darkness of various views.

and Asaṅga's *Explanation* says:

> Because it is free from proliferations and all conceptuality has been thoroughly pacified, it is spontaneous.

and so forth.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1374] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary* says:

> Obeisance to that Buddha who is singular in the sense of being matchless on the three grounds.[a] What are the specific qualities that [a Buddha] possesses?
>
> - Natural purity is an ultimate truth that is the absence of inherent establishment in the three—beginning, middle, and end—and is devoid of all the extremes of proliferation.
> - Adventitious purity is the quiescence of all adventitious defilements by means of antidotes; in dependence on that [quiescence] the thorough quiescence of exertion with regard to engaging in exalted activities is attained.
> - The exalted wisdom realizing the mode [of being of phenomena], a quality included among compounded phenomena, which, through buddhafication became buddhafied in self-aspect, does not see any proliferations of true existence—whereas, if there were proliferations of true existence, they would be suitable to be observed—and in terms of ultimate truth understands [emptiness] in the manner of water poured into water, that is to say, within the vanishing of dualistic appearance.

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[a] The three grounds are identified as under the ground, above the ground, and on the ground or as the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms.

- The exalted wisdom realizing the diversity of phenomena is buddhafied in the manner of directly perceiving the three aspects in that way.

Having been buddhafied, what does a Buddha do? The Merciful Compassionate One teaches the path to trainees for the sake of causing those sentient beings who have not yet realized [all] objects of knowledge—the mode of being and the diversity of phenomena—to realize them. Concerning the specifics of the path, the Merciful Compassionate One teaches a path of (1) fearlessness in the sense of its being supramundane and (2) permanence in the sense of irreversibility. Irreversibility is the meaning of permanence, whereas the assertion that [the path] is a permanent effective thing is reckless banter.

Concerning the specifics of capacity, through brandishing the supreme sword of knowledge and mercy [a Buddha] cuts the shoot of sufferings included within the name and form link [of the twelve links] of dependent-arising,[a] and through brandishing the supreme vajra of knowledge and mercy [a Buddha] destroys the walls of afflicted doubt surrounded by the dark forest of various views. [A Buddha] is endowed with such capacities.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1375] Also, the *Ornament Illuminating Exalted Wisdom Sūtra* says, "Mañjushrī, this non-production and non-cessation is the uncompoundedness of the One-Gone-Thus and so forth," and says:

> Mañjushrī, that One-Gone-Thus, Foe Destroyer, completely perfect Buddha also does not move, does not intend, does not disperse, does not think, does not conceptualize, and is without thought, without conception, without intention, without mental engagement, cool, without production, without cessation, unseeable, unhearable, unsmellable, untastable, untouchable, signless, without knowing.

and so forth, and the *Cloud of Jewels Sūtra* says, "Children of good lineage, a One-Gone-Thus permanently abides in meditative equipoise without severing the continuum of meditative equipoise," and Chandrakīrti's *Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges* says:

> It is said that like space, the Buddha
> Thoroughly abides in the noumenon,

[a] For the twelve links of dependent-arising, see the footnote on 977.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

And though non-conceptual and without thought,
[The Buddha's] mind, like a wish granting jewel,
Satisfies transmigrators' thoughts
Exactly as they are.
The precious mind of a perfect Buddha,
By means of adapting to their interests,
Knows how to perform
This and that activity for transmigrators.

This is to be extensively understood from the two truths and the sūtras cited earlier (638ff.).

2* Modes of Perception by the Two Exalted Wisdoms

In the perspective of perception of the element of attributes all proliferations have vanished. Nevertheless, without analysis the diversity of phenomena is known, like olives.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In the perspective of an omniscient consciousness's perception of the element of attributes, all proliferations of dualistic appearance, having vanished, do not exist. Nevertheless, without investigation[a] and analysis of the imputed object, all phenomena included within the diversity are known, like olives sitting in the palm of the hand.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1376] With respect to the vanishing of all elaborations of form in the perspective of perception of the element of attributes, Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says,[1377] "Because the mind has stopped, that is actualized by exalted body."

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1378] Concerning the meaning of this [statement], D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* says:[1379]

On the Buddha ground, conceptual minds and mental factors that have suchness as its object have in all respects stopped and do not operate with regard to the meaning of suchness as the object of exalted wisdom. Hence, the two—non-conceptual exalted wisdom and suchness—are undifferentiably merged like water poured into water. Consequently, that state is conventionally presented as initially actualized, that is, gained, by the complete enjoyment body.

[a] The interlinear commentary takes this as "without superimposition" (*sgro ma btags par*) rather than "without investigation/analysis" (*ma brtags par*).

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D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path:*[1380] The disappearance of the movement of minds and mental factors means that when suchness is actualized, the movement of conceptuality stops; it does not indicate that there are no minds and mental factors [at that time]. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* explains that the statement that there is no movement of the mind refers to the absence of the movement of conceptuality:[1381]

> If conceptuality is the movement of the mind, suchness is nonconceptual due to being devoid of it. Sūtra says, "What is ultimate truth? If it is without even the movement of the mind, what need is there to mention letters?"

Furthermore, Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"* says that during a Learner Superior's meditative equipoise [the movement of conceptuality] does not stop forever but at Buddhahood stops forever…

[Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"* says, in paraphrase:][1382]

> Because minds and mental factors do not operate with respect to suchness—the object of exalted wisdom—it is actualized only by the body.[a]

About that, the object to be actualized is suchness; the subject, exalted wisdom, is the means of actualization, and the complete enjoyment body is the agent of actualization, the knower. Its mode of actualizing suchness is in the manner of the stoppage of conceptual minds and mental factors.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1383] Nevertheless, that

[a] In La Vallée Poussin's edition (*Madhyamakāvatāra,* 362.6-362.9; also, D3862, vol. *'a,* 332a.1-332a.2), the passage reads in full (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's omissions in bold):

> ***de ltar na*** *ye shes kyi yul de kho na nyid la* ***rnam pa thams cad du de'i yul na*** *sems* ***dang*** *sems* ***las*** *byung* ***ba rnams*** *mi 'jug pas sku kho nas mngon sum du mdzad* ***par kun rdzob tu rnam par bzhag go/*** (citation provided by Kevin Vose)
>
> **In that case,** because minds and mental factors**, which have it as their object,** do not operate **in any way** with respect to suchness—the object of exalted wisdom—**it is conventionally posited that** it is actualized only by the body.

Since D̄zong-ka-b̄a's point is that minds and mental factors do indeed operate with respect to suchness, the dropping of "in any way" (*rnam pa thams cad du*) seems to skew the topic in his favor, allowing him to immediately qualify the stoppage as being of conceptual minds and mental factors. However, D̄zong-ka-b̄a indicates that he is sensitive to this charge and thus, as cited just above, shows that Chandrakīrti himself limits the scope of reference to conceptual minds and mental factors.

exalted wisdom's mode of perception of everything in terms of the diversity of phenomena and so forth is to perceive them without confusion, like olives in the hand. There are very many [statements of this] such as those in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* in the section on the ten powers and so forth, in the sūtras on those, and in the *Cloud of Jewels Sūtra,* which says:

> Children of good lineage, objects of the divine eye of a One-Gone-Thus are limitless…Although all sentient beings of the realms of the worlds, without exception, are like that, they are perceived exactly just as they are, like olives in the palm of a One-Gone-Thus's hand.

3* Divisions of Buddha Bodies together with an Elimination of Mistake

Because one body or two, three, four, or five bodies are asserted, that Subduers do not have the vast and that it is in the perspective of others are mistaken.

Word Commentary on Root Text: They assert the existence of:

- one body—effect truth body
- two bodies—truth body and form body
- three bodies—truth body, complete enjoyment body, and emanation body
- four bodies—nature body, wisdom truth body, complete enjoyment body, and emanation body
- five bodies—nature body, wisdom truth body, actual complete enjoyment body, imputed complete enjoyment body, and emanation body.

Know that it is mistaken that Sovereigns of Subduers do not have vast form bodies and such must rely on the perspective of others.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1384] Kālki Mañjushrīkīrti's *Brief Indication of Assertions on the View* says:

> Due to the power of the thought of sentient beings,
> The Buddha, the lion of the Shākyas,
> Spoke of the exalted bodies
> As one, two, three, four, or five.

Accordingly, there are five [layouts of Buddha bodies]:

One Body

Kālki Mañjushrīkīrti's *Brief Indication* says:

> The buddha is beginningless and endless.
> The primordial buddha is without lineage.

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

Accordingly, there is a single body, the nature body or the effect truth body.

Two Bodies

Kālki Mañjushrīkīrti's *Brief Indication* says:

> Just as there is the form body,
> So there is the buddha's truth body.

and Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1385]

> [The fulfillment of] one's own welfare and others' welfare are [respectively]
> The ultimate body [of attributes] and the conventional [form] bodies that depend on it.

and so forth. Accordingly, there are two bodies—a truth body [fulfilling] one's own aims and a form body [fulfilling] the aims of others.

Three Bodies

Bhāvaviveka says, "Those three bodies of exalted wisdom, exalted form, and exalted speech," and that same text says:

> The [Buddha] bodies are thoroughly proclaimed
> As three—truth, enjoyment, and emanation—
> By means of the differentiation of exalted mind, speech, and body.

Accordingly, there is a truth body which is mental, a complete enjoyment body which is verbal, and an emanation body which is physical. Or, in another way, Chandrakīrti's *Seventy Stanzas* says:

> There are three bodies of Sovereigns of Subduers—
> Truth, complete enjoyment, and emanation.

Accordingly, there are three bodies—nature body, enjoyment body, and emanation body.

Four Bodies

Chandrakīrti's *Seventy Stanzas* says:

> Nature, complete enjoyment,
> Likewise emanation,
> As well as that called truth body
> Are thoroughly expressed as the four aspects.

Accordingly, there are four bodies—nature body, wisdom truth body, enjoyment body, and emanation body.

Five Bodies

The *Expression of Mañjushrī's Ultimate Names* says, "That which possesses the nature of the five Buddha bodies." Accordingly, there are the bodies of the five exalted wisdoms.

In these ways five bodies and so forth are individually

described in Sūtra and Mantra, in Kālki Puṇḍarīka's *Great Commentary on the Kālachakra,* and so forth. Therefore, thinking, writing, and propounding that on the Buddha ground one does not have the vast—the two Form Bodies and so forth—but that these must rely on the perspective of others, are yelpings by one-eyed dogs beaten by heavy rain.

4* Detailed Explanation of the Four Exalted Bodies {4}

This section has four parts: nature body, wisdom truth body, enjoyment body, and emanation body.

a Nature Body*

Purity of the adventitious and natural purity are the nature body.

Word Commentary on Root Text: [With respect to the nature body] there are the nature body that is purity [of adventitious defilements] and the nature body that is natural purity.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1386] Since the thoroughly pure sphere of the Buddha ground is, from the start, pure of the sorrow of true establishment, it is naturally pure. And, since by means of antidotes it is purified of adventitious defilements, it is pure of adventitious [defilements]. It is the nature Body, [the finality of] true cessation, and so forth. Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes* says:

Just that purity from having purified
Just that which serves as the cause
Of cyclic existence is nirvāṇa.
The truth body is also just that.

Also, that nature body possesses five characteristics—uncompounded, without differentiation, devoid of the two extremes, free from the three obstructions, and naturally clear light. With respect to this Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1387]

About those, the nature body
Of Buddhas is to be known as possessing
Five characteristics
And in brief five qualities.

and:[1388]

[The nature body] is uncompounded, without differentiation,
Thoroughly devoid of the two extremes,
Definitely free from the three obstructions—

Afflictive emotions, [obstructions] to objects of knowledge,
and [obstructions to] meditative absorption—

And clear light because of being
Stainless, without conceptuality,
An object of yogis, and
The naturally pure element of attributes.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1389] With respect to the teaching [that the nature truth body] possesses five characteristics, Gyel-tsap's *Commentary* says that it is:

1. uncompounded and without production, abiding, and disintegration of a beginning, middle, and end
2. non-different due to being undifferentiable from the element of attributes in the sense of being a different entity from it
3. non-erroneous due to not falling to the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation
4. thoroughly pure due to being free from the three—afflictive emotions, obstructions to omniscience, and obstructions to meditative absorption
5. clear light because (1) the defilements are not inherently established, (2) the mode of realization by conceptuality is not realization in a complete manner, and (3) the element of attributes—the nature—is to be seen in the manner of one's own individual knowledge by a yogi in meditative equipoise realizing it.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1390] The nature body possesses five qualities; it is:

- incomprehensible due to vast qualities
- innumerable because the qualities are not enumerated to a certain count
- unthinkable because of not being an object of logic
- unparalleled because just it possesses those qualities
- pure because of being devoid of the predispositions of the obstructions as well.

Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1391]

In brief, it is to be known as just
Possessing five qualities.

and:[1392]

The nature body possesses
Thoroughly the qualities
Of incomprehensibility, innumerability, inconceivability,
Being unparalleled, and being the finality of purity.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1393] Also, with respect to [the nature truth body's] possessing five qualities, Gyel-tsap's *Commentary* explains:

[The nature truth body] is to be known as possessing [five] qualities:

1. It is vast due to the fact that the nature truth body, the stainless sphere of a One-Gone-Thus, is not comprehensible "as exhausted in merely this measure."
2. It is innumerable due to the fact that it surpasses the [number of] grains of sand in the Ganges River.
3. It is unthinkable by logic as the four alternatives.
4. It is unequalled by others.
5. It has completely abandoned faults—the afflictive emotions together with predispositions [established by them].

b Wisdom Truth Body*

The wisdom truth body is the twenty-one groups, and so forth.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The wisdom truth body is the twenty-one groups of uncontaminated exalted wisdom on the Buddha ground.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1394] Moreover, Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes* says:

The ocean of exalted wisdoms
Dwelling in the stainless truth body,
Brings about the welfare of sentient beings
Like varieties of jewels.

Accordingly, [the wisdom truth body] has exalted wisdoms and meditative stabilizations that are as numerous as the particles of the ocean. However, for the sake of trainees cultivating what are of a type concordant to them, there are the twenty-one sets of uncontaminated exalted wisdoms, sixteen compassions, and so forth. Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* says [about the twenty-one types of uncontaminated exalted wisdoms]:[1395]

That which embodies (1) the thirty-seven harmonies with
enlightenment, (2) the [four] immeasurables,
(3) The eight liberations, (4) that which has

The nature of the nine serial absorptions and
(5) The nature of the ten extinguishments,
(6) The eight aspects by way of thoroughly dividing
The sources overcome by magnificent splendor,
(7) Non-afflictedness, (8) the knowledge [which results] from resolve,
(9) The [six] clairvoyances,
(10) The [four] analytical knowledges,
(11) The four purities of all aspects,
(12) The ten sovereignties, (13) the ten powers,
(14) The four fearlessnesses,
(15) The three aspects of non-concealment,
(16) The three aspects of mindful establishment,
(17) A nature that does not possess bewilderment,
(18) The thorough vanquishment of predispositions,
(19) Great compassion for [all] creatures,
(20) Those described as the eighteen qualities unshared [with others and] which are only a Subduer's, and
(21) The knower of all aspects,
Is called the truth body [of a Buddha].

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Seventy Topics:*[1396] Wisdom truth body and exalted knower of all aspects are equivalent. When wisdom truth bodies are divided, there are the twenty-one sets of uncontaminated wisdoms on the Buddha ground:

1. thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment
2. four immeasurables
3. eight meditative liberations
4. nine serial absorptions
5. ten totalities
6. eight magnificences
7. unafflicted meditative stabilizations
8. exalted knowers of states of prayer-petitions
9. six clairvoyances
10. four individual correct knowledges
11. four purities of body and so forth
12. ten powers
13. ten strengths
14. four fearlessnesses
15. three non-concealments
16. three mindful establishments

17. nature of not having forgetfulness of sentient beings' welfare
18. thorough conquest of the predispositions of the three doors
19. great compassion for all creatures
20. eighteen unshared qualities of a Buddha
21. three exalted knowers.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1397] What are the sixteen aspects of compassion?
1. rootless and baseless
2. peaceful and thoroughly peaceful
3. naturally luminous
4. without adopting and discarding
5. signless
6. without observation [of inherent existence]
7. equality of the three times
8. bodiless and uncompounded
9. undifferentiated and baseless
10. not an object of body and mind
11. unapprehendable and foundationless
12. empty
13. equal to space
14. engaging without an aspect since it engages in basis and aspect just as they are
15. without contamination and without appropriation
16. pure, stainless, and without affliction.

Having attained the sixteen qualities of great enlightenment, one engages in the sixteen great compassions of a Conqueror within observing sentient beings who have not attained those and who have not realized the meaning of the mode of subsistence of great enlightenment.

Word Commentary on Root Text: For these, look at the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra.*

c Enjoyment Body*

Endowed with five and not withdrawing its appearance is complete enjoyment.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The complete enjoyment body has the five features of retinue, land, body, doctrine, and activities and does not withdraw appearances of exalted body until cyclic existence is emptied.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1398] This [complete

enjoyment body] is, together with a retinue of limitless Conqueror children of the ten grounds, beneath the center of a jeweled roof adorned with jewels and various streamers, held up by many thousands of blazing pillars, in the abode of complete, perfect buddhafication, the eighteenth type of abode—located above the seventeen types of abodes of the form realm—called "Abode of Maheshvara." The extent of this abode, produced by limitless collections [of merit], according to Bhāvaviveka, is equal to space, and its vastness is unlimited, according to Great Vehicle sūtras and Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle.* Chandrakīrti's *Seventy Stanzas* says:

> It is asserted that Buddhahood is actualized
> In the inestimable mansion of Highest Pure Land.

and:

> The Buddha's Form Body is ablaze
> With the marks and beauties.
> Assuming various bodies
> Through the power of transmigrators' interests,
> It is born from limitless collections of merit.
> Seen by Conqueror children
> On the ten grounds,
> This exalted body taking
> Complete enjoyment in the [Great Vehicle] doctrine
> Is enjoyed by Conqueror children.

The Superior Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Three Exalted Bodies* says, "[The Buddha's] own wealth is beyond the compass of the world, inconceivable, the fruit of hundreds of good activities," and there are many [such statements] in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* and so forth.

Also, the abode and the inestimable mansion are described very clearly; Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze Of Reasoning, Commentary on the "Heart of the Middle"* says, "Or, the inestimable mansion called 'Highest Pure Land' is above the billion world systems," and so forth. Also, a sūtra says:

> Perfect Buddhas are thoroughly purified
> In that vast palace of Highest Pure Land
> Where all ill-deeds have been thoroughly abandoned.
> Emanations are thoroughly purified here [in the desire realm].

and the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* says:

> The Bodhisattva, having taken birth and dwelling in the divine world of Maheshvara through powerful wisdom, is completely

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> and perfectly purified. The feature of this wisdom is that it proceeds to the essence of enlightenments.

and Nāgārjuna's *Praise of the Element of Attributes* says:

> When one's own individual self-knowledge is thoroughly purified,
> One abides in the nature of those grounds,
> The supreme abode of Maheshvara,
> In the very beautiful Highest Pure Land itself.

and Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* says:

> The upper mantle is beautiful with blazing pillars,
> Dangling pearl garlands, and
> From many varieties of jewels
> Artistically manufactured by various karmas.
>
> The inestimable mansion of blazing jewels
> Blazes with hundreds of shining lanterns,
> Very high, equal to space,
> Filling the directions with the light of jewels.

Furthermore, that Enjoyment Body possesses five features:

- retinue with whom [the Great Vehicle doctrine] is enjoyed
- land where [the Great Vehicle doctrine] is enjoyed
- body with which [the Great Vehicle doctrine] is enjoyed
- [Great Vehicle] doctrine which is enjoyed
- deeds by means of which [the Great Vehicle doctrine] is enjoyed.

Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:

> The Complete Enjoyment [Body] is distinguished
> In all of the realms by way of
> The complete assembly of retinue, land, marks of body,
> The doctrine enjoyed, and deeds.

Or, in another way, [the Complete Enjoyment Body] possesses five features:

- exalted body, the teacher
- exalted speech, verbalization
- exalted mind, uninterruptedly [fulfilling] the aims of transmigrating beings
- spontaneity without striving
- though displaying variously, undifferentiated like a precious jewel.

Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1399]

> [The Enjoyment Body also has five features: (1) continuous

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speaking of] the excellent doctrine in the varieties [of the profound and the vast,
(2) Continuous appearance] by way of bodies endowed with the light rays [of the marks and beauties,
(3) Continuous] effort at achieving the aim of release for transmigrators, (4) [spontaneity without fluctuation and exertion in] performing [activities] like a monarch of wish-granting jewels,
(5) Though [displaying] various phenomena [to the sight of trainees], not [abiding as having] the nature of those.

These should be extensively seen in sūtras, those treatises, and so forth.

d Emanation Body*

Artisan, incarnation, and enlightenment are the three emanation bodies. All of space is filled with speech having the sixty harmonies.

Word Commentary on Root Text: There are three—artisan emanation bodies, incarnation emanation bodies, and great enlightenment emanation bodies displaying the twelve deeds. They fill all the extent of space with pure melodies having the sixty-four branches of speech, pleasant and harmonious.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1400] This is because there are three types of emanation body:

- *artisan emanation body:* emanations as a lutist, for instance, for the sake of training Sunanda, the king of the Gandhārvas; as a goldsmith; as a writer, and so forth
- *incarnation emanation body:* The *Lantern of Jewels* says, "Those become a great tree in the wilderness," and so forth. Accordingly, these are emanations as a tree, as a *ru ru* deer, and so forth.
- *great enlightenment emanation body that displays the twelve deeds:* Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1401]

With great compassion [that looks after limitless sentient beings] knowing [the various constitutions of] worldly beings,
He saw [all] worldly beings [who are suitable as trainees]
And without stirring from [meditative equipoise within the immutable] Truth Body [knowing the mode of being

He displayed the twelve amazing deeds] with a variety of natures of emanations.

As long as cyclic existence lasts
He displayed in thoroughly impure lands
The deeds of birth [in a divine land], the Joyous Land,
[And then the first of the twelve deeds] descent from the Joyous Land [to Jambudvīpa],

Entry into the womb [of his mother, the goddess Mayā], birth [from the womb in Lumbini garden],
Becoming skilled in the arts [of letters and so forth],
Happy sport among the circle of consorts,
Renunciation, asceticism [for six years on the banks of the Nairañjanā River],

Proceeding to the tree of enlightenment [in Bodh Gaya],
Overcoming [with the power of love] the armies of demons [after dusk,
Gaining] full enlightenment [at dawn, turning the three] wheels of doctrine,
And passing away from sorrow [in Kushinagara].

Maitreya's *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras* says:

The innumerable emanations of a Buddha
Are asserted to be the emanation body.

and, "Artisans, incarnation, and great enlightenment," and so on, and Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* says:

Having filled the directions
With emanations in accordance with trainees,
[A Buddha] rains down jewels of teachings,
Whereby supramundane bliss is generated.

Accordingly, [a Buddha] emanates as various [beings such as] Hearers, Solitary Realizers, Shakra, Brahmā, and so forth. The way [a Buddha] thereupon sends forth many dissimilar lights fulfilling the aims of sentient beings is to be known from *The Lantern of Jewels,* Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle,* and so forth.

In accordance with the *Sūtra Showing the Inconceivable Mysteries of the One-Gone-Thus,* Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze Of Reasoning*, Vasubandhu's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,"* Vasubandhu's *Principles of Explanation*, Asaṅga's *Grounds of Yogic Practice*, Āryavimuktasena's *Illumination of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra*, and Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* which says:[1402]

Those qualities which, when seen, cause satisfaction,
And are called the thirty-two
Depend on the two—emanation bodies
And [the complete enjoyment body] thoroughly enjoying the [Great Vehicle] doctrine.

the two—the enjoyment body and a supreme emanation body—possess the marks and beauties and the sixty branches of harmonious speech. Hence, these are mentioned here [in the topic of emanation bodies; the sixty branches of harmonious speech] are also the mystery of speech.

5* Features of the Three Mysteries and so forth

Those having the lot see the sport of the three mysteries pervading all. A moment is transformed into an eon, and vice versa, and the stable and moving are placed in a hair-pore, but like space, do not become larger or smaller.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Those having the lot see the sport of the three inconceivable mysteries of exalted body, speech, and mind pervading all the stable and the moving. A moment is transformed into an eon and vice versa, that is, an eon is transformed into a moment. Although all the stable and moving are placed in a single hair-pore, they are not crowded, like space; the holes of the hair-pores do not become larger, and all the stable and moving do not become smaller.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1403] These should be known from the three chapters on the mysteries of exalted body, exalted speech, and exalted mind [in the *Sūtra Showing the Inconceivable Mysteries of the One-Gone-Thus*]. That the three mysteries pervade everywhere but are perceived by those having the lot, and so forth, are explained in the *Sūtra Showing Entry into the Inconceivable Realm of the Qualities and Wisdom of a One-Gone-Thus* and so forth, in many tantras, and in many [texts] such as Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* and *Blaze Of Reasoning*. However, let us give mere samples of them. Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1404]

The One-Gone-Thus is like Shakra,
Drum, clouds, Brahmā, the sun,
A precious jewel, an echo,
Space, and the earth.

Just as having seen Shakra in a pure area, [beings] made prayer-wishes [and practiced virtue in order to be born there] and so forth, so the Subduer's exalted body appears to the pure perspective of

trainees devoid of karmic obstructions, whereupon they make prayer wishes, and so forth, and he extensively sets forth [doctrine]. They are seen to the extent of the lot of respective trainees; however, it is not that the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who are seen do not make this demonstration.

Similarly, [a Buddha can] transform a moment into an eon and an eon into a moment. And, even though [a Buddha can] set all world systems into a single minute particle or a single hair-pore, their respective sizes are not changed, and, like space, they are not crowded. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* says:[1405]

Sovereigns of Subduers in a single form body,
Causally concordant with those [truth and complete enjoyment bodies],
Only simultaneously display clearly and without confusion
Their earlier past history of life situations in all detail…

By way of these pure [Buddha deeds] operating by wish,
Worlds filling space [can] be displayed in the area of a single particle,
And a particle [can] be displayed as filling the directions of limitless worlds,
But the particle does not become larger nor the worlds smaller.

and so forth. Accordingly, [the three mysteries] are extensively described in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* and his *Commentary on the "Supplement"* and in many sūtras and so forth.

6* Infiniteness of the Qualities of the Powers

Even though all Conquerors engaged in expressing the marvelous qualities—ten powers, eighteen unshared with others, and so forth—they would not finish, like the end of space.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Even though all Conquerors engaged in expressing the marvelous qualities—the ten powers such as knowledge of sources and non-sources, the eighteen Buddha attributes unshared with others, and so forth—they would not finish, like [searching for] the end of space.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1406] Here, the glorious Chandrakīrti and Asaṅga's *Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle"* are of the same thought. Having given the three cleansings of the king of precious substances [that is, gold] as an example, Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* treats the

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final vehicle as one, and Chandrakīrti also speaks of this on the occasion of the exalted body [in his *Commentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"*]. Asaṅga's *Explanation* also explains the two selflessnesses in accordance with Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* and describes the thirty-two exalted activities—the powers and so forth—in dependence on the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra*. Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"* describes the [ten] powers, four fearlessnesses, and eighteen unshared [attributes] within citing the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra*. Hence, one must know them in detail in those. Here let us speak of some features. Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1407]

> The ten powers are knowledges
> Of sources and non-sources, of the fruitions of actions,
> Of faculties, of dispositions,
> Of interests, of paths proceeding everywhere,
>
> Of afflicted and undefiled
> Concentrations and so forth,
> Of mindfulness of [former] states,
> Of the divine eye, and quiescence.

The ten powers are:

1. the power that is knowledge of sources and non-sources [that is, of causes and effects and so forth]
2. the power that is knowledge of actions and fruitions
3. the power that is knowledge of superior and lower faculties
4. the power that is knowledge of various dispositions
5. the power that is knowledge of various interests
6. the power that is knowledge of paths proceeding everywhere
7. the power that is knowledge of the concentrations, and so forth, and the undefiled states
8. the power that is knowledge remembering former states
9. the power that is knowledge of death, transmigration, rebirth, and so forth
10. the power that is knowledge of the quiescence of all contaminations.

From among the ten powers, the first six powers—ranging from the power that is knowledge of sources and non-sources through to the power that is knowledge of the paths proceeding everywhere or to all—are like a diamond piercing the armor-like non-afflictive ignorance, that is, the obstructions to omniscience. The three—the

power that is knowledge of the undefiled, that is, the concentrations and the serial absorptions, the power that is knowledge of remembering former states, and the power that is knowledge of death, transmigration, rebirth, and so forth—are like a diamond destroying the wall-like obstructions to the meditative absorptions. The power that is knowledge of the quiescence of contaminations is like a diamond cutting the trees of the afflictive obstructions. Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1408]

> From among the powers and so forth six, three, and one respectively
> Clear away entirely [the obstructions to] objects of knowledge,
> [The obstructions to] meditative absorptions, and the predispositions,
> And hence are like piercing armor, breaking a wall, and cutting down trees.

Similarly, the thirty-two qualities of separation—the four fearlessnesses and the eighteen attributes of a Buddha unshared with others, that is, Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and so forth [together with the ten powers]—and the thirty-two auspicious signs which are qualities of fruition, are the sixty-four qualities of endowment explicitly described here in Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum.*

Not only those, but the term "and so forth" [in the root text includes] the eighty beauties. Beyond that, is the convention of unshared qualities of a Buddha limited to just eighteen? There also are three hundred qualities of a Buddha unshared with sentient beings, and the qualities of each of those also, equal to space, should be known from individual sūtras. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* speaks of these within citing the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra:*

> With respect to that, the unshared qualities of a Buddha are eighteen…Those unshared eighteen qualities of a Buddha…"

Also, Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says:

> Teachings of the great nature of innumerable, immeasurable, and marvelous qualities appear in many sūtras. Three hundred unshared qualities of a Buddha are taught in the *Sūtra of Tens of a One-Gone-Thus:*
>
> 1. The thoroughly pure form bodies of Buddhas, Supramundane Victors, without end or center…Those are the ten qualities of a Buddha, without end or center.
> 2. Likewise, in a single instant Buddhas manifestly achieve ten exalted wisdoms.

3. Buddhas' ten non-passings beyond time
4. Buddhas' ten inconceivable objects
5. Buddhas' ten exalted wisdoms manifestly accomplishing blessings
6. ten incomprehensible inclusions
7. ten great and vast attributes difficult to be approached by those with fractured intelligence
8. ten great natures
9. ten thorough purities
10. Buddhas' ten activities
11. ten oceanic reasonings of the exalted wisdoms
12. Buddhas' ten leaderships
13. Buddhas' ten limitless doors of teaching doctrine
14. ten doctrines of sentient beings' matrix
15. Buddhas' ten stationings without attachment
16. Buddhas' ten adornments
17. Buddhas' ten sovereignties
18. Buddhas' ten completely perfected activities
19. Buddhas' ten skill in means
20. Buddhas' ten thoughts
21. Buddhas' ten powers
22. ten attributes of richness of doctrine
23. ten states of Ones-Gone-Thus
24. ten exalted knowledges of all phenomena without exception
25. ten states of omniscience
26. ten thoroughly pure mindfulnesses of a One-Gone-Thus
27. ten attributes of Ones-Gone-Thus' swift vision
28. Buddhas' ten meditative stabilizations
29. ten establishments of Ones-Gone-Thus
30. Buddhas' ten liberations.

These are just not shared with Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and so forth. If one wishes to extensively know in detail the teaching on the great nature of a One-Gone-Thus from the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra*, the *Cloud of Jewels Sūtra*, and the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*, one should thoroughly look at those sūtras.

Also, Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* says:[1409]

These sixty-four qualities,
Together with their individual causes,
In order, are to be known

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In connection with the *Ratnadārikāsūtra.*

Also, Asaṅga's *Explanation* prior to that stanza says:

> Accordingly, these ten powers of a One-Gone-Thus, the four fearlessnesses, the eighteen unshared attributes of a Buddha, and the thirty-two signs of a great being are included in one aspect as sixty-four.

Therefore, although the qualities even of a single quality of a Buddha are expressed in their entirety by all of the Buddhas, they would not reach the end, as is the case with the end of space. Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:[1410]

> Birds do not desist due to the non-existence of space.
> They desist due to the exhaustion of their power.
> Likewise, Buddha Children as well as learners desist
> Without having expressed all the Buddha qualities, limitless like space.

and his *Autocommentary* says:[1411]

> Only Buddhas thoroughly distinguish the features of the qualities of each hair-pore of a Supramundane Victor Buddha's Form Body, a great being's marks and beauties, fearlessnesses, unshared Buddha attributes, and so forth. If they spoke them out, then despite their relating the objects of their exalted wisdom quickly quickly with their lifespans being blessed to inconceivably numberless eons and without other activities, they could not completely finish the qualities. This being so, what need is there to mention Bodhisattvas?

7* Uninterrupted Inconceivable Activities

Spontaneous activities—whatever will tame—are displayed forever.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Activities that are spontaneous and inconceivable deeds appropriate to train respective [trainees] such as deeds pacifying the sufferings of transmigrators and so forth are continuously displayed forever until the end of cyclic existence.

Jam-ÿang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1412] Concerning that, in general, there is an activity for each of the qualities of a Buddha, and thus *mainly* there are thirty-two activities—the activities of the ten powers, the activities of the four fearlessnesses, and the activities of the eighteen unshared attributes—but individual activities taming each trainee are displayed, whereby [a Buddha] is endowed with an inconceivable [number of activities]. All of these operate

spontaneously, without striving, pervading all directions at all times. The *Questions of King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra* says:

> Children of lineage, moreover, what are the activities of Ones-Gone-Thus? The activities of Ones-Gone-Thus are these thirty-two…Children of lineage, furthermore, the activities of Ones-Gone-Thus are immeasurable, inconceivable, not to be known by all the world, not to be expressed with letters, difficult for others to attain, uninterrupted in all Buddha lands, equally accompanying all Buddhas.

and so forth. Also, that sūtra says:

> Therefore, children of lineage, by that format you should know that the activities of Ones-Gone-Thus are inconceivable, omnipresent, in all ways not unseemly, proceeding in the three times, the uninterrupted lineage of the three jewels…Children of lineage, that which is an uninterrupted continuum, continuous, with an unsevered continuum, the unsevered continuum of the treasury of prophesies of Bodhisattvas is the real activity of Ones-Gone-Thus.

Also, Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* says:

> That exalted body equally performing
> Various benefits for transmigrators
> As long as cyclic existence lasts
> Is the uninterrupted emanation body of a Subduer.
> Similarly, activities as long as cyclic existence lasts
> Are asserted to be uninterrupted.

There are many such [statements].

This has been the twelfth chapter, the section on the Consequence School which, having cleared away all extremes, establishes the great middle.

13. Secret Mantra

3' As an Offshoot, an Elimination of Qualms about the Fruit Vehicle {4}

This section has four parts: how the two obstructions are abandoned by Sūtra and Mantra as well as a dispelling of mistakes; differences of fast and slow paths; how except for Highest Yoga Mantra very subtle body, speech, and mind are hidden; and establishing through the meaning of those that, in general, Highest Yoga Mantra and, in particular, the king of tantras teaching the three mysteries are supreme.

a' How the Two Obstructions are Abandoned by Sūtra and Mantra as well as a Dispelling of Mistakes

Both Sūtra and Mantra are able to extinguish all afflictive obstructions. Just as the supreme object is taught but the supreme subject is hidden, so the principal defilements are taught but the supreme antidote is hidden. Hence, the subtle small obstructions to omniscience, except for Mantra, cannot be abandoned by Sūtra. Therefore, that the objects of abandonment and antidotes are similarly hidden is mistaken.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1413] If these were explained at length, it would turn into even proclaiming the secret, and these also are not greatly relevant to the topics at hand. Therefore, let us show a few common points.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Both Sūtra and Mantra—that is to say, the paths of the three vehicles described in sūtra and the paths of the four tantra-sets within Mantra—are able to extinguish all afflictive obstructions as well as their seeds.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1414] Not only in the three lower tantra-sets of Mantra [that is, Action, Performance, and Yoga Tantras] but even the lower trainees of the Perfection Vehicle—Hearers and Solitary Realizers—are able to extinguish all afflictive obstructions and conceptions of true existence:
>
> - because a consciousness conceiving true existence is the root of cyclic existence, and
> - because they are capable of meditatively cultivating the path of the subtle selflessness, the direct antidote to a consciousness

conceiving true existence, and

- because even when factually concordant doubt is generated about the subtle selflessness, a seed of liberation can be planted.

Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas* says:[1415]

Those of little merit would not even generate
Mere doubt about this doctrine.
Even through merely coming to doubt it
Cyclic existence is torn to tatters.

and:

Even though those knowing suchness
Might not attain nirvāṇa here,
They will be released without striving
In another life, like a karma definite [to issue its effect].

and Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* says:[1416]

When perfect Buddhas do not appear
And Hearers also have disappeared,
The exalted wisdom of Solitary Realizers
Arises without support.

Word Commentary on Root Text: However, just as the supreme object, the emptiness of inherent existence, is taught in sūtra and in the [three] lower tantra-sets, but the supreme subject, innate great bliss, is hidden, so the principal defilements, the subtle small obstructions to omniscience, are taught [in sūtra and in the three lower tantra-sets] but the supreme antidote [to them], the actual clear light at the end of being a learner, is hidden. Hence, the subtle small obstructions to omniscience, except for being abandoned by the path of Highest Yoga Mantra, cannot be abandoned by the paths of sūtra and the [three] lower tantra-sets.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1417] Therefore, although the supreme object, the absence of true existence, is taught in the Perfection Vehicle, through wisdom of this alone one is not released from the bonds of the obstructions to omniscience. Hence, the *Sūtra Set Forth by Vimalakīrti* says, "Wisdom devoid of methods is a bond," and so forth, and Saraha explains:

Those engaged in emptiness devoid of compassion [that is,
great bliss]
Do not gain the supreme path.

and so forth. Therefore, although the object, the supreme emptiness, is taught, the subject [that is, consciousness], the great bliss of Highest Yoga Mantra, is not taught even in the three lower tantras within Mantra…In order to abandon the subtle small obstructions

> to omniscience, conceptuality and karmic winds must be utterly stopped, and the antidote stopping those—the great bliss of Highest Yoga Mantra—is not taught [even in the three lower tantras]. Hence, the smallest, subtlest obstructions to omniscience, aside from [Highest Yoga Tantra] Mantra, cannot be abandoned by sūtra alone.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Therefore, it should be understood that the assertion by one [D̄ak-tsang] that the objects of abandonment and the antidotes are similarly hidden is mistaken.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1418] For such reasons and so forth and as explained earlier (634), desire for emission is an afflictive obstruction even in the Perfection Vehicle, and many—Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle,'"* the root text of Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle* and Asaṅga's commentary, the *King Dhāraṇīshvara Sūtra,* and so forth—describe the predispositions of emission as obstructions to omniscience. Consequently, D̄ak-tsang's proposition (687ff.) that the antidote (the bliss of Highest Yoga Mantra) and the objects of abandonment (the obstructions to omniscience) are equally hidden [in the Perfection Vehicle] is mistaken.

b' Differences of Fast and Slow Paths

They have many profound methods; hence, the paths also differ greatly in terms of speed.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In addition to completely having the love, compassion, [altruistic] mind of enlightenment, six perfections, four means of gathering students, and so forth described in the Perfection Vehicle—the four tantra sets within Mantra have many surpassing features of profound methods:

- features of vow and pledges
- features of easy and speedy completion of endless collections [of merit and wisdom] through meditating from the start on aspects concordant with the four—abode, body, resources, and deeds of the resultant [state as a Buddha].

Hence, the paths of Mantra and the Perfection Vehicle also differ greatly in terms of speed.

> Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1419] The *Introduction*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

to the Forms of Definite and Indefinite Progress Sūtra explains that due to [differences in motivational] method—the altruistic intention to become enlightened, compassion, and so forth—there are five differences in speed in the Perfection Vehicle among trainees who are Great Vehicle persons.[a] Even more so in Mantra, Tripiṭakamāla's *Lamp for the Three Modes* says:[1420]

> Though the object is the same, Mantra treatises
> Are superior because of being for the non-obscured,
> Having many skillful methods, no difficulties,
> And being contrived for those with sharp faculties.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1421] Since in his *Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*[b] D̄zong-ka-b̄a quotes this [stanza] and thereupon extensively and clearly sets forth a refutation of mistakes and posits his own system, you should look there. With respect to [how D̄zong-ka-b̄a explains] his own system's assertion on the difference in the speed of the path in Sūtra and Mantra, his *Great Exposition of Secret Mantra* says:[1422]

> The difference in speed between the three lower tantras and the Perfection Vehicle is that [in the path of the three lower tantras] the practices of enlightenment are completed through many common yogic achievements depending on the powers of deity yoga and repetition [of mantra], and through many skilful means such as being directly sustained and empowered by Buddhas and great Bodhisattvas. The difference in speed in Highest Yoga Tantra is that even the stage of generation has many profound essentials missing in the lower sets of tantras while the completion stage has supreme profound essentials; these will be explained later.
>
> A difference in speed due to the development of full purification [that is, Buddhahood] without relying on the passage of countless eons is a distinguishing feature of Highest Yoga. Such attainment by trainees of the lower sets of tantras

[a] For these five see H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-ka-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), 100.

[b] See ibid., 145-150. D̄zong-ka-b̄a rejects almost all of Tripiṭakamāla's own commentary (P4530, vol. 81, 115.2.5-118.2.6) on the stanza in an illuminating exposition of his own perspective on the difference between sūtra and tantra as well as the uncommon features of Highest Yoga Tantra.

> depends on their entering into the two stages of Highest Yoga; their own paths alone are not sufficient. Therefore, it should not be held that all differences of speed in mantra are only due to the development of full purification in one life in this age of conflict or to the development of full purification without relying on countless eons [of practice].

and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Lamp Illuminating the Five Stages* says:

> Even certain Hearers are capable of the mere extinction of the afflictive obstructions in three lives, and direct realization of the meaning of suchness also is common to the two vehicles [Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle]. Hence, mere speedier release from cyclic existence by way of speedier direct realization of emptiness is not the feature of speed here.
>
> Therefore, very speedy extinguishing of the obstructions to omniscience is needed in this path. Concerning this, according to the Perfection Vehicle if one does not have the factor of method in which one trains in endless different divisions that are instances of endless collections [of merit], then no matter how much one familiarizes with the view of emptiness upon realization of it from its depths, aside from being released from cyclic existence, one cannot extinguish the obstructions to omniscience. Hence, that those of the Great Vehicle train for a long time in such endless collections is for the sake of generating realization of emptiness into a means for extinguishing the obstructions to omniscience.
>
> Although in the path of Highest Yoga one does not train in endless different divisions that are instances of endless collections [of merit], it is said that if one meditatively cultivates with [a mind of] innate bliss the meaning of the very depths of emptiness, [the extinguishing of the obstructions to omniscience] is very speedy. Hence, it can be understood that due to the essential of this special subject[a]—great bliss—the realization of emptiness is extremely speedy at purifying the obstructions to omniscience, which are the predispositions of mistaken dualistic appearance…[1423]
>
> The establishment of the path of the union of bliss and emptiness as a supreme feature of speed depends on understanding how to achieve—in terms of the union of bliss and emptiness—an uncommon cause of achieving a Buddha's form

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[a] "Subject" here means "consciousness."

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

body that can serve as a substitute for endless different divisions of instances of the collection of merit. That, moreover, is none other than an illusory body. Hence, until one is skilled in the two completion stages—the class of emptiness that is the completion stage of great bliss and the class of appearance that is the completion stage of illusory body—one has not completely found the essentials of the two tantras [that is, the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* and its explanatory tantras].

c' How except for Highest Yoga Mantra Very Subtle Body, Speech, and Mind are Hidden

In order to purify the three—coarse, subtle, and very subtle—in body, speech, and mind, there are advances higher and higher in the vehicles and in sūtra and tantra. The other two are in the lower; however, the third—despite being suitable as a basis of thought—is not in sūtra and in the lower tantras.

Word Commentary on Root Text: In order to purify the three—coarse, subtle, and very subtle—that exist in each of the three, body, speech, and mind, many stages advancing higher and higher are set forth in the Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva vehicles and in the sūtras and the four tantra-sets.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:*[1424] With respect to the modes of being of the body, from among the coarse, subtle, and very subtle:

- the coarse body is the fruitional aggregate[a] of corporeal[b] flesh and bone
- the subtle body is the channels, winds, and drops [of essential fluid]
- and the very subtle body is the indigenous wind.[c]

With respect to the modes of being of the mind, from among the coarse, subtle, and very subtle:

- coarse mind is the five sense consciousnesses
- subtle mind is the eighty indicative conceptions, the six root afflictive emotions, the twenty secondary afflictive emotions, and those are in parallel association with them.
- and very subtle mind is indigenous mind.

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[a] *rnam smin gyi phung po;* the body that is a fruition of karma.

[b] *gdos bcas.*

[c] *gnyug ma'i rlung.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

However, it is explained that sense consciousnesses and indicative conceptions (641) are not mutually exclusive. Since here [Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a] says that speech also has three—coarse, subtle, and very subtle—it should be analyzed whether these are to be taken as:

- sounds of speech
- karmic winds inside channels
- and indigenous wind.

The achievement of a Conqueror's exalted body, speech, and mind upon the very subtle body, speech, and mind that exist in the basal [or ordinary] state acting as their substantial causes is the meaning of "binding" body, speech, and mind.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The other two—coarse and subtle body, speech, and mind—are described in sūtra and in the lower tantra-sets. However, the third, the very subtle—despite being suitable as a basis of thought[a] in Yoga Tantra and below—is not set forth either explicitly or implicitly in any sūtra or in any lower tantra-set.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations:* [1425] From between the two—hidden in the sense of not being explained and hidden in the sense of being non-manifest despite being taught—in the three lower tantras the supreme mysteries of the Highest Yoga system are hidden without being explained.

d' Establishing through the Meaning of those that, in General, Highest Yoga Mantra and, in Particular, the Monarch of Tantras Teaching the Three Mysteries are Supreme

They are clear in Highest Yoga in general and in the monarch of tantras. The path of secrecy of the Conquerors of the three times—the trail of millions of lords of adepts endowed with fortune going to the peak—is established as supreme.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Such features of the three mysteries are clear in general in Highest Yoga Tantras and in particular in the root tantra and explanatory tantras of *Guhyasamāja,* the monarch of tantras. The path of unsurpassed secrecy on which all the Conquerors of the three times went, go, and will go—the trail of millions of lords of adepts endowed with supreme fortune going to the peak of abandonment [of obstructions] and

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[a] *dgongs gzhi.*

{KEY: Bold = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Root Text.* Headings at left margin = Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's outline. Regular text at left margin = Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Word Commentary on the Root Text.*}

realization [of selflessness]—is established as the supreme from among all paths of Sūtra and Mantra.

This has been the thirteenth chapter, the section that, upon having distinguished Sūtra and Mantra, establishes Secret Mantra as supreme.

Perspective of the Treatise

III. END {5}

A. Features of the treatise mentioned by way of metaphors and similes

Free from the darkness of mistake, coming from the majestic light of the Smooth Protector's wisdom; arranged pleasantly and beautifully, like spoken by the goddess Svarasvatī; virtuous in the beginning, middle, and also end, like the speech of the Sovereign of Subduers; weighty, like a compilation of the systems of the supreme ornaments of the world.

Word Commentary on Root Text: The features of greatness of this treatise are that it:

- is free from the darkness of mistake, like coming from the majestic light of the foremost holy Smooth Protector's wisdom
- has elegantly arranged phrases of expression, pleasant and beautiful to the ear, like spoken by the goddess Svarasvatī
- is virtuous in the beginning, the middle, and also the end, like the speech of the Sovereign of Subduers [Shākyamuni Buddha]
- and has profound and weighty topics, like a compilation of the systems of the supreme scholar-adepts, such as the six ornaments of the world.[a]

B. Difference between those in Tibet who claim to be great meditators without having looked at and studied the scriptures, those of low intelligence, and those having merely trained a little and those proficient in all the subduer's teachings

Some, blind from not having studied, assert that they have progressed to the distant end; some, mice having low intelligence, take up an elephant's burden; and most are conceited from lifting a tiny hill of a little training. Who is the *kūrma* supporting the container of the jewels of teachings by the Sovereign of Subduers?

Word Commentary on Root Text: Nowadays:

- some persons—whose eye of wisdom is blind from not having studied,

[a] Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti.

that is, trained, in textual systems—assert that they have progressed to the distant end of abandonment and realization
- some—mice having low intelligence both inborn [from previous lives] and learned [in this life]—take up an elephant's burden of composing treatises
- and most are vain and conceited from lifting a tiny hill of training in a little bit of land.

Who among these is the *kūrma,* or tortoise, supporting the whole earth containing the jewels of the scriptural and realizational teachings by the Sovereign of Subduers? No one.

C. Rarity of realization of a combination of the two subtle features of the profound and vast even in both India and Tibet, as explained earlier[a]

Even many in the Land of Superiors and Snowy Tibet, greatly wiser than the wise—in whose mental perspective the profound and the vast, like the feet of rug weavers, were such that sometimes they were uncomfortable—sought everywhere with the walking-staff of scripture and reasoning without finding the path of union of appearance and emptiness.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Even many upholders of the teaching in the Land of Superiors and Snowy Tibet, greatly wiser than even the wise—in whose mental perspective the doctrines of the profound and the vast, like the feet of rope weavers not set at the same time on the ground, were such that sometimes they were uncomfortable with practice—sought repeatedly with the walking-staff of scripture and reasoning without finding the path on which dependently arisen appearances and the emptiness of inherent existence shine in union.

D. Even all great scholars—Indian and Tibetan, Outsider and Insider—strove at examining the features of Insider and Outsider schools of tenets, as [is evident in] the liberation-stories of, for instance, Dharmakīrti and the glorious sole deity Atisha

For the sake of traveling the ocean of tenets—sport of thousands of serpent sovereigns of many of our own and others' scholars, filled with overflowing jewels of help and happiness, and riled with the waves of refutation and proof—skilled captains built all sorts of ships.

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[a] See the praise of D̄zong-ka-b̄a in the expression of worship, 60.

Word Commentary on Root Text: For the sake of traveling the great ocean of tenets:

- abode of the sport of hundreds of thousands of serpent sovereigns of many scholars of our own and others' schools
- filled with overflowing varieties of jewels of benefit from the depths and of temporary happiness
- greatly riled with the waves of refuting others' systems and proving our own system

skilled captains built all sorts of ships of striving and exertion.

E. In connection with the history of D̄ak-tsang who did not reach the finality of tenets, an expression of a little haughty talk about my having reached the finality of tenets, relative to him

Even some low ones—who, due to striking the first chord mistaking the ship of reasoning, destroyed the mode—have had their arrogance of inflation about having crossed the ocean of tenets reduced, and I have gone to the other side of the ocean of tenets in order to see the two systems.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Even some of low intelligence in different places and times—who, due to striking the first chord of utter non-existence[a] from being mistaken about the ship of reasoning, destroyed the mode of conventional existence—have had their arrogance of inflated attitude and haughtiness thinking they had reached the other side of the ocean of tenets reduced, and I, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, have gone to the other side of the ocean of the immensity of tenets in order to see all the coarse and subtle modes of assertion in the two—Outer and Inner—systems.

Three Stanzas of Special Prayer-Wishes

May the collections of continuums of poisonous bewilderment and mistake be cleansed by the water—the ancestral tradition of L̄o-sang, flow of the three paths, coming from the matted hair of the great god of analysis—washing the defilements of the feet of the god of wealth, degraded and polluted with argumentation.

Word Commentary on Root Text: May the collections of continuums of the

[a] *gtan med kyi dang po'i rgyud brdungs pas;* I am guessing that this refers to playing a stringed instrument.

sixty thousand children of poisonous kings, persons bewildered and mistaken about the mode of being of phenomena due to innate ignorance, be cleansed by the water of the River Ganges—the ancestral tradition of the Conqueror Lo-sang,[a] flow of the three paths of gods, humans, and those below the ground, coming from inside the matted hair of the great god Īshvara of analysis—washing the defilements of the feet of Viṣhṇu, child of the god of wealth, the mind degraded and polluted with bad argumentation, that is to say, bad tenets.

As long as Mount Meru—heavy with loads of precious substances, with a vibrating girdle of great oceans, and raising the lamps of sun and moon—remains, may also this, heavy with loads of new exposition and waving the banner of fame, serve to illuminate the three grounds with the light of the lamp of eloquence.

Word Commentary on Root Text: As long as Mount Meru—heavy with loads of the four types of precious substances, with a vibrating girdle of great oceans, and raising the lamp of sun and moon—remains, may also this treatise, heavy with loads of new exposition and waving the banner of fame, serve to illuminate the three grounds with the light of the lamp of eloquence.

Through the force of the element of attributes—the basic disposition—and the Three Jewels, may transmigrating beings progress successively over the grounds like magical creations, and having completely fulfilled—like a full moon—all qualities, quickly attain omniscience shining more brightly than a hundred suns.

Word Commentary on Root Text: Through the force of the element of attributes—the primordially pure basic disposition [of phenomena]—and the non-deceptive magnificent blessings of the three jewels, may infinite transmigrating beings quickly progress successively over the ten grounds and five paths like a Buddha's magical creations, and having completely fulfilled, like a full moon on the fifteenth day, all qualities of abandonment and realization, quickly attain omniscient exalted wisdom shining far more brightly than even a hundred suns.

Colophon

Through this *Presentation of Tenets: Lion's Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience* put together and later slightly edited by Jam-yang-shay-b̄ay-dor-jay,

[a] D̄zong-ka-b̄a L̄o-sang-drak-b̄a.

exponent of endless scriptures and tenets,

with few words and clear meaning, summary of the extensive, on the fifteenth day of the Miracle Month in the year earth-female-monkey called "White" in the palace of the Sea of Enjoyment of the Great Vehicle Secret Mantra Great Bliss located on Mount Increase of Virtue, the Snowy Land's second Vulture Peak, gathering place of heroes and sky-travelers

in dependence upon texts on tenets by Indians and Tibetans and in particular on the great textual systems of Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) "Wisdom,"* Shāntarakṣhita's *Compendium of Principles* and Kamalashīla's commentary, *Kālachakra,* and so forth

in order to fulfill an earlier request by the learned S̄er-kang Chö-jay Guṇamati with fresh flowers of poetry and a later request by the great spiritual guide of all, Pak-b̄a-rin-chen, whose master was the supreme scholar J̄ang-ra and who in an official letter in poetry along with tea, turquoise, and a ceremonial scarf wrote, "A very extensive response to D̄ak-tsang's refutation is needed," and especially in order to develop facility in my own mind

upon having gained from the Great Scholar, Precious Lord of All Conquerors the religious boon of the three vows and so forth and having taken to the crown of my head the dust of the feet of many holy ones—the four (the father, Jam-yang Lama, precious Throne-Holder of Gan-den and his spiritual sons), Paṇ-chen Ḡa-gyur-ba, Dor-jay-chang M̄in-dröl Chö-ḡyi-gyel-bo, S̄ay-dor-jay-chang, great Bodhisattva Nga-w̄ang-lo-drö, and so forth—

and upon having gained ascertainment with respect to the Foremost Lama's Sūtra and Mantra,

may the Conqueror's teaching advance and spread in all directions and at all times!

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets:*[1426] The other parts of the colophon[a] are easy to understand. The four, father and sons, are

[a] Here are a few tentative identifications from among the many personages Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a mentions:

- S̄er-kang Chö-jay Guṇamati (*gser khang chos rje guṇamati / gser khang chos rje yon tan blo gros*), TBRC P5288.
- Pak-b̄a-rin-chen (*'phags pa rin chen*)
- J̄ang-ra (*lcang rwa*)
- the Great Scholar, Precious Lord of All Conquerors: the Fifth Dalai Lama *ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho,* TBRC P37.
- the four (the father, Jam-yang Lama, precious Throne-Holder of Gan-den and his spiritual sons): identified just below in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets.*

Jam-gön Lama Tri Rin-b̄o-chay, Nga-w̄ang-lo-drö-gya-tso,[a] and his senior spiritual sons:

1. the great Conqueror-child, treasure of Sūtra and Mantra and oral transmissions, the beneficent Lama Dön-drup-gya-mtsho[b]
2. the overlord of all Sūtra and Mantra and both scripture and realization, the great Vajradhara, Tulku of Gön-lung[c] Monastery, L̄o-sang-chö-den[d]
3. lord of reasoning without comparison on the earth nowadays with regard to expounding reasoning such as the Five Difficult Treatises and so forth, S̄hay-rap-jin-b̄a.[e]

Furthermore, the purposes of [fulfilling] those requests to compose this root text, of developing facility in my own mind with eloquent explanations, and so forth are very important, and it is in order to fulfill the wish stated in the *Ship Entering the Ocean of the Great Vehicle,* a treatise on the Middle Way written by Sovereign of Conquerors, supreme knower and seer of all [the Fifth Dalai Lama]:[1427]

> When one finely analyzes the eighteen great burdens of contradiction cited…by the Translator D̄ak-tsang with respect to some ideas in [D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] *Explanation*[f] from these points onward through the sixth mind-generation, except for being only quasi-damages they are not correct. Hence, it would be appropriate if a response of refutation was made…Although in [my commentary on] the eighth chapter [of Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* I] urged that "If among [D̄zong-ka-b̄a's] followers there is a one with majestic bearing who can lay claim as a wise being, it would be fitting to make a response," oil does not come from squeezing sand, and, therefore, [I]

• Paṇ-chen Ḡa-gyur-ba (*paṇ chen bka' 'gyur ba*)

• Dor-jay-chang M̄in-dröl Chö-ḡyi-gyel-b̄o (*rdo rje 'chang smin grol chos kyi rgyal po*)

• S̄ay-dor-jay-chang (*srad rdo rje 'chang*)

• the great Bodhisattva Nga-w̄ang-lo-drö (*sems dpa' chen po ngag dbang blo gros,* 17th century; TBRC P3081); his primary seat was *mdo smad mdzod dge smad bse tshang.*

[a] *'jam mgon bla ma khri rin po che ngag dbang blo gros rgya mtsho,* 1635-1688; the Forty-Fourth Throne-Holder of Ganden for three years, 1685-1688; TBRC P1574.

[b] *don grub rgya mtsho;* perhaps the 17th century Forty-Eighth Throne-Holder of Ganden for six years, 1702-1708; TBRC 2757.

[c] *mgon lung / dgon lung byams pa gling.*

[d] *blo bzang chos ldan,* 1642-1714; the First J̄ang-ḡya (*lcang skya*); TBRC P209.

[e] *shes rab sbyin pa;* perhaps *sbyin pa rgya mtsho,* 1629-1695.

[f] That is, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": Illumination of the Thought.*

> think it would be good if a response was made by the likes of a virtuous spiritual guide who does not need to take up the burden of conventional knowledge.[a]

and:

> If, without falling into bias and mere dumb adherence, one does not know well the lower paths and tenets—in relation to which the profound treatises of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth and also these explanations in Chandrakīrti's *Clarifying Lamp*[1428] about Mantra are superior—one will not know the subtle uncommon distinguishing attributes of the superior paths and of the higher schools of tenets…Having seen that although one is devoted to those, it is reduced to just faith, one [needs to] train in the texts of our own and others schools, our own greater and lesser vehicles, the Perfection Vehicle and the Mantra Vehicle, and the four tantra-sets of the Vajra Vehicle.

Such is needed [for a well-versed practitioner]. I also, having trained a little this way, have mainly made explanations of difficult points in our own and others' tenets, and have also opened—a little—a response to the scholar Ḏak-tsang—writing within thinking, "May it please all the Conquerors and their Children in the ten directions, the father, the unparalleled sovereign of Conquerors [Ḏzong-ka-ḇa] and his spiritual sons and so forth, and our own and others' great and subtle holy ones."

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[a] *tha snyad rigs pa'i khur bzhes mi dgos pa'i dge ba'i bshes gnyen 'dras lan 'debs na legs par sems so;* Taipei, 639.16. Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa changes the Fifth Dalai Lama's *rig* to *rigs,* but, either way, the meaning might be someone who is not overly involved in ordinary activities.

Backnotes

[1] The Introduction is drawn from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 2002), chaps. 3-4.

[2] *rtog ge 'bar ba, tarkajvālā.* This is Bhāvaviveka's commentary on his *Heart of the Middle* (*dbu ma snying po, madhyamakahṛdaya*). For a partial English translation of the latter (chap. III. 1-136), see Shōtarō Iida, *Reason and Emptiness* (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980).

[3] See David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 61.

[4] *de kho na nyid bsdud pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, tattvasaṃgrahakārikā.* A translation into English is available in G. Jha, *The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntirakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, vols. 50 and 53 (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937-1939; rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986).

[5] *theg pa mtha' dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa'i mtha' rin po che'i mdzod.*

[6] *grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho.*

[7] *grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong/ grub mtha' chen mo.* For an English translation of the beginning of the chapter on the Consequence School, see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom, 1996), 579-697.

[8] *grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan.*

[9] *grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long.*

[10] *Annotations, dbu ma pa, 'a,* 92.3.

[11] *chos mngon pa'i mdzod, abhidharmakośa;* VI.4.

[12] See Anne C. Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation: A Buddhist Epistemological Analysis in Support of Transformative Religious Experience: Tibetan Interpretations of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986), 19-22, 40-44.

[13] Gung-tang's *Beginnings of a Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Quintessence of "The Essence of Eloquence"* (*drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dga' 'grel rtsom 'phro legs bshad snying po'i yang snying*), 80.6-80.12 and 235.9ff. Gung-tang wrote two biographies of G̱ön-chok-jik-may-w̱ang-ḇo that are included in the latter's Collected Works; see the Bibliography.

[14] See Jeffrey Hopkins, "Practice of Emptiness" (Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974), 24.

[15] This is drawn from Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 897-903.

[16] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of the Middle* (Buxaduor, India: Gomang, 1967), 275b.6.

[17] See Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Cutting through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1989), 196-197, 238-239, 267, 287, and 307.

[18] P5256, vol. 96, 36.4.5.

[19] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 475a.4.

[20] *dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo, saṃdhinirmocanasūtra;* D106, *mdo sde,* vol. *ca;* Tibetan and English in John Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha* (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma Publishing, 1995), 76-77; Tibetan and French in Étienne Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. L'Explication des mystères* (Louvain and Paris: Université de Louvain and Adrien Maisonneuve, 1935), 58 and 187.

[21] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 476.2.

[22] *Presentations of Tenets* (Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970), 190.7.

[23] VIII.16; D3846, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsha,* 9b.6; Karen Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge,* Indiske Studier 7 (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), 82: *bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛta / ekasya śūnyatā yaiva saiva sarvasya śūnyatā //.* See *Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas: Gyel-tsap on Āryadeva's Four Hundred,* commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen, translated and edited by Ruth Sonam (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1994), 194.

[24] *grub mtha' rtsa ba gdong lnga'i sgra dbyangs / grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa 'khrul spong gdong lnga'i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba'i sgron me.*

[25] *grub mtha' chen mo / grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong*

[26] *grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho.*

[27] Taipei, 28.11.

[28] Taipei, 30.1.

[29] *stod, sa,* 17.5.

[30] *stod, ha,* 13.1.

[31] Taipei, 34.13.

[32] Taipei, 42.10.

[33] IX.36-37; D127, *mdo sde,* vol. *da,* 27a.7-27b.1; Sanskrit, Tibetan, and English in Cristoph Cüppers, *The IXth Chapter of the Samādhirājasūtra,* Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, 41 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990), 53. The second stanza is: *nairātmya dharmān yadi pratyavekṣate tāṃ pratyavekṣya yadi bhāvayeta / sa hetu nirvāṇaphalasya prāptaye ya anyahetū na sa bhoti śāntaye //.* The Tibetan is on 54, and English translation on 100.

[34] *stod, nya,* 39.3.

[35] Taipei, 45.10.

[36] Taipei, 46.7.

[37] Taipei, 47.8.

[38] Taipei, 47.11.

[39] IX.3-4b; citation lengthened by first four lines.

[40] Taipei, 49.12.

[41] Stanzas 394-396; *rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba, rājaparikathāratnāvalī;* P5658, vol. 129; translation from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998).

[42] Taipei, 50.5.

[43] Taipei, 58.12.

[44] Taipei, 59.13.

[45] Taipei, 59.15.

[46] Ḍak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets,* Dzongsar Institute, 2.16.

[47] For these assertions see Ḍak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets,"* Dzongsar Institute, 41.14-42.3.

[48] Taipei, 62.12.

[49] Taipei, 64.16.

[50] Ḍak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets,"* Dzongsar Institute, 41.10.

[51] Taipei, 67.12.

[52] Taipei, 68.3.

[53] See Shāntarakṣhita's *Compendium of Principles,* text 1370; G. Jha, *The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntirakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla,* Gaekwad's Oriental Series, vols. 50 and 53 (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937-1939; rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 683.

[54] Taipei, 68.16.

[55] Taipei, 69.16.

[56] Taipei, 70.14.

[57] Taipei, 70.17.

[58] Taipei, 71.2

[59] *Supplement,* VI.21ab; P5262, vol. 98, 101.5.2; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 239. Chandrakīrti's own commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 137.2.8.

[60] Taipei, 73.5.

[61] The chart is adapted from Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 322-323.

[62] Taipei, 73.20.

[63] This is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by Īshvarakṛṣhṇa (third century, C.E.). The Sanskrit text is available in *Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛshṇa,* edited and translated by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935).

[64] Taipei, 77.5.

[65] Taipei, 77.20.

[66] Dzongsar Institute, 46.20.

[67] Taipei, 79.7; the bracketed material for these five is drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, stod, tsa,* 103.8, which quotes Ke-drup's *Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition.'"*

[68] Paraphrasing *stod, tsha,* 109.3.

[69] Taipei, 82.8.

[70] Taipei, 82.17.

[71] Paraphrasing *stod, sha,* 90.4

[72] Taipei, 85.15.

[73] *stod, kha,* 120.6.

[74] Taipei, 87.8.

[75] Taipei, 87.9.

[76] Taipei, 87.13.

[77] *Supplement,* VI.9abc; P5262, vol. 98, 101.3.4; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.11, 280-284. Chandrakīrti's own commentary, P5263, vol. 98, 120.3.4ff.

[78] Taipei, 87.19.

[79] Taipei, 88.15.

[80] Taipei, 93.3.

[81] Taipei, 93.12.

[82] Taipei, 94.21.

[83] Taipei, 95.10.

[84] *stod, sa,* 140.7; commenting on the depiction of Vedānta positions as found in chapter eight of Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning.*

[85] Taipei, 100.6.

[86] The list is drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*stod, da,* 157.1)

[87] *stod, na,* 157.4.

[88] Taipei, 104.14.

[89] *stod, na,* 157.5.

[90] Taipei, 105.1.

[91] Taipei, 105.6.

[92] Taipei, 106.4.

[93] Taipei, 107.12.

[94] Taipei, 109.15.

[95] Taipei, 110.1.

[96] *stod, 'a,* 170.8.

[97] *stod, 'a,* 171.2.

[98] *stod, 'a,* 172.5.

[99] Taipei, 110.12.

[100] Taipei, 110.21.

[101] *stod, ya,* 173.2.

[102] Taipei, 111.1.

[103] Taipei, 111.5.

[104] *stod, ya,* 173.4.

[105] *stod, ya,* 173.5.

[106] Taipei, 111.10.

[107] Taipei, 111.21.

[108] Taipei, 113.14.

[109] This is in commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition,"* II.120.

[110] Taipei, 115.14.

[111] *stod, cha,* 183.6.

[112] Taipei, 116.1.

[113] Taipei, 118.8.

[114] Taipei, 118.12.

[115] *stod, na,* 190.3; this is paraphrase.

[116] Taipei, 122.7.

[117] Taipei, 124.4.

[118] Taipei, 124.11.

[119] Taipei, 127.6.

[120] *stod, zha,* 198.4.

[121] Ibid.

[122] *stod, zha,* 198.4.

[123] *stod, ya,* 202.1.

[124] *stod, ya,* 202.2.

[125] *stod, tha,* 74.4.

[126] 48.2.

[127] 48.7.

[128] 49.2.

[129] 50.1.

[130] 49.2.

[131] 53.2.

[132] 54.4.

[133] 54.1.

[134] 51.2.

[135] 50.6.

[136] 52.6.

[137] 54.5.

[138] *stod, cha,* 215.3.

[139] 55.2.

[140] See Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, stod,* 217.4.

[141] 55.3.

[142] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* Taipei, 142.11.

[143] *stod, pha,* 225.5.

[144] Taipei, 147.21.

[145] *stod, tsa,* 226.6.

[146] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's citation (*Annotations, stod,* 239.2) of alternate renditions of these is omitted.

[147] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's textual correction (*Annotations, stod,* 240.2) of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* is omitted.

[148] *stod, cha,* 34.6.

[149] *stod, ra,* 231.2.

[150] Taipei, 158.15.

[151] *stod, ya,* 230.8.

[152] Taipei, 159.9.

[153] Taipei, 159.14.

[154] Taipei, 159.17.

[155] Taipei, 159.21.

[156] Taipei, 165.14.

[157] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* Taipei, 166.3.

[158] Taipei, 166.4.

[159] *dngos, ca,* 3.5.

[160] *gzhan nyid.* Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 167.12) reads "a view of annihilation" (*chad lta*), but based on Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning,* Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations* (*dngos, ca,* 4.8) corrects Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's reading.

[161] *dngos, cha,* 7.4.

[162] *rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba, rājaparikathāratnāvalī;* P5658, vol. 129; stanzas 367-393; translation from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998), 107.

[163] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary* (lha sa: zhol par khang, 15th rab 'byung in the fire rooster year, i.e., 1897, *ka*), 59a.4.

[164] Brackets in this stanza from Gyel-tsap's *Commentary,* 59a.5.

[165] Ibid., 61a.6.

[166] Ibid., 61b.3.

[167] Ibid., 61b.6.

[168] Taipei, 170.15.

[169] *dngos, ta,* 26.3.

[170] *dngos, pha,* 30.5.

[171] *dge tshul gyi dang po'i lo dri ba;* P5634, vol. 127; and *dge slong gi dang po'i lo dri ba;* P5649, vol. 127. I take these two as being the referents of *lo dri,* since Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den in the passages cited just below refers to *dge tshul slong gi lo dri ba.*

[172] The charts are taken from Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 340, 713-719.

[173] Taipei, 175.21.

[174] *dngos, tsa,* 33.7.

[175] Taipei, 179.13.

[176] *dngos, dza,* 34.4.

[177] Taipei, 179.15.

[178] Brackets added from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, zha,* 35.1.

[179] *dngos, zha,* 35.4.

[180] Taipei, 181.1.

[181] *dngos, wa,* 34.5.

[182] *dngos, sha,* 42.2.

[183] *dngos, sha,* 42.5.

[184] *dngos, sha,* 42.7.

[185] Taipei, 182.15.

[186] *dngos, sha,* 43.5.

[187] *dngos, sha,* 43.6.

[188] Ibid.

[189] Ibid.

[190] *dngos, sa,* 43.8.

[191] *dngos, ha,* 44.2.

[192] *dngos, ka,* 44.5.

[193] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den gives only the names of the four groups.

[194] Paraphrasing Taipei, 184.5.

[195] *dngos, ja,* 46.4.

[196] *phar phyin spyi don shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba'i sgron me* (Buxaduor: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skong slob gnyer khang, 1963), 95b.2ff.

[197] Paraphrasing Taipei, 185.8.

[198] Paraphrasing Taipei, 185.8.

[199] Taipei, 187.6.

[200] 13.5; adapted from the translation by John Buescher.

[201] Taipei, 188.1.

[202] Taipei, 188.18.

[203] Taipei, 189.17.

[204] *dngos, ba,* 49.6.

[205] Paraphrasing *dngos, tsa,* 51.1.

[206] *dngos, tsha,* 52.7.

[207] The descriptions accompanying the list are paraphrases of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 190.20).

[208] Taipei, 191.11.

[209] *dngos, ma,* 50.6.
[210] Taipei, 191.18.
[211] Taipei, 198.8.
[212] Taipei, 198.17.
[213] Paraphrasing Taipei, 199.20.
[214] 34.1.
[215] 36.3.
[216] I.68-69.
[217] Taipei, 201.15.
[218] Ḏak-tsang compares the two schools at length; see Dzongsar Institute, 85.12ff.
[219] *dngos, tha,* 73.5; explaining Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition,"* III.4-5.
[220] This sentence is added from Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 201.20).
[221] Taipei, 202.12.
[222] Drawn from Ḏak-tsang's *"Knowing All Tenets"* and his autocommentary, Dzongsar Institute, 9.8 and 86.19.
[223] *dngos, da,* 74.5.
[224] Taipei, 203.4.
[225] *dngos, pha,* 75.4.
[226] *dngos, ba,* 75.6; explaining Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition."* The four headings are from Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 203.16).
[227] The descriptions are from Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 207.
[228] Taipei, 204.9.
[229] Taipei, 204.11.
[230] *dngos, ma,* 76.8; explaining Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition."*
[231] Taipei, 204.14.
[232] *dngos, ma,* 77.7.
[233] IX. 41ab.
[234] Taipei, 205.15.
[235] Stanza 390.
[236] Taipei, 207.6.
[237] The remainder of this section on momentariness is adapted from an unpublished translation by Anne C. Klein.
[238] *dngos, 'a,* 85.6. The initial statement of opinion of the Great Exposition School is added from Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 208.13).
[239] Taipei, 209.4.
[240] Paraphrasing Taipei, 209.10. Adapted from an unpublished translation by Anne C. Klein.
[241] Adapted from an unpublished translation by Anne C. Klein.
[242] Taipei, 210.19.
[243] Taipei, 211.7.
[244] *dngos, ka,* 89.1.
[245] Taipei, 213.19.
[246] Taipei, 214.4.
[247] Taipei, 215.9.
[248] *drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable* (Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991), ed. by Geshe Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal, 220.4.
[249] Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 216.3) identifies the passage as from *ldog pa bsdus pa.*
[250] Taipei, 216.14.
[251] Taipei, 217.7. Adapted from an unpublished translation by Anne C. Klein.
[252] Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Annotations, dngos, pha,* 94.5.
[253] *dngos, ba,* 94.6; explaining a passage from Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament of the Middle.* Adapted from an unpublished translation by Anne C. Klein.
[254] Adapted from an unpublished translation by Anne C. Klein.
[255] Taipei, 220.3.
[256] Taipei, 219.2; the second clause is paraphrase.
[257] Taipei, 219.16.
[258] Taipei, 219.10.
[259] *dngos, zha,* 96.6.
[260] Taipei, 220.17.
[261] *dngos, za,* 97.1.
[262] Taipei, 221.1.
[263] *dngos, la,* 98.1.
[264] Taipei, 221.14.
[265] The quote is rendered in accordance with Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's explanation in *Annotations, dngos, sa,* 99.4.
[266] *dngos, a,* 100.3.

[267] Reading *brda la byang ba'i gang zag* for *brda la* ***ma*** *byang ba'i gang zag; dngos, a,* 100.4.
[268] Continuing from *dngos, a,* 102.7.
[269] Taipei, 222.16.
[270] *dngos, kha,* 103.2.
[271] Taipei, 223.4.
[272] Brackets added from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, ca,* 104.3.
[273] Taipei, 226.13.
[274] *dngos, da,* 107.2.
[275] Taipei, 229.6.
[276] *dngos, ka,* 111.1.
[277] Taipei, 229.19.
[278] P775, vol. 29, 34.3.5, chapter 2. Suzuki's translation is 44 (123).
[279] Stanzas 394-396; see Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 65, 90-91, 147.
[280] Bracketed additions are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, kha,* 112.8.
[281] Taipei, 231.7.
[282] Taipei, 231.14.
[283] P162, vol. 6, 259.3.8-259.4.2, Chapter 36. This passage is translated by E. Obermiller in the *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston* (Heidelberg: Harrassowitz, 1932), Part 2, 111. He cites it as Kg. RGYUD. XI. 450a.5-450a.6. Later, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (468) cites the relevant parts of the passage with a slightly different reading, "He will know **many treatises teaching the basic constituent/** And **the suchness of** the meaning of no inherent existence.
[284] *dngos, ga,* 113.4.
[285] Taipei, 231.20.
[286] *dngos, nga,* 114.7.
[287] Taipei, 232.21.
[288] *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel bshad tshig rab tu gsal ba, abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā;* P5194, vol. 91.
[289] P5539, vol. 111, 83.2.6-87.2.3.
[290] P5539, vol. 111, 88.2.2.
[291] P5539, vol. 111, 89.2.2.
[292] Taipei, 234.3.
[293] Taipei, 234.19.
[294] Taipei, 235.15.
[295] Étienne Lamotte, *La Somme du grand véhicule d'Asaṅga,* reprint, 2 vols., Publications de l'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 8 (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1973), vol. 1, 24-25, and vol. 2, 87-89; and John P. Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaṅga: Translated from the Chinese of Paramārtha* (Berkeley, Calif.: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992), 39.
[296] *sa bcu pa, daśabhūmika;* chap. 6. P574, vol. 25, 263.3.8.
[297] See Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 79 (VIII.20), and vol. 2, 251; and Keenan, *Summary,* 98.
[298] Brackets from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a (*Great Exposition of Tenets,* Taipei, 236.13).
[299] Taipei, 237.1.
[300] Taipei, 237.12. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 115ff., and *Reflections on Reality,* 109ff. and 120ff.
[301] Chap. 7; Étienne Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra: L'Explication des mystères* (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935), 85 [30], and 206; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 27.1-28.2; see also the translation by John C. Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha: Saṁdhinirmocana Sūtra* (Berkeley, Calif.: Dharma, 1995), 139-141.
[302] Continuing from Taipei, 241.5.
[303] The text adds *phal chen,* which appears to be a repetition of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra.*
[304] Taipei, 241.16.
[305] The brackets throughout the section of the four reliances are drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, wa-nga,* 129.5ff.
[306] *dngos, nga,* 132.4.
[307] Taipei, 245.19.
[308] The exposition of the eight is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, ca,* 132.7, who quotes D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Golden Rosary.*
[309] *dngos, cha,* 133.4.
[310] Taipei, 246.21.
[311] *dngos, ja,* 133.7.
[312] Taipei, 247.3.
[313] *dngos, nya,* 134.1.
[314] Taipei, 247.19.
[315] *dngos, ta,* 134.5.

[316] Taipei, 248.1.

[317] Ser-shül's *Notes,* 54a.6.

[318] *dngos, ta,* 134.7.

[319] Bracketed material is from Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 248.6. In this case, Nga-wang-bel-den's *dgongs* clearly means "intended" since it refers to the purpose.

[320] Taipei, 248.9.

[321] *sa bcu pa, daśabhūmika;* chap. 6. P574, vol. 25, 263.3.8.

[322] Chap. 2; P5549, vol. 112, 224.4.1; Lamotte, *La somme,* vol. 1, 36 (24); vol. 2, 118-119; and Keenan, *Summary,* 50-51.

[323] Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 208ff.

[324] Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 121.2.

[325] Ibid., 121.4.

[326] Ibid., 121.5.

[327] Ibid., 121.6.

[328] Ibid., 122.1.

[329] Ibid., 122.1.

[330] Ibid., 122.1.

[331] Ibid., 122.1.

[332] Ibid., 122.1.

[333] Ibid., 122.2.

[334] Ibid., 122.4.

[335] Ibid., 122.4.

[336] Ibid., 122.4.

[337] Ibid., 122.4.

[338] Ibid., 122.5.

[339] "Of one continuum" is from ibid., 122.5.

[340] Taipei, 248.21.

[341] Taipei, 249.9.

[342] Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,* 67 [2], and 193; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 6.2-6.5; and Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha,* 97. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 82ff.

[343] Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 11.6.

[344] Chap. 7; Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,* 67 [3], and 193; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 6.6-7.1.

[345] *dngos, na,* 135.4.

[346] Taipei, 249.16; continuing from the previous citation.

[347] Stanza 23; this is cited also by Wonch'uk (P5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 130.4.8). For the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 371, footnote b. For other translations, see Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 188; and Thomas A. Kochumuttom, *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 258.

[348] Ser-shül's *Notes,* 14b.5; and Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 12.4.

[349] Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive,* 45.4; and Ser-shül's *Notes,* 14b.5.

[350] *rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba, viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī;* P5539, vol. 111, 71.2.8; Tokyo *sde dge, sems tsam,* vol. 9 (*zi*), 8.4.5.

[351] Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 12.4.

[352] Ibid., 12.3.

[353] Ibid., 93.1.

[354] A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 220.3.

[355] XI.50; P5521, vol. 108, 9.1.3; for the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 416, footnote a. The bracketed material is from A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 220.2. See Sylvain Lévi, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra* (Paris: Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 1907), vol. 1, 67.16; vol. 2, 121. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 172 and 302.

[356] P5550, vol. 112, 266.1.2-266.1.4, in the first section, entitled *lakṣaṇasamuccaya;* and Walpola Rahula, *Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1980), 141-142.

[357] Taipei, 250.3.

[358] Chap. 7; Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 77 [20], and 200-201; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 17.1-17.6; and Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha,* 119. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 95ff.

[359] Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 27.3.

[360] Ibid., 27.6.

[361] *dngos, pha,* 135.8.

[362] Taipei, 250.14.

[363] P5562, vol. 113, 278.5.7-279.2.8. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 240 and

345.

[364] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's ellipsis.

[365] P5562, vol. 113, 279.2.8-279.3.2. This passage immediately follows the previous one.

[366] D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 160.3.

[367] Taipei, 250.22. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 97ff. and 269ff.

[368] Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 75 [17], and 199; and Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha,* 115. I have re-arranged the citations so that they are contiguous with the points Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is making.

[369] XI.51; P5521, vol. 108, 9.1.3; and Lévi, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,* vol. 2, 122.

[370] P5550, vol. 112, 266.1.3-266.1.6, near the end of the second section, entitled *dharmaviniś-cayasamuccaya* (*chos rnam par nges pa kun las btus pa*). For fragments and reconstructed Sanskrit text, see Pralhad Pradhan, *Abhidharma Samuccaya* (Santiniketan, India: Visva-Bharati, 1950); for Yashomitra's commentary see N. Tatia, *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam,* Tibetan-Sanskrit Works Series, No. 17 (Patna, India: K.B. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976). For a translation into French, see Walpola Rahula, *Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1980), 142. For Wonch'uk's citation of this passage, see P5517, vol. 106, chap. 5, 134.1.2 and 134.1.8. To provide context, I have lengthened Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation by adding the first paragraph.

[371] Chap. 7; Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 69-70 [8], and 195; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 8.4-9.1; and Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha,* 103. I have added the final two sentences to this and the next citation from the *Sūtra Unraveling the Thought* for the sake of clarity and completeness.

[372] D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 30.1.

[373] Chap. 7; Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana,* 70 [9], and 195; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 9.2-9.6; and Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha,* 103.

[374] Taipei, 252.7.

[375] XI.52; P5521, vol. 108, 9.1.4; and Lévi, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,* vol. 2, 123. For the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 418, footnote c. The bracketed additions in the stanza are drawn from A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 222.1; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 157.5; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 94.4.

[376] *dngos, tsa,* 137.6.

[377] *dngos, tsha,* 138.2.

[378] Taipei, 252.16.

[379] Chap. 7; Lamotte, 73 [14]; 198; Dön-drup-gyel-tsen's *Four Intertwined Commentaries,* 13.2-13.5.

[380] *dngos, wa,* 138.8.

[381] For the passage in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle,* see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 438-439; P5549, vol. 112, 224.5.5-225.1.4; Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 38-39 (II.27), and vol. 2, 122-124; and Keenan, *Summary,* 52-53.

[382] For references to these, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 190 (briefly) and 312-314.

[383] Taipei, 253.2.

[384] Taipei, 253.6.

[385] *dngos, zha,* 141.1.

[386] Taipei, 253.9.

[387] Taipei, 253.11. See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 190-192.

[388] III.214-215. The bracketed material in these two stanzas is drawn from S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 41b.2-42a.1.

[389] Taipei, 253.20.

[390] III.216.

[391] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 42a.3.

[392] Taipei, 254.17.

[393] Taipei, 256.2.

[394] *dngos, sha,* 143.5.

[395] Taipei, 257.4.

[396] *dngos, sha,* 143.8.

[397] Taipei, 258.3.

[398] The last is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, nga,* 145.7.

[399] The four are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, cha,* 146.1.

[400] *dngos, ja,* 146.3.

[401] Taipei, 265.21.

[402] Commenting on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition,"* II.143cd-145ab. Cited in Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, stod, ha,* 178.6.

403 II.132.

404 Taipei, 266.18.

405 Taipei, 267.5.

406 *dngos, ta,* 146.4.

407 Taipei, 267.14.

408 Taipei, 268.19.

409 P5538, vol. 110, 144.4.1-144.5.5; see also the translation in Willis, *On Knowing Reality,* 161; for the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 398, footnote a.

410 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 187.5.

411 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 392.6.

412 Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 61.3.

413 Ibid., 61.3.

414 Ibid., 61.4.

415 *dngos, tsa,* 147.8.

416 Taipei, 269.8.

417 Taipei, 272.10.

418 Chap. 4, "The Questions of Subhūti"; Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,* 51.33-52.5, and 181; and Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha,* 63.

419 III.10c; P5522, vol. 108, 20.3.5; and Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu,* 236; for the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 407, footnote d.

420 *theg pa chen po'i mdo sde rgyan, mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra;* VI.1; P5521, vol. 108, 5.1.1; for the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 408, footnote b. For a translation into French, see Sylvain Lévi, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra: Exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra* (Paris: Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 1907, 1911; reprint, Shanghai: 1940), 22. The bracketed commentary in this stanza is from A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 197.1-197.4; for another interpretation of the five, see Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 425.1, and another's (perhaps his own) criticism of A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's interpretation, 430.3. I have added the citation from Dzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of Eloquence;* see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 159.

421 P5539, vol. 111, 61.4.7.

422 Ibid., 61.5.1; and Tokyo *sde dge, sems tsam,* vol. 9 (*zhi*), 289a.2.

423 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 197.6.

424 For Da-drin-rap-den's two explanations of this, see his *Annotations,* 76.5.

425 For Vasubandhu's treatment of this issue, see P5562, vol. 113, 283.2.7ff., and Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 168ff. and 298ff.

426 The list is a combination and paraphrase of Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 273.8-274.3, and Nga-wang-bel-den's *Annotations, dngos, wa,* 158.6ff.

427 A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 218.2.

428 Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 88.2.

429 Ibid. I have added "in the literal reading of."

430 Ibid., 88.3.

431 Ibid., 88.5.

432 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 483.1.

433 Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 88.6.

434 Ibid.

435 Ibid.

436 Bel-jor-hlün-drup's *Lamp for the Teaching,* 51.6; and Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 89.1.

437 See Ser-shül's *Notes,* 37b.1-37b.5, and Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 489.2-489.6.

438 This is found in the first section, entitled *lakṣaṇasamuccaya;* Walpola Rahula, *La compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1971), 23.

439 See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 171.

440 Jam-yang-shay-ba's ellipsis.

441 Brackets from Nga-wang-bel-den's *Annotations, dngos, a,* 161.1.

442 Tokyo *sde dge, sems tsam,* vol. 8 (*zhi*), 199a.7.

443 Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 80.4.

444 Ibid., 80.3.

445 Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 441.1; and Da-drin-rap-den's *Annotations,* 80.3.

446 *dngos, ka,* 161.2.

447 Taipei, 278.10.

448 *dngos, ca,* 161.5.

449 Taipei, 278.21.

450 *dngos, ja,* 162.3.

451 Taipei, 279.16.

[452] Taipei, 280.6.

[453] The remainder of the section on the definition is a combination of parts of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 280.8, and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, nya* and *ta,* 162.4.

[454] Taipei, 281.6.

[455] III.12cd; P5522, vol. 108, 20.3.7; for the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 411, footnote a, and *Absorption in No External World,* #154.

[456] D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 82.5.

[457] Ibid., 82.5.

[458] Ibid., 82.5.

[459] The identifications are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, da,* 162.6.

[460] *dngos, pha,* 162.8.

[461] Taipei, 282.8.

[462] For more detailed presentations of the levels of cyclic existence, see Lati Rinbochay's explanation in Lati Rinbochay, Denma Lochö Rinbochay, Leah Zahler, Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), 23-47; and Herbert V. Guenther, *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation by sGam-po-pa* (London: Rider, 1963; rpt. Berkeley: Shambhala, 1971), 55-73.

[463] Taipei, 301.6. In his commentary Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a details differences, 287.6-311.19.

[464] Taipei, 305.11.

[465] Taipei, 311.22.

[466] Taipei, 313.18.

[467] Chapter 10.

[468] Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 170-171.

[469] A-ku L̄o-drö-gya-tso's *Precious Lamp,* 219.2. The cited text is III.10bc; P5522, vol. 108, 20.3.5; for the Sanskrit, see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 414, footnote c.

[470] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 38a.5.

[471] Taipei, 314.3.

[472] Taipei, 314.6.

[473] *dngos, wa,* 183.7, elaborating on Maitreya's *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes.*

[474] Taipei, 315.1.

[475] The final example is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, zha,* 185.2.

[476] The final example is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, zha,* 185.3.

[477] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, za,* 185.3.

[478] Taipei, 316.10.

[479] Taipei, 316.15.

[480] *dngos, ra,* 185.8. The first sentence is from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 316.18.

[481] Taipei, 317.3.

[482] Taipei, 317.11.

[483] *dngos, la,* 186.6.

[484] Taipei, 317.21.

[485] Taipei, 318.4.

[486] *dngos, sha,* 187.4. Drawing from Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Asaṅga's) Summary of Manifest Knowledge.*

[487] Taipei, 318.8.

[488] P5549, vol. 112, 227.3.1-227.3.5. Lamotte's edition, vol. 1, 51.23ff; vol. 2, 162.1ff; and Keenan, *Summary,* 66. The citation is taken from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *The Essence of Eloquence;* see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 213-214.

[489] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 47a.2; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 128.4.

[490] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 47a.2; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 128.3.

[491] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 47a.2; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 128.4.

[492] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 47a.3; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 128.5.

[493] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 47a.3; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 128.4-5.

[494] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 47a.4; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 128.5-6.

[495] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 47a.5; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 128.6-129.2.

[496] D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 129.3.

[497] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 48b.3; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 129.3.

[498] S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 48b.3; and D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 129.3.

[499] D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en's *Annotations,* 129.5.

[500] Taipei, 319.12.

[501] Taipei, 319.18.

[502] Taipei, 320.9.

[503] Taipei, 321.19.

[504] P775, vol. 29, 40.2.6, chapter 2; see also the translation by Suzuki, 70 (139). See the commentaries by Jñānashrībhadra (P5519, vol. 107, 114.1.6) and Jñānavajra (P5520, vol. 107, 247.2.4). This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement"* (P5263, vol. 98, 134.2.3).

[505] Stanza 12.

[506] Taipei, 322.13.

[507] 249.5; this is drawn from Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 477-478.

[508] Taipei, 322.19.

[509] Taipei, 323.21.

[510] Taipei, 324.3.

[511] In this section I have arranged Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's word-commentary so that it corresponds with the order of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's commentary, which does not follow the order of his own root text.

[512] Taipei, 324.16.

[513] The four headings are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, ga,* 192.3.

[514] See Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 78 (VIII.20), and vol. 2, 250-251; and Keenan, *Summary,* 98.

[515] 246.6; this is drawn from Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 470-472.

[516] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 635.4.

[517] Taipei, 325.15.

[518] See Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 636.6.

[519] Taipei, 325.2.

[520] See Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 78 (VIII.20), and vol. 2, 250-251; and Keenan, *Summary,* 98.

[521] This is drawn from Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 473.

[522] *dngos, wa,* 139.2. For the passage in Asaṅga's *Summary of the Great Vehicle,* see Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 438-439; P5549, vol. 112, 224.5.5-225.1.4; Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 38-39 (II.27), and vol. 2, 122-124; and Keenan, *Summary,* 52-53.

[523] Taipei, 325.12.

[524] See Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 78 (VIII.20), and vol. 2, 250-251; and Keenan, *Summary,* 98.

[525] 636.2. This is drawn from Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality,* 474.

[526] Taipei, 325.17.

[527] *dngos, ga,* 192.4.

[528] See Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 79 (VIII.20), and vol. 2, 251; and Keenan, *Summary,* 98.

[529] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 633.2.

[530] Ibid., 636.5.

[531] Taipei, 326.2.

[532] The phrase "ideation and emptiness" is drawn from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's commentary in *The Essence of Eloquence;* see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 182ff.

[533] VI.47d; brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (Varanasi, 253.13).

[534] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, nga,* 192.6.

[535] *dngos, ca,* 192.6.

[536] Taipei, 327.1.

[537] Taipei, 327.8.

[538] *dngos, tha,* 200.1.

[539] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 331.4.

[540] Ibid.

[541] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, tha,* 201.1.

[542] Ibid.

[543] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, tha,* 202.7; Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den is explaining Gyel-tsap's system since his is the system that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is explaining.

[544] In the Dharamsala 1967 edition (41.6), read *dang/ sngon po* ***rags par snang ba dang/ sngon po*** *phyi* for *dang/ sngon po phyi* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (512.5), etc. This misprint (or editorial 'correction') is pointed out in the Go-mang 1980 edition (3.8).

[545] In the Dharamsala 1967 edition (41.11), read *zad/ sngon po* ***sngon por snang ba dang/ sngon po*** *rags* for *zad/ sngon po rags* in accordance with the Collected Works edition (512.5), etc. This misprint (or editorial 'correction' by the publisher of the Dharamsala 1967 edition) is pointed out in the Go-mang 1980 edition (3.8).

[546] *dngos, tha,* 201.8. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den is explaining Gyel-tsap's system since his is the system that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a is explaining.

[547] Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o presents three explanations of the three systems; here he is summarizing Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's exposition. I have put them in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's order.

[548] Ibid.

[549] Ibid.

[550] Taipei, 332.14.

[551] *dngos, pa,* 216.4.

[552] Taipei, 341.12.

[553] Paraphrasing 212.17.

[554] Taipei, 343.10.

[555] 213.7.

[556] Taipei, 343.16.

[557] The ellipsis in the quote is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

[558] Taipei, 344.14.

[559] Taipei, 344.15.

[560] Taipei, 346.5.

[561] P5549, vol. 112, 222.2.6-222.3.6. Lamotte, *La Somme,* vol. 1, 26-27 (II.7), and vol. 2, 93-96; and Keenan, *Summary,* 41.

[562] Taipei, 348.14; the individual identifications are paraphrases of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's text and of Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, sha* and *sa,* 220.4-220.6. For extensive discussion of the enumerations of consciousness, see Wilson, *Meaning of Mind,* 215ff.

[563] Stanzas 403-433; see Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 149-154.

[564] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, ha,* 220.7.

[565] The ellipses in this and the next two quotes are Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

[566] Taipei, 354.5.

[567] Taipei, 355.1.

[568] III.178ab.

[569] Taipei, 356.10.

[570] (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1998), 236.

[571] Taipei, 357.9.

[572] The parenthetical identifications of these four are from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 357.13

[573] Taipei, 357.21.

[574] (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1998), 69-90; this is a mere taste of his explanation. The indented explanations of the six powers are from Leah Zahler.

[575] (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1998), 91-92.

[576] (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1998), 42-43; for extensive discussion of the four types see, respectively, *Calm Abiding and Special Insight,* 183ff., 44ff., 192ff., and 208ff.

[577] Taipei, 361.2.

[578] *dbu ma pa, ka,* 1.2.

[579] Taipei, 361.5.

[580] Taipei, 361.20.

[581] Taipei, 363.18.

[582] Taipei, 364.5.

[583] Taipei, 365.8. All of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's exposition of the history is included in this translation; all ellipses are his own.

[584] P898, vol. 35, 253.3.3-253.3.5.

[585] P898, vol. 35, 251.4.3.

[586] In the Dalama edition (*ca,* 3b.8) read *rya* for *rgya* in accordance with the Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 251.4.3).

[587] In the Dalama edition (*ca,* 3b.8) read *phyed* for *khyed* in accordance with the Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 251.4.5).

[588] The Peking edition (P898, vol. 35, 251.4.5) reads *bstan bcos.*

[589] P898, vol. 35, 254.5.1, also 251.5.5 but with *nga'i nyan thos kyi mchog* instead of *da lta.*

[590] *sgron gsal, pradīpoddyotananāmatīkā.*

[591] *rigs pa'i rgya mtsho rtsa shes ṭik chen,* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, n.d.), 5.3.

[592] P888, vol. 35, 97.5.4.

[593] P888, vol. 35, 88.2.6.

[594] P888, vol. 35, 98.5.7.

[595] The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 98.5.7) reads *de nas phyis* instead of *de phyis* as in the Dalama edition (*ca,* 4b.5).

[596] P898, vol. 35, 255.3.2.

[597] *mngon par dad pa,* *abhiprasanna.* In the Dalama edition (*ca,* 4b.8) read *mngon par dad pa* both here and in the next sentence for *mngon par dang ba* in accordance with the Peking edition (vol. 35, 255.4.3) since the text immediately goes

on to say that the beings born there are beautiful and attain faith.

598 In the Dalama edition (*ca,* 5a.5) read *ba'i dge slong 'dzam* for *ba'i 'dzam* in accordance with the Peking edition, P898, vol. 35, 253.4.8.

599 In the Dalama edition (*ca,* 5a.6) read *mgo byi* for *mgo bya ba* in accordance with the Peking edition, P898, vol. 35, 253.4.8.

600 In the Dalama edition (*ca,* 5a.6) read *gnas* for *nas* in accordance with the Peking edition, P898, vol. 35, 253.5.2.

601 *rigs pa'i rgya mtsho rtsa shes ṭik chen,* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, n.d.), 4.18.

602 *gor sha.* Read *gor shas* for *gor sha'i.*

603 P888, vol. 35, 97.5.8.

604 This is from the expression of worship at the very beginning of the text. For the Sanskrit, see *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti* publiée par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 1.3.

605 In the Dalama edition read *rjes su rtogs bzhin* for *rjes su rtog cing* in accordance with the Dharamsala edition 2.5 which is confirmed by the Sanskrit (1.4) *yathānubuddham.*

606 In the Dalama edition read *gang gi gnyis med ye shes gsung mda'i tshogs* for *gang gis gnyis med gsung ba mdzad pa'i tshogs* in accordance with the Dharamsala edition 2.7 which is confirmed by the Sanskrit (2.1) *yasyāsamajñānavacaḥśaraughā.*

607 P898, vol. 35, 266.1.2.

608 The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 88.2.4) reads *rgyal po chen po khyod* instead of *khyod* as in the Dalama edition (*ca,* 6b.2).

609 The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 88.2.5) reads *tshe/ lo brgyad bcu lon pa na* instead of *tshe lo brgyad cu pa na* as in the Dalama edition (*ca,* 6b.3).

610 The Peking edition (P888, vol. 35, 88.2.6) reads *bar byas te/ mdo 'di 'dzin par* instead of *bar mdo 'di byin par* as in the Dalama edition (*ca,* 6b.3).

611 P888, vol. 35, 97.5.8.

612 In the Dalama edition (*ca,* 6b.5) read *yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa* for *yongs su 'das pa* in accordance with the Peking edition (vol. 35, 98.1.2).

613 This is a slightly different reading: *khams ston bstan chos du ma dang* rather than *bstan bcos sna tshogs don dam ni* as the Peking edition reads (P162, vol. 6, 259.4.1).

614 *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum/ Treatise on the Later Scriptures of the Great Vehicle* (*theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos, mahāyānottaratantraśāstra;* P5525.

615 Taipei, 371.19.

616 Stanza 386. For Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's and Gyeltsap's commentaries, see Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 84-89.

617 Taipei, 372.14.

618 P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.6ff, commenting on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle,* I.1.

619 This and the next brackets are from Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 225a.6ff.

620 Taipei, 373.15.

621 *dbu ma pa, pha,* 6.3.

622 Taipei, 374.19.

623 I have lengthened Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's citation of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* to include his quotation of Buddhapālita's refutation.

624 Ibid.

625 Taipei, 376.15.

626 In separate citations Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa quotes the first sentence and final clause; I have provided the rest to establish the context.

627 *dbu ma pa, tsa,* 7.3.

628 Taipei, 377.18.

629 XVIII.10.

630 Taipei, 378.15.

631 From stanza 4; the bracketed additions are from Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, wa,* 7.7.

632 The bracketed additions are from Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, zha,* 7.8.

633 Brackets in the quote are from Nga-w̄ang-ḇel-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, 'a,* 8.2.

634 The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's.

635 Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa ends the citation here with "and so forth"; I have included more for context.

636 The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's.

637 It is likely that Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa's reason for not specifying whether this is from Ḏzong-ka-

b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* or *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path* is that similar statements are made in both; see Tsong-kha-pa, *The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment,* vol. 3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 2002), 116. The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

638 Taipei, 382.4.

639 *dbu ma pa, la,* 9.1.

640 Taipei, 383.4. These five are paraphrases.

641 *dbu ma pa, nya,* 13.4.

642 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, tha,* 13.8.

643 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, na,* 14.3.

644 Taipei, 383.9 and 389.15.

645 D1118, *bstod tshogs,* vol. *ka,* 64b.5 and 65a.6-65a.7.

646 P2010, vol. 46, 31.5.3-31.5.7.

647 Taipei, 390.21.

648 P775, vol. 29, 39.5.5ff, chap. 2; Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, trans., *The Lankavatara Sutra* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932), 68-70. Jñānavajra's commentary is P5520, vol. 107, 246.4.4.

649 I have added this quotation so that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citations following it can be put in context.

650 S̄er-s̄hül's *Notes,* 52a.5.

651 This comes at the end of Sthiramati's commentary on I.2. P5334, vol. 109, 139.1.8-139.2.3; Sanskrit: Ramchandra Pandeya, *Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), 12.17-12.22; English translations: David Lasar Friedmann, *Sthiramati, Madhyānta-vibhāgaṭīkā: Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes* (Utrecht, Netherlands: Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1937), 15.25-16.4, and F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Madhyāntavibhāga, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and Commented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati,* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 30 (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970; reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971), 23.41-24.13.

652 Taipei, 394.6.

653 Taipei, 395.5.

654 P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.1, stanza 29. This is quoted in the *Clear Words* immediately following the last quote, P5260, vol. 98, 4.5.4; Buddhist Text Series No. 10, 6.1; Poussin, 5.7. See K. Bhattacharya's *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* (Delhi: Motilal, 1978), 23. The brackets are from *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 59a.6. For contextualization of this quote see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 471-473.

655 Taipei, 395.11.

656 The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

657 Taipei, 396.21. This is paraphrase.

658 VI.28a.

659 XI.17d/XII.8d; D3862, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 332a.1; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 362.6.

660 XI.11.

661 XI.12a.

662 *byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa, bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra,* IX.35; D3871, *dbu ma,* vol. *la,* 32a.4-.6; see also the translation in Stephen Batchelor, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* (Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), 140; Sanskrit in Das Shastri, *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* 305.

663 XI.15-16.

664 IX.36.

665 IX.40.

666 VI.214ab.

667 V.31ab.

668 VI.164; D̄ak-tsang cites only the last line.

669 IX.75abc.

670 IX.76ab.

671 VI.25; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 205a.7; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 104.4-104.7; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 11 (1910):301. I have lengthened D̄ak-tsang's citation of just the final two lines by adding the first two in order to provide context.

672 VI.53; D̄ak-tsang gives the first two lines and "and so forth."

673 XIII.1; cited in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (P5260, vol. 98, 8.1.8ff; Poussin, 42.10).

674 Toh. 3865, 197b.5.

675 Reading *mi slu ba* ***ma*** *yin* for *mi slu ba yin* in accordance with the *sde dge.*

[676] VI.22c.
[677] VI.30d.
[678] VI.36c.
[679] VI.32d; P5262, vol. 98, 102.1.5. His commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 24.5.8.
[680] VI.22c.
[681] VI.113ab.
[682] VI.148ab.
[683] VI.155-156.
[684] III.3. Ḏak-tsang gives the first line and "and so forth."
[685] VI.107.
[686] IX.86. The ellipsis is Ḏak-tsang's.
[687] IX.6ab.
[688] IX.10cd.
[689] VI.71b.
[690] VI.54cd.
[691] VI.127; P5262, vol. 98, 104.2.1ff.; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 292-4. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's own commentary, P5263, vol. 98, 142.5.5ff, and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination,* P6143, vol. 154, 84.5.4ff. I have lengthened the citation by adding the first two lines.
[692] VI.116.
[693] VI.34.
[694] VI.14ab.
[695] *Supplement,* VI.74.
[696] Dzongsar Institute, 16.19. Jam-ȳang-shay-ḇa (Taipei, 424.3) cites the seventh and eighth lines and "and so forth."
[697] Dzongsar Institute, 172.6. This section is included since it clearly presents many focal points of Ḏak-tsang's system.
[698] IX.7-8b.
[699] VI.28d; D3861, vol. *'a,* 205b.2-205b.3; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica 9 (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 107.1-107.4; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "*Madhyamakāvatāra.* Introduction au traité du milieu de l'ācārya Candrakīrti avec le commentaire de l'auteur," *Muséon* 11 (1910):303.
[700] Commenting on VI.39.
[701] VI.75; Ḏak-tsang cites only the first two lines.
[702] Reading *gzhan* for *bzhin* (Dzongsar Institute, 179.7) in accordance with the Dharmsala 1968 edition (133.11) and confirmed by Chandrakīrti's commentary.
[703] Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning,* stanza 35; D3825, *dbu ma,* vol. 68, 21b.5; Lindtner, *Master of Wisdom,* 84.
[704] *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa, sañcayagāthāprajñāpāramitā,* stanzas XII.10 and XIII.1a; P735, vol. 21; Sanskrit and Tibetan in Akira Yuyama, *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 52-53 and 171: *ākāśa-dṛṣṭu iti sattva pravyāharanti kha-nidarśanaṃ kutu vimṛṣyata etam arthaṃ / tatha dharma-darśanu nidiṣṭu tathāgatena na hi darśanaṃ bhaṇitu śakya nidarśanena // yo eva paśyati sa paśyati sarva-dharmān.* English translation in Edward Conze, *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and its Verse Summary* (Bolinas, Calif.: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), 32-33.
[705] IX.35; D3871, *dbu ma,* vol. *la,* 32a.4-.6; see also the translation in Stephen Batchelor, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life,* 140; Sanskrit in Das Shastri, *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* 305.
[706] VI.117cd.
[707] VI.119.cd.
[708] Dzongsar Institute, 21.21.
[709] Dzongsar Institute, 214.2.
[710] *rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā,* stanza 35; D3825, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsa,* 21b.5; Tibetan in Lindtner, *Master of Wisdom,* 85. I have added the last two lines to Ḏak-tsang's citation.
[711] Stanzas 35-36; Ḏak-tsang cites the first line and "and so forth."
[712] Chapter on the Qualities, stanza 36c.
[713] IX.35; D3871, *dbu ma,* vol. *la,* 32a.4-.6; see also the translation in Batchelor, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life,* 140; Sanskrit in Das Shastri, *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* 305.
[714] Taipei, 397.8. This is paraphrase.
[715] Taipei, 397.12.
[716] VI.28a.
[717] VI.214.
[718] Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path,* 478.4.
[719] Quote lengthened by the first two lines.
[720] Quote lengthened by the first paragraph.

[721] *dbu ma pa, za,* 18.3.

[722] Taipei, 405.3.

[723] IX.3ab.

[724] Taipei, 406.18.

[725] XI.17d/XII.8d; D3862, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 332a.1; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 362.6.

[726] XI.11.

[727] XI.12a.

[728] IX.35; D3871, *dbu ma,* vol. *la,* 32a.4-.6; see also the translation in Batchelor, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life,* 140; Sanskrit in Das Shastri, *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* 305.

[729] XI.15-16.

[730] IX.36.

[731] IX.40.

[732] VI.214ab.

[733] V.31ab.

[734] Taipei, 409.11.

[735] Dzongsar Institute, 17.11; commentary, 180.1. Citation lengthened.

[736] In Taipei, 409.14, and in Gomang, 695.5, read *bden **stong*** for *bden **pa*** in accordance with Dalama, *ca,* 25b.2, and Ḏak-tsang *Tenets* (Dzongsar Institute, 17.11), and his *Commentary* (180.2).

[737] XV.2cd.

[738] Poussin, 305.19-306.12.

[739] *dbu ma pa, 'a,* 18.6.

[740] Taipei, 412.7.

[741] IX.86. The ellipsis is Ḏak-tsang's.

[742] IX.6ab.

[743] IX.10cd.

[744] P5262, vol. 98, 102.1.5, VI.32d. His commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 24.5.8.

[745] VI.26.

[746] IX.11.

[747] VI.83; P5262, vol. 98, 103.1.8; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 238. Chandrakīrti's own commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 133.5.2. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 69a.4ff.

[748] Taipei, 416.8.

[749] Dzongsar Institute, 20.3; his commentary, 201.24.

[750] Dzongsar Institute, 178.23. Commenting on VI.33; citation lengthened by final sentence to accord with Ḏak-tsang's quotation.

[751] Sarnath, 120.1.

[752] VI.39.

[753] *dbu ma pa, la,* 20.2.

[754] VI.33; P5262, vol. 98, 102.1.5. His commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 25.1.1.

[755] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den cites only the first two lines but explains all four; hence, I have included the entire stanza.

[756] Taipei, 416.20.

[757] VI.12ab.

[758] *dbu ma pa, sha,* 20.8.

[759] Taipei, 417.16.

[760] *dbu ma pa, sa,* 21.3.

[761] Taipei, 418.5.

[762] Taipei, 418.6.

[763] VI.25; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 205a.7; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 104.4-104.7; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 11 (1910):301. I have lengthened Ḏak-tsang's citation of just the final two lines by adding the first two in order to provide context.

[764] Dzongsar Institute, 172.18.

[765] Dzongsar Institute, 171.14.

[766] VI.80cd.

[767] IX.3-4b.

[768] This sentence is added from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, a,* 21.7.

[769] *lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo, laṅkāvatārasūtra,* stanza X.429; Sanskrit in Bunyiu Nanjio, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,* Bibliotheca Otaniensis 1 (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), 319: *bhāvā vidyanti saṃvṛtyā paramārthe na bhāvakā / niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntistatsatyaṃ saṃvṛtirbhavet //.*

[770] VI.28abc; quote slightly lengthened for context.

[771] Taipei, 423.11.

[772] Dzongsar Institute, 183.21.

[773] Taipei, 424.3.

[774] Dzongsar Institute, 17.12.

[775] XIV.25cd; D3846, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsha,* 16a.5; Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka,* 134; R. Sonam, *Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas,* 275. The Sanskrit is not extant.

776 Dzongsar Institute, 176.2. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites just the first two lines.

777 The Peking edition (P6143, vol. 154, 17.2.7) reads *zad pa* (extinction) for *thar pa* (liberation). Both appear in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's commentary. Nāgārjuna's text itself is P2012, vol. 46, 34.2.8.

778 Taipei, 427.5.

779 XVIII.5.

780 XVIII.9.

781 *dbu ma pa, ca,* 22.5.

782 Taipei, 428.10.

783 Quoted in D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets,"* 173.22.

784 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ja,* 23.3.

785 Taipei, 434.5.

786 Dzongsar Institute, 163.17.

787 P5262, vol. 98, 102.1.5, VI.32d. His commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 24.5.8.

788 VI.32.

789 Taipei, 435.8.

790 Dzongsar Institute, 22.3. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a does not cite the first line, which is added for clarity.

791 Dzongsar Institute, 215.6. From "because" to the end has been added to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation for more context.

792 *byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa, bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra,* IX.35; D3871, *dbu ma,* vol. *la,* 32a.4-.6; see also the translation in Stephen Batchelor, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* (Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), 140; Sanskrit in Das Shastri, *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* 305.

793 II.6c-7.

794 Taipei, 439.7.

795 Dzongsar Institute, 15.18.

796 Dzongsar Institute, 16.5.

797 Dzongsar Institute, 20.22. I have added the first line to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation.

798 Dzongsar Institute, 208.8; I have added this citation for the sake of clarity.

799 P5260, vol. 98, 92.2.1, Colophon, stanzas 10-11. For the Sanskrit see J.W. de Jong's very helpful article on this Colophon, missing in Poussin's edition of Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words,* "La Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrakīrti" in *Oriens Extremus,* Jahrg. 9, 1962, 47-56 (reprinted in *J. W. De Jong Buddhist Studies,* 541-50 [Rep. of China: Asian Humanities Press, 1979]).

800 De Jong (*Buddhist Studies,* 549) takes *śataka* as being a sūtra ("Et aprés avoir lu égalément ces nombreux sūtra profonds tels que le Śataka…"), but Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's reading, given just below, as Āryadeva's *Four Hundred* is more plausible especially considering the *dang* in the Tibetan: *rgya pa la sogs de dag dang ni de bzhin.*

801 Dzongsar Institute, 16.11; *Commentary,* 166.23. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites only the final clause in the fourth line; the rest is added for context.

802 V.cd.

803 Sarnath, 67.12. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a merely refers to the commentary, but does not cite it.

804 V.cd.

805 Sarnath, 67.12. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a merely refers to the commentary, but does not cite it.

806 Toh. 3865, 197b.5.

807 There are a variety of confused readings in the editions here.

808 *dbu ma pa, ma,* 26.3.

809 P5228, vol. 95, stanza 32.

810 Stanza 33.

811 Taipei, 446.17.

812 P5260, vol. 98, 13.3.8.

813 P5260, vol. 98, 13.4.5.

814 Taipei, 448.12.

815 Dzongsar Institute, 23.16; Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites only the fifth line; the rest are included for context.

816 Dzongsar Institute, 224.10. I have added D̄ak-tsang's commentary on the above six lines for the sake of clarity. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites two passages from within this, prior to his response.

817 I.66.

818 Taipei, 448.17.

819 Taipei, 451.13.

820 Taipei, 453.20.

821 Dzongsar Institute, 1.16; Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites only the last line.

822 Brackets added from D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets,"* 33.19.

823 Dzongsar Institute, 36.5. I have filled in

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's elided citation.

824 VI.140-141; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 211a.3-211a.4; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 264.2-264.5; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 12 (1911):309.

825 VI.125abc; P5262, vol. 98, 104.1.8; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 210a.7; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 243.9-243.11; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 12 (1911):290. Citation lengthened by last line.

826 Dzongsar Institute, 33.17; citation lengthened.

827 VI.126cd; *dbu ma la 'jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra;* D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a;* La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 244.10-.11; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 12 (1911):291.

828 VI.124ab; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 210a.6-210a.7; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 242.1 and 242.6; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 12 (1911):289. Citation lengthened by first line.

829 Bracketed material in this line is drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, za,* 29.1.

830 VI.140; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 211a.3-211a.4; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 264.2-264.5; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 12 (1911):309. Citation lengthened by first sentence.

831 VI.121. The bracketed material is drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ya,* 29.3.

832 IV.2d. The brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought.*

833 *Supplement,* VI.140a.

834 *dbu ma pa, ya,* 29.5.

835 Dzongsar Institute, 10.20. As is evident below, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation is too short to provide context; so, I have added this as well as his commentary.

836 Dzongsar Institute, 107.4.

837 *Treatise on the Middle,* XV.

838 Dzongsar Institute, 20.3. I have added this citation from the section on the Consequence School to illustrate points behind D̄ak-tsang's assertion that in the Consequence School a mind-basis-of-all conventionally exists.

839 Dzongsar Institute, 201.18.

840 Chandrakīrti's *Supplement,* VI.39b.

841 Stanza 94; see Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 107.

842 Taipei, 456.5.

843 Dzongsar Institute, 10.20. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a puts together parts of the citation from D̄ak-tsang's *Knowing All Tenets* above so as to zero in on D̄ak-tsang's assertion of a mind-basis-of-all.

844 Dzongsar Institute, 107.4. Citation lengthened.

845 Commenting on VI.39.

846 *ye shes rdo rje kun btus kyi rnam bshad / dpal gsang ba 'dus pa'i bshad pa'i rgyud ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa'i rgya cher bshad pa rgyud bshad thabs kyi man ngag gsal bar bstan pa;* Toh. 5286.

847 Taipei, 457.2.

848 Dzongsar Institute, 18.7.

849 Dzongsar Institute, 184.11. I have inserted D̄ak-tsang's commentary to facilitate access to his system. As will be seen below, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites only the first sentence.

850 VI.23; D3861, vol. *'a,* 205a.5-6; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 102.8-102.9; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 11 (1910):299.

851 *Treatise on the Middle,* XVIII.9.

852 Taipei, 457.3.

853 Dzongsar Institute, 16.9. *Commentary,* 165.20.

854 Dzongsar Institute, 17.24. *Commentary,* 182.13.

855 Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 215.3. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a quotes only the initial "if" clause.

856 Taipei, 458.14.

857 IX.7-8b; brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, sha,* 31.2.

858 IX.46.

859 Taipei, 461.14.

860 Dzongsar Institute, 23.16.

861 Dzongsar Institute, 224.10.

862 In Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's text (Taipei, 461.18) read *rnam par* ***byang ba'i*** for *rnam par* ***byed pa'i*** in accordance with D̄ak-tsang's text (Dzongsar Institute, 224.21).

863 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's text (Taipei, 461) strangely reads *ma rig bag chags kyi sa'i nyon mongs dang sogs kyis ma rig bag chags kyi sa'i nyon mongs,* strangely repeating *ma rig bag chags kyi sa'i nyon mongs.*

864 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a cites this through "or."

865 VI.10-11; D3846, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsha,* 7b.2-7b.3; Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka,* 66; R. Sonam, *Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas,* 156-157.

866 *Four Interwoven Annotations on (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,"* 421.5.

867 Ibid.

868 See endnote 870.

869 *stong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, śunyatāsaptatikārikā,* stanzas 64-65; D3827, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsa,* 26b.3-26b.4; Tibetan text edited by Lindtner, *Master of Wisdom,* 114; Tibetan text, English translation, and contemporary commentary in David Ross Komito, *Nāgārjuna's "Seventy Stanzas"* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), 175-176. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, kha,* 32.1.

870 D3860, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 198b.5-199a.1; these are the first two stanzas of the fourteen-stanza colophon. The Sanskrit and Tibetan texts are edited by Jan Willem de Jong, "La Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrakīrti," *Oriens Extremus 9* (1962):49, 51-52. The Sanskrit reads: *yad buddhair iha śāsanaṃ navavidhaṃ sūtrādi saṃkīrtitaṃ lokānāṃ caritānurodhanipuṇaṃ satyadvayāpāśrayaṃ / tasmin rāganirākṛtau na hi kathā doṣakṣaye jāyate dveṣasyāpi nirākṛtau na hi kathā rāgakṣaye jāyate // mānāder api yat kṣayāya vacanaṃ nānyaṃ malaṃ hanti tat tasmād vyāpitaraṃ na tatra ca punas tās tā 'mahārthā kathā / yā mohasya parikṣayāya tu kathā kleśān aśeṣān asau hanyān mohasamāśritā hi sakalā kleśā jinair bhāṣitā //.* Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ga,* 32.3.

871 II.212cd.

872 Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ca,* 33.

873 I.67.

874 Taipei, 464.19.

875 The ellipses in the citation are Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

876 Commenting on XIII.1 and 2.

877 The list of the four features is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, pa,* 42.2.

878 Taipei, 471.14.

879 Dzongsar Institute, 16.13.

880 XXIV.14ab.

881 XXIV.14.

882 Taipei, 473.1.

883 Dzongsar Institute, 149.11. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a begins the quote with "The power" and finishes with "and so forth" after "perspective of mistaken."

884 Taipei, 475.12.

885 Dzongsar Institute, 23.17. This immediately follows the material of the three cyclic existences.

886 Dzongsar Institute, 225.21. The final paragraph, which I have appended to the earlier citation (636), is D̄ak-tsang's direct commentary on this stanza; the preceding material leads to it and thus is relevant to it.

887 Taipei, 475.14.

888 *kye'i rdo rje bsdus pa'i don gyi rgya cher 'grel pa, hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā.* The *Hevajra Tantra* itself has been translated by David L. Snellgrove in *The Hevajra Tantra, A Critical Study,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), Part 1.

889 Brackets from Kensur Ngawang Lekden's oral explanation, 1972.

890 Taipei, 479.19.

891 *dbu ma pa, tsha,* 47.3.

892 Taipei, 480.13.

893 The Dalama edition (*ca,* 60b.5) reads *kho na re;* the Taipei edition (481.3) reads *sa na re,* which would likely mean "a certain S̄a-ḡya-b̄a."

894 *bye brag rtogs byed / bye brag tu rtogs par byed pa;* P5832, vol. 144.

895 *Mahāvyutpatti* 7502. The Taiwan edition (481.16) and the Dalama edition misread *bhi na sva ra 'jigs pa'i ngang can* for *bi na shva ra 'jig pa'i ngang can.* There is no apparent reason for citing this line here, since it has no bearing on how to understand *svatantra.*

896 *Mahāvyutpatti* 7503.

897 *Mahāvyutpatti* 7498.

898 *Mahāvyutpatti* 7499.

899 *dpal gsang ba 'dus pa'i dkyil 'khor gyi cho ga'i 'grel pa, guhyasamājamaṇḍala vidhiṭīkā;* P2734, vol. 65; Toh. 1871.

900 *dbu ma pa, zha,* 53.3.

[901] (Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991), 185.15.
[902] Taipei, 484.1.
[903] Taipei, 484.13.
[904] Taipei, 485.11.
[905] Taipei, 485.13.
[906] Taipei, 486.9.
[907] These four are based on Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's citation (*dbu ma pa, ra,* 57.3) of the *snar thang* edition of Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* "*pa ni ya dang a ba dang sa ni la dang nir*"; I presume the third to mean "that having blue" but have not found it in a Sanskrit dictionary.
[908] *dbu ma pa, ya,* 54.1.
[909] The two sets of brackets in this sentence are drawn from Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 401.17 (codex Taipei edition).
[910] This paragraph is drawn from later in the same annotation: *dbu ma pa, ya,* 56.8.
[911] Chap. 2; P5549, vol. 112, 224.4.1; Étienne Lamotte, *La somme,* vol. 1, vol. 1, 36 (24); vol. 2, 118-119; and Keenan, *Summary,* 50-51.
[912] The brackets in this paragraph are drawn from Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 402.4 (codex Taipei edition).
[913] Taipei, 487.20.
[914] See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 97.
[915] Taipei, 488.16.
[916] *klu'i rgyal po ma dros pas zhus pa'i mdo, anavataptanāgarājaparipṛcchāsūtra;* P823, vol. 33; D156, vol. *pha.*
[917] *blo gros rgya mtshos zhus pa'i mdo, sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra;* P819, vol. 33; D152, vol. *pha.*
[918] XV.1ab.
[919] See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 98.
[920] See Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School,* 90.
[921] Taipei, 490.3.
[922] Taipei, 493.8.
[923] Buddhapālita cites the passage in commentary on the seventh stanza of chapter four in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* and recapitulates its meaning when commenting on chapter seven, stanza 34.
[924] *Saṃyutta Nikāya III,* ed. M. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, 1960), 141-142; *The Book of Kindred Sayings III,* trans. F. L. Woodward, Pali Text Society 13 (London: Luzac and Company, 1954), 120-121. (Note drawn from Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika,* 451 n.4.)
[925] *dbu ma pa, a,* 58.6.
[926] The translation is adapted from Tsong-ka-pa, Ken-sur Nga-w̄ang-lek-den, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 173.
[927] Stanzas 390 and 393.
[928] The Peking edition (P6143, vol. 154, 17.2.7) reads *zad pa* (extinction) for *thar pa* (liberation). Both appear in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's commentary. Nāgārjuna's text itself is P2012, vol. 46, 34.2.8.
[929] *dbu ma pa, a,* 60.1. The first sentence in each of the five is from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 494.10. The subsequent material is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ka,* 60.2.
[930] Taipei, 494.17.
[931] *dbu ma pa, kha,* 60.6.
[932] VI.23ab; D3861, vol. *'a,* 205a.5-6; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 102.8-102.9; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 11 (1910):299.
[933] VI.55cd. The brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (Sarnath, 262.9).
[934] Taipei, 495.15.
[935] *dbu ma pa, ga,* 64.2.
[936] VI.140-141; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 211a.3-211a.4; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 264.2-264.5; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 12 (1911):309.
[937] P775, vol. 29, 53.4.2, chapter 3; Suzuki's translation is 133 (33). See Jñānashrībhadra, P5519, vol. 107, 138.1.8. The bracketed material is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, 'a,* 206.8. I have added this four-line citation here in order to make the following commentary on them more accessible.
[938] *sa bcu pa, daśabhūmika;* chap. 6. P574, vol. 25, 263.3.8.
[939] *dbu ma pa, nga,* 65.3.
[940] Continuing in Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, tha,* 68.5. The statement of the

Mind-Only position is added from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 498.18.

941 Taipei, 498.5.

942 *dbu ma pa, da,* 69.3.

943 *dbu ma pa, pa,* 71.7.

944 Taipei, 500.21.

945 I have lengthened Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citations to include the entire stanza for the sake of context.

946 Taipei, 501.11.

947 Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 126.9.

948 I have added the first clause to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation for the sake of clarity. For the location in Kamalashīla's text, see two endnotes below.

949 *dbu ma pa, pha,* 72.4.

950 P5287, vol. 101, 83.2.2; D3887, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa,* 228a.8. Thanks to Paul Hackett for the identification.

951 *lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo, laṅkāvatārasūtra,* stanza X.429; Sanskrit in Bunyiu Nanjio, *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,* 319: *bhāvā vidyanti saṃvṛtyā paramārthe na bhāvakā / niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntistatsatyaṃ saṃvṛtirbhavet //.*

952 P6143, vol. 154, 31.2.1.

953 Taipei, 502.10.

954 This is drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's explanation, given just below.

955 *dbu ma pa, ma,* 74.4.

956 *dbu ma pa, tsha,* 75.7; presenting the meaning of a passage in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning.*

957 *dbu ma pa, wa,* 76.4.

958 Taipei, 504.10.

959 Taipei, 504.17.

960 P5255, vol. 96, 4.2.5.

961 *dbu ma pa, 'a,* 76.8.

962 The sentence to this point is from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 505.8.

963 Taipei, 505.15.

964 *dbu ma pa, ya,* 77.2; presenting the meaning of a passage in Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning.*

965 Taipei, 505.17.

966 Brackets from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ra,* 77.6.

967 *dbu ma pa, la,* 77.7.

968 Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 112.9. I have expanded Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's citation by adding one sentence at the beginning and one sentence at the end.

969 Taipei, 506.6.

970 Taipei, 506.13.

971 Taipei, 506.18.

972 Stanza 4ab; D3881, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa,* 1a.4; Tibetan in Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary,* 156; his English translation, 71.

973 *dbu ma pa, sha,* 78.5.

974 See Jñānagarbha's *Commentary on the Differentiation of the Two Truths* (*bden pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa, satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti*); D3882, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa,* 4a.4; Malcolm David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 156 (Tibetan) and 71 (English).

975 Taipei, 507.6.

976 *lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo, laṅkāvatārasūtra,* stanza X.429; Sanskrit in Bunyiu Nanjio, *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,* 319: *niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntistatsatyaṃ saṃvṛtirbhavet //.*

977 *dbu ma pa, a,* 79.3.

978 Taipei, 508.2.

979 I have lengthened Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citations to include the entire stanza for the sake of context.

980 *dbu ma pa, kha,* 80.1.

981 Taipei, 508.14.

982 The two sets of bracketed identifications are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, kha,* 81.3.

983 Taipei, 509.5.

984 Taipei, 509.11.

985 *dbu ma pa, na,* 84.7.

986 Taipei, 512.3.

987 *dbu ma pa, tsa,* 85.8.

988 VI.96.

989 D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought,* 328.15 (Sarnath edition).

990 Taipei, 512.11.

991 Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 119.1.

992 *dbu ma pa, wa,* 88.6.

993 For the appropriate stanzas from Shānta-

rakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle* see Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, wa,* 89.1ff.

[994] Taipei, 513.4; presenting the meaning of a passage in Shāntarakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle.*

[995] Taipei, 513.7.

[996] Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 119.6.

[997] Taipei, 515.13.

[998] Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 124.7.

[999] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 443.25 (Taipei edition).

[1000] Ibid.

[1001] Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 227.15. This appears at the end of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's text before the colophon.

[1002] Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso's *Port of Entry,* 562.3ff.

[1003] I have included material at the beginning of the quote not cited by Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a. The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

[1004] *dbu ma pa, sa,* 93.5.

[1005] Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 88.6.

[1006] Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 88.10.

[1007] Grags pa & rnam rgyal, 89.3.

[1008] Taipei, 517.18.

[1009] This sentence is drawn from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, ka,* 96.3.

[1010] Taipei, 518.16.

[1011] Taipei, 518.22.

[1012] Translation follows Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's correction at *Annotations, dbu ma pa, kha,* 96.4.

[1013] *dbu ma pa, ga,* 96.4; presenting the meaning of a passage in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle.*

[1014] Taipei, 520.6.

[1015] *dbu ma pa, nga* and *ca,* 97.2; presenting the meaning of two passages in Jñānagarbha's *Two Truths* and one passage in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle.*

[1016] Taipei, 520.15.

[1017] Taipei, 521.9.

[1018] *dbu ma pa, ta,* 99.1.

[1019] Taipei, 522.7.

[1020] *dbu ma pa, na, pa,* and *ba,* 100.3; presenting the meaning of passages in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle.*

[1021] Taipei, 523.16.

[1022] *dbu ma pa, ma,* 102.2; presenting the meaning of passages in Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle.*

[1023] Taipei, 523.20.

[1024] *dbu ma pa, tsa,* 103.2; presenting the meaning of the passage just cited from Jñānagarbha.

[1025] Taipei, 524.3.

[1026] Taipei, 524.8.

[1027] Taipei, 524.9.

[1028] Taipei, 524.12.

[1029] Taipei, 526.2.

[1030] P6142, vol. 153, 208.5.5. The Peking edition reads *mtshan 'dzin* instead of *mthar 'dzin.*

[1031] Taipei, 526.17.

[1032] P5260, vol. 98, 4.5.3, commenting on I.1. The Sanskrit is *Buddhist Sanskrit Texts*, vol. 10, 5.24; Poussin, 16.2. The brackets are from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 232b.6. With respect to this citation, the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts edition by Dr. L. Vaidya reads *mādhyamikasya sataḥ* which, despite his saying (p. 5 n. 5) that it is not rendered in the Tibetan, is rendered in the Tibetan by *dbu ma pa yin na ni* (vol. 98, 4.5.3). Poussin's edition (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, 16.2) reads *mādhyamikasya svataḥ* which he finds to be missing in the Tibetan (see n. 3); however, the Tibetan suggests that *sataḥ* is correct.

[1033] *dbu ma pa, ka,* 114.7.

[1034] Taipei, 526.18.

[1035] Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 58b.1.

[1036] P5246, vol. 95, 140.2.4, XVI.25. For Chandrakīrti's commentary see P5266, vol. 98, 279.2ff. This is quoted by Chandrakīrti in his *Clear Words* following the last quote, P5260, vol. 98, 4.5.4 (the Buddhist Text Series Sanskrit is No. 10, 5.25; Poussin, 16.4).

[1037] *dbu ma pa, kha,* 115.6.

[1038] Taipei, 527.4.

[1039] P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.1, stanza 29. This is quoted in the *Clear Words* immediately following the last quote, P5260, vol. 98, 4.5.4; Buddhist Text Series No. 10, 6.1; Poussin, 5.7. See K. Bhattacharya's *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* (Delhi: Motilal, 1978), 23. The brackets are from *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 59a.6. For contex-

tualization of this quote see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 471-473.

[1040] Translation from William Magee, *Evidently Empty: Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's Annotations for Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's "Great Exposition of Tenets"* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, forthcoming).

[1041] Taipei, 527.6.

[1042] *dbu ma pa, nga,* 117.2.

[1043] Taipei, 527.13.

[1044] Taipei, 527.14.

[1045] P5260, vol. 98, 10.3.1; Buddhist Text Series No. 10, 18.24; Poussin, 54.11. This is quoted in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 282a.2, and in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 37.5.3 and 38.3.2. The second quote almost immediately follows the first one.

[1046] Taipei, 527.17.

[1047] *don dam byang chub sems sgom, paramārthabodhicittabhāvanā;* P5431, vol. 103, 246.5.2. The Peking edition wrongly reads *stong pa gnyis* instead of *stong pa nyid.* The brackets are from *Annotations, dbu ma pa, nga,* 117.4, which confirms the latter reading as does J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets,* 409.10.

[1048] Taipei, 527.21.

[1049] P6142, vol. 153, 185.4.6ff. The quotation was lengthened by including the second clause.

[1050] *las mtha rnam 'byed, karmāntavibhaṅga;* P2676, vol. 62.

[1051] Taipei, 529.16.

[1052] Taipei, 531.2.

[1053] Missing in the Tibetan.

[1054] *Saṃyutta Nikāya III,* ed. M. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, 1960), 141-142; *The Book of Kindred Sayings III,* trans. F. L. Woodward, Pali Text Society 13 (London: Luzac and Company, 1954), 120-121. (Note drawn from Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika,* 451 n.4.)

[1055] Translation follows the Tibetan.

[1056] P5224, vol. 95, 3.1.3, I.1. This is quoted in brief by Chandrakīrti (P5260, vol. 98, 8.1.7; Poussin, 42.9).

[1057] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a gives only the first line of the first of the three quotes from the *Treatise on the Middle* (XIII.1, XI.1, and XV.7) and "and so forth"; I have expanded his citation in accordance with Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (P5260, vol. 98, 8.1.8ff; Poussin, 42.10), which is undoubtedly Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's reference.

[1058] The bracketed additions in this stanza are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle: Ocean of Reasoning,"* 232.2ff, Varanasi 1973 edition.

[1059] P5263, vol. 98, 43.5.7; Poussin, 270.3.

[1060] Taipei, 531.11.

[1061] P842, vol. 34, 64.3.6ff. This citation and that in *J̄ang-ḡya's Presentations of Tenets* (313.17ff) agree, but they differ from that in the *Clear Words* (P5260, vol. 98, 8.2.2; Poussin, 43.3). The Peking edition of it is a combination of both.

[1062] P842, vol. 34, 64.4.2; see previous endnote. Brackets are from J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets,* 315.17.

[1063] Taipei, 532.12.

[1064] J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets,* 317.4.

[1065] Taipei, 532.17.

[1066] P795, vol. 31, 281.1.5, VII.5. This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* (P5260, vol. 98, 8.2.8; Poussin, 44.1).

[1067] P763, vol. 27, 238.5.6, chapter 25; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 1, 286.10. Translation follows the Tibetan. The Peking edition reads *rdul bral.*

[1068] P160, vol. 6, 166.2.2.

[1069] Taipei, 533.8.

[1070] VI.95cd; P5262, vol. 98, 103.3.3.

[1071] Commenting on VI.95cd; P5263, vol. 98, 136.1.1ff. Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 250.

[1072] P774, vol. 29, 8.2.2, chapter 5.

[1073] P775, vol. 29, 34.3.5, chapter 2. Suzuki's translation is 44 (123).

[1074] P775, vol. 29, 39.5.2, chapter 2. See Jñānashrībhadra, P5519, vol. 107, 112.3.7. Suzuki's translation is 68.

[1075] P761.31, vol. 25, 263.3.8, chapter 6. This is quoted in the *Commentary on the "Supplement,"* P5263, vol. 98, 134.1.5, and in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Essence*, P6142, vol. 153, 196.2.6 as well as in his *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 71.5.8.

[1076] P5262, vol. 98, 103.1.8, VI.84; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 239. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's own commentary (P5263, vol. 98, 134.1.2).

[1077] P775, vol. 29, 40.2.6, chapter 2; see also the translation by Suzuki, 70 (139). See the commentaries by Jñānashrībhadra (P5519, vol. 107, 114.1.6) and Jñānavajra (P5520, vol. 107, 247.2.4). This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement"* (P5263, vol. 98, 134.2.3).

[1078] P761.31, vol. 25, 263.5.6.

[1079] P775, vol. 29, 53.4.2, chapter 3; Suzuki's translation is 133 (33). See Jñānashrībhadra, P5519, vol. 107, 138.1.8. The bracketed material is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dngos, 'a,* 206.8.

[1080] P2665, vol. 61, 285.5.6.

[1081] P5658, vol. 129, 181.2.2, stanzas 394-396; see Hopkins, *Advice for Living and Liberation.* Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, stod, pa,* 50.5. This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* in commentary on XVIII.6; Poussin, 359.

[1082] P5262, vol. 19, 103.3.2, VI.94; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 249.

[1083] P5262, vol. 98, 102.2.6, VI.43; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.11, 322. Commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 127.2.4ff. See D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought,* P6143, vol. 154, 55.5.8.

[1084] P778, vol. 29, 152.2.1.

[1085] Bracketed additions are from S̄er-s̄hül *Notes,* 53a.1.

[1086] P5263, vol. 98, 127.1.8ff, commenting on VI.42; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.11, 321. See D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought,* P6143, vol. 154, 55.5.1ff.

[1087] P5262, vol. 98, 103.3.4ff, VI.97; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 253. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement"* (P5263, vol. 98, 136.3.8ff.), and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 66b.4ff.).

[1088] P731, vol. 19, 189.2.1. This is quoted in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Essence* (P6142, vol. 153, 203.5.8).

[1089] I have restored Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's severe condensation of the quote from Chandrakīrti; P5263, vol. 98, 136.4.7ff., commenting on VI.97; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 255. This is quoted in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination* (P6143, vol. 154, 76.3.6ff) and *The Essence* (P6142, vol. 153, 204.5.3ff). See Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 66b.6ff., and Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 464a.2ff. Brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination.*

[1090] *Treatise,* XV.2cd.

[1091] I have omitted a sentence in which Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 255.5) refers back to an earlier annotation in which he indicates that Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's explanations agree with Ke-drup, but are difficult to fit together with D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* and *The Essence of Eloquence.*

[1092] Translation by William Magee.

[1093] Taipei, 539.12.

[1094] P5658, vol. 129, 175.2.6, stanza 80. D̄zong-ka-b̄a quotes it in his *Illumination* (P6143, vol. 154, 32.5.1). Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's commentary is based on Gyel-tsap's (21b.1).

[1095] Taipei, 540.20.

[1096] P5272, vol. 99, 260.4.5, IX.140. See Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 200a.5ff.

[1097] P5242, vol. 95, 112.1.7ff.; chap. 18.

[1098] P5260, vol. 98, 56.1.6, commenting on XVIII.7; Poussin, 368.4.

[1099] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 69a.1.

[1100] *Supplement,* VI.83; P5262, vol. 98, 103.1.8; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 238. Chandrakīrti's own commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 133.5.2. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 69a.4ff. The second quote is VI.159d; P5262, vol. 98, 104.5.6; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 321. Chandrakīrti's commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 147.3.8. The third quote is VI.24a; P5262, vol. 98, 101.5.5; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.11, 300. Chandrakīrti's commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 123.3.4.

[1101] Taipei, 542.3.

[1102] Taipei, 542.11.

[1103] Taipei, 542.21.

[1104] Taipei, 543.4.

[1105] P5262, vol. 98, 103.4.4, VI.104ab; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 267. Chandrakīrti's commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 138.5.4.

1106 Taipei, 543.12.

1107 Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 225b.3.

1108 P5242, vol. 95, 75.1.6ff, commenting on I.1. Brackets are from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 225a.6ff.

1109 This and the next brackets are from Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 225a.6ff.

1110 P5262, vol. 98, 101.3.4, VI.8c-13; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.11, 280-284. Brackets are mostly from Chandrakīrti's own commentary, P5263, vol. 98, 120.3.4ff.

1111 Taipei, 544.10.

1112 *Treatise,* P5224, vol. 95, 8.1.1, XX.19c-20d. These lines are quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement"* commenting on VI.14ab.

1113 VI.14; P5262, vol. 98, 101.4.2; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.11, 286-287.

1114 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 71a.8.

1115 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 71b.2.

1116 I.5; P5224, vol. 95, 3.1.5. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, P5260, vol. 98, 14.1.6. Chandrakīrti's other interpretation takes *parabhāva* as meaning production from other, but the meaning is roughly the same.

1117 VI.15-19; P5262, vol. 98, 101.4.3ff.; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 11, 288-93. Brackets are mostly from Chandrakīrti's commentary, P5263, vol. 98, 121.4.3ff, and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 38.3.7ff.

1118 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 71b.2.

1119 P876, vol. 34, 304.3.5. This is cited in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement,"* P5263, vol. 98, 122.3.7.

1120 Source for the brackets is Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement,"* P5263, vol. 98, 122.4.2.

1121 VI.20; P5262, vol. 98, 101.5.1; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 11, 295. Brackets are mostly from Chandrakīrti's own commentary, P5263, vol. 98, 122.4.5.

1122 *dbu ma pa, zha,* 146.2.

1123 Taipei, 545.13.

1124 P876, vol. 34, 304.2.8 and 305.4.6, with some variation in the reading. See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 502, for a citation of this by Chandrakīrti with a slightly different reading.

1125 P5260, vol. 98, 6.1.8, commenting on I.1; Poussin, 27.4. For the context of the quote, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness,* 503.

1126 P5262, vol. 98, 102.1.5, VI.32d. His commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 24.5.8.

1127 Taipei, 545.21.

1128 VI.98ab; P5262, vol. 98, 103.3.5; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 256 (misnumbered as 95ab). Chandrakīrti's commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 136.5.5.

1129 Taipei, 546.5.

1130 VI.21; P5262, vol. 98, 101.5.2; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 239. Chandrakīrti's own commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 137.2.8.

1131 Taipei, 546.17.

1132 P5227, vol. 95, 13.1.7.

1133 P5231, vol. 95, 52.5.6ff.

1134 VI.99; P5262, vol. 98, 103.3.6; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 11, 296. Citation lengthened by first two lines.

1135 The instrumental *bshad pas* is not an actual one according to Geshe Gedün Lodrö.

1136 Taipei, 547.11.

1137 This is a paraphrase of Kamalashīla's *Illumination of the Middle,* P5287, vol. 101, 76.4.2.

1138 Taipei, 547.17.

1139 The *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* is not included in the Peking Tripiṭaka, but only in the *sde dge* edition. This is stanza 14; for the Tibetan, see Malcolm David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha on the Two Truths* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987), 165. Brackets are from *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 73b.3ff.

1140 Taipei, 548.7.

1141 D̄ak-tsang's *"Knowing All Tenets,"* Dzongsar Institute, 20.11, and his commentary, 204.23.

1142 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, na,* 257.7.

1143 P5260, vol. 98, 3.3.7, commenting on the salutation; Poussin, 6.3-6.5.

1144 P5260, vol. 98, 13.3.7, commenting on I.3; Poussin, 74.3. For Dignāga's presentation of this,

see M. Hattori's *Dignāga, On Perception* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1968), 76 n. 1.11, and 87 n. 1.33.

1145 P5266, vol. 98, 259.1.5ff, chapter 13. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 74b.4. See n. 653.

1146 V.15; P5272, vol. 99, 248.5.3ff. Brackets are from Gyel-tsap's commentary, 43b. of a Gan-den edition.

1147 V.16; P5272, vol. 99, 248.5.4. This is quoted in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, 79b.5 (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1968).

1148 IV.21ab; P5272, vol. 99, 248.1.2.

1149 P5287, vol. 101, 76.4.2.

1150 P5287, vol. 101, 76.5.2.

1151 Taipei, 549.18.

1152 XXIV.19; P5224, vol. 95, 9.3.5. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 74a.8.

1153 IX.2 and IX.5; P5246, vol. 95, 136.4.3. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's commentary, P5266, vol. 98, 236.3.3. This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, P5260, vol. 98, 78.2.6; Poussin, 505.

1154 This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, P5260, vol. 98, 78.2.7; Poussin, 505. He also quotes it in his commentary to the *Four Hundred,* P5266, vol. 98, 236.5.2.

1155 Commenting on XXIV.19; P5260, vol. 98, 78.2.8; Poussin, 504.14.

1156 XXIV.18; P5224, vol. 95, 9.3.4. Brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's commentary, P6153, vol. 156, 148.3.2ff and 148.5.1ff.

1157 Commenting on XXIV.18; P5260, vol. 98, 78.2.3; Poussin, 504.13.

1158 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 75a.8.

1159 Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 75a.7.

1160 P6016, vol. 153, 37.3.5.

1161 P5265, vol. 98, 171.5.1ff.

1162 See P5591, vol. 115, 176.2.3ff, and P5593, vol. 116, 175.2.3ff.

1163 P5775, vol. 140, 45.3.8.

1164 P5775, vol. 140, 45.5.4.

1165 P5775, vol. 140, 45.3.8.

1166 P5775, vol. 140, 45.1.3.

1167 P5260, vol. 98, 3.2.8ff; Poussin, 5.1-4. See the notes in Poussin (p. 5ff.) throughout.

1168 P5260, vol. 98, 3.3.3ff; Poussin, 5.7-5.8.

1169 P5253, vol. 95, 154.1.8.

1170 Avalokitavrata, *Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka's) "Lamp for (Nāgārjuna's) 'Wisdom,'"* P5259, vol. 96, 169.5.8ff.

1171 This is a paraphrase of Sarvavarman's *Kalāpasūtra;* see n. 679.

1172 Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 75b.8.

1173 P5260, vol. 98, 3.3.5ff; Poussin, 6.1-7.5.

1174 P5260, vol. 98, 3.4.6ff; Poussin, 8.1-3.

1175 P5260, vol. 98, 3.4.7ff.; Poussin, 8.3-9.

1176 P5260, vol. 98, 3.5.2ff; Poussin, 8.10-9.6. The Tibetan reading is followed in the first two paragraphs of the translation.

1177 P5225, vol. 95, 11.4.1.

1178 P5253, vol. 95, 154.2.1.

1179 *Rice Seedling Sūtra*, P876, vol. 34, 303.3.8.

1180 P5260, vol. 98, 3.5.7ff; Poussin, 9.7-10.2. Literally: "That system which is presented as 'What then? The meaning…' is also incorrect."

1181 P5225, vol. 95, 11.4.1.

1182 P5658, vol. 129, 174.4.7, stanza 48ab. The Peking edition has: *'di yod pas na 'di byung dper/ ring po yod pas thung ngu bzhin.*

1183 P5260, vol. 98, 4.1.1ff; Poussin, 10.3-9.

1184 P5593, vol. 116, 175.2.3.

1185 XIV.23; P5246, vol. 95, 139.2.7. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's commentary (P5266, vol. 98, 270.3.6).

1186 P5225, vol. 95, 11.4.1. Chandrakīrti's commentary is P5265, vol. 98, 177.1.3.

1187 P5266, vol. 98, 270.3.3, which is commentary preceding XIV.23.

1188 P5682, vol. 129, 237.5.7.

1189 Mahāmati, *Clear Words, Extensive Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Friendly Letter,"* P5690, vol. 129, 270.4.3 and 270.4.8.

1190 P6016, vol. 153, 38.1.1.

1191 Taipei, 556.6.

1192 III.1a; P5709, vol. 130, 88.3.4.

1193 VI.166.

1194 Taipei, 556.14.

[1195] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle,* 464b.2ff.

[1196] This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Supplement,"* P5263, vol. 98, 142.4.8, commenting on VI.126. It is also quoted in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 84.3.7.

[1197] VI.124b; P5262, vol. 98, 104.1.7; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 289. The second quote is VI.132cd; P5262, vol. 98, 104.2.6; *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 301.

[1198] Commenting on VI.120; P5263, vol. 98, 141.2.7; *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 283. Brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination,* P6143, vol. 154, 82.2.8.

[1199] Commenting on XVIII.2ab; P5242, vol. 95, 111.1.2.

[1200] Commenting on VI.120; v. 12, 282; P5263, vol. 98, 141.2.3.

[1201] I.3ab; P5262, vol. 98, 100.2.5.

[1202] Commenting on I.3; P5263, vol. 98, 109.3.5. Brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 6.5.1.

[1203] P6153, vol. 156, 65.5.8ff.

[1204] P6153, vol. 156, 66.1.2.

[1205] Ke-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* (blockprint in the possession of Geshe Wangyal), 105a.6ff.

[1206] Commenting on XVIII.2cd; P5260, vol. 98, 53.5.8; Poussin, 347.13.

[1207] *dbu ma pa, ma,* 157.3.

[1208] Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle,* XVIII.2cd.

[1209] 422.5.

[1210] I.3. See Tsong-ka-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, 116. D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 201b.3-201b.4; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 9.7-9.10; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 8 (1907):258. Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den cites only the last two lines.

[1211] Sarnath, 405.8.

[1212] VI.164d.

[1213] The brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's commentary (Sarnath, 405.12).

[1214] VI.165ab.

[1215] Taipei, 558.11.

[1216] VI.124b; P5262, vol. 98, 104.1.7. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 83a.6.

[1217] VI.124b; P5262, vol. 98, 104.1.7; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 289. His commentary is vol. 98, 142.3.4. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 83a.6.

[1218] VI.125; P5262, vol. 98, 104.1.8; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 290. Brackets in the citation are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought*, P6143, vol. 154, 84.2.5.

[1219] VI.124b; P5262, vol. 98, 104.1.7; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 289. His commentary is vol. 98, 142.3.4. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 83a.6.

[1220] XVIII.1cd; P5224, vol. 95, 7.2.8.

[1221] Commenting on XVIII.1cd; P5260, vol. 98, 53.3.1ff.; Poussin, 343.8; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10, 146.20ff.

[1222] Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 88a.2ff.

[1223] Commenting on XI.3; P6153, vol. 156, 110.3.3.

[1224] Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 89a.6.

[1225] Commenting on VI.144; P5263, vol. 98, 146.1.1; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 312.

[1226] *Commentary on the "Supplement,"* commenting on VI.144; P5263, vol. 98, 146.1.3ff.; v. 12, 312.

[1227] *Clear Words*, commenting on XVIII.5; P5260, vol. 98, 54.5.6ff.; Poussin 355.5.

[1228] This is quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, commenting on XVIII.5 immediately after the last quote; P5260, vol. 98, 54.5.7; Poussin, 355.7.

[1229] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 84b.6.

[1230] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 84b.5.

[1231] Chandrakīrti uses this metaphor in his *Clear Words* commenting on X.14; P5260, vol. 98, 35.4.3; Poussin, 212-213.

[1232] XXII.1; P5224, vol. 95, 8.3.3. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma*

pa, 85a.1ff.

[1233] Stanza 82; P5658, vol. 129, 175.2.8. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 85a.2ff.

[1234] Commenting on XXII.1; P5242, vol. 95, 120.4.1.

[1235] Commenting on XVIII.1; P5260, vol. 98, 53.1.8; Poussin, 341.8.

[1236] XXVII.12.

[1237] XXVII.6.

[1238] VI.127-128; *Supplement*, P5262, vol. 98, 104.2.1ff.; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v.12, 292-4. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's own commentary, P5263, vol. 98, 142.5.5ff, and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 84.5.4ff.

[1239] Commenting on XXII.1; P5242, vol. 95, 120.4.2. Brackets are from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa,* 86b.8.

[1240] Commenting on XVIII.1; P5260, vol. 98, 55.3.1ff.; Poussin, 343.8.

[1241] Commenting on XXII.1; P5242, vol. 95, 120.4.4ff,.

[1242] Commenting on VI.142; P5263, vol. 98, 145.4.6ff.; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 310. Brackets are from *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 89.1.3ff.

[1243] Commenting on XXII.1; P5242, vol. 95, 120.4.5.

[1244] P5262, vol. 98, 104.3.7ff, VI.143; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 310-111. Brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 89.1.7ff.

[1245] Commenting on VI.143; P5263, vol. 98, 145.5.2ff.; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 311.

[1246] P5262, vol. 98, 104.4.6, VI.151; Poussin's translation is *Muséon,* n.s. v. 12, 316. Brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 90.2.4ff. Chandrakīrti's own commentary is P5263, vol. 98, 146.4.1ff.

[1247] VI.166-167; P5262, vol. 98, 105.1.3ff.; Poussin's translation ends with VI.165. Brackets are from Chandrakīrti's own commentary, P5263, vol. 98, 148.5.1ff, and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination*, P6143, vol. 154, 93.1.4ff.

[1248] P5256, vol. 96, 36.4.5. J̄ang-ḡya's *Presentations of Tenets,* 431.1, has *brjod pa* for *dran pa.*

[1249] Taipei, 564.2.

[1250] Taipei, 564.12. I have paraphrased Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's explanation of the six positions but not his subsequent refutations.

[1251] *yab dang sras mjal ba'i mdo, pitāputrasamāgamasūtra;* P760.16, vol.23; D60, vol. *nga* (*dkon brtsegs*), 60b.4-60b.5.

[1252] Taipei, 565.7.

[1253] Taipei, 566.12.

[1254] VI.23.

[1255] *dbu ma pa, ja,* 178.7.

[1256] *dbu ma snang ba, madhyamakāloka;* D3887, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa,* 221a.1-221a.2.

[1257] Taipei, 567.4.

[1258] This is the first of two stanzas summarizing and concluding chapter three.

[1259] This appears to be a paraphrase, or the implications, of D̄ak-tsang's *Commentary on "Knowing All Tenets,"* 185.

[1260] From the expression of worship at the beginning of the text.

[1261] Taipei, 570.2.

[1262] Taipei, 572.18.

[1263] *dbu ma pa, ma,* 183.5.

[1264] Taipei, 573.7.

[1265] Taipei, 577.5.

[1266] Taipei, 578.13.

[1267] Taipei, 580.3.

[1268] *dbu ma pa, ka,* 190.8.

[1269] *dbu ma pa, ga,* 191.7.

[1270] *dbu ma pa, ga,* 194.4.

[1271] *dbu ma pa, ga,* 198.7.

[1272] *dbu ma pa, ga,* 199.4.

[1273] Taipei, 581.3.

[1274] Taipei, 583.17.

[1275] *dbu ma pa, ba,* 203.6.

[1276] Taipei, 585.17.

[1277] *dbu ma pa, a,* 209.4.

[1278] Taipei, 591.4.

[1279] The bracketed material in this section is from Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, nga,* 211.3) .

[1280] *dbu ma pa, ca,* 211.6.

[1281] (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1998), 162-164.

[1282] Taipei, 593.11.

[1283] *dbu ma pa, cha,* 212.1.

[1284] Stanza I.9cd; D13, vol. *ka* (*she rab sna tshogs*), 2a.6-2b.1; Sanskrit and Tibetan in Akira Yuyama, *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 10 and 160: *imi skandha śūnya parikalpayi bodhisattvo caratī nimitti anupāda-pade asakto //.* Edward Conze, *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and its Verse Summary* (Bolinas, Calif.: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), 10.

[1285] Stanza I.28cd; Sanskrit and Tibetan in Yuyama, *Saṃcaya-gāthā,* 16 and 162: *prakṛti-asanta parijānayamāna dharmān eṣā sa prajña-vara-pāramitāya caryā //.* English translation in Conze, *Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines,* 12.

[1286] Stanza VII.3abc; Sanskrit and Tibetan in Yuyama, *Saṃcaya-gāthā,* 35-36 and 167: *yada dharma saṃskṛta-asaṃskṛta-kṛṣṇa-śuklā aṇu-mātru no labhati prajña vibhāvamāna / tada prajña-pāramita gacchati saṃkhya loke.* English translation in Conze, *Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines,* 23.

[1287] Stanza IX.37; D127, *mdo sde,* vol. *da,* 27a.7-27b.1; Sanskrit, Tibetan, and English in Cristoph Cüppers, *The IXth Chapter of the Samādhirājasūtra,* Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, 41 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990), 53: *nairātmya dharmān yadi pratyavekṣate tāṃ pratyavekṣya yadi bhāvayeta / sa hetu nirvāṇaphalasya prāptaye ya anyahetū na sa bhoti śāntaye //.* The Tibetan is on p. 54, and English translation on p. 100.

[1288] *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa snying po, prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya;* D21, vol. ka (*shes rab sna tshogs*), 145a.4-145a.5. Sanskrit in Edward Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 149-150: *atha-āyuṣmāñc chāriputro buddha-anubhāvena ārya-avalokiteśvaraṃ bodhisattvaṃ mahāsattvam etad avocat / ya kaścit kūlaputro vā kuladuhitā vā asyāṃ gambhīrāyāṃ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caryāṃ cartukāmas tena kathaṃ śikṣitavyam / evam ukta ārya-avalokiteśvaro bodhisattvo mahāsattvo āyuṣmantaṃ śāriputram etad avocat / ya kaścic chāriputra kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā asyāṃ gambhīrāyāṃ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caryāṃ cartukāmas tenaivaṃ vyavalokitavyam / pañcaskandhās tāṃś ca sva-bhāva-śūnyān paśyati sma.*

[1289] Taipei, 594.1.

[1290] Taipei, 596.11.

[1291] P5260, vol. 98, 56.1.6, commenting on XVIII.7; Poussin, 368.4.

[1292] Taipei, 597.20.

[1293] Taipei, 598.11.

[1294] Taipei, 598.13.

[1295] Taipei, 20.

[1296] Taipei, 599.13.

[1297] Taipei, 599.17.

[1298] *dbu ma pa, wa,* 223.7.

[1299] Taipei, 599.22.

[1300] *dbu ma pa, zha,* 223,5.

[1301] Taipei, 600.11.

[1302] Taipei, 600.18.

[1303] *dbu ma pa, ya,* 225.8.

[1304] Taipei, 603.3.

[1305] Taipei, 603.7.

[1306] *dbu ma pa, ra,* 227.1.

[1307] Taipei, 601.8.

[1308] Taipei, 602.13.

[1309] For these, see Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets,* 601-602.

[1310] Taipei, 603.13.

[1311] Taipei, 603.16.

[1312] *dbu ma pa, ka,* 229.7.

[1313] *dbu ma pa, ca,* 231.8.

[1314] Taipei, 604.4.

[1315] Taipei, 604.15.

[1316] The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

[1317] *dbu ma pa, tsa,* 27.3.

[1318] Toh. 3865, 197b.3.

[1319] Taipei, 605.1.

[1320] Taipei, 605.2.

[1321] The ellipsis is Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

[1322] Taipei, 605.7.

[1323] *dbu ma pa, nya,* 235.

[1324] I have added D̄zong-ka-b̄a's citation of the sūtra.

[1325] Taipei, 606.2.

[1326] Taipei, 606.20.

[1327] 487.8. This is cited in Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, tha,* 237.3.

[1328] Taipei, 607.4.

[1329] *dbu ma pa, na,* 238.1.

[1330] Taipei, 608.8.

[1331] Following emendation of Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's "six" (609.13) to "five" by Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*Annotations, dbu ma pa, ma,* 239.7).

[1332] *dbu ma pa, tsa,* 239.8.

[1333] Taipei, 610.9.

[1334] Stanza VI.26; D3861, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 205b.1; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 105.9-105.12; La Vallée Poussin, "Introduction au traité du milieu," *Muséon* 11 (1910):302.

[1335] Taipei, 611.1.

[1336] *dbu ma pa, dza,* 240.2.

[1337] Taipei, 611.5.

[1338] Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of Tenets* (Taipei, 611.19).

[1339] Reading *gzugs brnyan* for *gzugs can* (ibid., 612.2) in accordance with Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's *Great Exposition of the Middle* (Gomang edition, 1994, 802.6-803.1, and Ngawang Gelek edition, 804.6-805.1), which speaks of inference through analogy "realizing that a shoot is like a reflection in a mirror in that it is untrue." Thanks to Derek Maher for the emendation. All editions consulted read *gzugs can,* and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den does not offer a correction, but *gzugs can,* while not being impossible, is unusual.

[1340] Ibid., 612.1.

[1341] Ibid., 612.5.

[1342] Taipei, 612.8.

[1343] Taipei, 612.16.

[1344] In the Taiwan edition (14.19 and 613.20), the last line of the root text reads *shes rab grol rgyu mi rtog don sgrub* ***phyir***, whereas the Dalama edition (*cha,* 44a.3) reads *shes rab grol rgyu mi rtog don sgrub* ***byed***, which is reflected in Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's word commentary (*dbu ma pa, na,* 263.2) *bdag med rtogs pa'i shes rab ni 'khor ba las grol ba'i rgyu* ***dang*** *rnam par mi rtog pa'i don sgrub* ***byed*** *yin no;* the interlinear word commentary included in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's Collected Works (24a.3) has a still different reading *shes rab grol rgyu mi rtog don sgrub* ***mkhas***. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's commentary does not use any of these and thus does not resolve the issue.

[1345] Taipei, 613.20.

[1346] Stanzas 5-24; see Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 94ff.

[1347] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary,* 8b.6; see also Ajitamitra, Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 383.1.

[1348] Stanzas 5 (I have added the first and last lines to Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's citation) and 25-100; see Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 97ff.

[1349] Gyel-tsap's *Commentary,* 17a.6.

[1350] Ajitamitra, Golden Reprint, vol. 183, 416.2.

[1351] Taipei, 614.22.

[1352] Taipei, 616.9.

[1353] Taipei, 616.17.

[1354] Taipei, 617.22.

[1355] *dbu ma pa, ra,* 242.1.

[1356] *dngos, ja,* 45.4, and *dbu ma pa, sha,* 242.5.

[1357] *dbu ma pa, sha,* 242.6.

[1358] Taipei, 618.19.

[1359] Taipei, 619.1.

[1360] The root text reads "supports" (*rten*), but Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's own commentary (621.1) and Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's word commentary (*dbu ma pa, na,* 264.4) read "the supported" (*brten pa*).

[1361] Cited in Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's *Annotations, dbu ma pa, sa,* 242.7.

[1362] Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's word commentary (*dbu ma pa, na,* 264.2) reads *gdul* ***bya'i*** *don* ***nam*** *phar byin sogs la spyod pa'i sbyor ba* in an obvious attempt to correct scribal errors in Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's commentary (619.9) *gdul* ***byas*** *don* ***dam*** *phar byin sogs la spyod pa'i sbyor ba.* The reformulator of Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's word commentary, Ge-s̄hay N̄am-gyel-ḡel-den (*dge bshes rnam rgyal skal ldan,* 519.1), mysteriously turns Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's words into *gdul bya'i don* ***rnams*** *nam phar byin sogs la spyod pa'i* ***khyad par*** *sbyor ba* with a grammatically impossible ***rnams*** *nam.*

[1363] Collected Works of dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, vol. 7 (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971), 458ff.

[1364] Taipei, 621.3.

[1365] *dbu ma pa, ga,* 246.1.

[1366] Taipei, 622.10.

[1367] *dbu ma pa, cha,* 249.6.

[1368] Taipei, 622.21.

[1369] *dbu ma pa, ja,* 251.3.

[1370] Taipei, 623.3.
[1371] *dbu ma pa, nya,* 251.5.
[1372] Taipei, 623.4.
[1373] I.4.
[1374] *dbu ma pa, ta,* 251.6.
[1375] Taipei, 623.17.
[1376] Taipei, 624.8.
[1377] XI.17d/XII.8d; D3862, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 332a.1; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 362.6.
[1378] *dbu ma pa, tha,* 252.5.
[1379] Commenting on XII.8d; (Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, n.d.), 252.23.
[1380] 474.4.
[1381] Commenting on XVIII.9; D3860, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 120a.3-120a.4; La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapadā,* 374.1-374.2: *vikalpaścittapracāra / tadrahitatvāttattattvaṃ nirvikalpaṃ // yathoktaṃ sūtre / paramārthasatyaṃ katamat / yatra jñānasyāpyapracāra ka punarvādo ' kṣarāṇāmiti /.* Tibetan in J. W. de Jong, *Cinq Chapitres de la Prasannapadā.* Documents et Travaux pour L'etude du Bouddhisme, Tome IX (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1949), 104-105; his French translation is on p. 30. Thanks to Kevin Vose for the note.
[1382] Commenting on XII.8; D3862, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 332a.1-332a.2; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 362.6-362.8.
[1383] Taipei, 624.10.
[1384] Taipei, 624.17.
[1385] III.1ab.
[1386] Taipei, 625.13.
[1387] II.44. Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a quotes only two lines; I have added the others for context.
[1388] II.45-46.
[1389] *dbu ma pa, da,* 252.7.
[1390] Taipei, 625.21.
[1391] II.44cd.
[1392] II.47.
[1393] *dbu ma pa, da,* 253.3.
[1394] Taipei, 626.4.
[1395] VIII.2-6.
[1396] *Eloquent Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics: Sacred Word of Guru Ajita* (*dngos po brgyad don bdun cu'i rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma'i zhal lung*). This is given for the sake of clarity.
[1397] *dbu ma pa, na,* 253.4.
[1398] Taipei, 626.10.
[1399] II.40.
[1400] Taipei, 627.18.
[1401] II.53-56.
[1402] III.38.
[1403] Taipei, 628.14.
[1404] IV.3.
[1405] Stanzas 19-26 in the section on the fruit; the brackets are from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought,* 253.26 and 255.9.
[1406] Taipei, 629.6.
[1407] III.5-6.
[1408] III.29.
[1409] III.27.
[1410] Stanza 41 in the fruit section.
[1411] This appears just before stanza 41.
[1412] Taipei, 632.3.
[1413] Taipei, 634.9.
[1414] Taipei, 634.11.
[1415] Stanza 180 (VIII.5); sde dge 3846, 9a.7. See Karen Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge,* Indiste Studier 7 (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), 81; and *Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas: Gyel-tsap on Āryadeva's Four Hundred,* commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen, translated and edited by Ruth Sonam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1994), 188.
[1416] XVI.12.
[1417] Taipei, 634.19.
[1418] Taipei, 635.10.
[1419] Taipei, 635.19.
[1420] *tshul gsum gyi sgron ma, nayatrayapradīpa;* P4530, vol. 81, 115.2.5.
[1421] *dbu ma pa, nga,* 267.6.
[1422] H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-ka-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), 142-143.
[1423] The ellipsis is Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den's.
[1424] *dbu ma pa, cha* and *nya,* 269.3.

[1425] *dbu ma pa, nya,* 269.6.

[1426] Taipei, 639.3.

[1427] *Illuminating the Great Treatise, (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'"* (*bstan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa gsal bar byed pa theg chen rgya mtshor 'jug pa'i gru gzings*), 37b.5. The ellipses are Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's.

[1428] *sgron gsal, pradīpodyotana;* P2650, vol. 60; commentary on the *Guhyasamāja Tantra.*

Bibliography

Sūtras and tantras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section of the bibliography. Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second section; other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section.

"P," standing for "Peking edition," refers to the *Tibetan Tripiṭaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Foundation, 1956). "Toh" refers to the *Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon,* edited by Hukuji Ui (Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, 1934), and *A Catalogue of the Tohuku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism,* edited by Yensho Kanakura (Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, 1953). "Dharma" refers to the *sde dge* edition of the Tibetan canon published by Dharma—the *Nying-ma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-'gyur and bsTan-'gyur* (Oakland, Calif.: Dharma, 1980), which contains excellent references to editions, translations, and so forth. "Tokyo *sde dge*" refers to the *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka—bsTan hgyur Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo,* edited by Z. Yamaguchi et al. (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1977-1984). "Karmapa *sde dge*" refers to the *sde dge mtshal par bka' 'gyur: a facsimile edition of the 18th century redaction of Si tu chos kyi 'byung gnas prepared under the direction of H.H. the 16th rgyal dbang karma pa* (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1977). "*stog* Palace" refers to the *Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur* (Leh, Ladakh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemdzod, 1979). "Golden Reprint" refers to the *gser bris bstan 'gyur* (Sichuan, China: krung go'i mtho rim nang bstan slob gling gi bod brgyud nang bstan zhib 'jug khang, 1989). Works mentioned in the first or second sections are not repeated in the third section.

1. Sūtras and Tantras

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laṅkāvatārasūtra
lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo
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Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra

aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā

shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa

P734, vol. 21

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Expression of Mañjushrī's Ultimate Names Tantra

mañjuśrī-jñānasattvasya-paramārtha-nāma-saṃgīti

'jam dpal ye shes sems dpa'i don dam pa'i mtshan yang dar par brjod pa

Peking 2, vol. 1

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Great Drum Sūtra

mahābherīhārakaparivartasūtra

rnga bo che chen po'i le'u'i mdo

P888, vol. 35

King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra

samādhirājasūtra / sarvadharmasvabhāvasamatāvipañcatasamādhirājasūtra

ting nge 'dzin rgyal po'i mdo / chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin mnyam pa nyid rnam par spros pa ting nge 'dzin gyi rgyal po'i mdo

P795, vol. 31-2; Toh 127, Dharma, vol. 20

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ratnakūṭa / mahāratnakūṭadharmaparyāyaśatasāhasrikagrantha

dkon brtsegs / dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen po'i chos kyi rnam grangs le'u stong phrag brgya pa

P760, vols. 22-24

See individual sutra titles.

Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra

āryamahāparinirvāṇanāmamahāyānasūtra

'phags pa yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo

P787, vols. 30-31; translated by wang phab shun, dge ba'i blo gros, rgya mtsho'i sde

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āryatathāgatagarbhanāmamahāyanasūtra

'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo

P924, vol. 36

English translation: William H. Grosnick. "The *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra.*" In *Buddhism in Practice,* edited by Donald S. Lopez, Jr., 92-106. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Also: Shu-hui J. Chen. *Affirmation in Negation: A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory in the Light of the Bodhisattva Practices,* 457-503. PhD diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998.

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āryasarvabuddhaviṣayāvatārajñānālokāṃkāranāmamahāyanasūtra
'phags pa sangs rgyas thams cad kyi yul la 'jug pa'i ye shes snang ba rgyan gyi mdo ces bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo
P768, vol. 28

Questions of King Dhāraṇīṣhvara Sūtra / Sūtra Teaching the Great Compassion of a One-Gone-Thus
āryatathāgatamahākaruṇānirdeśasūtra
de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying rje chen po bstan pa'i mdo / 'phags pa gzungs kyi dbang phyug rgyal pos zhus pa'i mdo
P814, vol. 32

Sūtra of the Tens of a One-Gone-Thus
tathāgatadaśikasūtra
de bzhin gshegs pa bcu pa'i mdo
P924, vol. 36

Sūtra on the Ten Grounds
daśabhūmikasūtra
mdo sde sa bcu pa
P761.31, vol. 25
Sanskrit: *Daśabhūmikasūtram.* P. L. Vaidya, ed. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 7. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967.
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Sūtra Showing Entry into the Inconceivable Realm of the Qualities and Wisdom of a One-Gone-Thus
tathāgataguṇajñānācintyaviṣayāvatāranirdeśasūtra
de bzhin gshegs pa'i yon tan dang ye shes bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i yul la 'jug pa bstan pa'i mdo
P852, vol. 34

Sūtra Showing the Inconceivable Mysteries of the One-Gone-Thus
tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśasūtra
de bzhin gshegs pa'i gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan pa'i mdo
D47, vol. *ka* (*dkon brtsegs*)

Sūtra Unraveling the Thought
saṃdhinirmocanasūtra
dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo
P774, vol. 29; Toh 106; Dharma, vol. 18; *The Tog Palace Edition of the Tibetan Kanjur,* vol. 63, 1-160 (Leh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod, 1975-1978)
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Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra
akṣayamatinirdeśa
blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa
P842, vol. 34

Twenty-five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa
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Precious Lamp / Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and the Definitive Meanings, The Essence of Eloquence": A Precious Lamp

drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel rin chen sgron me

Delhi: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982.

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sārasvatavyākaraṇa / sārasvatīprakriyā

dbyangs can sgra mdo/ dbyangs can ma

P5886, vol. 148; P5911, vol. 149; P5912, vol. 149

Āryadeva (*'phags pa lha,* second to third century C.E.)

Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom

jñānasārasamuccaya

ye shes snying po kun las btus pa

P5251, vol. 95

Four Hundred / Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas / Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas

catuḥśatakaśāstrakārikā

bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa

P5246, vol. 95

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mahāyānottaratantraśāstravyākhya

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yogācārabhūmi / bhūmivastu

rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa / sa'i dngos gzhi

P5536-5538, vols. 109-110; D4035-4037, Dharma vols. 78

Grounds of Bodhisattvas

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   rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba
   P5539, vols. 110-111, D4038, vol. *zi*
3. *Compendium of Bases*
   vastusaṃgraha
   gzhi bsdu ba
   P5540, vol. 111; D4039, Dharma vol. 79
4. *Compendium of Enumerations*
   paryāyasaṃgraha
   rnam grang bsdu ba
   P5542, vol. 111; D4041, Dharma vol. 79
5. *Compendium of Explanations*
   vivaraṇasaṃgraha
   rnam par bshad pa bsdu ba
   P5543, vol. 111; D4042, Dharma vol. 79

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   abhidharmasamuccaya
   chos mngon pa kun btus
   P5550, vol. 112
   Sanskrit: Pralhad Pradhan. *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga.* Visva-Bharati Series 12. Santiniketan, India: Visva-Bharati (Santiniketan Press), 1950.
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mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana
theg pa chen po bsdus pa'i bshad sbyar
P5552, vol. 113

Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras"
sūtrālaṃkārāṭīkā
theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi rgya cher bshad pa
P5530, vol. 108

Atisha (*atiśa / atīśa,* 982-1054)
Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment
bodhipathapradīpa
byang chub lam gyi sgron ma
P5343, vol. 103
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prajñāpradīpaṭīkā
shes rab sgron ma'i rgya cher 'grel pa
P5259, vol. 96-7
Ḇel-jor-hlün-drup, Ñyel-ḏön (*dpal 'byor lhun grub, gnyal* [or *gnyan*] *ston,* 1427-1514)
Lamp for the Teaching / Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's) "The Essence of Eloquence": Lamp for the Teaching
legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me
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Blaze of Reasoning / Commentary on the "Heart of the Middle": Blaze of Reasoning
madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā
dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba
P5256, vol. 96
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madhyamakahṛdayakārikā
dbu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa
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Connected Explanation of [Āryadeva's] "Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom"
jñānasārasamuccayanāmanibandhana
ye shes snying po kun las btus pa shes bya ba'i bshad sbyar
P5252, vol. 95
Bu-ḏön Rin-chen-drup (*bu ston rin chen grub,* 1290-1364)
Catalogue of the Translated Doctrine
chos bsgyur dkar chag
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lung du ston pa cāndra pa'i mdo
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madhaymakāvatārabhāṣya
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Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges

triśaranasaptati

gsum la skyabs su 'gro ba bdun cu pa

P5366, vol. 103

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madhyamakāvatāra

dbu ma la 'jug pa

P5261, P5262, vol. 98

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Chim Jam-b̄ay-ȳang (*mchims 'jam pa'i dbyangs* or *mchims nam mkha' grags,* died 1289 / 1290)

Commentary on [Vasubandhu's] "Treasury of Manifest Knowledge": Ornament of Manifest Knowledge

chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa mngon pa'i rgyan

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D̄a-drin-rap-d̄en (*rta mgrin rab brtan, tre hor dge bshes,* 1920-1986)

Annotations / Annotations for the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "The Essence of Eloquence": Festival for the Unbiased Endowed with Clear Intelligence

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Delhi: Lhun-grub-chos-grags, 1978.

Dak-tsang Shay-rap-rin-chen (*stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen,* b.1405)

Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence

grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho

Edition cited: Bir, Kangra, India: Dzongsar Institute, 2001; also, Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-bzang-stobs rgyal, 1976; and photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sangpo, no other data.

Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets

grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos

Edition cited: Bir, Kangra, India: Dzongsar Institute, 2001; also, Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-bzang-stobs rgyal, 1976; and photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sangpo, no other data.

Damṣhṭasena (*daṃṣṭasena;* attributed so by Dzong-ka-ba; some others identify Vasubandhu as the author)

[Commentary on] the Three Mothers, Conquest over Harm / Extensive Explanation of the Superior One Hundred Thousand Stanza, Twenty-five Thousand Stanza, and Eighteen Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras

āryaśatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃsatisāhasrikāaṣṭadaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā

yum gsum gnod 'joms / 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa 'bum pa dang nyi khri lnga stong pa dang khri brgyad stong pa'i rgya cher bshad pa

P5206, vol. 93

Dharmakīrti (*chos kyi grags pa,* seventh century)

Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition

1. *Analysis of Relations*
   sambandhaparīkṣā
   'brel pa brtag pa
   P5713, vol. 130
2. *Ascertainment of Prime Cognition*
   pramāṇaviniścaya
   tshad ma rnam par nges pa
   P5710, vol. 130
3. *Commentary on (Dignāga's) "Compilation of Prime Cognition"*
   pramāṇavārttikakārikā
   tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa
   P5709, vol. 130. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1974.
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4. *Drop of Reasoning*
   nyāyabinduprakaraṇa
   rigs pa'i thigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
   P5711, vol. 130
   English translation: Th. Stcherbatsky. *Buddhist Logic.* New York: Dover Publications, 1962.
5. *Drop of Reasons*
   hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa
   gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa

P5712, vol. 130
6. *Principles of Debate*
vādanyāya
rtsod pa'i rigs pa
P5715, vol. 130
7. *Proof of Other Continuums*
saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa
rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
P5716, vol. 130

Dignāga (*phyogs kyi glangs po,* sixth century)

Compilation of Prime Cognition
pramāṇasamuccaya
tshad ma kun las btus pa
P5700, vol. 130
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Examination of Objects of Observation
ālambanaparīkṣa
dmigs pa brtag pa
P5703, vol. 130

Summary Meanings of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra
prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha / prajñāpāramitāsaṃgrahakārikā
brgyad stong don bsdus / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin ma bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5207, vol. 94

Dzong-ka-ba Lo-sang-drak-ba (*tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa,* 1357-1419)

Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": Ocean of Reasoning / Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"
dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho / rtsa shes ṭik chen
P6153, vol. 156. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, n.d. Also: *rJe tsong kha pa'i gsung dbu ma'i lta ba'i skor,* vols. 1-2. Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1975. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.
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Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Mind-Basis-of-All and Afflicted Intellect: Ocean of Eloquence: Ocean of Eloquence
yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' ba'i gnas rgya cher 'grel pa legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho
P6149, vol. 154. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.
English translation: Gareth Sparham. *Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa's Commentary on the Yogācāra Doctrine of Mind.* Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": Illumination of the Thought
dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal
P6143, vol. 154. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.
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English translation (chap. 6, stanzas 1-7): Jeffrey Hopkins and Anne C. Klein. *Path to the Middle: Madhyamaka Philosophy in Tibet: The Oral Scholarship of Kensur Yeshay Tupden,* by Anne C. Klein, 147-183, 252-271. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Golden Rosary of Eloquence / Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization, Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom" as Well as Its Commentaries: Golden Rosary of Eloquence

legs bshad gser 'phreng / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rgya cher bshad pa legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba

P6150, vols. 154-155. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.

Great Exposition of Secret Mantra / The Stages of the Path to a Conqueror and Pervasive Master, a Great Vajradhara: Revealing All Secret Topics

sngags rim chen mo / rgyal ba khyab bdag rdo rje 'chang chen po'i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad rnam par phye ba

P6210, vol. 161. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.

English translation (chap. 1): H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-ka-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins. *Tantra in Tibet.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987.

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Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa

P6001, vol. 152. Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1964. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.

English translation: Tsong-kha-pa, *The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment,* vols. 1-3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 2000, 2003.

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Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers

sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel

Toh. 5416. Vol. tsha of the 18 vol. New Zhol Par-khang edition of the collected works of Tsong-kha-pa

Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Small Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment

lam rim 'bring / lam rim chung ngu / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa

P6002, vols. 152-153. Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1968. Also: Mundgod, India: dga' ldan shar rtse, n.d. (includes outline of topics by Trijang Rinbochay). Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.

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Praise of Dependent-Arising / Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising: The Essence of Eloquence

rten 'brel bstod pa / sang rgyas bcom ldan 'das la zab mo rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba gsung ba'i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad pa'i snying po

P6016, vol. 153. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.

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Also: Robert Thurman. *Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa,* 99-107. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982.

Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence

drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po

Editions: see the preface to my critical edition, *Emptiness in Mind-Only,* 355. Also: Ye shes thabs mkhas. *shar tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pas mdzad pa'i drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po.* Tā la'i bla ma'i 'phags bod, vol. 22. Varanasi, India: vāṇa dbus bod kyi ches mtho'i gtsug lag slob gnyer khang, 1997.

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Gen-dün-drup, First Dalai Lama (*dge 'dun grub,* 1391-1474)

Commentary on [Guṇaprabha's] "Aphorisms on Discipline" / Essence of the Entire Discipline, Eloquent Holy Doctrine

legs par gsungs pa'i dam chos 'dul ba mtha' dag gi snying po

Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dge-'dun-grub-pa. Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Lama Sangye, 1978-1981.

Explanation of [Vasubandhu's] "Treasury of Manifest Knowledge": Illuminating the Path to Liberation

dam pa'i chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi rnam par bshad pa thar lam gsal byed

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Great Treatise on Valid Cognition: Adornment of Reasoning

tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po rigs pa'i rgyan

Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dge-'dun-grub-pa. Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Lama, 1978-81.

Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o (*dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po,* 1728-1791)

Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland

grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba

Tibetan: K. Mimaki. Le Grub mtha' rnam bzhag rin chen phreṅ ba de dkon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po (1728-1791), *Zinbun* [The Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University], 14 (1977):55-112. Also, Collected Works of dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, vol. 6, 485-535. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972. Also: Xylograph in thirty-two folios from the Lessing collection of the rare book section of the University of Wisconsin Library, which is item 47 in Leonard Zwilling. *Tibetan Blockprints in the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections.* Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries, 1984. Also: Mundgod, India: blo gsal gling Press, 1980. Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1967. Also: Dharmsala, India: Teaching Training, n.d. Also: A blockprint edition in twenty-eight folios obtained in 1987 from Go-mang College in Hla-s̄a, printed on blocks that predate the Cultural Revolution.

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on the Autonomy School and the Consequence School: Shōtarō Iida. *Reason and Emptiness,* 27-51. Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980.

Presentation of the Grounds and Paths: Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles

sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan

Collected Works of dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, vol. 7. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972.

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Guṇaprabha (*yon tan 'od*)

Aphorisms on Discipline

vinayasūtra

'dul ba'i mdo

P5619, vol. 123

Gung-ru Chö-jung / Gung-ru Chö-gyi-jung-nay (*gung ru chos 'byung / gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas;* fl. most likely in sixteenth century, since he refutes positions like those of Paṇ-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba and Jay-dzün Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen)

Garland of White Lotuses / Decisive Analysis of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence": Garland of White Lotuses

drang ba dang nges pa'i rnam par 'byed pa legs bshad snying po zhes bya ba'i mtha' dpyod padma dkar po'i phreng ba

sku bum, Tibet: sku bum Monastery, n.d. [blockprint obtained by the author in 1988].

Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me,* 1762-1823)

Annotations / Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba's) "The Essence of Eloquence" on the Topic of Mind-Only: Illumination of a Hundred Mind-Only Texts

bstan bcos legs par bshad pa'i snying po las sems tsam skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba

Collected Works of Guṅ-thaṅ Dkon-mchog-bstan-pa'i-sgron-me, vol. 1, 725-876. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975. Also: Go-mang, n.d. [ed. printed in India with fixed type].

Difficult Points / Beginnings of a Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Quintessence of "The Essence of Eloquence"

drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel rtsom 'phro legs bshad snying po'i yang snying

Collected Works of Guṅ-thaṅ Dkon-mchog-bstan-pa'i-sgron-me, vol. 1, 403-723. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975. Also: Sarnath, India: Guru Deva, 1965.

Gyel-tsap-dar-ma-rin-chen (*rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen,* 1364-1432)

Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle" / Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Treatise on the Later Scriptures of the Great Vehicle"

theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i ṭīkka

Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 2 (entire). Delhi: Guru Deva, 1982. Also: Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 2 (entire). Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1981. Also: blockprint in the library of H.H. the Dalai Lama, no other data.

Explanation of (Shāntideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds": Entrance of Conqueror Children

byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad rgyal sras 'jug ngogs

Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 4, 3-331. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1982. Also: Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 4. Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1981. Also: Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973.

How to Practice the Two Stages of the Path of the Glorious Kālachakra: Quick Entry to the Path of Great Bliss

dpal dus kyi 'khor lo'i lam rim pa gnyis ji ltar nyams su len pa'i tshul bde ba chen po'i lam du myur du 'jug pa

Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 1, 89-203. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1982. Also:

Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 1. Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1981.

Haribhadra (*seng ge bzang po,* late eighth century)

Clear Meaning Commentary / Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization, Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom"

sphuṭhārtha / abhisamayālaṃkāranāmaprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛtti

'grel pa don gsal / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan ces bya ba'i 'grel pa

P5191, vol. 90

Sanskrit: Unrai Wogihara. *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā, The Work of Haribhadra.* 7 vols. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1932-1935; reprint, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1973.

Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a Nga-w̄ang-d̄zön-drü (*'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus,* 1648-1722)

Decisive Analysis of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization" / Decisive Analysis of the Treatise (Maitreya's) "Ornament for Clear Realization": Precious Lamp Illuminating All of the Meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom

bstan gcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi mtha' dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don kun gsal ba'i rin chen sgron me

Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa'i-rdo-rdo-rje, vols. 7-8 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973. Also: Sarnath, India: Guru Deva, 1965.

Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Error: Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate

drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i mtha' dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong

Edition cited: Buxaduor: n.d. Also: Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa'i-rdo-rdo-rje, vol. 11, 3-288. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973. Also: dga' ldan pho phrang [blockprint obtained by the author in 1987].

Great Exposition of the Middle / Analysis of (Chandrakīrti's) "Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate

dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs

Edition cited: Buxaduor, India: Go-mang, 1967. Also: Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa'i-rdo-rdo-rje, vol. 9 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973.

Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

grub mtha' chen mo / grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong

Edition cited: Mundgod, India: Drepung Gomang Library, 1999; rpt. Taipei, Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, n.d. [this edition is based on the D̄ra-s̄hi-kyil blockprint]; other editions: Musoorie, India: Dalama, 1962 [this edition is based on the Central Tibet edition]; Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzhad-pa'i-rdo-rdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973 [this is the D̄ra-s̄hi-kyil blockprint with some "corrections"].

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J̄ang-ḡya Röl-b̄ay-dor-jay (*lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje,* 1717-1786)

Presentations of Tenets / Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching

grub mtha'i rnam bzhag / grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan

Edition cited: Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970. Also: Lokesh

Chandra, ed. *Buddhist Philosophical Systems of Lcaṅ-skya Rol-pahi Rdo-rje.* Śata-piṭaka Series (Indo-Asian Literatures), vol. 233. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1977. Also: An edition published by gam car phan bde legs bshad gling grva tshang dang rgyud rnying slar gso tshogs pa, 1982.

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English translation of Svātantrika chapter: Donald S. Lopez Jr. *A Study of Svātantrika,* 243-386. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986.

English translation of part of Prāsaṅgika chapter: Jeffrey Hopkins. *Emptiness Yoga: The Middle Way Consequence School,* 355-428. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1983.

Jay-d̄zün Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen (*rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan,* 1469-1546)

General-Meaning Commentary / General Meaning of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Eradicating Bad Disputation: A Precious Garland

drang nges rnam 'byed kyi spyi don rgol ngan tshar gcod rin po che'i phreng ba

Edition cited: Bylakuppe, India: Se-ra Byes Monastery, 1977. Also: Sarnath, India: Guru Deva, 1965. Also: Lhasa, Tibet: par pa dpal ldan, 1987.

Presentation of Tenets

grub mtha'i rnam gzhag

Buxaduor, India: n.p., 1960. Also: Bylakuppe, India: Se-ra Byes Monastery, 1977.

Jetāri

Differentiating the Sugata's Texts

sugatamatavibhaṅga

bde bar gzhegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa

P5867, vol. 146

Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (*'jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho*); poetic name Mi-pam-ȳang-j̄en-gye-b̄ay-dor-jay (*mi pham dbyangs can dgyes* [or *dges*] *pa'i rdo rje;* 1898-1946)

Port of Entry / Treatise Distinguishing All the Meanings of (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "The Essence of Eloquence": Illuminating the Differentiation of the Interpretable and the Definitive: Port of Entry to "The Essence of Eloquence"

drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba gsal bar byed pa legs bshad snying po'i don mtha' dag rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i 'jug ngogs

bkra shis chos sde, India: 199-?.

Jinendrabuddhi (*rgyal dbang blo*)

viśālāmalavatīnāmapramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā

yangs ba dang dri ma med pa dang ldan pa zhes by ba tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel bshad

P5766, vol. 139; Tohuku, 4268

Jñānashrībhadra

Commentary on the "Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra"

'phags pa langkar gshegs pa'i mdo

āryalaṅkāvatāravṛtti

P5519, vol. 107

Jñānavajra

'phags pa langkar gshegs pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo'i 'grel pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i rgyan

āryalaṅkāvatāramahāyānasūtravṛttitathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra

P5520, vol. 107

Ke-drup-ge-lek-b̄el-sang (*mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang,* 1385-1438)

Compilation on Emptiness / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness

stong thun chen mo / zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed

Collected Works of the Lord Mkhas-grub rje dge-legs-dpal-bzaṅ-po, vol. 1, 179-702 (edition cited). New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1980. Also: Collected Works of Mkhas-grub dge-legs dpal, vol. 1, 125-482. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1983. Also: New Delhi: n.p, 1972.

English translation: José Ignacio Cabezón. *A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the* stong thun chen mo *of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang,* 21-388. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992.

English translation of the chapter on the Mind-Only School: Jeffrey Hopkins. *Ke-drup's "Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate": The Mind-Only School.* Unpublished manuscript.

Ornament for the Seven Treatises

tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel

Toh. 5501

L̄o-sang-ḡön-chok (*blo bzang dkon mchog*)

Word-Commentary on the Root Text of (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Tenets": Clear Crystal Mirror

grub mtha' rtsa ba'i tshig ṭik shel dkar me long: in *Three Commentaries on the* grub mtha' rtsa ba gdoṅ nga'i sgra dbyaṅs *of 'jam dbyaṅs-bẓad-pa'i-rdo-rje ṅag-dbaṅ-brtson-'grus*

Delhi: Chophel Legden, 1978

L̄ong-chen-rap-jam (*klong chen rab 'byams / klong chen dri med 'od zer,* 1308-1363)

Precious Treasury of Tenets: Illuminating the Meaning of All Vehicles

theg pa mtha' dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa'i mtha' rin po che'i mdzod

Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche, 1969[?].

Maitreya (*byams pa*)

Five Doctrines of Maitreya

1. *Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum / Treatise on the Later Scriptures of the Great Vehicle*

mahāyānottaratantraśāstra

theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos

P5525, vol. 108; D4024, Dharma vol. 77

Sanskrit: E. H. Johnston (and T. Chowdhury). *The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra.* Patna, India: Bihar Research Society, 1950.

English translation: E. Obermiller. "Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation." *Acta Orientalia* 9 (1931): 81-306. Also: J. Takasaki. *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga.* Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966.

2. *Differentiation of Phenomena and Noumenon*

dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga

chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa

P5523, vol. 108; D4022, Dharma vol. 77

Edited Tibetan: Jōshō Nozawa. "The *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga* and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅgavṛtti,* Tibetan Texts, Edited and Collated, Based upon the Peking and Derge Editions." In *Studies in Indology and Buddhology: Presented in Honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday,* edited by Gadjin M. Nagao and Jōshō Nozawa. Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955.

English translation: John Younghan Cha. *A Study of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga: An Analysis of the Religious Philosophy of the Yogācāra, Together with an Annotated Translation of Vasubandhu's Commentary.* PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1996.

3. *Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes*

madhyāntavibhaṅga

dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa

P5522, vol. 108; D4021, Dharma vol. 77

Sanskrit: Gadjin M. Nagao. *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya.* Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964. Also: Ramchandra Pandeya. *Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

English translation: Stefan Anacker. *Seven Works of Vasubandhu.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

Also, of chapter 1: Thomas A. Kochumuttom. *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. Also, of chapter 1: F. Th. Stcherbatsky. *Madhyāntavibhāga, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and Commented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 30 (1936). Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970; reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971. Also, of chapter 1: David Lasar Friedmann. *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā: Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes.* Utrecht, Netherlands: Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1937. Also, of chapter 3: Paul Wilfred O'Brien, S.J. "A Chapter on Reality from the Madhyāntavibhāgacāstra." *Monumenta Nipponica* 9, nos. 1-2 (1953): 277-303 and *Monumenta Nipponica* 10, nos. 1-2 (1954): 227-269.

4. *Ornament for Clear Realization*
abhisamayālaṃkāra
mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan
P5184, vol. 88; D3786, vol. ka; Dharma vol. 63
Sanskrit: Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, eds. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Prajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa-Śāstra.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 23. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970.
English translation: Edward Conze. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra.* Serie Orientale Rome. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1954.

5. *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras*
mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra
theg pa chen po'i mdo sde rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa
P5521, vol. 108; D4020, Dharma vol. 77
Sanskrit: Sitansusekhar Bagchi. *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāraḥ of Asaṅga* [with Vasubandhu's commentary]. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 13. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1970.
Sanskrit text and translation into French: Sylvain Lévi. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le systḷme Yogācāra.* 2 vols. Paris: Bibliothḷque de l'École des Hautes Études, 1907, 1911.

Mi-pam-gya-tso, Ju (*mi pham rgya mtsho, 'ju*)
Annotations on (Maitreya's) "Great Vehicle Treatise, The Sublime Continuum": Sacred Word of Mi-pam
theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi mchan 'grel mi pham zhal lung. Collected Writings of 'jam-mgon 'ju mi-pham-rgya-mtsho, vol. pa, 349-561.
Gangtok, Sikkim: Sonam Topgay Kazi, 1972.

Nāgārjuna (*klu sgrub,* first to second century, C.E.)
Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment
bodhicittavivaraṇa
byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa
P2665 and 2666, vol. 61; D1800 and 1801, vol. ngi
Edited Tibetan and Sanskrit fragments along with English translation: Christian Lindtner. *Master of Wisdom: Writings of the Buddhist Master Nāgārjuna.* Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986.

Five Stages
pañcakrama
rim pa lnga pa
P2667, vol. 61
Sanskrit: Katsumi Mimaki and Tōru Tomabechi. *Pañcakrama.* Bibliotheca Codicum Asiaticorum 8. Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies for UNESCO, 1994.
English translation of the introductory stanzas: Alex Wayman, *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977.

Praise of the Element of Attributes
dharmadhātustotra
chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa
P2010, vol.46; D1118, vol. ka

Praise of the Supramundane [Buddha]
lokātītastava

'jig rten las 'das par bstod pa
P2012, vol. 46; D1120, vol. ka
Edited Tibetan and Sanskrit along with English translation: Christian Lindtner. *Master of Wisdom.* Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986.

Six Collections of Reasoning

1. *Precious Garland of Advice for the King*
rājaparikathāratnāvalī
rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba
P5658, vol. 129; D4158, Dharma vol. 93
Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese: Michael Hahn. *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī.* vol. 1. *The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese).* Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1982.
English translation: Jeffrey Hopkins. *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland,* 94-164. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, 1998. Supercedes that in: Nāgārjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama. *The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses,* translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, 17-93. London: George Allen and Unwin, l975; New York: Harper and Row, 1975; reprint, in H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. *The Buddhism of Tibet.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983; reprint, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, 1987.
English translation: John Dunne and Sara McClintock. *The Precious Garland: An Epistle to a King.* Boston: Wisdom, 1997.
English translation of 223 stanzas (chap. 1, 1-77; chap. 2, 1-46; chap 4; 1-100): Giuseppe Tucci. "The *Ratnāvalī* of Nāgārjuna." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1934): 307-325; (1936): 237-52, 423-35.
Japanese translation: URYŪZU Ryushin. *Butten II, Sekai Koten Bungaku Zenshu,* 7 (July, 1965): 349-72. Edited by NAKAMURA Hajime. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Also: URYŪZU Ryushin. *Daijō Butten,* 14 (1974): 231-316. *Ryūju Ronshū.* Edited by KAJIYAMA Yuichi and URYŪZU Ryushin. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha.
Danish translation: Christian Lindtner. *Nagarjuna, Juvelkaeden og andre skrifter.* Copenhagen: 1980.

2. *Refutation of Objections*
vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā
rtsod pa bzlog pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5228, vol. 95; D3828, vol. tsa
Edited Tibetan and Sanskrit and English translation: Christian Lindtner. *Master of Wisdom.* Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986.
English translation: K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst. *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna.* New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.
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French translation: S. Yamaguchi. "Traité de Nāgārjuna pour écarter les vaines discussion (Vigrahavyāvartanī) traduit et annoté." *Journal Asiatique* 215 (1929): 1-86.

3. *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*
śūnyatāsaptatikārikā
stong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5227, vol. 95; D3827, vol. tsa
Edited Tibetan and English translation: Christian Lindtner. *Master of Wisdom.* Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986.
English translation: David Ross Komito. *Nāgārjuna's "Seventy Stanzas": A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1987.

4. *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*
yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā
rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5225, vol. 95; D3825, vol. tsa
Edited Tibetan with Sanskrit fragments and English translation: Christian Lindtner. *Master of*

Wisdom. Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986.

5. *Treatise Called the Finely Woven*
vaidalyasūtranāma
zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo
P5226, vol. 95; D3826, vol. tsa
Tibetan text and English translation: Fermando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti. *Nāgārjuna's Refutation of Logic (Nyāya) Vaidalyaprakaraṇa.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995.

6. *Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called "Wisdom"*
madhyamakaśāstra / prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā
dbu ma'i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
P5224, vol. 95; D3824, vol. tsa
Edited Sanskrit: J. W. de Jong. *Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ.* Madras, India: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977; reprint, Wheaton, Ill.: Agents, Theosophical Publishing House, c1977. Also: Christian Lindtner. *Nāgārjuna's Filosofiske Vaerker,* 177-215. Indiske Studier 2. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982.
English translation: Frederick Streng. *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning.* Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1967. Also: Kenneth Inada. *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.* Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970. Also: David J. Kalupahana. *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way.* Albany, N.Y.: State University Press of New York, 1986. Also: Jay L. Garfield. *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Also: Stephen Batchelor. *Verses from the Center: A Buddhist Vision of the Sublime.* New York: Riverhead Books, 2000.
Italian translation: R. Gnoli. *Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka Kārikā, Le stanze del cammino di mezzo.* Enciclopedia di autori classici 61. Turin, Italy: P. Boringhieri, 1961.
Danish translation: Christian Lindtner. *Nāgārjuna's Filosofiske Vaerker,* 67-135. Indiske Studier 2. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982.

Nga-w̄ang-b̄el-den (*ngag dbang dpal ldan,* b. 1797), also known as B̄el-den-chö-jay (*dpal ldan chos rje*)

Annotations for (Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a's) "Great Exposition of Tenets": Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought
grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor
Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964. Also: Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4 (entire)-5, 1-401. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983.

Explanation of the Obscurational and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets
grub mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo'i glu dbyangs
New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972. Also: Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vol. 1, 3-273. Delhi: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983.

Nga-w̄ang-l̄o-sang-gya-tso (*ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho,* Fifth Dalai Lama, 1617-1682)

Instructions on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Sacred Word of Mañjushrī
byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i 'khrid yig 'jam pa'i dbyangs kyi zhal lung
Thimphu, Bhutan: kun bzang stobs rgyal, 1976.
English translation of the "Perfection of Wisdom Chapter": Jeffrey Hopkins. "Practice of Emptiness." Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974.

Pa-bong-ka-b̄a Jam-b̄a-d̄en-dzin-trin-lay-gya-tso (*pha bong kha pa byams pa bstan 'dzin 'phrin las rgya mtsho,* 1878-1941)

Answer to the Translator D̄ak-tsang's Objections: Vajra Nodes
stag tshang lo tstsha ba'i brgal lan rdo rje'i gzegs ma
Collected Works, New Delhi: 1973, Toh. 6154

Pāṇini

Pāṇini's Grammar Sūtra
pāṇinivyākaraṇasūtra
brda sprod pa pāṇini'i mdo
P5914

Prajñāvarman (*shes rab go cha, pra dznyā wa rmaṃ*)
Commentary on (Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin's) "Exalted Praise"
viśeṣastavanāmaṭīkā
khyad par du 'phags pa'i bstod pa'i rgya cher bshad pa
2002, vol. 46
Puṇḍarīka, Kalkī (*rigs ldan pad ma dkar po*)
Great Commentary on the "Kālachakra Tantra": Stainless Light
vimālaprabhānāmamūlatantrānusāriṇīdvādaśasāhasrikālaghukālacakratantrarājaṭīkā
bsdus pa'i rgyud kyi rgyal po dus kyi 'khor lo'i 'grel bshad rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi rjes su 'jug pa stong phrag bcu gnyis pa dri ma med pa'i 'od ces bya ba
P2064, vol. 46
English translation of the first section: John Newman. "The Outer Wheel of Time: Vajrayāna Buddhist Cosmology in the Kālachakra Tantra." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin.
Sarvarvarman
Kalāpasūtra
kalāpasūtra
ka lā pa'i mdo
P5775, vol. 140
Ser-shül Ge-shay Lo-sang-pün-tsok (*blo bzang phun tshogs, ser shul dge bshes;* fl. in early twentieth century)
Notes / Notes on (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive": Lamp Illuminating the Profound Meaning
drang nges rnam 'byed kyi zin bris zab don gsal ba'i sgron me
Delhi: n.p., 1974.
Shāntarakṣhita (*śāntarakṣita, zhi ba 'tsho,* eighth century)
Compendium of Principles
tattvasaṃgrahakārikā
de kho na nyid bsdud pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5764, vol. 138
Sanskrit: Dwarikadas Shastri. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita, with the Commentary "Pañjikā" of Shrī Kamalashīla.* Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.
English translation: G. Jha. *The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntirakṣita, with the commentary of Kamalaśīla.* Gaekwad's Oriental Series 80 and 83. Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1937, 1939; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass, 1986.
Ornament for the Middle
madhyamakālaṃkāra
dbu ma rgyan
D3884, vol. sa
Edited Tibetan and English translation: Masamichi Ichigō. "Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra" in *Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle.* Michigan Studies in Buddhist Literature No. 1, edited by Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk, 141-240. Ann Arbor: Collegiate Institute for the Study of Buddhist Literature and Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The University of Michigan, 1989.
Shāntideva (*zhi ba lha,* eighth century)
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra
byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa
P5272, vol. 99
Sanskrit: P. L. Vaidya. *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 12. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1988.
Sanskrit and Tibetan: Vidhushekara Bhattacharya. *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* Bibliotheca Indica, 280. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1960.
Sanskrit and Tibetan with Hindi translation: Rāmaśaṁkara Tripāthī, ed. *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* Baud-

dha-Himālaya-Granthamālā, 8. Leh, Ladākh: Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989.

English translation: Stephen Batchelor. *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life.* Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979. Also: Marion Matics. *Entering the Path of Enlightenment.* New York: Macmillan, 1970. Also: Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton. *The Bodhicaryāvatāra.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Also: Padmakara Translation Group. *The Way of the Bodhisattva.* Boston: Shambhala, 1997. Also: Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace. *A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1997.

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Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (*shes rab rgyal mtshan, dol po pa,* 1292-1361)

The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning

ri chos nges don rgya mtsho

Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Sangyey Lama, 1976.

Also: 'dzam thang bsam 'grub nor bu'i gling, n.d.

Also: Matthew Kapstein. *The 'Dzam-thang Edition of the Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen Dol-po-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan: Introduction and Catalogue,* vol. 2, 25-707. Delhi: Shedrup Books, 1992.

Also: Beijing: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1998.

Condensed English translation: Jeffrey Hopkins. *The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning.* Unpublished manuscript.

The Great Calculation of the Doctrine, Which Has the Significance of a Fourth Council

bka' bsdu bzhi pa'i don bstan rtsis chen po

Matthew Kapstein. *The 'Dzam-thang Edition of the Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen Dol-po-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan: Introduction and Catalogue,* vol. 5, 207-252. Delhi: Shedrup Books, 1992.

English translation: Cyrus R. Stearns. *The Buddha from Dol po: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen,* 127-173. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999.

Sthiramati (*blo gros brtan pa,* fl. late fourth century)

Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) "Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes'"

madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā

dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel bshad / dbus mtha'i 'grel bshad

P5334, vol. 109

Sanskrit: Ramchandra Pandeya ed. *Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

English translation (chap. 1): F. Th. Stcherbatsky. *Madhyāntavibhāga, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes Ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and Commented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 30 (1936). Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970; reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971.

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Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) "The Thirty"

triṃśikābhāṣya

sum cu pa'i bshad pa

P5565, vol. 113

Sanskrit: Sylvain Lévi. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi / Deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā (La Vingtaine) et Triṃsikā (La Trentaine).* Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 245. Paris: Libraire Honoré Champion, 1925.

Tibetan: Enga Teramoto. *Sthiramati's Triṃçikābhāṣyaṃ (Sum-cu-paḥi ḥGrel-pa): A Tibetan Text.* Kyoto: Association for Linguistic Study of Sacred Scriptures, 1933.

Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) "Commentary of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras'"

sūtrālaṃkārāvṛttibhāṣya

mdo sde'i rgyan gyi 'grel bshad

P5531, vol. 108

Tāranātha (1575-1634)

The Essence of Other-Emptiness

gzhan stong snying po

Collected Works of Jo-naṅ rJe-btsun Tāranātha, vol. 4, 491-514. Leh, Ladakh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod, 1985

English translation: Jeffrey Hopkins, in collaboration with Lama Lodrö Namgyel. *The Essence of Other-Emptiness.* Unpublished manuscript.

Tu-ḡen Ḹo-sang-chö-ḡyi-nyi-ma (*thu'u bkvan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma,* 1737-1802)

Mirror of Eloquence Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Systems of Tenets

grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long

Sarnath, India: Chhos Je Lama, 1963. Also: Gansu, China: kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1984.

Vajragarbha (*rdo rje snying po*)

Extensive Commentary on the "Condensed Meaning of the Hevajra Tantra"

hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā

kye'i rdo rje bsdus pa'i don gyi rgya cher 'grel pa

P2310, vol. 53

English translation of the tantra itself: *Hevajra Tantra*, Parts I and II. Ed. and trans. D. L. Snellgrove. London: Oxford University Press, 1959

Vajrapāṇi (*phyag na rdo rje*)

Meaning Commentary on the "Chakrasaṃvara Tantra"

lakṣābhidhanāduddhṛtalaghutantrapiṇḍārthavivaraṇa

mngon par brjod pa 'bum pa las phyung ba nyung ngu'i rgyud kyi bsdus pa'i don rnam par bshad pa

P2117. vol. 48

Vasubandhu (*dbyig gnyen,* fl.360)

Commentary on (Asaṅga's) "Summary of the Great Vehicle"

mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya

theg pa chen po bsdus pa'i 'grel pa

P5551, vol. 112

Commentary on the "Sūtra on the Ten Grounds"

daśabhūmivyākhyāna

sa bcu'i rnam par bshad pa

P5494, vol. 104

Eight Prakaraṇa Treatises

1. *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes"*

madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā

dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa / dbus mtha'i 'grel pa

P5528, vol. 108

Sanskrit: Gadjin M. Nagao. *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya.* Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964. Also: Ramchandra Pandeya. *Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

English translation: Stefan Anacker. *Seven Works of Vasubandhu.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984. Also: Thomas A. Kochumuttom. *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. Also, of chapter 1: F. Th. Stcherbatsky. *Madhyāntavibhāga: Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes Ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and Commented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 30 (1936). Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970; reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971. Also, of chapter 1: David Lasar Friedmann, *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā: Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes.* Utrecht, Netherlands: Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1937.

2. *Explanation of (Maitreya's) "Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras"*

sūtrālaṃkārābhāṣya

mdo sde'i rgyan gyi bshad pa
P5527, vol. 108
Sanskrit: S. Bagchi. *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra of Asaṅga* [with Vasubandhu's commentary]. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 13. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1970.
Sanskrit and translation into French: Sylvain Lévi. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra.* 2 vols. Paris: Libraire Honoré Champion, 1907, 1911.

3. *Principles of Explanation*
vyākyhayukti
rnam par bshad pa'i rigs pa
P5562, vol. 113

4. *The Thirty / Treatise on Cognition-Only in Thirty Stanzas*
triṃśikākārikā / sarvavijñānamātradeśakatriṃśakakārikā
sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa / thams cad rnam rig tsam du ston pa sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5556, vol. 113
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